

# A RECONSIDERATION OF THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE ORDER OF THE CHAPTERS OF THE *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA*

The Argument by Indian Commentators of Dharmakīrti\*

by

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## 0. Introduction

As is well known, the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, the main work of Dharmakīrti, is the *Svārthānumāna*, whereas the same chapter is located after the *Pratyakṣa*-chapter in his other works and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga. This strange order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* has been variously discussed and interpreted by modern scholars as well as Indian and Tibetan commentators. As for the historical fact, however, there is, in my opinion, no reason to suspect the conclusion of the majority of the modern scholars that the *Svārthānumāna* was first written and located at the top of the work by the author.<sup>1</sup>

Modern scholars also have considered the interpretations of the issue of the strange order by the commentators of the *Pramāṇavārttika* since Prof. Stcherbatsky.<sup>2</sup> To be sure, we cannot expect too much of the commentators in elucidating the historical fact about this issue.<sup>3</sup> But apart from the historical fact, it is significant to investigate the interpretations by Dharmakīrti-commentators. It is because differences among the interpretations of this issue by the commentators must be a crucial point for understanding the historical development of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Prof. Stcherbatsky was certainly well aware of this point of view.<sup>4</sup> Prof. van der Kuip and Prof. Kimura, based on their researches about Tibetan sources, also pointed out the significance of recognizing the difference among the interpretations of this issue by Dharmakīrti-commentators.<sup>5</sup> I think, however, we have not yet sufficiently inquired into the argument by Indian commentators itself. Therefore, I would reconsider the controversy among Dharmakīrti-commentators about the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* by tracing their argument in their own literature, and give some materials for elucidating the his-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Frauwallner, E. (1954), "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's", in *Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller zum 65. Geburtstag*, Leipzig, 142-154; *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary*. R. Gnoli (ed.), Roma, 1960, Introduction; Nagasaki, H. (1969) "*Pramāṇavārttika* Itahiryō-shō no Jun'i [The place of the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*]", *Bukkyōgaku Seminā* 10, 18-30; *Svārthānumānapariccheda by Dharmakīrti*. D. Malvania (ed.), Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series, Vol. II, Introduction.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Stcherbatsky 1932: 38ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Frauwallner 1954: 143.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Stcherbatsky 1932: 44f.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Kuip 1979; Kimura, S. (1988), "'Ryōhyōshaku' no shō no junjo ni tsuite [On the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*] (1)", *Komazawa-Daigaku Bukkyō-gakubu Ronshū* 19, (40)-(49); Kimura, S. (1989), "'Ryōhyōshaku' no shō no junjo ni tsuite [On the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*] (2)", *Komazawa-Daigaku Bukkyō-gakubu Kenkyū-kiyō* 47, (18)-(29).

torical development of the Indian Buddhist logico-epistemological school after Dharmakīrti.

According to Prof. Stcherbatsky, Dharmakīrti-commentators can be divided into three branches, namely the philological, the philosophical and the religious school.<sup>6</sup> Concerning our problem, the argument was basically carried out between the philological and the religious school.<sup>7</sup> Strictly speaking, the argument is not even the controversy between two schools. It is rather a criticism by the religious school, especially by Jayanta (=rGyal ba can),<sup>8</sup> of the philological school's interpretation. It is well known that Tibetan scholars regard him as the representative who asserted that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, contrary to the philological school, which asserted that the strange order must be accepted as it is.<sup>9</sup> I therefore attempt here to trace the development of the argument, focusing on the statement of Jayanta. The text of Jayanta extant only in Tibetan translation is, however, quite difficult to understand because of its obscure translation. Therefore, in order to make clear the context of Jayanta's text, first I would closely investigate interpretations by the philological school, because it is probably the object of Jayanta's criticism. Then, I would deal with interpretations by the religious school, especially with Jayanta's view.

## 1. The philological school's interpretation

### 1.1. Devendrabuddhi's view

At first, Devendrabuddhi, a direct pupil of Dharmakīrti and the earliest commentator of the *Pramāṇavārttika* belonging to the philological school, refers to this problem of the order of the chapters at the beginning of all three chapters of his commentary, the *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*, as follows:

1) "Having established the inference, which is the ground for the explanation of the treatise defining valid cognition, ~~by the teacher [Dignāga]~~ [Dharmakīrti] begins the explanation of the Maṅgala-verse, a chief subject by [the statement:] 'valid cognition' etc."<sup>10</sup>

2) "Having established in advance the inference, which is the ground for the explanation of the treatise defining valid cognition ~~by the teacher [Dignāga]~~, and finished the explanation of the first half [of the first Maṅgala-verse], because the latter half of the first Maṅgala-verse of the treatise composed by the teacher is easy to understand, then, in order to explain the definition of valid cognition, <sup>the teacher</sup> [Dharmakīrti] began [the explanation by the statement:] 'because the object of

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Stcherbatsky 1932: 39ff. To reconsider the validity of this classification and naming, probably depending on some Tibetan sources, is one of the objects of this paper, but I follow his way tentatively.

<sup>7</sup> Those who belong to the philosophical school, with the exception of Śaṅkarānanda, did not discuss this issue, because they did not compose the commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Śaṅkarānanda's interpretation is not so original, as we see later.

<sup>8</sup> We have until now called him 'Jina', but the present writer proved that his original name should be 'Jayanta'. See Ono, M. (1993), *Prajñākaraguptas Erklärung der Definition gültiger Erkenntnis (Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra zu Pramāṇavārttika II 1-7)*. 2 Vols. (Dissertation, University of Vienna), Einleitung, viii-x.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Stcherbatsky 1932: 44; Gnoli 1960: Introduction, xv-xvii.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *slob dpon gyis tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i rgyu rjes su dpag pa rnam par bzhag nas skabs su bab pa tshad ma zhes bya ba la sogs pas phyag 'tshal ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'i bshad pa mdzad par rtsom pa'o* //PVP 1b1f.

valid cognition is twofold', etc."<sup>11</sup>

3) "The inference is twofold. For oneself and for others. Between these, on the subject of the inference for oneself, [Dharmakīrti] explained it in advance. Therefore, [I] don't explain [it] here. The necessity for the reversion of the order [of the chapters] has already been explained [in the above two places]."<sup>12</sup>

Here, Devendrabuddhi apparently regards the *Svārthānumāna* as the first chapter, and recognizes this order as strange. He, however, defends this strange order. Namely, he considers that the normal order was reversed because the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter establishing the inference is the ground for explaining the whole of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by Dignāga.

