

# Content Analysis of Japanese Prime Ministers' Policy Speeches: The political thought of Murayama and Koizumi

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**Abstract.** To date, Japanese political thought has been researched from the voters' point of view, their perception of themselves and of the political parties. In this article, I undertake to complement this research by analysing the political thought from the point of view of the government, more precisely the prime ministers. Using the textual content of 145 speeches by 25 prime ministers, starting from Katayama, Ashida, and Yoshida's second term and concluding with Koizumi's 11 policy speeches, I conduct a content analysis on all policy speeches by all Japanese prime ministers's at the National Diet history. After revealing the similarities and differences of the prime ministers in terms of their rhetoric, I discovered a categorization of four groups. In addition, I conducted a further qualitative analysis on the representatives of the two most recent groups, analysing the speeches of Murayama and Koizumi with references to Miyazawa and Nakasone. The analysis showed that the political thought of the prime ministers resemble that of the Japanese voters and not necessarily the western traditional ideological discourses.

**Keywords:** political thought, prime minister's speeches, content analysis, National Diet (Japan)

## 1. Introduction

A half century has passed since the decade of tremendous upheaval in the Japanese political structure and with the great sons of Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke now in the government, it is particularly opportune time to take a closer look at the political thought of the Japanese prime ministers and their rhetoric during the post war period.

Supporting examination of political thought in Japan, there is an impressive collection of long-term research conducted by the JABISS<sup>1</sup> and JES (Japan Electoral Studies) groups of political scientists that concentrates on Japanese voters' ideology, their perception of political parties and actual policies of the Japanese political parties (JABISS 調査 1976, JES 調査 1983, JES II 調査 1993 - 1996 and JES III 調査 from 2001). The research concentrates on voters, political thought and changes voter attitudes. However, the focus of the JABISS/ JES research does not extend to the perspective of the

government. Do the two poles, the people and the government, actually correspond? The within analysis concentrates on the political thinking of the prime ministers, as being on the side of the government and provides a complementary study to this previous research. Theoretically, the ideal situation would imply that these two sides are consistent with each other, as the positions of the prime minister should mirror – or at least not contradict – the general views and aspirations of the electorate. Is this the case in Japan, or does the prime ministers' rhetoric resemble traditional western discourses of ideologies? These two questions guide the investigation in this paper.

In the following section, I present the main arguments of the research conducted to date concerning the Japanese electorate, mainly referring to Kabashima and Takenaka (1996), Kabashima (2003), Taniguchi (2005) and Kobayashi (2005). I then analyse the policy speeches of the prime ministers with a focus on the two most interesting cases from the perspective of this research, namely those of Murayama and Koizumi, with certain references to Miyazawa and Nakasone.

## **2. Review of the Japanese voters' political thought**

According to the JABISS/JES research, Japanese voters have an accurate understanding of the ideological differences between political parties and their positions on the conservative (保守) – reform (革新) scale. Further, this research demonstrates that Japanese voters' self-image — whether a person considers oneself to be conservative (rightist) or reformist (leftist) — is also closely linked to the image of the parties and the voter's party preferences.

The original conservative–reformist cleavage had two scales. The first to emerge was the "old regime/security policy" axis. With the foundation of the Communist regime in China and the outbreak of the Korean War, American attitudes and expectations towards Japan changed dramatically. The conservative politicians who had been purged immediately after the end of the war, such as Hatoyama and Kishi, were able to return to politics and seek Japan's rearmament together with changing the peace constitution. Thus, starting from opposition to Yoshida's administration through Kishi's revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the "old regime/security policy" axis emerged focused on issues such as the Self Defence Forces (SDF), the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, constitutional amendments, and the status of the Emperor. Later, with the

"Income Doubling" policy of the Ikeda administration, the public's attention was drawn away from security issues.

In the 1960s, the Japanese economy grew rapidly and the standard of living improved, however, at the same time, initiatives concerning social overhead capital and welfare lagged. Yet the expanding economy also brought about pollution and environmental problems, which all together had an influence on people's political activities and participation. Here, the second axis of "welfare/participation/equality" took shape. According to Kabashima et al. (1996), a third axis of "attitudes towards neighbouring countries/Soviet Union" emerged in the 1970s, and in the 1980s, the Thatcher–Reagan–Nakasone era brought about a fourth axis of "neo-conservatism".

Dramatic changes in party politics in the early 1990s had a remarkable influence on the ideological self-perceptions of Japanese voters as well as on the understanding of the parties' positions on the right–left scale. After almost 40 years of intense opposition, the Socialists agreed to form a coalition government with the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), and within a month, changed their basic policy stances concerning the SDF, the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, nuclear power plants, and the Japanese national flag and anthem. No less important was the emergence of new middle-of-the-road parties, who garnered the votes of an ever-growing group of moderate voters and those who were disappointed and distrustful of the traditional parties (especially the LDP) due to a series of corruption scandals. In this situation, with the Japanese people becoming more moderate and with the emergence of new centrist parties, it was clear that party loyalty was weakening and the voters were changing their parties much like "one might change television channels" (Fujita et al., 1997, 3). As a reflection of this tendency, the sharp ideological distinction between left and right became more blurred and the position of parties, as well as voters' self-images, moved steadily towards the centre of the left–right scale.

Thus, in the 1990s, the basic conservative–reformist cleavage remained. However, there were all together six dimensions. The traditional old regime/security policy axis was divided into two separate dimensions. The first dimension included issues such as providing a stronger say in government for the emperor, strengthening the U.S.–Japan security relationship, centralisation, constitutional amendments, and, to a certain extent, the strengthening of self-defence capacities. The second consisted of strengthening self-defence capacities<sup>2</sup>, contributions to international

military endeavours, nuclear armament, promotion of nuclear power generation and constitutional amendments. In a similar fashion, the other traditional axis of welfare/participation/equality also was divided into two dimensions. The first dimension included money politics, social welfare, labour rights, and nuclear armament; whereas the right to strike, women's position in the society and labour rights constituted the second dimension. A new fifth dimension included issues concerning the liberation of the agricultural market (including rice) and subsidies for farmers. And finally, the sixth dimension included traditional neo-conservative issues such as self-reliance, public services, and small government.

In conclusion, Kabashima et al. (1996) point out that Japanese voters have an accurate understanding of the ideological differences of the political parties and their position on the conservative–reformist scale. The Japanese voters' self-image is also closely linked to their image of political parties and individual party preferences. In addition, voters appear to support a political party mainly because its ideology is consistent with their own.

At this point at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the ideological cleavage of reformist–conservative attitudes has become more multidimensional and the distribution is diminishing at the reformist end of the scale and growing in the centre and conservative sides<sup>3</sup>. Economic factors such as living standards and the current economic situation, which are proven to be very effective in explaining voter behaviour in the U.S., may not be strong predictors of Japanese voter behaviour. Taniguchi (Taniguchi 2005, Ch 2), researching voters' interests during elections from 1972 to 2000, points out that increasing or decreasing trends in voters' interests in two main issues —the economic situation and welfare—are independent from each other in Japan despite the expectations based on western European or American experience. Kabashima (2004, 109ff) explains this more precisely. Japanese voters were asked questions such as "Do you think small government is desirable even if the public services decrease?", "Do you think social welfare, including pensions and medical services for the elderly, is to be provided at the utmost substantial level?" (ibid. Figure 7). The responses show that the Japanese support both the spirit of self-help (traditionally considered the basic principle for the small-government argument) as well as welfare policy (often given as the basic principle for the big-government argument) with no feeling of contradiction. Welfare issues such as pension and medical care for the elderly —namely issues concerning people who are not working any more—are considered very important<sup>4</sup>. In contrast,

those people who are in the prime of their working lives are expected to be self-reliant. This implies that the small government–big government issue is not directly related to the traditional ideological right–left scale in Japan.

