

Blending in the *Have Got* Construction*

Toshihiro Tamura

1. Introduction

This paper deals with the *have got* construction in British English, which is schematized as NP *have got* NP and denotes possession.¹ It is exemplified by sentences like the following:

- (1) a. They've got plenty of money.
 b. You've got a lot of work to do.
 c. The kids in my class haven't got any imagination.

The purpose of this paper is to show through a detailed analysis that it is a remarkable construction both syntactically and semantically.

Section 2 shows two anomalous behaviors of the *have got* construction, reviews some transformational analyses and points out their problem. Section 3 reveals semantic properties of the *have got* construction. Section 4 compares the *have got* construction with related constructions and argues that it is an independent construction. Section 5 discusses the *have got* construction in terms of blending. Section 6 gives a natural account of the anomalous behaviors. Section 7 makes concluding remarks.

2. Two Problems in the *Have Got* Construction

2.1. Cohesive Relation and Two-facedness

Syntactically, the *have got* construction shows the following behavior with respect to the interrogative and negation:

- (2) a. Have you got any interesting books?
 b. *Do you have got any interesting books?
 (3) a. I haven't got much to talk about this evening.

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¹ In British English, the form *have got* is used both a possessive expression and the perfect of the verb *get*. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between the former and the latter in the case that *have got* takes a noun phrase as object. A sentence like (i) is actually ambiguous between the possessive sense and the recent acquisition sense described by the present perfect without some context:

(i) John has got a key to the safe.

In American English, however, the regular past participle of *get* is not *got* but *gotten* and hence one can easily distinguish the *have got* construction in question from the perfect of *get*.

b. *I don't have got much to talk about this evening.

In **the** interrogative and negation, exemplified in (2) and (3), the *have got* construction does not require *do*-support; the *have* functions as the interrogative operator in the former and is followed by the negative affix *n't* in the latter. Furthermore, *have*, as is well known, induces contraction, which is one of the notable features of auxiliaries:²

(4) a. He's got some cash stashed somewhere in the house.

b. We've got a huge range of all kinds of jigsaw puzzles.

These examples above clearly show that *have got* of the *have got* construction consists of an auxiliary and a verb.

To take the case of the examples above, there is no anomalous behavior in the *have got* construction. However, we encounter difficulties when examining other examples. First, words or phrases can appear between an auxiliary and a verb in general to the extent that a semantic conflict does not arise as in (5), but cannot between *have* and *got* of the *have got* construction as in (6):

(5) a. Jack probably {can/may/will/should} guess why.

b. Jack {can/may/will/should} probably guess why.

(6) a. Jack probably has got an amusing book.

b. *Jack has probably got an amusing book.

As shown in (6a), the adverb *probably* is semantically compatible with the *have got* construction. However, when *probably* appears between *have* and *got*, the sentence is not accepted. What these facts suggest is that there is a cohesive relation between *have* and *got* in the *have got* construction.

Second, as for the tag question and VP deletion, when there is an auxiliary in the main clause, it generally appears in the tagged sentence or the sentence involving VP deletion as in (7) and (8), while the auxiliary *have* does not in (9) and (10):

(7) a. John can play basketball very well, can't he?

b. *John can play basketball very well, doesn't he?

(8) a. Mary will initiate a new research program, and John will too.

b. *Mary will initiate a new research program, and John does too.

(9) a. *John has got a dog, hasn't he?

b. John has got a dog, doesn't he?

(Battistella (1987: 214))

² Only some of the auxiliaries (e.g. *will*, *would*, *could*, *should* and so on) induce contraction.

- (10) a. *Mary has got a dog, and John has too.
 b. Mary has got a dog, and John does too.

(Battistella (1987: 216))

To the extent that *have got* counts as being composed of an auxiliary and a verb, one can predict that the auxiliary *have* appears in both the tagged sentence and VP deletion in accord with the main clause. Contrary to the prediction, both the tagged sentence in (9) and VP deletion in (10) require not the auxiliary *have* but *do*. As far as these examples are concerned, it might be possible that the *have* of *have got* is a main verb, not an auxiliary. In this respect, the *have* plays a two-facedness.

