Chapter IV.   Canadian and Japanese Political Culture and State Power

1.   Introduction

The state in a capitalist economy operates not in a vacuum but within a broad socio-cultural framework. The political attitudes, beliefs, values of citizens in a polity affect state actions and some dominant cultural elements are repeatedly manifested in political processes. The basic aim of this chapter is, therefore, to identify statist and anti-statist elements in the Canadian and Japanese political culture which would affect the levels of state power and autonomy in the public policy process.[1]

There are two approaches to the study of political culture, one based on survey research and the other, an historical analysis of cultural traits which have affected the development of a polity. The following section uses both approaches to examine the Canadian and Japanese political cultures. As stated before, however, it is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject: rather it is superficial and selective as it is designed to brief those who are not familiar with Canadian or Japanese political culture.[2]

2.   Canadian Political Culture and State Power

As in many other countries, political culture in Canada differs considerably from one generation to another, from one class to another or between men and women and the young and old. Some point out that regional variations in political culture are so large that Canada does not have one political culture but many regional cultures.[3]

Yet, it is possible to identify a dominant political culture at the national level as much as at the regional level.[4]

Even at the national level, there are many dimensions to Canadian political culture. The basic ones include support for popular sovereignty, political equality, majoritarianism and liberalism.[5] Of these, the belief in popular sovereignty provides a broad base for a democratic form of government. In the governing process, all citizens are given equal opportunity for participation and when there is disagreement, majoritarianism makes majority views legitimate.

The Canadian democracy as a whole makes the Canadian state act in response to the preferences of the majority. The subordination of the state to the society is reinforced by liberalism in Canada which places supreme value on individual freedom, private ownership and property rights, the free market system and capitalism. Liberalism supports government intervention in the society only to the extent required to ensure these fundamental beliefs and values.

There are, however, many counterforces to these pluralist elements in Canadian political culture, including toryism, socialism, and corporatism. Toryism supports collectivism based on an organic view of the state and it increases state power. Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington explain this pro-state element in the following way:

> In the same sense that the feudal landlord feels responsible for the well-being of his tenants or serfs and their families, the Canadian tory feels a "noblesse oblige" toward the less fortunate members of society. The liberal assumes all people are born equal and that therefore all the state must provide is equal opportunity and justice will be served. The tory on the other hand assumes that all people are not equal and never will be so that the state must look after the genetically inferior members of society by providing redistributive social programs. This phenomenon, referred to as "red toryism" has meant that conservative politicians have often been willing to initiate economically egalitarian policies

which one might expect to be more exclusively championed by socialists.[6]

The "red toryism" is rooted in the history of both French and English Canada. On the French side, the Catholic church attempted to maintain traditions from feudal France against the waves of Anglo-American liberalism. on the English side, the United Empire Loyalists who immigrated to Canada after the American revolution brought anti-liberalist thinking with them to the country and this was supported by the subsequent immigrants. The tory element was manifested in the "Peace, Order and Good Government" clause of the British North American Act instead of "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of happiness."[7]

Canadian toryism has much in common with statism. William Christian, for instance, points out that "there remained within Canadian Conservatism an element that manifested itself in the form of a belief in the primacy of politics over economic, the view that it was the responsibility of the government, superseding all others, including those of the business community."[8]

The opposition of the "red tory" and liberal elements in Canadian political culture, according to Gad Horowitz, facilitated the emergence of socialism and has made this idea acceptable in English Canada while in the United States because of strong, unopposed liberalism, this idea was rejected.[9] The result is that socialism has been firmly instituted in Canada in the form of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) or its present body the New Democratic Party (NDP). George Grant, an advocate for the return to conservatism, notes the similarity between toryism and socialism in the sense that both support the view that there are state goals which are more important than the desires of non-state actors.[10]

Not as strong as toryism or socialism is the corporatist element in Canadian political culture, which also supports an organic view of the community and the primacy of groups over individuals. Canadian corporatism seems to have similar roots to those of toryism and occasionally has manifested itself in political processes. Van Loon and Whittington give several examples of this. One is Mackenzie King who advocated that community interests, and not individual interests, would be given paramount consideration.[11] Others include the United Farmers of Alberta and Ontario, the catholic church and the union nationale governments in Quebec, all of which advocated policies conceived in corporatism.[12]

Corporatism has not, however, influenced government policies in any significant manner, as Van Loon and Whittington write:

> (T)he corporatist strain is there in our political culture; it appears and reappears in party platforms, government programs, and individual proposals for reform of the decision-making apparatus of the political system; but it very seldom is manifested by positive action. Only in Quebec, where liberal values are less compelling, have corporatist ideas been significant for policy outputs and even there the persistence of such policies has been weak. generally as with conservatism and socialism, corporatism has been permitted only to tinge our political culture, to slightly qualify and to dilute the dominant liberal value system, but never to replace it.[13]

Therefore, corporatism has not been manifested in the Canadian political process as much as other political ideas like business liberalism, welfare liberalism and red toryism.

Louis Hartz, Kenneth McRae and Horowitz observe that the Anglo-Saxon democracies share all of the pluralist elements as mentioned above but that Canada stands somewhere in between the American political culture, in which liberalism prevails, and the British which has strong elements of conservatism and socialism. This means that the restriction set on the Canadian state by political culture is not as

severe as the limit imposed on the American state but is more severe than the limit set on the British government.[14]

The statist and pluralist elements in Canadian political culture are incorporated in the philosophical basis of political parties. There are three major political parties at the federal level in Canada, the NDP, the Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservative Party (PCP). There three parties support basic Canadian political values such as popular sovereignty, political equality, and majoritanianism.

In addition, these political values are mixed with other values in each party. The NDP, for instance, has deeply rooted socialist elements, the Liberal Party, liberal elements and the PCP, tory elements respectively.

Furthermore, each party is colored by some other strains. The NDP has radical, liberal and moderate socialist elements. The particular strain which dominates party policy depends on the combination of supporters and the leader.

According to William Christian, Liberals have two distinct strains. One is what he terms "business liberalism" and the other, "welfare liberalism." The former is a doctrine that historically and at present has a strong appeal among businessmen and those who support business interests." He explains that "(t)his doctrine takes the view, so eloquently enunciated in the nineteenth century by writers such as John Stuart Mill, that the state is the institution most likely to restrict individual freedom." Welfare liberalism, on the other hand, goes back to T. H. Green, a nineteenth-century English political philosopher. "Rather than fearing the state," Christian argues, welfare liberalism "look(s) to it as the most effective social institution available to free citizens from other forms of restrictions, including those imposed by large business organizations."[15]

Welfare liberalism entered into the official Liberal Party Platform in 1919 when King Advocated the introduction of a state insurance system to protect against unemployment, sickness, dependence in old age, and disability. King illustrated the difference between his belief and socialism in the following terms:

> It is the business of the state to play the same part in the supervision of industry as is played by the Umpire in sports to see that the mean man does not profit in virtue of his meanness, and on their hand that nothing should be done which will destroy individual effort and skill. Some may term this legislation Socialism, but to my mind it is individualism.[16]

Thus, welfare liberalism assigns to the state the critical role in the society of ensuring optimum conditions for individual activities. Welfare liberalism therefore is likely to increase state power while business liberalism is likely to decrease it in a society.

The philosophical basis of PCP includes the elements of "nostalgia, hostility to rapid change, and business liberalism" in addition to toryism. Of these, nostalgia is "longing for the past," which is also related to hostility to rapid change. While these feelings are universal human emotions, some conservative politicians occasionally exploit these sentiments for their electoral advantage. Of these, toryism and business liberalism are not logically compatible but their combination is not at all strange, which Christian explains:

> Like welfare liberalism and socialism, they can serve as useful allies. The business liberal can concede the maintenance of social hierarchy to toryism, and in return can expect that tory collectivism's view of the national interest will be strongly colored by the needs and interests of the business community. In deed no political thinker in the middle of the nineteenth century in Canada could have hoped to gain the electoral support of the property-owning electors without adopting liberalism in some guise.[17]

Thus, the PCP like the Liberal Party have both statist and anti-statist strains. This means that even when the PCP is in power it is likely that the state may be more

extensively involved in the socio-economic process if toryism rather than business liberalism dominates the party platform.

What the government can do is affected by the general attitudes of the public. According to empirical research, Canadians have a high voter turnout rate at election times, but most are not directly involved in the political process beyond voting. They prefer to watch what their elected MPs and state leaders do rather than become directly involved in the political process. For this reason, Canadian attitudes are termed "spectator-participant."[18]

This may be related to the fact that the two major Canadian parties, the PCP and the Liberal Party, have both statist and anti-statist political ideas and values which are deeply rooted in Canadian political culture. What the Canadian state does, then, depends significantly on the ideological orientations and beliefs of the leaders of the party in power.

Of all the three major parties at the federal level, the NDP would be most likely to expand the state's role in society if it could secure a majority in the House of Commons or if it can ally itself with another party to govern the country. It can also be said that whether the Canadian government is under the leadership of liberals or conservatives, there is a good possibility that state involvement and power may increase unless business liberalism happens to be the dominant force within the party. This question very much depends on what kind of ideologies and belief systems state leaders in Canada have, especially because Canadian voters are mostly "spectator participant" and seldom determine the substance of state policies.

3.   Japanese Political Culture and the State

For most of its history, the Japanese state system developed in isolation from the political traditions of the West. Individualism, liberalism, toryism, socialism or corporatism were all somewhat foreign ideas for the Japanese polity until the modern state was set up through the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The new state took the form of a constitutional monarchy.[19]

Since then, Japan officially began to import Western political ideas and institutions. The civil rights movement began in the 1870s, from which political parties were born in a modern Japan. In 1889, the imperial constitution was introduced as a gift from the emperor to its subjects and in 1890 a parliament with limited power held its first election through limited manhood suffrage. Western political ideas played a crucial part in these political developments in modern Japan.

Despite the importation of Western political ideas and institutions, the working of the Japanese state system has been deeply affected by its indigenous political culture. It is often argued that the Meiji state system was developed on the traditional Japanese family system called 'ie' (house or household). The emperor was the head of the 'ie' and the Japanese people were its members. Since the working of the 'ie' system explains many fundamental features of Japanese political behavior in the modern era, it will be useful to start a discussion of Japanese political culture by briefly examining the basic features of this family system.[20]

The following is a description of an ideal type: in contemporary Japan there may be no 'ie' which corresponds to this type in reality. To an extent, most Japanese become familiar to this notion of the 'ie' through socialization. Its basic features are hierarchical, male-oriented, paternalistic, anti-individual and collectivist.[21] The most

senior male heads the *'ie'* and gains supreme respect from the family members. In turn he is expected to provide for the basic needs of his wife and children. From this develops a structure of dependence *(amae)* of the subordinates on the head of the household.[22]

The *'ie'* is given supreme importance and individuals are considered only as its parts. Individual endeavors are highly appreciated only if they promote the collective well-being of objectives of the family or strengthen the family's position in the society.[23] Family members are highly motivated and encouraged to make achievements for collective goals and not for individual ambitions. Many Western scholars have observed a strong achievement drive in Japanese people.[24] Often this results in intense competition between families. This competition is reinforced by the strong sense of *'uchi'* (house) and *'soto'* (outs). One's own family is often strongly identified as *'uchi'* and others as *'soto.'*[25]

The ramifications of the *'ie'* system are numerous. Its notion extends in many ways into classrooms, schools, universities, business enterprises, political parties and so on. Japanese seem comfortable acting as part of a group and belonging to *'ie'* settings in society. They compete against rivals for the sake of their own group at the levels of community, school., university, company, political party, ministry, and so forth. They also tend to form factions within these organizations.[26]

The heads of organizations and factional leaders are often expected to act as *'oyabun'* in traditional settings which literally means 'in place of parents.' In fact their role is comparable to that of the head of the *'ie.'*[27] During elections voters, especially in rural areas where the *'ie'* system is well maintained, elect a candidate based on his ability as a community leader rather than according to party affiliations.

At the national level, this role was once played by the emperor, who was considered to be divine and reigned over his people. He was the source of legitimacy and many government actions were taken in his name. In the postwar era the role of the emperor was changed by the new constitution of 1947 which defined it as no more than "the symbol of the State and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people, with whom resides sovereign power."

The relationships within and between factions or organizations in Japan have similar characteristics to those found among the members of the 'ie.' Internally, they are often paternalistic, hierarchical and group-oriented in achieving goals. Factions compete against one another within the organizations. Yet, they are united in times of inter-organizational competition, in pursuit of the collective goals of the organization. Externally, as an organization they compete as a whole against other groups and there is a hierarchy between all organizations based on their relative resources and performance, which is subject to change. Intergroup or inter-organizational competition can be intensified in Japan because of the homogeneity of Japanese society. The overwhelming homogeneity of the society gives Japanese people the sense that they have the same opportunities as anyone else for obtaining higher positions in the society if they work harder than others.

The hierarchy in society is often viewed as a result of the relative endeavor of individuals and groups. At the same time, it is also believed that one's standing in this hierarchy can be improved by one's own efforts rather than being absolutely pre-fixed and beyond one's control. An exception to this rule is the seniority system based on age. Nevertheless, one can also see some sense of equality within the hierarchical human relationships. For instance, a forty-year-old MP is expected to pay

respect to elderly MPs but at the same time he is likely to receive respect from his supporters and younger MPs especially if the latter have not served in the Diet as long as he has. As he becomes older, more and more people would pay him due respect. Within his political faction or in the party, he may respect those in the senior positions but as he goes up the organizational ladder, he will gain more respect. Thus, the Japanese seniority system is in many cases an evolving system unlike the absolute hierarchy found, for instance, in the Caste system of India in which many members of the society have fixed hierarchical status. In Japan, one's standing in an organization may be improved by one's own efforts. For example, by demonstrating exceptional skills and ability or by dedicating oneself to the organization. Other factors, such as age, which are beyond one's control, but which affect everybody equally at various stages of their life, are also important.

The Japanese state is no exception to these trends in Japanese political culture and society In fact one may argue that like the head of the household it stands at the apex of the overall social structure. The state is expected to lead the people, protect them from various repercussions, establish law and order and advance the common good. In prewar Japan, the state and its citizens were regarded as a 'kokutai,' a national body politic. The Japanese state system was seen as an extended family with the emperor as its head and his subjects as its members. In the immediate postwar era, the state, which was still viewed as the head of the Japanese family, played a critical role in socio-economic reconstruction and development. Forced to conclude unequal treaties with Western powers, modern Japanese state leaders believed that inter-state relations were hierarchical and highly competitive and the struggle for power was the

norm. As a result they attempted to increase industrial and military might and Japan's standing vis-à-vis foreign nations in the international system.

The state system is influenced in various ways by the dynamics of the '*ie*' outlined above. The '*ie*' promotes a monist view of the state, which is a dominant element of the contemporary political culture. For instance, Robert Ward writes that "Japanese have traditionally adopted a monist view" that the government is "a supreme and exclusive form of social organization whose power and authority would, when legally exercised, override and control almost all competing claims." As he says,"(s)uch governments in modern times are apt to play a very positive and extensive role in their societies."[28] Thus, the concept of the '*ie*' has been a fundamental force in Japanese political culture which legitimatizes the dominant role of the state at the national level.

Such a view of the state by the Japanese was reinforced by the ideology of the Meiji state which subordinated private goals to state goals. Masao Maruyama explains this in the following terms:

> So far in our country what is private has never yet been accepted as being private. In this regard the author of *Shinmin no Michi* (The Way of the Subject) argues that "what we usually call daily life is, after all, the realization of the way of the subject and has the public (political) significance of making it the duty of the subject to support the providential work of the emperor. .... Therefore, we should subordinate our private life to the emperor and should never forget the spirit of devoting ourselves to the state." However, such ideology preceded the rise of totalitarianism. It was embodied in the structure of the Japanese state system. Hence, private concerns were considered to be either evil or close to it, and always produced a guilty conscience.[29]

The lateness of industrialization and the relatively underdeveloped state of private capital, management know-how and technology in modern Japan has also demanded strong state initiatives. The state established model factories in textile,

steel and other industrial sectors, and while it eventually sold them to private capital,

it maintained close supervision over the development of those important industrial

sectors.