### 3. Content analysis of the Prime Ministers' policy speeches at the Diet

I analysed full length the policy speeches given by all the prime ministers of the National Diet history. The range of this survey is from Katayama, Ashida, and Yoshida's second term (as Yoshida served his first term as the prime minister in the Imperial Diet of Japan) and concludes with Koizumi's eleven policy speeches, all together 145 speeches by 25 prime ministers. I used two databases for this data: "The World and Japan" (世界と日本) (<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/>) and "Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet" (首相官邸) ([www.kantei.go.jp/](http://www.kantei.go.jp/))

There are two different types of policy speeches, namely, speeches that are given during the ordinary session of the Diet (施政方針演説) and speeches given during the extraordinary sessions of the Diet (所信表明演説). For the purposes of this paper<sup>5</sup>, I analyse both types. In general, the regular Diet session speeches are more official and are closely related to budget deliberations; thus, they tend to be rather long and provide in-depth explanation of current issues. By contrast, extraordinary Diet session speeches give the Prime Minister the option to express his personal views in more detail and elaborate on the issues for which the extraordinary session has been called. However, not all prime ministers follow this trend. For example, Miyazawa's speeches hardly differ from each other in this respect, regardless of their timing.

There has been a rich body of detailed research concerning presidential speeches in the U.S. For example, Cohen's 1995 study on state of the union addresses looks at policy implications covering almost four decades from 1953 to 1989. In addition, major research focusing on presidential inaugural speeches by Stuckey (1996) and Skowronek (1993) concentrate on the framework of institutions and structures. Other research concentrating on the impact of speeches has also been conducted (Wood et al. 2005; Ragsdale, 1984, 1996; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Cohen and Hamman 2003).

Compared to the U.S. and other countries, there has been little analytical research conducted concerning political speeches by Japanese political leaders. There are historical

characterisation of the times and personalities of the prime ministers (see, for example, Watanabe 2001) and interviews with prime ministers and outstanding politicians compiled in book format (see, for example, Naikakukanbo 1985; Takeshita 1990; C.O.E. Oraru Seisaku Kenkyu Purojekuto 2004; Miyazawa 1995; Nakasone 1996; and Kato 1995). However, speech compendiums and biographies lack analytical study and discussions of outcomes and tend to leave inferences for the reader to draw. Some research has been done on political language and the relationship between politics and words. However, this tends to concentrate on either singular words or short phrases (e.g. Ishida 1989) and is more in essay style (for example, Maruyama 1961 and Tsuzuki 2004). There has been some interesting content analysis on election pledges, for example, by Shinada (2000) and on history textbooks by Watanabe and Ito (Tsujimura et al. 1978). There is one content analysis study on prime ministers' policy speeches by Suzuki and Kageura (2006), however they analyse the speeches given by only two prime ministers (Nakasone and Koizumi) and compare the lexical diversity of the speeches without any qualitative research of the content. Therefore, in my study, I try to address the gaps in previous research and conduct a content analysis of all the speeches by all the prime ministers in the post-war democratic history of Japan and include some qualitative analysis.

I decided to take the starting point for the analysis from the minimal unit of analysis – the word in order to minimise the *a priori* influence of traditional ideological concepts<sup>6</sup>. If the speeches were coded based on traditional ideological terms, there would be the possibility of excluding and ignoring some important topics that are not easily classified by these terms. Thus, as the first step of the analysis, I used a Japanese-language program called "KHCoder" to obtain a frequency count of the words within the prime ministers' speeches. This first step serves as a general basis against which to compare each and every prime minister's word frequencies, and further, groups of prime ministers' word frequencies. As the number of speeches and the length of the speeches of each prime minister differ, I also calculated the percentage points of each entry (for more details concerning the methodology, see Reinem 2004 and Reinem 2005).

I then conducted a principal component analysis (PCA) and multidimensional scaling (MDS) using SPSS. PCA is used to detect the structure in the relationships between variables and to classify variables. MDS is used to uncover the underlying structure of data to detect the meaningful dimensions that explain the similarities and differences (Euclidean distances) between the investigated objects, i.e. in this research, between the

prime ministers/their rhetoric. The data used for the analysis includes all the speeches of all the prime ministers (from Katayama to Koizumi), calculated in percentage points ("total") and the margin difference of each of the prime ministers from the total (also given in percentages). In this way, the prime ministers who have given many speeches contribute more to the overall total than those with fewer or shorter speeches. This method is justified as it clarifies that a prime minister such as Nakasone (in office for almost five years) has had a greater influence on political thought than, for example, Hata (in office for less than two months).

The PCA of prime ministers' policy speeches during a period of almost 60 years in the Japanese parliament showed that the rhetoric of the 25 prime ministers have been too similar to mark any trends or deviations, given that the analysis returned only one combination of variables, i.e., only one principal component. This result can be explained by the fact that all speeches generally touched upon the same subjects—the economy, defence, foreign relations, etc. Further, this result also hints at the fact that the speeches have been written mainly by the bureaucrats in the Cabinet Office led by the Chief Cabinet Secretary<sup>7</sup>, thus the bureaucratic tradition is carried on despite changes in office. In order to verify this claim, further research on the Cabinet Office is needed, however this task is beyond the scope of the current paper. Finally, the one principal component may have been a result of the one-party dominant regime in Japan throughout post-war history<sup>8</sup>, which did not allow diversification in the speeches by prime ministers.

I further conducted an MDS analysis that helped to group the prime ministers into four main groups (see Appendix 1 for the MDS map). The first group is comprised of seven prime ministers from late 1940s to early 1970s and consists of Katayama Tetsu (1947-48), Yoshida Shigeru (1948-54), Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-56), Ishibashi Tanzan (1956-57), Kishi Nobusuke (1957-60), Ikeda Hayato (1960-64), and Sato Eisaku (1964-72). This group can be characterised by their use of words like "people" (国民), "parliament" (国会), "the state" (国家), "democracy" (民主主義) and "cabinet" (内閣), which occur more frequently than the average of the 25 prime ministers. A further distinction is that they also use economics-related vocabulary such as "industry" (産業), "production" (生産), "trade" (貿易) or "construction" (建設) more frequently. As they were in office during the period of state building after the Second World War, the issues of the government and economy were the main priorities. As politicians of that period faced the basic problem of state building, they were in most cases reluctant to use far-ranging concepts such as

"freedom", "peace", "wealth", "new", and "era". However, as some remarkable exceptions indicated, these issues were particularly sensitive, and the questions of freedom, relations with the U.S., etc. were handled delicately. The most suitable single keyword for this group is 国民 ("the people"); in contrast with other prime ministers in later years, these seven prime ministers used this word more frequently than the average.

The second group is smaller and consists of three prime ministers: Miki Takeo (1974-76), Fukuda Takeo (1976-78) and Ohira Masayoshi (1978-80). The keyword representing this group's rhetoric is "friendship" (友好), as none of the other prime ministers used it as frequently as those in this group. Other words that are characteristic for this group are "relations" (関係), "stability" (安定), "cooperation" (協力), and "mutuality" (相互). The only terms concerning economy that this group uses more frequently than the average are "business conditions" (景気) and "depression" (不況). The context shows that very often these two terms are connected to international issues, drawing attention to the fact that the depression is not only Japanese problem but also a predicament facing all industrialized nations. From this perspective, it is also natural to concentrate on terms such as cooperation, mutuality, etc. to engender a somewhat positive feeling in the audience combined with an emphasis on responsibility as a member of the global family of nations.

The third group is the largest one with nine prime ministers: Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-87), Takeshita Noboru (1987-89), Kaifu Toshiki (1989-91), Miyazawa Kiichi (1991-93), Hosokawa Morihiro (1993-94), Hata Tsutomu (1994), Murayama Tomiichi (1994-96), Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-98), and Mori Yoshiro (2000-01). The keyword for this third group is "society" (社会), as these nine prime ministers use this word more than the average. Other words used particularly frequently include "reform" (改革), "local area" (地域), and "problematic issue" (課題). It is possible to divide this group of prime ministers into three subgroups, the first being Nakasone and Takeshita, the second comprised of a group of three, namely Miyazawa, Hosokawa, and Murayama, and the final group being Hashimoto and Mori.

Finally, Koizumi Junichiro (2001-06) is included in the fourth main grouping along with Uno Sosuke (1989). Ashida Hitoshi (1948), Tanaka Kakuei (1972-74), Suzuki Zenko (1980-82) and Obuchi Keizo (1998-2000) are different from all other groups. Concerning Uno, however, it is not possible to make far-reaching conclusions on the



statistical findings as Uno gave only one speech in the Diet. The characteristics of Koizumi include his significantly frequent use of the verb "do" (する) (see Appendix 3 for the usage of "do") combined with his frequent use of the word "reform" (改革) (see Appendix 2 for a detailed list of Koizumi's characteristic phrases). His utilization of these terms appears to be rather opposite to the second group of Miki, Fukuda and Ohira. Besides "do", the verbs Koizumi uses often are all very active, strong, and positive words such as "advance" (進める), "aim" (目指す), "can" (できる), and "deal with" (取り組む). The analysis indicates that with the passage of time, prime ministers tended to increasingly use assertive verbs to add strength and intensity to their speeches. On the other hand, in Koizumi's case as well, as the results of a calculation of the component matrix of the top 200 words analysis show, the opposite of "do" is not "be" (ある) or not even "become" (なる), but "think" (考える) (see Reinem 2004).

