

On the English Present Perfect:
A Cognition-based Approach to the Categorization of Its Functions*

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1. Introduction

There seems to be fairly general agreement these days that the English present perfect *per se* has only one temporal meaning: all of its functions are derived from the only one semantic structure (i.e., anteriority).¹ Factors such as the lexical property of a verb, the presence or absence of a temporal adverbial and the context of discourse lead us to a particular reading of a present perfect sentence. Let us consider (1):

(1) Mana has played the *koto*.

The sentence in (1) as it stands is ambiguous. We may consider it the experiential perfect. However, if uttered when the event of Mana's playing the *koto* has just finished, the sentence will be interpreted as the resultative perfect; and when accompanied by a temporal adverbial such as *for ten years*, the sentence will be regarded as the continuative perfect.

A question then arises as to how many "contextual classes of functions (i.e., pragmatic categories)" of the English present perfect exist. Linguists disagree about this issue. Fenn (1987) thinks it is the prevailing view that functions of the English present perfect are classified into three pragmatic categories: the continuative perfect, the experiential perfect and the resultative perfect. However, some linguists add one more pragmatic category (e.g., McCawley's (1971) "hot-news" perfect and Comrie's (1976) perfect of 'recent-past') to the three categories mentioned above; others admit only two pragmatic categories. Declerck (1991a, b), for example, contends that functions of the present perfect should be classified into either the "continuative" perfect or the "indefinite" perfect (i.e., the

'non-continuative' perfect) from the point of view of temporal location, and the experiential and the resultative perfects should be incorporated into the latter type.

This kind of disagreement arises, because some of these previous studies (e.g., Fenn (1987), Comrie (1976, 1985), among others) have paid very little attention to the motivation(s) of the classification of functions of the present perfect from a unified point of view, whereas others (e.g., Declerck (1991a, b)) have overlooked some data which can be regarded as a motivation for the distinction between one pragmatic category and another. I agree with Fenn (1987), Inoue (1979), among others, that the classification of functions of the present perfect into pragmatic categories is ultimately determined by pragmatic factors like the context of discourse and non-linguistic information. However, we cannot predict, from this statement, how many pragmatic categories of the present perfect will stem from its basic semantic structure. Put differently, such a statement does not explain why a particular pragmatic category of a present perfect is derived from its basic temporal meaning (i.e., anteriority). To elucidate this point is the major aim of this paper.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the three pragmatic categories of the English present perfect in Fenn (1987). We choose Fenn's work as our starting point in that it is a recent exhaustive study of the English perfect. Section 3 reveals some problems in Fenn (1987), pointing out that two criteria are not valid which Fenn offers in order to distinguish one pragmatic category from another, and that the coverage of his label 'resultative' is too wide. Section 4 presents an alternative categorization of functions of the present perfect. I will claim that it should be based on two kinds of criteria which have their roots in our cognition. I will argue that our proposal is more motivated and systematic than Fenn's. Section 5 considers some remaining issues. Section 6 makes concluding remarks.

2. Three Pragmatic Categories in Fenn (1987)

In this section we outline Fenn's tripartite system of the English present perfect.

2.1. Why Do We Use the Term *Pragmatic Category*?

Before going on to the review of Fenn's three pragmatic categories, we will briefly observe that the categorization of functions of the present perfect is ultimately determined on the basis of pragmatic factors like the context of discourse and non-linguistic information. Semantic factors like proposition classes (e.g., accomplishments, activities, etc.) and temporal adverbials (e.g., *for ten years*, etc.) can be "guidelines," but cannot be "determinants" for the classifying functions of the present perfect into pragmatic categories. Consider the following examples:

- (2) Jack Nobert has taught at MIT. (Inoue, 1979:566)

Inoue (1979:566) says that without context sentence (2) tends to be interpreted as an experiential perfect by virtue of the fact that its proposition is an activity class (i.e., a non-stative class). In the case of a non-stative proposition class, we tend to use the perfect progressive form so as to express a continuative sense. However, Inoue continues that the sentence in (2) will be construed as a continuative perfect in response to a certain question (e.g., *What has Jack Nobert done for past ten years?*).

A temporal adverbial like *for past ten years* does not necessarily lead us to the continuative reading of a given perfect. Observe (3):

- (3) Well, Jack Nobert has taught at MIT for ten years, he has done some research in Alaska for a year,
(Inoue, 1979:566)

Inoue (1979:566) claims that the situation of the first sentence in (3) can convey an experiential meaning in this context. She

says it is possible that Jack Nibert taught at MIT on and off at several different times within the time-span up to now. We can therefore argue that semantic factors do not determine which reading a given perfect finally reaches. The classification of functions of the present perfect is done at the pragmatic level. For this reason, Fenn uses the term *pragmatic category*. I share his view in this respect.

2.2. Three Criteria and Definitions

Let us now take a look at Fenn's three pragmatic categories: the continuative perfect, the experiential perfect and the resultative perfect.

Fenn offers three criteria to distinguish one type of perfect from another. Two of them distinguish the resultative perfect from the other two perfects. They will be referred to as (i) the 'time-span' criterion (i.e., whether or not a present perfect has an S(peech time)-inclusive time-span) and (ii) the 'result' criterion (i.e., whether or not a present perfect necessarily includes a resultative state), respectively. The other criterion distinguishes between the continuative perfect and the experiential perfect. It can be labeled as (iii) the 'continuity' criterion (i.e., whether or not the situation of a present perfect continues up to a state at S (henceforth S) homogeneously). Note that both the experiential and the resultative perfects are perfective on the grounds that their situation is not contiguous with S.

We are now concerned with the definitions of Fenn's three pragmatic categories. First, let us sum up the characteristic features of the continuative perfect:

- (4) The *continuative* perfect involves an S-inclusive time-span; its situation is regarded as occurring throughout the time-span;² this type of perfect implies a state at S.

Let us present a representative example. A continuative perfect

such as *She has lived in Tsukuba for four years* can be interpreted as follows: the adverb *for four years* can express an S-inclusive time-span; the situation of a girl's living in Tsukuba is true throughout the time-span.

With respect to the experiential perfect, its characteristic features are summarized as in (5):

- (5) The *experiential* perfect also involves an S-inclusive time-span; its situation is regarded as taking place at unspecified point(s) within the time-span; this type of perfect merely implies a state at S.

Consider, for example, an experiential perfect like *I have visited Italy before*. This sentence is to be interpreted as follows: the adverb *before* leads us to set up a time-span in mind; the situation of the speaker's visiting Italy has occurred at some unspecified point(s) within the time-span.

Finally, we summarize the characteristic features of the resultative perfect:

- (6) The *resultative* perfect has no S-inclusive time-span; its situation is complete; this type of perfect entails a state at S,³ thus necessarily conveying a resultative reading.

