Let's Have It out about *Have**
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1. Introduction

One of the difficulties in describing the verb *have* in a linguistically significant way seems to lie in the interference from our "intuition" about the notion of possession, even if we focus our attention to the uses of *have* that have more or less to do with this notion.   For illustration, let us begin with the following question: is it the case that the possessive verb *have* as used in (1) is expressing its most typical use?:

(1)   Susie has a new doll.

Virtually no one would hesitate in saying yes if "typical" is taken to be "commonly found"; no doubt, sentences like (1) are the first to come across when you are asked to think of an example of *have*.   But are you sure of your answer (whether affirmative or negative) in the presence of the following uses of *have*?:

(2) a.   Watch out—he has a gun!
    b.   I have an electric drill, though I never use it.
    c.   They have a good income from judicious investments.
    d.   She often has migraine headaches.
    e.   He has a lot of freckles.

Here, these examples are borrowed just for the sake of discussion from Langacker (2000), in which they are set out in the order that "properties characteristic of immediate physical control are successively stripped away until the reference point function stands alone." (p. 183)   Arguably, a dividing line can be drawn between (2b) and (2c):   on the one hand, (2a,b), along with (1), seem to belong to the subset that expresses "alienable possession"; on the other, (2c-d) contain the theme that describe the subject's attribute (if taken broadly) in one way or another, and thus can be regarded as instances of inalienable possession.   Isn't it the case that *have* as it stands at either extreme on that scale of "control" is in its typical, *or* unmarked, use?   Specifically, can we say that (2a) is more suitable to be regarded as so than (2b), which is analogous to (1)?

Sentences like (2a) and (2b) may be considered to express "transitory possession" and "nontransitory possession," respectively (cf. Chafe (1970:148)). Speaking of "physical control," however, recourse is most frequently had to this notion when we discuss a certain asymmetry between *have* and *own*, that is, their difference in passivizability.   Returning to this issue in due course, more important at present is the fact that, of all the examples in (2), only (2b) (and thus (1) as well)

allows substitution of *own* for *have*. Would that substitutability assure that nontransitory possessive *have* is most typical of use of *have*? If affirmative, that would immediately lead to another question: why sentences with transitory possessive *have* do not have passive counterparts despite its (relatively) high controllability? True, the sense of physical control involved in transitory possessive *have* may not be high enough. But in face of this, what is all the more mysterious is the fact that nontransitory possessive *have* and *own* are synonymous (or, according to Chafe (*ibid.*), closer to each other than transitory and nontransitory uses of *have* are), even though, the former is lower, and the latter is higher, than transitory possessive *have* in terms of controllability. This fact suggests that transitory possessive *have* should be treated in isolation. In other words, it seems that what transitory possessive *have* expresses is not possession in its more restrictive sense, and thus by "alienable possession" I exclusively mean "nontransitory possession" in what follows.

Of course, the questions about "typicality" and "substitutability" are raised just for illustrative purposes; indeed, the former question is meaningless unless it is made clear what is meant by "typical." That question addressed in a different way, it should be noted that remarks have often been made in the literature to the effect that the notions of possession and location have much to do with each other. Along these lines, Freeze (1992) observes the different behavior of uses of *have* with respect to the [±ANIMATE] value of the subject. For illustration, consider the following examples, which are adapted from Freeze (1992:583):

    (3) a.   The tree has branches.
        b.   The flour has weevils (in it).
        c.   * The tree has a nest.
        d.   The tree has a nest in it.
    (4) a.   The boy has a cousin/a nose.
        b.   The boy has fleas (on him).
        c.   The boy has a needle.

