Make-Causatives and *Have*-Causatives in English[*]

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0. Introduction

Although many aspects of causatives have been discussed in the liter-
ature, little attention has been paid to the nature of the semantic differ-
ences, or more specifically, to the nature of "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations.[1] It
is safe to say that all languages in the world have some means to encode cau-
sation, which are realized as causative constructions, and that every language
has a wide range of such constructions to describe a variety of causative situ-
ations suitably. We must note here that, as Wierzbicka (1988) points out, in-
vestigating causative constructions can be reduced to the problem of "CAUSE-EF-
FECT" relations; i.e. *how the speakers of the language draw distinctions be-
tween different kinds of causal relations and how they perceive and interpret
causal links between events and human actions.*[2]

This paper takes a first step toward exploring semantic differences
among periphrastic causatives in English, with special attention to *make*-
causatives and *have*-causatives.[3] The goal of this paper is to show differ-
ences in the "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations between the two periphrastic causatives.

The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 1, we see some
characteristics of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives, which have been
observed in previous analyses. Furthermore, I point out some crucial problems
which so far have been ignored. In section 2, I present an alternative anal-
ysis which serves to define the "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations of the two caus-
atives. In section 3, I show that our definitions of these causatives can
effectively explain both problems pointed out in section 1 and examples which
cannot be explained in a satisfactory way in previous analyses. In section 4,
I deal with some problematic examples of *have*-causatives.

1. Some Characteristics and Problems

In this section I will show some characteristics of *make*-causatives and

have-causatives which have been observed in previous analyses. These charac-
teristics are helpful in clarifying semantic differences between *make*-
causatives and *have*-causatives. Moreover, I will point out some crucial
problems as to the differences between these two periphrastic causatives.

1.1. Some Characteristics of *Make*-causatives and *Have*-causatives

Baron (1974) observes that the embedded verb of *make*-causatives permits
both [±stative] verbs, while that of *have*-causatives permits only [-stative]
verbs:

(1) a. John made me *read* the book.   [-stative]

    b. I made him *become* very cautious.   [+stative][4]

(2) a. John had me *read* the book.   [-stative]

    b. *I had him *become* very cautious.   [+stative]

She further observes that *have*-causatives can have only a [+agentive] subject
while *make*-causatives can have a [-agentive] subject as well as a [+agentive]
one:[5]

(3) a. *The confusion* made me change my mind.   [-agentive]

    b. **The confusion* had me change my mind.   [-agentive]

Baron also remarks that *make*-causatives can be passivized while *have*-causa-
tives cannot:

(4) a. I was made to read the book.

    b. *I was had to read the book.

On the basis of Baron's observation, Oohashi (1985) points out that
there is a certain restriction on the embedded subject of *have*-causatives,
which *make*-causatives do not exhibit; the embedded subject of *have*-causa-
tives must not be inanimate. Compare the following examples:

(5) a. John made *Mary* roll down the hill.

    b. John made *the rock* roll down the hill.

(6) a. John had *Mary* roll down the hill.

    b. *John had *the rock* roll down the hill.

Example (5) shows that the embedded subject of *make*-causatives can be either animate (*Mary*) or inanimate (*the rock*). On the other hand, as the contrast in (6) shows, the embedded subject of *have*-causatives cannot be inanimate but be animate. Oohashi attributes the contrast in (6) to the semantic ambiguity of the verb *roll*, following Jackendoff's (1972) observation:

(7) a. Mary rolled down the hill.

    b. The rock rolled down the hill.

Jackendoff observes that the verb *roll* has two readings, i.e. intentional (henceforth [+intentional]) and nonintentional (henceforth [-intentional]). (7a) is ambiguous due to the fact that *Mary* is animate with volition; on one reading, Mary intentionally rolled down the hill, and on the other reading, Mary did not roll down the hill under her own volition. On the other hand, (7b) has only the [-intentional] reading because *the rock* is inanimate with no volition. The following figure in (8) summarizes Oohashi's claim that in the case where the embedded subject of *have*-causatives is animate (e.g. *Mary*) the motion of rolling can be interpreted as either [+intentional] or [-intentional], while in the case where the subject is inanimate (e.g. *the rock*) the motion of rolling is interpreted only as [-intentional].

(8)   The embedded subject   The embedded verb

       [+animate] ⟶   [+intentional]

       [-animate] ⟶   [-intentional]

Therefore, based on the contrast shown in (6), he proposes the following condition for *have*-causatives:

(9) The embedded verb of *have*-causatives must be [+intentional].

(9) implies that the embedded subject of *have*-causatives must not be inanimate

because only [+animate] subjects can be connected with a [+intentional] read-
ing of the embedded verbs. Apparently, (9) can effectively explain the
contrast in (6).

However, there seems to be a somewhat problematic example for Oohashi's
analysis. Look at the following example:

(10) Roosevelt had B29 drop many bombs.

Along with Oohashi's analysis, the embedded subject of *have*-causatives must
be connected with [+intentional] verbs and thus it cannot be inanimate. If
so, his analysis would predict that example (10) is ruled out becuase *B29*
itself is inanimate with no volition.[6] However, this is not true, as example
(10) illustrates. Thus we cannot straightforwardly explain the examples such
as (10) in terms of (8) and (9). In order to provide a satisfactory explana-
tion, we must discuss what factors are responsible for the acceptability of
(10). I will discuss this matter in section 4.

As for the further characteristics of *make*-causatives and *have*-caus-
atives, let us consider Shibatani's (1973a) observation. Consider the follow-
ing examples:

(11) a. I made the doctor come by twisting his arm.
     b. *I had the doctor come by twisting his arm.

(Shibatani (1973a))

(12) a. The trainer made the lion enter the cage by beating it
        with a whip.
     b. *The trainer had the lion enter the cage by beating it
        with a whip.   (cf. Baron (1974))

In both (11) and (12), the *by*-phrases induce some coercive meaning. For ex-
ample, the *by*-phrase in (11) indicates a situation where the matrix subject *I*
threatens *the doctor*. Thus in (11a) this threatening forces *the doctor* to
come, irrespective of his own will. The significant point to note here is
that *make*-causatives are compatible with this coercive meaning, while *have*-
causatives are not. From this fact, Shibatani claims that *make*-causatives
are "coercive" and *have*-causatives "noncoercive".[7]

Thus far, we have shown four characteristics of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives. To recapitulate: (i) [+stative] verbs can appear in the embedded clauses of *make*-causatives, but not in those of *have*-causatives; (ii) the matrix subject of *have*-causatives must be [+agentive], while *make*-causatives can have a [-agentive] subject as well as a [+agentive] one; (iii) according to Oohashi's analysis the embedded verb of *have*-causatives must be [+intentional], and thus the embedded subject must not be inanimate with no volition; and (iv) *make*-causatives have "coercive" meaning, whereas *have*-causatives are "noncoercive".

1.2. Problems

As we have seen above, some linguists such as Baron and Oohashi argue that the two periphrastic causatives behave differently in terms of semantic features such as [±stative]. However, there seems to be an inadequacy in their analyses because they do not consider the crucial problem of what are responsible for the behavioral differences as shown in (1)-(3). Without investigating this problem, each semantic nature of the two causatives could not be captured. Similarly, in connection with "coercive" meaning, we must consider the problem why *make*-causatives have coercive meaning while *have*-causatives do not. This problem has not been explained in a satisfactory way.

On the basis of the characteristics we have seen above, the main question we shall be concerned with in this study is the following:

(i) What is the nature of the causations of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives?

Closely related to this question are the following two questions, which have not been explained in a satisfactory way in the previous analyses:

(ii) Why do *make*-causatives have coercive meaning, while *have*-causatives do not?

(iii) What semantic factors are responsible for the different behavior?

In section 2, I will discuss (i) and (ii). The third problem will be dis-

cussed in section 3.

2. Analysis
2.1. The Basic Data

Before we directly go into details, consider the following examples:

(13) a. John made Mary do the work without considering her wishes.

b. *John made Mary do the work after considering her wishes.[8]

(14) a. *John had Mary do the work without considering her wishes.[9]

b. John had Mary do the work after considering her wishes.

In the (a) sentences, the adverb phrase *without considering her wishes* implies a situation where John (the causer) forces Mary (the causee) to do the work in spite of the fact that Mary hardly, if ever, wishes to do the work. On the other hand, the adverb phrase *after considering her wishes* in the (b) sentences is considered to indicate a situation where Mary has (or will have) a wish to do the work. Thus, from the contrast in (13), we can say that the causee in *make*-causatives is acting against his/her own will. On the other hand, the contrast in (14) suggests that *have*-causatives are compatible with a situation in which the causee has (or will have) his/her own will to do the work. In other words, the causee in *have*-causatives positively participates in bringing about the event or the situation described in the embedded clause. Thus, in this respect, it seems reasonable to suppose that the causee in *have*-causatives acts like an Agent.[10]

Next, consider the following contrast:

(15) a. *John made Mary cough by asking her to do so.

b. John had Mary cough by asking her to do so.

Again, a plausible situation in *make*-causatives is such that the causer forces the causee to do something without considering the causee's wish. Thus the unacceptability of (15a) comes from the fact that the situation implied is incompatible with the expression *by asking her to do so*. As for (15b), the causee in *have*-causatives, unlike the one in *make*-causatives, has his/her

own wish to bring about the event or the situation described in the embedded clause. Thus the causation in (15b) can be stated as follows: the causer *John* in (15b) wants the causee *Mary* to cough and he conveys his wish to the causee by asking her to do so; accepting the causer's offer, the causee *Mary* voluntarily coughs. In order to define the causation of *have*-causatives in more general ways, we must notice Wierzbicka's (1988) observation. As for *have*-causatives, she points out the following three points: (i) the causer assumes that the causee is ready to serve what the causer wants; (ii) the causee is supposed to be a cooperative performer of the causer's will; and (iii) the causee is treated as someone to whom the causer's will can be communicated and who will be neither unable to understand it nor unwilling to perform it.[11] Her observation gives support to our analysis. We will return to this subject in the next subsection.

From a typological viewpoint, similar phenomena are observed in other languages as well. Look at the following examples:

(16) a.   nuqa Fan-ta rumi-ta   ipa-či-ni
          I   Juan-acc rock-acc cary-cause-1sg
          "I made Juan carry the rock"

     b.   nuqa Fan-wan   rumi-ta   ipa-či-ni
          I   Juan-Instru rock-acc carry-cause-1sg
          "I had Juan carry the rock"

                              (Bolivian Quechua: Cole (1983))

(17) a.   Köhögtettem   a   gyereket
          I-caused-to-cough the boy-acc
          "I made the boy cough"

     b.   Köhögtettem   a   gyerekkel
          I-caused-to-cough the boy-Instru
          "I had the boy cough"

                              (Hungarian: Cole (1983))

As for these examples, Cole (1983) observes as follows: when accusative Case (*-ta* in (16a) and *-ket* in (17a)) is used, an appropriate situation is the one in which the causee is directly under the causer's authority and has no control over the action for himself (herself); in contrast, instrumental Case

(-*wan* in (16b) and -*kel* in (17b)) is used in a situation where the causee
retains control over the action for himself (herself) and voluntarily accepts
the causer's wish. In these cases, case-markers reflect the semantic dif-
ference which we have seen between *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives in
English. Thus, in addition to the facts shown in (13)-(15), the examples in
(16) and (17) confirm that our observation is correct.

2.2. Conceptual Structures of *Make*-causatives and *Have*-causatives

In this subsection, based on the facts we have seen above, we will
propose each conceptual structure of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives,
which serves to define its causation. First, we will look more carefully into
make-causatives, and then discuss *have*-causatives in detail.

2.2.1 *Make*-causatives

First of all, consider the following examples:

(18) a. I made the box.
     b. I made [him go].

In (18a) *make* has a meaning of production. On the other hand, *make* in (18b)
has a causative meaning. It appears that these two uses of *make* are dif-
ferent. But we can assume that the two uses of the verb *make* are basically
the same in terms of the notion of PRODUCE. That is, in (18a), *the box* is
produced by the subject's action. Moreover, in (18b), the situation [HE GO]
described in the embedded clause can be supposed to be produced by the sub-
ject's (or the causer's) authority. From this viewpoint, the use of *make* in
(18a) is similar to that of *make* in (18b) in that the notion of PRODUCE is
involved in both uses of *make*; more specifically, while in (18a) the con-
crete object (*the box*) is produced, in (18b) the abstract situation of his
going is produced. Thus I propose here from the above observation that the
two uses of *make* in (18) can be analyzed in terms of polysemy.

Turning to the problem of the definition of the causation in *make*-caus-
atives, we must consider the following examples:

(19) a. [That I did it] made [him go].

 b. [What I did] made [him go].

 c. [My doing it] made [him go].

What is indicated in (19) is that not only a person but also a situation or
an event, which is described as the matrix subject, can bring about or produce
the situation described in the embedded clause; for example, in (19a), the
situation such as [That I did it] produced the situation [him go]. In other
words, in *make*-causatives, a situation can be the CAUSER of the causation.[12]
The question now arises as to how we can relate these two cases of *make*-caus-
atives, i.e, the case where a person is conceived as the CAUSER and the one
where a situation is conceived as the CAUSER.

    Wierzbicka (1988) makes several important statements on the causation of
make-causatives, one of which gives a hint to the above problem. In her
framework, *make*-causatives where the causer and the causee are human can be
represented as follows:[13]

(20) X made Y type the letters.

         X wanted this: Y will type the letters

         X did something because of that

         Y typed the letters because of that

         not because Y wanted it

         Y didn't want it

                                             (Wierzbicka (1988))

In her analysis, what can be considered to be the immediate cause of the
causee(Y)'s typing the letters is shown in the statement *X did something
(because of that); Y typed the letters because of that*. What has to be
noticed in (20) is that it was because X did something that Y typed the
letters. In this respect, we can say that the immediate cause of Y's typing
the letters is not X himself (herself), but rather a situation or an event
which results from X's doing something. If it is true, we can account for the
above problem as to how the two types of *make*-causatives can be related.
That is, as is clear from the above observation, the type of *make*-causatives
where the CAUSER is described as a person can be reduced to the other type of

make-causatives where the CAUSER is conceived as a situation. In cases where the matrix subject (the causer) is a person, it is taken to be an instigator of a situation which produces another situation described in the embedded clause. Thus, we can now conclude that *make*-causatives are such that the situation described in the embedded clause (henceforth SITUATION$_2$) is produced by a situation described in the matrix clause (henceforth SITUATION$_1$). In other words, *make*-causatives can be defined in terms of SITUATION$_1$ and SITUATION$_2$.[14]

To define *make*-causatives more clearly, it is important to recall that *make*-causatives can be passivized:[15]

(21) He was made to go.

It has been generally claimed that passive sentences are acceptable if an entity referred to by the subject NP can be conceived as affected.[16] Thus it is obvious from the example in (21) that the causee of *make*-causatives is an affected entity. Let us briefly consider here how the causee of *make*-causatives is affected. As we have seen above, in (21) the situation [he go] (SITUATION$_2$) is produced by a certain situation (SITUATION$_1$). From this fact we can say with fair certainty that the causee, who is the most salient participant of SITUATION$_2$, is affected by SITUATION$_1$ in the sense that s/he must do some action though s/he does not want to.