We interpret a resultative perfect like *She has gone to Singapore* as follows: the situation of a girl's departure for Singapore has already finished, and at the speech time she is not at the place where she was.

In the following subsections we will briefly observe the subdivisions of each of the three pragmatic categories.

2.3. The Continuative Perfect

Within the framework of Fenn (1987), the continuative perfect is divided into three subcategories: *actual continuative*, *recurrent continuative* and *discontinuous continuative*. Each of

these subcategories is exemplified in (7):

- (7) a. I've been thinking for several minutes now.⁴
 (actual) (Fenn, 1987:7)
- b. I've been taking pills of one sort or another since
 I was 8 years old. (recurrent) (Fenn, 1987:21)
- c. Tom has been building this house for the past two
 years. (discontinuous) (Fenn, 1987:22)

The perfect in (7a) is regarded as the actual continuative in that the single situation of the speaker's thought actually obtains throughout the S-inclusive time-span. The reason why the perfect in (7b) is conceived of as the recurrent continuative is due to the speaker's recurrent uses of the pill throughout the S-inclusive time-span. The sentence in (7c) is labeled as the discontinuous continuative in the sense that the single situation of Tom's building a certain house continues up to S with interruptions.

Fenn notes the following two points: first, in the cases of the actual continuative and the discontinuous continuative, non-stative proposition classes have an affinity for the progressive form, on one hand, and states are expressed in the non-progressive form (e.g., *She has lived in Tsukuba for four years*), on the other. Second, the recurrent continuative in a habitual sense can go along with the non-progressive form; Fenn (1987:49) presents as its representative example a sentence like *For the last ten years Jill has cut her own hair*.

2.4. The Experiential Perfect

Let us now move on to the experiential perfect. Following Comrie (1976:59), Fenn divides the experiential perfect, from the standpoint of time-span involved, into two subtypes: *general experiential* and *limited experiential*. The general experiential has no earlier boundary; thus the time-span involved in it is the whole time up to S, and is often indicated by time adverbials like *before* and *ever*. The limited experiential is

regarded as the perfect which involves 'a specified time-span restricted by an earlier limit' (Fenn, 1987:78). These two subtypes of the experiential perfects are exemplified in (8):

- (8) a. Those curtains are really the most insistent colour that I have ever seen. (general) (Fenn, 1987:78)
 b. Threats against the lives of presidents have become fairly routine in recent years. (limited)
 (Fenn, 1987:83)

The adverb *ever* in (8a) leads us to build up a life-span long interval in mind; hence the perfect in (8a) is viewed as the general experiential. In (8b), on the other hand, the adverb *in recent years* triggers a limited experiential reading because the S-inclusive time-span starts from an implied earlier time point.

2.5. The Resultative Perfect

Fenn admits two levels of result with respect to resultative perfects. First, the verb itself entails a resultative state at S. Secondly, a resultative state at S is brought about by factors in the social (i.e., non-linguistic) or linguistic environment of utterance. Both types of the resultative perfects are exemplified in (9):

- (9) a. You've woken him up now. (he's awake.)
 (Fenn, 1987:100)
 b. I've changed my mind about that favour you wanted me to do. (consequence: and I am now ready to do it.)
 (Fenn, 1987:112)

Fenn's explanation goes as follows: in (9a) the verb phrase *have woken* entails not only the event of the hearer's waking a man up but also the resultative state of the man's being awake at S; whereas in (9b) the verb phrase *have changed* only alludes to the resultative state of the speaker's being in condition to do something; that is, the environment of discourse brings about the

resultative state at S in this case. Fenn calls this type of resultative meaning *consequential meaning*.

3. Problems in Fenn (1987)

In this section, we will argue against Fenn (1987) in some respects. Valuable as Fenn's investigation into the perfect is, Fenn's two criteria to distinguish one kind of perfect from another are problematic. We will criticize them in turn.

3.1. The Time-Span Criterion

3.1.1. Arguments against Fenn's Time-Span Criterion

My first objection to Fenn (1987) is about Fenn's time-span criterion. Fenn argues that the resultative perfect is not an S-inclusive time-span perfect, whereas the other two (i.e., the continuative and the experiential perfects) include an S-inclusive time-span in their semantic structure. Fenn claims that the only commonality shared by the three perfects is the concept of *S-orientation*; a speaker of the present perfect strongly directs himself or herself to the speech time (i.e., S), thus having in mind 'an abstract underlying state at S' (Fenn, 1987:207).⁵ What Fenn is arguing there is that the continuative perfect and the experiential perfect involve an S-inclusive time-span in their semantic structure, while the resultative perfect does not involve one. Fenn thinks of the presence or absence of an S-inclusive time-span as a criterion to distinguish the resultative perfect from the others.

I agree with Fenn that S-orientation is an essential part of the present perfect. However, this does not necessarily amount to the claim that only the resultative perfect does not involve an S-inclusive time-span in its semantic structure. We will argue that the present perfect *per se* has an S-inclusive time-span in its semantic structure. Let us take a look at three arguments for our claim in turn. First, the concept of S-orientation is meaningless without clear definition so as for us to distinguish the present perfect from the simple past.

Consider (10):

(10) Why is Chris so cheerful these days?

— Well, he won a million in the lottery.

(Klein, 1992:531)

As is clear from the dialogue in (10), we can say that the answerer expresses S-orientation by using the simple past form. It is certain that Chris' present condition has much to do with the situation of his having won a million in the lottery. Fenn (1987:208) notes that "any implication of a present state by a past tense is secondary, and solely contextual meaning." To put it another way, the simple past itself does not entail a state at S. On the other hand, the present perfect entails a state at S because the present perfect includes an S-inclusive time-span which involves the state. In the following subsection we will return to the reason why we argue that the present perfect itself includes an S-inclusive time-span.

Secondly, Fenn misunderstands the so-called time-span theory of the present perfect, confusing the time-span which a present perfect has with the one indicated by another factor like an "S-inclusive time-span" adverbial. Consider the following pair of examples:

(11) a. I've seen John this morning.

b. I saw John this morning.

(Fenn, 1987:203)

Fenn states that the so-called time-span theory cannot account for the differences in meaning between these two sentences. His claim is based on the fact that both sentences include an S-inclusive time-span by virtue of the presence of the adverb *this morning*. Fenn also says that in both cases the event of the speaker's seeing John is regarded as instantaneous. He argues that the only difference between the resultative perfect and the simple past in (11) is therefore whether or not the speaker has a state at S in mind. However, this line of argument is not valid. The time-span of a present perfect is one thing, and the

time-span indicated by a temporal adverbial is another. In order to clarify the difference between the present perfect sentence and the simple past one in (11), we have to concentrate on the difference between their own semantic structures. This issue will also be discussed in the following subsection.