When the subject of *have* is [−ANIMATE], the theme must be an inalienably possessed noun, as in (3a), or a "characteristically associated" one (i.e. treated as inalienably possessed), as in (3b). But (3c,d) show that whereas alienably possessed themes are grammatical when they are followed by the PP containing a pronoun coindexed with the subject, the sentence is excluded without one. As will be shown below, sentences with that PP would deserve to be treated separately, and may be called locative *have* sentences for the sake of reference. When the subject is [+ANIMATE], by contrast, the theme is not limited to one possession type: it may

be an inalienably possessed, a characteristically associated or an inalienably possessed noun. Each case is illustrated in (4a-c), respectively. Besides them, it would be better to take into consideration examples like *I have a needle on me* (Freeze (1992:581)), which show that locative *have* sentences can have a [+ANIMATE] subject as well. Freeze concludes then that since only a [+ANIMATE] subject allows either inalienably or alienably possessed themes, while a [−ANIMATE] subject is restricted to formally inalienably possessed themes, we may deduce that the *have* sentences with a [+ANIMATE] subject is less restricted than the one with a [−ANIMATE] subject.

In light of Freeze's observation, it is important to see that the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject virtually disappears when an anaphor co-indexed with the subject appears in the PP complement. Also of note is the fact that of the two types of possessive uses, the restriction takes effect only when the object is an alienably possessed theme; when an inalienably possessed theme emerges, again, the restriction disappears. To see the other way round, the generalization would be that both locative and inalienable possessive *have* are ignorant of the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject. In other words, the [+ANIMATE] restriction has nothing to do with sentences of these kinds, and is in effect only with alienable possessive *have* sentences.

From the discussion I have made so far can be drawn a tentative answer to the question I addressed at the onset of this paper: alienable possessive *have* is marked in the sense that in comparison with other relevant uses of *have*, sentences of this type only obey the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject.

1.1. More on the Markedness of Have: *in Comparison with* Own

In the light of the [+ANIMATE] subject restriction involved in alienable possessive *have*, one might be reminded of the verb *own*, another possessive verb which exclusively designates alienable possession, which is touched on in the discussion above about their substitutability. Observe the following examples, which show that *own* is also influenced by that restriction:

(5) a.   John owns a new car.

b.   * The garage owns a new car.

One might conclude, then, that *have* as used in alienable possession would not be so peculiar as when it is compared with other uses of *have*, and some semantic notion such as controllability would have much to do with the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject.

A case can be made along the lines of Pinker (1989) for the involvement of controllability in *own*. Surely, Pinker does not speak of "physical control," but it

is obvious enough that this notion is identical to what he bears in mind when he accounts for the reason why sentences with *own* have corresponding passive sentences. He maintains:

> Perhaps an alienably possessed object is construable as having an inherent tendency to move away from the owner, but the owner exerts a stronger opposite force keeping it with him and allowing him to do with it what he pleases. If so, the owner would have a quasi-agentive or antagonist role with respect to the possession/antagonist. (Pinker (1989:145))

and that this quasi-agentive nature of the subject makes *own* a passivizable verb. Extending his proposal, it is reasonable to explicate the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject of *own* in terms of controllability: animate but not inanimate subjects can exerts the stronger opposite force that is essential to the notion of alienable possession.

Returning to alienable possessive *have* sentence, however, a question immediately arises about the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject. Notice that Pinker (1989) attributes the absence of passive counterparts from sentences with *have* to the conception that *have* expresses the pure concept of possession without distinguishing alienable and inalienable possession (and others). This suggests that the verb totally lacks the sense of controllability, which makes *own* qualified as a passivizable verb. If so, then why is it the case that alienable possessive *have* sentences also have the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject? Does that restriction have anything to do with the sense of controllability which, contrary to the fact, would make *have* passivizable?

It follows then that the relation between controllability and the passivizability of verbs of possession is not so straightforward as Pinker's (1989) account suggests. Notice also that the same seems true of approaches to the passivizability of verbs of this class on the alienable and inalienable distinction (among which, essentially, is Kobukata (2004a)). Alienable *have* differs from *own* in passivizability, while both of them exhibit the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject. If the latter property is associated with the sense of controllability directly, why only alienable possessive *have* resists passivization?

