

# Location of “shinwa (≠myth)” in the pre-war Japanese study of religions

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## Introduction

In this article, I will address the issue of location of “shinwa (≠myth)” in the cultural and scholarly context of the pre-war Japan. This issue involves how cultural transaction and translation are possible, what kind of roles the cultural relativism and multi-culturalism play in face of the growing global hetero-cultural societies, and what the location of “shinwa” has been in the study of religion in Japan. These questions arise to me when I noticed, after reviewing the recent scholarly works dealing with the category of myth in the West, that “myth” as a category is “indigenous and local” in the Western tradition while the Japanese word “shinwa” is the invented translation of the word “myth” and, therefore, hasn’t received similar treatment in the Japanese cultural context.

While the “modern” Western scholars treat the category of the myth as if it is the essential part of their cultural heritage, there is some hesitation among intellectuals in Japan to talk about “shinwa” as “serious” topic. Probably, as Benson Saler says that scholars used a familiar concept as a scholarly terminology,<sup>1)</sup> the Japanese term “shinwa” has a connotation of “fakeness” and “lie,” but not so much of the “true story” or “sacred narrative” in public usage as employed in the Western cultural environment.

I will discuss the issue of cultural relativity and different cultural contexts in which a scholarly category could function. By doing so, I would like to draw an attention to the ambiguous and wobbly meanings of scholarly categories such as “myth”, which defy any “definitional” attempt.

### 1. “Myth” as an indigenous and local category of the Western cultural heritage

The recent critical studies of myth in Western academics can be roughly categorized into two groups, one focusing on theoretical discourse of scholarly

literature, and another locating them within the social, political and cultural contexts. For example, Robert A. Segal, in his *Theorizing about Myth* (1991), examines the theoretical significance of important scholars of myth and religion from the nineteenth century to the twenties, mainly in terms of their relationship to the dynamic relationship between the scientific view of the physical and social world and the interior and inner world.<sup>2)</sup> Focusing on theoretical development before the nineteenth century, Andrew von Henty in his *The Modern Construction of Myth*, says that,

“The linguistic shift from ‘fable’ to ‘myth’ in the 1760s marks, then, the outbreak of a revolution in Western conceptions of fantasy and storytelling in some ways comparable, as the poets were quick to note, to the contemporary political revolutions in America and France. The concept of ‘myth’ that emerges by the end of the subsequent fifty-year process generally known as the romantic movement is so radical a departure from the two-thousand-year tradition of Neoplatonizing allegory, and so plainly a major move in the self-legitimation of modernity, that it seems to appropriate to speak of the modern construction of myth as a fresh invention.”<sup>3)</sup>

From my own study of the *Jesuit Relations* in the seventeenth century, I knew that the Jesuit missionaries used the term “fable” to designate the indigenous narratives, contrasting it to the Christian “revelation”.<sup>4)</sup> After von Henty examines the historical context of the resurgence of the category of myth in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, he details the discourse development concerning the exploration of meanings of the myth from three perspectives: the taxonomic, the diachronic, and the axiological. His three types of theory about myth, the ideological, the folkloristic, and the constitutive, all stem from a romantic or transcendental origin. Similar critical perspective into the interior discourse concerning the category of religion is found in Benson Saler’s *Conceptualizing Religion*, where he points out that “religion is a Western folk category that contemporary Western scholars have appropriated.”<sup>5)</sup> Thus, problematizing the fluid relationship between the folk perspective and ordinary life and the refined, intellectual and scholarly perspective, he raises the issue of family-resemblance à la Wittgenstein in the formation of Western scholarly categories.

While these historical reviews of the category of myth are very important,

I pay closer attention to Bruce Lincoln's *Theorizing Myth*, and to Robert Ellwood's *Politics of Myth*, since they locate intellectual studies of religion in the historical, political and social contexts in which the categories were employed and used sometime for political purposes. Ellwood takes up three major "mythologists," Carl G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell, and locates their scholarly works in social and political contexts in order to examine whether there are any political and ideological dimensions to their scholarly products.<sup>6)</sup> Though his approach and other similar ones, including Irvin Stravinsky's work, which represent recently a kind of popular scholarly trend in reviewing the past scholarly works rather pose a question about what these writers intend to achieve by criticizing and unmasking the political and ideological bases of the past scholars of religions' work, there are still many important scholarly issues to consider in them. I will only focus on some important scholarly issues raised by Lincoln's book here.

Bruce Lincoln begins his analysis with his critical and detailed study of the etymological origin of the Greek term *mythos*, and carries it through almost two thousand years of intellectual history of the West. His choice of the Greek myth as the departing point is culturally validated and accepted because the term myth itself is of a Greek origin, and also because characteristics of myth are found in the Greek myth. Among many important issues he raises in his work, one issue interesting to me as one, who doesn't share the cultural assumption and validation, is his implicit and implied suggestion that scholars of religions need to return to the original and radical meaning of the term in order to continue to use it, and rebuild the more appropriate meaning of the term by stripping away the modern constructed meaning of the term. After he examines the original sense of *mythos* in Hesiod and Homer, he writes,

"The situation, then, is very much like that we have encountered in Hesiod: *mythos* is an assertive discourse of power and authority that represents itself as something to be believed and obeyed. Nowhere in the epic does it mean 'false story,' 'symbolic story,' 'sacred story,' or anything of the sort."<sup>7)</sup>

This remark makes me ponder about the implications of this sentence for a little while, and I recognize that Lincoln is attempting to point out the invalidity of the modern meaning of the term, as it has been constructed by

the modern scholars. Lincoln proposes to return to the radical and original meaning of the term in order to use the term for the scholarly discussion. Though Lincoln offers a critical analysis of the modern resurgence of the myth since the 16th century, he maintains the original meaning of the myth in referring to the category in his study.

I fully acknowledge that his radical and critical approach to the meaning of myth provides a solid intellectual ground for reconsidering the meaning of the term "myth." Yet, at the same time, his cultural assumption that the culturally-limited specific term of the Western origin would readily provide the valid foundation for cross-cultural comparative inquiries in the multicultural global situation would raise a serious issue to a scholar of other culture who doesn't share the same cultural background and cultural assumption about the history, since precisely his "radical" criticism leads to the cultural and historical specificity of the term itself. In addition, seen from the other cultural perspective, the modern western scholarship itself presents a different picture. For example, I would like to refer to Ueyama Yasutoshi's *Shinwa to Kagaku* (Myth and Science),<sup>8)</sup> that is the study of the European intellectual societies, especially around Max Weber and his Kleis. Ueyama acknowledges in Weber's address entitled "Wissenschaft als Beruf" that Weber was in the middle of more complicated social human relationship. Ueyama's study is too complicated and subtle to be summarized, but I would like to draw an attention to his insight that Max Weber was not so much "rational" in his own life always as his "method and theory" aspire to achieve. Therefore, a problem arises to us whether or not it is still, scholarly speaking, useful and meaningful for non-Western scholars to take the Western' scholars self-designation and self-understanding and just listen to only what Western scholars insist.

In addition, rationality, represented by Weber's methodological assumption, belongs to the "old" scientific reasoning accompanied by predictability based upon rational calculation. As his "scientific and sociological" method clarifies, Weber only deals with the "rationally" predictable social phenomenon. It is "old," because the recent development of the theory of complexity reveals unpredictability and chaos as underlining principles to "create" natural phenomenon. Therefore, rationality that scholars of religions need to accept and absorb in developing a new perspective is that sort of "reasoning" that can fully appreciate and absorb complexity and unpredictability in human religious

experience and phenomenon. Human society as well as natural phenomenon wouldn't evolve according to a rational and predictable scheme.

