Object- vs. Event-Oriented Resulatives*
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1. Introduction

English resultative constructions based on unergative intransitive verbs are often used as hyperbole to express the idea that the action performed was done to excess (cf. Simpson (1983), Goldberg (1995), and Kageyama (1996), among others). This is exemplified by sentences such as those in (1):

(1)   a.   The joggers ran the pavement thin.   (Carrier and Randall 1992)

b.   I cried my eyes out.   (Simpson 1983: 146)

c.   John laughed himself silly.

In these examples the postverbal NP is not the actual object of the verb, as shown in (2); such a postverbal NP is called "fake object," so named by Simpson (1983).

(2)   a. *The joggers ran the pavement.

b. *I cried my eyes.

c. *John laughed himself.

Thus, (1a) would not be used to describe an actual change in the thickness of the pavement, but the situation in which the joggers ran hard (cf. Goldberg (1995: 185)). Similarly, expletive body part and fake reflexive cases, as in (1b) and (1c), permit a figurative interpretation. That is, (1b) describes the situation in which I cried very hard, but not the situation where my eyeballs came literally out of my head as a result of the action of crying. (1c) describes the situation where John laughed hard, but not the situation in which John ended up literally silly as a consequence of the laughing action. Hence, the fake object cases in (1) focus on the manner of the action denoted by the verb. Observed from the aspectual point of view, they describe atelic eventualities. Notice that they may characteristically occur with a durative adverb, as in (3).[1] (3a) is taken from Miyata (1999: 29); (3b) and (3c) are taken from Jackendoff

[1] Eventualities are divided into two aspectual classes: telic eventualities - those that are bounded in time, and atelic eventualities - those with no specific temporal delimitation (Declerck

(1997: 552).

    (3)   a. The joggers ran the pavement thin for an hour.

           b. I cried my eyes out for an hour.

           c. John laughed himself silly for an hour.

In these cases the sequence of a postverbal NP plus a resultative carries a sort of adverbial force, denoting intense and perhaps passionate activity, and therefore, they do not carry typical resultative semantics (cf. Jackendoff (1997)).[2]

On the other hand, resultative constructions such as (4), based on transitive verbs, admit a literal (result) interpretation.

    (4)   a. Terry wiped the table clean.

           b. John hammered the metal flat.

           c. John broke the door open.

In these cases the resultative modifies the object noun phrase and specifies the state of the entity denoted by that noun phrase as a result of the action described by the verb. Thus, (4a) means that the table became clean as a consequence of wiping it. The same is true of (4b) and (4c). (4b) means that the metal became flat as a result of hammering it; (4c) means that the door became open as a result of breaking it. In sum, these examples describe telic eventualities. This is verified from the result of the *for/in* test, as in (5):

    (5)   a. Terry wiped the table clean in/*for five minutes. (Van Valin 1990: 255)

           b. John hammered the metal flat in/?for an hour   (Rapoport 1999: 670)

           c. John broke the door open in/*for ten minutes.   (Miyata 1999: 28)

The compatibility of the *in*-phrase adverbial with the resultatives in (5) shows that these cases describe the state of the postverbal NP resulting from the action denoted by

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(1979), Dowty (1979), among others). According to Tenny (1987), telic eventualities are called delimited eventualities, and atelic eventualities non-delimited ones. A telic eventuality can be differentiated from an atelic one by a variety of tests. One of the tests is what we call the *for/in* test: an atelic eventuality can occur with a *for*-phrase, whereas a telic eventuality can occur with an *in*-phrase.

[2] Jackendoff (1997) says that a fake object case such as *I cried my eyes out* and one class of the fake reflexive resultatives like *Dean laughed himself silly* are not really resultatives, since they have an intensive adverbial force. Moreover, they are nearly always idiomatic and the choice of phrases is hardly productive. According to him, these cases are instances of yet another family of idiomatic intensifiers that use the same syntax as the resultative. In this paper, I regard this type of fake object cases like *I cried my eyes out* and *Dean laughed himself silly* as manner-focused resultatives (cf. Miyata (1999)).

the verb.