From the examples above, we can conclude that, though the *have got* consists of an auxiliary and a verb, it is not the same as other auxiliary and verb combinations. Therefore, we have to ask the following questions: (i) why is there a cohesive relation between *have* and *got*? and (ii) why does the *have got* construction play a two-facedness with respect to the tag question and VP deletion?

2.2. Transformational Analyses and Associated Problems

LeSourd (1976) and Fodor and Smith (1978) deal with the two-facedness shown in the previous subsection, resolving it transformationally. LeSourd (1976) postulates that *have got* consists of a main verb *have* and a meaningless morpheme *got*, which is transformationally inserted into main verb position, i.e. *Got-Insertion*. After the *Got-Insertion* rule has applied, the main verb *have* (or *has*) must become an auxiliary. Therefore, the *have* functions as the interrogative operator:

- (11) a. *Does Archibald have got a blue Mercedes?
 b. Has Archibald got a blue Mercedes?

(LeSourd (1976:511))

Though LeSourd's analysis is sufficient to explain the normal syntactic behavior of the *have got* construction in the interrogative and negation, it also has to solve the anomalous behavior in the tag question and VP deletion. Observe the following:

- (12) a. Archibald has got a Mercedes, doesn't he?
 b. * Archibald has got a Mercedes, hasn't he?
 (13) a. Bill believes that Archibald has got a Mercedes, and he does.
 b. * Bill believes that Archibald has got a Mercedes, and he has.

(LeSourd (1976:514))

For tag questions and VP deletion, LeSourd assumes the transformational order in which their formation precedes *Got-Insertion*, resulting in their requiring *do-support*, as shown in the examples above. To put it more concretely, the tagged sentence and VP deletion are generated before the *have* syntactically rises to the auxiliary position by *Got-Insertion*, and hence require *do-support* in accordance with the main verb *have*. After generating the tagged sentence and VP deletion, the meaningless *got* is inserted into main verb position, whereby the *have* comes to be an auxiliary. Hence, the establishment of the surface string *have got*.

Fodor and Smith (1978) revises LeSourd's analysis, arguing that *have got* consists of a main verb *got*,³ which appears only in this construction and which has the same range of meanings as stative *have*, and a meaningless item *have*, which is transformationally inserted into an auxiliary position, i.e. *Have-Insertion*. They also postulate the transformational order in which tag questions and VP deletion are generated before *Have-Insertion*, resulting in the requirement of *do-support*. Their view is quite similar to LeSourd's one in that they postulate a meaningless item transformationally inserted and a transformational order to generate tag questions and VP deletion which require *do-support*.

Although their transformational analyses seem enough to explain the two-facedness of the *have got* construction, I cannot accept their view. Firstly, they fail to detect semantic differences between the *have got* construction and the *have* construction, as the following examples show:

(14) a. I always/usually have cash in my wallet.

b. *I always/usually have got cash in my wallet.

If the *got* or *have* of *have got*, as LeSourd and Fodor and Smith assume, is meaningless, the semantic value of the *have got* construction should be equal to

³ According to Fodor and Smith, the claim that the main verb of the *have got* construction is not *have* but *got* is supported in terms of language acquisition. Many children produce sentence such as the following:

- (i) a. Tommy gots one.
 b. I don't got one.
 c. Do you got one?

(Fodor and Smith (1978:57))

All of the examples listed here denote possession, not acquisition. We should notice that a verb *got* itself inflects and requires *do-support* just like other regular main verbs in English. According to Fodor and Smith, there is a reason for the independence of *got* in terms of the phonological property: *got* is a rather prominent word, i.e., more phonologically prominent than *have* because of its two stop consonants.

that of the *have* construction, exemplified in (14a). Contrary to their view, only the *have* construction is compatible with the adverb *always* as in (14a), while the *have got* construction is not as in (14b). This clearly shows that the former does not have the same semantic value as the latter, albeit they both denote the possession of cash. Based on their view, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to explain the difference between them.

