@article{oai:tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp:00018298,
 author = {花木, 伸行 and 石川, 竜一郎 and 秋山, 英三 and Hanaki, Nobuyuki and Ishikawa, Ryuichiro and Akiyama, Eizo},
 issue = {10},
 journal = {Journal of economic dynamics & control},
 month = {Oct},
 note = {application/pdf, This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little
knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not
only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The
model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma and coordination
games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at
learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy
higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one
player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others.
However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow
learners.},
 pages = {1739--1756},
 title = {Learning Games},
 volume = {33},
 year = {2009}
}