

The *Not that*-Construction *

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1. Introduction

This paper is an analysis of the *not that*-construction from a semantic and pragmatic point of view. Example sentences are shown in (1) and (2):

- (1) She ignored my suggestion –*not that* I care.

(*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, p.2368)

- (2) It had taken him some time to realize this, at the beginning. *Not that* he was boastful or conceited, but he had been, in his early twenties, as ambitious as most other young men at such age.

(J. Hilton, *Good-bye Mr. Chips*, p.25)

The syntactic form of the *not that*-construction varies from a dependent clause following the main clause as in (1) to an independent sentence as in (2). The *not that*-construction rejects the proposition in the *that*-clause, which is related to the preceding sentence.

Previous studies have, to the best of my knowledge, not so far examined the exhaustive data of the *not that*-construction as well as not presenting an adequate explanation for them. In this paper I will show that *not that*-sentences are classified into two classes with respect to the relation between the *not that*-construction and the preceding and the following contexts. I argue that the *not that*-construction functions as a marker, which indicates that the information conveyed by this construction is complementary to the main subject in discourse. I will further argue that some of one class can be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences, in virtue of a property of the *it is that*-construction.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will introduce previous studies as well as presenting my arguments against them. Section 3 will present my analysis on the *not that*-construction. Section 4 will be dedicated to my

own proposals concerning the substitution of *not that*-sentences for *it is not that*-sentences. The paper will be concluded in section 5.

2. Previous Studies

2.1 Mōri (1980)

Mōri (1980) says that, in the sequence *S. Not that S'*, in which *S* is the preceding fact to the *not that*-construction and *S'* is a proposition, the speaker's motivation for this construction is that s/he considers it as some precautionary measures for the hearer not to form hasty conclusions expressed in the *that*-clause. Consider the following example:

- (3) "He's not on my list," said the Inspector. "Of people employed here, I mean."
 "Oh, well, you can see him tomorrow, mister," said Briggs. " *Not that* he can tell you anything, I don't suppose."
 "You never know," said the Inspector. (Mōri 1980:210)

In (3), Briggs, who is a speaker of the sentence *you can see him tomorrow*, presents the *not that*-clause for his addressee not to draw a conclusion from that statement that he can tell the Inspector anything.

Mōri argues that *not* in the *not that*-construction is an abridgement of 'I would not say that', which can be symbolized as (I don't say <it is [*S'*]>), and that it is a performative sentence.

Mōri's claim that a *not that*-clause functions as precautionary measures is available when the speaker of a *not that*-clause is the same as the speaker of the preceding sentence, as in (3). That is not the case where the speaker of the *not that*-clause is distinguished from the speaker of the preceding sentence as in (4):

- (4) "Have you ever had a Red Stripe?"
 " *Not that* I recall." (J.Grisham, *The Farm*, p.129)

The speaker of the *not that*-clause rejects the proposition *I recall*, which he believes must be an implication of his interlocutor's question *Have you ever had a Red Stripe?*. In this use of the *not that*-construction, the speaker reminds his interlocutor of the fact that he does not recall Red Stripe.

Mōri's assertion that the *not that*-construction is a performative sentence is problematic. The *not that*-clause, as Hurford (1973) points out, is not equivalent to *I do not say that...*. Look at the following examples:

- (5) Phil asked his boss for a raise (not that he needs one).
 (6) I do not say that Phil needs a raise.

(Hurford 1973:254)

As Hurford observes, the *not that*-clause in (5) is not synonymous with *I do not say that Phil needs a raise* in (6). The latter constitutes deliberate avoidance of any assertion on the subject of Phil's need for a raise. The *not that*-clause in (5), however, definitely contains the assertion that Phil does not need a raise.

Yamanashi (1986), among others, claims that performative sentences should have the following properties: the subject in the main clause is *I*; the indirect object is *you* (implicit or explicit); and their main verbs have such characteristics as are present tense, active voice, indicative mood and positiveness. The example in (7) is distinguished from a performative sentence because the verb in the main clause is not positive. (The star indicates that the sentence is not a performative sentence):

- (7) *I do not promise that I shall be there. (Yamanashi 1986:35)

In virtue of this constraint, the *not that*-construction is not a performative sentence in the sense that it is, according to Mōri, symbolized as *I don't say <it is [S']>*.¹

2.2 Declerck (1992)

Declerck (1992) considers the *not that*-construction to be an inferential construction, giving the following examples:

- (8) Why did he bring you flowers? *Not that* there's any reason, of course, why he shouldn't bring you flowers.
- (9) You might have been able to teach me something. *Not that* I need much teaching.

(Declerck 1992:223)

In (8) the proposition rejected by the *not that*-clause is an inference drawn from the preceding question *Why did he bring you flowers?*. In (9) the speaker negates the proposition *I need much teaching*, which can be inferred from the preceding statement *You might have been able to teach me something*. Declerck's indication that the *not that*-construction is inferential is an important point. In this paper I will follow this point.

However, Declerck's analysis on the *not that*-construction has three issues to be discussed. The first issue is that the nature of the inference in the *that*-clause is less specific than that in the *it is that*-construction. The inference of the latter, according to Declerck (1992), is usually concerned with a reason or cause of a situation just referred to. Consider the following examples:

- (10) We've chosen good colors, gentle colors. Does that mean we're gentle, you reckon? (...) *It is that* there's so much suffering in the world that I suddenly need other kinds of knowledge, to soothe it all out. (...) (Declerck 1992:205; requoted from Wesker 1970:75)
- (11) I wonder why he did it. –Perhaps *it's that* he needs money.

(Declerck 1992:220)

The *that*-clause in (10) gives an inferential reason for the choice of particular colors. In (11), the *that*-clause expresses an inferential reason for his having done it.

On the other hand, the inferences in the *that*-clauses in (8) and (9), as Declerck claims, cannot be said to represent a reason or cause of the preceding sentence(s). Rather, they give a less specific implication inferred from it.

As far as examples (8) and (9) are concerned, Declerck's argument on this matter seems to be correct. The following example, however, offers an inferential reason for the preceding context:

- (12)=(2) It had taken him some time to realize this, at the beginning.
Not that he was boastful or conceited, but he has been, in his
 early twenties, as ambitious as most other men at such age.

In (12) the proposition which is rejected here is the inferential reason for the fact *It had taken him some time to realize this, at the beginning*. Thus, the inference in the *not that*-sentence in (12) is as specific as those in (10) and (11). In section 3, I will distinguish (12) from (8) and (9) by classifying the *not that*-construction into two classes.

The second issue is that the *not that*-clause serves to clarify the speaker's intention in making the statement. Declerck ascribes this to the fact that in all the examples of the *not that*-construction he has found the speaker of the *not that*-construction is the same as the speaker of the statement in question, as in (8) and (9). Take (8) for instance:

- (8) Why did he bring you flowers? *Not that* there's any reason, of course, why he shouldn't bring you flowers.

The speaker's intention of asking the question in (8) is clarified by his or her saying after the question *Not that there's any reason, of course, why he shouldn't bring you flowers*.

However, in the case where the speaker of the *not that*-sentence is different from the speaker of the preceding sentence, as in (4) (repeated here in (13)), it is not possible to hold on that assertion:

- (13) "Have you ever had a Red Stripe?"
 "Not that I recall."

As stated in 2.1, the speaker of the *not that*-sentence intends to remind his or her interlocutor of the fact that s/he does not recall Red Stripe, which is not compatible with Declerck's assertion that this construction serves to clarify the speaker's intention in asking the question. This gives rise to the following question: Why can the speaker of the *not that*-sentence in (13) deny the inference which is drawn from his or her interlocutor's preceding question? In section 3, I will answer this question, discussing the property of the inference

in (13).

The last issue is that *not that*-sentences normally cannot be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences. For this, Declerck gives the following pair:

(14) I shan't ever vote socialist after this. *Not that* I ever did.

(15) *I shan't ever vote socialist after this. *It is not that* I ever did.
(Declerck 1992:224)

Declerck claims that the reason why this replacement is not possible is due to the fact that the *it is not that*-sentence is specificational but the *not that*-sentence is not. I will discuss the specificational *it is that*-construction in detail in section 4.

However, it is not rare to find the examples in which *not that*-sentences can be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences. Consider the following examples:

(16) "Will you accompany me?"

"Well, *it's not that* I wouldn't like to, but my wife is waiting for me."
(Declerck 1992:222)

(17) "Will you accompany me?"

"Well, *not that* I wouldn't like to, but my wife is waiting for me."

The *it is not that*-sentence in (16) can be substituted for the *not that*-sentence as in (17) and vice versa. Then, what restriction is imposed on this substitution? I will discuss this matter in detail in section 4.

3. Analysis

3.1 Two Classes

As it is clear from the observations in section 2, the full range of the distribution of the *not that*-construction has not been captured yet in previous analyses (except Otake (1994)).

All the examples of *not that*-sentences I have found are classified into two

classes with respect to the relation between the *not that*-clause and the preceding and the following contexts. The *not that*-sentences which belong to Class I function as a proviso, as in (1). They are not followed by any reason and/or explanation of the *not that*-construction. Class II expressions are followed by a statement(s) concerning the assertion of the *not that*-construction, as in (2), for instance, a reason/cause, an explanation, and/or what the speaker believes to be true instead of a rejected proposition in the *that*-clause. It should be noted here that all the *not that*-sentences dealt with by Mōri (1980), Declerck (1992), and Hurford (1973) are classified into Class I.

I will investigate in the following subsections characteristics of Class I and Class II in detail, discussing the difference between their functions in discourse.

3.2 Class I Expressions

Let us begin by examining the way Class I expressions are used and interpreted. Consider the following examples:

- (18)=(1) She ignored my suggestion—*not that* I care.
 (19) Who were you with last night?—*not that* I'm nosey.
 (20)=(8) Why did he bring you flowers? *Not that* there's any reason, of course, why he shouldn't bring you flowers.
 (21)=(13) "Have you ever had a Red Stripe?"
 "*Not that* I recall."
 (22)=(3) "He's not on my list," said the Inspector. "Of people employed here, I mean."
 "Oh, well, you can see him tomorrow, mister," said Briggs.
 "*Not that* he can tell you anything, I don't suppose."
 "You never know," said the Inspector.
 (23)=(9) You might have been able to teach me something. *Not that* I need much teaching.

The forms of Class I expressions vary from a dependent clause, as in (18) and (19), to an independent sentence, as in (20)–(23). The preceding situation from which the inference in the *that*-clause is drawn is not only the speech act of

it, as in (18)-(21), but also the content of statement, as in (22) and (23). In (18) the speaker rejects the inference that the speaker cares about her ignoring his or her suggestion, which is inferred from the preceding utterance *She ignored my suggestion*. In (19), the speaker who asks the question *Who were you with last night?* negates the inference that s/he is nosey, which is inferred from the act of asking the question *Who were you with last night?*. The example in (20) shows that the rejected inference represented in the *that*-clause, *there's any reason, of course, why he shouldn't bring you flowers*, is drawn from the act of asking the question *Why did he bring you flowers?*. The reason why the addressee of the question *Have you ever had a Red Stripe?* in (21) can deny the inference *I recall*, which is drawn from that question, is due to the same reasons as in (18)-(20); that is to say, he rejects the inference drawn from his interlocutor's speech act of asking the question.

On the other hand, in (22) and (23), the speaker negates the inferential proposition drawn from the content of the preceding statement. In (22), Briggs denies the inferential proposition that he can tell the Inspector anything, which is inferred from his preceding statement *Oh, well you can see him tomorrow, mister*. In (23), the rejected proposition *I need much teaching* is inferred from the previous statement *You might have been able to teach me something*.

It is important to point out that since Class I expressions, as shown in (18)-(23), are not followed by an explanation and/or reason for the speaker's rejecting the inference in the *that*-clause, they are understood as giving complementary information about the preceding sentence. Thus, they function as a proviso in discourse.²

In the case where the rejected proposition is inferred from the speech act of the preceding sentence and the speaker of a *not that*-sentence is the same person as the speaker of the preceding sentence(s), *not that*-sentences can occur in the initial discourse position. To take an example, the *not that*-sentence in (19), for instance, can appear in the initial position of discourse:

(24) *Not that* I'm nosey, but who were you with last night?

(Hurford 1973:261)

In (24), before asking the question, the speaker rejects the inference drawn

from that question.

This seems to be restricted to the inference drawn from the speech act of the preceding sentence. When the inference in the *not that*-sentence is drawn from the content of the preceding sentence and the speaker of the former is the same as the speaker of the latter, as in (23), the *not that*-sentence cannot occur in the initial discourse position:

- (25) **Not that* I need much teaching, but you might have been able to teach me something.

Needless to say, the *not that*-sentence in (21) cannot be positioned in the initial discourse position leading the former question, since the speaker of the former is different from the speaker of the latter.

3.3 Class II Expressions

A distinguished characteristic of Class II expressions is that they are followed by a proposition(s) related to the *not that*-construction. They can be further divided into two subclasses. First, consider the case in which the *not that*-construction is followed by an affirmative proposition instead of the rejected inference in the *that*-clause, as in (26) and (27):

- (26)=(12) It had taken him some time to realize this, at the beginning.
Not that he was boastful or conceited, but he had been, in his early twenties, as ambitious as most other young men at such age.
- (27) Errors such as these which have occurred over the last few months have been, naturally enough, injurious to one's self-respect, but then there is no reason to believe them to be the signs of anything more sinister than a staff shortage. *Not that* a staff shortage is not significant in itself; but if Miss Kenton were indeed to return to Darlington Hall, such little slips, I am sure, would become a thing of the past. (K. Ishiguro, *The Remains of the Day*, p.140)

In (26) the rejected inference *he was boastful or conceited* in the *that*-clause

is followed by the affirmative proposition *he had been, in his early twenties, as ambitious as most other young men at such age*, which is led by the conjunction *but*. This affirmative proposition is what the speaker believes to be correct, related to the preceding context *It had taken him some time to realize this, at the beginning*, instead of the rejected inference. In (27) there is an affirmative proposition *if Miss Kenton were indeed to return to Darlington Hall, such little slips, I am sure, would become a thing of the past* after the rejected inference *a staff shortage is not significant in itself*, which is drawn from the preceding statement *there is no reason to believe them to be the signs of anything more sinister than a staff shortage*.

It is possible for an explanation and/or reason for the assertion of the *not that*-sentence to intervene between the *not that*-clause and the affirmative proposition. Consider the following example:

- (28) He was now a professor, this same Artie with whom Wilhelm had played near the soldiers' and sailors' monument on River Drive. *Not that* to be a professor was in itself so great. How could anyone bear to know so many languages? And Artie also had to remain Artie, which was a bad deal. But perhaps success had changed him. Now that he had a place in the world perhaps he was better...

(S. Bellow, *Seize the Day*, p.16)

In (28) the speaker gives, between the *not that*-sentence and the affirmative proposition *perhaps success had changed him* led by *but*, reasons for asserting *Not that to be a professor was in itself so great*. Note here that the main assertion with respect to the topic in discourse is not the one that the professor itself is not an admired professional, but the assertion before the *not that*-sentence and the assertion after the reasons following it; that is to say, Artie, a friend of Wilhelm's early childhood, is now a professor. Thus, the contents of the *not that*-sentence and the following reasons function as digressing from the discourse topic.

There are other Class II expressions which are not followed by an affirmative proposition instead of the rejected one in the *that*-clause, as in (26)-(28), but are followed by the reason and/or the explanation of stating the *not that*-construction. The following is an example:

- (29) As early as 1903, Beaverbrook ran his business by standing at a lectern dictating letters and memos, just as Davie observed him doing in 1956. *Not that* he disdained the telephone. He used it constantly to communicate, to show off, to harass: one editor remembered being awakened by Beaverbrook's shouted criticism and hearing his girl of the moment laughing in the background... Davie had also noted Beaverbrook's restlessness, his fascination with scandal, and his unself-conscious assembling of mismatched people... (Otake 1994:51)

In (29) the inference *he disdained the telephone* is rejected, which is drawn from the preceding context *As early as 1903, Beaverbrook ran his business by standing at a lectern dictating letters and memos, just as Davie observed him doing in 1956*, and then the reason for that is stated, offering several concrete examples, for instance, Beaverbrook used the telephone constantly. Note here that the discourse topic after the reason is the way Beaverbrook ran his business. It returns to the preceding context of the *not that*-sentence. It is obvious here that the *not that*-sentence and the following reasons as a whole also function to digress from the main subject in the discourse.

The function of the *not that*-sentence and the following reason and/or explanation is extended so as to constitute an independent paragraph by themselves. Look at the following example:

- (30) I'd never considered, though I should have, that these crackpot prejudices of Banny's which I found so amusing were not remotely ironic but deadly serious.

Not that Francis, in normal circumstances, wasn't perfectly able to take care of himself. He had a quick temper, and a sharp tongue...

I don't really have the heart to recount all the vile things he said and did to Francis, the practical jokes, the remarks about faggots and queers, the public, humiliating stream of questions about his preference...

(D. Tartt, *The Secret History*, p.257; requoted from Otake 1994:42)

In (30) the first paragraph shows that Banny did evil things to Francis, while

the content of the second paragraph led by the *not that*-sentence is that Francis was not normally able to take care of himself. Concerning the semantic relation between the first paragraph and the second paragraph, the topic in the latter digresses from the topic in the former. As Otake (1994) observes, it can be said that the *not that*-sentence functions as a sort of trigger which deviates the whole content of the second paragraph from the subject in the preceding context. It is important to note here that the topic in the third paragraph that Benny did various vile things to Francis goes along the lines mentioned in the first paragraph. The topic in the third paragraph is the same as the topic in the first paragraph. Thus, the second paragraph functions to digress from the main topic in discourse.

With the preceding context concerned, the function of Class II expressions is offering a rejected inference drawn from the preceding sentence(s), which is the same as that of Class I. However, what distinguishes Class II from Class I is that the former constitutes composite information together with the following reason, explanation and/or an affirmative proposition, but the latter does not. The Class I's function as a proviso is, in some of Class II expressions, so extended as to function as a marker which indicates that the *not that*-sentence and the following information digress from the topic in discourse. The noticeable point is that Class I expressions and Class II expressions (and the following information) all serve as information not equivalent to the preceding context in discourse. In other words, their information is complementary to the main topic in discourse.

4. The *It is not that*-Sentence

In this section I discuss the possibility of replacing *not that*-sentences with *it is not that*-sentences based on the classification of the *not that*-construction proposed in section 3.

Declerck (1992) and Otake (1994) claim that *not that*-sentences cannot be substituted for *it is not that*-sentences for some reason.³

Declerck asserts that the reason why *not that*-sentences are not replaced by *it is not that*-sentences is due to the fact that the latter is specification-al but the former is not, giving the examples in (14) and (15) (repeated here

in (31) and (32)):

- (31)=(14) I shan't ever vote socialist after this. *Not that* I ever did.
 (32)=(15) *I shan't ever vote socialist after this. *It's not that* I ever did.

According to Declerck, the sequence of the two sentences in (32) is incoherent because it is interpreted as 'The reason why I shan't ever vote socialist after this is not that I ever did' (p.225). Before going into this assertion, we need to discuss the *it is that*-construction, which, as Declerck (1992) points out, is specificational and inferential.

4.1 The Specificational *It is that*-Construction

A specificational sentence, as Declerck (1992) says, is defined as "one that is identifying in the sense that it specifies a value for a variable" (p.219). Take for instance (33):

- (33) A: Who's the committee's chairman?
 B: Mr. Burns is the chairman. (Declerck 1992:210)

In (33) the question asks for specificational information. The noun phrase *the committee's chairman* represents a variable whose value is unknown to the speaker asking the question. The speaker B supplies the identifying information, that is to say, Mr. Burns is the value that satisfies the variable.

As Declerck argues, the *it is that*-construction is specificational. The *it is that*-sentence in (34), for example, is understood as in (35):

- (34) If there has been an explosion, *it's that* the workers have not taken the necessary precautions.
 (35) The only possible explanation of the fact that there has been an explosion is the following: the workers have not taken the necessary precautions.

(Declerck 1992:211)

Referring to (35), this kind of paraphrase, "the form x is the following: y " (p.212), in which x is the variable and y is the value, is typical of specificational sentences.⁴ I will henceforth follow Declerck's definition of the specificational sentence in terms of *value* and *variable*.

