

Exhaustiveness Implicature of *It*-clefts and WH-clefts in Discourse*

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1. Exhaustiveness Implicature

Focus clauses of *it*-clefts and WH-clefts of specificational use are more generally associated with a well-known implicature, which excludes from the set the elements other than the one(s) appearing in the focus position of these constructions:

- (1) a. It was John who broke the window.
- b. John and nobody else broke the window.
- c. John broke the window.

(Halliday (1967:236))

- (2) a. What the duke gave my aunt was that teapot.
- b. 'I am going to tell you about the duke's gift to my aunt: it was that teapot---and nothing else'.
- c. The duke gave my aunt that teapot.

(Halliday (1985:43))

Halliday pointed out that (1a) and (2a) imply (1b) and (2b) respectively, whereas the non-cleft counterparts in (1c) and (2c) do not. This implicature is called an exhaustive implicature and considered a functional feature of specificational sentences.¹ Consider the following examples:

- (3) a. We want Watney's.
- b. What we want is Watney's.

(Halliday (1967:224))

The example in (3a) is the London brewer's actual slogan, which envisaged the possibility that we want other items as well. Thus, it was soon replaced by the WH-cleft sentence in (3b).

2. Approaches to Exhaustiveness Implicature

Three different views have been offered on the exhaustiveness implicature associated with *it*-clefts and WH-clefts; it is claimed to be (i) a conventional implicature [Halvorsen (1978), Collins (1991)], or (ii) an entailment [Atlas and Levinson (1981)], or (iii) a conversational implicature [Ota (1980), Horn (1981), Declerck (1988), Headberg (1990)].

Before examining the plausibility of these views, I would like to refer to Grice's theory of implicature proposed in Grice (1975). Grice distinguished two different sorts of implicature: conventional implicature and conversational

implicature. They have in common the property that they convey additional meaning beyond the semantic meaning of the utterances. They differ in that in the case of conversational implicature, it is derived from a simple assumption that the speaker is observing the cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation, and thus what is implied varies depending on the context of an utterance. In the case of conventional implicature, the same implicature is always transmitted regardless of context because it is not derived from the cooperative principle or the maxims, but it is associated with specific words and results in additional meaning when those words are used. Conventional implicatures have the following properties:

- (4) a. Conventional implicatures will be *non-cancellable* because they do not rely on defeasible assumptions about the nature of the context.
- b. Conventional implicatures will be *detachable* because they depend on the particular linguistic items used.
- c. Conventional implicatures will *not* be *calculated* using pragmatic principles and contextual knowledge, but rather given by convention.

(Levinson (1983:128))

Then, conventional implicatures can be detachable, but not cancelable nor calculated. None of these properties apply to conversational implicatures.

Since conventional implicatures are a part of the meaning of an expression, they emerge whenever the expression is used in any context. For example, the implicature of John's difficulty arises from the verb phrase *manage to* in the sentence "John managed to finish his paper." It is also observed that conventional implicatures are maintained in negation and interrogation:

- (5) a. John managed to write a paper to present at the conference.
- b. John wrote a paper to present at the conference.
- c. It is difficult to write a paper to present at the conference.
- d. John did not manage to write a paper to present at the conference.
- e. Did John manage to write a paper to present at the conference?

(Collins (1991:69))

(5b) is an assertion of (5a), and (5c) is a conventional implicature of (5a), which is retained in (5d) and (5e).

Halvorsen (1978) claims that not only lexical items but complex syntactic constructions such as *it*-clefts may have conventional implicatures associated with them:

- (6) a. It was John that Mary kissed.
- b. Mary kissed John.
- c. Mary kissed somebody.
- d. Mary kissed only one person.