Finally, Fenn's explanation for the following sentences shows that the time-span criterion cannot disambiguate some present perfect sentences.

- (12) a. A week has elapsed since the preceding scene.
 b. A month has gone by since then. (Fenn, 1987:74)

According to Fenn, these perfects are resultative perfects with continuative connotations. They are borderline cases between resultative and continuative perfects. Fenn (1987:75) considers that in these perfects the condition that a situation obtains throughout the S-inclusive time-span is fulfilled, but the condition of a situation's ongoingness at S is not satisfied, thus concluding that 'a curious kind of categorial ambiguity arises.' Within Fenn's framework, since the subjects in (12) are themselves time-spans, the perfects in (12) should be categorized as continuative perfects from the point of view of the time-span criterion. In fact, the time-span criterion does not disambiguate the perfects in (12). Therefore we need another framework which permits so-called borderline perfects like (12a, b). We will return to this issue in section 4.

3.1.2. *The Dual Structure of the Perfect*

A clue to solving the issues in the previous subsection lies in the 'dual' structure of the perfect. We can argue that the perfect (at least, the English perfect) is composed of two situations. This statement is justified by Frawley's (1992:347) claim that as far as he knows, in all cases and in all languages (including English) which have a perfect construction, a perfect tense conveys a relation of anteriority between two situations. Frawley states that the compatibility of the perfect with certain

time adverbials supports the dual structure of the perfect.
Observe (13):

- (13) a. Tom had seen the movie by ten o'clock/before he
arrived/etc. (Frawley, 1992:347)
b. Tom had seen the movie at ten o'clock.
(Frawley, 1992:348)

In (13a), adverbials like *by ten o'clock* and *before he arrived* presuppose two distinct times: one is the time of the situation of Tom's seeing the movie and the other the time of an 'understood' situation (In general, this kind of time is called 'point of reference'). Furthermore, drawing on Comrie (1985:66), Frawley claims that the ambiguity in (13b) can be a piece of evidence for the dual structure of the perfect. On one interpretation, the situation of Tom's seeing the movie obtains at ten o'clock; on the other interpretation, that situation had already completed at ten o'clock. The sentence in (13b) thus presupposes two separate situations on the time line.

Having verified the assumption that the perfect (at least, the English perfect) is a case of the dual structure, we will inquire into the semantic structure of the present perfect. The present perfect can be decomposed into the present tense and the perfect tense (or anteriority). It thus consists of a situation in the past time domain and a situation in the same time domain as simultaneous with the speech time (=S). In English, both situations are reflected in surface form: the former is represented by a past participle complement (including its internal arguments) and the latter by perfect *have*.

Nakau (1994), who also argues that the English perfect is composed of two situations, presents the schema of the present perfect in (14), wherein E_2 is the symbol of the situation described by a past participle complement; whereas E_1 is the symbol of the situation described by perfect *have*; time flow goes from left to right:⁶

(14) $E_2 - E_1, S$

(Nakau, 1994:302)

The representation of 'X,Y' indicates 'X is simultaneous with Y' and 'X-Y' 'X precedes Y.' Notice that 'X precedes Y' covers the reading of 'X continues up to and overlaps Y.'

In this connection, Bauer (1970) states that the basic function of the perfect is that at an "understood" time (equal to Reichenbach's (1947) point of reference and our "time of E_1 ") a situation's having occurred within the time-span of the perfect is completed; the so-called continuative perfect stems from "an interplay between the function of the perfect and certain contextual factors" (p.194) such as certain temporal adverbials (e.g., *since 1989*) and atelic propositions. Hence the schema of the present perfect shown above can represent both the reading of ' E_2 completely precedes E_1 ' and that of ' E_2 continues up to E_1 .' We can now claim from the schema in (14) that in both cases the perfect proposition entails a time-span. In the case of ' E_2 continues up to E_1 ,' E_2 itself is durational and therefore the present perfect proposition as a whole is a 'past-present' continuum. In the case of ' E_2 completely precedes E_1 ,' E_2 may be instantaneous, but the resultative state (i.e., E_1) continues up to the speech time. Thus the whole perfect proposition extends from the past domain to the present one.

3.1.3. Examination

We will now examine our theory based on the dual structure of the perfect in this subsection. First, the dual structure of the present perfect explains why the present perfect entails a state at S. Penn only suggests it intuitively, whereas our explanation stems necessarily from the dual structure of the perfect.

As is self-evident from the schema in (14), E_1 , an essential component of the perfect proposition, is simultaneous with the speech time (=S) in the case of the present perfect. This is why the present perfect always indicates a state at S. Consider:

(15) a. She has gone to Singapore.

b. She has lived in Tsukuba since 1989.

The continuative perfect in (15b) is a time-span perfect. E_2 (i.e., the situation of a girl's living in Tsukuba) obtains homogeneously throughout the S-inclusive time-span which the perfect inherently entails, and thus E_2 reaches a state at S (i.e., E_1). It should be stressed here that even a resultative perfect such as (15a) has an S-inclusive time-span. It is true that E_2 (i.e., the situation of a girl's departure for Singapore) has already finished before S; the event itself (i.e., E_2) may be considered 'punctual.' This is one of the reasons why Fenn regards the resultative perfect as a non-time-span perfect. However, we have thus far verified that the perfect consists of two situations separately located on the time line. This means that the proposition of the resultative perfect as a whole spreads over a certain period on the time line. The resultative state of E_2 (i.e., her absence) extends from the (immediate) past to the present. However short it is, the present perfect has a time-span. Thus our theory need not make an exception of the resultative perfect. The resultative perfect has a time-span in its semantic structure. The claim that all of the perfects have a time-span in their semantic structure is not an ad hoc one, but one which derives necessarily from the dual structure of the perfect.

Secondly, our theory on the basis of the dual structure of the perfect can explain the fundamental difference between the resultative perfect and the simple past. A present perfect sentence is a composite proposition in that it consists of E_1 and E_2 ; whereas a simple past sentence is a single proposition to the extent that the simple past expresses only a past situation. Compare the following two sentences:

- (16) a. She has gone to Singapore. (= (15a))
 b. She went to Singapore.

Suppose that these sentences are uttered at a certain airport in Japan. Both sentences in (16) entail a situation in the past

(i.e., a girl's departure for Singapore). The difference between them is that the present perfect sentence entails one more situation, that is, a resultative state at S. This is why the present perfect conveys what we call current relevance (i.e., strong relevance to the present time). In particular, sentence (16a) entails the resultative state of a girl's absence at S; while it is possible in the case of (16b) that the girl in question is now in Japan. This line of explanation, which is based on the dual structure of the perfect, is compatible with the prevailing view that in general the present perfect conveys current relevance whereas the simple past does not convey such a nuance. In the case of the present perfect one of its components (i.e., E_1) coincides with S because the present perfect is a variant of the present tense. On the other hand, the simple past itself does not include a component which coincides with S.