As Declerck observes, the *it is that*-construction is specificational but does not overtly lexicalize the variable, which means that the speaker has to infer the variable from the context. Therefore the specificational *it is that*-construction is inferential.⁵

There are several observations, as Declerck notes, that can be explained from the fact that the *it is that*-construction is specificational. First of all, specificational *it is that*-sentences are not interpreted in isolation. Look at the following examples:

- (36) a. *It may be that* I'm late home tonight.
 b. *It's that* I'm late home tonight. (Declerck 1992:212)

When the specificational *it is that*-sentence in (36b) occurs in the initial discourse position, it is not interpretable on its own, because its variable is not recoverable for the addressee. The sentence in (36a), which is an instance of extraposition, is, by contrast, fully interpretable by itself.

The second characteristic of the specificational *it is that*-construction is that most *it is not that*-sentences are followed by an affirmative *it is that*-sentence. Consider the following example:

- (37) I mean, you don't really like her, do you? *It's not that* I don't like her, that's not at all. She's very amusing and intelligent and attractive. *It's just that* I sometimes wonder whether she's your kind of person.

(Declerck 1992:215; requoted from Hampton 1970:19)

In (37) the *it's not that*-sentence is followed by the affirmative *it's just that*-sentence including a correct value for the variable. Note here that the *it's not that*-sentence in (37), as Declerck among others points out, does not deny that I don't like her, but it does deny that the proposition in the *that*-clause is not the value that satisfies the variable. The following pair, which

is originally observed by Delahunty (1990:22-23), makes this point clear:

- (38) a. *It is not that* one fears treachery, though of course one does.
 b. ?One does not fear treachery, though of course one does.

The *it is not that*-sentence in (38a) does not deny the truth of the proposition expressed in the *that*-clause, but does deny that the proposition is the one that satisfies the variable (which is not explicit here). In other words, the *it is not that*-sentence rejects not the truth of the proposition in the *that*-clause but its relevance to the variable.

Incidentally, the affirmative proposition including a correct value does not always take a form of the inferential *it is that*-sentence. In the following example, the correct value is expressed by a form of a noninferential sentence:

- (39) My father was actually the chairman of the local Conservative Association, so, as you can imagine, he had pretty definite views and rather strong political ambitions. *It's not that* he was lacking compassion for other people at all –he was actually a very nice, kind man. (Otake 1994:37)

In (39) the correct value is presented by the noninferential sentence *he was actually a very nice, kind man*.

4.2 Substitution and Class II

In this subsection I first discuss the reason why *not that*-sentences cannot be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences, concerning the examples in (31) and (32). Next my concern centers around the case where this substitution is possible, which, as far as I know, has not so far been mentioned in previous studies.

Let us return to the examples in (31) and (32) (repeated here in (40) and (41)):

- (40)=(31) I shan't ever vote socialist after this. *Not that* I ever did.
 (41)=(32) *I shan't ever vote socialist after this. *It's not that* I ever

did.

It is obvious from the discussion in the previous subsection that the reason why the *not that*-sentence in (40) cannot be replaced by an *it is not that*-sentence is not owing to the fact that, as Declerck says, the latter is interpreted as "The reason why I shan't ever vote socialist after this is not that I ever did". I would like to suggest instead that this impossibility is attributed to the fact that the negative *it is not that*-sentence in (41) is not followed by a correct value. With a correct value satisfying the variable following the *it is not that*-sentence, the sequence would be acceptable. This prediction is borne out. Look at the following example:

(42) I shan't ever vote socialist after this. *It's not that* I ever did,
but *it's that* I hate the leader.

The example in (42) is acceptable because the correct value *I hate the leader* is supplied instead of the negated value. In other words, the specificational *it is that*-construction requires the *it is not that*-sentence to be followed by the *it is that*-sentence including a correct value.

As is clear from the examples in (16) and (17), however, there are cases in which *it is not-that* sentences can be substituted for *not that*-sentences and vice versa. Look at the following examples:

(43)=(16) "Will you accompany me?"

"Well, *it's not that* I wouldn't like to, but my wife is waiting for me."

(44)=(17) "Will you accompany me?"

"Well, *not that* I wouldn't like to, but my wife is waiting for me."

(45)=(39) My father was actually the chairman of the local Conservative Association, so, as you can imagine, he had pretty definite views and rather strong political ambitions. *It's not that* he was lacking compassion for other people at all—he was actually a very nice, kind man.

