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Information channels in labor markets:On the resilience of referral hiring
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/100079
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/100079a1ee4367-8f50-45c7-8636-a471510eddd4
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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JEBO_66-3.pdf (377.0 kB)
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Item type | Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2008-07-31 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Information channels in labor markets:On the resilience of referral hiring | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
Casella, Alessandra
× Casella, Alessandra× Hanaki, Nobuyuki |
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著者別名 |
花木, 伸行
× 花木, 伸行 |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Economists and sociologists disagree over markets’ potential to substitute for personal connections. We study a model of labor markets where social ties are stronger between similar individuals, and firms prefer to rely on personal referrals than to hire on the open market. Workers in the market can take a costly action that can signal their productivity. The paper asks whether signaling reduces the reliance on the network.We find that the network is remarkably resilient. Signaling is caught in two contradictory requirements: to be informative it must be expensive, but if it expensive it can be undercut by the network. |
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書誌情報 |
Journal of economic behavior & organization 巻 66, 号 3-4, p. 492-513, 発行日 2008-06 |
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ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 0167-2681 | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA00257625 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.014 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | © 2007 Elsevier B.V. | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
値 | author | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Elsevier B.V. | |||||
URI | ||||||
識別子 | http://hdl.handle.net/2241/100079 | |||||
識別子タイプ | HDL | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf |