

On the Conceptual Structure of *Get*-Causatives*

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1. Introduction

Over the past few decades a considerable number of studies have been made on causative constructions. Especially since Lakoff's (1970) attempt to analyze English causative verbs within the framework of generative semantics, the discussion has centered around the legitimacy of lexical decomposition based on the synonymy relation between lexicalized causative verbs such as *kill* and corresponding periphrastic causative expressions like *cause to die*.¹ Some linguists challenge a lexical decomposition analysis. Fodor (1970) convincingly argues that lexicalized and periphrastic causatives should be distinguished from each other.² Agreeing with his view, Shibatani (1973) further argues, from a typological viewpoint, that causative expressions have meanings of their own, and that lexical and periphrastic causatives cannot be lumped together simply because of their synonymy relation.

Following Shibatani, this paper takes the position that different causative constructions describe causative situations differently; e.g. *make*- and *have*-causatives describe different causative situations.³ This position leads us to conclude that causative constructions have their own semantic nature. In this paper, I will investigate the semantic nature of *get*-causatives. I will present the conceptual structure (henceforth CS) of *get*-causatives which represents their "CAUSE-EFFECT" relation.^{4, 5} I will claim that the CS can successfully define the semantic nature of *get*-causatives.

The sentence in (1c) is a typical example of a *get*-causative:

- (1) a. Mary *made* John do the work.
 b. Mary *had* John do the work.
 c. Mary *got* John to do the work.

The sentences in (1a-b) are examples of *make-* and *have-caus-*atives, respectively. In this paper, they are not our main issue, although some examples of them will be given to compare them with *get-causatives*, when necessary.

This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I show some characteristics of *get-causatives*, and then point out some crucial problems, which we deal with in this paper. In section 3, I examine the lexical meaning of the verb *get* itself, which contributes to the semantic nature of *get-causatives*. In section 4, I consider the semantic function of *to*-infinitives in *get-causatives*. Furthermore, I examine how the joint property of the verb *get* and *to*-infinitives characterizes the nature of *get-causatives*. In section 5, I provide the CS of *get-causatives* which successfully characterizes their semantic nature. Then, I discuss how the CS works to explain *get-causatives*. Some concluding remarks are made in section 6.

2. Phenomena and Issues

In 2.1, I will overview some crucial characteristics of *get-causatives* which are observed in previous analyses. In 2.2, I will point out some problems which will be tackled with in this paper.

2.1. Some Characteristics

First consider the following examples:

- (2) a. John *got* Mary to do the work.
 b. *John *got* Mary ϕ do the work.

The contrast in (2) shows an important syntactic property of *get*-causatives: They take *to*-infinitives, not bare infinitives, as their complements. In this respect, *get*-causatives clearly contrast with *make*- and *have*-causatives, both of which take bare infinitives as their complements, as shown in (1a-b).

Next, there is a certain condition on the embedded verb of *get*-causatives, as the following contrast indicates:

- (3) a. Donald got Paula to *learn* the score of Beethoven's fifth.
 b. *Donald got Paula to *know* the score of Beethoven's fifth. (Baron (1974))

Baron (1974) postulates a condition requiring that the embedded verb of this type of causatives be [-stative]. The verb *learn* meets this condition, but *know* does not. Her account is descriptively workable, but she does not provide any explanation of why the embedded verb of *get*-causatives must be [-stative].

As for the matrix subject of *get*-causatives (or the CAUSER), only agentive entities are permitted:

- (4) a. John got Mary to cry with joy.
 b. *The garden's smell got Mary to cry with joy. (Givón (1975))

Furthermore, Givón observes that the same restriction is placed on the embedded subject (or the CAUSEE):

- (5) *John got the chair to move. (cf. Shibatani (1973))

The examples in (4)-(5) remind us of an observation made by Ikegami (1990). Surveying the examples of *get*-causatives taken from the corpus called *SEU* (*Survey of English Usage*), he draws

the following conclusion: "in all sentences, the subject of the construction [*get*-causatives] is a human noun.... The object of the construction is also predominantly human..." (Ikegami (1990: 188)). Following him, I specify the CAUSER and the CAUSEE as HUMAN:

(6) CAUSER : CAUSEE
 HUMAN : HUMAN

Finally, let us consider situations described by *get*-causatives. Observe the following sentences:

- (7) a. I **made** him clean the garage by threatening to cut his allowance.
 b. I **got** him to clean the garage by threatening to cut his allowance.
 c. *I **had** him clean the garage by threatening to cut his allowance.
- (8) a. *I **made** him clean the garage by promising to raise his allowance.
 b. I **got** him to clean the garage by promising to raise his allowance.
 c. I **had** him clean the garage by promising to raise his allowance.