Secondly, a fundamental question remains unanswered: why is the meaningless item *got* or *have*, which plays no role in the semantics, required and inserted? Or to say the same thing in a different way, how is the insertion of the meaningless item motivated? If we regard *got* or *have* as a meaningless item, its insertion, i.e. *Got-Insertion* or *Have-Insertion*, is not semantically motivated at all: the existence of the *have got* construction would be redundant, or rather, uneconomical in terms of a natural language system if the meaning of the *have got* construction is exactly equal to that of the *have* construction. Far from answering the question, both LeSourd (1976) and Fodor and Smith (1978) do not discuss it at all.

Thirdly, their analyses have no ground for assuming the transformational order in which the formation of tag questions and VP-deletion precedes *Got-Insertion* or *Have-Insertion*. It is clear that this order is assumed only to explain the behavior of tag questions and VP-deletion of the *have got* construction, where *do*-support is required. In other words, the transformational order is not motivated at all.

Finally, even if their transformational analyses are enough to explain the two-facedness, the question of the cohesive relation between *have* and *got* shown in the previous subsection remains unsettled.⁴

As we have seen, their transformational analyses appear to raise more questions than they answer. As long as these questions remain unsolved, their transformational analyses are ad hoc. We will propose an alternative account for the two-facedness which is motivated empirically and cognitively.

3. Semantic Analysis of the *Have Got* Construction

As has been noted, the transformational analyses are artificial and lack a semantic observation. In this section, we will reveal the semantics of the *have got* construction.

⁴ LeSourd (1976) and Fodor and Smith (1978) do not give examples involving the phenomenon.

Toda (1993) makes an important statement on the semantics of the *have got* construction, giving the following example:

(15) I haven't got any whiskey. (Toda (1993:60))

According to Toda, possession described by the *have got* construction is temporary. That is to say, the example above implies that whiskey is out of stock not habitually but right now.

If the *have got* construction describes temporary possession, we can predict that it is not compatible with adverbial phrases which modify a habitual action. Let us consider the following pair of examples:

(16) a. *I always/usually have got cash in my wallet.

b. *Every year he's got a week's holiday. (Toda (1993:61))

In fact, the *have got* construction are not compatible with the adverbial phrases *always*, *usually* and *every year*, which modify a habitual action.

The following example supports the claim that the *have got* construction describes temporary possession:

(17) I haven't got a driving license because I don't have a driving license.

Although both of the main clause and subordinate clause negate the possession of the same entity, the example above is perfectly acceptable. This is because the main clause does not mean the same as the subordinate clause. To put the matter simply, example (17) can be paraphrased as *A driving license is not here with me because I've never passed the test*: the main clause, i.e. the *have got* construction, denotes a temporary lack of a driving license, whereas the subordinate clause denotes that the subject does not even take the driving license.

The fact that the *have got* construction describes temporary possession leads us to the prediction that it cannot describe inalienable possession, because the possessor and the possessee are *permanently* associated with one another in the possessive relation. Our prediction, however, is incorrect, because the *have got* construction describing inalienable possession is perfectly acceptable, as shown in the following example:

(18) Mary has got blown eyes.

Is the example above exceptional, or is the claim itself implausible?

We should not overlook the fact that, in many cases, this type of possession is based on certain contexts, for being described by the *have got* construction:

(19) a. Look at that face, he hasn't got any teeth.

b. I can see that he's got long hair and blue eyes.

It is clear that possession of *teeth*, *hair* or *eyes* as part of a body is not temporary.

However, just because possession of these objects is permanent in the real world does not mean that the possession is construed as permanent in the speaker's mental world. In fact, in (19a), the phrase *look at the face* suggests that the speaker focuses on not the permanent state but the temporary or momentary state of the possessive relation between *he* and *teeth*. In (19b), the speaker utters the sentence almost at the same time as the recognition of *his* appearance. That is, the speaker conceptualizes the possession as temporary. From the examples above, we can say that inalienable possession can be described by the *have got* construction in a situation in which the speaker conceptualizes the possessive relation as temporary.

