

DHARMAKĪRTI ON *ASĀDHĀRAṆĀNAIKĀNTIKA**

by

Motoi Ono, Vienna

0. Introduction

It is not entirely clear when Indian or Buddhist logicians began to use the term ‘the specific indeterminate’ (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) to indicate a category of fallacious logical reasons (*hetvābhāsa*). The Buddhist logician Dignāga (ca. 480–540) may have been the first to use this term.¹ But even before Dignāga we can find traces of attempts to categorize such a fallacious logical reason, which is a specific property of the subject of a thesis (*pakṣa*), and whose examples can be found neither in the similar instance (*sapakṣa*) nor in the dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*).²

This strange fallacious logical reason apparently concerns the traditional inductive character of the Indian or Buddhist logic. In Indian logic, when one tries to prove something, one must indicate concrete examples except the subject of a thesis, in terms of which he confirms the inevitable connection between the logical reason (*hetu*) and what is to be proved (*sādhya*). That Dignāga recognizes the specific indeterminate as a category of fallacious logical reasons means that Dignāga’s logic still retains the traditional inductive character of Indian logic, although he strives to make a consistent system of formal logic.

However, this inductive character of traditional Indian logic is drastically transformed by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). He inherited Dignāga’s thought, but modified his inductive logic forwards a type of deductive system. And in accordance with this transformation of the system of logic, the interpretation of the specific indeterminate must be necessarily changed.³ In what follows, I would like to examine how Dharmakīrti re-interprets the concept of specific indetermi-

* I am very grateful to Prof. Nobuhiro Kaga and Ms. Sophie Kidd who kindly corrected my English.

¹ In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga criticizes Vasubandhu for not using the term ‘specific’ in order to classify indeterminate fallacious logical reasons in his *Vādaśāstrī* (cf. PS 8a7f.: *rTsod pa bsgrub pa nas ni ma grub dbye ba brjod ma yin // khrul pa la yang brjod ma yin // de ni thun mong min pa’ang yin // gal ba mi khrul pa can yang //*; H. Kitagawa (1965), *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū*, Kyoto: 399). Therefore, Vasubandhu probably did not use the term in his theory of fallacious logical reasons and Dignāga perhaps introduced this term to the theory of fallacious logical reasons. Prof. Ishitobi assumes that Dignāga probably applied the term ‘*asādhāraṇa*’, which originally meant a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as an object of an perception (cf. PS I 4a), to the theory of fallacious logical reasons (cf. M. Ishitobi (1981), “Indo ronrigaku ni okeru *hetvābhāsa*” [On *hetvābhāsa* in Indian Logic], *Bukkyōgaku* 12, 63–84: 73f.).

² For example, the term ‘the mark which is recognized as separated from (all) other things’ (*thams cad mi mthun par dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid*; 一切異類可得相) in the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra* (cf. Peking No. 774, N 57a3; T vol. 16, 710a4), as a later commentator interpreted it, might have been a similar concept to Dignāga’s ‘specific indeterminate’ (cf. Y. Kajiyama (1984), “Bukkyō chishikiron no keisei” [The Origins of Buddhist Epistemology], *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō*, vol. 9, 2–101: 57ff.).

³ It is well known that Ratnākaraśānti (ca 11c.) regards the specific indeterminate as a valid logical reason from

nate. However, it is not correct to regard this re-interpretation of the specific indeterminate by Dharmakīrti as a mere result of the development of his new theory of logic. We should rather say that Dharmakīrti has established his new deductive logic in confrontation with this difficult problem of the specific indeterminate.

In the following sections, I will first summarize Dignāga's definition of the specific indeterminate. Then I will investigate Dharmakīrti's interpretation of this concept. Finally, I will present the hypothesis that this confrontation with the specific indeterminate is crucial for the development of Dharmakīrti's logic.

1. Dignāga on *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*

Prior to investigating Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the specific indeterminate, we must examine how Dignāga originally defines this logical reason.

1.1. The position of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* in the *hetucakra*

As is well known, the concept of specific indeterminate appears in Dignāga's *hetucakra*, i.e., 'Wheel of reasons'. The *hetucakra* is an invention of Dignāga's which is described in his early work, the *Hetucakraḍamaru*.⁴ The *hetucakra* is a list classifying nine sorts of logical reasons according to whether they wholly exist, partially exist or do not exist, both in the similar instance and the dissimilar instance. In terms of this list, Dignāga divides the logical reasons which satisfy the *pakṣadharmatva*, i.e., the first condition of the three forms (*trairūpya*), into four groups, that is to say, a valid group and three fallacious groups, namely, the contradictory (*viruddha*), the general indeterminate (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) and the specific indeterminate (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*). The specific indeterminate is the fifth type in the *hetucakra* and is located at the center of the Wheel. This concept means the fallacious logical reason which exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance. Dignāga shows an example of the logical reason in the following syllogism:

[Thesis] Sound (*śabda*) is eternal (*nitya*).

[Reason] Because (it is) audible (*śrāvaṇatvāt*).⁵

'Audibility' (*śrāvaṇatva*) is specific to the subject of a thesis, namely 'sound'. And no other thing than the subject of a thesis has 'audibility'. Therefore, the logical reason, 'audibility', exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance.

Thus, Dignāga considers that there is a logical reason which is specific to the subject of a

an Antaryvāptivādin's point of view (cf. AVS 113,4ff.; note 44). The change of the evaluation of this logical reason corresponds to the historical development of *antarvyāptivāda* in Buddhist logic.

⁴ Cf. E. Frauwallner (1959), "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung," WZKSO 3, 83–164: 90, 162f.

⁵ Cf. PSV(K) 131b1ff.: *phyogs kyi chos dgu po 'di dag go rims ci lta ba bzhin du dpe dang sbyar bar bya ste / gzhal bya yin pa'i phyir rtag go / byas pa'i phyir mi rtag go / mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las byung ba'o // byas pa'i phyir rtag go / mnyan bya yin pa'i phyir rtag go / rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir rtag go / mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin no // rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir mi rtag go / reg par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba de rnams bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcaḍ pa ni / gzhal bya byas dang mi rtag dang / byas dang mnyan rung rtsol las byung // mi rtag rtsol byung reg bya min // rtag sogs rnams la de dgu'o // (PS III 21) de ltar phyé bas gan tshigs dang / 'gal ba dang / ma nges pa rnams brjod par bya ste /; Kitagawa [1965: 187ff.]*

thesis and therefore exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance, designates this logical reason as the specific indeterminate and excludes it from valid logical reasons. This concept as defined by Dignāga shows that Buddhist logic obviously retains its inductive character until the age of Dignāga.⁶

1.2. *Śrāvaṇatva* from the point of view of the *trairūpya*

How is this logical reason regarded from the point of view of the *trairūpya*? Dignāga refers to this issue in the Svārthānumāna chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. There he classifies logical reasons according to whether they satisfy or do not satisfy each condition of the three forms (*trairūpya*), and enumerates six cases except the two cases in which all three conditions are satisfied or unsatisfied. Note that Dignāga gives as an example of the fallacious logical reason which satisfies the first condition (*pakṣadharmatva*) and the third condition (*asapakṣe 'sattvam*) but not the second condition (*sapakṣe sattvam*), the following syllogism:

[Thesis] Sound (*śabda*) is non-eternal (*anitya*).⁷
 [Reason] Because (it is) audible (*śrāvaṇatvāt*).

