WEKO3
アイテム
Characterization of anonymous, weakly monotonic and strategy-proof aggregation functions
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/119694
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/11969477b95702-833d-4d0d-a9d4-178a2425d43b
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
---|---|---|
![]() |
|
Item type | Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2013-09-11 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
タイトル | Characterization of anonymous, weakly monotonic and strategy-proof aggregation functions | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | open access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |||||
著者 |
山本, 芳嗣
× 山本, 芳嗣× ZHOU, You |
|||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | This paper is concerned about the aggregation function which plays a central role in the majority judgement that was recently proposed by Balinski and Laraki as a new voting mechanism. We raise two issues about their aggregation function, named order function, and show that they are resolved by relaxing the strong monotonicity condition imposed on the aggregation function, and that the anonymous, weakly monotonic and strategy-proof aggregation function is completely determined by the set of final grades when the judges split deeply. |
|||||
言語 | en | |||||
書誌情報 |
発行日 2013-08 |
|||||
出版者 | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
出版者 | University of Tsukuba. Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering. Doctoral Program in Social Systems & Management | |||||
シリーズ | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
関連名称 | Department of Social Systems and Management Discussion Paper Series;no.1310 |