(cf. Baron (1974))

Notice that the *by*-phrases in (7) have coercive meanings. The contrast in (7a, c) shows that *make*-causatives are compatible with this meaning, while *have*-causatives are not. In contrast, the *by*-phrases in (8) describe a non-coercive situation. That is to say, by getting a promise to raise the allowance, the CAUSEE willingly does what the CAUSER wants. In such a situation, *have*-causatives are acceptable, while *make*-causatives are not.

From this fact, Shibatani (1973) characterizes *make*-

causatives as coercive causatives and *have*-causatives as non-coercive causatives. He makes two further observations: (i) In a coercive situation, the CAUSEE shows a great resistance to the CAUSER since the CAUSEE is forced to do what the CAUSER wants, irrespective of his/her will; (ii) In a non-coercive situation, the CAUSEE shows no/little resistance to the CAUSER because the CAUSEE can willingly do what the CAUSER wants.

What about *get*-causatives? The examples in (7b) and (8b) indicates that they can be basically used in both coercive and non-coercive contexts. Shibatani, thus, ranks *get*-causatives semantically between *make*- and *have*-causatives, as shown in (9):

(9) <i>Make</i> -causatives	Coercive	a great resistance
<i>Get</i> -causatives	↑ ↓	a slight resistance
<i>Have</i> -causatives	Non-coercive	no/little resistance

To recapitulate, we have seen four characteristics of *get*-causatives: (i) the complement must be headed by *to*-infinitives; (ii) the embedded verb must be [-stative]; (iii) the CAUSER and the CAUSEE are typically human; (iv) *get*-causatives are ranked between *make*- and *have*-causatives with regard to 'coerciveness'.

2.2. Issues

Our main interest in this paper is to construct the conceptual structure of *get*-causatives which clearly defines their semantic nature. Thus, in this paper, we deal with the following question:

(10) What is the conceptual structure of *get*-causatives?

To provide a satisfactory answer to the question in (10), we examine the following three points: (i) What role does the verb

get play in the semantics of *get*-causatives?; (ii) How do *to*-infinitives contribute to the semantic nature of *get*-causatives; and finally (iii) How do we understand the situation described by *get*-causatives?

If we can give a satisfactory answer to the question in (10), the properties observed in 2.1. naturally emerge. That is, the answer to (10) gives accounts of the following three questions for *get*-causatives: (a) What factors is/are semantically involved in the restrictions on the embedded verb ([-stative])?; (b) Why must the matrix and the embedded subjects be [+human]?; and finally (c) What is responsible for the intermediate status between *make*- and *have*-causatives?

3. The Verb *Get*

Get-causatives are supposed to inherit a certain lexical property from the lexical verb *get*. Thus, in this section, we examine what factor of the verb *get* contributes to the semantic nature of *get*-causatives.

Tanaka (1987) claims that the verb *get* is an inchoative verb, i.e. a change-of-state verb:

- (11) a. He got a letter from UCLA.
b. I got my shirts dirty.

In (11a), *get* describes a change from the state where the subject *he* did not have a letter to the state where he had it; and in (11b), a change is described from the state where the shirts were not dirty to the state where they became dirty. This is schematically represented as in (12a-b), which correspond to (11a-b), respectively:⁶

- (12) a. NOT[he HAVE a letter] ----> [he HAVE a letter]
b. NOT[my shirts BE dirty] ----> [my shirts BE dirty]

On the basis of the observation above, Tanaka claims that the verb *get* focuses on the starting point from which a new situation or event is brought about.⁷ However, I claim that the focus is not only on the starting point but also on the process. Let us briefly consider evidence of this claim.

A crucial piece of evidence is found in the following sentences:

- (13) a. *John gradually discovered a new comet.
b. John's shoes gradually got dirty.

The adverb *gradually* is a process adverb. It cannot modify the verb *discover*, which is not a process verb, as is shown by the unacceptability of (13a). In contrast, as is shown in (13b), it can modify the verb *get*. This suggests that the verb *get* itself has a property as a process verb.