Namely, Dignāga regards 'audibility', which is indicated as an example of the specific indeterminate in the *hetucakra*, as the logical reason which satisfies the third condition of the three forms.⁸

That Dignāga regards 'audibility' as satisfying the third condition of the three forms is related to his view of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). Namely, he claims that *vyatireka* is confirmed by 'mere non-perception' (*adarśanamātra*).⁹ According to this idea, a logical reason

⁶ Logic possessing this inductive character is called the theory of 'the external concomitance' (*bahirvyāpti*). However, usage of this term is not found in the Buddhist literature until Arcaṭa's *Hetubinduṭīkā*. Cf. HBT 63,23; 27; see also T. Funayama (1994), "8-seiki Nālandā shushshin chūshakuka oboegaki—Bukkyō chishikiron no keifu—" [Notes on Commentators from the 8th Century Nālandā in the Buddhist *Pramāṇa*-Tradition], *The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association* 60, 49–60: 60.

⁷ It is noteworthy that the thesis of this syllogism 'sound is non-eternal' is contradictory to the thesis of the syllogism 'sound is eternal' which is indicated as an example of the specific indeterminate. In terms of this exchange of the *sādhya*dharmas, the similar and dissimilar instances are exchanged. However, both syllogisms are similar in that their logical reasons are 'audibility' which is specific to the sound, the subject of a thesis.

⁸ Cf. PSV(K)111b3ff.: *tshul ni re re'am gnyis gnyis kyi // rtags ni don gyi don byed min //* (PS II 6cd) *de la tshul re re'i ni gang rjes su dpag pa kho na la yod kyi / de dang mtshungs pa la med la / de med pa la med pa ma yin pa dang / de dang mtshungs pa la yod kyi / rjes su dpag par byas la med la / de med pa la med pa'ang ma yin pa dang / de med pa la med kyi / rjes su dpag par bya ba la med la de dang mtshungs par bya ba la'ang med pa'o // tshul gnyis gnyis ni / dper na rjes su dpag par bya ba la yod la / de la mthun pa la yod la / de med pa la med pa ma yin pa dang / rjes su dpag par bya ba la yod la / de med pa la med cing / de dang mtshungs pa la med pa dang / de dang mthun pa la yod la / de med pa la med cing / rjes su dpag par bya ba la med pa ste / gtan tshigs ltar snang ba drug po 'di shugs kyis dgag par rigs par bya'o // de 'di lta ste / byas phyir sgra ni rtag pa dang / lus can phyir dang gzhan min phyir // lus min phyir dang mnyan bya las // mi rtag mig gi gzung bya'i phyir //* (PS II 7); Kitagawa [1965: 102f.]

⁹ The view in which *vyatireka* is confirmed by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) was hitherto ascribed to Īśvarasena, a teacher of Dharmakīrti (cf. E. Steinkellner (1966), "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund," *WZKS* 10, 73–85; do. (1991), "The Logic of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*," in *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, Wien, 311–324). Prof. Katsura, however, has recently claimed that this view can be traced back to Dignāga's semantic theory (cf. S. Katsura (1992), "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra*

'audibility' satisfies the third condition of the three forms only because it is specific to the subject of a thesis and therefore cannot be found in the dissimilar instance.

1.3. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* and the problem of the contraposition between *sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta* and *vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*

Dignāga also refers to the specific indeterminate in relation to the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) in the *Dr̥ṣṭāntadr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa* chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. There opponents claim that only a statement of the dissimilar example is sufficient because the content of the similar example (*sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*) is indicated by the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*). Dignāga counters this argument by saying that the specific indeterminate would be a valid logical reason if only a statement of the dissimilar example is sufficient.¹⁰ That is to say, because of the specific indeterminate Dignāga could not explicitly claim that only a statement of the dissimilar example is sufficient, although he mentions the contraposition between the similar and the dissimilar examples in another place.¹¹

Thus, Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate is deeply concerned with the problem of the contraposition between the similar and the dissimilar examples (or the one between the second and the third conditions of the three forms, in Dharmakīrti's term, the one between *anvaya* and *vyatireka*). Dignāga's above-mentioned explanation apparently implies that the specific indeterminate could be a valid logical reason if one admits the contraposition between the similar and the dissimilar examples. Thus, at a later period, when Dharmakīrti consistently claims the contraposition between *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, he had to re-interpret the meaning of the specific indeterminate as a fallacious logical reason.

2. Dharmakīrti's approach to *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*

For Dharmakīrti, the theory of fallacious logical reasons is primarily the topic of a section of the *Parārthānumāna* chapter. However, the issue of the specific indeterminate is so significant for the basic theory of his system of logic that he dealt with this issue in his earliest work, the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, in which he established his own theory of the logical nexus, the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*).

and *anupalabdhi*," *Asiatische Studien* 46/1, 222–231). Dignāga's position that the specific indeterminate logical reason satisfies the third condition of the three forms is easy to understand if we accept Katsura's claim. As we shall see later (cf. section 2.2.2.), Dharmakīrti says: 'Depending on mere non-perception, (Dignāga) has explained that (the specific logical reason) has only the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*)'. That is, Dharmakīrti himself probably ascribes the view in which *vyatireka* is confirmed by mere non-perception to Dignāga.

¹⁰ Cf. PSV(K) 149a6: 'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa nyid nye bar bstan na / mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'di la nyes pa ci zhig yod ce na / dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba yin te / mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gtan tshigs su 'gyur ro //; Kitagawa [1965: 252].

¹¹ Cf. *Nyāyamukha*, T vol. 32, 3a3: 或由義準一能顯二; PVSV 18,17: *arthāpattiyā vānyatāreṇobhayapradarśanāt*; S. Katsura (1981), "Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū (3)" [A Study on *Nyāyamukha* (3)], *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 41, 61–82: 71ff.

2.1. Some relevant arguments in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*

2.1.1. Criticism of Dignāga's concept of *śrāvaṇatva*

As shown above, Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate concerns his characteristic concept of *vyatireka*. Dharmakīrti, who tries to deny Dignāga's concept of *vyatireka* in order to establish his own theory of the logical nexus, cannot accept Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate. Thus, we can find Dharmakīrti's criticism of Dignāga's concept of 'audibility' in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Dharmakīrti says:

"Further, 'on the ground of (mere) non-perception, the specific (*viśeṣa*) (indeterminate) would be a (valid) logical reason which is excluded (from the dissimilar instance) (PV I 19ab)'. Audibility also would be a (valid) logical reason which is excluded from this (dissimilar instance) because (audibility) is excluded on the ground of (mere) non-perception both from eternal things and from non-eternal things. Namely, the exclusion is none other than the exclusion from this (dissimilar instance). Nevertheless, (in reality) there is no exclusion, because for any (area) it is not determined whether (audibility) is excluded from (it)."¹²

Here, Dharmakīrti states that Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate is inconsistent with Dharmakīrti's system of logic. Dignāga regards 'audibility' as a logical reason which is found neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance, and therefore satisfies the third condition of the three forms. But that concept is possible, inasmuch as Dignāga asserted that the *vyatireka* is confirmed by mere non-perception. According to Dharmakīrti, who asserts that only the non-perception of a perceptible object (*drśyānupalabdhi*) can determine non-existence, it is not possible to say that 'audibility' satisfies the third condition of the three forms.

2.1.2. Criticism of Naiyāyika's *kevalavyatirekīhetu*

From almost the same point of view, Dharmakīrti refutes Uddyotakara's proof of the existence of a soul (*ātman*) which depends on 'the pure negative logical reason' (*kevalavyatirekīhetu*).¹³ Dharmakīrti says:

"Further, 'the (logical reason) which has (only) the negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*) would be a valid logical reason (PV I 18c)' (The opponent presents the following syllogism:) 'This living body (*jīvaccharīra*) is not not endowed with a soul because (if it is not endowed with a soul) it would not have breathing and the like (*prāṇādi*)'. (He asserts that) one can recognize (the existence of) a soul in terms of excluding this (breathing and the like from the dissimilar instance like a pot), because breathing and the like are not found, whether the pot which is not endowed with a soul is found or not found. (However) so far as one cannot prove the non-existence in terms of non-perception of an imperceptible (soul), one cannot prove that the pot and the like are not endowed with a soul. Therefore, breathing and the like are not excluded (from the dissimilar instance)."¹⁴

¹² PVSV 13,19: *kiṃ ca, viśeṣasya vyavacchedahetutā syād adarśanāt* / (PV I 19ab) *śrāvaṇatvasyāpi nityānityayor adarśanād vyāvṛttir iti tadvyavacchedahetutā syāt. na hi tadvyāvṛtter anyad vyavacchedanam. avyavacchedas tu kutaścīd vyāvṛtter evāniścayāt.*

¹³ Cf. NV 291,2, etc.; K. Kanō (1987), "Shusaishin no sonzai ronshō to *kevalavyatirekīhetu*" [The Proof of the Existence of God and *kevalavyatirekīhetu*], *Indo Shisōshi Kenkyū* 5, 1–27.

¹⁴ PVSV 12,26ff.: *kiṃ ca, vyatireky api hetuḥ syāt* / (PV I 18c) *nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādīmattvaprasaṅgād iti. nirātmakeṣu ghaṭādiṣu dr̥ṣṭād̥r̥ṣṭeṣu prāṇādyadarśanāt tannivṛttyātmagatiḥ syāt.*

Here Uddyotakara asserts that his proof of the existence of a soul is valid because the logical reason 'breathing and the like' has the negative concomitance. Dharmakīrti points out that the *vyatireka* is not confirmed because non-existence of the logical reason in the dissimilar instance is not necessarily confirmed, and concludes that the pure negative logical reason does not satisfy the conditions of a valid logical reason.¹⁵

2.2. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* in Dharmakīrti's theory of *hetvābhāsa*

Thus, Dharmakīrti acknowledged early on that Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate is problematic, and must have felt it necessary to re-define this fallacious logical reason in order to reconcile it with his own system of logic. Now, Dharmakīrti deals intensively with the investigation of the specific indeterminate in the context of the description of the theory of fallacious logical reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) in the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. In fact, Dharmakīrti describes his theory of fallacious logical reasons only partially in the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and prolongs its completion until the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.¹⁶ But he closely investigates the specific indeterminate in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Thus, in what follows, I will examine Dharmakīrti's theory of specific indeterminate, focusing on the statements in the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*.¹⁷ First I will briefly look at the context of the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, in which the specific indeterminate is discussed.

2.2.1. The context of the description of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* in the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*

In 285 verses of the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti deals with two main topics, namely, the thesis (*pakṣa*) and the logical reason (*hetu*). The description concerning the logical reason begins with verse 189. After having considered the first condition of the logical reason (*pakṣadharmatva*) in verses 189–194, Dharmakīrti sets a program verse (195) in order to summarize his classification of logical reasons. There, he interprets Dignāga's *hetucakra* from his own point of view as follows:

“(In the *hetucakra*,) two (logical reasons) (are stated) in order to establish that the essential property (*svabhāva*) and the effect (*kārya*) (are valid logical reasons, and) two contradictory logical reasons (are stated in order to indicate that they are fallacious). (Further), because of disagreement (with opponents), the specific (*bheda*) and the general (*sāmānya*) (are stated in order to indicate that they are fallacious), (and) the rest establish that (the valid reason is confirmed by) the exclusion (from the dissimilar instance).” (PV IV 195)¹⁸

adr̥śyānupalambhād abhāvāsiddhau ghaṭādīnām nairātmyāsiddheḥ prāṇāder anivṛttil.

¹⁵ Dharmakīrti also deals with the criticism of Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of a soul in the later part of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Cf. PVSV 154,21ff.; F. Ōmae (1991), “Dharmakīrti no seitenkan—Pramāṇavārttika daiiishō oyobi jichū no wayaku (8)” [Dharmakīrti on Scripture—Japanese translation of the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and its *Svavṛtti* (8)], *Nishinihon Shūkyōgaku Zasshi* 13, 79–94: 86f.

¹⁶ As for a general view of Dharmakīrti's theory of fallacious logical reasons, cf. M. Ono (1987), “Dharmakīrti no gijironshōin setsu” [Dharmakīrti's Theory of *hetvābhāsa*], *Bukkyōgaku* 21, (1)–(21). This article deals with Dharmakīrti's systematic description of the *hetvābhāsa* in the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.