To summarize, our explanation on the basis of the dual structure of the perfect is not only more explanatory but also more advantageous than Fenn's in some respects. For one thing, our proposal can explain why the present perfect entails a state at S, thus conveying current relevance. For another, we need not make an exception of the resultative perfect in terms of time-span. Moreover, we can discriminate between the present perfect and the simple past by saying that the former is a composite proposition and the latter a single one. Fenn's time-span criterion is not valid, or at least less explanatory than ours.

3.2. The Result Criterion

In this subsection we will criticize Fenn's result criterion.

3.2.1. *Is the Result Criterion Necessary?*

Before going further, let us review Fenn's central

conception of result (or resultativeness). Fenn defines the term *result* (or *resultativeness*) as describing a resultative state at S which stems from the occurrence of a preceding situation, and he says that in the use of the resultative perfect, such a resultative state (or result) cannot be denied:

- (17) a. *You've woken him up, but he is not awake now.
(resultative)
- b. I've been clearing the sideboard for the last 10 minutes, but it is not clear at the moment.
(continuative)
- c. I've cleared the sideboard several times this week, but it is not clear at the moment. (experiential)

Unlike resultatives, continuative and experiential perfects do not entail such a resultative state, as shown in (17b) and (17c): in (17b), the action of the speaker's clearing a sideboard may still be ongoing at S; in (17c), the sideboard in question is not necessarily clear at S. This observation is sufficient for the purpose of the clarification of Fenn's result criterion; a perfect sentence which entails a result at S is the resultative perfect; any other perfects are either the continuative perfect or the experiential perfect.

Judging from the result criterion, it seems that an undeniable result at S is a characteristic feature of the resultative perfect. As we have observed in section 2.5, however, Fenn considers that a resultative state at S can be brought about not only by the perfect verb form itself, but also by pragmatic environments (i.e., linguistic and non-linguistic contexts) where a given perfect sentence is used. Recall that Fenn thinks of the latter type of resultative state as a consequential meaning. We usually construe such a resultative state as a deniable one in that it is induced by pragmatic inference. However, whether a consequential meaning can be deniable or not is not important here. The important point to note is that if a perfect sentence conveying a consequential meaning (e.g., (18a)) is categorized as the resultative perfect

as Fenn mentions, the perfect in (18b) can also be categorized as the same type of perfect.

- (18) a. I've changed my mind about that favour you wanted me to do. (consequence: and I am now ready to do it.) (=9b) (Fenn, 1987:112)
- b. Mana has played the *koto* hundreds of times this month. (consequence: and she is now ready for the concert.)

To the extent that both of the perfects express a consequential meaning which is expectable from a particular context, they can both be subsumed under the same kind (or level) of resultativeness; the status of resultativeness in (18a) is equal to that of (18b), both of which are represented in the parentheses. What should be emphasized here is that the perfect in (18b), which is normally viewed as the experiential perfect by virtue of the presence of *hundreds of times*, conveys the same kind (or level) of resultativeness as what Fenn calls the resultative perfect in (18a). Thus, if we regard (18b) as an experiential perfect, we can regard (18a) as the same type of perfect.

Fenn himself admits that some experiential perfects are accompanied by a strong resultativeness at S:

- (19) a. They have, since Paul N's encyclical *Humane Vitae*, learnt to decide for themselves.
- b. Mrs. Dot: Why, since my husband died I've almost doubled our profits. (Fenn, 1987:122)

Within Fenn's framework, these perfects are categorized into the limited experiential. In these perfects, their consequential meanings are strongly implied in certain contexts; in (19b), for instance, the resultative state of Mrs. Dot's profits being almost twice as much as ever can still obtain at S in this context. If so, this type of perfect should be labeled as the resultative perfect within Fenn's framework. Fenn nevertheless

classifies such perfects into the experiential perfect by arguing that the time-span criterion, which serves to distinguish the resultative from the experiential, is applied to this case on account of the presence of the temporal adverb *since*, which leads us to build up a time-span in mind. Some experiential perfects (e.g., *I have visited Venice once*), however, do not indicate a specified time-span. The presence or absence of a time-span adverbial does not serve as a determinant for a distinction between two types of perfect sentences. Besides, we have abandoned the time-span criterion in the previous subsection. As a consequence, we cannot determine which pragmatic category perfects such as the ones in (19) are to be classified into.

Moreover, Fenn himself points out that some resultative perfects are not accompanied by an expected consequential meaning (Fenn thinks of this kind of perfect as 'nil'-results resultative'). Observe the following examples:

- (20) a. Eva, look I've phoned the doctor but he's not there.
 b. I've implored her to lend me the money, and she absolutely refuses. (Fenn, 1987:113)

In these cases the result criterion does not function as a criterion to distinguish the resultative perfect from the experiential perfect. To that extent the result criterion is useless. Fenn regards these perfects as being classified into resultative perfects in terms of the time-span criterion, though no expected resultative states happen. Fenn states that, although the perfects in (20) seem to be experiential perfects at first glance by virtue of the non-realization of an expected result, there is no reason for building up in mind a particular time-span which is to be referred to; hence they are to be regarded as members of the resultative perfect. As has already been discussed, however, the time-span criterion is not valid for the distinction between the resultative perfect and the other two. The above perfects are therefore difficult to categorize.

Some problems mentioned above can be ascribed to an

inappropriate use of the label *resultative*. The coverage of the word is too wide. In order to use the word *resultative* appropriately, we should regard perfects like (9a) and (15a) as the resultative perfect.

(9) a. You've woken him up now.

(15) a. She has gone to Singapore.

The resultative state of (9a) (i.e., a man's being awake) is exclusively derived from the lexical property of the verb *wake*; the resultative state of (15a) (i.e., a girl's absence) stems exclusively from an interplay between the lexical property of the verb *go* and contextual information, for example, such that the speaker utters the sentence at an airport.

Other perfects, which are considered resultative perfects within Fenn's framework, are not conceived of as the resultative perfect in our system. We will return to the question of how we deal with our resultative perfect in section 5.1, and until then we will use the resultative perfect in Fenn's sense.