## 1.2. Śākyabuddhi's elaboration

Śākyabuddhi, the author of the subcommentary to both Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvayṛtti* and Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*, and the most influential person of the philological school, basically follows the interpretation by his predecessor, Devendrabuddhi, and elaborates on it. Śākyabuddhi's important references to the problem of the order of the chapters are found in the *Svārthānumāna*- and the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*.<sup>13</sup> At first, let us examine the statement in the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter of his commentary. This statement concerns the interpretation of the first sentence of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvayṛtti*. There, Dharmakīrti says:

"The distinction between the rational and the irrational (*arthānārtha*) depends on the inference. Therefore, in order to establish this [inference], [the author] has explained [the inference], because there is misunderstanding concerning this [very inference]."<sup>14</sup>

Śākyabuddhi interprets this sentence as follows:

"Therefore, one must explain [this sentence] in a different manner. [The word:] 'artha' means the definition of valid cognition accomplished by Dignāga, because [his definition] is rational. [The word:] 'anartha' means [the one, which] is made by the heretic, because [it] is irrational. 'To distinguish' these two means to distinguish the rational one from the irrational one. 'Because this [distinction, however] depends on the inference', one should ascertain whether the defining words are rational or irrational, by means of depending on the inference, but not depending on the direct perception, because the [latter] doesn't make any judgement. If one says that the definition of the inference has already been explained [by Dignāga], [Dharmakīrti] says 'because there is misunderstanding concerning this'. [Namely] because there is the ignorance of this inference, the author of the treatise [*i.e.*,

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *slob dpon gyis tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i rgyu rjes su dpag pa sngar nam par gzhaḡ pa dang / slob dpon gyis gsungs pa bstan bcos kyi dang po phyag 'tshal ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'i phyed 'og ma rtogs sla ba nyid kyi phyir phyed gong ma nyid kyi bshad pa yongs su rdzogs par mdzad nas / da tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bshad pa mdzad pa'i phyir / gzhāl bya gnyis phyir zhes bya ba la sogs pa brtsams pa yin no* // PVP 122a4ff.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *rjes su dpag pa ni nam pa gnyis te / rang gi don dang gzhan gyi don to // de la 'dir rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i skabs su bab pa las / de sngar bstan zin pa de ltar na mi 'chad do // go rims bzlog pa'i dgos pa ni sngar bstan zin to* // PVP 268b6f.

<sup>13</sup> In the *Parārthānumāna*-chapter of his commentary, he also refers to this issue (cf. PVT(Ñe) 252a4ff.). See *infra* note 25.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *arthānārvhivēcanasyānumānāśrayatvāt tadvipratipattes tadvyavasthāpanāyāha*. PVSV 1,8.

Dharmakīrti] ‘has explained’ [it] ‘in order to establish this’, namely in order to establish the inference by means of removing misunderstanding. Thus, when one depends on the inference, and then explains the meaning of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, there [can] be the misunderstanding concerning this very [inference]. Therefore, [Dharmakīrti] first of all established this very [inference]. [Dharmakīrti] explained [in such a way]. [Devendrabuddhi] will explain [it] in the same way at the beginning of the second chapter [of his commentary]: ‘having established the inference, which is the ground for the explanation of the treatise defining valid cognition by the teacher [Dignāga]’ etc.”<sup>15</sup>

Here, Śākyabuddhi relates Dharmakīrti's statement at the beginning of his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti* to the problem of the order of the chapters. According to Śākyabuddhi, ‘the rational one’ in this statement means the definition of valid cognition by Dignāga, namely the content of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. According to him, therefore, Dharmakīrti himself states here that the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter explaining the inference is at the top because it is the ground for explaining Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. By means of interpreting Dharmakīrti's statement in such a way, he tries to confirm the Devendrabuddhi's interpretation that the *Svārthānumāna* is the first chapter because it is the ground for explaining Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. This idea by Śākyabuddhi has had a great influence upon those who discuss the problem of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* after him.<sup>16</sup>

We can also find such interpretation by Śākyabuddhi in his statement at the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of his commentary:<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *de lta bas na gzhan du rnam par bshad par bya ste / don ni slob dpon Phyogs kyi glang pos mdzad pa'i tshad ma'i mtshan nyid la sogs pa yin te rigs pa dang ldan pa'i phyir ro // don ma yin pa ni mu steg kyis byas pa yin te / rigs pa dang mi ldan pa'i phyir ro // de gnyis rnam par 'byed pa ni rigs pa dang ldan pa dang / rigs pa dang mi ldan pa nyid du rnam par 'jog pa'o // de ni rjes su dpag pa la bsten pa yin pa'i phyir te / rjes su dpag pa kho na la bsten nas mtshan nyid kyi tshig rnam rigs pa dang ldan pa dang / rigs pa dang mi ldan pa nyid du rnam par gzhas par bya ba yin gyi / mngon sum la bsten nas ni ma yin te / de ni rnam par dpyod par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // gal te rjes su dpag pa'i mtshan nyid ni bshad zin to zhe na / de las log par rtog pas zhes bya ba smos te / rjes su dpag pa de la rmongs pas de rnam par gzhas pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa de log par rtog pa bsal bas rnam par gzhas pa'i phyir bstan bcos mdzad pas bshad pa'o // 'di skad du gang gi phyir rjes su dpag pa la bsten nas / Tshad ma kun las bstus pa'i don bshad par bya ba yin na de la yang log par rtog pa yod pa de'i phyir re shig de nyid rnam par gzhas go zhes bshad pa yin te / de skad du rab tu byed pa gnyis btsom pa na yang slob dpon gyis tshad ma'i mtshan nyid bshad pa'i rgyu rjes su dpag pa rnam par gzhas nas zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'chad par 'gyur ro // PVT(Je) 5b7ff. See also Kuijp 1979: 15.*

<sup>16</sup> E.g. Śāṅkarānanda comments on the same sentence of Dharmakīrti as follows: "In this [*Pramāṇavārttika*], one can also find the comment on the treatise [which states:] ‘who became the means of valid cognition’ etc. Therefore, [the *Pramāṇavārttika*] is a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Nevertheless, it is not unjust that [Dharmakīrti], having abandoned the order of [the chapters of] this [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*], first explains the inference by [the statement:] ‘a property of the subject’ etc. In order to show this, [Dharmakīrti] explains the necessity [of the reversion of the order] by means of the comment ‘*artha* and’ etc. ‘*artha*’ means [something] of which nature is an absolute real being. ‘*anartha*’ means the counterpart of this. [Namely it means] relative real being such as colour-shape (\**rūpa*) etc., or unreal being such as the primary matter (\**pradhāna*), God (\**īśvara*) and the horns of a hare etc.” (cf. ‘*dir yang tshad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i gzhang gi 'grel par dmigs pa'i phyir Tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel pa yin yang de'i rim pa dor te phyogs chos zhes bya ba la sogs pas dang por rjes su dpag pa brjod pa gang yin pa de mi rigs par mi 'gyur bar bya ba'i phyir 'grel pas dgos pa bshad pa ni don dang zhes bya ba la sogs pa yin no // don ni don dam par yod pa'i ngo bo'o // don ma yin pa ni de las bzlog pa ste / gzugs la sogs pa kun rdzob tu yod pa 'am / gtso bo dang dbang phyug dang ri bong gi rva la sogs pa med pa nyid do // PVTśaü 4a4ff. ) See also Kuijp 1979: 15.*

<sup>17</sup> As for this paragraph, Prof. Steinkellner found some important fragments in Appendix I in R. Sāṃkṛtyāyana's edition of Manorathanandin's *Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiḥ*. See Steinkellner, E. (1980), "Philological Remarks on Śākyamati's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*", *Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*, Wiesbaden, 283-295.