¹⁷ I will refer to the parallels in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in the notes.

¹⁸ PV IV 195: *svabhāvakāryāsiddhyarthaṃ dvau dvau hetuviparyayau / vivādād bhedasāmānye śeṣo*

Thus, in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti attempts to establish his classification of logical reasons on the ground of Dignāga's *hetucakra*. First, in the verses 196–204, he strives to relate the two valid logical reasons in the *hetucakra* to his classification of valid logical reasons, i.e. the essential property and the effect.¹⁹ Next, he goes on to explain 'the specific', skipping the contradictory logical reasons which come next in the program verse.

The explanation of the specific indeterminate begins with the verse 205, and continues to (at least) verse 259.²⁰ In this paragraph, Dharmakīrti closely examines the concept of specific indeterminate. Here, it is a little curious that Dharmakīrti first considers Naiyāyika's pure negative logical reason, i.e. 'breathing and the like', not the 'audibility' which Dignāga indicated as an example of the specific indeterminate, although he does mention it afterwards.²¹ At any rate, as we saw above, Dharmakīrti has certainly realized in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* that the pure negative logical reason and 'audibility' have the same construction. Thus, he identifies the pure negative logical reason with the specific indeterminate in this context, and explains why the pure negative logical reason, that is to say, the specific indeterminate, cannot be acknowledged as a valid logical reason. The reason why the purely negative logical reason is fallacious, is entirely different from the reason which Dignāga demonstrates concerning 'audibility'. Namely, the meaning of the specific indeterminate is here drastically changed by Dharmakīrti.

vyāvṛttisādhanah //; PVin III 203b3.

¹⁹ Here Dharmakīrti attempts to justify his new classification of valid logical reasons by indicating that the two valid logical reasons in the *hetucakra* are different in their pervasion and this difference is also found between his two types of logical reasons. Cf. M. Ono (1985), "Dharmakīrti no kukuin kaishaku" [Dharmakīrti's Interpretation of the *hetucakra*], *Hikaku Shisō no Michi* 4, 81–85.

²⁰ As for the following part of the Parārthānumāna chapter, verses 260–279 deal with the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) and the verses 280–285 are concerned with the proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*). According to commentators, Dharmakīrti explains the non-perception here because it is not mentioned in verse 195, although it is a type of valid logical reason (for example, PVP 321b1f.; PVV ad PV IV 260). In my opinion, however, the description of the non-perception and the proof of momentariness is involved with the issue of the specific indeterminate logical reason (cf. note 33; I will mention verses 280–285 below). I suppose that the topic with which Dharmakīrti deals in the last stage of his *Pramāṇavārttika* was the specific indeterminate logical reason. It is certain that Dharmakīrti did not complete the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, or the whole *Pramāṇavārttika*, as Prof. Frauwallner has already elucidated (cf. E. Frauwallner (1954), "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's," in *Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig, 142–154). However, Prof. Frauwallner did not further pursue the reason why Dharmakīrti did not complete this work. We need to consider it. A clue is, in my opinion, the last problematic topic for Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, i.e., the specific indeterminate logical reason.

²¹ If we compare Dharmakīrti's examples of *hetucakra* in the PVin III with that of Dignāga (cf. note 5), we can easily recognize that only the example of the specific indeterminate is exchanged from 'audibility' to 'breathing and the like' by Dharmakīrti (cf. PVin III 203a3: *phyogs kyi chos dgu bstan pa de dag ni gzhal bya yin pa'i phyir rtag go // byas pa'i phyir mi rtag go // mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las byung ba'o // byas pa'i phyir rtag go / gson pa'i lus ni bdag dang bcas pa yin te / srog la sogs pa dang ldan pa'i phyir ro // rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir rtag go / mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byung ba'o // mi rtag ste rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir ro // rtag ste lus can ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba lta bu'o //*). Dharmakīrti probably considers in the PVin that 'audibility' is not appropriate as a typical example of the specific indeterminate. I will answer the question of why Dharmakīrti had to change the example of the specific indeterminate below.

2.2.2. Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*

Let us now examine how Dharmakīrti re-interprets the meaning of the specific indeterminate in the concrete statements in the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. At the beginning of the long discussion, Dharmakīrti refutes Uddyotakara's proof of the existence of a soul, i.e., 'The living body is endowed with a soul. Because it has breathing and the like':

"The determination (*aikāntikatva*) of the exclusion (from the dissimilar instance) means the inevitable nexus (*avinābhāva*). But this (determination) does not exist in (breathing and the like) which are not necessarily connected (with a soul). On the ground of this very (determination), the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) is established. Namely, if the identity or the causality is established, (a logical reason) has the negative concomitance. Therefore, neither the negative concomitance nor the positive concomitance are established with respect to the specific (*viśeṣa*) (indeterminate logical reason, i.e., breathing and the like)." (PV IV 205–206)²²

According to Dharmakīrti, a logical reason has the inevitable nexus with what is to be proved (*sādhya*), inasmuch as it has the negative concomitance. However, the inevitable nexus does not exist between a soul and 'breathing and the like' because they are not necessarily connected on the ground of either the identity (*tādātmya*) or the causality (*tadutpatti*). Therefore, logical reasons such as 'breathing and the like' in a proof of the existence of a soul are fallacious, because the inevitable nexus does not exist there, not because they have only the negative concomitance and lack the positive concomitance, as Dignāga explained concerning the specific indeterminate. In Dharmakīrti's system of logic, whatever has the negative concomitance also has the positive concomitance. So, a logical reason which satisfies *pakṣadharmatva* is valid, inasmuch as it has the negative concomitance. For Dharmakīrti, there is no logical reason which has only the negative concomitance. The reason why so-called 'pure negative' logical reason is fallacious is, paradoxical as it may be, that it does not have the negative concomitance in Dharmakīrti's sense.