(Halvorsen (1978: 14-15))

On this view, (6a) entails (6b) and conventionally implicates (6c) and (6d). He refers to implicatures of *it*-clefts like (6c) as their *existential implicature* and those in (6d) as *exhaustive implicature*. Collins (1991), following Halvorsen (1978), regards the exclusive feature of cleft constructions as a conventional implicature.²

Horn (1981), Atlas and Levinson (1981), Declerck (1988) and Valluduvu (1992), *inter alia*, reject the analyses of Halvorsen (1978) and Collins (1991). We have observed that the conventional implicature associated with *manage to* is preserved in negation (5d) and interrogation (5e). Therefore, given the exhaustiveness implicature of a cleft sentence in (6a) is a conventional implicature, its negative and interrogative counterparts retain exhaustiveness implicatures. However, this is obviously not the case. Neither of the *it*-clefts below has an exhaustiveness implicature:

- (7) a. It wasn't John that Mary kissed.
- b. Was it John that Mary kissed?

Atlas and Levinson (1981) claim that the exhaustiveness implicatures associated with clefts are entailments rather than conventional implicatures:

...THERE IS NO UNIQUENESS PRESUPPOSITION FOR CLEFTS. Instead, the affirmative sentence *It was John that Mary kissed*, but not the preferred (choice negation) understanding of the negative sentence *It wasn't John that Mary kissed*, entails *Mary kissed (exactly) one person*.

(Atlas and Levinson (1981:29-30))

It is generally accepted that presuppositions of a sentence normally survive negation, but entailments do not. Although the affirmative *it*-cleft in the citation above retains an exhaustive implicature, its negative counterpart does not. From these observations, Atlas and Levinson (1981) propose that exhaustiveness implicatures associated with cleft constructions are entailments rather than presuppositions. Following their analyses, (6a) entails (6b), (6c), and (6d), and the fact that the negative counterpart of (6a), i.e. (7a) does not have exhaustiveness implicatures can be appropriately captured by their proposal, since entailments do not survive negation.

Horn (1981:130), however, refutes Atlas and Levinson's analyses on the

ground that if exhaustiveness implicatures associated with *it*-clefts were entailments, then (8a)-(8d) as well as (8') should have been acceptable, whereas in fact, they are not:

- (8) a. #I know Mary ate a pizza, but it wasn't a pizza that she ate!
- b. #I know Mary ate a pizza, but was it a pizza that she ate?
- c. #I know Mary ate a pizza, but I've just discovered that it was a pizza that she ate!
- d. #I know Mary ate a pizza, but if it was a pizza that she ate, then all is well.
- (8') I know Mary ate a pizza, but I've just discovered that it was only a pizza that she ate!

Given that exhaustiveness implicatures of *it*-clefts were entailments, it follows that whenever *it*-clefts are true, then the exhaustiveness implicatures associated with them should be necessarily true. Horn illustrates that the anomaly of (8a-d) is strikingly redeemed if we add *only* to *a pizza* in each of the foci of the clefts, e.g. (8'). Then, Horn (1981:130) concludes, "...there is no obvious way to rule out the infelicitous sequences of (8) if we are to insist, with Atlas and Levinson, that clefts entail exhaustiveness."

Regarding exhaustiveness implicatures of clefts, Ota (1980:601) speculates that they are conversational implicatures. When one responds to the question "Who came to the party?" with the answer "JOHN came to the party," we normally understand that no one other than John came to the party. If one knows that other than John, Mary came to the party and answers the same way, then he/she may violate Grice's Maxim of Quantity. The same is true with the cleft sentence *It was John that came to the party*. Since one of the pragmatic functions of *it*-clefts and WH-clefts is to formally distinguish what is presupposed from what is asserted and list all the members of the latter set in the focus of each construction, the implicatures of exhaustively enumerating membership are so strong that they seem even to be asserted in each structure (Ota (1980:601)).

Declerck (1988) claims that exhaustiveness implicatures associated with *it*-clefts and WH-clefts are derived from the fact that these constructions have specificational meanings and that the speaker is supposed to observe the conversational Maxims:

- ...it is not hard to see how exhaustiveness follows from the very act of specification if the speaker is taken to abide by the conversational Maxims described by Grice (1975). The Maxim of Quality prescribes

that the speaker should specify the correct value(s) for the variable; the Maxim of Quantity ('Make your contribution as informative as required') prescribes that the speaker should give the complete (exhaustive) list of the values that satisfy the variable. If the speaker is taken to be co-operative (i.e. abiding by the Maxims) the listener has a right to conclude that there are no values satisfying the variable apart from those listed in the focus of the specificational sentence. This is why a sentence like *The one who went out was John* implicates the truth of the statement *Only one person went out*. (Declerck (1988:30))

According to Declerck's arguments, the listener has a right to conclude that the value satisfying the variable [X who went out] of the WH-cleft in the citation is *John* and *only John*, which is an exhaustiveness implicature of this sentence, provided that the speaker is taken to be co-operative.

In this section we have reviewed previous studies regarding exhaustiveness implicatures. Ota (1980), Horn (1981), and Declerck (1988) conclude that exhaustiveness implicatures associated with *it*-clefts and WH-clefts are conversational implicatures rather than conventional implicatures or entailments. I believe this is on the right track. However, their examples of cleft constructions, on which their arguments crucially depend, are collections of artificial examples reproduced by making use of native intuitions. I would like to develop empirical arguments based on the actual data collected from written discourse and to claim from a different point of view that exhaustiveness implicatures are conversational implicatures.

3. Conventional Implicatures vs. Conversational Implicatures

3.1 Negative Cleft Sentences and Non-specific Focus Clauses

Conventional implicatures are part of the linguistic system, emerging whenever the linguistic expression with which they are associated is used (*manage to* in the case of (5)) and preserved under negation and interrogation. Therefore, if exhaustiveness implicatures are claimed to be conventional implicatures, then it is a logical consequence that they cannot be cancelled under any context. On the other hand, conversational implicatures, falling in the realm of pragmatics and, in fact, depending on contexts and listeners' inferences, can be cancellable. Consequently, if exhaustiveness implicatures are conversational implicatures, then they can be cancelled in appropriate situations of utterances and contexts. Which of these conflicting characterizations captures the linguistic facts regarding exhaustiveness implicatures? I will demonstrate

that the conventional implicature approach runs into serious problems. Further I favor the argument that exhaustiveness implicatures are conversational implicatures.

- (9) As expected, Kenya swept the medals in the 3,000 steeplechase, but *it wasn't three-time champion Moses Kiptanui who earned the gold*. That went to Wilson Boit Kipketer, who won a sprint to the finish between the trio in 8:05.84. (*The Daily Yomiuri*, 8/8/97)
- (10) *It is not the antiquity of the pages that intrigues me*; it is the use to which they were put that gives them magic.

(*National Geographic*, Nov. 1996)

These are examples of negative cleft sentences. However, they do not have exhaustiveness implicatures. *It*-clefts are typical examples of specificational sentences whose semantic function is to specify a value for a variable in a *that*-clause by elements represented in a focus clause. In other words, an exhaustiveness implicature is a set of values specifying those variables. The negative cleft sentence in (9) simply describes that the value for the variable *the X who earned the gold* is not *Moses Kiptanui*. In fact, it is appropriate to assert that exhaustiveness implicatures are cancelled in this case. The same is true in (10).

Suppose that exhaustiveness were a conventional implicature, then elements in a focus clause of clefts should be a set of values exhaustively specifying variables of a *that*-clause. Furthermore, since *that*-clauses of clefts are definite noun clauses including variables, it should be expected that indefinite nouns could not occur in focus clauses:

- (11) a. LONDON (Reuters)...“It (the age of the mother) shouldn't be a problem. *It's other people that make it into a problem*,” Liz Buttle, who gave birth on Nov. 20 to a healthy baby boy, told Sky television in an interview broadcast Sunday.

(*The Daily Yomiuri* (Reuters), 1/20/98)

- b. *What George saw was something.