Although the ownership of these industries was transferred into private hands,

together with management and technical know-how, industry kept close contact with

the state, and looked to it for guidance. As a result, the state's presence remained high

and the state exerted considerable influence over industry. Of equal importance is the

fact that as a result of such historical circumstances state intervention in industry was

hardly considered to pose a serious obstacle to the development of private capital in

Japan, unlike in the United States where capitalism has been developed under the

strong influence of liberalism and individualism.

The particular historical circumstances within which modern industries

developed in Japan formed a basis for a distinctively Japanese type of business-state

relations, which can be termed a special form of statism. Sydney Crawcour

characterizes this Japanese statism in the following terms:

> According to Marshall, the ethical foundation of classical free
> enterprises utilitarianism - that is to say the belief that the operation of
> choices based on individual utility or profit maximization produces the
> optimum allocation of resources - was regarded as unacceptably selfish
> in japan and some other socially more acceptable justification for
> business activity had to be developed in terms of service to the
> community and to the State. This striking difference in the rationale of
> Japanese capitalism went along with a special relationship between the
> modern business sector and the State, in which business was
> ideologically and, to some extent, financially dependent on the good
> will of the political establishment.[30]

His observation points strongly to the fact that there are dominant statist elements in

modern Japanese political culture. Those elements include a belief in the dominance

of state institutions over economic processes, the subordination of private activities to

public goals or to the state. Non-state organizations were dependent on the state's support for its existence and expansion.

Beyond the realm of business-state relations, survey research done by Bradley M Richardson has revealed that the state enjoys considerable autonomy based on Japanese political culture. Most Japanese voters feel that politics is interesting and relevant but "only small minorities of the electorate are inclined to assume active roles in public affairs or would participate in collective activities in order to articulate demands and influence politicians' decision." In this sense Japanese political culture can be also termed as "spectator participant" as in the Canadian case. In fact, there is a strong sense of ambivalence among Japanese voters.[31]

The combination of these factors in political culture increases the scope for the wide use of Japanese state power to intervene in the private spheres of life. Ward, for example, points out that:

> The concept of either individual or institutional rights as in any way removed from or immune to governmental control is completely alien to the Japanese tradition. No real or meaningful sphere of private decision or action was legally or theoretically recognized in japan until the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1947. It was generally assumed that government could do whatever in fact it had the power and the inclination to do. This right was qualified on occasion by authoritative statements as to how a virtuous ruler or government should deport itself, but these were often of more theoretical than practical consequence. Since 1947, the law has changed in this respect, but it takes time for legal changes to affect popular attitudes and behavior.[32]

There are, however, important signs of change in Japanese political culture in the postwar era. For example, according to a survey of Japanese attitudes, some twenty to thirty percent of the respondents expressed the view that the most important thing in their life is their family and children. Only a small percentage attach the highest value to the 'ie' and ancestors" or "the state and society."[33] This may be a

result of a drastic increase in the number of nuclear families, that is, those consisting of only a couple and their immediate children instead of traditional, extended families. The number of nuclear families exceeded extended families in 1964 and by the early 1980s about 60 percent of Japanese families were nuclear.[34]There are some other important signs that the ideas of individualism, liberalism and other Western political values are becoming increasingly accepted by the Japanese. For instance, the present constitution places a limit on basic human rights if they conflict with public welfare. Many liberal scholars insist that this limit should be lifted since such a limit may enable the state to unnecessarily exploit the private spheres of life in the name of the public interest.[35] Such a critical stance on this issue is supported by an increasing number of citizens. A majority of the Japanese believe that freedom of expression is an important part of the democratic process and support no restriction on expressing political ideas and opinions. Although a majority still thinks that there should be censorship on films and publications which may have undesirable effects on the education of juveniles, those who oppose this view increased from 11 percent in 1958 to 18 percent in 1980.[36]