Then Dharmakīrti explains the reason why Dignāga defines the specific indeterminate, i.e., 'audibility' as a logical reason which satisfies only the third condition of the three forms, i.e., the negative concomitance, and does not satisfy the second condition of the three forms, i.e., the positive concomitance:

²² PV IV 205–206: *aikāntikatvaṅ vyāvṛtter avinābhāva ucyate / tac ca nāpratibaddheṣu tata evānvayasthitiḥ // svātmate hetubhāve vā siddhe hi vyatirekitā / sidhyaty ato viśeṣe na vyatireko na cānvayah //*; PVin III 223b4ff.: *ldog pa'i rnam pa de lta bu'i (D: bu P) smra ba des ni med na mi 'byung ba nyid (D: nyid du P) brjod par 'gyur ro / 'di ltar bdag med pa nyid la (D: med pa nyid la lacks P) med pa nyid do zhes don gyis bdag (D: bdag lacks P) la gnas pa gzhan dang ma 'brel par bstan par 'gyur ro // de nyid kyis ni rjes su 'gro ba grub pa'i phyir ldog pa can zhes brjod pa can yang (D: zhes brjod pa can yang lacks P) ma yin no // med na mi 'byung ba yang 'brel pa yin na bdag nyid 'brel pa de ni (P: yin na yang D) de'i bdag nyid dang de las byung ba las (D: byung ba las lacks P) gzhan med do zhes bshad zin to // de dag kyang mthong ba med par mi 'grub pa'i phyir srog la sogs pa med na mi 'byung ba ma yin no // de nyid kyī phyir (P: de nyid kyis D) gang las ldog pa can (D: can lacks P) zhes brjod pa (P: brjod pa yang D) bdag log (P: ma logs D) kyang 'di nges par (P: 'brel par D) ldog pa yang ma yin no // 'brel pa med pa ni 'ga' zhig log na nges par ldog pa ma yin no (P: 'brel pa med pa ni 'ga' zhig log na nges par ldog pa ma yin no lacks D) // de bas na khyad par ni ldog pa med pa dang rjes su 'gro ba med pa yin no //*

“Depending on mere non-perception, (Dignāga)²³ has explained that (the specific logical reason) has only the negative concomitance. (But in fact, the negative concomitance is not confirmed by mere non-perception.) Therefore, (the specific logical reason is) indeterminate. Otherwise (i.e., if the negative concomitance is confirmed by mere non-perception), (the specific logical reason) could prove (something).” (PV IV 207)²⁴

The ground for Dignāga’s assertion that the specific indeterminate satisfies the third condition of the three forms derives from the fact that ‘audibility’ is merely not perceived in the dissimilar instance, i.e., the non-eternal things (except sound). In the same manner, the ground for Uddyotakara’s assertion that the pure negative logical reason has the negative concomitance is no other than the fact that ‘breathing and the like’ are not perceived in the dissimilar instance, i.e., what is not endowed with a soul (except the living body) like a pot. For Dharmakīrti, the negative concomitance is not confirmed by mere non-perception. To be sure, a soul is not perceived in a pot which is not endowed with ‘breathing and the like’. But this non-perception does not necessarily confirm that there is no soul in a pot. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:

“[Opponents:] Because the non-existence of breathing and the like pervades the non-existence of a soul, breathing and the like would not exist, if a soul does not exist.

[Answer:] It is not right, because the non-existence of one (i.e., a soul) is not necessarily connected with the non-existence of another (i.e., breathing and the like).

[Opponents:] (Breathing and the like are) essential properties of this (soul), or this (soul) causes (breathing and the like).

[Answer:] That is not right. If these (i.e., breathing and the like) are perceived when a soul is perceived, and (a soul) is not perceived when (breathing and the like) are not perceived, (the inevitable connection between a soul and breathing and the like) is established. And such perception and non-perception are not established as far as a completely imperceptible object (*atyantaparokṣa*) is concerned.” (PV IV 208–210)²⁵

The negative concomitance of two things can be established, inasmuch as they are necessarily connected. And this necessary connection is basically confirmed by establishing between two things a condition that A is perceived when B is perceived and B is not perceived when A is not perceived. As for the proof of the existence of a soul in question, the existence and non-

²³ Cf. PVinI 156a2.

²⁴ PV IV 207: *adrṣṭimātram ādāya kevalam vyatikṛitā / uktānaikāntikas tasmād anyathā gamako bhavet //*; PVin III 223b7: *ma mthong ba tsam la brten nas slob dpon gyis mnyan par bya ba nyid ldog pa can du bshad do // de tsam gyis med par rtogs pa ni ma yin no zhes bshad zin to / de lta ma yin na the tshom gyi rgyu nyid du mi 'gyur te /*

²⁵ PV IV 208–210: *prāṇādyabhāvo nairātmyavyāpīti vinivartane / ātmano vinivarteta prāṇādir yadi tac ca na // anyasya vinivṛṭtyāyavinivṛtter ayogataḥ / tadātmā tatprasūtaś cen naitad ātmopalambhane // tasyopalabdhāv agatāv agatau ca prasidhyati / te cātyantaparokṣasya drṣṭyadrṣṭi na sidhyataḥ //*; PVin III 224a1ff.: *srog la sogs pa med pas (D: med pas lacks P) bdag med pa la khyab pa'i phyir bdag log na srog la sogs pa ldog par 'gyur ro zhe na ma yin te ma 'brel pa med pas nye bar mi sbyor ba med pa la khyab pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro // gal te srog la sogs pa de'i bdag nyid dam (D: ma P) / de las byung bas (P: ba D) bdag dang 'brel pa yin na / de dag de log na ldog par 'gyur bas de'i tshe srog la sogs pa med pas bdag med pa la (P: las D) khyab par 'gyur ro / de med na med par grub pas khyab pa grub pa'i phyir de yang mi 'grub ste / bzlog (D: ldog P) pa la 'brel pa med (D: ma grub P) pa'i phyir ro // de dag gi 'brel pa ni dmigs pa dang mi dmigs pa dag las shes pa yin na / de dag ni shin tu lkog tu gyur pa la mi 'grub po //*

existence of the logical reason ‘breathing and the like’ can be recognized because they are perceptible (*drśya*). But the existence and non-existence of a soul cannot be recognized because it is imperceptible (*adrśya*).²⁶ Because a soul cannot be perceived at all, it is indeterminate whether it exists in a pot or not, even if it is not perceived in a pot. For Dharmakīrti, as is often indicated, the non-existence must be confirmed by non-perception of a perceptible object (*drśyānupalabdhi*). As a result, the ground for the fallacy of the pure negative logical reason, i.e., the specific indeterminate logical reason, is that both their positive and negative concomitance are doubtful (*saṃdigdha*) because what is to be proved (*sādhyā*) is imperceptible.²⁷

2.2.3. The position of *śrāvaṇatva*

Thus, Dharmakīrti drastically re-interprets Dignāga’s term ‘the specific indeterminate’ by criticizing Uddyotakara’s concept of pure negative logical reason, and reconciles this term with his system of logic. However, he is not entirely free from Dignāga’s traditions, because he insists that ‘audibility’, which Dignāga indicates as an example of the specific indeterminate, be the specific indeterminate in Dharmakīrti’s sense as well. He says:

“The breathing and the like are equal to audibility with respect to the deviation (*vyabhicāra*). (Namely, both of them are devious because they are excluded also from the similar instance). [Opponents:] (They are) not (equal). The latter (i.e., audibility) is devious, even if (it has) the negative concomitance. (But the former is not devious because it is not excluded from the similar instance.)