Given this, we can say that there are at least two different interpretations relevant to the resultative construction: one is an interpretation where the construction focuses on the manner of the action denoted by the verb, describing an atelic eventuality, as in (3), and the other is an interpretation where the construction focuses on the resultant state rather than the manner of the action, describing a telic eventuality, as in (5). The aim of this paper is to illuminate how these two different interpretations are produced.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Kageyama's (1996) analysis concerning the resultative construction. Basically based on his observation, section 3 argues that whether a resultative is interpreted as "manner-focused" or "result-focused" is strongly dependent upon the way we understand the causal relation between two subevents, i.e. the event denoting the action named by a verb and the event describing a changing state. Further, in section 4, I claim that the difference between manner-focused and result-focused resultatives can be characterized with respect to whether the modification of a resultative is oriented to the state of an object (entity) or the way the relevant event is carried out. That is, their difference can be captured in a more general term: "object-oriented" and "event-oriented" modifiers. I will show the distinction is closely related to the telic/atelic distinction. The fact that one form displays two semantic interpretations, however, is not unusual, since a similar observation applies to the adverb *away*, the prepositions *to* and *at*. In this light, section 5 discusses a similarity and a difference between depictives and manner-focused resultatives. I will argue that they both modify the manner of the action denoted by a verb, but they specify different kinds of manner: depictives describe a specific way of performing the denoted action, whereas manner-focused resultatives modify the degree to which one performs the action named by a verb. Section 7 makes concluding remarks.

2. Kageyama (1996)

2.1. *Resultative formation*

In the study of lexical semantics it is said that resultative formation is a process of causativization of basic verbs in terms of semantic conflation (cf. Levin and Rappaport (1988)).

By positing the composition of two subevents, i.e. the superordinate event describing the action denoted by a verb and the subordinate event describing a changing of state at the level of Lexical Conceptual Structure (LCS), Kageyama (1996) argues the mechanism of resultative formation, schematically represented below:

(6) [x ACT ON y] + [y BECOME [y BE AT-z]]

  → [x ACT ON y] CAUSE [y BECOME [y BE AT-z]]

(6) represents the meaning 'y becomes z as a consequence of x's acting on y;' the two subevents, i.e. [x ACT ON y] and [y BECOME [y BE AT-z]], combine to express a causal relation. The variables x, y and z are the arguments that are projected to the subject, object and complement (resultative) in syntactic structure via argument structure (see Grimshaw (1990) and Kageyama (1993)).

For example, the LCS representation for the resultative construction *Terry wiped the table clean* mentioned above would be roughly given as follows:

(7) [x ACT ON y] CAUSE [y BECOME [y BE AT-z]]

  ↓ ↓   ↓   ↓

  subject verb   object resultative

  Terry *wiped*   *the table* *clean*

As Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1991) point out, the verb *wipe* does not lexically encode a resultant state; it simply describes the manner of surface contact. That is to say, *wipe* is an activity verb which can be modified by a durative adverb as in (8a). (8b) is taken from Van Valin (1990: 255).

(8) a. Terry wiped the table for five minutes.

   b. *Terry wiped the table clean for five minutes. (cf. (5a))

The incompatibility of the durative adverb with the resultative in (8b) shows that the aspect type of the verb has changed into what implies an endpoint on the event expressed by the verb. In Tenny's (1994) terminology, the event is delimited by the resultative expression *(clean)*. In other words, the verb *wipe* is causativised as a result of combination of the two subevents. According to Kageyama (1996), in order to express a causal relation, the identification of the internal argument is basically necessary in the resultative formation. As shown in the LCS pattern in (7), *the table* (y) participates in both the two subevents. Hence, this example expresses a causal relation.

Further, Kageyama (1996) applies the analysis of LCS to fake object cases as well, suggesting that in order to express a causal relation, the existence of fake objects such as fake reflexives (cf. (1c)) or expletive body parts (cf. (1b)) which bear some relation to the subject NP is necessary. Observe the following sentence in (9a):

(9) a. The lecturer talked herself hoarse.

   b. [lecturer ACT] CAUSE [y BECOME [lecturer BE HOARSE]]

As shown in the LCS pattern in (9b), *lecturer* participates in both the superordinate/subordinate events, and therefore (9a) expresses a causal relation. According to Kageyama, such an NP is expediently added to the subordinate event, so

this type of resultative construction is often used as hyperbole to express the idea that the action performed was done to excess, rather than a literal expression (change of state).

A similar explanation applies to fake object cases like (1a) in which there is no common participant in the superordinate and the subordinate events. Kageyama says that, in such cases, the LCS is formally composed of two subevents; semantically the superordinate event, that is, the action denoted by the verb is focalized. Therefore, this type of resultative construction is used as a hyperbolic expression and is hardly productive.