On the basis of the facts pointed out above, we can say that the conceptual structure of *make*-causatives can be represented as follows:

(22) I made him go.

In (22) the mechanism in which SITUATION$_2$ is produced is as follows: SITUATION$_1$ [That I did it] is the CAUSER; SITUATION$_1$ affects the most salient par-

ticipant of SITUATION$_2$ (i.e. the causee, *HE*) and produced SITUATION$_2$ as the
EFFECT.

It is worthwhile to consider why *make*-causatives can have coercive mean-
ings, which is concerned with the question (ii) pointed out in the previous
section. The important point to note here is that in *make*-causatives the
causee is forced to do some action although s/he does not want to. It is in
this sense that *make*-causatives are semantically compatible with coercive-
ness.

2.2.2.   *Have*-causatives

As with *make*-causatives, *have*-causatives can be analyzed in terms of
polysemy. Consider the following examples:

(23) a. I have a pen.
     b. I had [him go].

If we consider the relation between *I* and *a pen* in (23a), we can say that
the sentence in (23a) can be paraphrased as "A pen BELONGS TO me".[17] Fur-
thermore, I propose here that *have* in (23b) can be also paraphrased in terms
of the verb "belong to"; that is, "the situation [he go] BELONGS TO me (the
causer)". The question arises, then, as to how the situation and the causer
of *have*-causatives can be related in terms of "belong to". In order to
account for this problem, let us return to the examples in (13)-(15). What is
indicated in (13)-(15) is as follows: in *have*-causatives the causer has a
wish to bring about the situation described in the embedded clause and s/he
convey his/her wish to the causee; accepting the causer's offer, the causee,
who is the most prominent participant in SITUATION$_2$, voluntarily does some-
thing which brings about SITUATION$_2$. In this respect, it can be said that the
occurrence of SITUATION$_2$ is attributable to the causer's wish. Thus, we can
paraphrase (23b) as "[he go] (SITUATION$_2$) BELONG TO me (the causer)" in an
abstract sense. From these remarks, one general character of *have*-causatives
becomes very clear; that is, the causer and the caused situation can be
related in terms of the notion "ATTRIBUTE" in the sense that the caused
situation belongs to the causer.[18]

Next consider the following examples, where unlike *make*-causatives, the subject (or the causer) of *have*-causatives must be a person, and not a sentential NP which describes a situation:

(24) a. *[That I did it] had [him go].

   b. *[What I did] had [him go].

   c. *[My doing it] had [him go].

   d. I had [him go].

We can easily explain the contrast in (24) by considering the causation of *have*-causatives. Recall that it is the causer's will that brings about the situation described in the embedded clause. This indicates that the subject of *have*-causatives must be a person with some will. Thus, sentential NPs which describe a certain situation cannot be the subject of *have*-causatives.[19]

On the basis of the facts pointed out above, I illustrate the conceptual structure of *have*-causatives as in (25):

(25) I had him go.

In (25) the significant point to note is as follows: the causee accepts the causer's will, which is a distinguished property of *have*-causatives; moreover, because the caused situation belongs to the causer, we can say that CAUSER and SITUATION in (25) can be related in terms of the notion of "AT-TRIBUTE", which represents the notion of belonging.

It is worthwhile here to make a few remarks on the reason why *have*-causatives have often been analyzed as noncoercive causatives in the literature. Based on the above observation, we can say that the causee has no/little resistance to the causer because s/he voluntarily accepts the

causer's will. It is in this sense that *have*-causatives can be analyzed as noncoercive causatives.

2.3. Summary

The definitions of the "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives can be summarized as follows:

(26) *Make*-causatives

(i) SITUATION$_1$ ———┬———> SITUATION$_2$

AFFECTED

(ii) The CAUSER is a situation (SITUATION$_1$).

The most salient participant of the caused situaiton (SITUA-TION$_2$) is affected by SITUATION$_1$, and as a result SITUATION$_2$ is produced.

(iii) SITUATION$_1$ and SITUATION$_2$ are related in terms of the notion of PRODUCE.

(27) *Have*-causatives

(i) PERSON ———┬———> SITUATION

ACCEPT

(ii) The aim of the causer is to achieve his/her will, and the will is transfered to the causee.

The causee accepts the causer's will in the sense that s/he voluntarily does something according to the causer's will.

(iii) The caused situation is ATTRIBUTED to the causer.

The great differences between *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives are as follows: (i) what can be the CAUSER (i.e. SITUATION or PERSON); (ii) the way in which the CAUSER and the causee are related (i.e. AFFECT or ACCEPT); and (iii) how the CAUSER and the caused situation can be characterized (i.e. PRO-DUCE or ATTRIBUTE). It is in these three respects that *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives are semantically different. In the next section I will offer some evidence for my proposal, indicating that it is on the right track.

3. Evidence

In this section we will look more carefully at examples which cannot be explained in a satisfactory way in the previous analyses, as we saw in section 1. We will show that our analysis can fully provide accounts for such examples.

As we observed in section 1, Baron and Oohashi analyze the difference between *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives in terms of semantic features. As I pointed out, a serious problem has been ignored in their analyses; that is, what semantic factors are responsible for the behavioral differences. Our analysis can easily solve such a problem. Consider the following examples:

    (28) a. I made him know French.

         b. *I had him know French.