More importantly, a large majority of the population now consider that the present constitution is good for the country. In 1952 only 18 percent of the respondents of a survey thought that the constitution was appropriate for japan while 45 percent disagreed. It was only early in 1960 that those who favored the present constitution began to exceed those who opposed it.[37]

Even stronger evidence for popular acceptance of the constitution is indicated by the strong support for the present status of the emperor. The ratio of those who support the present legal status of the emperor in surveys increased from 50 percent in

1958 to 73 percent in 1980.[38] Furthermore, the ratio of those who believe that his power should be strengthened decreased from 33 percent in 1958 to 4 percent in 1980. Postwar generations tend to support the present status of the emperor more than prewar generations and the population size of the former has naturally been increasing. Though indirectly, this evidence seems to indicate that many Japanese accept general Western political ideas such as popular sovereignty, political equality, majoritarianism and other democratic values which are embodied in the postwar constitution. They also seem to indicate that the Japanese are becoming more individualistic in their orientation. Increases in such tendencies mean that liberalism is growing in Japanese political culture. The rise of liberalism may work as a counterforce to the statist orientation of the traditional Japanese political culture.

4.   Conclusion

There are statist and anti-statist elements in both Canadian and Japanese political culture. In the Canadian case, however, the dominant element is liberalism. The prevalence of business liberalism especially limits the use of state power. Yet, there are counterforces against the anti-statist element. There are toryism, socialism, welfare liberalism and corporatism. This means that the Canadian state is unlikely to intervene in the private sector unless its state leaders are strongly steeped in toryism, socialism, welfare liberalism or corporatism.

On the contrary, the dominant element in the Japanese political culture is deeply rooted in the idea of the 'ie' which has a strong paternalistic, hierarchical, collectivist, and anti-individualist character. This has allowed the Japanese state to

play a dominant role in society. Nevertheless, there are some important signs of change which indicate the emergence of individualism and liberalism in Japan. They may work against the use of state power in the policy. Yet, the degree and speed of such change is yet to be seen.

From the discussion above, one may conclude that the use of state power is generally limited in Canada except possibly in an emergency or when its leaders have strong beliefs in the interventionist role of the state. On the contrary, in Japan, the exercise of large state power is generally expected and accepted. Accordingly, from the standpoint of political culture, the power potential of the Canadian state is usually not as great as that of the Japanese counterpart.

[1] "Statist elements" simply means those dimensions of political culture which are likely to increase state influence and autonomy in the policy process. The opposing forces are "anti-statist elements."

[2] There are many ways to describe different approaches to the study of political culture. For example, Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington classify them into three, survey research, historical analysis and institutional approach. In this study, institutional approach is treated as part of historical analysis. Van Loon and Whittington, *The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure, and Process*, Third Ed. Revised (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), pp. 93-94.

[3] See, for example, Richard Simeon and D. J. Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 7 (September 1974), pp. 397-497.; and John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures," *ibid.*, 7, 3, 1974, pp. 438-483.

[4] Michael A. Whittington, "Political Culture: the Attitudinal Matrix of Politics," in John H. Redekop (ed.), *Approaches to Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 138-140.

[5] Van Loon and Whittington, *op.cit.*, pp. 95-102.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[7] William Christian, "Ideology and Politics," in Redekop, *op.cit.*, p.126.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[9] Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Politics*, 32, 2 (May, 1966).

[10] George Grant, *Lament for a Nation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965).

[11] Van Loon and Whittington, *op.cit.*, p. 105.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[14] Louis Hartz (ed.), *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964). See also: K.D. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in *ibid.* Horowitz, *op.cit.*.

[15] Christian, *op.cit.*, pp. 123-124.

[16] As quoted in ibid., p. 124. For original, see, H.B.Neatby, "The Political Ideas of William Lyon Makenzie King," in Neatby (ed.), *The Political Ideas of the Prime Ministers of Canada* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1968), p. 125.