2.2. *Two questions*

Here we have two questions to address. First, how does the analysis of LCS explain the difference in interpretation between the following fake object cases?

(10) a. I cried my eyes red.

      b. I cried my eyes out.   (=(1b))

(10a) permits a literal and a hyperbolic reading: I cried very hard, so my eyes or the skin around my eyes became red and puffy. On the other hand, (10b) admits not a literal only but a hyperbolic reading, as we have seen in section 1. As we notice in (10), the difference in interpretation is affected by the choice of resultative. Following the analysis of LCS, we assume that (10a) and (10b) have literal and hyperbolic meanings, since the fake object *my eyes* bears some relation to the subject NP *I* and both these sentences express a causal relation. In addition, on the basis of Kageyama (1996), in these cases the superordinate event, that is, the action denoted by the verb, is more focalized, rather than the subordinate event, i.e. the change of state. However, in fact, (10a) and (10b) differ in interpretation: (10a) is susceptible to a literal interpretation, whereas (10b) is not. Indeed, unlike (10a), (10b) is not compatible with the *in*-adverbial, as in (11):

(11) a. I cried my eyes red in five minutes.

      b. *I cried my eyes out in five minutes.

As (11a) and (11b) show, (10a) can describe a telic eventuality, whereas (10b) cannot. In this respect these two fake cases are different from each other. In short, there are some cases where fake object cases admit only a hyperbolic interpretation, even though the postverbal NPs bear some relation to the subject NPs. It seems to me that the difference in interpretation between (10a) and (10b) suggests the limit of the analysis dependent on LCSs. Indeed, the analysis of LCS works well in explaining the similarities and differences between fake object cases and true object cases, but it fails to explain the difference between fake object cases such as (10a) and (10b).

Second, as for the fake object case in (1a), repeated as (12a), Kageyama says that there is no common participant in the two subevents, so not the change of state but the action denoted by the verb is focalized (cf. (3a)):

(12)　a.　The joggers ran the pavement thin.　(=(1a))

　　　　b.　The joggers ran on the pavement and the pavement became thin.

It seems to me, however, that the entity *the pavement* participates in both subevents (cf. (12b)). But, if we assume so, we cannot explain the reason why (13a) has a hyperbolic, but not a literal meaning.

On the other hand, the following fake case in (13a) does not express a hyperbolic meaning but only a literal one: the teapot became empty as a result of the drinking action. According to Kageyama (1996), since the entity *the teapot* participates in both subevents (cf. (13b)), (13a) shows a clear causal relation.

(13)　a.　He drank the teapot dry.

　　　　b.　He drank from the teapot and the teapot became dry.

It is not clear, however, why *the teapot* in (13a) participates in both two subevents, while *the pavement* in (12a) does not.

Basically, I agree with Kageyama that the resultative construction is composed of two subevents, i.e. the event denoting the action named by a verb and the event describing a changing state. In the following section, I will argue that whether a resultative is interpreted as "manner-focused" (hyperbolic) or "result-focused" (literal) is strongly dependent upon the way we understand the causal relation between two subevents.

3.　Analysis

3.1.　True object cases

I will start with the resultative construction based on the transitive verbs, as in (4), repeated here as (14):

(14)　a.　Terry wiped the table clean.

　　　　b.　John hammered the metal flat.

　　　　c.　John broke the door open.

Recall that these sentences admit a pure result reading. Here I would like to pay attention to the causal relation between the action denoted by the verb (the causing subevent) and the described change of state (the change of state subevent). The verb *wipe* in (14a), for example, simply describes the activity of wiping, but does not specify a particular achieved state, as we have seen in section 2. That is, the verb *wipe* is inherently atelic and therefore cannot in principle code a result state. As Washio (1997) points out, the verb *wipe* has a disposition toward removal. That is,

the verb *wipe* describes an activity which potentially affects an object in such a way that, if the object is caused to change its state, then it changes in a certain fixed direction to reach the final state where the object is free of dirt, liquid, etc. From this semantic property of *wipe*, we may say that the verb *wipe* implies a change of state (cf. Miyata (1999)). Thus, a change of state such that the table became clean should be implied in the activity of wiping, and it can be naturally inferred from the wiping activity (cf. Miyata (1997)). Then, we can understand that there is a causal relation between the action of wiping and the described change of state.