Before seeking to answer the question, however, let us point out another feature of *have*, which is made clearer by comparing it with *own*. There is another respect in which the two verbs differ, that is, what is called the definiteness effect on the object: *own* can have both definite and indefinite objects, whereas alienable possessive have allows indefinite objects only. Recall that the term *the definiteness effect* is most commonly used to refer to the phenomenon in which the

existential *there* sentences has an indefinite but not definite DP, which comes between the verb *be* and the locative PP. A case in point are the following examples:

(6) a.   There is a student in this room.

b. * There is the student in this room.

cf.   The student is in this room.

It has been pointed out in the literature (e.g., Bach (1967), Anderson (1971), Costa (1974) Dixon (1991), Burton (1995), and Partee (1999)) that the same applies to certain types of *have* sentences. For instance, Partee (1999), referring to her own unpublished works, notes the parallelism between existential *there* sentences and relational *have* sentences, which she summarizes as follows:

(7)   There is/are __ candidate(s) for the job.

(8)   John has __ sisters.

(9)   OK in (7), (8): *a, some, three, at least three, several, many, a few, no, few, at most three, exactly three.*

(10)   * in (7), (8): *the, every, both, most, neither, all, all three, the three.*

Notice that Partee's (1999) discussions are confined to the cases of *have* followed by a relational noun (i.e., inalienable possessive sentences), but no less important is that the definiteness effect is also found with alienable possessive *have* sentences, as noted by other researchers. For illustration, consider the following sentences, which are adopted from Costa (1974: 6):

(11)   Surely someone in this room has/owns a copy of *The Language of Ronald Ziegler*.

(12)   Surely someone in this room has the copy of *The Language of Ronald Ziegler*.

Costa states that the difference between (11) and (12) illustrates what may be referred to as a "possession" vs. "position" contrast (cf. Gruber (1976)):   (11) is concerned with ownership of a token of the book of that name, and this sentence admits of a paraphrase with *own*;   in (12), on the other hand, the focus of concern is the location of the particular book,[1] and *have* as used in this sentence cannot be substituted by *own* without preserving the paraphrase relationship. When utterances like "Surely someone in this room owns the copy of *The Language of Ronald Ziegler*" are used, Costa continues, the location of the book is probably known to the speaker and the addressee, and thus they are more concerned with the identity of the owner. To summarize, it would be the case that *own an N* is paraphrasable by *have an N*, but the forms with the definite article are not

interchangeable. Costa concludes then that "this asymmetry of *have* with indefinites and definites provides the first clue as to a possible underlying source of *have*," for there is another area of grammar which behaves differently with definites and indefinites, namely, existential expressions.

1.2. Locative vs. Possessive Have, *with Reference to the Definiteness Effect*

Costa's (1974) claim seems to be inconsistent in one respect: whereas the affinity of a certain use of *have*, which is followed by the definite theme, has much to do with the sense of location, it is not this but the other uses of *have* that are similar to existential expressions. For, as shown above, only the latter uses of *have* (alienable and inalienable possessive *have*) exhibit so called the definiteness effect. In fact, Costa's suggestion of the association of uses of *have* with existential expressions is not unpreceded, and Anderson (1971) offers a more accurate description about their relationship. Anderson (1971:107-110) analyzes semantically similar but superficially different locative expressions like (13a,b):

(13) a. There is a book on the table.

b. The table has a book on it.

by giving them the same underlying structure, and maintains that they are variant to each other. *Mutatis mutandis*, Anderson's view is that both sentences have a common underlying form such as [LOC V_{copula} TH LOC] with double locatives, "differing only in the nature of the 'pronominalization,' which in the case of the clause [13b] affects the second locative [DP] ... and in the presence of *have* rather than *be*." (p. 110)

Interesting though it is by and large, however, Anderson's (1971) analysis gives rise to difficulties in some details, and thus it seems to be untenable as such. One of them concerns the sensitivity to the definiteness effect, of the two locative sentences. In actuality, Anderson (1971:110) notes the fact, but, in the absence of further comment, he seems to take it not to be particularly problematic to his analysis. In any way, let us first summarize his observation, and then examine its relevance to the present discussion. Consider:

(14) a. The table has a/the book on it.

b. There is a/*the book on the table.