To conclude thus far, as the results of the MDS indicated, we can recognize that the positions of the prime ministers are generally defined in terms of time and, considering the distances of the positions, we can divide the prime ministers into four tentative groups (see Reinem 2005 for further details of the characteristics of each group). Further, the characteristics of the groups were closely related to the political-economic situation during their respective terms of office. The first group is bound by the exceptionality of the period of the state-building process and democratisation immediately following the war. The second group has the characteristics that reflect the economic depression in the 1970s with an emphasis on international economic cooperation and friendly relations with the world's countries. The third group is comprised of prime ministers during the period when economic growth and LDP-led political stability triggered the need for social and administrative reform and consciousness of the people's role in political process. And finally, a fourth group can be characterized by Koizumi's five-year period of implementing various reforms. His singularity shown in this research, with the exception of Uno's one speech, reveals the possibility that he personally contributed to the process of speech compilation to a larger extent than his predecessors and relied less on the bureaucracy.

However, the within quantitative analysis did not show any characteristics of traditional major ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, and the like. Therefore, in order to delve into this perspective, I conducted a further qualitative analysis of the textual proportions of the speeches to understand the priorities and the contexts of how each

issue was presented. In the following section, I concentrate on two indispensable cases of prime ministers' ideology by examining the cases of Murayama and Koizumi. The case of Murayama is indispensable, as he has been the only socialist prime minister in the period of established and developed democracy in the post-war period and Koizumi is seen as representing traditional liberal discourse.

#### 4. Proportional analysis of the speeches by Murayama and Koizumi

Murayama was the first socialist prime minister in 47 years. Being in opposition for almost a half a century, the socialists/social democrats lacked the experience of governing. Their coalition with the LDP in 1994 was unthinkable only some years before and their policy positions continued to be wide apart. Due to this, in becoming prime minister, Murayama had to make policy concessions that weakened his position as he lost the coherent support of his party as well as traditional JSP/SDPJ (Japan Socialist Party/Social Democratic Party of Japan) voters.

As the results of the quantitative content analysis indicate, Murayama appears closest to Miyazawa and Hosokawa among the third group of prime ministers (Takeshita to Mori). Different from the other members of the group, they used the words "politics", "lifestyle" and "local area" more often and conspicuously used the phrases for "welfare" and "democracy" less often than the average. At the same time, Murayama, together with Hosokawa and Hata, used the word "reform" more often than the average, ranking alongside LDP reformists such as Nakasone and Koizumi.

For the proportional analysis, I coded the speeches on a sentence-by-sentence basis while at the same time considering the context. The results show that Murayama spends a great deal of time and space reflecting on foreign policy (see Table 1). This fact in itself is not unusual. However, the extent to which he pays attention to foreign issues is remarkable, being 30.43 per cent of the total (in comparison, Koizumi refers to foreign policy in only 17.52 per cent of his speeches).

**Murayama's Foreign Policy.** Taking a closer look at Murayama's stance on foreign issues, in general, he comments on international affairs in the paragraphs concerning foreign policy issues as well as in the introductions of his speeches. At the start of the introduction of his first speech<sup>9</sup>, he draws an ideologically conscious parallel between the end of American-

Table 1. Proportional categorization of Murayama's speeches

Categories	Percentage of the Total
Foreign policy	30.43%
Reforms	19.20%
Introduction	13.96%
Economy	12.28%
Society	8.24%
Conclusion	3.64%
New ideas	3.57%
Safety	3.30%
Regional	2.60%
Education	1.76%
Environment	1.02%

style cold war capitalism versus Soviet-led socialist opposition and the decades-long opposition of the LDP to his own JSP. The actual foreign policy paragraphs are especially long in his first speech. Generally, in his speeches, foreign policy issues are divided into three main parts. First, he concentrates on global problems, world peace and stability, and the need for Japan to play a bigger role in solving these issues. He depicts Japan as a "nation of peace"<sup>10</sup> (*passim*), being the "only country to have been the target of nuclear attack" (first speech), and to have learned from the "errors of our history"/"painful experiences" (second and third speeches). Especially in the first speech, he uses very lofty wording such as "as a nation of peace...we must posit a world without armaments as mankind's ultimate aim and must convey to future generations our vow never again to tread to the road to military power"; and "...[E]nvironmental conservation, human rights, refugees, population, narcotics, and other global issues are increasingly important in the quest for caring for all humankind". His most obvious concern when iterating these thoughts is naturally his JSP's long-term stance as a pacifist party, historically opposing the SDF and the security treaty with the U.S., strongly advocating the "three non-nuclear principles" (no production, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory), and maintaining strict limitations on military spending. As a coalition partner with the LDP, Murayama made concessions and declared in his first speech "I will firmly maintain the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. On the Self Defence Forces, I will persistently maintain an exclusively defence-oriented policy, study our defence posture for the future considering changes in the international situation, and work to build the necessary minimum defence capability". He continues with a thought repeated in his later speeches, that "The era of East–West confrontation backed by massive military

force having ended, now is the time for Japan to marshal its economic and technological capacities to make an even greater contribution to the resolution of the mutual distrust, poverty and other problems that underlie international conflict". In the second speech, he again emphasises the changed international situation, saying, "As regards Japan's own defence capability, taking into account the changes in the international situation since the end of the Cold war and adhering to its exclusively defence-oriented policy, Japan will keep up its efforts to have the necessary minimum defence capability consistent with Japan's hopes for global disarmament and its goal of being a nation of peace". Also in his following speeches, he combines the two issues of the role of the SDF and the end of the Cold war as well as nuclear disarmament/non-proliferation and the end of Cold war.

Thus, Murayama starts with addressing international issues and problems that concern humankind and makes very lofty and ideologically conscious remarks concerning the changed international order. These remarks on the changes of the international situation often serve as a sort of justification for the dramatic changes in his and the JSP's long-term policy positions.

After stating his concern regarding world peace and prosperity in general, Murayama goes on to discuss regional conflicts (such as those in former Yugoslavia and the Middle East), the role of the SDF and the related legislation, and the role of the United Nations.

The third main part is dedicated to relations with Asian countries as well as development and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He expresses his remorse by saying, for example, "...I recognise anew that Japan's past actions, including aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable sufferings and sorrow for many people in this [Asia-Pacific] region and I intend to make every effort, based on my deep remorse, to build world peace in line with my antiwar commitment" (first speech). In the second speech, he says, "Japanese acts of aggression and colonial rule during that period in our history not only claimed numerous victims here in Japan, but also left the people in neighbouring Asian countries and elsewhere with scars that remain even today", and makes similar comments in the third speech. He then touches upon relations with the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Korean Peninsula, and relations with China and Russia. Conspicuously, in his fourth speech, he does not express his heartfelt remorse to the Asian nations. Instead, he mentions briefly the issue of "comfort women" (in

the same sentence with the victims of the nuclear bombings and other "issues arisen from the war") in the introduction. And later, in the section concerning Asia–Pacific development, Murayama concentrates on the forthcoming APEC Economic Leaders' and Ministerial Meeting in Osaka by referring to mainly economic issues such as promotion of trade and investment, and economic and technical cooperation.

Yet Murayama never initially mentions relations with the U.S. and Europe, but rather leaves these topics mainly until the end of his foreign policy sections. In the third and fourth speeches, the paragraphs concerning relations with the U.S. are somewhat longer and more precise than in the first two speeches. In the third speech, Murayama explains the results of the summit meeting with former U.S. President Bill Clinton, including issues such as the U.S.–Japan security arrangement, cooperation for APEC success, and support for women in development.

Taken together, the foreign policy sections in the speeches indicate that Murayama must have been very conscious of the traditional Japanese ideological axis concerning defence issues, relations with the United States, and the role of the SDF. Although recognising the SDF and the security arrangements with the U.S., he reiterates the Japanese role as the nation of peace, concentrating on global problems such as poverty, refugees, regional conflicts, and always directs his attention to nuclear disarmament issues. His first speech is by far the most ideologically oriented, and the final fourth speech the least, lacking the socialist touch of apologies to Asian nations and long passages on world peace and prosperity. In a way, the fourth speech, given just approximately three months before resigning his post to Hashimoto, was Murayama's most conservative, specific, and concrete speech, clearly different from the lofty wording and style of his first speech.