- (12) There is no question what they are after. *What the committee is after is somebody at the White House*. They would like to get Haldeman or Colson, Ehrlichman. (Prince (1978:887))

The cleft sentence in (11a) is, however, impeccable, though the variable of the *that*-clause cannot be uniquely specified because *other people* refer to indefinite people. Thus exhaustiveness implicatures do not arise from this example. The WH-cleft sentence in (12) is also felicitous, even though an indefinite noun

phrase *somebody* appears in the focus of a WH-cleft. By contrast the WH-cleft in (11b), as we expect, is infelicitous because semantically vacuous indefinite noun phrases such as *something*, which cannot specify values for variables of a wh-clause, cannot occur in the focus of a WH-cleft.

It is interesting to note that in the acceptable examples in (11a) and (12), the referents of the indefinite noun phrases *other people* and *somebody* are revealed in immediately following sentences. This fact may suggest that the speakers have already assumed *Liz Buttle*, or *Haldeman* or *Colson*, *Ehrlichman* as referents for those indefinite noun phrases at the time of utterance. On the other hand, in (11b) there is no clue in the context to derive assumptions like those in (11a) and (12), and thus, leaving the variables unspecified, it turns out to be unacceptable.

3.2 Focusing Subjuncts

3.2.1 Restrictive Subjuncts

Quirk et al. (1985:604) characterize the function of focusing subjuncts as “drawing attention to a part of a sentence as wide as the prediction or as narrow as a single constituent of an element.” They further subcategorize focusing subjuncts into two main subdivisions, RESTRICTIVES and ADDITIVES. “Restrictive subjuncts indicate that the utterance is true in respect of the part focused... Additive subjuncts indicate that the utterance concerned is *additionally* true in respect of the part focused. (Quirk et al. (1985:604))”

Let us look at the acceptability of cleft constructions where restrictive subjuncts such as *only* and *just* appear in focus clauses:

- (13) a. The monument marks the point at which the corners of the four states intersect. *It is the only place in the United States where this happens.* (National Geographic, Sep. 1996)
- b. This theory I find very appealing. It is more explicit than most theories on the market; ...*it is the only theory that both properly acknowledges the linguistic underdetermination of what is said and yet accounts for the hearer's ability to select a unique interpretation.* (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10)
- (14) MacWorld Tokyo 1997, in fact, looked more like an auto show thanks to an eye-catching Olympus display luring in unsuspecting men with the promise of bikinis. What they found, however, was technology and innovation geared at the Mac.
(The Daily Yomiuri, 2/ 25/97)
- a. What they found, however, was {*only* / *just*} technology and

innovation geared at the Mac.

- b. ??What they found, however, was technology and innovation geared at the Mac, *among other things*.

If cleft constructions always carry exhaustiveness implicatures, then we can expect that adding restrictive subjuncts such as *only* and *just* to the focus clauses should increase redundancies and result in decreasing the acceptability of the sentences. Contrary to our expectations, we can find felicitous use of *it*-clefts in (13a-b) and a WH-cleft in (14a). However, attaching to clefts a prepositional phrase like *among other things*, the meaning of which explicitly contradicts exhaustiveness, causes the infelicity of the cleft as in (14b).

Collins (1991) points out the same observations:

- (15) a. The car needs a new battery, amongst other things.
 b. *The car only needs a new battery, amongst other things.
 c. ?It is a new battery that the car needs, amongst other things.

(Collins (1991:32-33))

The unacceptability of (15b) is due to the semantic contradiction between *only* and *among other things*. That is, while car components other than a new battery are specifically excluded by the use of *only*, at the same time the use of the prepositional phrase *among other things* permits us to select other things from a set of car components. Hence, the infelicity in (15b) results. The *it*-cleft in (15c) exhibits low acceptability, even though it contains no exclusive elements such as *only* or *just*. This may be due to the incompatibility of the exhaustiveness implicature associated with the cleft sentence and the selective implication of *among other things*.

It is interesting to consider the differing point of view that *only* and *just* in (14a) may have lost or weakened the function of exclusion associated with restrictive subjuncts, and have been transformed into subjuncts expressing "simply" which designates degrees of importance.³

- (16) A: I lost my bag.
 B: Did you lost your money?
 A: No, it was *only* my lunch that I lost.