Jackendoff (1990) supports the claim that *get* functions as a process verb. He posits the representation below for *get*:

- (14) *get*: $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{[CAUSE ([X], [GO ([Y], [TO [Z]])])}] \\ \text{[BY [F([X])]} \end{array} \right]$

(Jackendoff (1990: 228))

Notice that representation (14) includes the GO-function. According to Jackendoff (1985: 174; 1990: 44), GO may express the path, not just the initial and the final points. This means that not just the initial point, but the process in which a new situation or event is occurring are essential to the GO-function.⁸

From (13) and (14), we can say that the verb *get* focuses on both the starting point and the process where a new situation or event is brought about, but not on the endpoint. Then, a question arises: in *get* causatives, why is the end point not focused on? I will attribute it to the semantic function of *to*-infinitives in *get*-causatives, which will be dealt with in the

next section.

4. The Role of *To*-infinitives

As we have seen above, containing *to*-infinitives is a crucial characteristic of *get*-causatives. In this section, I will examine the semantic function of *to*-infinitives. More specifically, I will observe how the difference between *to*-infinitives and bare infinitives affects the meanings of sentences. I will then consider the relation between *to*-infinitives and *get*-causatives.

4.1. No Simultaneity Restriction

Nakau (1980) presents a suggestive argument concerning some general properties of *to*-infinitives. Consider the examples in (15):

- (15) a. I saw the man cross the road.
 b. We can't allow them to do that.

(Nakau (1980))

Sentence (15a) is an example with a bare infinitive, while (15b) is an example with a *to*-infinitive. Comparing the two sentences in (15), Nakau claims that there is a semantically crucial difference between them. Observe the following contrast:

- (16) a. *Yesterday I saw the man cross the road tomorrow.
 b. The day before yesterday we had intended to give you an exam next week.

(Nakau (1980))

Two different time adverbials are not allowed in the sentence with bare infinitives, as shown in (16a): *Yesterday* purports

to modify the matrix verb *saw*, and *tomorrow* the embedded verb *cross*. By contrast, sentences with *to*-infinitives can be modified by two different time adverbials, as shown in (16b): *The day before yesterday* modifies the matrix verb *intended* and *next week* the embedded verb *give*.

Nakau claims that, as the contrast in (16) indicates, sentences with bare infinitives, but not those with *to*-infinitives, are subject to a restriction requiring that the two events described in the matrix and embedded clause occur simultaneously. He calls this restriction "simultaneity restriction".⁹

If we apply Nakau's claim to the three types of causatives, we get the same result as in (16):

- (17) a. **On Wednesday* John made/had Mary do the work
 on Friday.
 b. *On Wednesday* John got Mary to do the work
 on Friday.

In (17a), examples of *make*- and *have*-causatives with bare infinitives, the two time adverbials (i.e. *on Wednesday* and *on Friday*) cannot modify the causative verbs (i.e. *make* and *have*) and the embedded verbs (i.e. *do*), respectively. On the other hand, as shown in (17b), *get*-causatives allow this 'split modification of time adverbials': *On Wednesday* modifies the causative verb *get* and *on Friday* the embedded verb *do*. This means that the simultaneity restriction applies not to *get*-causatives but to *make*- and *have*-causatives. We can thus get the conclusion: in *make*- and *have*-causatives, the caused event (henceforth E_2), which is described in the embedded clause, must take place during the causing event (henceforth E_1), which is described in the matrix clause;¹⁰ on the other hand, this is not always the case in *get*-causatives.

With this observation in mind, we can say that there is a certain dependency relation between E_1 and E_2 of *make*- and *have*-causatives in the sense that they must occur simultaneously. On

the other hand, such a dependency relation does not exist between E_1 and E_2 of *get*-causatives in the sense that they do not necessarily occur simultaneously.

4.2. Negation of the Embedded Clause

To make the role of *to*-infinitives still clearer, let us next consider their behavior in negation. Observe the following examples:

- (18) a. *I saw Olivier not act the part of Othello.
 b. I warn you not to believe a word he says.

(Nakau (1980))

As (18) shows, *to*-infinitives can be negated, while bare infinitives cannot.¹¹ On the basis of this contrast, Nakau (1980) claims as follows:

- (19) The fact that the infinitival clause can be negated indicates that the clause itself constitutes a proposition separately from the main clause.