**Murayama's Reform Policies.** After foreign policy issues, the second most widely addressed topic is reform comprising 19.2 per cent of the total (compared with Koizumi's 14.76 per cent). The most compelling issue here is deregulation coupled with decentralisation. In the third speech, Murayama states, "To sum up the thrust reform in a single phrase, it is a shift from the public to the private sector, from the national to the local (「官から民へ、国から地方へ」). In the relationship between the public and the private sectors this means deregulation, in the relationship between the national and the local, it means decentralisation, and from the standpoint of ensuring

popular trust it means promoting freer access to government information..." Earlier in the speech, he had pointed to "administrative systems that once sustained Japan's post war development today engender distortions making it impossible to respond to society's needs by simply following the old ways". Similarly, in the first speech, he says, "It is imperative that we review our ossified social arrangements and institute drastic reforms responsive to the historic changes under way". Thus, he describes the situation at the time as something utterly outdated and rigid, and therefore unsuitable for the years approaching the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In order to improve the situation, deregulation was indispensable together with transparency and decentralisation. In addition, he naturally emphasises political reform.

Murayama further focuses on fiscal and tax reforms. It is impressive how he in one breath mentions the welfare society on one hand and tax cuts on the other. Discussing deregulation and administrative, fiscal, and tax reforms in the first speech, he says, "to achieve a vigorous and comfortable welfare society...I will work, within the context of tax reform including tax cuts in fiscal 1995 and beyond..." He later explains his intentions to reform the tax system to ensure that the tax burden be more equitably shared.

**Murayama's Economic and Social Policies.** In the traditional left–right or small government–big government thinking, two fields of issues are most telling, namely economic policies and social (welfare) policies. In the case of Murayama, text concerning the economy accounts for 12.28 per cent and social policies, 8.24 per cent (which are similar to Koizumi's 13.15 per cent and 8.89 per cent, respectively. It is remarkable, though, that the amount of text that Koizumi devotes to social issues is larger). Text concerning the Hanshin–Awaji Great Earthquake and the shocking Aum Shinrikyo terrorist incident contribute a great deal to the total percentage in the social policy sections. Thus, aside from these two concrete issues, the social aspect in Murayama's speeches would drop even further. In the sections concerning those two topics, it is difficult to find any reciprocity or correlation. Murayama often discusses economic policy in the light of reform, especially in his earlier speeches. He shortly introduces the state of economy and then goes on to explain his reform policies.

Another trend in the paragraphs on economic policies is to create a link to future prospects and ideals, to introduce what I coded as "new ideas". These are new ideas not

in the sense that they were unheard of but rather that they are new ideas because they cannot be easily classified or coded within traditional concepts such as the economy, society, or foreign policy categories. Further, they do not easily fit into the traditional ideological divisions of left–right or progressive–conservative. These "new ideas" touch on issues such as innovation, information technology, advancing research and development, and other ideas. They are discussed in the light of economic recovery and progress, simultaneously linking to reforming society, the economy, and government, as well as linking to the education field. For example, Murayama emphasises that "creative cutting-edge science and technology, advanced information communications, and the rest are all intellectual assets sustaining a countries future and they constitute the foundations from whence are born affluent standards of living and sophisticated industries" (fourth speech). Similarly, in the first speech, he says, "If we are to maintain Japan's economic vigour and create new jobs for the future, it will be necessary to foster new industries that are technology- and creativity-intensive and to push back economic frontiers. Promoting the greater use of information is particularly important for its potential for altering the traditional movement of people and products and radically transforming home lifestyles and corporate activity...Likewise, the education of our young people and the promotion of science and technology are extremely important if we are to ensure that Japanese society is truly creative and truly dynamic in the future".

We can see that Murayama does not deliberate long over the state of economy with keywords like the current fiscal budget or concrete problems with solutions. Rather, he tends to proceed to more ambiguous descriptions of reforming the economic structure through deregulation and introduce future ideals or "new ideas" of using information technology and science to "push back economic frontiers", to improve people's standard of living, and to strengthen international cooperation. In other words, Murayama is eager to explain his vision of Japan's future socio-economic structure and the reforms needed as means to achieve this vision, and dedicates less time to immediate economic problems and concrete economic policies.

There is a further key theme in the traditional left–right division, namely that of social policy issues. As pointed out earlier, the socialist Prime Minister spends only slightly over eight per cent of his speech text to issues concerning society. The key word here is "caring", used most often in "caring government", but also in "caring community", "caring country", "caring society", "caring individuals", and "caring education". The

core concept of his caring government, as he says in the third speech, "is to create a society in which all people, regardless of their standing or situation, can support each other and can enjoy fair and rewarding lives with their human rights respected". He repeats the aim of people living at peace with their minds at ease, living stress-free lives, growing old without fear, children growing up safely, and everybody including the infirm and the disabled participating in society as independent individuals to the best of their abilities. In all but his fourth speech, he also discusses women's participation in society and his aim to create a society of gender equality.

When considering his social policy sections from the traditional ideological point of view, the second speech is the most interesting. He starts by saying, "We have worked with all our might pursuit of affluence, yet who among us can deny that, as a result, we may have tended to err on the side of profit maximisation and thinking in purely material terms?" This could be a perfect introduction for a small-government versus big-government discussion, with the emphasis on the need for big-government welfare programs. However, Murayama continues, "I believe the essence of creating a caring government lies in working to create a society in which each and every individual's human rights are respected..." Thus, he does not give any credit for the traditional cleavage and instead emphasises an individual's human rights, which is usually referred to when supporting liberal socio-economic policies. Actually, in all of his speeches, he emphasises the word "individual", with "individual self-responsibility" added in the fourth speech. Thus, somewhat unexpectedly, Murayama reveals his very liberal views concerning the individual's position in society.

Another interesting phrase is included in the same "caring society" paragraph of the second speech. Right after the rhetorical question on the pursuit of affluence and the introduction of a caring government for an individual's human rights, Murayama continues, "Accordingly, we are working to restructure pensions, medical care, welfare and other social security provisions..." This short passage hints further at Murayama's evasive and ambiguous perception of the general idea of the welfare state/big government versus individual liberties/small government. In this sentence, the "social security provisions" are "pensions, medical care, and welfare"; however, in the western tradition, "welfare" is itself a general term which includes pensions, medical care, unemployment insurances etc. Thus, if one would be conscious of the social democratic thought, this passage would sound, "pensions, medical care, /.../ and other



welfare provisions". However, Murayama uses it in a narrow sense<sup>11</sup>, just enumerating the problem issues Japan will face in the era of fewer children and more old people.

To conclude, in Murayama's policy speeches, there is too little evidence of his concern for welfare policies that would presume big government and tax-redistribution policies. In his discussions about economic as well as social issues, he provides an attractive idea of a caring society where human rights and freedoms are protected, people live with peace of mind, and advances in sciences and technology can create new markets and push back economic frontiers. However, there are no concrete policy proposals or even any appeals for the need for welfare budget and policies. Additionally, the curious wordings quoted above, such as "lower taxes to achieve a welfare society" reveal his lack of consciousness of the traditional ideological cleavage of left–right positions in domestic policy.

On the other hand, the way Murayama presents his ideas concerning international affairs and foreign policy is very much in tune with the Japanese voters' ideological perceptions as discussed earlier. Having made policy concessions to build the coalition with the LDP, he is very sensitive regarding defence issues and Japan's role in the world as a "nation of peace". Murayama shows his concern about general international problems like world peace and regional conflicts, poverty, and refugees. Further, he dedicates long passages to Asia and ASEAN, including apologies to the Asian people for the colonial and Second World War era. The first speech reveals to the largest extent how Murayama considers Japanese ideological perceptions and the expectations of Japanese voters (or JSP voters, to be more precise). Yet the last speech lacks the ideological touch and omits some paragraphs that are present in all other speeches of Murayama, such as apologies to Asian nations or gender equality and women's participation issues.