From what has been discussed above, the *have got* construction is specialized to describe temporary possession. Furthermore, Toda claims that temporary possession of something must be limited to the time of speech. The evidence of this can be seen in the following examples:

(20) a. *John had got a red car.

b. *Had you got any interesting books?

As these examples show, the *have got* construction cannot be used in the past tense. This clearly means that the construction cannot describe possession in the past.

The *have got* construction also cannot be used in the future tense:

(21) a. We believe him to have got the flu. (Toda (1993:62))

b. *We believe him to have got the flu at tomorrow's meeting.

Although the *have got* construction refers to the possession at the time of speech as in (21a), it cannot refer to the possession in the future as in (21b). Thus, the *have got* construction cannot be used not only in the past tense but also in the future tense. Therefore, we can say with fair certainty that temporary possession is limited to the time of speech.

From what has been discussed above, we can represent the semantics of the *have got* construction as follows:

(22) The *have got* construction describes temporary possession at the time of speech

4. The *Have Got* Construction as a Independent Construction

So far, we examined the syntactic and semantic properties. In this section, we compare them with those of other constructions.

4.1. Comparison with the *Perfect of Get*

As far as the syntactic form of the *have got* construction is concerned, one

may say that *have got* of the construction is the perfect of *get*, because both forms consist of the auxiliary *have* and the verb *get*:

- (23) a. [NP _{AUX}*have* VERB*got* NP] (have got construction)
 b. [NP _{AUX}*have* VERB*got* NP] (perfect of *get*)

In fact, Jespersen (1933) and Visser (1973) focus on the historical origin of *have got*, regarding it as the perfect of *get*.⁵ As described in the Oxford English Dictionary entry for *have*, *have got* came to be used as the perfect of *get* denoting an acquisition from Early Middle English. However, there are some difficulties in analyzing *have got* as the perfect of *get*.

Firstly, in Contemporary English, the perfect of *get* denotes *acquisition* of something as in (24a), while the *have got* construction *possession* of something as in (24b):

- (24) a. John has got a dictionary for Christmas.
 b. Her brother's got long dark hair and blue eyes.

In (24a), it is described that John acquires a dictionary for a Christmas present. On the other hand, in (24b), there is no implication that he recently acquired a part of the body (e.g. hair, an eye, a tooth and so forth), or even he acquired it at all. Rather, the *have got* construction in (24b) describes the possession of it.

Secondly, the perfect of *get* can be used in the past or future tense as in (25a), while the *have got* construction cannot as in (25b):

- (25) a. John had got/will have got a red car.
 b. *John had got/will have got a read car.

As I mentioned before, the *have got* construction is used only in the present tense, because the possession is limited to the time of speech.

Thirdly, *have got* as the perfect of *get*, exemplified in (26a), can be intervened by words or phrases, whereas *have got* in the *have got* construction, exemplified in (26b), cannot as shown in section 2:

- (26) a. Jack has probably got an amusing book.
 b. *Jack has probably got an amusing book. (= (6b))

Only in the *have got* construction, there is a cohesive relation between *have* and *got*.

Finally, the perfect of *get* and the *have got* construction show a different behavior with respect to the tag question and VP deletion, though *have got* of both forms consists of an auxiliary and a verb:

⁵ As the purpose of this paper is concerned, it is not necessary to discuss why the form *have got* is used as both the possessive sense and the acquisition sense in British English, while it only as the possessive sense in American English.

- (27) a. You've got another job, haven't you?
 b. Mary has got a present for Christmas, and John has too.
- (28) a. John has got a dog, doesn't he? (= (8b))
 b. Mary has got a dog, and John does too. (= (9b))

As is well known, perfects generally do not require *do*-support in both the tagged sentence as in (27a) and VP deletion as in (27b). On the other hand, the *have got* construction, as shown as the two-facedness in section 2, requires *do*-support in both the tagged sentence as in (28a) and VP deletion as in (28b).