Baron (1974) argues that the unacceptability of (28b) is due to the fact that the embedded verb of *have*-causatives cannot be [+stative]; that is, *know* in (28b) is a [+stative] verb and this fact is incompatible with *have*-caus- atives. However why is a [+stative] verb incompatible with *have*-causatives? She gives no explanation to this problem. But our analysis can answer it. Recall here that the embedded subject (i.e. the causee) acts like an Agent in the sense that s/he voluntarily does something along the causer's will. That is, we can say that the embedded subject itself has a will. If this is true, it must be combined with a verb with intention. Generally, stative verbs are not verbs with intention because they do not appear in imperatives; e.g. *Know the truth.* Thus, stative verbs cannot appear in *have*-causatives.

    Similarly, consider the following examples:

    (29) a. John accidentally made Mary drop her books.

         b. *John accidentally had Mary drop her books.

The adverb *accidentally* is relevant to the contrast in (29). As we have claimed, the CAUSER (or the immediate cause) of *make*-causatives is taken to be not a person but a situation; that is, the CAUSER in (29a) is not *John* but a certain situation such as [that John did something]. A situation can

bring about another situation by accident. For this reason, (29a) is acceptable. On the other hand, the causer of *have*-causatives must be a person who wants to bring about a situation described in the embedded clause. Thus the meaning of the adverb *accidentally* is semantically incompatible with this fact. Hence the unacceptability of (29b).

Next, consider the following examples:

(30) a. That his wife is a poor cook made John go to cooking class.

b. *That his wife is a poor cook had John go to cooking class.

Baron also claims that the subject of *have*-causatives (i.e. the causer) must be [+agentive], or more specifically, a person (see Notes 5). Our analysis can explain the problem why the causer of *have*-causatives must be a person. This point is ignored in Baron's analysis. The important point to note here is that in *have*-causatives an "attributive" relation holds which is an abstract relation between the causer and the caused situation. What is indicated by the "attributive" relation is that the causer experiences the caused situation. In this respect, we can say that the causer acts like an Experiencer. As is well known, an Experiencer is limited to a person with an ability to experience. Therefore, the causer of *have*-causatives must be typically a person. On the other hand, the causation of *make*-causatives is defined in terms of the relation between SITUATION$_1$ and SITUATION$_2$. Thus, as (30a) indicates, a certain situation (or [-agentive] subject) can be the subject of *make*-causatives.

The same phenomenon can be found in Japanese as well. Consider the following examples:

(31) a. [Gorvachov-ga sikkyakusi-ta koto]-ga
    Gorbachov-NOM lose his position-Past fact-Nom
    gaimudaijin-o America-e ika-se-ta.
    the Minister of Foreign Affairs-ACC America-to go-cause-past
    "That Gorbachov lost his position caused the Minister of Foreign
    Affairs to go to America."

b. *[Gorvachov-ga sikkyakusi-ta   koto]-ga

   Gorbachov-NOM lose his position-Past fact-Nom

   gaimudaijin-*ni*   America-e   ika-se-ta.

   the Minister of Foreign Affairs- DAT America-to go-cause-past

   "That Gorbachov lost his position caused the Minister of

   Foreign Affairs to go to America."

The contrast in (31) shows that in Japanese o-causatives can have a situation
as their CAUSER, while ni-causatives cannot.[20,21] What does this fact indi-
cate? According to Shibatani (1973b), in Japanese, o-causatives are coercive
while ni-causatives are noncoercive, as suggested by the examples in (32);

(32) a. boku-wa tikarazukude/ ??tanonde Taroo-*o* ika-se-ta.

         I-TOP   forcibely / by asking   Taro-ACC go-cause-past

         "I caused Taro to go forcibly/by asking to do so."

    b. boku-wa tikarazukude/ ??tanonde Taroo-*ni* ika-se-ta.

        I-TOP   forcibely / by asking   Taro-DAT go-cause-past

        "I caused Taro to go forcibly/by asking to do so."

                                                      (Shibatani(1973b))

Recall here that in English *make*-causatives are coercive causatives and *have*-
causatives are noncoercive ones. Furthermore, only *make*-causatives can have
situations as their causers. We can say that o-causatives in Japanese are
almost parallel to *make*-causatives in English, while ni-causatives are
almost parallel to *have*-causatives.[22] Thus it can be said that, in o-caus-
atives, a situation can be taken to be the CAUSER, while it is not the case in
ni-causatives.

4. Related Issues

As we have seen in section 1, there are somewhat complicated examples of
have-causatives, which cannot be straightforwardly explained in Oohashi's
proposal. In this section, I deal with such problematic examples as shown in
the following contrast:

(33) a. *I had the pen write the letter.

   b. Roosevelt had B29 drop many bombs.

We can easily explain the unacceptability of (33a). As we have seen above, the causee of *have*-causatives has some volition to bring about the situation or the event described in the embedded clause. In this sense, the causee can be regarded as an Agent. *The pen* in (33a) is inanimate and does not have volition. Furthermore, the pen is conceived as an Instrument rather than an Agent. Hence the unacceptability of (33a). In contrast, (33b) is acceptable in spite of the fact that the embedded subject *B29* itself is inanimate with no volition. This appears to be incompatible with our analysis. Why is (33b) acceptable?

