@techreport{oai:tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp:00029106,
 author = {OGAKU, Michiko},
 month = {May},
 note = {This paper studies the economic consequences of choosing two different
types of executive compensation contracts. The analysis is based on a two-period
agency model in which compensation contracts are subject to renegotiation; compensation
is paid based on the agent’s earnings report (e.g., a performance-based contract)
or a non-verifiable measure within the firm (e.g., a conventional implicit contract).
According to the analysis, conventional implicit contracts can dominate performancebased
contracts if the non-verifiable measure is sufficiently informative so that the
agent’s earnings report is not significantly considered during renegotiation. However,
if the agent has strong bargaining power, the performance-based contract is optimal.
The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First,
the firms’ compensation policy may not serve as a useful test for identifying profitable
firms. Second, the combination of the compensation policy and the ownership structure
is likely to be associated with the level of executive compensation.},
 title = {Are the shareholders in Japanese governance mechanisms getting a benefit from the use of annual incentive plans?},
 year = {2013}
}