To put aside irrelevant details, what is important is the fact that locative *have* sentences are immune from the definiteness effect of the object, and thus can admit of the verb followed by both definite and indefinite DPs.

Now, recall Costa's (1974) remark about the asymmetry between *have* and *own*. She points out that only possessive *have* with an indefinite theme corresponds to *own*; *have* followed by a definite theme rather expresses the sense of

position. In other words, of the two examples in (11),(12), abbreviated here as (15a,b) for convenience, only (15b) can be treated on a par with (14a) and be qualified as a locative sentence:

(15) a. Someone has a copy of the book. (= own)

    b. Someone has the copy of the book. ($\neq$ own)

Thus it is a plausible move to analyze (15b) into having an underlying structure in the form of [have DP PP], and to take it to be a variant of the following sentence:

(16) Someone$_i$ has the copy of the book on/with/*etc.* him$_i$.

Notice also that how to account for their difference on the surface might make some contribution to the issue of designing a plausible grammatical theory. Some would posit a phonologically empty pronominal element like *pro* along the lines of some conventional version of Generative Grammar; others might think of a (relatively) brand-new morpho-syntactic operation, which would incorporate the PP into the verb, and in that way seek to associate the surface form of *have* with other copulative verb like *be*. Still others might regard this phenomenon as a superficially elliptical one with little theoretical significance. For lack of empirical evidence, however, it is impossible to decide one way or another in this paper, and I leave the issue open, only noting the prospective it would bring about. Nevertheless, the point is that the absence of the definiteness effect from a certain subclass of *have* sentences suggests that they express location and (explicitly or covertly) have the PP complement that contains anaphoric element co-indexed with the subject.

In this connection, it is important to see that in an attempt to make substantial the native speaker's intuition about the relation between possession and location, remarks have occasionally been made to the effect that alienable possessive sentences like (16a) should also be treated similarly. Of them, the one made by Déchaine, *et al.* (1995) is more interesting than others in that they associate the presence of phonologically-null element with the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject, and thus their analysis is worthwhile to review. Assuming an approach that makes use of *pro*, they first observe the contrast between *John has a hat on (him)* vs. *The table has a lamp on *(it)*, and attribute the difference to the restriction on "animate *pro*," which is excluded in the case of inanimate locations.[2] They further assume the existence of phonologically null preposition, which they identify with the preposition of "central coincidence" of Hale (1986), with the meaning close to that of *with* and *on*. Accordingly, the example in (15a) could be given the following representation:

(17) Someone$_i$ has a copy of the book [$_{PP}$ $\emptyset_P$ *pro*$_i$]

Again, the sentence would take the form of [have DP PP], with the PP containing an anaphor coindexed with the subject. Thus, there would be no structural difference between both of the examples in (15), which contain alienable possessive *have* and locative *have*, respectively.

There are some difficulties with Déchaine, *et al.*'s (1995) proposal, however, and I do not take side with them. For one thing, the status of phonologically-null preposition is totally uncertain, and it seems to me no more than a stipulation. If it exists at all, the sentence *John has a hat* can be used as a variant of *John has a hat on* (*him*). Even if possible, isn't it simply because the former expression can convey more general meanings than the latter? Besides, the alleged synonymy cannot apply to the pair of **Mary put red glasses* and *Mary put red glasses on*. These considerations seem to be enough to cast doubt on their proposal, but there is another issue which gives rise to difficulty for them. Indeed, this is more important under the present context, since it can make a rather strong argument against approaches in which simple alienable possessive sentences contain an underlying [have DP PP] configuration. Again, the point is the asymmetry between possessive and locative sentences with respect to the definiteness effect. If both of them have the same structure, a question arises as to why the definiteness effect is in effect only with the former type of sentence. Of course, one might wonder whether the issue could be coped with by making some auxiliary assumptions. But such a move seems to be very unlikely to impossible, since neither *pro* nor an empty preposition has any structural and semantic relevance to the definiteness of the DP preceding.[3] Moreover, the same can be said of the other approaches I have mentioned above to the phenomena of locative *have* sentences with a covert locative PP. It is questionable whether these approaches, or whatever treatment might be given to the PP, for that matter, should shed light on the asymmetry with respect to the definiteness effect, so long as they ignore the structural difference between possessive and locative sentences.