At this point, it is also interesting to take a quick look at Miyazawa's rhetoric as he represented the traditional LDP stance and at the same time appeared closest to Murayama, as shown in the foregoing quantitative analysis. A proportional analysis of Miyazawa's speeches shows similar general trends with some telling differences. The most important similarity is the extent to which Miyazawa dedicates his speech space and time to foreign policy (36.99 per cent). Also, similar to Murayama, he discusses international issues in the introduction as well as the actual sections regarding foreign

affairs. However, the content is somewhat different from Murayama, as Miyazawa maintains the traditional LDP position concerning relations with the U.S. and security arrangements. Therefore, Miyazawa discusses much more in detail the relations with the U.S. and somewhat less the relations with other Asian countries than Murayama. Further, similar to Murayama, Miyazawa also discusses a very wide range of issues in addition to bilateral relations with different countries, such as refugees, local conflicts, diseases, and the environment. Thus, it is possible to distinguish two different sets of vocabulary that Murayama and Miyazawa use to discuss international affairs issues. The first set places great emphasis on various sovereign states and regions, international organizations, and conspicuous repetition of the phrase "system/order" (秩序) by Miyazawa in an international context. The other set of vocabulary terms includes words such as "humankind", "prosperity", "environment", "peace", and "contribution" that have a connotation to universal global issues concerning humans in general and not individual states and their relations.

Certainly, it would seem somewhat surprising if Miyazawa did not pay special attention to these issues after the tremendous changes in the world order in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the extent and passion with which Miyazawa treats these issues indicate his great interest in international affairs. At the same time, these major changes in the international arena offer him a convenient chance to diffuse people's attention from difficult and scandal-ridden domestic affairs.

In Murayama's case, the second most often discussed topic was "reform" (19.2 per cent). However, in comparison, most remarkably, Miyazawa dedicates only 9.27 per cent to reform. Major themes within this area include political reform, the Sagawa Kyubin and Recruit scandals, the cost of elections, and public trust. Thus, contrary to the traditional opposition member Murayama, Miyazawa of the mainstream LDP was not in a position to advocate reform, which would weaken the very organisation that was supporting him. The second most often discussed topic in Miyazawa's case is society with 14.35 per cent (the JSP's Murayama dedicated only 8.24 per cent of his total speech text to social issues). Miyazawa introduces his "Japan – A Great Country to Live" (see Table 2) policy in detail, referring to housing, shorter working hours, and women's position in the society.

Among the issues in this vision, Miyazawa seems most concerned with housing

Table 2. The vision "Japan – A Great Country to Live"

Miyazawa's vision of Japan as "A Great Country to Live" (生活大国)
1. Improving housing and living conditions
2. Reducing working hours to enable people to have more free time
3. Promoting elderly and handicapped people to fully participate in society
4. Securing equal status for women in society
5. Making efforts towards the balanced development of urban and local areas
6. Promoting education, the arts, and sports

conditions, including land prices and taxes, and he aims to create a situation where "an ordinary wage owner [can] buy quality housing within a major metropolitan area for about five times his or her annual income" (the fourth speech, with similar wording in the third speech).

In conclusion, both Murayama and Miyazawa dedicate an extensive amount of space in their speeches to foreign policy issues, including such widely shared problems as refugees, poverty, world peace, and regional conflicts. They both also mention bilateral relations with a variety of countries from all regions. However, different from Miyazawa, Murayama appears very conscious of the traditional Japanese right-left ideological cleavage concerning relations with the U.S., the status of the SDF, and relations with other Asian countries. Further, while Miyazawa concentrates more on social issues, Murayama advocates reform. From the traditional ideological discourse of the socialist/social democratic line emphasising big government and a larger tax burden for more extensive welfare policies, one might have expected Murayama to concentrate more on the social issues, being the first socialist prime minister in decades. While from Miyazawa, who finally turned out to be the last LDP prime minister whose party did not have coalition partners, one would have expected more discussion of reform, such as reform of the LDP, of bureaucracy, of political structure, or of the electoral system. However, Miyazawa, having had a brilliant career in the bureaucracy as well as in the party, evidently found it too complicated to criticise either and thus emphasise the need to reform those institutions. Yet in contrast, Murayama seemed conscious of the ideological cleavage inherent in the Japanese system.

Koizumi. The quantitative analysis pointed to Koizumi's singularity: His position was far apart from each of the other three groups of prime ministers in the multidimensional scaling. The closest group to him however is the third group with prime ministers from Nakasone through Mori. His keywords were "reform" and "do"

and he was found to use conspicuously active verbs.

*Koizumi's Foreign Policy.* My extended analysis of the proportions of Koizumi's 11 speeches showed some very interesting differences from those of Murayama and Miyazawa. First, the space Koizumi dedicates to foreign policy is almost half that of Murayama and Miyazawa at only 17.52 per cent (see Table 3). Further, Murayama and especially Miyazawa discussed the international situation in the introductions of their speeches in a style appropriate for the introduction; that is to say, in broader and more philosophical terms, compared to the actual sections on foreign policy itself. On the other hand, Koizumi touches on the foreign issues only in 4 out of his 11 introductions, in his second speech about two weeks (September 27) after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., again the terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the FIFA World Cup in the third speech (February 4, 2002), problems with North Korea right after his visit in 2002 (in the fourth speech held October 18, 2002) and the damages caused by the tsunami off the coast of Sumatra Island (ninth speech held January 21, 2005). Thus, in contrast to Murayama and Miyazawa, who describe the international situation to depict a wide framework of the situation around the globe and then Japan's position, Koizumi, in most cases, never touches on international issues in his introductions or mentions only very concrete and grave events.

The sections where Koizumi discusses foreign policy are always at the end of his speeches immediately before the conclusions, except for the sixth speech, when he discusses it right after the introduction. In general, different from other prime ministers, there are two issues that Koizumi displays more interest in and is dedicated to: terrorism and international economic relations. In many cases, Koizumi discusses the fight against terrorism separately from the foreign policy sections, among issues such as disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the eighth speech, he conspicuously connects the issue of terrorism with empty *kobans* (police boxes), food safety, and reform of the judicial system. Very often, he discusses this issue from the domestic point of view, expressing his concern about the Japanese people.

It has been a common knowledge, especially in prime ministers' speeches, that the U.S. and the U.N. are the pillars of Japan's foreign policy. However, Koizumi hardly ever mentions the role of the U.N. in Japanese foreign policy; instead, he emphasises the role and importance of the WTO (World Trade Organization). Regarding the U.N.,

Table 3. Proportional categorization of Koizumi's speeches

Categories	Percentage of the Total
foreign policy	17.52%
reforms	14.76%
economy	13.15%
conclusion	10.22%
introduction	9.36%
society	8.89%
new ideas	5.84%
safety	5.52%
environment	5.40%
regional policy	5.34%
education	4.01%

Koizumi mostly mentions the organisation in relation to the need of reform of the Security Council or in relation of the war in Iraq and peace-keeping operations. He never emphasises the role of the U.N. in Japanese foreign policy, despite the fact that he usually introduces his foreign policy sections by pointing to Japan's alliance with the U.S. More precisely, in all of his policy speeches in extraordinary sessions of the Diet (所信表明演説) and final speech in an ordinary session of the Diet (施政方針演説), he underscores relations with the U.S. as an introduction to the foreign policy section and later in his discussion returns to the topic of bilateral relations with the U.S. In other speeches in previous ordinary sessions, he never introduces the foreign policy sections, but just mentions Japan's special relationship with the U.S. when discussing the bilateral relations.

It is very interesting to point out the wording in these short introductions to the foreign policy sections. For example, he says that the Japan–U.S. alliance and international coordination are the foundation of the Japan's foreign policy (日米同盟と国際協調が、日本外交の基本です). The question is: What exactly does Koizumi mean by the phrase "international coordination"? It seems to have taken the traditional place of the U.N. On one hand, this term is rather vague, so that one can include the U.N. as associated within it. On the other hand, in many of his speeches, Koizumi advocates strong individual ties between the world leaders, thus the term can also mean closer cooperation between the leaders.