Recall here that *get*-causatives take *to*-infinitives and *make*- and *have*-causatives take bare infinitives. Then, we can predict that *get*-causatives will behave differently from *make*- and *have*-causatives with regard to negation. As a matter of fact, the same result as (18) is obtained:

- (20) a. *John made/had Mary not do the work.
 b. John got Mary not to do the work.

The embedded clauses of *make*- and *have*-causatives, both of which are headed by bare infinitives, cannot be negated. In contrast, those of *get*-causatives, which are headed by *to*-infinitives, can be negated. Following Nakau, we take the

contrast to indicate that with *get*-causatives, E_1 is separate from E_2 . We can therefore say that with *get*-causatives, E_2 is not dependent on E_1 , while with *make*- and *have*-causatives, E_2 is wholly dependent on E_1 .

This difference in the dependency relation between E_1 and E_2 is confirmed by the contrast between (21a) and (21b):

- (21) a. *John made/had Mary do the work, but she couldn't because something important came up.
 b. ?John got Mary to do the work, but she couldn't because something important came up.¹²

As the unacceptability of (21a) shows, if E_1 in *make*- and *have*-causatives occurs, E_2 never fails to occur. In other words, the occurrence of E_2 is wholly dependent on that of E_1 . In contrast, (21b) is acceptable, which indicates that the occurrence of E_1 in *get*-causatives does not necessarily result in that of E_2 . Sentence (21b) justifies our claim that E_2 in *get*-causatives is not necessarily dependent on E_1 .

Let us now return to the question which remains unanswered. We have seen in the previous section that both the starting point and the ongoing described by *get* are focused on, but the end point of the event is not. How is this involved in *get*-causatives? Taking into consideration the function of *to*-infinitives, we can easily answer the question. In *get*-causatives, E_1 , which is taken to be the starting point and the process of the occurrence of E_2 , is focused on. E_2 , which occurs as a result of E_1 , serves as the end point which is not focused on. The important point to be recalled here is that the occurrence of E_2 is not always implied in the whole situation described by *get*-causatives because E_2 does not depend on E_1 . This point has to do with the claim that the verb *get* does not focus on the end point, which is realized as E_2 in *get*-causatives.

5. The Semantic Nature of *Get*-Causatives

In the first subsection, I will carefully examine how we understand the causative situation described by *get*-causatives. Then, the conceptual structure (CS) for them will be presented. In the latter parts of this section, I will show that our CS clearly defines the semantic nature of *get*-causatives: First, it can explain examples of *get*-causatives; second, although it can be translated into Jackendoff's (1990) framework, our CS is more adequate.

5.1. The Conceptual Structure

First, consider the following examples:

- (22) a. *John accidentally got Mary to do the work.
 b. John intentionally got Mary to do the work.

The sentences in (22) differ in the choice of adverbs; i.e. *accidentally* or *intentionally*. What is indicated by the contrast is that the CAUSER's will or intention is involved in the occurrence of E₂. More specifically, E₂ of *get*-causatives takes place under the CAUSER's intention.

Next observe the following sentences:

- (23) a. ??Because he wanted to do the work, I got him
 to do it.
 b. Because he didn't want to do the work, I got
 him to do it.

The *because*-clause in (23a) describes a situation where the CAUSEE has his/her own intention to do what the CAUSER wants. On the other hand, the *because*-clause in (23b) indicates that the CAUSEE reluctantly does it. We can thus claim that the CAUSEE does not positively engage in bringing about what the

CAUSER wants. Although the CAUSEE finally ends up bringing about E_2 , s/he is not inclined to do so at first. Therefore, the CAUSER must do something to persuade the CAUSEE, probably having difficulty in changing the CAUSEE's mind. This claim is confirmed by the following examples, where adverbial phrases such as *finally* and *with difficulty* go well with *get-causatives*:

- (24) a. I got him to do that with difficulty.
 b. I finally got him to do that.

With difficulty in (24a) indicates the difficulty the CAUSER encounters in persuading the CAUSEE. *Finally* in (24b) indicates that the CAUSEE is persuaded as a result of the CAUSER's doing something to persuade him/her.

Finally, consider the sentences in (7)-(8) again, which are repeated as (25)-(26):


- (25) a. I made him clean the garage by threatening to cut his allowance.
 b. I got him to clean the garage by threatening to cut his allowance.
 c. *I had him clean the garage by threatening to cut his allowance.
- (26) a. *I made him clean the garage by promising to raise his allowance.
 b. I got him to clean the garage by promising to raise his allowance.
 c. I had him clean the garage by promising to raise his allowance.