1.3. Summary of Section 1

So far, I have raised several questions, to some of which, I have given a tentative answer. But none of them has not been answered in a systematic way in which we can make sense of properties of *have*. Thus, before proceeding, it is useful to summarize discussions so far, sorting out crucial issues from those that were touched upon only for the sake of comparison.

First, the uses of *have* to be dealt with can be summarized as follows:

(18) a.   Alienable Possessive *Have*

Jane has a yellow bicycle.

[+ANIMATE] subject; [−DEFINITE] theme; no coda

b.   Inalienble Possessive *Have*

Jane has blue eyes/a sister. / The house has a red roof.

[−DEFINITE] relational noun; no coda

c.   Locative *Have*

John has a/the book on him. / The table has a/the book on it.

PP that contains an anaphor coindexed with the subject.

By "no coda", in (18a,b), I mean the cases where there is no corresponding PP to that of locative *have* sentences, as in (18c).

Of the three, locative *have* sentences come in the most noticeable appearance, and seem to best serve as a starter. Indeed, I will argue below that their other characteristics, namely, the absence of the [+ANIMATE] subject restriction and of the definiteness effect, follow from the presence of the PP in question. As I have suggested above, a similar role is played in the crucial respect by the relational noun that is preceded by inalienable possessive *have*, and thus discussions about this type of sentences will be devoted mainly to describing the nature of relational noun. Finally, I will seek to account for characteristics of alienable possessive *have* sentences. What is most remarkable about this type of sentences is its apparent absence of peculiarities. (Indeed, this is the reason I began this paper as I did.) Alienable and inalienable possessive *have* sentences are similar in that they have no coda, but the former does not have a relational noun to take its place, either. The DP that follows alienable possessive *have* seems not to have any noteworthy semantic properties available for exploring its characteristics. Yet, in comparison with the other uses of *have*, alienable possessive *have* is marked in that the [+ANIMATE] subject restriction is in effect with only sentences of this type. In face of the fact that a similar restriction is imposed on *own*, as in *John/*the garage owns a new convertible*, however, it would be natural to guess that the concern of this restriction is with some general property of verbs of possession, but it does not play an important role in making peculiarities of (uses of) *have* explicit. On the contrary, I will argue that their similarity is merely apparent and the [+ANIMATE] subject restriction on alienable possessive *have* sentences is a reflection of the most crucial feature of this type of sentences.

Finally, remember that a comparison between alienable possessive *have* and *own* has revealed another issue to be considered, namely, their asymmetry in passivizability: alienable possessive *have*, as opposed to *own*, resists passivization.

This issue should not be treated in isolation, since not only *have* but the other uses of *have* also cannot undergo passivization, which in turn suggests that their absence of passive counterpart can be taken to be a general feature of uses of *have*.   Indeed, to make sense of the mechanism of their passivizability seems all the more important, since two conflicting issues have to be taken into consideration: the mechanism must be general enough to cover various uses of *have*, especially irrespective of whether the subject is agentive or not, and, at the same time, it must be so fine-grained that it can account for the asymmetry of alienable possessive *have* and *own*.

2.   *Have* as a Verb with v_{part}

One of the important features of *have* is its general absence of passive counterparts, except for some idiomatic uses.   For detailed discussion, see Green (1974), Palmer (1987) Harley (1998) and references cited there.   A case in point are the following examples:

(19) a.   The oak tree had a nest in it.   (Locative *have*)
    b.   * A nest was had in it by the oak tree.
(20) a.   Mary has long hair.   (Inalienable possessive *have*)
    b.   * Long hair is had by Mary.
(21) a.   John has three cars.   (Alienable possessive *have*)
    b.   * Three cars are had by John.