3.2.2 Additive Subjuncts

We can hardly find examples of cleft sentences of which focus clauses contain additive subjuncts like *even*:

- (17) a. *It was *even* John that Mary kissed.
 b. *It was *even* John who hit Bill. (Gundel (1977:127))
 c. *It was *even* John who ran away. (Declerck (1988:34))

d. *The one who insulted George was *even* John.

e. Even John ran away. (Dillon (1977:9))

(18) It was *even* John who protested. (Quirk et al. (1985:611))

The non-cleft sentence in (17e) presumes that 'someone else' also ran away. This presumption derived from the use of *even* runs counter to the exhaustiveness implicature 'only one person, *John*' carried by the cleft constructions in (17a)-(17d). The sentences are therefore unacceptable. Surprisingly, Quirk et al. (1985) judge the *it*-cleft in (18) as acceptable, which is judged infelicitous by our informants and questioned by Ota (1980:600) and Declerck (1988:34).

Apparently the infelicity of the clefts in (17a)-(17d) could be explained in terms of Halvorsen's (1978) claim that exhaustiveness implicatures associated with cleft constructions are conventional implicatures and thus cannot be cancelled in any context. This exhaustive implication and the additive meaning carried by *even* contradict each other in these examples, and unacceptability results. However, this argument is totally implausible in the sense that the exhaustiveness implicatures carried by the negative cleft constructions, the clefts with non-specific focus clauses, and the clefts with focusing subjuncts other than *even* are cancelled, whereas those associated with the clefts with *even* in focus clauses cannot be cancelled. This is an ad hoc conclusion and does not make for a consistent argument.

The infelicity of (17a)-(17d) is due to the pragmatic anomalies that *John* is made conspicuous placed in the focus clauses on the one hand, and describes by the use of *even* that John is the last person of the acts expressed in the *that*-clauses on the other. These two incompatible aspects of John cannot be realized in cleft constructions. Let us look at the relevant examples:

(19) A: Why do you think John is the murderer?

B: Because it's John who the victim was blackmailing. It's John who was heard to threaten him. It's John who lacks an alibi. It's John whose fingerprints were on the murder weapon. And *it's even John who inherits the money!* (Headberg (1990:204))

(19B) explains B's suspicion of John: that John was blackmailed by the victim, that John was heard to threaten the victim, that John's fingerprints were on the weapon, and that John inherits the money. John has been emphatically repeated and made salient as a discourse topic in the context. Although *even* appears in the focus clause, it seems to modify *inherits the money* rather than *John*.⁴ Hence, (19B) is felicitous because no contradictions arise in the cleft sentence.⁵

Fraser (1971) points out that noun phrases functioning as the scope of

even cannot be clefted:⁶

- (20) a. *It was even John who shot James.
- b. *It was even a table she repainted.
- c. *It was even at 5 p.m. that the bell chimed.

(Fraser (1971:156))

Now let us consider the following clefts with the additive subjunct *also*, of which judgments vary according to speakers:

- (21) It was *also/only Muriel who voted for Hubert. (Horn (1969:106))
- (22) It was also John who protested. (Quirk et al. (1985:611))
- (23) It was also John who ran away. (Declerck (1988:33))

Horn (1969:106) explains the unacceptability of (21), saying "...the natural explanation for the facts of (21) is that clefting, like *only*, specifies uniqueness, while *even* and *also* presuppose non-uniqueness and thus cannot be clefted." According to Declerck (1988), the sentence in (23) cannot be interpreted as saying that John was not the only one who ran away. If the cleft sentence is appropriate, then it is because another interpretation is available, "...viz. the reading on which John is taken to be the value not only of this variable but also of another one (or other ones)." That is, (23) is interpreted something like (24):

- (24) It was not only John who did X (and Y) but it was also John who ran away.

The cleft in (22) is judged acceptable in Quirk et al. (1985:611) without any comments. I suppose that the additive subjunct *also* adds the meaning of additionally true to the part focused on, and that this does not contradict the emphatic function of cleft constructions.