- (46) My father was actually the chairman of the local Conservative Association, so, as you can imagine, he had pretty definite views and rather strong political ambitions. *Not that* he was lacking compassion for other people at all –he was actually a very nice, kind man.

The *it is not that*-sentences in (43) and (45) can be substituted for *not that*-sentences as in (44) and (46) and vice versa. The meanings conveyed by (43) and (45) are on a par with those by (44) and (46), respectively.

It is clear from the examples in (43)-(46) that *not that*-sentences and *it is not that*-sentences are interchangeable. However, not all the *not that*-sentences can be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences. Then what is the condition which makes this substitution possible with regard to the *not that*-sentence? In (44), the *not that*-clause is followed by the affirmative proposition *my wife is waiting for me*. The same holds true for (46). The *not that*-sentence in (46) is followed by the affirmative proposition *he was actually a very nice, kind man*. These facts indicate that the *not that*-sentences in (44) and (46) are Class II expressions.

Class I expressions cannot be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences because they are not followed by any information related to the *not that*-construction. Take for instance example (18) (repeated here in (47)):

(47)=(18) She ignored my suggestion—*not that* I care.

(48) *She ignored my suggestion—*it's not that* I care.

The sequence in (48) is unacceptable because the *it is not that*-sentence is not followed by a correct value. Note here that the *not that*-sentence in (40) is an instance of Class I, which means that this substitution is not allowed, as (41) shows.

It should be noted here that not all the Class II expressions can be substituted for *it is not that*-sentences. As it is discussed in 3.3, some Class II members are followed by an affirmative proposition among others, as in (26), (27) and (28), while others are not as in (29) and (30). With the specificational *it is that*-construction concerned, only the Class II expressions which are followed by the affirmative proposition can be substituted for *it is not*

that- sentences. Look at the following examples:

- (49)=(26)) It had taken him some time to realize this, at the beginning. *Not that* he was boastful or conceited, but he had been, in his early twenties, as ambitious as most other young men at such age.
- (50) It had taken him some time to realize this, at the beginning. *It's not that* he is boastful or conceited, but he had been, in his early twenties, as ambitious as other young men at such age.
- (51)=(27)) Errors such as these which have occurred over the last few months have been, naturally enough, injurious to one's self-respect, but then there is no reason to believe them to be the signs of anything more sinister than a staff shortage. *Not that* a staff shortage is not significant in itself; but if Miss Kenton were indeed to return to Darlington Hall, such little slips, I am sure, would become a thing of the past.
- (52) Errors such as these which have occurred over the last few months have been, naturally enough, injurious to one's self-respect, but then there is no reason to believe them to be the signs of anything more sinister than a staff shortage. *It is not that* a staff shortage is not significant in itself; but if Miss Kenton were indeed to return to Darlington Hall, such little slips, I am sure, would become a thing of the past.
- (53)=(28)) He was now a professor, this same Artie with whom Wilhelm had played near the soldiers' and sailors' monument on River Drive. *Not that* to be a professor was in itself so great. How could anyone bear to know so many languages? And Artie also had to remain Artie, which was a bad deal. But perhaps success had changed him...
- (54) He was now a professor, this same Artie with whom Wilhelm had played near the soldiers' and sailors' monument on River Drive. *It is not that* to be a professor was in itself so great. How could anyone bear to know so many languages? And Artie also had to remain Artie, which

was a bad deal. But perhaps success had changed him...

The *not that*-sentences in (49), (51) and (53) can be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences as in (50), (52) and (54), respectively. The reason why these particular Class II expressions as well as (44) and (46) can be substituted for *it is not that*-sentences is that the former is followed by an affirmative proposition and the latter is followed by a correct value.

