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Quasi-option value under strategic interactions
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/115461
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/115461f7085b27-5b0b-4657-b0b0-598f5f17f7e6
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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REE_34-1.pdf (166.6 kB)
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Item type | Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2012-03-06 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Quasi-option value under strategic interactions | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
Fujii, Tomoki
× Fujii, Tomoki× Ishikawa, Ryuichiro |
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著者別名 |
石川, 竜一郎
× 石川, 竜一郎 |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to various global environmental problems. | |||||
書誌情報 |
Resource and energy economics 巻 34, 号 1, p. 36-54, 発行日 2012-01 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 0928-7655 | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA1091348X | |||||
DOI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.09.002 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | © 2011 Elsevier B.V. NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Resource and energy economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, VOL34, ISSUE1, 2012 DOI:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.09.002 | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | author | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Elsevier B.V. | |||||
URI | ||||||
識別子 | http://hdl.handle.net/2241/115461 | |||||
識別子タイプ | HDL |