I shall further take a closer look at his rhetoric on one of his top priorities in foreign policy, namely the North Korean question. We can follow the shift from emphasising

dialogue when dealing with North Korea to emphasising harder measures. In the early speeches and especially after his first visit (the fourth speech), Koizumi emphasises diplomatic means of resolving problems between the two countries. Then, in the ensuing speeches through to the ninth speech, he never mentions the means (dialogue) by how he is going to resolve issues, with one exception of the seventh speech held on January 19, 2004 when he mentions the six-party talks (the only time in all of his speeches). By the ninth speech on January 21, 2005, frustration had grown to the point that he brings in a new term "dialogue and pressure" (対話と圧力) and finally in the last speech a year later he says, "a U.N. resolution condemning the human rights situation in North Korea was adopted for the first time at the U.N. General Assembly", thus expressing not only Japanese but international frustration.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that compared to others, Koizumi's speeches differ to a large extent depending on the occasion, that is to say, if the speech was given in a regular session of the Diet or an extraordinary session of the Diet. The regular Diet session speeches are much longer and more detailed; by comparison, the extraordinary session speeches are much shorter, and this appeared to be the case especially concerning the foreign policy sections in the speeches.

**Koizumi's Reform Policies.** The second most often discussed issue in Koizumi's speeches is reform (14.76 per cent, see Table 3). However, it must be pointed out at this time that for coding purposes, it is hardly possible to separate his comments concerning reform from his rhetoric on economic policies. Thus, for "reform", I coded sentences that explain the reform plans in general, the overall layout of his reform plans, and further, administrative reforms concerning issues such as public corporations, decentralisation, and postal privatisation. For the keyword "economy", I coded sentences concerning descriptions of the economic situation, budget, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME), non-performing loans, and employment. However, non-performing loans and employment are some of the key issues of his actual reform plans. Further, it can be said that Koizumi discusses the overall theme of the Japanese economy in the light of reform and restructuring. If adding the sections regarding economic policy (13.15 per cent) to those concerning reform, we obtain an even bigger figure than that for the foreign policy sections, namely, 27.91 per cent. Although this percentage number is not correct in the strictest terms (as it includes the usual economic discussion), it is still quite insightful of Koizumi's priorities and should be kept in mind. Thus, for the sake

of clarity, I do not separate the two themes in the following discussion.

Through his first to the third speeches, Koizumi develops the basic idea and layout of his reform program. In the second speech, he elaborates on the basic ideas of the first speech, "The Five Goals of the Koizumi Structural Reform". We can see that his reform plans are very ambitious, covering basically all areas of domestic policy, the economy, and society as well as the government. In more detail, the first goal points to economic reforms, the second to administrative reforms, the third to social issues, the fourth to environment initiatives, and finally, the fifth to education reform. Quite unexpectedly, Koizumi does not spend his speech time on political reform despite mentioning it in his first speech as the fifth pillar of his reform program.

The fourth and sixth speeches were given at extraordinary Diet sessions and therefore, he only elaborates on economic and administrative reforms. On the other hand, by this time (from October 18, 2002 through September 26, 2003), these two themes of economic and administrative reform take very concrete and established shapes that will be repeated in his later speeches. His vision of administrative reform concentrates on postal privatisation and also includes reforming public corporations (such as the highway corporation). The three issues fall under the slogan "Leave to the localities what they can do", namely, elimination or reduction of state subsidies, review of local allocation of taxes, and transfer of tax revenue sources to local governments. Economic reforms include key issues such as non-performing loans, small- and medium-sized enterprises, employment, easier start-up of businesses, and tax reform. During the same period, in the fifth speech at the regular session, economic reform is introduced with the words, "In order to revitalise the Japanese economy...we will accelerate four reforms, namely government expenditure reform, tax system reform, financial system reform and regulatory reform". These four are mentioned either in the introduction or in the economic reform sections in most of his later speeches.

It is also important to point out that economic reform and regional policy issues (such as Koizumi's urban revitalisation plans, "special zones", and tourism, together with foreign investment and agriculture) are usually closely connected. In the first two speeches (that is to say, in the basic layout of his reform policies), Koizumi mentions the need to revitalise cities and develop "urban renaissance projects", and, in addition, advance "togetherness and exchange between cities and agricultural, mountainous

and fishing communities" (the second speech). These projects are mentioned in the economic reform sections after issues such as non-performing loans. Through the next four speeches, Koizumi's interest in regional issues develops, and he discusses creating, for example, "special zones" (by April 2003) that are specially designated geographical areas where—through the implementation of regulatory exceptions consistent with local characteristics—it is possible to carry out activities that are prohibited on a nationwide basis by laws and ordinances. However, only from the seventh speech on does he continually discuss the regional policy issues together with the economic reform, usually after issues such as non-performing loans. Yet in the seven speeches prior to that and in the last speech, he devotes almost the entire economic policy section to regional policy issues. Thus, we can see how his focus on regional issues is growing, and considering the content of the regional policy discussions, we could add the 5.34 per cent to the percentage of the reform policy, which would then give a total 33.25 per cent.

This again indicates that Koizumi's reforms are not dealing only with concrete economic measures such as reducing the amount of non-performing loans, but hint at the wider scale of his reform vision. This was already seen in the first three speeches, where basically all policy spheres (the economy, society, and administration) were discussed in the light of reform. Here again he points to the fact that it is not enough to reform just the centres of economic activity but also the regions, thus allowing the cities and local areas to support and compliment each other.

Closely connected to economic reform and regional policy issues are two further issues of "new ideas" and environmental concerns. In Koizumi's speeches, the "new ideas" category includes issues such as making Japan the world's most advanced IT country, increasing the budget for science and technology research, discussing concrete cases of scientific programs with examples of the rice genome as well as human genome decoding, cancer treatment, and biotechnology, supporting new technologies and venture enterprises, establishing Japan as a nation built on intellectual property, and advancing industry–academia–government cooperation. As the subtitle in the ninth speech, "Promotion of science and technology and response to global environmental issues" (similar wording in the fifth speech) hints, these sections usually also involve discussions concerning environmental questions. When connecting these categories (economic reform, "new ideas" and environment), Koizumi's ideas are expressed, for example, in the eighth speech, when he says, "I have concentrated my efforts on



keeping a balance between environmental protection and economic development utilising scientific technology....It is our conviction that the development and spread of environmental friendly science and technology will be conducive to economic development"...Promotion of information technology (IT) strategy is extremely effective in improving convenience in everyday living, revitalising the economy and constructing a streamlined and efficient government".

One of the issues Koizumi is very concerned about through his speeches is unemployment as one of the foreseeable negative effects of his economic reforms. To resolve employment insecurity, he again relies on "new ideas", saying, for example, in the second speech, "In order to create employment through new markets and industries, I will promote the advancement of science and technology through enhancing the functions of universities and through cooperation among industry, universities and government in local regions".

Thus, it becomes clear how far reaching Koizumi's economic reform plans were, involving actual economic policies such as reducing non-performing loans and the pay-off system, and advancing ambitious scientific and research plans that would create employment, advance local development as part of regional development, and provide the means to protect the environment. Koizumi's strong vision of the outcome of his structural reforms, which involve administrative reforms, economic reforms together with "new ideas", and regional and environmental policies, is mirrored to a certain extent in his often-used expression of "cooperation between the government, private enterprises and academia".

*Koizumi's Social Policy.* I shall next analyse Koizumi's sections concerning society and social policy. His general tendency, as was the case with foreign policy issues, is that in speeches in extraordinary Diet sessions, the topic of social issues garners less attention than in speeches given in ordinary sessions. For example in the fourth speech (extraordinary session), Koizumi does not even dedicate two full sentences to social issues.

The speeches held during the first half of his tenure often convey the liberalist message of self-help as well as the need for every person to manage by oneself and not wait help or rely on the government. In the very first speech he declares, "I am determined to base the three pillars of social welfare —pensions, medical care and nursing—on "a spirit of self-

help and self-sufficiency". Combined with an emphasis on the prevention of disease to maintain good health rather than rely on treatment, this self-help-centred discussion is well in line with liberal economic thought. At the same time, it is very interesting to note that Koizumi also refers to "concern for others", mutual care, and support. For example, in the first speech, he says, "I intend to reach out widely to local community residents, volunteers and non-profit organisations (NPOs) to create a society sustained through mutual assistance in taking care of the sick, elderly and children". This reminds people of Prime Minister Nakasone's speeches, where he distinguishes between European welfare and Japanese welfare. In his first speech (December 3, 1982), Nakasone says, "There are fervent calls for a bountiful Japanese style and family-centred welfare, which differs from the West European concept of the welfare state ...I believe the time is now right to put forth as a new goal this post-war, as opposed to pre-war<sup>12</sup>, ideal of transforming Japan into a country of resilient culture and welfare." Nakasone then goes on to explain the meaning of "resilient" by pointing to the Japanese traditional stance of solidarity, spirit of mutual assistance, and of learning together throughout their lifetimes, which leads to respect for freedom, creativity, and joy of life. He goes on with a very illustrative passage of what happiness is: A happy family of three generations gathered together around the dinner table. He strongly emphasises the importance of a happy family and close ties between generations. He concludes, "This ideal society must be constructed in close cooperation between the government and the people. Each citizen's acting in the spirit of *self-reliance* and *self-help*<sup>13</sup> to fulfil his own responsibilities in cooperation with others is the driving force facilitating smooth political process".