3.2.2. *The Status of the Resultative Perfect*

In this subsection we will consider the status of the resultative perfect. Declerck (1991b) contends that the status of the resultative perfect is not equal to that of the experiential perfect or that of the continuative perfect. The reason is that a resultative interpretation is merely invited under a certain pragmatic environment or the lexical property of a verb; whereas the continuative perfect and the experiential perfect are established from the standpoint of temporal location of the situation. Declerck continues that since it is not an inherent part of the meaning of the present perfect, resultativeness should not play its role as criterion to distinguish one kind of perfect from another. The only criterion he adopts for the categorization of functions of the present perfect is whether a situation in the past reaches S or not. He thus admits only two types of perfects, that is, the

'continuative' perfect and the 'indefinite' perfect (including the experiential perfect). Declerck considers that the resultative perfect is a variant of the indefinite perfect. The most advantageous point of Declerck's dichotomy is that we can easily deal with perfect sentences like (19) and (20) which are borderline cases between the resultative and the experiential; we do not bother to determine which type of the perfect they belong to. They are all categorized into the indefinite perfect.

It is true, however, that some indefinite perfects with a resultative meaning seem to be distinguished from others from a certain point of view. Compare the following resultative perfects:

- (21) a. She has gone to Singapore. (She's not here now.)
- b. Dodos have already died out. (They do not exist on the earth now.)

Within Declerck's framework, these are indefinite perfects because a resultative perfect is a variant of the indefinite perfect. It is certain that the status of the resultative perfect is different from that of the experiential perfect or that of the continuative perfect. As Declerck himself mentions, however, a resultative interpretation can be invited under a certain pragmatic environment (e.g., (21a)). This is a crucial point. Since we are concerned with 'pragmatic' categories of the present perfect, there are no reasons for arguing that the categorization of functions of the present perfect should be done only from the standpoint of temporal location of the situation. It is possible that another kind of viewpoint motivates a further categorization of the indefinite perfect. For example, the perfect (21a) accompanied by an adverbial like *just* seems to be distinguished from the perfect (21b) from a certain viewpoint. That is to say, Declerck's indefinite perfect can be divided further into two pragmatic categories. We will consider this issue in the following section.

In this section we have pointed out some problems in Fenn (1987). Fenn's time-span and result criteria are not valid.

Hence we have to establish another system of classifying functions of the present perfect into pragmatic categories. We will discuss this matter in the following section.

4. An Alternative


In this section we will present two cognition-based criteria. They are each based on a pair of concepts with a scale and serve as the motivations to classify functions of the English present perfect into pragmatic categories. One is a pair of the concepts (i.e., perfectivity and continuity) arising necessarily from the dual structure of the perfect. The other is a pair of the concepts (i.e., particularity and generality) regularly reflected in English tenses (e.g., the simple present tense, the simple past tense, etc.). It should be kept in mind that both of them are represented by a scale which is delimited by two opposite limits; they are gradable entities. Each of them is expressed as a kind of continuum, rather than a strict binary system. We will discuss our two criteria in the following subsections.

4.1. Two Kinds of Criteria

4.1.1. *The Temporal Criterion*

Let us begin by examining the validity of the first criterion. Recall that we argue that the perfect consists of two separated situations: the situation represented by perfect *have* (symbolized by E_1) and the situation represented by a past participle complement (symbolized by E_2); the latter is anterior to the former on the time line (see the schema in (14)). Given the two situations with one anterior to the other, it seems natural that we have a tendency to determine whether or not the preceding situation (i.e., E_2) continues up to the following one (i.e., E_1). This way of cognition results from such a dual structure, and is therefore well-motivated to function as a criterion for the categorization of functions of the perfect. Let us call it *Temporal Criterion*. This criterion differentiates

one pragmatic category of the present perfect from another, that is, the [CONTINUATIVE] perfect from the [PERFECTIVE] perfect. In the former, E_2 reaches E_1 ; in the latter, E_2 completely precedes E_1 . They correspond to Declerck's continuative and indefinite perfects, respectively. What has to be noticed here is that our temporal criterion is a scale, not a clear-cut system.⁷ The temporal criterion is diagrammed as follows:



There are two pragmatic categories (i.e., the [PERFECTIVE] perfect and the [CONTINUATIVE] perfect) in this bipolar scale. 'Pe' is the abbreviation of 'perfective' and 'Co' that of 'continuative.' From the standpoint of the concept of perfectivity, we can say that the closer to the [PERFECTIVE] pole a present perfect is situated, the higher the degree of perfectivity of it becomes; and the closer to the [CONTINUATIVE] pole, the lower. From the standpoint of the concept of continuity, we can claim that the closer to the [CONTINUATIVE] pole a present perfect is situated, the higher the degree of continuity of it becomes; and the closer to the [PERFECTIVE] pole, the lower. The central part with an oblique slash in (22) is interpreted as expressing both the characteristics of perfectivity and those of continuity, though the degree of perfectivity/continuity is lower. A perfect like *She has already finished the work* is a typical member of the [PERFECTIVE] category (perfect). A perfect like *She has been playing tennis now* is a typical member of the [CONTINUATIVE] category (perfect). Borderline cases between the [PERFECTIVE] and [CONTINUATIVE] categories are situated in the central part of the diagram (22). We call them 'double-duty' perfects because they have both the characteristics of the [PERFECTIVE] category and those of the [CONTINUATIVE] category. Note, in passing, that resultative perfects, experiential perfects and borderline cases between them

are all subsumed under the feature [PERFECTIVE].

Our system is superior to Fenn's in that our temporal criterion can easily deal with borderline cases between continuative perfects and resultative perfects. Observe (12) again, repeated here as (23):

- (23) a. A week has elapsed since the preceding scene.
 b. A month has gone by since then. (Fenn, 1987:74)

As we have already mentioned in section 3.1.1, Fenn categorizes these perfects as resultative perfects with continuative implication. If we change the point of view, however, we can say that the perfects in question are continuative perfects with resultative connotations in that they convey a characteristic feature of the continuative perfect (i.e., the past situation's reaching S). Within our framework we do not bother to make it clear which pragmatic category the perfects in (23) belong to; they are characterized as double-duty perfects.

4.1.2. The P(articular)-G(eneral) Criterion

In this subsection, we will argue that one more criterion motivates the categorization of functions of the present perfect.

4.1.2.1. The Particular/General Distinction

So far, we have examined the temporal criterion. It is well-motivated for the categorization of functions of the present perfect. It is useful to the extent that we can deal with borderline cases between continuative perfects and resultative perfects. In the following subsections, we will see that another kind of pair of concepts plays an important role in the categorization of functions of the present perfect.

It is safe to say that English tenses reflect the following two opposite concepts: "particularity" (or "specificity") and "generality" (or "non-specificity"). The former is used to refer to a particular (or specific) situation directly related to the

'real' time line, whereas the latter is used to mention to a generalized (or non-specific) situation which is conceptualized as a 'state of knowledge.' Let us label the former concept as [PARTICULAR] and the latter as [GENERAL].

