HAVE-relation and English Ditransitive Constructions*

Manabu Kusayama

1. Introduction

Verbs compatible with ditransitive constructions are generally known to participate in *to*-dative alternations (V-NP-*to*-NP) and in *for*-dative alternations (V-NP-*for*-NP). The ditransitive construction is a construction which focuses on a change of possession, so it has generally been held in the literature that dativizable verbs are capable of implying "prospective possession" of the direct object referent by the indirect object referent (Green 1974, Oehrle 1976, Pinker 1989, Goldberg 1995, and Kishimoto 2001, among others). The practical problem which motivates this paper is, however, that of how to determine the presence or absence of such possessive relationship as being necessary for the formation of felicitous ditransitive constructions, which, as far as I know, has not been explained in any consistent and explicit manner.

The first task of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding of the necessity of characterizing the indirect object as Recipient and to make a clearer distinction between Goal and Recipient roles, with a variety of examples which cannot be explained without such distinction (sections 2-3). Then, we will enter into close investigation of how to determine whether the required possessive relationship is implied or not. We will see that the existence of such relationship is assured not just by lexical semantics of verbs, but also with the help of association processes including conceptual metaphors like *attributes are possessions*, *controlling is possessing*, and a metonymic process like *if you have, you can give* (sections 3-4). We will realize that the formation of ditransitive constructions is based on the correlation between lexical semantics and pragmatic knowledge.

2. Basic Assumptions

2.1 Irrelevance of Dativizability to the Lexicalization of Goal

Randall (1987) argues that there is a strong correlation between dativizability and the obligatoriness of Goal arguments, presenting the fact that dativizable verbs cannot occur in simple transitive structures with theme objects, unless the presence of a definite goal is contextually assured (ex. *John gave/handed his painting *(to Mary), John told the message *(to*

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*Mary), John brought the posies *(to Mary)*). On the basis of the generally held assumption that the obligatoriness and lexicalization of arguments correlate with each other, it appears to be the case that all of the presented dativizable verbs (*give, hand, tell, bring*) inherently imply the termination of events and thus presuppose the presence of a definite goal, without which the relevant situations could not be what they are.

A strict view of the notion of lexicalization, however, would lead us to say that the verb *bring* does not lexicalize Goal at least in the same way as the other three verbs. In certain context, the verb could be analyzed as lexicalizing Goal and as expressing exclusively a delimited event (cf. Akashi 2001), as indicated by the incompatibility of *bring* with durative phrases (ex. *John brought a box in/*for an hour* (Akashi 2001:3)); here the omission of the goal phrase is made possible with the presence of the non-durative time adverbial, possibly because the phrase evokes the termination of the motional event and so the arrival of *a box* at some place. A close examination suggests, however, that such delimited interpretation could be available only within the limited context.

(1) a. John brought the heavy box with him
b. The dictionary is unsuitable to bring it around with you.
c. John brought/carried the heavy box around with him (for/*in) an hour.

As indicated above, with the presence of the comitative phrase *with one*, *bring* can allow the omission of goal phrases, without any implication of a definite goal, in the same way as the verb *carry* in *John always carried the dictionary around with him.* The possibility of non-delimited interpretation is evidenced by the inadmissibility of the non-durational phrase in (1c). Verbs like *give, hand, tell* cannot express such an unbounded event as implying no definite Goal. This is why I think that *bring* should not be viewed as lexicalizing Goal in the same way as the other three verbs do.

Interestingly, the ditransitive version of (1a) is not allowed, as in (2b), while the prepositional realization of Goal arguments is possible, as in (2a):

(2) a. John brought the heavy box with him to Mary.
b. *John brought Mary the heavy box with him. (cf. John brought her the heavy box.)

One might argue that the unacceptability of (2b) is due to that aspectual shift (i.e. from a bounded to an unbounded event) which is caused by the comitative phrase, or that this is good evidence to show the existence of the correlation between dativizability and the obligatoriness of Goal phrases. However, I do not agree with that Goal-based approach, since the obligatoriness or the lexicalization of Goal turns out to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition (cf. Pinker 1989:39-41).

To being with, there are some dativizable verbs which arguably do not lexicalize Goal, such as *throw, roll, slide, sing, read, etc.* (cf. *John threw/rolled/slid Mary the ball, John sang Mary a song, Mary read her child the book*); without there being any definite goal, the

events described by these verbs can be completed. Conversely, there are some non-dativizable verbs whose lexical meanings undoubtedly involve the presence of Goal. For example, the verb *put* is generally assumed to lexicalize Goal, to express a delimited event, and to obligatorily select goal phrases (ex. *Mary put the label *(on him), He put the gun *(to Mary)*), and yet the verb resists dativization (ex.**John put Mary the label/the gun*). Interestingly, it is observed that the selection of an abstract object such as *a question* enhances the compatibility of *put* with the relevant construction (ex. *John put Tom a question*), in spite of the goal phrase being optional in the corresponding prepositional sentence (ex. *John put a serious question (to Mary)*).[1] Likewise, "one can ask a question without there being anyone to whom the question is addressed, and yet *Ask him a question* is possible (Pinker (1989:41))." This fact might sound bizarre for the Goal-based approach. Furthermore, the behavior of *attach* and *assign* poses a similar problem. Despite the fact that they equally require the presence of a definite goal obligatorily as in *John attached the label *(to Mary)* and *They assigned much work *(to him)*, the latter alone is allowed to enter into the dative alternation as the following contrast shows: **John attached Mary the label. vs. They assigned him much work.* These verbs are verbs of Latinate origin which are generally assumed to follow so-called the Latinate restriction (cf. Levin (1993:43)). It goes without saying that the above dativizability contrast is beyond the scope of that morphological and phonological restriction.