   I propose here that *B29* in (33b) is cognitively agentivized under a certain condition. This proposal is confirmed by Schlesinger's (1989) analysis of Agents and Instruments. He presents two conditions under which Instruments can be agentivized, which he calls "Naturalness Conditions 1 and 2":

(34) a. Naturalness Condition 1: When the event is not instigated by a human Agent, or when the Agent is unknown or no longer on the scene, the Instrument by means of which the action is performed or which is involved in the event may be naturally expressed as the subject.

   b. Naturalness Condition 2: To the extent that attention is drawn to the Instrument by means of which an action is performed and away from the instigator of the action, the performer will be naturally expressed as the sentence subject.

                                                    (Schlesinger (1989))

Schlesinger explains the following contrast in terms of the Naturalness Conditions:

(35) a. *The pen wrote the letter.

   b. B29 dropped many bombs.

In (35b) our attention is drawn to *B29*, and not to the pilot because we

perceive that the action of dropping bombs is performed by *B29*. Thus, meeting Naturalness Condition 2, (35b) is acceptable. In contrast, *the pen* in (35a) cannot be conceived to be an Agent because our attention is drawn not to the pen but to the true Agent who uses it. The sentence in (35a) cannot satisfy neither Naturalness Condition 1 nor 2. Hence the unacceptability of (35a). It should be noticed that the fact pointed out by Schlesinger also affects the contrast in (33); (33a) is unacceptable in the same way that (35a) is, while the acceptability of (33b) is similar to that of (35b). More specifically, the causee of (33b) (i.e. *B29*) is agentivized under Naturalness Conditions while that of (33a) is not. Therefore, only the sentence in (33b) is acceptable.

The agentivization of the causee in *have*–causatives can also be found in some phenomena which Schlesinger shows to argue against Fillmore's (1968) observation. First we will look at Fillmore's (1968) observation and Schlesinger's counterarguments. Next we will see how Schlesinger's proposal (i.e. Naturalness Conditions 1 and 2) works in *have*–causatives.

Fillmore (1968) observes that two NPs with different Cases cannot be conjoined, as seen in (36), where the Agent (*Carol*) and the Instrument (*the stick*) purport to be conjoined:

(36) *Carol and the stick hit the horse.

In contrast, as Schlesinger points out, in (37) a human Agent and an inanimate object used as an Instrument can be conjoined:

(37) a. Percy and his new Citoroën won the race.
     b. Her son and the computer play a game of chess.

Schlesinger explains the contrast between (36) and (37) as follows: in (37) the inanimate objects (*his new Citoroën* and *the computer*) are agentivized or can be considered to be Agents in the sense that it can be conceived that they perform some action by their own. Therefore, Naturalness Condition 2 is satisfied. On the other hand, *the stick* in (36) cannot be conceived as an Agent and thus it cannot satisfy the Naturalness Conditions.

If the causee of *have*–causatives can be conceived as a high degree Agent,

following Shclesinger's observation, we can say that the contrast between the following examples is essentially the same as the contrast between (36) and (37):

(38) a. *I had Carol and the stick hit the horse.

b. The commissioner had Percy and his new Citoroën win the race.

c. Mary had her son and the computer play a game of chess.

As we have seen above, in (38b) *his new Citoroën* can be considered to be an Agent. Because both causees (*Percy* and *his new Citoroën*) are Agents, (38b) is acceptable. The same is true of (38c). *The computer* is not conceived as an Instrument, but rather as an Agent in the sense that it has a complicated mechanism by which it performs some action by its own (i.e. playing a game, calculation etc.). Thus, because the whole causee (*her son* and *the computer*) is an Agent, the sentence in (38c) is acceptable. On the other hand, in (38a) *the stick* cannot be considered to be an Agent. If so, the whole causee is not taken to be an Agent; *Carol* is an Agent while *the stick* is an Instrument. Thus, (38a) is not acceptable because the causee of *have*-causatives must be an Agent.

Furthermore, according to Fillmore (1968), two identical Cases cannot occur in a simple sentence:

(39) *A hammer broke the glass with a chisel.

(39) is unacceptable under the interpretation that *a hammer* and *a chisel* are both understood as an Instrument. As we can predict, a causative construction which has the sentence in (39) as its embedded complement cannot be acceptable:

(40) *I had a hammer break the glass with a chisel.

On the other hand, against Fillmore's analysis of (39), Schlesinger observes that if some special properties of the subject to be stressed are described by a *with*-phrase, the sentence becomes acceptable:

(41) The cruiser bombard the coast with heavy shells.

In (41) *heavy shells* are a special property of the subject *the cruiser* to be taken notice of. In addition, *the cruiser* itself can be agentivized because of its complicated mechanism. Thus (41) is acceptable.

Likewise, a causative construction in which the sentence (41) is embedded is acceptable:

(42) Bush had the cruiser bombard the coast with heavy shells.

In (42) *the cruiser* can be agentivized in terms of the Naturalness Conditions and moreover, *heavy shells* are described as a special property of the cruiser. Hence the acceptability of (42).