We will briefly see that both the simple present and the simple past reflect the concepts of particularity and generality. Let us first consider the simple present. The simple present represents either the concept of [PARTICULAR] or that of [GENERAL]. Observe the following examples:

- (24) a. Napier passes the ball to Attwater, who heads it
straight into the goal! (Leech, 1987:6)
b. She walks to work. (Leech, 1987:9)

Sentence (24a) is uttered in sports commentaries. The simple present forms *passes* and *heads* express the ongoing events of passing and heading directly connected to the real time line. They reflect the concept of [PARTICULAR]. In (24b), on the other hand, the situation of a girl's walking to work is not an ongoing situation, but a generalized state (or a habitual state) of the event. The sentence in (24b) reflects the concept of [GENERAL].

Let us then consider the simple past tense. We can say that the simple past describes both a [PARTICULAR] situation and a [GENERAL] situation. Compare the following pair of examples:

- (25) a. We visited Selfridges last week. (Leech, 1987:13)
b. In those days I enjoyed a game of tennis.
(Leech, 1987:13)

We can claim that sentence (25a) reflects the concept of [PARTICULAR] because the adverb *last week* leads us to connect the situation in question to the real time line. With respect to sentence (25b), Leech (1987:13) notes that this sentence is exchangeable for a sentence like *I used to enjoy a game of tennis*. The auxiliary verb *used to* expresses a state or a habit in the past. In this case it describes the speaker's habit of enjoying a game of tennis in the past. A habit is a generalized

state of the same kind of event(s). Therefore we can say that the concept of [GENERAL] is reflected in the simple past of the sentence (25b).

By analogy, we can infer from the above observation that the present perfect reflects the conceptual pair, that is, [PARTICULAR] and [GENERAL]. The following pair of present perfect sentences are manifestations of these concepts:

- (26) a. I have just been to the post office.
 b. I have been to Italy before.

We usually use a sentence like (26a) so as to refer to a specific event which happened a few minutes ago. In (26b), by contrast, we refer to a generalized state of an event which has ever happened. We can thus say that a present perfect like (26a) conveys the concept of [PARTICULAR] category and one like (26b) the concept of [GENERAL]. The adverb *just* is a representation of the feature [PARTICULAR] while the adverb *before* represents the feature [GENERAL]. In the following subsections we will present evidence which supports the claim that the particular/general distinction motivates us to classify the functions of the present perfect.

4.1.2.2. Evidence

Let us first observe the following examples:

- (27) a. I have not seen him this month.
 b. *I have never seen him this month.
 (cited from *Progressive English-Japanese Dictionary*
 2nd edition, p.1213)

Without the adverb *this month*, these sentences are both grammatical. They are both subsumed under the feature [PERFECTIVE]. They are categorized into the [PERFECTIVE] perfect. As the ungrammaticality of (27b) shows, however, a perfect sentence with the negative *never* in the sense of 'at no

time' cannot cooccur with an adverbial of specific time reference. On the other hand, the perfect in (27a), whose interpretation is vague without the adverb *this month*, is unambiguously construed as a perfect of specific reference to a past situation. In (27b), the negative *never* reflects the concept of [GENERAL] whereas the adverb *this month* is an expression of the concept of [PARTICULAR]. A contradiction occurs as a result; hence sentence (27b) is unacceptable. In (27a), the present perfect itself is vague; accompanied by the adverb *this month*, the whole sentence is characterized as a [PARTICULAR] perfect in that the adverb is a representation of the feature [PARTICULAR].

Let us then present another piece of evidence to suggest that our [PERFECTIVE] perfect (or Declerck's indefinite perfect) should be divided into two categories from the point of view of the particular/general distinction. It is widely admitted that the present perfect does not cooccur with a time-point-specifying adverbial (henceforth a TP adverbial) such as *at ten o'clock*.⁸ However, we should note that certain present perfects can go along with a TP adverbial. Compare the following examples:


- (28) a. *She has telephoned me at ten o'clock.
 b. She has telephoned me at ten o'clock three times.

The difference in acceptability in (28) shows that the present perfect cannot go along with a TP adverbial only in the case of specific reference to a past situation, whereas they can cooccur with such an adverbial in the case of the description of a generalized situation in the past. In (28b), we do not refer to a specific event of a girl's telephoning the speaker, but describe a generalized state of the event. The adverb *at ten o'clock* is "an essential element of the situation" (Declerck, 1991a:109). Thus a TP adverbial which appears in a present perfect sentence does not refer to a specific time point on the time line. This kind of TP adverbial is 'metatemporal.' The observations above lead us to the conclusion that the

particular/general distinction is reflected in the English present perfect.

4.1.2.3. *The P(articular)-G(eneral) Criterion*

In the previous subsection we have seen that we distinguish the concept of [PARTICULAR] from that of [GENERAL] in the use of the present perfect. We regard the criterion on the basis of this pattern of cognition as *P(articular)-G(eneral) Criterion*. We can represent it diagrammatically as follows:



This diagram shows that the [PARTICULAR] to [GENERAL] scale permits two pragmatic categories (i.e., the [PARTICULAR] category (perfect) and the [GENERAL] category (perfect)). 'Pa' is short for 'particular' and 'Ge' for 'general.' The closer to the [GENERAL] pole a present perfect is situated, the higher the degree of generality becomes. The closer to the [PARTICULAR] pole a present perfect is situated, the higher the degree of particularity becomes. The central part with an oblique slash in the above diagram expresses both the characteristics of particularity and those of generality. We describe the particular/general scale vertically for convenience's sake.

We have thus far seen that some [PERFECTIVE] perfects convey the concept of [PARTICULAR] and others the concept of [GENERAL]. We can thus divide the [PERFECTIVE] category further into two different categories: one category is formed by combining the [PERFECTIVE] feature with the [PARTICULAR] one; the other by combining the [PERFECTIVE] feature with the [GENERAL] one. We call the former the 'perfective' perfect and the latter the

'experiential' perfect.

4.1.2.4. *The P-G Criterion and the [CONTINUATIVE] Category*

Let us now move on to the question of whether or not our P(articu~~m~~lar)-G(eneral) criterion is applied to the case of the [CONTINUATIVE] perfect. The answer is affirmative. Recall that Fenn (1987) divides the continuative perfect into three subcategories: the actual continuative, the recurrent continuative, and the discontinuous continuative. It may be safe to say that among them, recurrent continuative perfects with habitual connotations are marked by the feature [GENERAL] on the grounds of the characteristics of a habitual meaning; since it is a set of the same type of events, a habit is a generalized state. We call this type of perfect the "habitual" perfect.