[Answer:] Why (is audibility devious)?

[Opponents:] Because this (audibility) is excluded not only from the dissimilar instance (but also from the similar instance).

[Answer:] If you say so, it follows that there is no positive concomitance (*anuvṛtti*) in the similar instance concerning this (audibility). (And) this (absence of the positive concomitance in the similar instance) is the same for another (logical reason, i.e., breathing and the like) as well. That A is necessarily excluded from the dissimilar instance (actually) means that A exists in the similar instance. That is the reason why (Dignāga) said that ‘in terms of implication (*arthāpatti*) one of (two examples) indicates another’.²⁸ Therefore, (in other words) the above-mentioned non-deviation cannot be established, if the positive concomitance does not exist. And negation of negation is nothing else than affirmation.” (PV IV 218–221)²⁹

²⁶ Cf. PV IV 212: *prāṇādeś ca kvacid drśtyā sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate / tathātmā yadi drśyeta sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate //*; PVin III 224a4f.: *srog la sogs pa yang mthong ba nyid las la lar yod pa dang (D: dag P) med par rtogs pa yin no / bdag ni de lta ma yin pa'i phyir de yod pa dang med par mi rtogs so //*

²⁷ Cf. PVin III 223a4f.: *de nyid kyi phyir (P: de nyid kyi phyir lacks D) rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa dag la (P: las D) the tshom za ba'i phyir ma nges pa yin te / de las bsgrub par bya ba dang cig zhos dag tu nges pa med pa'i phyir ro //* Here, the concept of ‘doubtful’ (*saṃdigdha*) plays an important role. Dharmakīrti crucially uses this concept in classifying the fallacious logical reasons in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Cf. Ono [1987: (4)ff.]

²⁸ Cf. note 11.

²⁹ PV IV 218–221: *śrāvaṇatvena tat tulyaṃ prāṇādi vyabhicārataḥ / na tasya vyabhicāritvād vyatireke 'pi cet katham // nāsādhyād eva viśleṣas tasya nanv evam ucyate / sādhye 'nuvṛtyabhāvo 'rthāt tasyānyatrāpy asau samaḥ // asādhyād eva viccheda iti sādhye 'stitocyate / arthāpattiyāta evoktam ekena dvayadarśanam // īdṛgavyabhicāro 'to 'nanvayeṣu na sidhyati / pratīṣedhaniṣedhaś ca vidhānāt kūrśo 'paraḥ //*; PVin III 224b5ff.: *srog la sogs pa mnyan bya nyid dang 'khrul par yang mtshungs so // ma yin te de'i (P: de ni D) ldog pa 'khrul pa'i phyir ro zhe na ji ltar*

Furthermore, at the end of the discourse on the specific indeterminate, Dharmakīrti defends Dignāga, who indicates ‘audibility’, not the pure negative logical reason, as an example of the specific indeterminate with the following statement:

“(Dignāga) made reference to audibility in order to indicate (that fallacies of specific indeterminate logical reasons are) the same. (Therefore), one should assume that each of them is a method of understanding that whatever has (only) the negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*) is not a (valid) logical reason.” (PV IV 259)³⁰

Thus, Dharmakīrti emphasizes that ‘audibility’ is still the specific indeterminate, because ‘audibility’ and ‘breathing and the like’ have the same fallacy.³¹ However, if the two logical reasons are the same in the fallacy, why does Dharmakīrti first indicate the pure negative logical reason as an example of the specific indeterminate? One reason is undoubtedly that he has to criticize the syllogism which Uddyotakara established and Dignāga did not know. But a more essential reason is probably that it is inconvenient for him to criticize ‘audibility’ directly, as we shall see below.

3. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* and the development of Dharmakīrti’s logic—a hypothesis

The foregoing investigation clearly shows Dharmakīrti’s basic view that the pure negative logical reason whose negative concomitance is confirmed by mere non-perception is in fact fallacious because its positive and negative concomitance are doubtful. It then follows that the inevitable connection (*nāntarīyakatā*), i.e., the positive and negative concomitance between a logical reason (*sādhana*) and what is to be proved (*sādhya*), must be ascertained not by mere non-perception but by further valid logical reasons (*sādhana*) in order to confirm the validity of a logical reason.³² Dharmakīrti considers the issue of the inevitable connection in verses 245–258. Here, I will not investigate the description of this section closely, but I should point out that Dharmakīrti deals mainly with the issue of the ascertainment of the inevitable connection in the

'khrul / de ni mthun (P: mi mthun D) pa'i phyogs ma yin pa (D: par P) kho na las ldog pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhe na / des ni 'di (D: 'di lacks P) mthun pa'i phyogs la 'jug pa med par brjod pa ma yin nam / de ni gzhan la yang mtshungs pa'i phyir / ji ltar srog la sogs pa dang mi mtshungs / mthun pa'i phyogs ma yin pa nyid la med do zhes bya bas ni (P: ni lacks D) 'di mthun pa'i phyogs la yod par brjod pa yin te / dgag pa gnyis kyi rnal ma go ba'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na rnam par bcad par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir nges par gzung ba'i 'bras bu cir 'gyur ro (P: ro lacks D) // gcig la nges par gzung ba med na ni / ldog pa mi 'khrul par mi 'grub pa'i (P: 'khrul pa'i D) phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang mthun pa'i phyogs ma yin pa nyid la med pa zhes don go bas dpe gnyis las gang yang rung bas (P: ba D) gnyi ga bstan par brjod do // de'i phyir ldog pa mi 'khrul pa 'di 'dra ba ni rjes su 'gro ba med par mi 'grub po // grub na ni nan gyis rjes su 'gro ba 'gugs par byed de (P: 'gug par byed do D) / de dgag pa bkag pa'i ngo bo ni sgrub pa'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir ro /

³⁰ PV IV 259: *ahetuvagatinyāyaḥ sarvo 'yaṃ vyatirekiṇaḥ / abhyūhyaḥ śrāvaṇatvokteḥ kṛtāyāḥ sāmādrṣṭāye //*

³¹ Mokṣākaragupta, a later follower of Dharmakīrti, also states: TBh 48,1–7: *tatrāsādhāraṇānaikāntiko yathā; sātmaṇaṃ jīvaccharīram, prāṇādīmattvād aparajīvaccharīravat ghaṭavat. ayaṃ hetur aparajīvaccharīre ātmanā vyāpta iti na niścitaḥ. ghaṭe ca vipakṣe ātmano 'bhāvān nivrta iti na niścitaḥ. dharmiṇi tu jīvaccharīre vidyata ity asādhāraṇānaikāntika ucyate. aparāś cāsādhāraṇo yathā; anityaś chabdaḥ, śrāvaṇatvāt, ghaṭavat, ākāśavad iti;* see also Y. Kajiyama (1966), “An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta,” *Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University* 10, 1–173, Kyoto: 113f.