Although the observed data are limited due to the limit of space, they are sufficient to show not only the irrelevance of dativizability to the lexicalization of Goal but also the necessity of an alternative which can cover at least the observed facts including the unacceptability of (2b). The problem with the Goal-based approach lies in the lack of the proper understanding of the difference between Goal and Recipient, which I think essential for the proper characterization of the felicity condition for the ditransitive construction.

2.2 HAVE-relation and the Goal/Recipient *Distinction*

To achieve a deeper understanding of the difference between the two participants, it is necessary to assume that both are characterized as locations where something enters or comes into existence; their opposed participants (Source and Giver) as locations where something comes out of. It follows that that they share such schematic image as in (3):[2]

(3) Location A Location B



The presence or absence of possessive relation is assumed to be a key concept for distinguishing Goal (or Source) from Recipient (or Giver). When the possessive relation is

[1] I am grateful to Hiroaki Konno (personal communication) for pointing out that the behavior of *put* is problematic for the analysis based on the lexicalization or obligatoriness of Goal.

[2] In (3), Location and Locatum are indicated by the circle and the black dots, respectively.

implied between Location and Locatum, Locations A and B are assigned Giver and Recipient, respectively. In the converse case, Source and Goal are assigned to Locations A and B. It turns out that Recipient is regarded as a possessive location, whereas Goal as an existential location. Given this, we tentatively propose the following assignment rule:

(4) A. If Location X is expected to come into HAVE-relation with Locatum Y after the relevant event has finished, X is assigned Recipient.

B. If Location X is expected to come into EXIST-relation with Locatum Y after the relevant event has finished, X is assigned Goal.

Here the term HAVE-relation is introduced as an inclusive concept subsuming an experiential relation as in *I received an insult* and a cognitive relation as in *John perceived/understand the problem clearly* (cf. *Mary got a clear perception of the problem*), in addition to a (temporal) possessional relation as in *John got a dictionary*).[3] It follows that that the notion of Recipient can include those of receiver, getter, learner, experiencer, perceiver, and hearer. The term EXIST-relation is used just to indicate the concept opposed to HAVE-relation, such as in *John is near the house.*

Especially important here is that HAVE-relation can syntactically be realized in two ways: the prepositional form with Locatum-Location order (hereafter A-type) and the prepositionless form with Location-Locatum order (hereafter B-type). Sentences of B-type taken up here are limited to those including possessive verbs like *get* and *receive* whose subjects are assigned Recipient alone, while those of A-type includes the locative, directional preposition *at* or *to*, whose object referents can be either Recipient or Goal. The point is that HAVE-relation is compatible with both types, whereas EXIST-relation with A-type alone: [4]

(5)	Locatum-Location (A-type)		Location-Lacatum (B-type)
a.	An angel appeared at her room.	↛	* The room got an angel.
b.	The package moved to John with the explosion.	↛	# John got/received the package.
c.	An angel appeared to/*at* Mary.	→/↛	Mary got visual contact with (perceived) an angel.
d.	A package got to/arrived at John by airmail.	→/↛	John got/received the package.
e.	A good idea occurred to/*at John.	→	John got a good idea.
f.	The diamond came to belong to/*at Mary.	→	Mary got the diamond.

Notice here that the exchangeability of A- into B-types is contingent on the conceivability of

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[3] Experiential and cognitive locations (ex. visual field) are abstract locations which are inalienably possessed by experiencers or perceivers and can be regarded as a kind of possessive locations, and thus something entering into one's cognitive and experiential domains tends to be perceived as coming into his or her possessive domains. This is why we sometime use possessive verbs like *get* and *have* to describe such cognitive, experiential relations. The tendency for inalienable locations to be viewed as one's possessive locations is reinforced by the fact that *The diamond is in her hand* can imply a (temporal) possessive relation, whereas *The diamond is in her house* does not necessarily. The reason for this is that one's hands are undoubtedly inalienable possessions and are likely to be regarded as his/her possessive locations, whereas one's house is alienable and can exist independently of him/her and thus is likely to be viewed just as his/her physical existential location.

[4] Here # indicates that the described situation does not match with that of the corresponding A-type sentence, and → and ↛ represent being exchangeable and inexchangeable, respectively.

HAVE-relation. In (5a-b), only A-type is allowed, since the assignment rules in (4) allow the prepositional objects (locations) to be assigned Goals alone due to the low conceivability of the occurrence of HAVE-relation. The reason why *John* in (5b), though being human, becomes still unqualified for Recipient is that in this context *John* represents via metonymy his physical existential location (i.e. where he is) and thus to be understood to enter into such EXIST-relation as expressed in *The package is at/near the place where he is.* In contrast to this, the prepositional object (*Mary*) in (5c) is ambiguous between Goal and Recipient readings: it can metonymically refer either to her physical place (i.e. where Mary is) or to her cognitive location (i.e. her visual field). Needless to say, it is in the latter reading alone that *Mary* is interpreted as Recipient (see also note 3). Evidence for the ambiguous reading is the existence of the defeasible relation between A- and B-types, as in *An angel appeared at Mary, but in fact she perceived it,* in which *Mary* is only interpreted as her physical place at which the agent appeared.[5] Likewise, the prepositional object in (5d) can be either Goal or Recipient.[6] Needless to say, the occurrence of Recipient interpretation is due to the presence of the phrase *by airmail* which lexically evokes such event of transfer as involving the sender-sendee relation. This is where (5d) shows a notable contrast with (5b); they equally express a physical motion, yet the latter involves a pure movement of *the package* to *John*, which does not evokes the occurrence of HAVE-relation at all.