"In order to explain the relationship between the first and the second chapter indirectly by means of posing question and answer, [Devendrabuddhi] states 'by the teacher', etc. There [can be] the following question: If the very [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*] should be explained because the teacher Dharmakīrti [intends to] make a commentary on this treatise, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, why did he establish the definition of the inference first independently?<sup>18</sup> The objection to this [question] is [the statement:] 'The explanation of the treatise defining valid cognition by the teacher', etc. Here 'the teacher' means Dignāga because it is his treatise that [Dharmakīrti] will explain. [The word:] 'by the teacher' means 'his'. 'The treatise defining valid cognition' is the treatise by which one defines valid cognition, namely the direct perception and the inference. It means the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. [This is] a treatise with clear words, which destroys the heretical opponent and delivers [them] from the ignorance. [This sentence is] a determinative compound [which can be analyzed] as follows: this is [written] 'by the teacher' and is 'the treatise defining valid cognition' as well. Even if there are the \**Vinayaṭīkā*, etc. [written] 'by the teacher', [they are] not 'the treatise defining valid cognition'. [On the other hand] even if there is 'the treatise defining valid cognition', which is written by other people than him, [they are] not [written] 'by the teacher'. Therefore, both [attributes] are said. 'The explanation' means that one explains [the treatise] definitely, after [he] removed the wrong explanations by the commentators prior to him and the misunderstanding by the heretic. 'The ground' for this [explanation] is 'the inference'. Namely, the explanation is characterized by the distinction between the rational and the irrational one. This [distinction] depends on the inference, because [the former] is necessarily accompanied by conceptual construction. Therefore, [Dharmakīrti] 'established' the very [inference] at first, because it necessarily becomes a means [of the explanation of the treatise defining valid cognition]. Even if the teacher Dignāga has already defined the inference, there is no error [in saying that Dharmakīrti established the inference] because [he] established [it] by modifying [Dignāga's definition] fundamentally.

There is [another] question: In the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* [i.e., the *Svārthānumāna*], [Dharmakīrti] freely commented on the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by means of refuting different opinions. Why did he [nevertheless] make [the commentary] literally in this [*Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter] by refuting [different opinions]? Therefore, [Devendrabuddhi] says 'by the teacher', etc. 'The treatise defining [something]' means the treatise by which the [five] constituent elements of being, the [eighteen] elementary spheres and the [twelve] places [etc.] are defined. [In this case, the compound:] '*pramāṇalakṣaṇaśāstra*' means what is both 'valid cognition' because of trustworthiness and 'the treatise defining [something]'. It means the Buddha's word. The ground for the explanation of the [Buddha's word] is 'the ground for the explanation of valid cognition and the treatise defining [something]'. It is an appositional compound (\**karmadhāraya*), which means what is [written] 'by the teacher', and is 'the ground for the explanation of valid cognition and the treatise defining [something]'. What is [this ground]? [It is] 'the inference'. [Here] 'the inference' means the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, because it explains the inference. Thus, having

<sup>18</sup> *dang por rang dbang gyis: ādāv utkrāmya* Skt. uncertain [neglecting the first [chapter]]. See Steinkellner 1980: n. 32.

depended on the inference, [Dharmakīrti] will explain [later]<sup>19</sup> that the word of the Lord is rational, but [the word of] the other, the heretic's one, is not [rational]. Thus, [this] explanation [of the sentence<sup>20</sup>] is different [from the first explanation]. Also [in this case, however] this inference is examined at the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter [of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*]. Therefore, [Dharmakīrti] explained in advance the very *Svārthānumāna*-chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* by means of refuting different opinions."<sup>21</sup>

In this long paragraph, Śākyabuddhi shows two different interpretations of the first sentence of Devendrabuddhi's first statement we investigated above. In the first interpretation, Śākyabuddhi follows Devendrabuddhi and elaborates his view as he did in the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter of his commentary. Namely, he considers that the *Svārthānumāna* is the first chapter because the inference is the ground for the explanation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. In the second interpretation, however, he brings forward another remarkable view. Namely, he says that the *Svārthānumāna* is the first chapter because the inference is the ground for the explanation of 'the Buddha's word'. Further, he asserts that Dharmakīrti, having depended on the inference, indicates that the Buddha's word is rational. He seems to consider that the inference as valid cognition is more fundamental than the Buddha as valid cognition. We can, to be sure, find the

<sup>19</sup> I think it refers to PV II 284-285.

<sup>20</sup> Namely, the sentence: *slob dpon gyis tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i rgyu rjes su dpag pa* / PVP 1b1f.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *rgol ba dang lan bstan pa'i zur gyis le'u dang po dang gnyis pa'i 'brel pa bstan pa'i phyir / slob dpon gyis zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / de la gal te slob dpon Chos kyi grags pa 'di bstan bcos Tshad ma kun las btus pa rnam par bshad par bzhed pa yin pas de nyid bshad par bya ba yin na / ci'i phyir dang por rang dbang gis rjes su dpag pa'i mtshan nyid rnam par gzhas pa mdzad ces bya ba nang rgol ba'o // slob dpon gyis tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni 'di'i lan yin no // 'dir slob dpon ni Phyogs kyi glang po yin par 'dod de / de'i bstan bcos bshad par 'gyur ba nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // de'i don ni slob dpon gyi'o // bstan bcos gang gis mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma mtshan par byed pa de ni / tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos te / Tshad ma kun las btus pa zhes bya'o // mu stegs kyi dgra 'chos shing mi shes pa las skyob pa'i phyir nges pa'i tshig gi tshul gyi bstan bcos so // slob dpon gyi yang de yin la tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos kyang yin pas zhes bya ba ni khyad par gyi bsdu pa'o // slob dpon gyi 'dul ba'i tik la sogs pa yod mod kyi / tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos ma yin no // de las gzhan pas byas pa'i tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos yod mod kyi / slob dpon gyi ma yin no // de bas na gnyi ga smos so // de'i sngar gyi fik byed pa'i rnam par bshad pa ngan pa dang / mu stegs byed kyi rtsod ngan bsal nas khyad par du bshad pa ni rnam par bshad pa'o // de'i rgyu ni rjes su dpag pa'o // de lta na don dang don ma yin pa rnam par 'phyed pa'i mtshan nyid can ni bshad pa yin no // de'i yang rjes su dpag pa iten yin te rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa nyid kyi phyir ro // de bas na thabs su gyur pa nyid kyi phyir de nyid dang por rnam par gzhas pa yin no // gal te slob dpon Phyogs kyi glang pos rjes su dpag pa'i mtshan nyid mdzad pa de lta na yang rgyas par rnam par dkrugs nas rnam par gzhas pa de lta na skyon yod pa ma yin no //*