These facts leads us to the conclusion that the *have got* construction is not the same as the perfect of *get*. However, even if there is much evidence to mirror the difference between them, we should not overlook some similarities. The most important and remarkable similarity between them is that they share the same syntactic structure as shown in (23).

In addition to the syntactic similarity, there is a semantic similarity between them. Consider the following examples of the perfect of *get*:

- (29) John has got a new guitar, but he does not have it anymore.

As (29) shows, one can cancel the possession when the perfect of *get* is used, because the acquisition of something does not always mean the possession of it. It must be noted that the perfect of *get* metonymically denotes possession and that the acquisition of something itself is a temporary or momentary action. Accordingly, one can easily predict that the perfect of *get* is not compatible with adverbs such as *always* and *usually*:

- (30) *John has always/usually got a nice bike.

Since these adverbs modify a habitual action, it is quite natural that they cannot be used in the perfect of *get*.

Such a notable feature is also reflected in the following contrast:

- (31) a. Mary has got angry.
 b. *Mary has got tall.

While the adjective *angry* is compatible with the perfect of *get*, *tall* is not. The reason why *tall* cannot appear as in (31b) is its permanent property contradicts temporality of the perfect of *get*. In contrast, *angry*, which is a temporary property, is harmonized with the perfective of *get*. These examples above also tell us that the perfect of *get* shows temporality.

With this in mind, we have to remind ourselves of the fact that the *have got* construction describes temporary possession. Consider (14a) for example, repeated here as (32):

- (32) *I always/usually have got cash in my wallet.

Since the *have got* construction describes temporary possession, it is not compatible with adverbial phrases such as *always* and *usually*. In this respect, we can say that the *have got* construction shares the semantic property with the perfect of *get*.

4.2. Comparison with the Possessive Have Construction

This subsection seeks to compare the *have got* construction with the possessive *have* construction, schematized as NP *have* NP, because they both denote possession as exemplified in (33):

- (33) a. John has got much money.
 b. John has much money.

Although they differ in that the *have got* construction describes temporary possession while the possessive *have* construction temporary or habitual possession, they are similar in denoting that the subject NP possesses the object NP.

Furthermore, the *have got* construction shows the same behavior as the possessive *have* construction with regard to the relation between possessor and possessee. According to Heine (1997), the possessive relation is broadly classified into four types: *animate alienable possession* as in (34a), *animate inalienable possession* as in (34b), *inanimate inalienable possession* as in (34c) and *inanimate alienable possession* as in (34d):

- (34) a. John has a beautiful house/a lot of problems.
 b. Mary has blown eyes/a bad temper.
 c. This room has large windows.
 d. *That tree has a ball.

As these examples show, the possessive *have* construction can describe animate alienable, animate inalienable, inanimate inalienable possessions but cannot describe inanimate inalienable possession. Interestingly, the same goes for the *have got* construction:

- (35) a. John has got a beautiful house/a lot of problems.
 b. Mary has got blown eyes/a bad temper.
 c. This room has got large windows.
 d. *That tree has got a ball.

As these examples show, the *have got* construction describes the same types of possessive relation as the possessive *have* construction. In addition to the perfect of *get*, the *have got* construction also has the similarity with the possessive *have* construction.

Syntactically, the *have got* construction and the possessive *have*

construction clearly have different forms. However, if taking into consideration the fact that the word *have* is used in both constructions, we might say that there is a relation between the two *haves* of the *have got* construction and the possessive *have* construction. Interestingly, adding to the fact that the *have* of the *have got* construction is also an auxiliary, that of the possessive *have* construction is also intrinsically used as an auxiliary mainly in British English (cf. Kaga (1985), Trudgill, Nevalainen and Wischer (2002), among others):

- (36) a. Have you (any) coffee in the cupboard?
 b. I haven't (any) coffee in the cupboard.