Turning now to the cases in (5e-f), we can see that both types are allowed without any problem and that EXIST-relation is not obtained at all even in the prepositional sentences. The absence of the relation is, in the case of (5e), due to the fact that an abstract entity like *a good idea* can exist only in one's conceptual domain which is viewed as his/her possessive location (cf. note 3) as shown in *The good idea is in his mind/*in his house*, and in that of (5f) evidently due to the lexical property of *belong*. Exclusive occurrence of HAVE-relation in (5e-f) is certified by the existence of the indefeasible relation between the A- and B-type sentences (ex.**A good idea occurred to John, but in fact he could not get the idea, *The diamond came to belong to John, but in fact he couldn't get it*). It follows that the prepositional objects in (5e-f), unlike those in (5c-d), are unambiguously interpreted as

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[5] In a strict sense, the prepositional object (*John*) in (5b), like that in (5c), can be viewed as undergoing a perceptive change in the sense that the image of *the box* moves on *John*'s visual field (i.e. his possessive location). The perceptive change involved here, however, does not imply a new entrance of an entity (locatum) into his visual field, while that in (5c) does. Thus, the occurrence of an entity in one's possessive location is necessarily required to get the Recipient interpretation, as is expressed in the phrase "come into HAVE-relation" in (4A). This is the reason why the appearance of an entity on the scene is judged more compatible with the B-type than the mere movement of an entity on the same scene. This is reflected in the fact that the verbs listed in B-type are mostly verbs of appearance or occurrence. In this paper, "coming into HAVE-relation" is often referred to as "the occurrence of HAVE-relation", which is assumed to be necessary for an entity to be Recipient (cf. Kishimoto (2001)).

[6] Here also as being ambiguous between the two readings, the defeasible relation holds between the A-type and B-type sentences, as in *A package got to/arrived at John by airmail, but in fact he never received/noticed it.*

Recipients. The lack of EXIST-relation in (5e-f) is also evidenced by the infrequency of the locative preposition *at*, as is also observed in *An accident happened at/to his home* vs. An *accident happened to/*at me* (cf. *I had an accident*).

2.4 The Relation between HAVE-relation and Dativizability

Given that the alternation between A- and B-types is essentially the same as the dative alternation, we can assume such correlation as illustrated in (6).

(6) a. NP-V-$NP_{locatum}$ *to/for* $NP_{location}$ → NP-V-$NP_{location}$-$NP_{locatum}$
└— HAVE-relation —┘

b. NP-V-$NP_{locatum}$ *to/for* $NP_{location}$ ↛ * NP-V-$NP_{location}$-$NP_{locatum}$
└✕ HAVE-relation ✕┘

What is suggested above is that the prepositional form can lack HAVE-relation and express only EXIST-relation, whereas the ditransitive form cannot lack HAVE-relation (cf. Kishimoto (2001)). (Hereafter the indirect, the direct, and the prepositional objects relevant here are referred to as the IO, the DO, and the PO, respectively). That is to say, IOs must be Recipients, while *to*-POs can be either Goals or Recipients. It follows naturally that the occurrence of HAVE-relation on the part of PO referents is a necessary condition for them to be promoted to the IO position. We can now propose the two related conditions, which are necessarily relevant to the formation of felicitous ditransitive constructions:

(7) A. For X to occupy the IO position, X must be assigned Recipient.[7]
B. For X to be assigned Recipient, the occurrence of HAVE-relation must be evoked in a X-centered way.[8]

The condition of (7B) suggests that the assignment of Recipient is dependent not upon the presence/absence of animacy, but upon that of the occurrence of HAVE-relation. Such animacy restriction as observed in *John threw {Jack/*the wall} the ball* is just a reflection of the correlation in (6); the unacceptability of *the wall* is due not to the lack of animacy, but to the violation of (7) (ex. *??The wall has a ball*). This is reinforced by Krifka's (1999:2) example (ex. *I gave the wall a new coat of paint* (cf. *After that, the wall has a new coat of paint*). Here the pragmatic association process *attributes are possessions* helps us to evoke HAVE-relation between *the wall* and *a new coat of paint*. Possessors are not always animate (ex. *His argument has a fallacy*), and so are Recipients.

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[7] In a ditransitive sentence like *Sam promised to move his lover a mountain* (Green (1974:95)), no HAVE-relation is established between the IO and DO. This type can be analyzed as a "pure benefactive" construction, as it has the interpretation that the subject's action brings some benefit to the IO referent. Given that the IO gets or receives *a benefit* from the action of subject, it could be regarded as a Recipient. However, this paper distinguishes this type from the "pure possessive" type, and deals only with the latter, for one thing due to the limit of space, and for another due to the fact that the acceptability of benefactive constructions is, as Takami (2003) argues, strongly dependent upon sentence-external context, which would defeat the purpose of this paper (i.e. the clarification of the correlation between lexical semantics and pragmatics in determining the felicity of the construction). For a close examination of pure benefactive constructions and their relation to possessive ditransitive constructions, see Takami (2003).

[8] The phrase "in a X-centered way" means "in a way in which X is in the subject of HAVE-relation.