History, therefore, cannot be seen as simply unilateral and linear, but as unpredictable and complex in the present multi-cultural global situation. I would like to point out that if I try to apply the term "shinwa" to the Japanese religious history or to some other indigenous religions, I cannot help but noticing that there is a huge epistemological gap in semantic and cultural significance between the myth and the "shinwa," and hesitate using it for the study of the narrative. But, at the same time, I need to ask whether it is possible or desirable to employ the indigenous Japanese term "kamiyo (神代)" as a general scholarly category in the study of religion. Along with the Japanese case, I would like to point out that the indigenous notions of "Jukurrpa," "Alcheringa" and others of the Aboriginal societies of Australia, that are often translated into "Dreamtime" or "Dreaming" in English, have a wide range of connotation that could be expressed in European words such as "myth" and "law," that are in European societies regarded as being exclusive from each other. In addition, since the religious significance of "Jukurrpa" is closely and tightly connected with the landscape and topology, and with the Aboriginal understanding of the relationship between the places and events in the period of "Jukurrpa," this term cannot be justly translated into either "myth" or "law" readily. As Ronald M. Berndt writes,

"Human beings are regarded as being part of nature, bound to it by strong emotional ties, sharing a common life-force."<sup>9)</sup>

There is some cultural significance which cannot be easily translated into other languages. Also, there are some categories which cannot be easily projected upon other culture, either.

In the present multicultural and culturally relativistic global situation, where the English language is a dominant global political, economic and scholarly medium, Lincoln's remark implies a cultural and ideological insistence of privileging the Western-originated category over other indigenous categories. At the same time, cultural relativism allows other "indigenous" and local categories of various parts of the world to be entitled also to claim their unique and original meaning of their indigenous term without being "nationalistic." Even using the category of "myth" as heuristic device for

methodological convenience poses an issue of cultural limitation and non-openness of the present Western consciousness to other cultural vocabularies. If one culture can claim its privileged position over others, others can also claim the same on equal terms. Radical cultural relativism might request that the scholars in the West should limit the usage of the “myth” only to the Western tradition. If so, what kind of cultural possibility is there in taking up an “indigenous and local” category from the cultural tradition, and employing it as a general category? Is it really possible? In order to inquire this possibility, it is in order to examine and review the intellectual and cultural history of the Japanese scholarly heritage.

## **2. Civilizing Religion, Primitive Myth and Ignorant Superstition in the Japanese study of “shinwa”**

By developing cross-cultural conversations with these scholarly debates over the adequacy and appropriateness of scholarly categories of Western origins, I would like to reflect on the cultural history of the Japanese study of “shinwa (≠myth)” below, since now many Japanese scholars of religions face the issue of a culturally asymmetrical relationship between various scholarly categories of the Western origins and Japanese scholarly categories. Starting with the keen realization that the Japanese term “shukyo (religion)” is a translation of the Western term “religion,” and not an “indigenous” term, I would like to problematize the established scholarly scheme, which we inherited from the former generation of the scholars of religions.<sup>10)</sup>

It is in the historical, social and intellectual process since the opening of Japan to the Western societies in the mid-nineteenth century that many academic divisions and discourses and their associated theories and concepts of the West such as religion, philosophy, nature, society, and others were introduced into Japan. Back then, one of most urgent and political issues for Japanese politicians and others was to build an independent nation state with a modern capitalist economy, strong enough to defend itself against the approaching western colonial powers. In this social and political milieu, the ancient narrative of Kojiki became the foundational text in constructing the social framework to unite divided feudal states into one nation. Though there was a prehistory of studying this text by Kamo, Motoori, Hirata and others from the eighteenth century on, that was, historically speaking, almost equivalent to

the resurgence of myth in the Western society, what is interesting to me is that the government treated the narrative of Kojiki as historical fact, locating the authenticity and lineage of the political imperial reign in its content. I don't want to go in detail into the history of State Shinto here, but in the same period of time, the dichotomy between "civilized" and "primitive" were accepted as social ideology, in which Japanese intellectuals attempted to locate Japanese society between the two, and tried to change it into "civilized" society, by accepting the Western ideology of social and historical evolutionism. In this cultural context, "shinwa" belongs to the "primitive".