Thus, we can notice how both prime ministers, while focusing on self-help and self-responsibility, also point out mutual assistance and concern for others, which Nakasone clearly designates as Japanese values and Japanese-style welfare<sup>14</sup>. Further, they both illustratively describe economic development and the fruits of such development as changes in the lifestyles of the people. Appealing to the work ethic of the people would diffuse attention from the problems of the everyday life or shortcomings of the welfare system.

In the speeches held during the latter half of his tenure, Koizumi dedicates more time and detail to social policy issues. The main concerns throughout the speeches are how to support the social security system while the population of Japan is rapidly aging and how to provide a "Zero Waiting for Day Care Program". The latter would encourage

families to have more children, thus fighting the declining birth rate, and would give the women the possibility to return to work. This theme addresses the issue of gender equality as well as recognition of women's potential and contribution to the workforce. Koizumi also shows great concern regarding the situation of the disabled and thus advocates building a barrier-free society.

In my more detailed research<sup>15</sup> on Miyazawa and Koizumi, I analyse the words "society" and "economy" in the context of the speeches by both politicians. The results show that Miyazawa uses the word in the social context in a large majority of the cases (60%), i.e. explaining his vision of "Japan – A Great Country to Live". He uses expressions such as "aging society" and "participation in society". As the ones whose participation in society he is trying to support, Miyazawa mentions elderly people, disabled people, and women. And, being very closely related, he goes to emphasise welfare programs (福祉施設職員、ホームヘルパー、福祉サービス). Conspicuously, he uses the expression "fair society" (公正な社会), contrasting it, for example, with "efficiency priority"-led society (効率優先から公正にも十分配慮した社会).

On the other hand, Koizumi uses the word "society" equally in the social as well as economic contexts (30% in both). With regard to the social context, in the first speech he uses expressions such as an "aging society with fewer children" (少子高齢社会), "social security", and "both men and women contribute to society". These expressions point to concrete concerns and ideas of his plans for his government policies. However, in his later speeches, in the majority of the cases, the word is used in slogans. For example, "a society that nurtures the dreams and hopes of its children" (子どもたちの夢と希望を育む社会) or "a caring society in which people can live safely in peace" (人をいたわり、安全で安心に暮らせる社会)<sup>16</sup>. It seems that Koizumi at the time of the first speech was actually concerned with social problems, and later, he concentrated his attention on solving more urgent problems such as the revitalisation of the economy. As such, he could not go into detailed discussion of social issues and his policies for dealing with the problems, and instead he uses echoing slogans that are pleasant to listen to and easy to understand and remember.

As for the second —economic— context for the word "society", Koizumi uses expressions such as "a society that rewards efforts and offers a second chance at success" or "society where each individual as well as businesses and local regions can freely

realise their great latent potential and expand their latent potential", which are much in accordance with traditional liberal discourse. Further, he also uses expressions such as "[an] individual, who has the leading role in our economy and society, can realise his potential, exert individuality and achieve all that he strives for" and "to realise a society where the human rights of each and every person are respected".

When considering the word "economy" in context, by contrast, we can see that Miyazawa uses the word a large majority of cases (over 60 per cent) in the international context. There are three patterns. First, he uses it when discussing the role of Japan and the Japanese economy in the international arena. Second, he uses expressions such as "world economy", "market economy", and "economic society" as concerning the world economy in general; for example, when discussing poverty and prosperity in the world or issues of sustainable growth. Third, Miyazawa uses the word "economy" in an international context when discussing bilateral relations between Japan and the U.S., Korea, and China.

On the other hand, Koizumi uses the word "economy" mainly (half of all the cases) in the economic context, namely, when discussing Japanese economic issues and problems. It is further remarkable that he uses it in 20 per cent in the introductions where he also discusses the state of the Japanese economy (in sharp contrast with Miyazawa who discusses world affairs in his introductions, as mentioned earlier). In the international context, Koizumi uses the word "economy" only in 20 per cent of the cases. When characterising his vision of the economic development that he wants to accomplish, he most often uses the attributes "competitive" and "self-sustaining" (自立型の経済). In this context, he also mentions "latent power" (潜在力) that has to be brought out and further strengthened. In addition, Koizumi often binds the word "free" or "freely" with the economy.

Thus, it is apparent that there are two trends here—the liberal economic dimension and international–social dimension. Through the analysis conducted earlier, it has been shown that Koizumi is the closest to liberal discourse, as he often uses the word "economy" and, in one-third of the cases, the word "society" in the economic context. On the other hand, Miyazawa, who appeared closest to the socialist Murayama, uses the word "society" in the social context and the word "economy" mostly in an international context.

**Conclusion Sections in Koizumi's Speeches.** Finally, I would like to take a closer look at the conclusion sections in the Koizumi's speeches. As pointed out earlier, Koizumi mentions political reform as the fifth pillar of his reform policies but does not devote much speech time to discussing it. However, the people's trust and participation in politics is his regular opening to his closing remarks. As the popular support was his major stronghold, Koizumi naturally respects it.

Another characteristic of the conclusions is references to respected historical figures and their sayings or thoughts. These references provide a focus for the entire speech. The messages he conveys with the references can be divided into three groups. The first three speeches emphasise the importance of enduring the hardships of the changing times. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth speeches, he contemplates pessimism and encourages people's spirit of challenge. In the eighth through the eleventh speeches, he repeats the slogan "if you do it, it will happen" (やればできる) to achieve one's ideals without giving up. The seventh speech focuses on the Iraq War and the dispatch of the SDF, and the conclusion is dedicated to explaining and justifying the policy.

The third characteristic of the conclusion sections is Koizumi's appeal to his own person, referring to what he has said and done. For example, in the third speech, he recalls his first two speeches, saying, "In my first policy speech to the Diet, I called upon the people to be resolved to stand up for reform. In my address to the last extraordinary session of the Diet, I exhorted the people to have the courage not to be afraid of change. Today, at a time when the pains of reform are beginning to be felt, I again ask you to be strong and never lose hope for the future trusting our nation and our people, who have overcome great and diverse difficulties in the past, to lay a path to a new age".

These passages provide a direct personal connection to the audience and the people, and this closer link with the people makes it easier for Koizumi to appeal his policies.

## 5. Concluding remarks.

The quantitative analysis of the speeches of 25 post-war prime ministers did not hint at any characteristics of the traditional ideologies such as conservatism and liberalism. Instead, four groups of prime ministers appeared as a result of the MDS with their

characteristics differing with the passage of time. The qualitative analysis of the speech proportions and contexts of the speeches of the two most revealing Prime Ministers, Murayama and Koizumi, further strengthened the inferences of the quantitative analysis. The speeches by Murayama indicate that he was very conscious of the Japanese concepts of the progressive–conservative ideological contrast with special handling of issues such as the SDF, relations with the U.S. and Asia, as well as explicit references to the ideological cleavages. On the other hand, Koizumi's speeches are more in line with the liberal discourse of small government and self-sufficiency than other prime ministers, thus his singular position in the MDS comprising the fourth group wherein he is basically alone with his eleven speeches accompanied only by one speech by Uno. Therefore, we can conclude that the prime ministers' rhetoric does not resemble traditional western ideological concepts, but are consistent with the Kabashima et al. JABISS/JES findings suggesting unique Japanese cleavages deriving from the historical war defeat, the U.S. occupation, and speedy economic growth combined with one-party dominance.

