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Are the shareholders in Japanese governance mechanisms getting a benefit from the use of annual incentive plans?
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/119359
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/119359e41d4a80-deeb-4129-aa73-55b5b7be9cc4
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | Technical Report(1) | |||||||
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公開日 | 2013-06-13 | |||||||
タイトル | ||||||||
タイトル | Are the shareholders in Japanese governance mechanisms getting a benefit from the use of annual incentive plans? | |||||||
言語 | ||||||||
言語 | eng | |||||||
資源タイプ | ||||||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||
著者 |
OGAKU Michiko
× OGAKU Michiko
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抄録 | ||||||||
内容記述 | This paper studies the economic consequences of choosing two different types of executive compensation contracts. The analysis is based on a two-period agency model in which compensation contracts are subject to renegotiation; compensation is paid based on the agent’s earnings report (e.g. a performance-based contract) or a non-verifiable measure within the firm (e.g. a conventional implicit contract). According to the analysis conventional implicit contracts can dominate performancebased contracts if the non-verifiable measure is sufficiently informative so that the agent’s earnings report is not significantly considered during renegotiation. However, if the agent has strong bargaining power the performance-based contract is optimal. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the firms’ compensation policy may not serve as a useful test for identifying profitable firms. Second the combination of the compensation policy and the ownership structure is likely to be associated with the level of executive compensation. |
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書誌情報 |
発行日 2013-05 |
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アクセス権 | ||||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||||
出版者 | ||||||||
出版者 | University of Tsukuba. Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering. Doctoral Program in Social Systems & Management | |||||||
シリーズ | ||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||
関連名称 | Department of Social Systems and Management Discussion Paper Series;no.1306 |