A similar observation applies to (14b) and (14c): there is a causal relation between the action of hammering and a change of state such that the metal became flat; the action of breaking and a change of state such that the door became open.

From the observations above, we will assume that when the resultative construction is susceptible to a literal (result) reading, there is a causal relation between the action named by a verb (the causing subevent) and the described change of state (the change of state subevent).

3.2. Fake object cases

Let us consider, in turn, fake object cases, as in (10), repeated as (15):

(15) a.   I cried my eyes red.

        b.   I cried my eyes out.

Recall that (15a) and (15b) differ in interpretation: (15a) has a literal meaning, while (15b) does not. The latter has only a hyperbolic meaning.

We will first consider (15a) with respect to the causal relation between the action denoted by the verb (the causing subevent) and the described change of state (the change of state subevent). Unlike true object cases like (14), the change of state described in (15a), that is, my eyes or the skin around my eyes became red, is not implied in the action of crying. The important point to note is that in order for one's eyes to become red, the action of crying must be repeated over and over or to some extent. That is, one's continuous crying makes one's eyes red. Thus we can say that in this case it is necessary to repeat the action named by the verb in order to establish the causal relation. Hence, the more the action denoted by a verb is repeated, the more salient the part of the action is. Given this, we can understand the reason why (15a) may put a focus on the action of crying, i.e., it receives a hyperbolic reading, as we have seen in section 2.

The same line of argument is applied to the following sentences:

(16) a.   He ate himself sick.

        b.   He walked his feet sore.

(16a) means that his continuous eating made him sick; (16b) means that his continuous walking made his feet sore. That is, these two expressions have a literal meaning. In addition, they may put a focus on the action denoted by the verb, i.e., these expressions imply that he ate to the point where he could eat no more (cf. Goldberg 1995: 196), or walked to the point where he could walk no more. What is important to note is that in order to cause a change of state such that one becomes sick or one's feet become sore, the action of eating or walking must be repeated over and over or to some extent. Under such conditions, the part of the action is more salient than the resultant state. So (16a) and (16b) may put a focus on the action denoted by the verb; they can be used as hyperbolic expressions.

Let us now return to the fake object case in (15b). Unlike (15a) and (16), (15b) does not admit a literal reading, but not only a hyperbolic one. We assume that this difference depends on whether there is a causal relation between the action denoted by the verb (the causing subevent) and the described change of state (the change of state subevent). A change of state such that one's eyes become out is never caused by the action of crying. And even though the crying action is repeated, such a situation does not take place in the real world. Then we may say that when the resultative construction permits only a hyperbolic interpretation, there is no causal relation between the action denoted by a verb and the described change of state.

The same applies to the following cases, as in (1a) and (1c), repeated as in (17):

(17) a. The joggers ran the pavement thin.
b. John laughed himself silly.

The described change of state in (17a), i.e., the pavement became thin, is not implied in the action of running; even though the action of running is repeated, such a change of state does not take place. Namely, there is no causal relation between the running action and the resultant state of the pavement. Likewise, the change of state, i.e., he became literally silly, is not implied in the laughing action; even though the action is repeated over and over, such a change of state does not occur. Hence, there is no causal relation between these two subevents.

Given this, we can capture the difference in interpretation between (13a), repeated here as (18a), and (17a):

(18) a. He drank the teapot dry.
b. The joggers ran the pavement thin.   (=(17a))

(18a) admits only a literal reading, but not a hyperbolic one, as we have seen in section 2: the teapot became empty as a consequence of drinking. The teapot in (18a) is a container, and we see, from the context described by this sentence, that the teapot contained something to drink before he drank it from the teapot. That is, the teapot is

affected by the action of drinking in the sense that the contents of the teapot became empty by that action. Thus we see that there is a causal relation between the action of drinking and the resultant state of the teapot. In this respect (18b) is different from (18a). That is, the pavement in (18b) is not understood to be affected by the action of running. Hence, there is no causal relation between the action of running and the resultant state of the pavement.

3.3. Summary

To sum up, there are at least three types of interpretation of resultatives, as in (19):

(19)

Interpretation Type	Literal	Hyperbole
Type 1	ok	—
Type 2	ok	ok
Type 3	—	ok

(cf.) Type 1 (e.g. Terry wiped the table clean.)
   Type 2 (e.g. He ate himself sick.)
   Type 3 (e.g. I cried my eyes out.)