Let us summarize the main points that have been made in this section. We have closely looked at cases where the causee of *have*-causatives is inanimate with no volition. Even in that cases, *have*-causatives are acceptable, if the causee can be agentivized under Schlesinger's Naturalness Conditions. The fact we have seen in this section provides good evidence for our analysis that the causee of *have*-causatives must be an Agent.

5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have been mainly concerned with the semantic differences between the causations (the CAUSE-EFFECT relations) of the two periphrastic causatives, i.e. *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives. In *make*-causatives, the definition of the CAUSE-EFFECT relation is such that a certain situation (SITUATION$_1$), which is an immediate cause, affects the causee that is the most salient participant of the caused situation (SITUATION$_2$) and some situation (SITUATION$_2$) is PRODUCED as an EFFECT. In contrast, the causation of *have*-causatives is such that the causer conveys his will to the causee in order to bring about a certain situation according to his/her will; the causee of *have*-causatives voluntarily does what the causer wants and for this reason the causee can be considered to be an Agent; and the caused situation is ATTRIBUTED to the causer. From this viewpoint, distinct properties of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives emerge: in *make*-causatives (i) the

immediate cause (the CAUSER) is a certain situation, (ii) the causee, who is the most salient participant in SITUATION$_2$, is AFFECTED by SITUATION$_1$, and (iii) SITUATION$_2$ is PRODUCED by SITUATION$_1$; in *have*-causatives, (i) the causer must be a person because the causer can be considered to be an Experiencer, (ii) the causee ACCEPTS the causer's will and voluntarily does what the causer wants, and (iii) the causer and the caused situation are related in terms of the notion of ATTRIBUTE.

I have also observed cases where *have*-causatives are acceptable even if their causees are inanimate with no volition. I have pointed out that, in such cases, inanimate causees can be agentivized under Schlesinger's Naturalness Conditions. Thus, these problematic cases can be straightforwardly accounted for within our analysis.

NOTES

* This is a slightly modified version of the paper read at the monthly meeting of the Tsukuba English Linguistics Colloquium held on October 20, 1991. I would like to thank the audience there for useful comments. I am especially indebted to Yukio Hirose, Hidehito Hoshi and Kazue Takeda for their valuable suggestions on the earlier version of this paper. Thanks are due to Noriko Nemoto and Takashi Yoshida for reading this paper and pointing out some stylistic errors. Finally, my special thanks go to Ronald Craig, who patiently acted as an informant.

[1] Over the past few years a considerable number of studies have been made on the relation between lexical causatives and periphrastic causatives (as for the term *periphrastic causatives*, see Notes 3). From the syntactic point of view, the main problem is how lexical causatives can be derived from their corresponding periphrastic causatives (for example, *kill* is derived from *cause to die*). Semantically, it is mainly claimed that lexical causatives are "direct causatives", while periphrastic causatives are "indirect causatives". See McCawley (1976), Shibatani (1976), Yang (1976) and among others.

[2] See Wierzbicka (1988:237)

[3] The term *periphrastic causatives* is used differently among linguists; in Shibatani (1973) it is termed *productive causatives* in the sense that the causative verbs *make, have, cause* etc. can freely occur with any type of

verbs. Babcock (1972) calls causatives of this type *paraphrastic causatives* in that they are paraphrases of their corresponding lexical causatives. In this paper, however, I use the term *periphrastic causatives* in the most general sense of the word "periphrastic".

⁴ In a strict sense, the verb *become* is not a stative verb, but rather a process verb. Baron regards this verb as stative in the sense that *become*, like true stative verbs, cannot be used in an imperative form.

⁵ It seems to me that Baron uses the term [agentive] roughly. Thus, when she claims that the subject of *have*-causatives must be [+agentive], it implies not that the subject functions as Agent, but that it must be a person. See Baron (1974) for details.

⁶ One may point out that the verb *drop* has two interpretations, i.e. [+intentional] and [-intentional], and that in the case of example (10) *drop* is interpreted as a [+intentional] verb. However, recall that *B29* is inanimate in the sense that it has no volition per se. Following Oohashi's analysis and also from figure (8), *B29* should be combined with the [-intentional] reading of the verb *drop*. Thus the verb *drop* in (10) is interpreted as [-intentional].

⁷ Wierzbicka (1988) argues that the analyses of causative constructions in terms of ready-made labels such as "direct vs. indirect causation", "strong coercive vs. weak coercive causation" etc. are often misleading. She also points out that they do not have much explanatory or predictive power because such analyses cannot explain the different behavior of causatives among languages. I agree with Wierzbicka's view. But we will make no further inquiry into this matter.

⁸ My informant points out that (13b) will be acceptable if we interpret this sentence in the following way: John authoritatively orders Mary to do the work, and the order is accidentally according to her wishes.

⁹ (14a) can be acceptable when the interpretation is such that, though Mary voluntarily does the work, her doing it ends up in a situation where the result does not meet her wishes.

¹⁰ It has often been discussed what is a plausible thematic role for the causee of *have*-causatives (Agent or Patient) and the causer of the causatives (Agent or Experiencer). Because of the limitation of space, we cannot discuss this matter. But in this paper we propose that the causee acts

like an Agent and the causer like an Experiencer. In section 4 we will see good evidence to show that our position is on the right track.