The *by*-phrases in (25) have coercive meanings, and *make-causatives*, which are coercive causatives in Shibatani's term, are acceptable. In contrast, the *by*-phrases in (26) have non-coercive meanings, and *have-causatives* (non-coercive causatives

in Shibatani's term) are acceptable. Then, why can *get*-causatives appear in both coercive and non-coercive contexts? Recall here that since the CAUSEE at first has no intention to do what the CAUSER wants, the CAUSER must persuade the CAUSEE. This fact therefore suggests that *by*-phrases used in *get*-causatives merely describe the CAUSER's efforts to persuade the CAUSEE, regardless of whether they are described as a coercive or non-coercive situation.

We are now in a position to present the CS for *get*-causatives which specifies their semantic nature. The rough representation of the CS is presented below:

(27) John got Mary to do the work.




EVENT₁ (E₁), which is described in the matrix clause, is such that the CAUSER (*John*) makes efforts, either coercively or non-coercively, in order to persuade the CAUSEE (*Mary*) to do the work according to his will. The CAUSEE is then persuaded by his efforts, and as a result, EVENT₂ (E₂), which is described in the embedded clause, takes place. In (27), the CAUSER's efforts are represented as PERSUADING PROCESS by using the wavy arrow. Since the CAUSEE is persuaded by this process, the representation "PERSUADED" is placed on the side of the CAUSEE. These are all the contents of EVENT₁. The solid arrow in representation (27) indicates that EVENT₂ takes place as a result of EVENT₁.

Recall that in *get*-causatives, focus is on E₁, which is taken to be the starting point and the process of the occurrence of E₂. Taking this claim into consideration, I slightly modify

the representation in (27):

(28) John got Mary to do the work.



In (28), the focus on E_1 is shown by the part enclosed with a rectangle. That E_2 is outside the rectangle means that it is independent of E_1 . This representation is the final version of the CS for *get*-causatives which specifies their semantic nature.

5.2. Consequences

In this section, I show that the CS presented in (28) is workable enough to explain the problems pointed out in section 2. First, recall that Ikegami (1990) states that both the CAUSER and the CAUSEE must be human, but he does not explain why they must be human. The CS in (28) can easily offer an answer. In *get*-causatives, the CAUSER makes efforts to persuade the CAUSEE. This means that the CAUSER must be an entity with ability to persuade someone, typically human. The CAUSEE, in turn, is taken to be an entity that is persuaded. Therefore, the CAUSEE also must be human. Given this, we can account for the unacceptability of the sentences in (4b) and (5), repeated here as (29) and (30), respectively:

(29) *The garden's smell got Mary to cry with joy.

(30) *John got the chair to move.

The garden's smell cannot be interpreted as an entity that makes

efforts to persuade Mary to cry. Hence comes the unacceptability of (29). Also, *the chair* in (30) cannot be construed as an entity that is persuaded. Therefore, (30) is unacceptable as well.

The following sentences might appear to be counterexamples to our argument:

- (31) The forecast of the rain for the following week finally got him to fix a roof.
- (32) I got the computer to generate all premise up to 1,973. (Goldsmith (1984))

The CAUSER in (31) and the CAUSEE in (32) are not strictly human, but (31) and (32) are acceptable. What makes (31)-(32) acceptable? Let us first consider sentence (31). Here, the forecast of the rain is reported by a weatherman. That is, in the case of (31), a weatherman is metonymically implied by the expression *the forecast of the rain for the following week*. Therefore, the real CAUSER of (31) is the weatherman. Moreover, imagine that our daily life is frequently influenced by the forecast. For example, if it tells us that it will rain this afternoon, we do not fail to carry an umbrella with us. In this respect, *the forecast*, in which a weatherman is metonymically implied, is taken to have ability to persuade us (or the CAUSEE). Hence, sentence (31) is acceptable.

Next consider sentence (32). A computer can be generally treated as an entity which has equivalent ability to a person, in that it has a complicated mechanism by which it performs some action by itself. In this case, feeding information into a computer corresponds to the PERSUADING PROCESS because by doing that it starts to process data. Thus, this pragmatic consideration makes sentence (32) acceptable.

Finally, consider the following example:

- (33) *I got him to know the truth.