In Type1 and Type2, there is a causal relation between the action named by a verb (the causing subevent) and the described change of state (the change of state subevent). Namely, resultatives specify the state of the entity denoted by a postverbal NP as a result of the action named by a verb. The important point to note is that, in Type 1, there are cases in which a single action is sufficient to cause the described change of state, whereas in Type2 it is necessary to repeat the action named by a verb in order to establish a causal relation. That is, in Type 2, the continuous action is necessary to cause the described change of state. The more the action denoted by a verb is repeated, the more salient the part of the action is, and therefore Type2 may put a focus on the action denoted by a verb; it is susceptible to a hyperbolic interpretation.

Contrary to Type 1 and Type 2, in Type 3 which admits only a hyperbolic reading there is no causal relation between the action denoted by a verb and the described change of state. And even though the action named by a verb is repeated, the described change of state does not take place in the real world. Thus we see that in Type 3 a resultative does not specify the resultant state of a postverbal NP any more; a resultative functions as only a kind of adverbial. Then we may say that the resultative construction which receives a hyperbolic reading, that is, a manner-focused resultative, is not composed of two subevents, i.e. the action denoted by a verb (the

causing subevent) and the described change of state (the change of state subevent). Rather, this type of resultative construction is understood to be composed of a simple event, since the sequence of a postverbal NP plus a resultative functions as a modifier of a subject NP's action named by a verb.

In sum, whether a resultative is interpreted as manner-focused (hyperbole) or result-focused (literal) is strongly dependent upon the way we understand the causal relation between two subevents, i.e. the event denoting the action named by a verb and the event describing a changing state. As will be shown in the following section, their difference can be captured in a more general term: "object-oriented" and "event-oriented" modifiers.

4. Object-Oriented vs. Event-Oriented

4.1. Resultatives

Compare the examples in (15), repeated here as (20):

> (20) a. I cried my eyes red.
> b. I cried my eyes out.

As we have mentioned above, a literal (result) reading is eligible for only (20a); (20b) has only a hyperbolic meaning. (20a) means that my continuous crying made my eyes red, whereas (20b) means that I cried very hard. The point to observe is that in the case of (20a) the resultative *red* directly specifies the state of the postverbal NP *my eyes*, while in the case of (20b) the resultative *out* does not modify *my eyes*. Rather, *out* modifies the event or action denoted by the sequence of *I cried*, together with a postverbal NP (*my eyes*).

It is worth noting from the observation above that when a resultative receives a literal reading, i.e. result-focused, the modification of a resultative is oriented to the state of an object (entity). On the other hand, when a resultative permits a hyperbolic reading, i.e. manner-focused, the modification of a resultative is oriented to the way the relevant event is carried out. In terms of telicity, the resultative construction displays two semantic possibilities in one form, i.e. a telic (result-focus) one and an atelic (manner-focus) one. The point to observe is that when the resultative construction describes a telic eventuality, a resultative is taken as an "object-oriented modifier, whereas when this construction describes an atelic eventuality, a resultative is taken as an "event-oriented" modifier. Relevant to our discussion is the adverb *away*, and the prepositions *to* and *at*, as we will see in the following subsections.

4.2. Two uses of away

The adverb *away* displays two semantic interpretations, i.e. a telic one and an

atelic one (cf. Bolinger (1971), Jackendoff (1997), and Kusayama and Miyata (1999)). Let us look at the following sentences:

(21)   a.   The water boiled away (for/in ten minutes).

        b.   Mary danced away (for/in ten minutes).

As is shown by the result of the test for telicity in (21), these two expressions are ambiguous between the two interpretations. The telic reading for (21a) is one in which the water boiled and it evaporated; the atelic reading is one in which the event of water boiling continued. A similar observation applies to (21b): the telic reading for (21b) is one in which Mary danced and finally she was out from the spot where she was; the atelic reading is one in which the event of Mary's dancing continued.[3] Thus we see that the combination of a verb plus *away* expresses either an atelic eventuality ('continuation') or a telic one ('disappearance').