It follows that other Class II expressions as in (29) and (30) (repeated here in (55) and (57)) cannot be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences because they are not followed by an affirmative proposition:

- (55) As early as 1903, Beaverbrook ran his business by standing at a lectern dictating letters and memos, just as Davie observed him doing in 1956. *Not that* he disdained the telephone. He used it constantly to communicate, to show off, to harass: one editor remembered being awakened by Beaverbrook's shouted criticism and hearing his girl of the moment laughing in the background... Davie had also noted Beaverbrook's restlessness, his fascination with scandal, and his unself-conscious...
- (56) *As early as 1903, Beaverbrook ran his business by standing at a lectern dictating letters and memos, just as Davie observed him doing in 1956. *It is not that* he disdained the telephone. He used it constantly to communicate, to show off, to harass: one editor remembered being awakened by Beaverbrook's shouted criticism and hearing his girl of the moment laughing in the background... Davie had also noted Beaverbrook's restlessness, his fascination with scandal, and his unself-conscious...
- (57) I'd never considered, though I should have, that these crackpot prejudices of Banny's which I found so amusing were not remotely ironic but deadly serious.

Not that Francis, in normal circumstances, wasn't perfectly able to take care of himself. He had a quick temper, and a sharp tongue...

I don't really have the heart to recount all the vile things he

said and did to Francis, the practical jokes, the remarks about faggots and queers, the public, humiliating stream of questions about his...

- (58) *I'd never considered, though I should have, that these crackpot prejudices of Banny's which I found so amusing were not remotely ironic but deadly serious.

It's not that Francis, in normal circumstances, wasn't perfectly able to take care of himself. He had a quick temper, and a sharp tongue...

I don't really have the heart to recount all the vile things he said and did to Francis, the practical jokes, the remarks about faggots and queers, the public, humiliating stream of questions about his...

The *not that*-sentences in (55) and (57) cannot be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences because the former is not followed by an affirmative proposition. In other words, this does not meet the condition that the specificational *it is that*-construction requires the negative *it is not that*-sentence to be followed by a correct value.

5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have examined *not that*-sentences in detail and made it clear that they are classified into two classes with respect to the relation between them and the preceding and the following contexts. We have observed that the function of a proviso in Class I is extended in Class II to a marker indicating that the *not that*-construction and the following information digress from the topic in discourse. On the basis of this analysis, we have argued that the characteristic common to these two classes in discourse is that their information is complementary to the main topic in discourse. Based on this classification, we have illustrated that some of Class II expressions, which are followed by the speaker's affirmative proposition, can be replaced by *it is not that*-sentences because the specificational *it is that*-construction requires the *it is not that*-sentence to be followed by a correct value.

NOTES

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¹ Naoaki Wada (personal communication) has pointed out to me that in the prototype approach (7) would not be excluded from the performative sentence but could be considered to be less prototypical.

² There is another linguistic expression which expresses, as complementary information, the proposition inferred from the preceding context. The example of this construction is as follows.

(i) "You mean you actually used to work for that Lord Darlington?"

He was eyeing me carefully again. I said:

"Oh no, I am employed by Mr John Farraday, the American gentleman who bought the house from the Darlington family."

"Oh, so you wouldn't have known that Lord Darlington. *Just that* I wondered what he was like. What sort of bloke he was."

(K.Ishiguro, *The Remains of the Day*, p.120)

The speaker of the question *You mean you actually used to work for that Lord Darlington?* supplies the inferential reason *I wonder what he was like* for his asking the question.

The meaning conveyed by a *just that*-sentence seems to be on a par with that by an *it is just that*-sentence. The *just that*-sentence in (ii), according to my informant, can be replaced by an *it is just that*-sentence.

(ii) I visited Kyoto last week. *Just that* it seemed to be an interesting place.

³ Otake (1994) claims that when the speaker knows well the preceding situation s/he uses the form of the *it is not that*-sentence instead of the *not that*-sentence. As will be clear in the discussion in section 4, his assertion

is not correct.

⁴ Sentences of the form "NP *be* NP" (Declerck 1988:1) are divided into two semantic types, which are referred to as specificational and as predicational. A predicational sentence, in contrast to a specificational sentence, does not specify a value for a variable. The distinction between specificational and predicational is first proposed by Akmajian (1979)(cf. Higgins (1979)).

⁵ The following *it is that*-sentence given by Declerck (1992:218) is ambiguous:

- (i) If he has a problem, *it's that* he is not careful enough.

As Declerck (1992) observes, one reading of (i) is "If he has a problem, that problem is that he is not careful enough"(p.218). On this reading the sentence is not inferential, since the variable is lexicalized by *it*. The second interpretation is "If he has a problem, the reason is that he is not careful enough" (p.218). On this reading the sentence is inferential.

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