Recall that Baron (1974) ascribes the unacceptability of (33) to the [+stative] verb (*know*) in the embedded clause. According to her analysis, however, the following example should be unacceptable because the embedded verb is also [+stative], but, in fact, it is not:

(34) I got him to be careful.

One might add to Baron's account the stipulation that the embedded verbs of *get*-causatives must be [+intentional]. But this solution is not very attractive. Even if we can explain the acceptability of (34) by means of such a feature as [+intentional], the question of why such a stipulation is needed remains unanswered.

Our analysis can explain the contrast between (33) and (34) without such a stipulation. The crucial point to be noted is how the caused event or E_2 takes place. As is clearly shown in the CS, the CAUSER makes some efforts to persuade the CAUSEE since at first s/he does not want to do what the CAUSER wants. Because of this persuasion, the CAUSEE takes some action to bring about E_2 with his/her own intention; that is, s/he tries to do what the CAUSER wants. In this respect, the embedded subject (or the CAUSEE) must occur with a verb having the meaning of intention. Stative verbs such as *know* cannot encode the intention of their subjects, while predicates such as *be careful* can, which is illustrated in the following examples:

- (35) a. *Know the truth.
 b. Be careful.

The unacceptability of (35a) indicates that the subject of the imperative cannot intentionally know the truth. On the other hand, the acceptability of (35b) means that the intention of the subject is involved in the predicate *be careful*. Therefore, we can say that since the embedded subject in (33) cannot

intentionally know the truth, the sentence is excluded.

5.3. A Related Issue

In this subsection, I will demonstrate that our CS in (28) is translatable into Jackendoff's (1990) terms. And then, I will show that compared with our CS shown in (28), his framework has two inadequacies.

Recall his representation of the verb *get* for *get-causatives*, which is repeated as (36):

(36) *get*: $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{[CAUSE ([X], [GO ([Y], [TO [Z]])])}] \\ \text{[BY [F([X)])]} \end{array} \right]$

(Jackendoff (1990: 228))

Representation (36) merely conveys that the X-argument causes the Y-argument to go into a situation where the Y-argument does something. If we take into consideration our observation above, (36) needs modifying. There are two crucial points which must be incorporated into (36): (i) E_2 is independent of E_1 , and (ii) the X-argument intentionally brings about the causing event and the Y-argument also intentionally brings about the caused event. The modified representation is as follows:

(37) John got Mary to do the work.

$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{CS}^v \left(\text{[John]}, \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{GO} \left(\text{[Mary]}_1, \text{[TO [Mary]}_1 \text{ do the work}] \right) \\ \text{AFF}_{+VOL} \left(\text{[Mary]}_1, \right) \end{array} \right] \right) \\ \text{AFF}_{+VOL} \left(\text{[John]}, \text{[Mary]}_1 \right) \\ \text{[BY [F([John])]} \end{array} \right]$

In Jackendoff (1990), CS is a more general function than CAUSE, which is divided into three types by means of a "success parameter": CS^+ , CS^- , and CS^v .¹³ CS^v is used for application of force with an undetermined outcome. As I have argued above, in *get-causatives*, E_2 is independent of E_1 . This indicates

that the occurrence of the caused event (E_2) is not determined. Therefore, the modified version (37) has a CS^v function.

Next consider $AFF+vol$.¹⁴ AFF is a function indicating an affect relation. The first argument of this function is the Actor, and the second the Patient. The representation $_{v,0,1}$ means that the Actor does something of his or her volition. In *get*-causatives, the causing event occurs under the causer's volition and the causer affects the causee by way of persuading. The representation in (39) thus has the representation $AFF+vol$ ($[John]$, $[Mary]$). The caused event occurs under the causee's volition in the sense that s/he is persuaded by the causer's efforts and then s/he tries to do what the causer wants. This is included in the representation $AFF+vol$ ($[Mary]$, $_{v,0,1}$).¹⁵