³² PV IV 246ab: *nāntarīyakatā sā ca sādhanam samapekṣate /*

case of the effect as reason (*kāryahetu*),³³ and that concerning the ascertainment of the inevitable connection in the case of the essential property as reason (*svabhāvahetu*) he only suggests his basic idea as follows:

“The inevitable connections of the essential property (*svabhāva*) (as reason) should be recognized respectively depending on logical reasons, as (I) have already explained concerning perishment (*vināśa*) and being produced (*kṛtakatva*).” (PV IV 258)³⁴

Namely, Dharmakīrti states that the inevitable connections of the essential property as reason should be ascertained according to the method he himself uses in his ‘inference on the ground of perishment’ (*vināśītvānumāna*).³⁵ In this statement, the issue of the specific indeterminate is related to one of Dharmakīrti’s most crucial topics, i.e., a proof of momentariness. This statement, in my opinion, is a starting point of a new development in Dharmakīrti’s logic.

Taking into account the above discussion on the specific indeterminate, I would like to present a hypothesis, in terms of which we could answer the two important questions, i.e., why Dharmakīrti did not complete his *Pramāṇavārttika*, and what motivated him to reform his proof of momentariness.

As is mentioned above, according to Dharmakīrti, the specific indeterminate logical reason is invalid, because its positive and negative concomitance are doubtful, not because it is specific to the subject of a thesis and exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance, as Dignāga explained. Namely, Uddyotakara’s pure negative logical reason ‘breathing and the like’ is regarded as the specific indeterminate, because its positive and negative concomitance are doubtful. And the ultimate reason for this doubtfulness is that a soul, i.e., what is to be proved (*sādhya*), is imperceptible (*adrśya*).

Here, we should recall that Dharmakīrti regards ‘audibility’ as the specific indeterminate, because ‘audibility’ and ‘breathing and the like’ are the same in the fallacy. Therefore, Dharmakīrti must have admitted that the positive and negative concomitance between ‘audibility’ and ‘eternity/non-eternity’ (*nityatvalanityatva*) are doubtful. And inasmuch as ‘audibility’ is perceptible in essence, it follows that ‘eternity/non-eternity’ is imperceptible (*adrśya*).³⁶ On the other hand, in the proof of momentariness which Dharmakīrti presented in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, the so-called ‘inference on the ground of perishment’, the thesis that things are non-eternal, is proved by ascertaining the inevitable connection between ‘being produced’ (*kṛtakatva*) and ‘non-eter-

³³ The issue of the inevitable connection in the case of the effect as reason concerns the issue of non-perception (cf. PV IV 246 cd: *kārye dṛṣṭir adṛṣṭis ca kāryakāraṇatā hi te //*). That is the essential reason why Dharmakīrti deals with non-perception in verses 260–279 (cf. note 20). There, non-perception is finally grounded on self-cognition, and therefore, *regressus ad infinitum* is avoided (cf. PV IV 274: *tasmād anupalambho 'yaṃ svayaṃpratyakṣato gataḥ / svamātravṛtter gamakas tadabhāvavyavasthiteḥ //*).

³⁴ Cf. PV IV 258: *nāntarīyakatā jñeyā yathāsvaṃ hetvapekṣayā / svabhāvāsya yathoktaṃ prāk vināśa-kṛtakatvayoḥ //*

³⁵ Cf. PVSV 98,4–100,24; 141,17–150,5.

³⁶ Dharmakīrti probably noticed this inconvenient consequence. That is the reason why he did not directly criticize ‘audibility’ as an example of the specific indeterminate.

nity'. And this ascertainment essentially depends on the empirical fact of perishment.³⁷ Therefore, this ascertainment is possible only if 'non-eternity' is perceptible. If 'non-eternity' is imperceptible, this inference cannot function.³⁸

Thus, as a result of the re-interpretation of the concept of specific indeterminate, Dharmakīrti probably would have to reconsider his proof of momentariness presented in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. His fragmentary description of 'the inference on the ground of perishment' located at the end of the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV IV 280–285) reveals a great deal about these circumstances. However, he does not seem to have been able to come to any appropriate solution at that time. In my opinion, that is the direct reason why Dharmakīrti did not complete his main work, the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Afterwards in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, he succeeded in solving this problem by establishing so-called 'the inference on the ground of existence' (*sattvānumāna*). There, as is well known, he introduced 'the negative proof with reference to the contradictory' (*viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*) as a method, in terms of which one can *a priori* ascertain the inevitable connection without depending on any perception of the empirical fact. Thus, he drastically reformed the proof of momentariness.³⁹

Conversely, the establishment of *sattvānumāna* might mean that the inevitable connection between 'audibility' and 'non-eternity' could also be ascertained by applying 'the negative proof with reference to the contradictory'. Indeed, Jinendrabuddhi (8c.)⁴⁰ observes that the inevitable connection between 'audibility' and 'non-eternity' can be ascertained by 'the negative proof with reference to the contradictory' (i.e., 'whatever is eternal cannot have *arthakriyā*'), and concludes that 'audibility' can be a valid logical reason.⁴¹

³⁷ Cf. E. Steinkellner (1968/69), "Die Entwicklung des kṣaṇikatvānumānam bei Dharmakīrti," *WZKS* 12/13, 361–377: 366, 371.

³⁸ On the other hand, at the stage of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, Dharmakīrti did not consider that a soul (*ātman*) and Buddhist dogmas which are included in the four noble truths (*caturāryasatyā*) such as 'everything is non-eternal' are objects of the same kind of the inference. Namely, he states that the four noble truths are 'objects of the inference not depending on the scripture' (*anāgamāpekṣānumānaviśaya*), but that a soul is not so (cf. PVSV 108,24ff.: *tathānāgamāpekṣānumānaviśayābhimatānām tathābhāvaḥ yathā catūrṇām āryasatyānām. ananumeyānāṃ tathābhāvo yathātmādīnām.*). From this point of view, the proof of momentariness in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* may not be invalid.