Furthermore, the prime ministers who are eager to achieve reform use more active verbs such as "do" (Koizumi, Nakasone, and Tanaka) and tend to advocate traditional liberal economic policies. On the other hand, in contrast, "think" persons do not advocate the welfare state or big government, but tend to concentrate and spend a rather remarkable length of speech time on international issues (such as world peace, regional conflicts, refugees, HIV) as well as bilateral relations. Thus the categories of foreign policy issues are large (Murayama and Miyazawa, among others). Generally, there are no major differences in wording and structure of the speeches, depending on whether the speech is given at an ordinary or extraordinary session of the Diet, with the most notable exception of Koizumi. His speeches at extraordinary Diet sessions are much shorter and more focused on single priority issues. Instead, the general trend of the 25 prime ministers is that their first speech is rather different from the following speeches. Since the first speech is held at the hectic moment right after they assume office, we can infer that the policies of the new cabinet may not be fully established and the speechwriters not yet accustomed to their jobs. This hints at the possibility that the first speeches most purely express the prime minister's own beliefs and opinions and the later speeches are more of a blend or compromise of the opinions of the cabinet and the coalition.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Miyake Ichiro, Watanuki Joji, Scott Flanagan, Bradley Richardson and Kohei Shinsaku led

the JABISS research in 1976. Inoguchi Takashi and Kabashima Ikuo, in addition to Miyake and Watanuki, conducted the JES research in 1983. For the next research JES II, Kobayashi Yoshiaki and Ikeda Kenichi joined the group. The latest JES III is led by Ikeda, Kobayashi and Hirano Hiroshi. See also Miyake 1985 and 2001; Watanuki 1977, 1986 or 1991; Kobayashi 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Presented here are the results of a factor analysis, thus different dimensions include the same features.

<sup>3</sup> See Kabashima and Takenaka (1996, 282f) and Kabashima (2004, 95-100) for the argument against Murakami's (1984) concept of *de-ideologisation* (脱イデオロギー化). Instead they argue that the voters' attitudes had become more conservative (保守化).

<sup>4</sup> Kabashima goes on comparing the positions on welfare issues of Japanese, Swedish and the U.S. elite. He shows that the Japanese are leaning left comparable to the Swedes, however, if excluding the elderly and disabled, the Japanese are far most conservative.

<sup>5</sup> There are all together 75 speeches held at ordinary Diet session and 70 held at extraordinary. In the qualitative analysis, both types of speeches are analysed together. In the following qualitative analysis, attention is paid to the difference of the speech type.

<sup>6</sup> The methodology, more precisely, the direction of this analysis can be viewed as exactly opposite to that of Yamamoto (2005). He conducts his content analysis based on the data from a free-form questionnaire survey of 2003 and uses the "Autocode" program to establish categories such as "pro-peace-anti-war", "criticism about the Japanese government", etc. to understand the people's reasoning behind taking part in demonstrations in Japan protesting the current war in Iraq.

<sup>7</sup> I was able to confirm this while interviewing former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa (April 16, 2004) and former deputy chief cabinet secretary Shinzo Abe (April 11, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> The same politicians (from the Liberal as well as the Democratic Party) who dominated the Japanese political arena later established the LDP in 1955. Despite falling from power from 1993 to 1994, the LDP was strong enough to return to office within a year. In addition, in the Murayama cabinet, a number of crucial posts were given to LDP members.

<sup>9</sup> See Appendix 4 for the dates of the speeches.

<sup>10</sup> The entire analysis, including the analysis of proportions, is based on the original speeches in Japanese. The quotes of the speeches presented here in English are the translations of the policy speeches published in *The Japan Times* and on the official webpage of the Prime Minister in case of the speeches by Koizumi. See Appendix 4 for the dates of the speeches. The English translations in the *Japan Times* are published the day after the respective speech was held at the Diet.

<sup>11</sup> In addition to a general term "welfare", in Japanese the word is often used in a narrow sense in which it is used as one part of a "social security system". The others are social insurance, social benefits, public hygiene/medical service and pensions.

<sup>12</sup> Nakasone begins this theme with a description of the post war destruction and poverty and compares it to current economic affluence. "Immediately after the war, people beset by hunger and living in makeshift shacks began to embrace the ideal of Japan as a country of culture and welfare. In 1947, the year I was first elected to the National Diet, I came to these corridors threading my way between rubble and black-market peddlers. Even today, these scenes are never far from my mind. The ideal of a country of culture and welfare built on the aftermath of destruction was a new value for a people freed from the war-time structure of military priorities and constraints of freedom....Over thirty years have passed since then, and Japan has today gone through a period of rapid economic growth to develop into the second-largest economic power in the Free World."

As if continuing Nakasone's thought, Koizumi describes the development in his fifth speech (January 31, 2003), "From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, washing machines, refrigerators and black and white televisions were called the 'three sacred treasures' that symbolised the new lifestyle; from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s they were automobiles, air-conditioners and colour televisions. Now, at the time when some are claiming "there is nothing they want," sales of productions which befit the new age such as camera-equipped mobile phones, thin shaped televisions and dishwashers are increasing...The eagerness of the people to improve their quality of life remains intact."

In 2005, there were events celebrating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the LDP (立党50年記念の歴代総裁・官房長官リレー講演会). It is interesting that both Nakasone and Koizumi in their presentations at the LDP Headquarters referred to these excerpts of their speeches held several years earlier. It is further curious that both politicians discuss this not in the sections concerning economic policies in their policy speeches, but refer to them within social policy issues to emphasise the changes (for good, of course) in the lifestyles of the Japanese people due to economic growth.

<sup>13</sup> My italics.

<sup>14</sup> As there are almost 20 years diving Koizumi's era from Nakasone's, it is only natural that there are clear differences regarding the society and circumstances and regarding the two prime ministers' rhetoric and ways of thinking. Nakasone, who is from Gunma prefecture, emphasised more of traditional solutions like family and neighbourhood relations, whereas actors like NPOs had not yet taken root at that time. On the other hand, Koizumi, from a metropolitan Kanagawa, emphasises rather modern solutions, at least from today's point of



view, and carries the social reform initiative one step further to actual policies.

<sup>15</sup> See Reinem 2004, where I use the Japanese language dictionary, 日本語語彙体系 to group similar words or synonyms into categories in addition to the KHCoder basic frequency analysis and then analyse the most frequent categories in their context.

<sup>16</sup> At the same time, concerning the term "freedom", in spite of the common impression that this is one of the key words characterising Koizumi, it is actually used as often by Miyazawa. However, Miyazawa uses the word more in slogan-like expressions, for example, "I want to secure 'peace' and 'freedom' and 'prosperity'" (私は、「平和」と「自由」と「繁栄」を挙げたい) or "freedom and democracy must be respected" (「自由と民主主義」が尊重され). On the other hand, Koizumi does not use the word in slogans at all. It is further interesting to consider the character "power". Namely, the category "power/strength" (力) is very large in Koizumi's speeches in absolute as well as in relative terms, while the categories "effort" (努力) and "cooperation" (協力) are often used by Miyazawa to a remarkably large extent in absolute and relative terms.

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
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
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Appendix 1. The results of multidimensional scaling



Appendix 2. Koizumi's characteristics "do" and "reform"



## Appendix 3. The margin of the total usage of "do"

Ashida	1.84%
Koizumi	1.51%
Tanaka	0.73%
Uno	0.46%
Kishi	0.43%
Kaifu	0.42%
Nakasone	0.25%
Suzuki	0.19%
Ikeda	0.13%
Hashimoto	0.09%
Sato	0.07%
Ishibashi	0.06%
Takeshita	-0.03%
Yoshida	-0.11%
Mori	-0.15%
Katayama	-0.18%
Miyazawa	-0.23%
Hatoyama	-0.35%
Hosokawa	-0.50%
Hata	-0.51%
Fukuda	-0.66%
Murayama	-0.78%
Ohira	-1.00%
Miki	-1.00%
Obuchi	-1.04%

## Appendix 4. The dates of the speeches

<b>Nakasone</b>	1. December 3, 1982	6. October 14, 1985
	2. January 24, 1983	7. January 27, 1986
	3. September 10, 1983	8. September 12, 1986
	4. February 6, 1984	9. January 26, 1987
	5. January 25, 1985	10. July 6, 1987
<b>Miyazawa</b>	1. November 8, 1991	3. October 30, 1992
	2. January 24, 1992	4. January 22, 1993
<b>Murayama</b>	1. July 18, 1994/7/18	3. January 20, 1995
	2. September 30, 1994	4. September 29, 1995
<b>Koizumi</b>	1. May 7, 2001	7. January 19, 2004
	2. September 27, 2001	8. October 12, 2004
	3. February 4, 2002	9. January 2005
	4. October 18, 2002	10. September 26, 2005
	5. January 31, 2003	11. January 20, 2006
	6. September 26, 2003	