What has to be noticed here is that these two uses correspond to the distinction between object- and event-oriented modifiers. Thus, when (21a) describes the telic eventuality (disappearance), i.e., water evaporated, *away* modifies or specifies the state of *water*. On the other hand, when this sentence describes the atelic eventuality (continuation), i.e., water kept on boiling, *away* modifies the "event" denoted by the sequence of the subject NP plus the verb *the water boiled*. The same is true of (21b): when (21b) expresses the telic eventuality, i.e., Mary danced and she went away, *away* specifies the state of *Mary*, while when it expresses the atelic one, *away* modifies or specifies the event denoted by the subject NP plus the verb *Mary danced*.

Then, if our analysis of *away* is on the right track, we would predict that the following examples have a disappearance meaning because, as assumed here, in these cases *away* modifies or specifies the state of *water* and *John*.

(22)   a.   The water is away.

        b.   John is away.

In fact, (22a) and (22b) describe the telic eventuality; they receive a disappearance reading.

It can be said from the observation above that when *away* describes a telic eventuality (disappearance), it is regarded as an "object-oriented" modifier, while when

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[3] As for the data (21b), the result of the *for/in* test is different from Jackendoff's (1997). He finds the telic reading with *in*-adverbial unacceptable with the sequence of *dance* plus *away*, as in (i):

(i)   Lois and Clark danced away for/*in two blissful hours. (Jackendoff 1997: 540)

It is true in this context a telic reading is not acceptable, but, in fact, some native speakers I have asked accepted the telic reading for the sentence in (21b) *Mary danced away (in ten minutes)*. Taking this observation into consideration, *away* is understood to be susceptible to a telic reading.

away describes an atelic eventuality (continuation), it is taken as an "event-oriented" modifier. In this respect *away* and resultatives are very much the same. Given this, we may say that *away* is neutral with respect to aspectuality. The points made so far apply in principle to the prepositions *to* and *at*.

4.3. Ambiguity of the preposition to

According to Tenny (1994: 77), the preposition *to*, which introduces a terminus, functions as a delimiter.[4] In fact, as (23) shows, the addition of the preposition *to* affects the interpretation:

(23) a. Carmen walked for/*in an hour.

      b. Carmen walked to school *for/in an hour.

(23b), in contrast to (23a), has only a delimited interpretation. Tenny says that verbs of motion or imparting motion can occur with an implicit path and a terminus which together measure out the event.

It should be stressed, however, that there are cases in which the preposition *to* does not play the role of delimiter.[5]

(24) a. Carmen talked to Mary for/*in an hour.

      b. Carmen walked to school *for/in an hour. (=(23b))

As (24) shows, unlike *walk to*, *talk to* cannot describe a telic event. Notice that whether or not the preposition *to* functions as a delimiter depends on the semantic property of each verb: *walk* strongly implies that the subject entity moves, whereas the meaning of *talk* does not imply the movement of the subject entity. The point not to be missed here is that *to school* in (24b), functioning as a delimiter, specifies the terminal point where "Carmen" reaches, and thus can be regarded as an object-oriented modifier. On the other hand, *to Mary* in (24a), which does not play the role of delimiter, specifies the direction of "Carmen's talking," but not the terminal place where "Carmen" arrives, and thus can be taken as an event-oriented modifier. This fact leads us to say that the delimiting function is not truly an inherent part of the meaning of the preposition *to*; the presence or absence of the delimiting function is determined not by the lexical property of *to* but by the context where it appears.

There is further evidence in support of the idea that *to-NP* is neutral with respect to aspectuality:

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[4] In most existing work on resultatives, a sentence like (23b) is regarded as a resultative construction due to the result-like quality of the directional PP (cf. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), Wechsler (1996), and Verspoor (1997), among others).

[5] I am indebted to Kusayama (p.c.) for the data in (24a).

(25) Carmen told the message to Mary *for/in an hour.

Although the verbs *talk* and *tell* belong to the class of verbs of communication (cf. Levin 1993), *to Mary* in (25), unlike that in (24a), functions as delimiting the event. It is apparent that the difference in aspectuality comes from the difference in lexical property between *talk* and *tell*. That is, the latter contains some message (Theme) transferred to someone, whereas the former does not. Thus, *to Mary* in (25) can specify where the Theme moves in the sense that *Mary* received the massage, and can be regarded as an object-oriented modifier in this context. Kevin Varden (p.c.) pointed out to me that the expression *Carmen told the message to Mary* can be used for repeated telic action: Carmen told the message to (poor) Mary for an hour (i.e. again and again and again). Of importance is that this shift in aspectuality brings about the shift in semantic function of the preposition *to*. In such a context, *to Mary* specifies not only the terminal point where the message (Theme) is conveyed, but also where the repetitive action of telling the message is directed. Given this, we can say that the delimited/non-delimited distinction corresponds to the distinction of object-/event-oriented modifications.