2.5 When Bring *does not Dativize*

We are now ready to explain why *bring* does not dativize with the presence of such comitative phrase as *with one*, as we saw in (2), being repeated here as in *John brought the heavy box with him to Mary* (= (2a)) *vs.* **John brought Mary the heavy box with him* (= (2b)). The point is that the lexical property of the comitative phrase prevents the *to*-PO referent (*Mary*) from entering into HAVE-relation with the DO referent (*the heavy box*), from being assigned Recipient, and hence from promoting to the IO position. Specifically, the phrase lexically evokes the situation where the subject (*John*) keeps possessing or controlling *the heavy box* throughout the whole event, and the evoked situation contradicts with the situation associated with the ditransitive construction. Assuming that the PO in *John brought the box to Mary* is ambiguous between Goal and Recipient (see section 3.2 for the verification of the assumption), the PO in (2a) becomes disambiguated to be Goal; it metonymically refers only to her existential location (where *Mary* is) in the same way as *Mary* in *John come to Mary with the box*. This is certified by the fact that *to* in (2a) can be exchanged into *up to* which can receive the Goal interpretation alone, without any substantial change in meaning. From this, we conclude that the unacceptability of (2b) is due to the violation of (7).

3. Lexical, Lexical-Pragmatic, and Pragmatic Processes

3.1 When Verbs Lexicalize Recipients

The presence of Recipient, that is, the occurrence of HAVE-relation can, of course, be assured by the verbal lexical property. This is the case where verbs lexicalize or strongly imply the presence of Recipients, and I tentatively assume the following three characteristics, which are shared by verbs or verb phrases which lexicalize Recipient: [A] the limited selection of POs; POs are limited to those which have the potential to be in HAVE-relation (cf. (8)), [B] the incompatibility of (any one of) the locative or pure goal prepositions like *at, on* or *up to* (cf. (9)), and [C] the obligatoriness of *to*-prepositional phrases (cf. (10)). The three characteristics serve as a test to show the lexicalization of Recipient. We use [+X] or [-X] to represent the absence or presence of the characteristics of [X] in the semantics of verb and verb phrases:

(8) a. John gave/handed a present to {Mary/*the wall}. [+A] (*cf.* *The wall got a present.)
b. John showed a picture to {Mary/*the wall}. [+A] (cf. *The wall got a picture.)
c. John told the news to {Mary/*the wall}. [+A] (cf. *The wall got the news.)

(9) a. John gave/ handed a present {to/*up to/*at/*on} Mary. [+B]
b. John showed a picture {to/*up to/*at/*on} Mary. [+B]
c. John told the news {to/*up to/*at/*on} Mary. [+B]

(10) a. John gave/ handed a present *(to Mary). [+C]
b. John showed a picture *(to Mary). [+C]
c. John told the news *(to Mary). [+C]

The obtained results allow us to analyze verbs like *give, hand, show, tell* as a group of verbs which strongly imply the presence of Recipient, because they all show [+A,+B,+C]. This means that they contain of their own lexicon the meaning shared by the relevant construction, and thus irrespective of the prepositional or the prepositionless frame they can constantly produce that meaning. Notice, however, that verbs showing [+A, +B, -C] can also show high dativizability. For example, although verbs like *sing* and *read* are arguably shown not to lexicalize Recipient, they show [+A, +B, -C] in *to*-prepositional sentences and do undergo dativization.[9] This implies that when they are found in VP-NP-to-NP frame, they can show a similar behavior to those truly lexicalizing Recipient with respect to [A] and [B]. From this, I argue that these verbs can be viewed as semi-lexicalizing Recipient, and that [A] and [B] are primary tests, with [C] being secondary; for one thing, because if verbs bear [C] alone, they never dativize, though the opposed case being possible; for another, because the obligatoriness of *to*-phrases can be affected by some extra-lexical elements. It turns out that verbs which (semi-)lexicalize the presence of Recipient, they show either [+A, +B, +C] or [+A, +B, -C] (see also note 10).

Notice that non-dativizable predicates show [-A, -B, -C] or [-A, -B, +C]:

(11) a. shout/whisper/mumble/speak/say something ({at /to} {Mary/the wall}). [-A,-B,-C]
b. push/pull/drag/lower/move the box ({up to/to}{Mary/the table}). [-A,-B,-C]

Unlike *tell*, the communication verbs in (11a) show [-A, -B, -C], and so do the locomotion verbs in (11b) which express continuous-force motion. It has generally been argued that the verbs in (11) resist dativization (Pinker (1989), Pesetsky (1995), van der Leek (1996), Krifka (1999)), or we could say at least that they do not dativize as easily as *hand, tell*, and *show, throw*, though judgments vary from speaker to speaker among these locomotion verbs, as is pointed out in Akashi (2000), Kishimoto (2001), and Bresnan and Nikitina (2003).

In addition to this, let us consider again the fact that the dativizability of the verb *put* is affected by the choice of direct object, repeated here as in *John put Mary a question* vs. **John put Mary the gun* (cf. section 2.1). What is important here is that the dativizable counterpart shows [+A, +B, -C] (ex. *put a question* ({**up to/*at/*on /to*} {*Tom/*the wall*}). By contrast, the non-dativizable counterpart show [-A, -B, +C] (ex. *put the gun* *({*up to/on to*} {*he wall/Mary*}). Given this, we can say that the PO in *put a question to* is lexically and unambiguously assigned Recipient, owing to the lexical property of the noun *question*, which makes *put* have the property of [+A, +B]. On the other hand, the PO in *put the gun to* is constantly assigned Goal alone, since the occurrence of HAVE-relation is not evoked at all from the relevant situation.