In this same context, the tripartite divisions of religion, myth and superstition were also constructed as intellectual and social ideology and gradually accepted. As the "civilization" represented the high value, the followers of Christianity and Buddhism began to claim that their "religions" were civilizing and moral ones, useful for constructing the society,<sup>11</sup> therefore implicitly insisting that there was no room for myth in them. "Religion" went in hand in hand with capitalism and rationality, the latter was the dynamic intellectual force to build a new epistemological system. In the capitalist social economic system, these "civilized" religions supported the power and authoritative canopy maintained by the capitalist economy, that relegated the private and protesting "spiritual experience" of lower class workers to the realm of superstition, regarded as hindrance to economic progress and the civilizing process.

Therefore, in a double process, civilized and civilizing religions become almost endowed with the power of rationality and separated themselves from both the so-called "ignorant" "superstitious" peoples who were most often manual laborers and the primitive "indigenous" peoples, the Ainu, in the case of Japanese history. In these social and political contexts, germinating scholarly works on myth in the twentieth century have to be located. It needs to be recognized that scholars of religion, including scholars of myth, are members of established institutions where rationality and literacy are major epistemological tools. As Yamaguchi points out, even two prominent Japanese scholars of religion suffered the historical limitation before the end of WWII. Kato Genchi, who called the Shrine Shinto a "religion" in the face of Shintoists' claim that it is not religion, adopted the division of religion and superstition, and condemned some religious practices of new religious organizations as superstitious. Anesaki Masaharu critically assessed that poor people without any capital caused superstitious noise

in some new religious organizations.<sup>12)</sup>

These people whom these elite intellectuals disregarded as “superstitious” need to be located in the historical and social context. Back then, about eighty percent of the population was still farmers, most of whom were landless poor tenant farmers.<sup>13)</sup> The farm, where only an eldest son could succeed a poor household, functioned as the place to produce cheap male labor for the companies. Therefore, other male siblings and those who had reasons to leave were willing to go to colonize Hokkaido, the northern new frontier, and young girls either worked as cheap labor at the silk-weaving factories, or were sold as prostitutes by the parents. Uneducated lower-class folk people were regarded by the intellectuals, as being “ignorant” and practicing “bad deeds” due to ignorance. Folk people’s lives were deprived of any sensible cultural importance.

Therefore, “superstition” and “myth (shinwa)” were located on the fringe of the cultural ideology, and rather regarded as playing a minor role in the study of religion. I will examine how the category of “shinwa” was referred to by Japanese scholars of “religion” before the end of WWII.

Anesaki Masaharu, the first chair of the study of religion at the Imperial University of Tokyo, did some mythological studies and had an scholarly exchange with Takagi Toshio, probably the first modern mythologist in Japan, over the latter’s interpretation of the Japanese “myth” Kojiki, but soon withdrew from the mythological study. In the fourth chapter of the third section entitled “Sociology of Religion” in his *Introduction to the Study of Religion*, Anesaki takes up the issue of “myth” as a human expression of people of lower “intelligence” who attempted to explain natural phenomenon by analogically finding personal will and behavior in them. He separates “myth” from his religion, and regards primitive religion as mythic religion and myth as primitive religion.<sup>14)</sup> His concern in shinwa is set aside as a minor topic in his study of religion.

In his *Shukyogaku* (1931), Uno Enku made little reference to the term “shinwa” as an important scholarly topic in his study of religions, probably since his scholarly emphasis was laid rather upon anthropological dimensions of religion, that means, instead of religious “object,” the religious “subject” was rather the object of his scholarly inquiry.<sup>15)</sup> Or, put in the social and political context, perhaps he tried to avoid any involvement with ideology of politics by not mentioning even the term “shinwa” in his study. If so, his a-political stance



couldn't grasp the ideological dimension of the religious phenomenon.