There are two pieces of evidence to suggest that the habitual perfect exists as an independent pragmatic category. A piece of evidence is the fact that, as Fenn (1987) observes, borderline cases between experiential perfects and habitual continuative perfects are amply suggested, on one hand, and those between experiential perfects and actual continuative perfects are rarely offered, on the other. Observe (30), for example:

- (30) Gerald: Well, the fact is, I've been spending a great deal of money lately, and I'm rather broke.
(Fenn, 1987:89)

According to Fenn (1987:89), the identification of this perfect depends on the speaker's subjective viewpoint: the distinction between the experiential perfect and the (habitual) continuative perfect is made in terms of non-regular iteration vs. regular iteration. Aside from the way of distinction, let us consider why a sentence like (30) can be interpreted either as the experiential perfect or as the habitual continuative perfect (rather than the actual continuative perfect). Intuitively, we

can consider that both types of the perfects above are subsumed under the same feature, i.e., [GENERAL]. This may be one of the reasons why they can easily be exchanged for each other.

Another piece of evidence for the habitual perfect is the compatibility with TP (time-point-specifying) adverbials:

- (31) a. She has telephoned me at ten o'clock three times.
 (= (28b))
- b. She has telephoned (been telephoning) me at ten o'clock for the last two years.

As we have already seen that a TP adverbial cooccurring with the present perfect has the feature [GENERAL], the perfect in (31b) as well as the one in (31a) is a case of the [GENERAL] perfect. The interpretation of (31b) is that the event of a girl's telephoning the speaker regularly obtains throughout the S-inclusive time-span.⁹

The rareness of borderline cases between the experiential perfect and the actual continuative perfect, by contrast, can be ascribed to the widely accepted view that the interaction between members of two different levels of cognition is more difficult than that between members of the same level: the experiential perfect is marked by [GENERAL] and the actual continuative perfect by [PARTICULAR].

4.2. Four Pragmatic Categories

For reasons discussed above, we can categorize functions of the present perfect systematically by combining the temporal criterion with the P(articular)-G(eneral) criterion. The relations among four pragmatic categories are represented by the diagram in (32):

(32)

		[PERFECTIVE]	[CONTINUATIVE]
		Pe	Co
[PARTICULAR]	Pa	perfective <1>	continuative <3>
		<2>	<5>
[GENERAL]	Ge	experiential <4>	habitual

As is clear from this diagram, the English present perfect has four basic pragmatic categories in our system: the perfective perfect (the combination of [PERFECTIVE] and [PARTICULAR]), the experiential perfect (the combination of [PERFECTIVE] and [GENERAL]), the continuative perfect (the combination of [CONTINUATIVE] and [PARTICULAR]) and the habitual perfect (the combination of [CONTINUATIVE] and [GENERAL]). Let us present the following sentences again as a representative member for each category:

- (33) a. I've been thinking for several minutes now.
(=(7a)) (continuative)
- b. I've been taking pills of one sort or another since I was 8 years old. (=(7b)) (habitual)
- c. I've changed my mind about that favour you wanted me to do. (=(9b)) (perfective)
- d. Those curtains are really the most insistent colour that I have ever seen. (=(8a)) (experiential)

It can be said that our system is superior to Fenn's in that our system is not only more systematic and motivated with fewer criteria, but also can deal with some borderline cases between two perfects (i.e., double-duty perfects). We do not bother to

identify them, but situate them in any of the four shaded areas numbered <1>-<4> in the diagram (32). Area <1> designates the borderline area between the perfective and continuative perfects, Area <2> the one between the perfective and experiential perfects, Area <3> the one between the continuative and habitual perfects, and Area <4> the one between the experiential and habitual perfects. Double-duty perfect sentences are all classified into any of the four borderline areas. Each representative example is shown in (34):

- (34) a. A week has elapsed since the preceding scene.
 (= (12a)) (Area <1>)
- b. Mrs. Dot: Why, since my husband died I've almost doubled our profits. (= (19b)) (Area <2>)
- c. Mana has been playing the *koto*. (Area <3>)
- d. Gerald: Well, the fact is, I've been spending a great deal of money lately, and I'm rather broke. (= (30)) (Area <4>)

Sentence (34c) can be regarded as a borderline case between a continuative reading (i.e., Mana's playing the *koto* is actually ongoing at the speech time) and a habitual one (i.e., Mana has the habit of playing the *koto*). Suppose that Mana is in the situation where she started playing the *koto* one or two weeks ago and has been in practice on the *koto* since then. In this case she may not be playing the *koto* at the time when this sentence is uttered; that is, this is not the continuative perfect in our system. On the other hand, it is an exaggeration to say that she has the habit of playing the *koto*. This type of perfect is thus categorized into Area <3>. As for the other three borderline cases (i.e., Area <1>, Area <2> and Area <4>), we have already looked through them, and, thus, will not go any further here.

Logically speaking, we have one more shaded area numbered <5>. Perfects which are categorized into this area have the four features in the diagram (32): [PERFECTIVE], [CONTINUATIVE], [PARTICULAR] and [GENERAL]. We cannot offer any example of this area at present.

5. Remaining Issues

In this section we will discuss how we should deal with the following three types of perfects, that is, the resultative perfect in our sense, McCawley's hot-news perfect and Comrie's perfect of recent-past within our framework.

5.1. The Resultative Perfect as a Subcategory of the [PERFECTIVE] Perfect

Let us begin with the question of how to deal with our resultative perfect. We will contend that the resultative perfect is a subtype of the [PERFECTIVE] perfect. As we have seen in section 3.2.1, the undeniable resultative state of a given perfect is derived almost exclusively either from the lexical property of a verb or from an interplay between the lexical property of a verb and pragmatic information. Let us consider (21) again, repeated here as (35):

- (35) a. She has gone to Singapore. (She's not here now.)
 b. Dodos have already died out. (They do not exist on the earth now.)

In (35a), the undeniable resultative state is predictable from the lexical property of the verb under a specific context while in (35b), the undeniable resultative state stems from the lexical property of the verb itself. Common for the perfects above is the [PERFECTIVE] feature. The preceding situation (i.e., E_2) of each perfect in (35) no longer obtains at the speech time.