This feature is the key with which to make explicit the crucial property that is shared by uses of *have*.   In view of this, I propose that *have* is of the type that is equipped with v_{part}, and attribute its unpassivizability to the involvement of that type of light verb.

2.1.   *Morita (2002, 2003) on the Unpassivizability of* Contain

I have argued in Morita (2002, 2003) that a certain subclass of transitive verbs, among which is *contain*, do not emerge in passive sentences because of a certain morpho-syntactic property, which distinguishes them from run-of-the-mill transitive verbs, in an attempt to draw a general picture of the typology of transitive verbs. For illustration, consider the following.

(22) a.   Susie shot John.
    b.   Susie broke the vase.
(23) a.   The box contains the doll.
    b.   Susie broke her leg.

The examples in (22) express a certain agent-patient relation, whereas those in (23) covey a certain whole-part relation.   It is this whole-part relation that makes verbs

of this class unable to undergo passivization, As has been pointed out in the literature (e.g., Helke (1979), Bresnan (1982)), a DP that expresses a body-part is in a certain local relation with the subject that designates the whole, and, to use more recent terminology, what these works show is that the former, being an anaphor, is bound by the latter. Compare the following sets of examples, which are drawn from Helke (1979:33-62) and arranged in a way that makes the parallelism between body-part DPs and reflexives clearer:

(24) a.   The poor girl lost her mind.

b.   * Her mind was lost by the young lady.

(25) a.   The poor girl hurt herself.

b.   * Herself was hurt by the poor girl.

By identifying the whole-part relation observed in (24a) and (25a) with that of the sentences in (23), I assume that the unpassivizability of both cases obeys the same pattern. In other words, I propose that Binding Condition A, a device for explaining the grammaticality observed in examples like (24)/(25), should be extended to cover the ill-formedness of the examples like in (26):

(26) a.   * The doll is contained by the box.

b.   * Her leg was broken by Susie.

For concreteness, I assume the following version of Binding Condition A, which is given in Chomsky (1993:43):

(27)   If α is an anaphor, interpret it as coreferential with a c-commanding phrase in D.

I assume along the lines of Chomsky (1993) that the domain D to be the minimal clause or DP that contains the anaphor and its antecedent, and that the binding conditions including (27) are applied at LF. I conclude then that the establishment of the whole-part relation is guaranteed by the partitive DP satisfying Binding Condition A. As shown in (28), the whole DP, if not passivized, c-commands the partitive DP in the object position, while passivization breaks the c-command relation required for the whole-part relation, resulting in a Binding Condition A violation:

(28) a.   the package T^0 v_{part} contain   a present
                (whole)   c-command for binding   (part)

b.   a present T^0 be v_{def} contained   by the package
                *(part)   (whole)

On the other hand, I assume that *own* is no more than a verb of the agent-patient type, and nothing particularly noteworthy seems to prevent it from undergoing passivization.   I will return to this issue below, where a comparison with alienable

possessive *have* makes its features clearer. In short, verbs with v_{acc} designates an agent-patient relation, and are passivizable, while verbs with v_{part} designates a whole-part relation, and are unpassivizable.

2.2. Contain *and Locative* Have

Locative *have* is quite similar to *contain*, as the following examples show:

(29) a. The oak tree had a nest on a twisted branch.

b. E. coli contains about 3000 genes in its genome.

and they can be treated on a par. Thus, I tentatively propose the following structure for locative *have*:

(30) a. [The table]$_{whole_1}$ has [$_{part_2}$ the book] [$_{part_1}$ [in it]$_{whole_2}$ t]

b. whole$_1$ $\geq$ [$_{part_1}$ whole$_2$ $\geq$ part$_2$]

The point is that the locative PP and the theme DP make a small clause, within which they are in a whole-part relation. This small clause plays the role of *part* in relation to the subject of the sentence. See Morita (2003) for details.