We can find quite a few cleft constructions with *also* in focus clauses in actual discourse. The following examples are borrowed from Headberg (1990:203):

- (25) The rate of fatal heart attacks among middle-aged men increased steadily until the late 1960's, at which point it leveled off and soon began to decline. Not coincidentally, it was about that time that large numbers of men wised up to the harmfulness of cigarettes. *It was also in the late 60's that more healthful food---specifically, foods low in cholesterol and saturated fat began to invade American kitchens.* Since then, the average cholesterol level of adult males has fallen...[Jane E Brody, 'America's Health: An Assessment' *The New York Times Magazine*, 10/8/89, p. 42]

- (26) It was the President in a rare departure from the diplomacy of caution who initiated the successful Panama invasion. *It was also Bush who came up with the ideas of having an early, informal Malta summit with Gorbachev and a second round of troop cuts in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall.* But it was Baker who subtly turned the Malta summit from the informal 'putting our feet up' chat initially envisaged by the President into a platform for the United States to demonstrate through a 16-point initiative that it was prepared to help Gorbachev. [M. Dowd and T.L. Friedman 'The Fabulous Bush and Baker Boys,' *The New York Times Magazine*, 5/6/90, p. 64]
- (27) Rough location work is nothing new for Sheen. When he was young, the family traveled to location with his father, actor Martin Sheen. They spent 16 months in the Philippines... Ten years later, Charlie Sheen found himself back in the Philippines...as the star of. . . Platoon. The terrain and environmental elements...are very similar to Vietnam, including 120 degree heat by 8 a.m., blood-thirsty bugs and an impenetrable jungle. And to make matters worse, the Marcos government had just been toppled three days before the filming party arrived. *It was also location work that gave Sheen his first acting break.* He was nine and his dad was filming *The Execution of Private Slovik*... [Jane Ammeson, 'Intensity fuels Charlie Sheen's On-screen Presence,' *COMPASS Readings*, Northwest Airlines Magazine, July 1990, p. 69]
- (28) These amusements were more common in the winter when inclement weather kept people indoors, and served to while away the long evenings between other social engagements. *It was at this time of year also that the major villages were continuously occupied and ceremonies took place.* As centres of ceremonial activity houses had ritual significance and were given sacred names... [People of the Totem]

These examples in (25)-(28) show that additive subjuncts *also* can appear in focus clauses of cleft sentences in certain appropriate contexts. Headberg (1990:202) points out, "It can surely be no coincidence that all such examples [(25)-(28)] are independently analyzable as comment-clause clefts with activated clefted constituents," and she claims that it is in comment-clause clefts that *also* can appear in focus positions.⁷ She further puts forward a generalization

that it is comment-clause clefts that can cancel exhaustiveness implicatures:

It may also be possible to conclude more generally, that the exhaustiveness implication associated with clefts (cf. Halvorsen 1978, Atlas and Levinson 1981, Horn 1982 [sic] for discussion), can be cancelled in comment-clause clefts like (29) and (30), but not in topic-clause clefts:

- (29) It was that article, *among other places*, that Bork expressed his support for California's anti-open-housing referendum and his belief that it was only 'political speech' which deserved First Amendment protection. [David S. Broder, 'The need to be sure on Bork', 9/20/87] (Headberg (1990:205))
- (30) It was Lansdale *as much as* anyone who established Diem in power. [Mark Frankland, Predecessor makes North look an amateur operator, 3/5/87] (Headberg (1990:205))

Since the examples in (29)-(30) are comment-clause clefts and thus cancel exhaustiveness implicatures, those phrases like *among other places* and *as much as*, which conflict with exhaustiveness implicatures, can occur in the focus clauses above. Headberg's (1990) generalization, however, cannot be tenable as it stands because there is little evidence presented in her paper. I admit that there seem to exist certain correlations between cancellability of exhaustiveness implicatures and subcategories of clefts like 'topic-clause clefts' and 'comment-clause clefts.'⁸ I will leave this issue for future research.