We are now concerned with the relations between the resultative perfect in our sense and the [PERFECTIVE] perfect. In some cases (e.g., when the speaker has just seen a girl off at an airport), the perfect in (35a) is interpreted as a particular situation which occurred just now. In other cases (e.g., a year after the speaker saw a girl off and she is still in Singapore), the perfect in (35a) is construed as a generalized state of the

event which occurred a year ago. In the former case, we construe the event in terms of the concept of [PARTICULAR]; in the latter, we capture the same event in the light of the concept of [GENERAL]. The point I wish to emphasize here is that we interpret the resultative perfect by using the P-G criterion on the basis of pragmatic information (i.e., the context of discourse or non-linguistic (social) information). That is, the resultative perfect is either a variant of the perfective perfect (the combination of [PERFECTIVE] and [PARTICULAR]), or one of the experiential perfect (the combination of [PERFECTIVE] and [GENERAL]), or one of the borderline cases between the two perfects. As for (35b), we categorize it into the experiential perfect, because we know as a social information dodos' extinction was caused a long time ago and accordingly we construe the situation as a generalized state of knowledge. The above observations lead us to categorize the resultative perfect into any of the three areas in the diagram (32) (i.e., the perfective perfect, the experiential perfect or Area <2>), all of which are subsumed under the same feature, i.e., [PERFECTIVE]. Therefore we can conclude that the resultative perfect is a subcategory of the [PERFECTIVE] perfect.

5.2. The "Hot-News" Perfect as a Subcategory of the [PERFECTIVE] Perfect

In this subsection, we are concerned with McCawley's hot-news perfects. According to McCawley (1971:104), a hot-news perfect is used to report hot news, as in (36):

(36) Malcolm X has just been assassinated.

Fenn (1987) objects to the view that the hot-news perfect form an independent pragmatic category. He regards it simply as a variation of the resultative perfect in his sense (or our perfective perfect) by arguing that the concept of 'recency,' which is said to be the major implication in the hot-news perfect, is a characteristic feature represented by the semantics

of the present perfect on the grounds that a past situation of the perfect is oriented to S. I will agree with Fenn in this respect. A characteristic feature of news is newness, which is not contradictory to the characteristics of recency that all the present perfects have in common. In (36), the resultative state of Malcolm X's death stems exclusively from the lexical property of the verb *assassinate*. Regardless of the cancelability of the resultative state, the hot-news perfect has the feature [PERFECTIVE] if we take the characteristics of news into consideration. The characteristic features of the "hot-news" perfect are subsumed under the feature [PERFECTIVE].

However, suppose that the speaker wants to tell the hearer that Malcolm X was assassinated a month ago and the hearer does not know the fact because he or she has long been isolated. The sentence (36) is then a hot-news perfect to the hearer; but it is already a generalized state of knowledge to the speaker. So the hot-news perfect sometimes expresses the feature [PARTICULAR] and sometimes describes the feature [GENERAL]. Thus, we categorize the hot-news perfect into the [PERFECTIVE] perfect.

5.3. The Perfect of "Recent-Past" as a Subcategory of the [PERFECTIVE] Perfect

Finally, let us look at Comrie's (1976) perfect of recent-past briefly. Observe (37):

- (37) a. I have recently learned that the match is to be postponed.
 b. Bill has just arrived. (Comrie, 1976:60)

We can say that these perfects are marked by [PERFECTIVE]. In a certain context, sentence (37a) can be interpreted as a representation of a piece of stored information (i.e., a generalized state), thus resulting in a special case of the experiential perfect. The occurrence of the situation happens to be closer to S. As for (37b), however, this kind of perfect tends to be interpreted as the perfective perfect since we take

into consideration the context where this type of sentence is most likely to be uttered. We typically use this type of sentence to refer to a situation which happened just before. That is, some perfects of recent-past are classified into the experiential perfect and others into the perfective perfect. It is possible that some perfects of recent-past have both the characteristics of the perfective perfect and those of the experiential perfect. Therefore we regard the perfect of recent-past as a subcategory of the [PERFECTIVE] perfect.

6. Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have attempted to establish a new system of the categorization of functions of the English present perfect. Our starting point was Fenn (1987). We have pointed out some problems and have criticized Fenn in some respects. We have then offered two kinds of criteria: the temporal criterion and the P(articlar)-G(eneral) criterion. They are both represented as a scale which has two opposite limits. By combining one criterion with the other, we have proposed four pragmatic categories which are all related to each other through the medium of borderline areas in which double-duty perfects are situated (see (32)). Our new system is more systematic and motivated than Fenn's. Furthermore, our framework is more advantageous than Fenn's in some respects.

NOTES

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questions about some English data. All remaining inadequacies are of course my own.

¹ We define the term *anteriority* as describing a temporal relation between two situations with one situation anterior to the other.

² We will use the term *situation* in such a way that it can cover an action, event, state of affairs, or whatever a verb phrase expresses.

³ Fenn (1987) uses the term *entail* as referring to logical inclusion, distinguishing it from the term *imply*, which is used to refer to inferential inclusion. Throughout this paper, we will follow Fenn (1987) in this respect.

⁴ Fenn (1987) regards the term *aspect* as referring to the progressive and non-progressive forms. The former is to mark the predicated situation as 'ongoing.' The latter is to express the situation as a 'complete whole.'

⁵ Declerck (1991b) interprets this notion as equivalent to the notion of 'current relevance.'

⁶ Readers may be familiar with Reichenbach's (1947) temporal system. Within Reichenbach's framework, the temporal schemata of the present perfect and the preterite (the simple past) are as follows:

- (i) a. E - R , S (the present perfect)
- b. E , R - S (the preterite)

E, R, S are the symbols of the time of event, the point of reference, and the time of speech, respectively. How to interpret these schemata is equal to those in (14). Among some reasons why we do not adopt Reichenbach's temporal system, the one which is most relevant here is that Reichenbach's system cannot deal with the dual structure of the perfect and the single structure of the preterite from a unified point of view: if R expresses an event other than E, the preterite as well as the present perfect has the dual structure; if R represents the speaker's point of view, not an event, we have to say that the present perfect as well as the preterite has the single

structure. See Klein (1992), Nakau (1994), and Tanaka (1991) for further discussion.

⁷ Declerck (1979) states that the bounded/unbounded distinction should be supplemented with a third value named "0-bounded," which covers the borderline value between the "+bounded" and "-bounded" values. Our temporal criterion admits the [PERFECTIVE] category, the [CONTINUATIVE] category and the borderline area between them. Perfects which are situated in the borderline area have the characteristics of both of the categories.

⁸ This type of adverbial may be divided into two subtypes: a lexically-determined type and a pragmatically-determined type. Examples of the former are *yesterday*, *last year*, etc. They are lexically past-time-specifying adverbials. Examples of the latter are *at ten o'clock*, *on March 5*, etc. Whether they refer to the past time or not depends on pragmatic information.

⁹ The sentences in (31) can be said to express iterative aspect. Note that iterative aspect does not always appear in the [GENERAL] perfect (i.e., the habitual perfect or the experiential perfect). Consider the following example:

(i) Light has been flashing continuously.

This perfect sentence is marked by the feature [PARTICULAR] when the event of light's flashing is ongoing at the speech time.

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