(Trudgill, Nevalainen and Wischer (2002:3))

Generally speaking, auxiliaries do not express actions or states by themselves. Contrary to the general property of an auxiliary, the *have* not as a main verb but as an auxiliary can describe possession as in (36). Therefore, we can represent their forms as follows:

- (37) a. [NP_{AUX}*have* VERB*got* NP] (have got construction)
 b. [NP_{AUX}*have* NP] (possessive *have* construction)

Is it accidental that they both have the auxiliary *have*, which can denote possession, and a possessive meaning? Rather, it is quite likely that the two constructions have a relation not only semantically but also syntactically.

4.3. Summary

Let us summarize the main points of the similarities and differences between the *have got* construction and the other constructions:

- The *have got* construction shares the form with the perfect of *get*.
- The *have got* construction shares the temporality with the perfect of *get*.
- The *have got* construction denotes possession, while the perfect of *get* acquisition.
- The *have got* construction shares a possessive meaning with the possessive *have* construction.
- The *have got* construction partially shares the form: they both have the auxiliary *have*.

The observation above reveals the following two points: (i) the *have got* construction is an independent construction in that its syntactic and semantic aspect cannot be predicted from other constructions (cf. Goldberg (1995:5)), and (ii) the *have got* construction is related to the perfect of *get* on the one hand, and to the possessive *have* construction on the other.

5. Blending in the *Have Got* Construction

Here, we must ask why the *have got* construction shows the syntactic or semantic similarities with the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have* constructions. One might think that they accidentally share some aspects, but there is a crucial problem which can be raised: why do the *have got* construction and the perfect of *get* share the same form in spite that they are perfectly independent construction? Rather, we assume that they are syntactically or semantically similar constructions because they are related. In other words, they are independent constructions on the one hand, and related constructions on the other.

In order to capture the relation between the constructions, the Conceptual Blending put forth by Fauconnier and Turner (1996), which plays a central role in much cognitive activity, is useful. In this cognitive operation, properties of two input spaces are projected to a third space called the blend, wherein new properties that contain partial projection from the inputs are produced. The most important point of this theory is that the blend has new emergent properties of its own. Fauconnier and Turner (1996) characterize this as follows:

(38) The blend inherits partial structure from the input spaces, and has emergent structure of its own.

(Fauconnier and Turner (1996:113))

This operation also applies not only to the conceptual level but also to the constructional level. According to Konno (2002), based on the similarity between two constructions, they can be blended into a new construction, which has new properties of its own in addition to inherited properties.⁶ On the basis of the constructional blending, we can capture the relation between the *have got* construction and the other constructions. That is to say, the *have got* construction results from the blending of the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have* construction, and inherits some properties from them.

Accordingly, the reason why the *have got* construction shows the similarity with the other constructions is that it inherits some properties from them. Concretely, the *have got* construction inherits mainly two syntactic and semantic properties from the perfect of *get*. First, the former inherits the form which consists of the auxiliary *have* and the verb *got* from the latter. Second, the *have got* construction inherits temporality from the perfect of *get*. As I mentioned

⁶ Konno (2002) deals with the *if you be* construction in terms of constructional blending. See Konno (2002) for further details.

before, both the constructions are not compatible with *always* or *usually*:

- (39) a. *I always/usually have got cash in my wallet. (have got construction)
 b. *John has always/usually got a nice bike. (perfect of *get*)

As for the possessive meaning, we cannot say that the *have got* construction inherits it from the perfect of *get*, because it does not always denote possession. Rather, the *have got* construction inherits possessive meaning from the possessive *have* construction. The evidence of this can be seen in the following:

- (40) a. John has/has got a beautiful house/a lot of problems.
 b. Mary has/has got blown eyes/a bad temper.
 c. This room has/has got large windows.
 d. *That tree has/has got a ball.