*Tshad ma rnam 'grel le'u dang por Tshad ma kun las btus pa'i rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i le'u rtsod ngan lan btab pa'i sgo nas don gyis rnam par bshad nas / de la ci'i phyir rim pa las rgal nas mdzad ces bya ba'i rtsod pa 'di la / de'i phyir slob dpon gyis zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / bstan bcos gang gis phung po dang khamdang / skye ma ched mtshan par byed pa de ni mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos so // mi slu ba nyid kyi phyir tshad ma yang de yin la / mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos yang yin pas na / tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos te / sangs rgyas kyi bka' zhes bya ba'i don to // de'i bshad pa'i rgyu ni tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i rgyu'o // slob dpon gyi yang de yin la tshad ma'i mtshan nyid kyi bstan bcos bshad pa'i rgyu yang de yin pas na shes bya ba ni las 'dzin pa'o // de gang zhe na rjes su dpag pa ste / rjes su dpag pa ston pa'i phyir Tshad ma kun las btus pa'i rang gi don rjes su dpag pa'i le'u ni rjes su dpag pa'o // de skad du gang gi phyir rjes su dpag pa la brten nas / bcom ldan 'das kyi bka' rigs pa dang ldan pa yin gyi / gzhan mu stegs pa dag gi ni ma yin no zhes bstan par 'gyur ro // de skad du bshad pa ni rnam pa gzhan yin no // rjes su dpag pa de yang rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i le'u rnam par phyed ba de bas na Tshad ma kun las btus pa'i rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i le'u de nyid rtsod ngan lan btab pa'i sgo nas sngar rnam par bshad pa nyid yin no // PVT(Ñe) 70b7ff.*

basis of his assertion in the statements by Dharmakīrti himself.<sup>22</sup> But in comparison with the religious school's interpretation we examine next, this assertion concerning the relationship between the inference and the Buddha as valid cognition seems to be quite characteristic of the philological school, especially of Śākyabuddhi.

## 2. The religious school's interpretation

### 2.1. Prajñākaragupta's approach

In contrast with the commentaries by the philological school we examined above, the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta, the founder of the religious school, does not explicitly discuss the problem of the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. It is quite natural in a sense, because Prajñākaragupta does not comment on the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter and therefore has no occasion to explain the curious placement of the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Nevertheless, we cannot say that Prajñākaragupta is not interested in this problem at all and uncritically accepts the philological school's interpretation.

Indeed, in the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter is located at the top. And it is not the case that the original second chapter automatically becomes the first chapter, as the result of the lack of the original first chapter. It is because he actually puts his own Maṅgala-verse at the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of his work after the model of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's 'one'<sup>23</sup> and moreover makes a paraphrase of the introduction of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as follows:

"Here [in this work], a line praising [the Lord] is recited at the beginning of the treatise since the Lord became a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇabhūta*) through [his] perfection in cause and effect. It is because [the very Lord] is the purpose of the treatise."<sup>24</sup>

Here, Prajñākaragupta shows the purpose of the whole of the work. For him, the purpose of the treatise is the Lord. And then, in order to explain the meaning of the word 'who became a means of valid cognition' as the essential characteristic of the Lord, he begins to explain the definition of valid cognition. Thus, this introduction by Prajñākaragupta shows the necessity that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter in Prajñākaragupta's own system. One could say, therefore, that Prajñākaragupta intentionally locates the *Pramāṇasiddhi* at the beginning of his work from his own philosophical viewpoint. And so far as this order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* is an inevitable conclusion of Prajñākaragupta's system, it is possible

<sup>22</sup> For example, Dharmakīrti states that the four noble truths are objects of the normal inference. Cf. PVSV 108,16ff.; see also PV II 284-5.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine /  
kutarkasaṃbhrāntajānānukampayā pramāṇasiddhir vidhivad vidhīyate ||1||  
prāyaḥ prastutavastuvistarabhīto nekṣyanta evocakair  
vaktāraḥ paramārthasaṃgrahadhiyā vyādhūtapahgukramāḥ /  
tenāsmiṇ viralakramavyapagamād atyantaśuddhān dhiyaḥ  
dhanyānāṃ vidadhātum uddhatadhiyāṇ dhīḥ saṃvide dhīyate ||2||* PVA 3,6-11.

The first verse is undoubtedly composed after the model of the Maṅgala-verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. The second verse also seems to be composed after the model of Dharmakīrti's second Maṅgala-verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *atra bhagavato hetuphalasaṃpattiyā pramāṇabhūtatvena stotrābhīdhānaṃ śāstrādaḥ, śāstrārthatvāt*. PVA 3,12f.; 'dir yang rab tu byed pa'i dang por rgyu dang 'bras bu phun sum tshogs pas tshad mar gyur pa nyid kyis bcom ldan 'das la bstod pa brjod pa ni gus pa bskyed par bya ba'i don du'o / PSV 14b2.

to argue that he, as a commentator of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, may consider that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter in Dharmakīrti's system also. In this sense, the following statement in the *Parārthānumāna*-chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* should not be overlooked:

"The *Parārthānumāna* is stated immediately after the *Svārthānumāna*, because the *Parārthānumāna* presupposes the *Svārthānumāna*."<sup>25</sup>

Here, he actually suggests that the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter should be located immediately before the *Parārthānumāna*-chapter. However, this statement maybe does not concern the *Pramāṇavārttika*, but *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, because Prajñākaragupta refers to a sentence of the latter work immediately after this statement.<sup>26</sup> In any case, his opinion on the problem of the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* is not clear enough. This is the reason why there arose two different opinions regarding this problem in his followers.

## 2.2. Jayanta's new interpretation

It is Jayanta, a commentator of Prajñākaragupta, who under the influence of the above-mentioned approach of Prajñākaragupta first explicitly asserted that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. We can find out his discussion about this issue in all of the three chapters of his commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*, the *\*Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā*. A thorough explanation of his new interpretation can be found at the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of this work, in the folios De 2a2-4b3 of the Derge-edition. Therefore, I would mainly deal with this explanation in what follows. The description is not so long, but quite difficult to understand correctly, as I mentioned above. Nevertheless, we can realize at least that this description seems to consist of two parts. Namely, in the first half, he criticizes the philological school's interpretation that the *Svārthānumāna* is the first chapter, and accordingly in the second half, he tries to explain the reason for his assertion that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter.<sup>27</sup> First let us examine his criticism of the philological school's interpretation.

### 2.2.1. Jayanta's criticism of the philological school's interpretation

The main question, which Jayanta here poses, is whether the *Pramāṇavārttika* is really a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* or not. Jayanta says:

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *svārthānumānānantaraṃ parārthānumānam ucyate, svārthānumānapūrvakatvāt parārthānumānasya*. PVA 467,4. A similar statement can be found in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the fourth chapter of Śākyabuddhi's commentary (cf. *de la 'dir rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i skabs su bab pa zhes bya ba ni mngon sum de ma thag tu bstan zin pa nyid kyi phyir rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i skabs su bab pa yin par 'gyur ro // de sgar bstan zin pa zhes bya ba ni le'u dang por ro* // PVṬ(Ñe) 252a4f.) [[Devendrabuddhi says:] 'Between these, on the subject of the inference for oneself'. [One considers] that the *Svārthānumāna* should be the (next) subject, because [it] was stated [in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*] immediately after the *Pratyakṣa*. [Devendrabuddhi answers to this question:] '[Dharmakīrti] explained it in advance.' Namely, in the first chapter.] Manorathanandin, who locates the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter at the top, states similarly at the beginning of the *Pratyakṣa*-chapter of his commentary, the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (cf. *tatra svārthānumānam idānīṃ vaktavyam etatpūrvakatvāt parārthasya*. PVV 282,4).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *tatra parārthānumānam tu svadīṣṭārthaprakāśanam*. PVA 467,5=PS III 1ab. [Between these [two inferences], the inference for others reveals the object perceived by oneself [to others].]