In view of the parallelism between locative *have* and *contain*, one might wonder whether *contain* is a morphologically colorful, semantically specialized variant of (locative) *have*.[4] But *contain* does not exhibit the definiteness effect irrespective of whether the object is followed by a coda (i.e., the PP containing the another coindexed with the subject). After all, what is qualified as *part* is different with the verb, and it is the verb's idiosyncrasies that specify this. The absence of the definiteness effect from *contain* suggests the verb to be non-existential; or rather, the verb can be better conceived of as among verbs of relative alignment, if the term is taken broadly. In short, what *contain* does is, like this type of verbs, namely, *follow*, *precede*, or *parallel* (Morita (2002)), to depict the spatial relation among the entities involved in the way that the verb does. By contrast, the involvement of the definiteness effect in the possessive uses of *have* suggests that it is existential, to which I will return below.

2.3. Relational Nouns with Inalienable Possessive *Have*

To begin with, notice that the two cases of locative and inalienable possessive *have* sentences can be generalized as follows: inalienable possessive themes are relational nouns in the sense that it designates the relation between its arguments associated through its argument structure. Thus, relational nouns in this sense play the role of anaphor and can be assumed to establishing the anaphoric relation with the subject as the antecedent. The story with inalienable possessive *have* is more straightforward than locative *have* in a sense; its characteristics stem from the nature of the noun that follows. Exploring the insight of Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992), Déchaine, *et al.* (1995) propose that inalienably possessed

nouns are taken to have argument structure, which guarantees to hold the inalienable possessive relation between the subject and the object by coindexing the former with one of the arguments of the latter. In this way, relational nouns can play the role of part, as shown in (32):

(31)   Susie$_1$ T^0 v_{part} have   a sister$_{<1,2>}$

        (whole)   (part)

Notice that some nouns are typically relational, and some are less so. See Kobukata (2004b) for related issues. But there are some nouns that are not inherently relational, but are tentatively qualified as so by the help of context. In this regard, recall that with respect to (3b) and (4b), Freeze (1992) speaks of 'characteristically associated' noun (i.e. treated as inalienably possessed); nouns of this type illustrate the last case. Now a related question is whether the same analysis can be given to alienable possessive *have*. In this analysis, the DP that follows alienable possessive *have* could also be treated as a relation noun, at least temporarily, with the help of context (or by means of coercion, if one wants to say so). In the next subsection, however, I reject this analysis in favor of the one that makes use of the notion of proximity, on the grounds that the latter can be more in conformity with the involvement of the [+ANIMATE] subject restriction in alienable possessive *have* sentences.

2.4.   Alienable Possessive Have *and the Notion of Proximity*

Finally, we come to alienable possessive *have*. I propose that alienable possessive *have* and *own* have in common the notion of proximity which, as Iwata (1999:79) points out, is based on the metaphor POSSESSIONS ARE OBJECTS IN A PERSON'S PROXIMITY, and their differences are reducible to the use that these verbs make of that notion. First, let us consider *own*. This is no more than a run-of-the-mill transitive verb. The analysis I propose here about the verb *own* is quite similar to that of Pinker (1989), but I depart him with respect to the account of the verb's passivizability, since I assume that it is the absence of passive counterparts from *have* that should be accounted for, and no special measures need to be taken for *own*. In any case, *own* expresses the sense of proximity in which the subject exerts a stronger opposite force to keep the object within the abstract local domain of the subject in which he is allowed to do with the object what he pleases. Notice that what *own* expresses is the relation that the subject and the object directly hold, and in this sense *own* is parallel with verbs of relative alignment (in the strict sense) like *follow*.

Alienable possessive *have*, on the other hand, cannot be conceived of as so, and the definiteness effect with this use of *have* suggests the verb to be existential.

Then, how this nature of *have* is associated with the notion of the alienability of the subject? I propose that what alienable possessive *have* expresses is the idea of the existence of the object in the subject's proximity, and in this sense the verb is existential. In other words, with alienable possessive *have*, the expression *X has Y* means X's PROXIMITY DOMAIN CONTAINS Y or Y EXISTS IN X's PROXIMITY DOMAIN, and v_{part} but not v_{acc} is introduced into the structure accordingly. Thus, the [+ANIMATE] subject restriction on the alienable possessive *have* sentences is due to the involvement of the notion of proximity in this way: only [+ANIMATE] subjects can have the capacity of exerting the force with which the object is kept in his abstract local domain that is relevant to the notion of possession.