As has been pointed out, both constructions describe the same types of possessive relation: animate alienable, animate inalienable, inanimate inalienable possessions. Moreover, they partially share the form as shown in (37), repeated here as (41):

- (41) a. [NP_{AUX}*have* VERB_{got} NP] (have got construction)
 b. [NP_{AUX}*have* NP] (possessive *have* construction)

In terms of the blending, we assume that the *have* of the *have got* construction comes from that of the possessive *have* construction. To put it another way, the *have* of the possessive *have* construction, which expresses the possessive meaning, is blended into that of the perfect of *get*. Hence the possessive meaning of the *have got* construction.

Furthermore, as has been pointed out, the blend must have new emergent properties of its own, which differentiate the blend from the inputs. As has been pointed out, the *have got* construction cannot be used in the past tense, while the other construction can:

- (42) a. *John had got a red car. (have got construction)
 b. John had got a red car. (perfect of *get*)
 c. John had a red car. (possessive *have* construction)


The reason of the unacceptability in (42a) is that possession described by the *have got* construction is limited to the time of speech. On the other hand, neither the perfect of *get* nor the possessive *have* construction has the limitation. Therefore, it is concluded that the semantic property does not stem from them but arises only in the *have got* construction. To borrow Fauconnier and Turner's phrase, the *have got* construction "has emergent structure of its own." If our

claim is on the right track, some doubt remains about the motivation of the **blending**: why can the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have* construction be blended? Let us consider the following pair of examples:

- (43) a. John has got a linguistic book. (perfect of *get*)
 b. John has a linguistic book. (possessive *have* construction)

Apparently, (43a) and (43b) describe acquisition and possession, respectively. We should notice here that the two events described by the constructions given in (43) are semantically related by metonymy: acquisition means a part of possession. It is this metonymic relation that allows us to blend the two constructions.

From what has been discussed above, we can represent the blending operation of the *have got* construction as follows (dotted lines represent inheritance relations):



In conclusion, the *have got* construction is semantically and syntactically a **blended construction** and hence describes temporary possession at the time of speech.

In the next section, we deal with the problems posed in section 2 and give a natural account.

6. The Syntax/Semantics Mismatch in the *Have Got* Construction

6.1. *Have Got as a Semantic Unit*

As has been discussed in the previous section, the *have got* construction is syntactically and semantically a blended construction. What is important is that the blending forces the *have got* construction to have a special status. Recall that its form is made up by the mixture of the two constructions: *have got* of the *have got* construction is syntactically the blended form of the *have got* as the perfect of *get*, which has the temporality, and the *have* of the possessive *have*

construction, which has a possessive meaning. To put it more concretely, not either *have* or *got*, but *have got* as a unit describes temporary possession.

With this in mind, I will return the question posed in section 2: why is there a cohesive relation between *have* and *got*? Observe the pair of examples in (6) again, repeated here (45):

(45) a. Jack probably has got an amusing book.

b. *Jack has probably got an amusing book.

Although the adverb *probably* is semantically compatible with the *have got* construction as in (41a), it cannot appear between *have* and *got*. On the contrary, it can appear in the middle of *have got* as the perfect of *get*:

(46) Jack has probably got an amusing book. (= (15a))

As this example suggests, syntactically, there is not necessarily a cohesive relation between the auxiliary *have* and the verb *get*. If so, why does only *have got* of the *have got* construction show a cohesive relation in spite that it also consists of the auxiliary *have* and the verb *got*? The only way to account for this problem lies in the specialness of *have got* in the *have got* construction. That is to say, *have got* forms a semantic unit and hence shows a cohesive relation.

As a result, the blending of the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have* construction creates a syntax/semantics mismatch, which is represented as follows:

(47) semantics: [*have got*]

 syntax: [_{AUX}*have*] [_{VERB}*got*]

Have and *got* are tightly connected each other in semantics and form a unit, whereas they are not in syntax. In this respect, we can say that there is a mismatch between *have* and *got* in semantics and those in syntax.