[17] Christian, *op.cit.*, p. 127.

[18] Van Loon, "Political Participation in Canada: The 1965 Election," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3 (1973), pp. 376-399.

[19] For a concise summary of the nature and structure of the government in prewar Japan, see, Theodore McNelly, *Contemporary Government of Japan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), pp. 1-25; and Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[20] I am indebted to J.A.A. Stockwin in the discussion of Japanese political culture in this section. See, Stockwin, *Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), pp. 22- 34.

[21] For a further discussion of the 'ie' see, Tadashi Fukutake, *Japanese Society Today*, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981); Joy Hendry, *Understanding Japanese Society*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1995): Nozomu Kawamura, "The Transition of the Household System in Japan's Modernization," in Ross E. Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto (eds.), *Constructs for Understanding Japan* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1989), pp. 202-227; Hironobu Kitaoji, "The Structure of the Japanese Family," *The American Anthropologist*, 73, 5 (October 1971), pp. 1036-57; Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972); and Kazuko Tsurumi, *Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before and After Defeat in World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[22] For the concept of 'amae', see, Takeo Doi, "Amae: A Key Concept for Understanding Japanese Personality Strucutre," in Takie Sugiyama Lebra and William P. Lebra (eds.), *Japanese Culture and Behavior: Selected Readings*, rev. ed.(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), pp. 121-129. For a critical analysis of this concept, see, Ross E. Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, *Images of Japanese Society* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1986), pp. 130-139.

[23] Ezra P. Vogel,, *Japan's New Middle Class: The Salaryman and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 156-158.

[24] See, for examples, George Devos, *Socialization for Achievement* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973); John Singleton, "*Gambaru*: A Japanese Cultural Theory of Learning," in James J. Shields, Jr. (ed.), *Japanese Schooling: Patterns of Socialization, Equality, and Political Control* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), pp. 8-15; and Thomas Rohlen,

Japan's High Schools (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).

[25] Nakane, *op.cit.*.

[26] J.A.A. Stockwin, *op.cit.*, pp. 31-32.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[28] Robert Ward, *Japan's Political System*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p.67.

[29] As quoted in Miyake Ichiro, "Yoron to Shimin no Seiji Sanka (Public Opinion and Citizens' Political Participation," in Miyake, et. al, *Nihon Seiji no Zahyo* (Perspectives on Japanese politics) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1985), p. 257. For original, see, Masao Maruyama, "Chokokka Shugi no Ronri to Shinri" (The Logic and Psychology of Untranationalism) 1956, pp. 11-12. The following section is based on the sources listed in Miyake, *op.cit.*.

[30] As quoted in and translated by Richard A. Boyd, "Government and Industry Relations in Japan: A Review of the Literature and Issues for Research with Particular Reference to Regulation, Restructuring, the Promotion and Adoption of New Technologies," a paper submitted to the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom, 1985, p.17. For original text, see, Sydney Crawcour, "Japanese Economic Studies in Foreign countries in the Post-War Period," *Keizai Kenkyu*, 30, 31, (January 1979), pp. 49-63.

[31] B.M. Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 29-64.

[32] Ward, *op.cit.*, p. 67.

[33] Miyake, *op.cit.*, p. 259. See also, NHK Hoso Yoron Chosajo, *Zusetsu: Sengo Yoronshi* (An Illustrated history of Postwar Public Opinion) (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Kyokai, 1982), pp. 12-14 and Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, *Daiyon Nihonjin no Kokuminsei* (Japanese National Character: 4th Survey) (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1982).

[34] Miyake, *op.cit.*, p. 259.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261. See, also, Naoki Kobayashi, *Nihonkoku Kenpo no Mondai Jokyo* (The Problems of the Japanese Constitution) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1964), p. 104.

[36] Miyake, *op.cit.*, 260-261; and NHK Hoso Yoron Chosajo, *op.cit.*, p. 133.

[37] Miyake, *op.cit.*, pp. 262-263; and Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, *op.cit.*, p. 485.

[38] Miyake, *op.cit.*, pp. 263-266.