Genchi Kato, in his *Shukyogaku Seiyō* (1945), addresses the problem of "myth (≠shinwa)" in terms of three different but related issues. In terms of philosophical speculation, Kato was of the opinion of that "shinwa" is an infantile philosophical speculation on the ancient gods. The second is that the god of "myth" is no longer received as having reality, that is, not an object of "religion", but the product of the ancient people' imagination. Third, shinwa is seen as for-runner of history, though it is not history, but as providing a clue to the ethnic character that produced certain "shinwa".<sup>16)</sup>

I will refer to Suzuki Munetada's *Shukyogaku Genron* (1948) a little bit here, since it represented a different lineage of the study of religion in Japan. Suzuki criticized the then-established study of religion for being highly Christianity-oriented, and attempted to frame and organize his study of religion by basing it upon the study of Buddhism. He intended to give an equal weight to Buddhism, especially Mahayana Buddhism in opposition to Christianity, therefore it is possible to regard his work as an attempt to locate his scholarly work of religion in the Japanese "religious" heritage. Because it is a sort of Buddhism that Suzuki saw as an "ideal form of life," he rarely mentioned the topic of "shinwa." He referred to it only when he was discussing the relationship between religion and knowledge, and discussed that knowledge as well as religion originated from "shinwa" in the primitive form.<sup>17)</sup>

So, myth had not been given any importance and significance in the study of religion in Japan. Yet, "shinwa (≠myth)" was not a neglected topic at all. "Shinwa" was taken seriously by scholars in the field of literary studies. "Shinwa" as a narrative was regarded as an important human cultural achievement by the scholars of literature first. The earliest scholars of myth in modern Japan were scholars like Takagi Toshio, who was a scholar of German literature or Matsumura Takeo, a scholar of English literature. According to Obayashi Taryo, who edited Takagi's mythological studies, Takagi was the first academic mythologist who took the issue of myth seriously.<sup>18)</sup> Due to historical limitation, Takagi focused his study on the Eastasian myths and legends and European and Indian myths and legends, not including then-available information about "primitive" societies' myths and ancient Mesopotamian materials.

Matsumura Takeo was the first systematic mythologist in the history of Japanese scholarship, though he heavily emphasized the Greek myths and Japanese equivalents as many Japanese "mythologists" have. As his example

shows, the philological background was the base for his “mythological” study. Matsumura’s *Shinwagaku Genron* (Introduction to Mythology) published in 1940 and 1941, was quite a scholarly achievement, considering the academic situation in the world.<sup>19)</sup> Some of his insights are still quite useful to me. Yet, one of the problems here is that in the Japanese scholarly minds, the term “shinwa ≠ myth” is mostly applied to the Greek myths and *Kojiki* as representative cases.

All these examples of the study of religions and myth seem to show that the study of myth has minor place in the study of “religion” in Japan. It shows very stark contrast to the Western study of religion where the study of myth has been an important and necessary sphere of inquiry. The contrast rather points to the placelessness of the term “shinwa” in the popular and academic culture of Japan.

### 3. Tsuda Sokichi and the historical study of Japanese “myth”

In the pre-war era, history was a pivotal category in interpreting the meaning of myth. When the new era opened its door, the modern Japanese government laid its claim of political authenticity and lineage on historicity of the narrated myth-history of *Kojiki*. Then, almost all “scholarly” works dealing with the content of *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* were the comforting intellectual works used to justify the political ideology. Therefore, history became the politically charged issue, back then. Yet, there was a conflict between the political usage of the concept of history and the academic meaning of the term. In 1940, when the anniversary of first emperor’s reign was celebrated, the historian Tsuda Sokichi resigned from his professorship at Waseda University due to the right-wings’ pressure upon him for his historical treatment of the *Kojiki*.