<sup>27</sup> I think it is also possible to consider these two parts as the response to the former and the latter part, respectively, of Śākyabuddhi's statement in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of his commentary we examined above.

"With respect to this, one said: 'there are living beings that take a wrong step of despising the teacher [Dignāga] who teaches right knowledge to those who have wrong knowledge as the cause of suffering. [Dharmakīrti] wants to protect [them] with [his] compassion. [And] on the ground of [this compassion] he writes the *Pramāṇavārttika* as a commentary on the treatise of the [teacher Dignāga].'<sup>28</sup> This [assertion] is [however] not right. There is no reliable evidence concerning this. It is because there is no statement: 'I commented on the treatise [of Dignāga].' Also [in case of the statement:] 'his teaching', etc. [at the beginning of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*],<sup>29</sup> 'he' means the Lord or his followers. He [*i.e.*, Dharmakīrti] does not explain his [*i.e.*, Dignāga's] teaching."<sup>30</sup>

Jayanta eventually wants to assert that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* is the first chapter. And this order is rather suitable to the tradition of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. In this sense, it seems to be curious that he asserts that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is not a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. It is, however, quite understandable, if we remember the reason for which the philological school asserts that the *Svārthānumāna* is the first chapter. In their interpretation, they presuppose that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Namely, Devendrabuddhi, and Śākyabuddhi as well, asserted that Dharmakīrti established in advance the inference in his *Pramāṇavārttika* because the inference is the ground for the explanation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

Jayanta's argument for the assertion that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is not necessarily a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is persuasive enough and significant in itself. For example, he argues as follows:

"The definition of thesis (*\*pakṣa*) etc., which [Dharmakīrti] explains at a certain [place in his work], is, to be sure, an explanation of the meaning of the [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*], because [Dignāga] also discussed [this issue] in his treatise. But [Dharmakīrti] considers [Dignāga's statement] as a mere guide. He did in that way [namely, presented his own teaching by utilizing Dignāga's statements], in order to explain [his own teaching] easily, but not in order to comment on his [*i.e.*, Dignāga's] treatise."<sup>31</sup>

As the present writer explained in another paper, Dharmakīrti presents his new teaching for the definition of thesis by utilizing Dignāga's sentence of the definition tacitly.<sup>32</sup> In this sense, we can say that Jayanta recognizes the relationship between the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Pra-*

<sup>28</sup> It is not yet clear for me, who actually made this assertion. It probably could be ascribed to a commentator of the philological school, namely Śākyabuddhi (cf. PVṬ 3a4-5b7; PVSṬ 2,23-4,27).

<sup>29</sup> Cf. PVin I 30,11. Dharmottara apparently regards this 'his' as 'Dignāga's' (cf. PVinṬ(Dse) 2a5ff.).

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *de la sdug bsngal gyi rgyur gyur pa'i log pa'i shes pa can la yang dag pa'i shes pa bstan pa dang 'dra bar slob dpon la brnyas pa'i kha na ma tho bas 'khrul pa'i skye bo yongs su bskyang bar 'dod pa'i thugs rjes de'i gzhang gis bshad par gyur pa 'Tshad ma rnam 'grel mdzad pa yin no zhes zer ba de ni mi rigs te | 'di la tshad ma med do || gang gis phyir de'i gzhang la kho bos bshad ces bya ba'i tshig med pa'i phyir ro || de'i lugs zhes bya ba la sogs pa yang | de shes bya ba ni bcom ldan 'das sam rjes su 'dzin pa po zhes bya ba'i don to || de'i lugs ni 'dis ston pa ma yin te | J(De) 2a3ff.*

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *phyogs kyi mtshan nyid la sogs pa gang du yang bstan pa de'i gzhang nyid la yang brjod pa'i phyir de'i don 'chad par byed la | de yang drangs pa kho nar dgongs pa'o || bstan par sla ba'i phyir de ltar byas pa yin gyi de'i gzhang bshad pa'i phyir ni ma yin no || J(De) 3b2f.*

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Ono, M. (1986), "Dharmakīrti ni okeru shuchō-meidai no teigi ni tsuite [On the definition of thesis by Dharmakīrti]", *IBK* 34/2, (109)-(112).

*māṇavārttika* quite exactly. In fact, the *Pramāṇavārttika* is not a mere commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

Now, Jayanta concludes his criticism of the philological school's interpretation with the following statement:

"Because of the very above-mentioned reason, it is not [right to say] that [Dharma-kīrti] explains the inference at first because [it] becomes a means of the explanation for his [*i.e.*, Dignāga's] treatise."<sup>33</sup>

Given this statement, it becomes clearer that Jayanta criticizes Śākyabuddhi's interpretation. It is because we can find out the relatively uncommon expression 'becomes a means (*thabs su gyur pa*)' in the very statement by Śākyabuddhi we examined above.<sup>34</sup>

### 2.2.2. Jayanta's own interpretation

On the other hand, concerning his own interpretation that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter, Jayanta attempts to confirm it on the basis of the following arguments.

At first, he lays stress upon the superiority of the Buddha as valid cognition over the other means of valid cognition. He says:

"[Only] the Buddha, who attained to complete enlightenment, the Lord, inscrutable, who indicates righteousness and unrighteousness, [can] establish [something], and everyone depends necessarily on him. Therefore, [the other means of valid cognition] which can establish [something] are also not right without depending on him."<sup>35</sup>

According to Jayanta, only the Buddha, namely the omniscient being, is the ultimate means of valid cognition, and the other means of valid cognition such as the direct perception and the inference must depend on it. Without the Buddha as valid cognition, the direct perception and the inference ultimately cannot be legitimated. Therefore, the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, which proves that the Buddha is the one who became a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇabhūta*), must be located at the top of the work. It is because the explanation of the Buddha as valid cognition must precede the explanations of all the other means of valid cognition.