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[9] Actually, verbs like *sing* and *read* show the properties [+A, +B, -C] (ex. *sing a song* ({**at/*up/ to*} {*Tom/ *the wall*}), *read a book* ({**at/*up to / to*}{ *the child/*the wall*}).

The same approach is applicable to the problem of why the verbs *assign* and *attach*, as we saw in section 2.1, behave differently with respect to dativizability (ex. *They assigned Mary much work* vs. **John attached Mary the label*), though both are verbs of Latinate origin and are expected to follow the Latinate restriction. The contrast is due to the fact that they show a contrast with respect to the two primary features. The *to*-prepositional form of *assign* carries [+A, +B, +C] (ex. *assign much work* *({*??on/to*} {*Mary/*the wall*}), whereas that of *attach* satisfies [-A, -B, +C] (ex. *attach a label* *({*on/to*} {*Mary/a package*})[10]

What is problematic is, however, that there are not a small number of dativizable verbs which do not meet any of the presented criterions. For example, although deictic motion verbs such as *bring/take* show [-A, -B, -C], as in (12), they do dativize without any problem. So do verbs of ballistic motion (cf. Pinker (1989), Pesetsky (1995), Krifka (1999), among others), which also carry [-A, -B, -C], as in (13):

(12) a. John brought/took the box to {the table/Mary}. [-A]
b. John brought/took the box {to/up to} Mary. [-B]
c. John brought/took the box around with him. (cf. (1c)) [-C]

(13) a. John threw/kicked/slid/rolled the ball to {the wall/Mary}. [-A]
b. John threw/kicked/slid/rolled the ball {to/up to/at} Mary. [-B]
c. John threw/kicked/slid/rolled the ball. [-C]

This fact suggests that the (semi-)lexicalization of Recipient is not a necessary condition, though [+A, +B, +C] may be a sufficient one and more importantly that even such verbs as having [-A, -B, -C] may dativize. There are at least two related questions to be asked here: one is the question of how it is possible for such verbs to participate in dative alternation, and the other is that of how to explain the dativizability difference between the locomotion verbs in (12)/(13) and (11b). In what follows, the case of *bring* and *take* is first dealt with, and the next is that of ballistic motion verbs.

3.2 The Dual or Neutral Status of Bring/Take

It is clear that the events of *bringing/taking the box to the table* are similar to those of

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[10] What is noteworthy is, however, that the verb *assign* shows [+A, +B, +C], like *give* and *tell*. From this, we can infer that Latinate verbs which are found in the *to*-frame can dativize if they have all characteristics. For example, Latinate dativizable verbs such as *allot* and *guarantee* are shown to have [+A,+B,+C], while non-dativizable verbs of Latinate origin such as *donate*, *announce*, *explain* and *display* show [+A,+B,-C], though they are similar in meaning to *give*, *tell*, and *show*. In fact, it is generally observed that non-dativizable verbs of Latinate origin frequently or easily drop the *to*-phrase (ex. *John* {*donated/*gave*} *a lot of money* (cf. *John* {*gave/*donated*} *us a lot of money*), *The president* {*announced/*told*} *his resignation* (cf. *He* {*told/*announced*} *us his resignation*) (Wierzbicka (1988:373)), *He*{*explained/*told*} *the situation* by radio (cf. *Can you* {*tell/*explain*} *me the situation?*), *He openly* {*displayed/ *showed*} *the Picasso* (*cf. He showed/*displayed us the Picasso*). Wierzbicka (1988:373) argues that their frequently dropping of Recipient is due to their lexical absence of a definite Recipient; for example, *tell* lexically focuses on a specific addressee, whereas *announce* "on the object of communication, not on a specific person whom one wants to inform." This idea is really intriguing, yet I cannot really tell whether the account covers all of the related phenomena. Here I just stipulate that Latinate verbs can participate in the *to*-dative alternation if and only if they have all of the three characteristics.

dragging/pulling the box to the wall (cf.(11b)) in the sense that both involve a continuous-force motion with no implication of transferring possession. When the *to*-POs are human, however, *bring/take* can assign the Recipient reading to them as well as that of Goal, while the motion verbs in (11b) only the latter interpretation. In fact, *Mary* in *John brought a book to Mary* can refer either to Recipient (the one to whom the book is handed or given) or to Goal (her physical place to which the book was moved to). Interestingly, when the preposition *to* is exchanged for the pure goal phrase *up to* as in *John brought a book up to Mary* (≠ *John brought Mary a book*), the sentence becomes disambiguated, with the PO being given Goal alone, and it never produces the meaning associated with the corresponding ditransitive sentence. On the other hand, the motion verbs in (11b) do not receive such ambiguous reading in the first place. For example, *Mary* in *John lowered/moved the box {to/up} to Mary*, irrespective of *to* or *up to*, is unambiguously assigned the Goal interpretation.

Given this, we can say that *bring/take* are really ambiguous in the sense that they can belong either to the class of change-of-possession verbs, such as *give* and *get,* or to that of pure change-of-location verbs, such as *move*, which makes their semantics blurred. In fact, *bring* can behave as if it were a genuine change-of-possession verbs like *give*.