What is crucial to the conception of alienable possessive *have* in the manner just described is the role that is played by the mechanism of metonymy with respect to the subject. The point is that in the case of, say, *Mary has two cars*, we mean by *Mary* something that has much to do with Mary. To use Langacker's terminology, Mary is the reference point of something that is less prominent. Notice that in his analysis of the verb *have*, Langacker (2000) refers to this notion to describe the relation between the subject and the theme DP. To use the example just mentioned, it would be meant that Mary is the reference point of the cars in question. I differ from Langacker, however, in that I propose to apply the mechanism of metonymy to describe the relation between the subject, which explicitly represented, and its proximity domain, which is covertly signified. The subject of alienable possessive *have* is special in this sense, and this is one of its idiosyncrasies that are not found in the other uses of *have* discussed in this paper, namely, inalienable possessive and locative *have*. In short, the relation between the subject and its proximity domain is guaranteed by metonymy, which is evidenced by the [+ANIMATE] restriction on the subject.

Finally, I shall put emphasis on the difference between the proposal I have made above and that of Langacker (2000) with respect to the use which is made of the notion of proximity. As I have shown at the onset of this paper, Langacker takes it to be a common feature of uses of *have*, with their differences attributed to the various degrees of the controllability involved: the least to no degree of controllability with inalienable possessive *have*, and in this sense, this use of *have* could be said to make the most illustrative example of proximity. By contrast, I have just proposed to apply this notion only to alienable possessive *have*, and that, in a quite different fashion. The crucial point is that locative *have* and inalienable possessive *have* are better described without recourse to the notion of proximity: their properties are merely reducible to the nature of the complement that they take.

2.5. Summary of Section 2

In this section, I have explained properties of possessive and locative uses of *have* by extending the proposal I made in Morita (2002, 2003), on the grounds that these uses of *have* alike do not have passive counterparts. I take it that their absence from *have* indicates the involvement of the light verb v_{part}, and seek to attribute the differences among the uses of *have* to the way in which each of them makes use of that light verb. As shown in section 1, alienable possessive *have* seems to be more difficult to analyze than the other two uses of *have*, namely, inalienable possessive and locative *have*, because that use of *have* lacks noteworthy characteristics, apparently. To the contrary, what I have argued in this section is that while the latter two uses of *have* are given fairy straightforward accounts, alienable possessive *have* is marked (again!) in that only this use of *have* makes crucial use of the notion of proximity.

NOTES

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[1] As Costa points out, definite theme DPs can apparently emerge in possessive *have* sentences. In that case, however, the DP expresses the idea of type but not that of token.

[2] Déchaine (1994) claims that the existence of an animate *pro* can easily be supported with a wide range of phenomena across various languages, including null objects in Portuguese.

[3] Empty constituent like them are characterized as such by their lack of phonological properties, and it is not reasonable to assume (unless independent evidence is provided) that otherwise, especially with respect to the semantic contributions they make, they are distinguished significantly from their overt counterparts. Even if these two options were to have certain semantic differences of relevancy, the PP and the DP seem to be in a structural relation local enough for the alleged semantic contributions to be in effect.

[4] Similar remarks can be made about the relation between alienable and inalienable possessive uses of *have* and *possess*. Notice also that Kobukata (2004a) points out curious behavior that the verbs of possession in English, viz. *have*, *possess*, and *own*, exhibits. She first summarizes major views that have been made in the literature, pointing out that *have* (except in certain idiomatic uses) is invariantly regarded as an unpassivizable verb, while *own* is shown to be passivizable. As regards to *possess*, she continues, judgment varies among

researchers. Some of them even seems to avoid speaking of its grammaticality explicitly, although they make some remarks that suggest the verb to be included into either side. See Kobukata (2004a) for discussion.

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