The fact that the *to-NP* form is used as either event- or object-oriented is parallel to the fact that resultatives are used in either way, as we have seen before. Compare (26a) with (26b) and (27a) with (27b) respectively:

(26) a. Carmen walked to school in/*for an hour.   (=(24b))
       b. Terry wiped the table clean in/*for five minutes. (=(5a))
(27) a. Carmen talked to Mary for/*in an hour.   (=(24a))
       b   I cried my eyes out for/*in an hour.   (cf. (3b))

It can be said that *clean* in (26b), functioning as a delimiter like *to school* in (26a), specifies the state of the object (*table*). On the other hand, *out* in (27b), which cannot be regarded as a delimiter like *to Mary* in (27a), modifies the event or action denoted by the sentence *I cried*, together with a postverbal NP (*my eyes*). I suggest that both goal phrases like *to* and resultatives are neutral with respect to aspectuality, and that the presence of the changing entity in the event is relevant to whether or not they function as a delimiter.

4.4. The preposition *at*

The same line of argument holds for the preposition *at*:

(28) a. John arrived at the station (*for/in an hour).
       b. John laughed at Bill (for/*in an hour).

The point is that *arrive* implies the change of location of the subject NP, whereas *laugh* does not. This difference affects the interpretation of *at*; *at the station* in (28a)

specifies the location achieved by the subject NP (*John*), and thus can be regarded as an object-oriented modifier. On the other hand, *at Bill* in (28b) specifies the target of 'John's laughing/sneering' (event), and may be seen to be an event-oriented modifier. As evidence, (28a) implies that '*John* is at the station,' while (28b) does not imply that '*John* is at Bill.' Notice that *at-NP* can be used to refer to both a location and a target. I argue that these two uses correspond to the distinction between object- and event-oriented modifiers.

4.5. *Summary*

In this section I have argued that the determination of the telicity of a sentence is related to the distinction between "object-oriented" and "event-oriented." That is, when a sentence describes a telic eventuality, "object" (entity) is focalized, whereas when it describes an atelic, "event" is focalized.

Finally, I would like to pay attention to so-called depictives. The depictive construction superficially resembles the resultative construction. Semantically, depictives are similar to manner-focused resultatives, but there is a subtle difference between the two.

5. Depictives vs. Resultatives

The depictive construction is exemplified below, with subject and object hosts, respectively (the bold-faced expressions indicate the hosts of depictives):

  (29) a. **Noa** ate the meat *nude.*

     b. Noa ate **the meat** *raw.*

(29a) means that Noa ate the meat and at the time that he ate it he was nude; (29b) means that Noa ate the meat and at the time that he (started to) eat it, it was raw. Thus, depictives modify an entity at the time of the (initiation of the) action denoted by the verb (cf. Rapoport (1999)).

It has been sometimes argued that depictives are predicates of the subject/object NPs (cf. Rothstein (1983), Williams (1989), Jackendoff (1990), etc.). That is, depictives have a subject-predicate relation with their host NPs.

However, Maruta (1995) proposes that depictives are not predicates, but rather modifiers of action- or motion/change-eventualities just like a certain subset of adverbials.[6] He provides five pieces of evidence in favor of this approach. I would like to take up here one of them. He argues that the interrogative of depictive

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[6] According to Maruta (1995), this idea is not new. O'Grady (1982), for example, explicitly includes depictives in the class of adverbs.

constructions provides evidence supporting his approach. Typical predicative APs are generally questioned by *what*, not by *how*, as in the following example:[7]

(30) a. My younger brother-in-law is Estonian.

    b. *What/*How* is your younger brother-in-law?

On the other hand, the appropriate question word for depictives is *how*, as in (31):

(31) a. **John** ate **the meat** *raw/nude*.

    b. *How/*What* did John eat the meat?

The use of *how* in (31) is against the prediction of the predication approach, but consistent with Maruta's (1995) analysis, which assumes depictives to be adverbials, the typical question word for them being *how*, as in (32)

(32) a. John drives his car *carefully*.

    b. *How* does John drive his car?