The second argument is so difficult that I can understand it only partially now. In this argument, Jayanta seems to justify his interpretation by means of relating the four chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* with the five epithets of the Buddha in the Maṅgala-verse by Dignāga and Prajñākara-gupta, namely: 'who became a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇabhūta*)', 'who strives for the welfare of all living beings (*jagaddhitaṣṭin*)', 'the Teacher (*śāstri*)', 'the Well-gone (*sugata*)' and 'the Saviour (*tāyin*)'. Anyway, in this argument, Jayanta states a second reason the *Pramāṇasiddhi* must be located at the top:

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *de nyid kyi phyir de'i gzhung bshad pa'i thabs su gyur nas rjes su dpag pa dang por bshad pa ni ma yin no* // J(De) 3b4.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *de bas na thabs su gyur pa nyid kyi phyir de nyid dang por rnam par gzbag pa yin no* // PVT(Ñe) 71a6. See also *supra* note 21. In order to refer to Śākyabuddhi's interpretation, Jayanta uses this expression again later. Cf. J(Ne) 1b2ff. See also *infra* note 47.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das chos dang chos ma yin pa ston par mdzad pa rnam par dpyad par bya ba ma yin pa sgrub par byed pa yin la de nyid ni thams cad kyi bltos par bya ba yin pa'i phyir de la bltos pa med par sgrub par byed pa yang rigs pa ma yin no* // J(De) 3b5f.



"Among these [three means of valid cognition], the direct perception is [explained] at first because the production of the perfection for oneself is fundamental. By virtue of this [direct perception], the inference is also valid cognition. Therefore, some verbal behaviour is designated [as 'the inference' for others] metaphorically, because [this behaviour results from] only remembering [the content of the inference for oneself] that the logical reason is pervaded by a certain [object] to be established. Therefore, [Prajñākaragupta] wants to establish that 'the *Parārthānumāna* is [stated] immediately after the *Svārthānumāna*', and explains it [with the epithet:] 'the Saviour'.

Without a common definition to these all three means of valid cognition, one [can] not recognize that the Veda is not a means of valid cognition because it does not satisfy the definition [of valid cognition]. Therefore, in order to establish the common definition, [Prajñākaragupta] explains this [common definition] in the first chapter [concerning the epithet:] 'one who became valid cognition'.<sup>36</sup>

Here, Jayanta asserts that the common definition to the three means of valid cognition, namely the direct perception, the inference for oneself and the inference for others, must be established before explaining those means of valid cognition individually, because one cannot determine whether a means of cognition is valid or not without the common definition. It is the reason why the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, which explains the Buddha as valid cognition and the common definition of valid cognition, must precede other chapters explaining those means of valid cognition individually. This argument was regarded by later thinkers as a strong confirmation for the assertion that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Yamāri, who later criticizes Jayanta's interpretation, takes first this argument as a target of his criticism and refutes it.<sup>37</sup> Later Tibetan scholars also regard this argument as decisive for Jayanta.<sup>38</sup>

At last, he explains the order of the four chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* as follows:

"One should rather say: the Lord, whose nature is both conventional and ultimate, and who removes misunderstanding by others, should be established here [at first].

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *de la rang gi don phul du byung ba rtsa ba yin pa'i phyir thog mar mngon sum mo // de'i dbang // du gyur pa'i rjes su dpag pa yang tshad ma yin pas bsgrub bya ji lta bas khyab pa'i rtags dran par byed pa nyid kho nas tshig gi tha snyad la nye bar sbyor ba'i phyir rang gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i 'og tu gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa bsgrub par 'dod nas de bstan pa ni skyob la zhes bya ba'o // tshad ma gsum po 'di'i yang spyi'i mtshan nyid med na / rig byed la sogs pa tshad ma ma yin pa mtshan nyid dang bral ba can mi rtogs pa'i phyir tshad ma spyi'i mtshan nyid rab tu sgrub pa'i phyir le'u dang pos te de bstan pa ni tshad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba'o // J(De) 4a4f.*

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *gal te de lta na yang bar du bstan pa'i phyir 'di ci ltar ngag dang po yin zhe na / 'di la kha cig na re spyi'i mtshan nyid med par ni / rig byed la sogs pa tshad ma ma yin pa la mtshan nyid mi rtogs pa'i phyir spyi'i mtshan nyid brjod pa'i phyir le'u dang po'o // de nas rang gi don 'phel ba'i rtsa bar gyur bas mngon sum gyi le'u'o // rang don gyi rjes su dpag pa ni mngon sum la rag las pa'i tshad ma yin pas mngon sum gyis 'og tu'o // de'i de ma thag tu ni gzhan don gyi rjes su dpag pa'o // de'i phyir go rim 'di la / rtsod pa 'jug pa ga la yod do zer ro // de'i rjes su rjod par byed pa gzhan dag kyang yod pa ni lHa dbang blo la sogs pa ni le'u'i go rim la 'khrul pa yin te / slob dpon gyi rjes su dpag pa dang por bshad pa ni dka'i ba'i phyir // zhes skangs par byed do // de la 'dir rigs pa yal bar dor bar mi nus pas cung zhig brjod do // Y(Phe) 179a6. Here, the *pūrvapakṣa* (underlined) is this second argument by Jayanta. On the other hand, Yamāri's following statement seems to be a criticism of Jayanta's first argument: *rig pa nyid yid ches pa'i rgyu yin no zhe na / go rim de mi rigs pa nyid yin pa ni bla'o // slob dpon gyi ma yin pa ni ma yin te / skyes bu tshad ma zhes bya ba'i sgrub par byed pa ni slob dpon gyi bshad par yang ma yin no // rig pa nyid la yang slob dpon gyis yin pa nyid bka' ba ci yod de // Y(Phe) 179b5ff.**

<sup>38</sup> For example, see dGe 'dun grub's statement in his *Tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po Rigs pa'i rgyan*. See Kimura 1989: 19f.

[The Lord] perceives the highest entire non-duality, because [he] attains the perfection of the virtues by means of entirely removing whole impurity accompanied with unconscious impressions. Therefore, it is the ultimate truth that his nature is the direct perception. Also in view of the conventional [truth], [cognition] is valid, which is consistent with the [direct perception by the Lord]. In order to recognize it, (Dharmakīrti) distinctively explains the inference for oneself and for others, whose natures are conceptual cognition and words [respectively], which are not inconsistent with the [direct perception by the Lord]."<sup>39</sup>

### 2.2.3. The origin of Jayanta's interpretation

Thus, Jayanta's new interpretation of the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* has a theoretical background; it is not a casual idea. Now, can we ascribe this new interpretation by Jayanta entirely to his originality? In my opinion, the second argument, which later scholars regard as Jayanta's own idea, and for that matter the first argument as well, are not necessarily original to Jayanta. It is because the fundamental idea of his arguments can be traced back to the statements of his great predecessor, Prajñākaragupta.<sup>40</sup>

As for the first argument, which asserts the superiority of the Buddha as valid cognition, Jayanta probably derives his idea from Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of omniscience. Prajñākaragupta says as follows:

"For the very reason, the misunderstanding is removed only by the treatise that the omniscient being revealed, not by other [treatises]. In view of this, only the word of the omniscient being is valid cognition. Therefore, ultimately only the cognition by the omniscient being is valid cognition, [but the cognition] by others is not. [It is] the ultimate truth. <Other [cognition such as the direct perception] is [ultimately] not valid, because it is impossible [for the cognition] to pervade its object. [And] the non-pervading cognition cannot grasp the connection with the effect, etc.> For the causality accompanied by [the cognition] pervading space and time, [namely] the past, the future and the present, is by no means the object of the cognition by the non-omniscient being, because the direct perception grasps only present and near space, and because the inference has no place for [the object of the direct perception]. [Now] how can the omniscience of the author of treatises be recognized? We will explain it later."<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *gzhan yang bcom ldan 'das kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i ngo bo gzhan gyi 'khrul pa sel ba 'dir bsgrub par bya ste / bag chags dang bcas pa'i dri ma thams cad rab tu spangs pa'i phyir yon tan phun sum tshogs pa brnyes pas phul du byung ba dngos po ma lus pa gnyis su med par thugs su chud pa'i phyir mngon sum pa'i bdag nyid can ni don dam par ro // kun rdzob tu yang de dang rjes su mthun pa nyid kyi tshad ma yin par shes pa'i don du de la 'khrul ba med pa'i nam par rtog pa dang tshig gi ngo bo rang gi don dang gzhan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i dbye bas bstan te / J(De) 4a7ff.*

<sup>40</sup> Prof. Nagasaki has already assumed in his article that Jina (=Jayanta) followed Prajñākaragupta's criticism of the philosophical school (cf. Nagasaki 1969: 28).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ata eva śāstreṇaiva sarvajñoktena moho nivartate, nānyenety anena prakāreṇa sarvajñavacanam eva pramāṇam iti paramārthataḥ sarvajñajñānam eva pramāṇam, nāparam iti paramārthataḥ.*

*anyasya na pramāṇatvaṃ prameyāvyāptisaṃbhavāt / avyāpinā na kāryādisaṃbandhasya parigrahaḥ (222)*  
*kāryakāraṇabhāvo hy atītānāgatavartamānakāladeśavyāpīsāhacaryarūpo na khalv asarvajñajñānasya viśayaḥ, vartamānasaṃpnnihitadeśamātragrahaṇāt pratyakṣasyānumānasya cānavatārāt. sarvajñatvaṃ katham jñāyate śāstrakārasya cet, tad uttaratra vakṣyāmaḥ. PVA 29,26-31.*

Here, Prajñākaragupta explains the fundamentality of omniscience in his epistemological system. According to him, ultimately only omniscience, which can pervade the whole time and space, can recognize causality fully. And the inference, whose basis is the invariable concomitance, depends on the causality. Therefore, the inference ultimately must presuppose the omniscient being, the Buddha as valid cognition.<sup>42</sup> I think, Jayanta presents his first argument on the basis of this idea of Prajñākaragupta.<sup>43</sup>

Concerning Jayanta's second argument, which asserts that the common definition must precede an explanation of the direct perception and the inference, we can also find the origin of this argument in Prajñākaragupta's statement. At the beginning of the *Pratyakṣa*-chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* he says as follows:

"After [Dharmakīrti] explained the common definition in this way [in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter], he has talked about particular definitions, [following Dignāga's statement:] 'the direct perception and the inference are valid cognition'.<sup>44</sup> <sup>45</sup>

This statement probably leads to Jayanta's second argument. Jayanta really suggests that he derives his second argument from Prajñākaragupta's statement. Jayanta says in the *Pratyakṣa*-chapter of his commentary as follows:

"The commentator and the listener<sup>46</sup> [explained as follows:] '[Dharmakīrti] explains the inference in the first chapter, which becomes a means of the explanation of the treatise by the teacher [Dignāga]. [In] the second chapter [he] establishes valid cognition by [the explanation of] the first half of the verse: 'one who became valid cognition' [etc.]. [In] the third [chapter] [he] explains the direct perception.' [But Prajñākaragupta] considers [it] as absurd, because [this] does not explain the [true] meaning [of the order of the chapters]. Therefore, he says: 'the common definition in this way'.<sup>47</sup>

Namely, according to Jayanta, in the statement: 'after [Dharmakīrti] explained the common definition in this way', Prajñākaragupta asserts that the philological school's interpretation of the order of the chapters is wrong and the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

In addition to these points, it is also noteworthy that Jayanta refers in his second argument to Prajñākaragupta's statement in the fourth chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, which sug-

<sup>42</sup> According to Prof. Nagin J. Shah, the author of the *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* regards Prajñākaragupta as the Buddhist representative who asserted that the yogic perception is the means of cognising the invariable concomitance. See Shah, S. Nagin (1967), *Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy - a Study* -, Ahmedabad, 263.

<sup>43</sup> Strictly speaking, the concept of the omniscient being which Prajñākaragupta presents here might correspond to the *sarvasarvajña*, whereas Jayanta seems to describe the Buddha as the *pradhānārthajña* in his statement (cf. *supra* note 35).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag // tshad ma 'o* PS 1b3.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *evaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam abhidhāya viśeṣalakṣaṇam āha: pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe*. PVA 169,3.

<sup>46</sup> These expressions are not clear for me. I tentatively assume that 'the commentator ('*chad pa po*') and 'the listener ('*nyan pa po*') mean Śākyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi respectively.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *slob dpon gyi gzhung 'chad pa'i thabs su gyur pa'i le'u dang pos ni rjes su dpag pa 'chad / le'u gnyis pa tshad ma yang dag ces bya ba'i tshig su bcad pa phyed kyis ni tshad ma grub pa // gsum pa ni mngon sum 'chad pa yin no zhes 'chad pa po dang nyan pa po sbyor par byed pa ma yin te / don mngon par ma brjod pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'i dgongs pas / de ltar spyi'i mtshan nyid ces bya ba smos so // J(Ne) 1b2ff.*

gests that the *Svārthānumāna* should be located immediately before the *Parārthānumāna*-chapter.<sup>48</sup>

As shown above, Jayanta's new interpretation depends heavily on Prajñākaragupta's statements. We can say that Jayanta's interpretation that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter is not necessarily original to him, but derives from Prajñākaragupta's idea. We recognize that Prajñākaragupta plays an important role in Jayanta's new interpretation. But Prajñākaragupta's suggestions are fragmentary at the most. It is Jayanta who collects these suggestions and constructs a concrete interpretation regarding the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. In this sense, the main advocate of the assertion that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter is none other than Jayanta.