(14) a. His writing brought (or gave) $10,000 to {him/*the wall}. [+A]
b. His writing brought $10,000 (to/*up to) him. [+B]
c. ?? His writing brought $10,000. [+C]

Here *bring*, like *give*, expresses exclusively the occurrence of HAVE-relation on the part of the PO. This is reinforced by the exchangeability of *bring* in (14a) into *give* with no substantial change in meaning and by the fact that the *to*-prepositional sentence including *bring* shows the properties of [+A, +B, +C] shared with those verbs which lexicalize Recipient. Such situation as involved in (14a) cannot be described by any of the locomotion verbs in (11b) as well as of the ballistic motion verbs in (13). It is this dual status of *bring/take* that makes them more dativizable than the other (pure) locomotion verbs.[11] To put it more specifically, even when *bring* is used to describe a pure change of location between human participants as in bringing something to someone, its lexical nature facilitates us to evoke the occurrence of HAVE-relation on the part of the PO, and hence it is highly likely to occupy the IO position, unless the PO is unqualified for the possessor (ex. *John brought {Mary/*the table} the box*).

Further, *bring/take*, unlike the motion verbs in (11b), do not express a mere movement of something in the sense that they behave similar to the verb *hand*. The verb *hand* also does

[11] *Take* also can express a pure change of possession without any implication of physical motion, as in *He took the house from his friend.* Here also the verb *take* is exchangeable into a pure possessive verb like *get* (or *steal*).

not describe a pure change of location in the sense that it involves change of locations from one's hand to another, thus expressing a temporary possessive change. In describing a physical motion, *bring* and *take* can also imply such temporary possessive relation between the subject and the moving entity. For example, from *John brought/took some flowers to Mary*, we can easily evoke such possessive relation as in *John moved some flowers while having or holding them in his hand.* Such possessive implication cannot be obtained by the pure motion verbs in (11b). Therefore, we can say that *bring/take* have the meaning which is regarded as "a prelude to giving or handing." In other words, the presence of that possessive implication makes it easier to associate the bringing event to that of giving or handing. This association process is based on such metonymic understanding as "*if you have (hold), you can give (hand).*"

This association process might play a role in explaining the idiosyncratic behavior of the verb *carry*. Although Pinker (1987) characterizes *carry* as non-dativizable verbs, some linguists argue that *carry* tends to be judged more dativizable than the motion verbs listed in (11b) (cf. Krifka (1999), Bresnan and Nikitina (2003)). For example, among the five verbs *carry, push, pull, lower, drag*, Bresnan and Nikitina (2003:14) state that *carry* might be the most dativizable, since "pushing is probably less likely to be discussed as a mode of transferring possession than carrying, with pulling perhaps less so, and lowering and dragging the least." The reason for higher dativizability of *carry* might be due not just to the high conceivability of the action of carrying as "a mode of transferring possession," but to its lexical implication of the (temporal) possessive relation. The existence of possessive relation in its moving event might be evidenced by the fact that *carry* is, like *bring* and *take*, compatible with the comitative phrase, whereas the motion verbs in (11b) are incompatible with it, as the following contrast shows: *He brought/took/carried an umbrella with him* vs. **John pulled/pushed/dragged/lowered/moved the box with him.*[12] It is not so surprising, then, if *hand-carry* may be judged to be more dativizable than the simple *carry*, as in *Mary hand-carried him the box* (cf. Bresnan and Nikitina (2003)).

3.3 Transfer of Control is Transfer of Possession

Let us now turn to the case of ballistic motion verbs. Pinker (1989) might be the first who says that ballistic motion verbs are more dativizable than continuous-force verbs. [13]

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[12] It is interesting to note that the verb *hand*, unlike *bring*, is incompatible with the comitative phrase (ex. *John brought the box with him to Mary* (= (2a)) vs. **John handed the box with him to Mary*), though they equally imply the same kind of possessive relation. The contrast is due to their lexical difference: the fact that *hand* lexically entail the subject's releasing the control over the object, whereas *bring* is neutral with this. This neutral status of *bring* makes it possible to assign Goal to the PO, while *hand* cannot assign Goal to the PO, but only Recipient; the Recipient reading contradicts with the meaning associated with the comitative phrase, which explains the incompatibility of *hand* with the phrase (see also section 2.5).

[13] The two types of caused-motions roughly correspond to Talmy's notions of "onset and extended causation."

Hereafter I will use the terms "onset-force" and "continuous-force" verbs to refer to these two types of verbs.

(15) a. John threw/kicked/tossed/slid/flung Paul the puck. (Pinker (1989))

b. * John pushed/pulled/dragged/lifted/schlepped/lowered/hauled Paul the box.

Since Pinker (1989), the existence of this tendency has been generally agreed. For example, van der Leek (1996:330) states explicitly that "it is an empirical fact that English as a language resists dativization of PUSH-type verbs." Strong evidence for this tendency, I think, is that there is quite little speakers who judge THROW-type to be less dativizable than PUSH-type; among continuous-force verbs, judgments could vary from speaker to speaker.

The preference for the onset-force type is well exemplified by the behavior of *roll*:

(16) a. John rolled the ball to Mary. (ambiguous between onset and extended-force)

b. John rolled Mary the ball. (onset-force reading only)

c. ??John rolled Mary the ball *by pushing on it again and again.*

The prepositional sentence with *roll* in (16a) can involve either an onset or an extended-force reading, while the latter reading does not match with the ditransitive sentence in (16b). The oddness of (16c) is due to the presence of the *by*-adverbial phrase which forces an extended motion interpretation; the phrase perfectly goes with the prepositional sentence (ex. *John rolled the ball to Mary by pushing on it again and again*).