4. Conclusion

We have examined the plausibility of the analysis that exhaustiveness implicatures associated with cleft constructions are conventional rather than conversational implicatures by scrutinizing negative clefts and non-specific focus clauses in Section 3.1, and clefts with focusing subjuncts in Section 3.2. We have pointed out that (11b) is unacceptable because the value for the variable cannot be specified, and that every example with *even* in (14) and (15) is not appropriate because the meaning of focusing subjuncts and the pragmatic function of cleft constructions are not compatible. It is observed that there is only one example containing *among other things* (14b) judged unacceptable because the exhaustiveness implicature cannot be cancelled. However, this does not seem crucial counter evidence when we take into consideration the acceptable cleft sentence in (29) where *among other places* occurs in the focus clause of the cleft sentence. In all the other examples of cleft constructions surveyed in this article, exhaustiveness implicatures can be cancelled. We can

conclude from these arguments that the analysis that exhaustiveness implicatures are conventional ones is not tenable by any means.

NOTES

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¹ Halliday (1967:236, 1985:43) uses the term *exclusion* or *exclusiveness* to express the implicature in (1) and (2) and suppose that it is a semantic feature added to these structures. Halvorsen (1978) first termed this type of implicature as *exhaustiveness implicature*, and I use this term here.

² Collins (1991) uses the term *exclusive implicature* to refer to what we call exhaustive implicature in this paper.

³ Carolyn Kaltenbach offered this alternative idea and these examples (personal communication).

⁴ See the discussions on *also* in examples (22)-(23).

⁵ Headberg (1990) points out, showing the following example, that *even* can possibly appear in focus clauses of cleft constructions:

Wexford and Mr. Sung looked through the wooden grille at the great deep rectangular burial shaft and Mr. Sung quoted almost verbatim a considerable chunk from Fodor's Guide to the People's Republic of China. He had a retentive memory and seemed to believe that Wexford, because he couldn't decipher ideographs, was unable to read his own language. *It was even Wexford's Fodor's he was quoting from, artlessly borrowed the night before.* Wexford didn't listen. (Headberg (1990:204))

Headberg admits that the *it*-cleft above is a predicational cleft rather than a specificational one, and thus does not carry exhaustiveness implicatures.

⁶ Fraser (1971) claims that *even* may occur in a non-clefted part of a sentence:

- a. It was the lawn mowing that even *I* objected to.
- b. It's that girl to whom I wanted to give even *a second* kiss.
- c. It was John that we must see even *in San Francisco*. (Fraser (1971:156))

However, our examples show that *even* cannot occur freely in *that*-clauses:

- a. *It was even John that Mary kissed.
- b. *It was John that even Mary kissed.
- c. *It was John that Mary even kissed.

Fraser (1971:156-157) maintains that "...the class of noun phrase which cannot function as

the scope of *even* (for example, *no one*, *anyone*, *someone*, *all*, *everyone*, *each*, and so on) cannot be clefted." This assertion, however, does not capture the behaviors of indefinite noun phrases occurring in cleft constructions. As we have pointed out in section 3.1, they can appear in cleft sentences in appropriate contexts.

⁷ Headberg (1990:135) categorizes cleft constructions into two subsets, 'topic-clause clefts' and 'comment-clause clefts', saying, "...two pragmatic subtypes of clefts can be distinguished: a 'topic-clause' cleft, ..., in which the cleft clause expresses the topic, and a 'comment-clause' cleft, ..., in which the cleft clause expresses part of the comment." That is, she defines a 'topic-clause cleft' as a cleft of which the *that*-clause describes the topic, and a 'comment-clause' as a cleft of which the *that*-clause describes the comment.

⁸ Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1424) show the following examples and demonstrate that foregrounding elements that carry discourse-new presupposition and appear in the focus of *it*-clefts may be adjuncts or compliments:

- a. It was fifty years ago that the first real computer was built in Philadelphia.
- b. It is with great pleasure that I now declare this Exhibition open.
- c. The Indians were helpful in many ways. It was they who taught the settlers how to plant and harvest crops successfully in the New World.

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