### 2.3. Yamāri and Ravigupta's view

Jayanta's new interpretation was criticized at great length by Yamāri, the second commentator of Prajñākaragupta.<sup>49</sup> An interesting question is this: Why does Yamāri, who seems to be an orthodox successor of Prajñākaragupta's thought, raise an objection to Jayanta's new interpretation, which derives from Prajñākaragupta's new interpretation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy? A detailed investigation of this question must be left for future research, because Yamāri's criticism of Jayanta's view is very comprehensive and elaborate. We can say at least that Yamāri, and Ravigupta as well, have a different opinion from scholars of the philological school with respect to the reason why the *Svārthānumāna* is the first chapter, although they generally follow the philological school's view on the order of the chapters. For example, Yamāri says:

"As for the four noble truths, which will be explained [later], one cannot easily understand [them] without the explanation of the inference. Therefore, it is right to explain the inference at first [in the *Pramāṇavārttika*]."<sup>50</sup>

Ravigupta states similarly:

"In this way, (Dharmakīrti) explains the Maṅgala-verse [of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*] clearly in the second chapter [of the *Pramāṇavārttika*], because, in order to strive for the four noble truths, these [four noble truths] should be explained, after the inference was established [at the *Svārthānumāna*]."<sup>51</sup>

Thus, in both cases, the reason why the *Svārthānumāna*-chapter is located at the top is that the

<sup>48</sup> See *supra* note 25; 36.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Y(Phe) 179a6-191a7. For example, Yamāri refers to the name 'Jayanta' in the following: "Therefore, the teacher Devendrabuddhi did not misunderstand. The rejection by Jayanta and his epigones is not necessary at all. Therefore, it is best to [consider the traditional order] as [the order] by the teacher [Dharmakīrti himself]." (cf. *de'i phyir slob dpon lHa dbang blo 'khrul pa ma yin no // Dza yā nta dang des yongs su zin pa'i bshad pa byed pa dag lan dgos pa yang med do // des na slob dpon gyi yin pa mchog go //* Y(Phe) 181a6f.); "It is not possible to say that [Prajñākaragupta], intending to explain the very *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapters at the top of the whole [work], talks about the very purpose [of the treatise here], because Jayanta's opinion was refuted comprehensively." (cf. *tshad ma grub pa'i le'u nyid thams cad kyi dang por bstan pa'i bsam pas gtso bo'i don nyid du brjod pa yin no zhes kyang smra bar mi nus te // Dza yā nta'i 'dod pa rgya cher sun phyung pa'i phyir ro //* Y(Phe) 197b7).

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *'chad par 'gyur ba 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi po nams su rjes su dpag pa bstan pa ma gtogs* (corrected: *rtogs*) *par bde blag du mi rtogs pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa dang por bshad pa'i rigs so //* Y(Phe) 191a1f.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *de ltar 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi la 'jug pa yin pa'i phyir rjes su dpag pa nam par bzhas nas de nyid bstan par bya ba'i phyir le'u gnyis pas phyag 'tshal ba'i tshigs su bcad pa gsal bar bshad par mdzad do //* R 293b2f.

knowledge of the inference is indispensable to understanding the four noble truths.<sup>52</sup> In the case of the philological school, the *Svārthānumāna* must be located at the top basically because the inference is the ground for explaining the whole of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Śākyabuddhi, to be sure, also asserted that the *Svārthānumāna* is at the top because the inference is the ground for explaining 'the Buddha's word' such as the four noble truths. For him, however, the inference as valid cognition is more fundamental than the Buddha's word as valid cognition. In the case of Yamāri and Ravigupta, the situation of these two means of valid cognition seems to be reversed. For these two thinkers, the inference must be explained in advance in order to understand the four noble truths as the Buddha's word, and the Buddha as valid cognition is, of course, more fundamental than the inference as valid cognition. In this point, we probably could recognize a difference between Śākyabuddhi's view and Yamāri's/Ravigupta's view.<sup>53</sup>

### 3. Conclusion

In the foregoing sections, we have sketched out the development of the interpretation of the order of the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* among the Indian Dharmakīrti-commentators. We have examined the philological school's interpretation, Jayanta's criticism of the philological school's interpretation, and Jayanta's new interpretation and its origin. Finally, I will summarize this paper, and make an additional remark:

It is Jayanta, who first explicitly asserted that the *Pramāṇasiddhi* should be the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. He criticizes Śākyabuddhi's interpretation and presents his new interpretation. Jayanta's interpretation, however, depends heavily on Prajñākaragupta's idea. In this sense, Jayanta's interpretation can be regarded as a further extension of Prajñākaragupta's new interpretation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

In view of Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of the Buddha as valid cognition, which is an important factor of Jayanta's new interpretation, the school Prajñākaragupta founded is appropriately referred to as 'the religious school'. In view of Yamāri's and Ravigupta's interpretation, which seemingly follows the philological school's opinion, we can ascertain that their interpretation is essentially different from the philological school's interpretation and is suitable to be designated as 'religious'. Thus, it is quite appropriate, following Prof. Stcherbatsky, to designate the school, which Prajñākaragupta founded, and to which Ravigupta, Jayanta and Yamāri belong, as 'the religious school', in contrast with the school to which Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi belong.

<sup>52</sup> According to Prof. Kuijp, Go ram pa thinks that Yamāri's and Ravigupta's opinions are found in their interpretation on Dharmakīrti's statement '*arthānarthavivecanasya*' (cf. Kuijp 1979). But I could not find the corresponding statements in their commentaries. Nevertheless, it is sure that their opinions correspond to one of the six interpretations concerning '*arthānārtha*', which Karṇakagomin enumerates (cf. PVSVT 7,23-27). I would like to thank Prof. Shōryū Katsura, who kindly informed me of this passage of the PVSVT.

<sup>53</sup> I think it is possible to designate Yamāri's and Ravigupta's view as 'religico-metaphysical', as Prof. Kuijp did. Cf. Kuijp 1979: 17f.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- J *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* (Jayanta): D 4222, Vol.7-8, Tshad ma, De 1b1-365a7; Ne 1b1-312a7.
- PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga): D 4203, Vol.1, Tshad ma, Ce 1b1-13a1.
- PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga): D 4203, Vol.1, Tshad ma, Ce 14b1-85b4.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Ed. Y. Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72), 1-206. (The chapter I, II, III, IV of our order correspond to the chapters III, I, II, IV in Miyasaka's edition).
- PVSV *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary*. Ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.
- PVSVṬ *Pramāṇavārttika(śva)vṛttīkā* (Karaṇakagomin): *Ācārya Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānu-mānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñāvṛtṭyā Karaṇakagomiviracitayā Taṭṭīkayā ca sahitaṁ*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad 1943.
- PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākara-gupta): *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam (Vārttikālaṅkāraḥ) Prajñākara-guptena viracitaṁ*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.
- PVin I *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Kapitel I (Dharmakīrti): Tilmann Vetter: *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung. Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung*. Wien 1964.
- PVinṬ *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara): D 4229, Vol.15, Tshad ma, Dse 1b1-289a7.
- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi): D 4217, Vol.2, Tshad ma, Che 1b1-326b4.
- PVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi): D 4220, Vol.3-4, Tshad ma, Je 1b1-328a7; Ñe 1b1-282a7.
- PVṬŚāṅ *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śāṅkarānanda): D 4223, Vol.9, Tshad ma, Pe 1b1-293a7.
- PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam Ācārya-Manorathanandikṛtāyā vṛtṭyā saṅvalitaṁ*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1938-1940.
- Y *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhi* (Yamāri): D 4226, Vol.10-13, Tshad ma, Phe 174b1-287a7; Be 1b1-261a7; Me 1b1-328a7; Tse 1b1-251a7.
- R *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Ravigupta): D 4224, Vol.9, Tshad ma, Pe 293b1-398a7.

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
Volume II

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