Furthermore, Baker (1992) observes that *push* in the soccer context allows for dativization (ex. *Maradona pushed Pele the ball*), yet then it expresses an event of initial imparting of force (cf. Krifka (1999)). Importantly, the context of soccer does not always produce a good result. For example, the verb *dribble*, used frequently in the soccer context, resists dativization (ex. **Maradona dribbled Pele the ball* (cf. *Maradona dribbled the ball to Pele*)). It goes without saying that dribbling a ball is a type of continuous-force.

The reason for the preference for onset-force over continuous-force is that in the former we can easily evoke the transference of control over the moving entity (locatum) from one participant to another. The actor involved in the onset type of caused-motion is understood to control the causing event alone and the motion event is not under his/her control, thus he/she is likely to be understood to release or lose the control over the locatum. In continuous-force type of caused-motion events, on the other hand, the implication of such transference is less likely to be available since the actor involved in this type is perceived to never release the control over the moving entity, rather to keep controlling it, at least while it is moving. It is natural to think that one's releasing the control enhances the chance for another person to get the right to control. This is the reason why transfer of control between two participants is more readily evoked by the onset-force event.

The notion of control is conceptually associated with that of possession; prototypical instances of possession imply some kind of control of the possessor over the possessee.

Among the descriptive concepts that were proposed to deal with possession, 'control' has perhaps most frequently been used (cf. Heine (1997)). Thus, it is quite natural to assume such metaphorical association process as *Controlling is possessing*.[14] Through this metaphor, transfer of control can be easily associated with that of possession. With the help of this association process, onset-force verbs are likely to be understood to express the transfer of temporal possession. On the other hand, keeping control is not associated with any possessive transfer (see also section 2.3). This is the reason why onset-force and continuous-force verbs behave differently as to dativizability.

To summarize, we have proposed three processes involved in facilitating us to evoke the occurrence of HAVE-relation: (i) the lexical process: the lexicalization or the strong implication of Recipient, (ii) the lexical-pragmatic process: *if you have, you can give*, (iii) the pragmatic process: *transfer of control is transfer of possession*. In the type of onset-force verbs, (iii) plays a major role in evoking that occurrence; in the *bring/take* type (i) and (ii) do; (i) does with the *give/hand type*. Importantly, the *bring/take* type, like that of *give/hand*, do not need to ask the help of (iii). The process of (ii) can be regarded as a lexical-pragmatic process, since it is available only to those which can lexically evoke HAVE-relation on the part of subject. Thus, onset-motion verbs are insufficient to gain access to (ii), let alone (i); without the help of (iii), they could not undergo dativization. Things are at their worst for continuous-force verbs other than *bring/take*: the semantics of these verbs do not have any qualification for (iii), much less (ii) and (i), which causes the lowest dativizability.

4. The Application to the *For*-Dative Alternation[15]

Before closing this paper, it may be significant to show the present analysis is applicable for the case of the *for*-dative alternation.

4.1 If You Get, You Can Give

It goes without saying that both *get* and *give* lexicalize the occurrence of HAVE-relation, though they differ with respect to where it emerges. Irrespective of that lexical difference, both can participate in dative alternations, though their corresponding prepositional counterparts differ between *for*- and *to*- types. Based on the discussion so far, we can assume that in a sentence like *John got Mary the book*, the event of getting is associated with that of giving, with the help of the association process *If you get, you can give*. Through this process, the two distinct events can be incorporated into single clause constructions (i.e. the

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[14] The pervasiveness of this metaphor is clearly shown in Webster's Third definition of the word *possession* as being "the act or condition of having in or taking in one's control or holding at one's disposal', 'actual physical control or occupancy of property', and more briefly, simply something owned, occupied or controlled. (the underlines are mine)" Another evidence to show this is the fact that *possess* and *control* are interchangeable with each other in contexts like *He is controlled/possessed by an evil spirit.*

[15] Here we do not deal with "the pure benefactive" ditransitive construction (see also note 4).

ditransitive construction).

Given this, we can predict that ditransitive sentences of *for*-type involve two distinct subevents: one is relevant to the event of getting, and the other to that of giving. In fact, *for*-type dativizable verbs characteristically presuppose the presence of the getting event (i.e. the change of possession on the part of the subject referent).[16] For example, in addition to verbs of obtaining (ex. *John got/won/bought/found Mary the medal*), verbs of keeping can participate in *for*-dative alternations (*John saved/kept/secure/reserved Mary the seat*), since there is a sense in which they can involve the event of getting. In *John saved the seat*, the object saved (*the seat*) is understood to come to be in control of the subject (*John*), or to be in his temporary possession after the relevant event has finished, and thus the occurrence of HAVE-relation is implied. So it is not entirely surprising that verbs of keeping allow for dative alternation.[17]

Furthermore there is a reason to think that verbs of creation (*build, make, knit, paint, dig,* etc.) belong to the class of verbs which imply the occurrence of HAVE-relation on the part of the subject (i.e. the event of getting). Created objects are understood to come to exist in creators' control or possessional domain after the event of creation has finished. For example, in *John built the house for himself*, there is a strong implication that the subject referent got the house, though the implication is defeasible (ex. *John built the house for himself, but in fact he never got it*).[18] Hence we can say that verbs of creation form a natural class with verbs of obtaining, which helps us to understand not only why creation verbs tend to dativize (ex. *Mary knitted John a sweater*), but also why verbs of creation and of obtaining have generally been assumed to be a good candidate for *for*-dative alternations (Green (1974), Pinker (1998), Levin (1993)). Given this, we can assume the following generalization:

(17) Verbs or verb phrases which can imply the occurrence of HAVE-relation are more compatible with the ditransitive construction. Conversely, verbs or verb phrases with no such implication are less compatible with it.