Tsuda, by examining and analyzing the texts historically from a historian’s perspective, revealed that the mythic narrative of *Kojiki* is not “history,” but was the product of contemporary political ideology in the eighth century. So, here there are two kinds of “history” contesting against each other around the text of *Kojiki*, ideological and academic.<sup>20)</sup>

Tsuda’s historical study of *Kojiki* is important not only because he critically unmasked ideological aspects of the ancient narrative, but also because it is possible to recognize ambiguous meanings of the term “shinwa” in his study. I owe my view here to Ienaga’s study.<sup>21)</sup> In the first edition of his book in 1919,<sup>22)</sup> he used the term “shinwa” for *Kojiki*, in referring to various contemporary European ethnological studies he learned through Takagi

Toshio's mythological work.<sup>23)</sup> In a sense, he accepted the contemporary view that the modern studies of "primitive" myths would help in understanding the ancient mental life. But in the later edition of the same book published in 1924,<sup>24)</sup> he erased the term "shinwa" as he gradually recognized that it would not be appropriate to apply ethnological insight into historical study, pointing out the inadequacy of the method of applying anthropological knowledge to historical study. Therefore, I can emphasize here that there was a historical and critical study of the Japanese "myth" as a political ideology in 1930's, that was succeeded not by scholars of religions and scholars of "myth," but by the historians of the later generation.

Tsuda's scholarly legacy can be best found in the historian Ienaga Saburo's social involvement with the Ministry of Education over the illegality of checking the content of the high school textbook in 1970's. I would like to explain this case in a little more detail below.

After WWII, there was no direct political pressure upon the scholars and general population over the meaning of the ancient myth, due to the emergence of the democratic society. Little by little, non-ideological scholarly works on the Kojiki and ancient narratives began to appear. When Ienaga prepared a draft of a high school history textbook in 1962 and submitted it to the Ministry of Education for approval, he received a reply, saying that some of his descriptions were not appropriate, and had to be corrected. He waited until in 1965, to file a lawsuit against the Ministry for the illegality of their bureaucratic procedure to demand changes in the content of the textbook. He filed three lawsuits in total, the third in 1980. The reason why his case is related to our discussion is that the Ministry of Education demanded that he change his explanation of the political features of the ancient chronicles, Kojiki and Nihonshoki and retract his denial of any "mythical" aspect of them.<sup>25)</sup> Ienaga insisted that he wrote his descriptions by referring to Tsuda's historical work, and could not call both narratives as "mythical" because they were the ideological product of the ancient political regime of the eighth century. Naoki Kojiro agrees with Tsuda in that he refrains from calling both ancient narratives "shinwa," by citing the "romantic" definition of "shinwa,"

"A narrative needs to be fulfilled with three conditions to be qualified to be called shinwa: first, it has to be a story about gods; second, it is not the product of a circle of intellectuals, but is widely accepted by, transmitted

through, and believed by the populace; third, it contains religious or magical power, controlling the society.”<sup>26)</sup>

In Ienaga's lawsuit, the government accepted the legitimacy of the “romantic” meaning of “myth”, and attempted to endow the ancient texts with the power of myth in the high-school textbook of history. Here is found the conflict between a scholarly historian's critical analysis of the ancient text and his denial that it is “mythic”, and the government's ideological insistence of calling the same text “mythic”, since this term reflects volk's ancient and original mental world.

## Conclusion

In contrary to what it has been expected, the scholars of religion before WWII, especially, in the case of Anesaki, took and incorporated the issue of myth in his religious studies. It shows rather a stark contrast to the post-WWII study of religion in Japan, where the scholarly study of myth has been marginalized within the sphere of study of religions. In the post-war period, the study of myth has been rather taken up seriously outside of the study of religion, for example, by the anthropologist Obayashi Taryo, and by mythologist Yoshida Atsuhiko. I examined the cultural and historical context in which the Japanese term of “shinwa (≠ myth)” was located and had been employed in order that I would inquire into the possibility of utilizing a Japanese “indigenous” category as a general scholarly category in the study of religions. “Shinwa (≠ myth)” has been marginalized and its importance has been minimized by the rational intellectuals in the process of modernization. Its usage remains very ambiguous and questionable. It is now necessary for a Japanese scholar of religions to consider seriously whether any “indigenous” categories or any East Asian categories would be useful as general scholarly categories for the sake of comparative enterprise in the study of religion.