Although the representation in (37) demonstrates the verb *get* in *get*-causatives more clearly than that in (36), there seems to be two inadequacies in Jackendoff's framework. First, as we have seen above, a crucial property of *get*-causatives is that the causing event (E_1) is focused on because it is taken to be the starting point and the process of the caused event (E_2). Representation (37) cannot tell us the property. Second, we have pointed out that there is a persuading process between the CAUSER and the CAUSEE. This process is also a crucial property to characterize *get*-causatives. We cannot read off the process from representation (37).¹⁶ These two inadequacies convinces us that our CS shown in (28) is more adequate.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, by examining the semantic function of the verb *get* and that of *to*-infinitives, we have made it clear that in *get*-causatives, E_1 (or the causing event) is focused on and that E_2 (or the caused event) is not dependent on E_1 . Moreover, we have observed how we perceive the situation described by *get*-causatives. On the basis of these observations, we have

presented the conceptual structure of *get*-causatives which clearly defines their semantic nature. The CS tells us that (i) the CAUSER makes efforts to persuade the CAUSEE to do what s/he wants, that (ii) at last the CAUSEE is persuaded by the efforts, and as a result of that, E₂ takes place, and that (iii) E₁ is focused on because it is taken to be the starting point and the process for E₂. We have shown that the CS is workable to explain a variety of examples of *get*-causatives.

Notes

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¹ See McCawley (1968) for a detailed discussion of lexical decomposition. I will not further inquire into this matter because it is not our main interest.

² Fodor (1970) establishes the difference between lexicalized and periphrastic causatives based on the behavioral differences with regard to the following three points; (i) *do so* replacement, (ii) the modification of time adverbials, and (iii) the interpretation of the instrumental adverbial phrases. See Fodor (1970) for details.

³ See Okuyama (1992, 1993) for detailed discussions of *make*- and *have*-causatives.

⁴ We must notice here Wierzbicka's (1988) claim that the investigation of causative constructions is deeply concerned

with the problem of "CAUSE-EFFECT" relations. She states 'how the speakers of the language draw distinctions between different kinds of causal relations and how they perceive and interpret causal links between events and human actions' (Wierzbicka (1988: 237)).

⁵ The term *conceptual structure* is widely used in the literature. For example, Jackendoff, in his work, characterizes it as a level of mental representation at which linguistic, sensory, and motor information are compatible. In his framework, the conceptual structure is given to a verb, and it enables us to decide what kind of argument(s) is/are required by the verb. (For example, see representation (14) in the text.) In this paper, I also take 'conceptual structure' to be a level of mental representation. I, however, assume that this level represents the way we perceive the world surrounding us; e.g. in *get*-causatives, how we perceive the causal relation described by them. Furthermore, I assume that the conceptual structure is determined by considering both the form of a construction and the meaning described by the construction. Our conceptual structure of *get*-causatives can be translated into Jackendoff's terms. See section 5.3.

⁶ The representations in (12) are slightly modified from that of Tanaka's (1987).

⁷ Tanaka (1987) intuitively uses the term *focus*. In this paper, along Tanaka's intuitive idea, the term *focus* is used to indicate what we take to be salient at the conceptual level. More specifically, *focus* indicates what point(s) of the event described by the verb (i.e. the starting point, the process and the ending point) is (are) essential or important at the conceptual level. The verb *run*, for example, does not entail the starting point or the endpoint of the action 'running'. More important information denoted by this verb is the process of running. Thus, the focus of the verb *run* is supposed to be not on the starting point and the endpoint but on the process.

⁸ Nakau (1985) also claims that the GO-function indicates

the process type of proposition. See Nakau (1985).

⁹ Nakau (1980) argues that simultaneity restriction comes from the fact that bare infinitives involve the imperfective aspect. In this paper, I do not go into this issue. See Nakau (1980) for a detailed discussion.

¹⁰ Talmy (1977) also notes that this is one of the characteristics of basic causative situations.

¹¹ Nakau (personal communication) has suggested that though sentence (18a) could be acceptable depending on the context, there is still a clear contrast between (18a) and (18b) even in those cases.

¹² Some speakers may not accept sentence (21b). This is because the interpretation in which the caused event has occurred is preferred in ordinal causative situations. But we cannot ignore the fact that even for such a speaker there is a contrast between (21a) and (21b).

¹³ See Jackendoff (1990) for the functions CS⁺ and CS⁻.

¹⁴ Jackendoff (1990) introduces the two types of tiers: a thematic tier and an action tier. The former deals with motion and location; the latter deals with Actor-Patient relation. The AFF-function belongs to an action tier.

¹⁵ The blank in the representation *AFF+vol* ([Mary],) means that the Actor *Mary* affects something which is undetermined.

¹⁶ In (39), [BY [F ([John])]] indicates that the event occurs by John's doing something. This representation might correspond to PERSUADING PROCESS in our terms. Even if so, however, it seems to me that we cannot precisely understand that there is a PERSUADING PROCESS between the causer and the causee.

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