From this observation, Maruta claims that depictives function as adverbials, but not predicates. I agree with him on this point.

Then we may say that depictives and manner-focused resultatives are similar in this respect. That is, it is conceivable that manner-focused resultatives (hyperbole) function as a kind of adverbial as well. Kusayama (p.c.) suggested to me the way to present evidence in support of this thought. The evidence is as follows:

(33) a. I cried my eyes out.

    b. How did you cry?

(34) a. He ate himself sick.

    b. How much did he eat?

As (33b) and (34b) show, the interrogative *how* can be used for resultative constructions like (33a) and (34a).

On the other hand, in the resultative construction which has only a literal (result) reading, *how* is not appropriate question word, as (35) and (36) show:

(35) a. Terry wiped the table clean.

    b. *How did Terry wipe the table?

(36) a. John broke the door open.

    b. *How did John break the door?

Therefore, *Terry wiped the table clean* in (35a), for example, does not mean Terry wiped the table cleanly; *clean* is not regarded as an adverbial.

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[7] Maruta (1995) notes that *how* may be used to question AP-predicates, though this use of *how* is restricted to the following contexts:

(ii) A: *How* are you?   B: I am *fine*.

    A: *How* does she feel?   B: She feels very *happy*.

From the observations above, we can say that depictives and manner-focused resultatives alike modify the manner of the action denoted by a verb. More noteworthy is, however, that they specify different kinds of manner. As Maruta (1995) points out, depictives describe a specific way of the action denoted by a verb. For example, *Noa ate the meat raw* in (29b) describes a specific way of eating; it implies that the meat was eaten while it was raw. On the other hand, manner-focused resultatives describe the degree to which the action denoted by a verb is performed. Thus, *I cried my eyes out* in (33a) describes the extent to which the action of crying is performed, but not a specific way of crying.

Finally, I would like to consider the reason why the example in (29b), repeated as (37), cannot be taken as a resultative construction.

(37) Noa ate the meat raw. (=(29b))

Recall that when resultative constructions have a literal (result-focus) meaning, resultatives modify the postverbal NPs, i.e. "objects" (entity). With (37), there is no causal relation between a change of state such that the meat becomes raw and the action of eating; such a change of state cannot be naturally inferred from that eating action. Then, *raw* in (37) does not specify the resultant state of the meat any longer. Rather, *raw* modifies the whole event of eating activity. Namely, (37) describes a specific "way" of eating, and therefore it is regarded as a depictive construction. A full discussion of the topic mentioned in this section will have to be left for future research.

6. Concluding remarks

The resultative construction admits either a literal or a hyperbolic reading. In terms of telicity, this construction displays two semantic possibilities in one form a telic one and an atelic one. That is, this construction puts a focus on either a change of state (result-focus) or the extent to which the action denoted by a verb is performed (manner-focus). I argued in this paper that whether a resultative is interpreted as "manner-focused" or "result-focused" is strongly dependent upon the way we understand the causal relation between two subevents, i.e. the event denoting the action named by a verb and the event describing a changing state.

I proposed that the difference between manner-focused and result-focused resultatives can be captured in a more general term "object-oriented" and "event-oriented" modifiers. That is, when the resultative construction describes a telic eventuality (result-focus), the modification of a resultative is oriented to the state of an object (entity), whereas when this construction describes an atelic eventuality (manner-focus), the modification of a resultative is oriented to the way the relevant event is

carried.

I further showed that the phenomenon in which one syntactic form displays two semantic interpretations is not unusual. Indeed, a similar observation applies to a variety of phenomena including the adverb *away*, and the prepositions *to* and *at*. I argued that the analysis based on "object-oriented"/"event-oriented" is also of relevance to these phenomena. I suggested that the determination of the aspectuality is affected not by the lexical property of adverbs (e.g. *away*) or prepositions (e.g. *to/at*) but by the context where they appear: they are understood to be neutral with respect to aspectuality.

We further focused on depictives and manner-focused resultatives. They are superficially alike, and semantically they modify the manner of the action denoted by a verb. In terms of object-oriented/event-oriented modifiers, then, depictives are event-oriented modifiers as well. They, however, specify different kinds of manner: depictives describe a specific way of performing the denoted action, whereas manner-focused resultatives modify the degree to which one performs the action named by a verb.

The analysis proposed here has shown that the determination of the telicity of a sentence is related to the distinction between "object-oriented" and "event-oriented."

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