6.2. Two-facedness Again

Another problem posed in section 2 remains as a matter to be discussed further: why does the *have got* construction play a two-facedness with respect to the tag question and VP deletion? The mismatch represented in (42) offers the key to an explanation of this problem. Consider the interrogative and negation of the *have got* construction again, repeated here as (43) and (44):

(48) a. Have you got any interesting books?

b. *Do you have got any interesting books?

(= (2))

(49) a. I haven't got much to talk about this evening.

b. *I don't have got much to talk about this evening.

(= (3))

Naturally, the interrogative and negation are purely syntactic operations. Hence the *have*, which is syntactically an auxiliary, functions as an interrogative operator. This is why the *have got* construction does not require *do*-support in the interrogative and negation.

The question now arises: if *have* and *got* forms a semantic unit, why is only the *have* of *have got* inversed or negated? Let us consider *be going to*, which forms a semantic unit:

(50) a. Are you going to leave tomorrow?

b. I'm not going to give you my number.

Wada (2000) claims that *be going to* forms a semantic unit. Nevertheless, only the *be* can be inversed in the interrogative as in (50a) and negated as in (50b). That is to say, one can inverse or negate one of the elements, even if they form a semantic unit. This also holds true for the interrogative and negation of the *have got* construction.

Having discussed the behavior of the interrogative and negation, we will proceed to that of the tag question and VP-deletion of the *have got* construction, repeated here as (51) and (52):

(51) a. *John has got a dog, hasn't he?

b. John has got a dog, doesn't he?

(= (9))

(52) a. *Mary has got a dog, and John has too.

b. Mary has got a dog, and John does too.

(= (10))

Contrary to the interrogative and negation, both the tag question and VP deletion require not the auxiliary *have* but *do*. I am in a position to give a more natural account for the problem. The mistake the previous literatures make is in thinking that, in addition to the interrogative and negation, both the tag question and VP deletion should be dealt in syntax. On such a view, the behavior shown in (48)-(49) and (51)-(52) is presented as a *syntactic* two-facedness. Rather, the tag question and VP deletion, to put it plainly, should be dealt in semantics, while the interrogative and negation in syntax.⁷

⁷ There are many tagged sentences which cannot be derived from syntactic principles:

- (i) a. Lucy can play the viola, can she? (McCawley (1988))
 b. I think Tom likes foreign beers, {*don't I?/ doesn't he?}. (Nakau (1994))
 c. Ready on time, wasn't I? (Kay(2002))

In fact, syntactic analyses face a problem in the following tag questions, presented in Takeda (1998):

- (53) a. People oughtn't to ill-treat animals, should they?
 b. Jane ought to be in New York by now, shouldn't she?

(Chalker (1984:128))

Generally speaking, when an auxiliary is in a host sentence, a tagged sentence must correspond to it. In each example, however, the auxiliary of the tagged sentence clearly differs from that of the host sentence. According to Takeda (1998:149), even if auxiliaries differ between a host sentence and a tagged sentence, the whole sentence is acceptable to the extent that a certain semantic similarity lies between them. This clearly supports our claim that the tagged sentence is made in correspondence with the semantics of the host sentence (cf. Nakau (1994)).⁸

The same goes for the *have got* construction: its tagged sentence, exemplified in (51b), corresponds not to the syntax but to the semantics, in which *have got* counts as a semantic unit as in (47). Hence the need of *do*-support in the tagged sentence. As for VP deletion, I *haven't got* data now, but the same thing as the tag question might be said. A continuous examination will be needed to prove our claim.

In summary, it is the syntax/semantics mismatch of the *have got* construction resulted from blending that causes the different behavior between the interrogative and negation and the tag question and VP deletion.

7. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have argued that the *have got* construction results from syntactic and semantic blending of the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have* construction. This blending results in forming a semantic unit and also in creating a syntax/semantics mismatch in the *have got* construction, by which the two-facedness posed in the previous literature can be explained in a natural and motivated way.

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⁸ Nakau (1998) claims that the tagged sentence corresponds with the proposition.

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Doctoral Program in Humanities and Social Sciences

University of Tsukuba

e-mail: hirohirojp@hotmail.com