This generalization is neutral with respect to where HAVE-relation emerges, and is

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[16] In relation to this, it is interesting to note that the verb *bring/take* can participate in either the *to*-dative or the *for*-dative alternations as in *John brought/took a brandy for/to Mary* (cf. Allerton (1982:103)). This might be because the event of bringing/taking something to someone is considered to involve the two subevents: getting something for him/her ($event_1$) and carrying it to him/her ($event_2$). For example, a sentence such as *John brought/took Mary a brandy* is best used in the context where *John went and poured a brandy for Mary and carried it to her.* The selection of *for* or *to* depends on which of the two subevents are in the focus of attention. Interestingly, when a ditransitive sentence formed with *bring* cannot evoke the getting event as in *His writing brought him $10,000* (cf. (14)), the *to*-preposition type is preferable (ex. *His writing brought $10,000 {to/*for} him*).

[17] It is convincing that Levin (1993:49) analyzes verbs of keeping and of obtaining as constituting the same class; the only difference between the two classes is in whether the relevant possessional relation is temporary or not.

[18] We use a possessive pronoun to indicate the creator or designer of the object as in *her sweater (= the sweater knitted by her)* or *his house (= the house designed or built by him)*. This might be a reflection of the fact that created objects can be understood to be in the possession of the creator.

applicable to the case of *for*-dative alternation as well as that of *to*-dative alternation. The point is that (17) is viewed as a precondition to gain access to the lexical-pragmatic process *if you can get, you can give.*

The dativizability contrast between *build* and *rebuild* (ex. *John build/*rebuild her a house* (Wierzbicka (1988:369)) is a good example to show the validity of our analysis; rebuilding a house does not imply any possessional change, whereas building a house does in the sense just mentioned above. Likewise, concerning a contrast like **John cleared Bill the floor* vs. *John cleared Bill a place to sleep on the floor*, Langacker (1991:360) states that "clearing someone a place to sleep on the floor makes him a possessor in the sense of having that place at his disposal for a particular purpose." Notice that the corresponding normal transitive form (ex. *John cleared a place to sleep on the floor*) can imply that John got the place for sleeping by clearing the floor.

4.2 The Irrelevance of the Affectum/Effectum *Distinction to Dativizability*

One might argue that such dativizability contrast as observed between *build* and *rebuild* should be reduced to what Fillmore (1968) calls the *affectum/effectum* distinction. We should think, however, that the preference for *effectum* objects over *effectum* ones is a natural consequence of the generalizations in (17). In fact, there is a strong correlation between the presence of an *effectum* object and the occurrence of HAVE-relation, which is reflected in the fact that a sentence like *An idea occurred to me* can be paraphrased by using a change of possession verb as in *I got an idea* (see the discussion of (5)). Yet there is a case in which the presence of an *effectum* object does not correlate with the occurrence of HAVE-relation. For example, when one write a circle on the paper, one is unlikely to be interpreted as the possessor of the circle, which explains the unacceptability of the corresponding ditransitive sentence (ex. **John wrote Mary a circle on the paper* (cf. *John wrote a circle on the paper for Mary*)).

Further, in some context even *affectum* objects can be expected to enter into HAVE-relationship. For example, in the case of *John opened the door/the bottle of beer*, either of the objects (*the door* or *the bottle*) is regarded as an *affectum* object, and yet the latter is expected to enter into the possessive relationship with the subject; one can *get* (or drink) the content of the bottle (*beer*) after opening it. Hence the generalization in (17) correctly predicts the following dativizability difference (ex. *John opened Mary a bottle of beer/*the door* (Wierzbicka (1988:370)). The followings are another evidence to show the inadequacy of the idea based on the *affectum/effectum* distinction alone:

(18) a. John killed Mary a centipede *(for her collection). (Takami (2003:204))
b. Mom cut us the birthday cake. (Takami (2003:205))
c. Break us the bread. We need to be fed. (www.merseyworld.com/faith/html_file/magapril2000.htm)

As Takami (2003:204) points out, the adverbial phrase *for her collection* in (18a) helps us to

establish the possessive relation between the IO and the DO, and the absence of this phrase makes the sentence less acceptable. The *affectum/effectum* distinction also does not give a sufficient account of the acceptability of (18b) and (18c). We can explain instead that in some context cutting the cake and breaking the bread may be equated with an act of getting/taking the relevant foods, and thus the events can easily be associated with that of giving (or serving). This is not true for the cases of cutting the picture and breaking the vase, and thus the corresponding ditransitive sentences are unlikely to be acceptable as shown in **John cut Mary the picture* and **John broke Mary the vase*.

I would like to end this paper by emphasizing that the association process "*If you get, you can give*" works only when the relevant possessive relation is alienable and uncontrollable. This is the reason why verbs of ingesting such as *drink* and *eat* cannot participate in the ditransitive construction (ex. **John drunk Mary a cup of coffee, *John ate Mary a hamburger*), although they undoubtedly belong to the class of verbs of obtaining. On the basis of the way we perceive the world, we can reasonably explain that once you eat or drink something, you cannot give it to someone, since what is ingested comes to be possessed in an uncontrollable manner.

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Faculty of Humanities
Kanto Gakuin University
e-mail: k8mark3min5@hotmail.com