¹¹ She also points out that the causer transfers his/her will either directly or by an intermediary.

¹² I distinguish the use of "the CAUSER" from that of "the causer" in the text. As for the one which is represented in the small letters, it serves to refer to a person. On the other hand, when we use the term in the capital letters (i.e. the CAUSER), it is used as referring to the abstract notion of immediate causes.

¹³ Wierzbicka (1988) does not deal with *make*-causatives where the causer is inanimate as in *The wind made the flag flutter*.

¹⁴ One may say that the causer (or the immediate cause) of *make*-caus-atives must not be a situation but a person on the basis of the argument that the CAUSER functions as an instigaor of the situation that imperative forms indicate:

       (i) Make him go to the store.

But if we look more carefully into this problem, it will be clear that sentence (i) is not problematic for our analysis. Let us consider the meaning which imperative forms of *make*-causatives indicate. What the example in (i) indicates is as follows: Do something by which the causee is affected and thus he is forced to go to the store. In this respect we can say that the immediate cause of SITUATION$_2$ [he go] is not the causer himself/herself, but rather the situation (SITUATION$_1$) which is a result of some action of the causer's. This is compatible with our analysis in which SITUATION$_1$ is the CAUSER of *make*-causatives. A person who is implicitly realized as the causer is taken to be an instigator of SITUATION$_1$, but not in the whole situation that the imperative sentence indicates.

¹⁵ When *make*-causatives are passivized, *to* must appear before the embedded verbs:

       (i) a. He was made to eat my spinach.
          b. *He was made eat my spinach.

Although this fact is a debatable point, I will not discuss it in this paper.

[16] The following contrast indicates that the notion of "affectedness" is involved in the acceptability of passive sentences:

(i) a. The page was turned by George.
b. *The corner was turned by George.

(Bolinger (1975))

In example (ia), *the page* can be conceived as an affected entity in the sense that the state of it is changed because of George's turning it (i.e. the page went from right side to left side). On the other hand, *the corner* in (ib) cannot taken to be an affected entity because George's turning it does not give rise to any significant change of it. See Bolinger (1975) for the detailed discussion of the notion of "affectedness".

[17] Tanaka (1987) proposes that the core meaning of *have* is that "in the relation HAVE (X, Y), Y is in the sphere of X's possession". According to Tanaka, the notion of "the sphere of X's possession" can be applied not only to the physical sense of possession but also to more abstract senses of possession such as experience. Tanaka's analysis supports our analysis of the causative *have* in two respects: (i) his proposal that Y is in the sphere of X's possession is compatible with our analysis in which the causative *have* is characterized in terms of the notion of "belong to" and (ii) the notion of "the sphere of X's possession" can also be applied to the abstract sense of *have* as used in causatives.

[18] Our claim that *have*-causatives can be defined in terms of the notion "ATTRIBUTE" has more implications; that is, this notion can also be applied to related constructions which are often differentiated from *have*-causatives as experiencer uses of the verb *have*. For further discussion, see Okuyama and Hashimoto (1992) and Okuyama (1992).

[19] For another but related reason, the causer must be a person with volition. The causer of *have*-causatives is considered to function as an Experiencer because s/he experiences SITUATION$_2$ in the sense that SITUATION$_2$ is attributable to him/her. Thus, we can say that the causer must be a person with volition. I will discuss the point in detail in section 3.

[20] Following Shibatani (1973b), the term o-causatives means causatives

whose causees (or embedded subjects) are case-marked with accusative " o ". On the other hand, ni-causatives are such that their causees are case-marked with dative " ni ".

[21] In Japanese, there is so-called "double-o constraint". This constraint prevents two occurrences of NPs from being case-marked with accusative "o" in a single sentence. Thus in the case where the verb in the embedded clause of Japanese causatives is transitive, the causee is invariably case-marked with dative "ni". For example;

(i) a. *Taroo-ga Ziroo-o hon-o   kaw-ase-ta.
        Taro-Nom Jiro-Acc book-Acc   buy-Cause-Past

   b. Taroo-ga Ziroo-ni hon-o   kaw-ase-ta.
        Taro-Nom Jiro-Dat book-Acc   buy-Cause-Past

(ia) involves two o-marked NPs and thus it is ungrammatical. On the other hand, if the o-marked causee is turned into the ni-marked one, (ib) is grammatical. Therefore, a sentence like (ib) is ambiguous as to the coerciveness involved.

[22] Wierzbicka (1988) points out that "causative constructions of a language are usually unique in the meaning they encapsulate". She also claims that "what is called *direct causation* or *coercive causation* in one language is usually different from what is called *direct causation* or *coercive causation* in another". However, in her representations of o-causatives and ni-causatives, it seems to me that they are parallel to those of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives respectively: in her framework, the causation of o-causatives is, like that of *make*-causatives, such that a certain situation brings about the subsequent situation; and as for ni-causatives, the crucial point is that the causee voluntarily does something according to the causer's offer. Thus, in the text, I maintain that the causations of o-causatives and ni-causatives are parallel to those of *make*-causatives and *have*-causatives, respectively. See Wierzbicka (1988) for the detailed discussion.

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