- 1) Benson Saler, *Conceptualizing Religion: Immanent Anthropologists, Transcendent Natives, and Unbounded Categories* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), p. ix.
- 2) Robert A. Segal, *Theorizing about Myth* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999)
- 3) Andrew Von Hendy, *The Modern Construction of Myth* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 3.
- 4) Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations* (CD-Rom version) (Rhode Island: Quintin Publications, 2000).
- 5) Saler, *op. cit.*

- 6) Robert Ellwood, *Politics of Myth: A study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
- 7) Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 17-18.
- 8) Ueyama Yasutoshi, *Shinwa to Kagaku: Yoroja chishiki shakai: seikimatsu-20seiki* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001). This book was originally published in 1984.
- 9) Ronald M. Berndt, "Good and Bad in Aboriginal Religion," In Max Charlesworth, ed., *Religious Business: Essays on Australian Aboriginal Spirituality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.27.
- 10) Araki Michio, *Shukyo no Sozo* (Tokyo: Kondansha, 1999); Ikegami Yoshimasa, *Shisha no Kyusaishi* (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 2003). Both carry the similar attempt as I do here.
- 11) Yamaguchi Teruomi, *Meiji Kokka to Shukyo* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1999), pp. 32-35, pp. 41-43.
- 12) Ibid. pp. 174-176.
- 13) "Farmers' lives in those days were seriously severe even if bad weather didn't effect the area. If famine occurred, their situations had gotten worse. Their lives were almost equivalent to be exploited and colonized as slaves by foreign state." Matsunaga Goichi, ed., *Kindai Minshu no Kiroku* v. 1, Nomin (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Oraisha, 1972).
- 14) Anesaki Masaharu, *Shukyogaku Gairon*: Anesaki Masaharu Chosakushu v. 6 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1982), pp. 299-314. Originally published in 1900.
- 15) Uno Enku, *Shukyogaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1931).
- 16) Kato, Genchi, *Shukyogaku Seiyō* (Tokyo: Kinseisha, 1955). This book was published originally in 1944 or 45 before the end of WWII.
- 17) Suzuki Munetada, *Shukyogaku Genron* (Tokyo: Nikko Shoin, 1948), p. 82.
- 18) Obayashi Taryo, "Kaisetsu," Takagi Toshio, Obayashi Taryo, ed., *Zotei Nihon Shinwa Densetsu no kenkyu*; Toyo Bunko 241 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1973), pp. 378-394.
- 19) Matsumura Takeo, *Shinwagaku Genron*, v.1 & v.2 (Tokyo: Baihukan, 1940, 1941).
- 20) Though Tsuda was a historian in a strict sense, he shared the contemporary ethnocentric view of the Japanese myth, saying that there was no myth in China, because all Chinese legends are fragmentary, not reaching a level of literature. Ienaga Saburo, *Tsuda Sokichi no Shisoshi-teki-kenkyu* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1972), p. 209.
- 21) Ibid., pp. 241-260.
- 22) Tsuda, Sokichi, *Kojiki oyobi Nihonshoki no shin-kenkyu* (Tokyo: Rakuyodo, 1919).
- 23) Takagi, Toshio, *Hikaku Shinwagaku* (Tokyo: Musashino Shoin, 1924). This book is a collection of Takagi's scholarly essays, that were published earlier, and most likely referred to by Tsuda.
- 24) Tsuda, Sokichi, *Kojiki oyobi Nihonshoki no kenkyu* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1924).
- 25) Ienaga, Saburo, *Kentei Hugokaku Nihonshi* (Tokyo: San'itsu Shobo, 1974), pp. 313-314.
- 26) Naoki Kojiro, *Shinwa to Rekishi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1971), p. 20.

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