³⁹ Cf. Steinkellner [1968/69: 369ff.]. However, inasmuch as the *sattvānumāna* itself depends on Dharmakīrti's definition of existence (cf. PV III 3ab: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat /*), this new proof also cannot be accepted by those who do not accept Dharmakīrti's ontology. For example, Akalaṃka states that there is no essential difference between the *kevalavyatirekin* and the *sattvānumāna* (cf. SVṬ 206,16f.: *jīvaccharīre prāṇādir yathāhetur niranvayāt / tathā sarvaḥ sattvādir ahetuḥ kṣaṇike kvacit //17//* [Everything such as 'existence' regarding a certain momentary (thing) is not less a (valid) logical reason than 'breathing and the like' regarding the living body, because the positive concomitance does not exist (in either cases).]).

⁴⁰ Cf. T. Funayama (1995), "Arcaṭa, Śāntarakṣita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Kamalaśīla on the aim of a treatise (*prayojana*)," *WZKS* 39, 181–201.

⁴¹ Cf. PST 171a2: 'o na mnyan par bya ba nyid ni rna bas gzung bar bya ba nyid de / rang gi rnam pa can gyi rna ba'i rnam par shes pa'i rgyu nyid kyi mtshan nyid can yin zhing / de yang mi rtag pa kho nar rigs kyi rtag pa ni ma yin te / rnam pa thams cad du don byed nus pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro / don byed nus pa'i mtshan nyid can yang dngos po zhes pa 'di ni bshad zin to // des na mnyan par bya ba nyid mi rtag pa kho na la 'jug go zhes pa 'di ni the tshom med de / de na ci ltar rjes su 'jug pa dang ldog pa dag ma nges pa'i phyir ro zhes brjod ce na / skyon 'di med de / pha rol po'i rtag pa yang dngos por khas len te / des na de'i 'dod pa la ltos pas de skad bshad do // rang gi lugs

Dharmakīrti himself insists not only in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, but also in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* that 'audibility' is the specific indeterminate as a kind of fallacious logical reason.⁴² And almost all of Buddhist logicians including Arcaṭa⁴³ seem to hold that 'audibility' is a fallacious logical reason, until Ratnākaraśānti explicitly states that it is a valid logical reason.⁴⁴ But inasmuch as the *sattvānumāna* is established, we could say that for the later Dharmakīrti there is no actual reason to classify 'audibility' with the specific indeterminate as a fallacious logical reason.

Abbreviations

AVS	<i>Antarvyāptisamarthana</i> (Ratnākaraśānti): In <i>Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts</i> , ed. Hariprasad Śāstri, Bibliotheca Indica 1226, 103–114. Calcutta, 1910.
HBT	<i>Hetubinduṭikā</i> (Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa): Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji, eds. <i>Hetubinduṭikā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra</i> . Baroda, 1949.
IBK	<i>Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū</i> (<i>Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies</i>).
NV	<i>Nyāyavārttika</i> (Uddyotakara): <i>Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyāṭikā-sahitam</i> , with Vātsyāyana's <i>Bhāṣya</i> , Uddyotakara's <i>Vārttika</i> , Vācaspati Miśra's <i>Tātparyāṭikā</i> and Viśvanātha's <i>Vṛtti</i> . Vol. 1. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936. Vol. 2. Ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemanta Kumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29. Calcutta, 1944.
PS	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> (Dignāga) (Tib.): D 4203 (Tshad ma, vol. 1, Ce 1b1–13a1).
PST	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā</i> (Jinendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4268 (Tshad ma, vol. 20, Ye 1b1–314a7).
PSV(K)	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> (Dignāga) (Tib. tr. Kanakavarman): P 5702 (Vol. 130, Ce 93b4–177a7).

kyis ni mnyan bya nyid mi rtag pa nyid la gtan tshigs kho na'o // Prof. Wakahara assumes that this description is the basis on which Tibetan Buddhist scholars asserts that Jinendrabuddhi is an advocate of the theory of the internal concomitance (*antarvyāptivādin*). Further, he suggests that Dharmottara might refute Jinendrabuddhi's theory of the internal concomitance (cf. Y. Wakahara (1987), "Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan no naihenjuron hihan" [Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's Criticism of the theory of the internal concomitance], *IBK* 35/2: 867–869).

⁴² Cf. PVin II 7,13ff.: *gal te mnyan par bya ba nyid ldog pa yin yang go bar byed pa nyid ma yin no zhe na / ma yin te / ltog pa med pa'i phyir ro // mnyan par bya ba nyid ni 'ga' las kyang ldog pa ma yin te / the tshom sgrub par byed pa'i phyir ro // ldog pa dang ldan pa la ni the tshom med pa'i phyir te / byas pa nyid las mi rtag pa nyid bzhin no // dngos po'i chos dang dngos po thams cad las ldog pa ni 'gal ba'i phyir ro // des na yod par dogs pa nyid kyis the tshom du 'gyur ro // rjes su 'gro ba ma mthong ba'i phyir ldog pa dang ldan par bshad pa yin no // ldog pa'i rnam pa 'di lta bu ni go bar byed pa ma yin te / go bar byed pa gang yin pa de ni brjod zin to // de yang rjes su 'gro ba med par bstan par mi nus te / de'i ngo bo dang rgyu'i dngos po mthong ba sgrub par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro //*; cf. E. Steinkellner (1979), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ*, zweites Kapitel: *svārthānumānam*, Teil II, *Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien: 37f.

⁴³ Arcaṭa is regarded as a representative who asserts so-called *antarvyāptivāda*. He, however, holds the conservative position that 'audibility' is a fallacious logical reason. Cf. HBT 212,6: *saty api hi dharmisambandhe śrāvaṇatvādeḥ sapakṣe bhāvo nāsti* ["Namely, concerning audibility and the like, they do not exist in the similar instance, even if they are related to the subject."].

⁴⁴ Cf. AVS 113,12ff.: *athavāsādhāraṇataiva śrāvaṇatvasya mūdhābhīmānopakalpitā. dṛṣṭaiva hi śabdavyaktidharmiṇī vivādādādhikaraṇāt. anyathā dharmyasiddhiprasaṅgāc ca. dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaśabdavyaktisādhāraṇam ca śrāvaṇatvaṃ hetuḥ, dhūmasāmānyāt. tataḥ sarvopasaṃhāravatyāḥ vyāpteh sambhavāt sattvādivad adṛṣṭam eva sādhanam śrāvaṇatvākhyam. kramayaugapadyānupalambha eva cātra bādhakam pramāṇam. śrotrajñāna-janakatvam eva hi śrāvaṇatvam*; Y. Kajiyama (1989), "Ratnākaraśānti 'Naihenjuron'" [Ratnākaraśānti's *Antarvyāptisamarthana*], *Bukkyōdaigaku Daigakuin Kenkyūkiyō* 17 (1–24): 22f.; see also Kajiyama [1966: note 301].

- PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 1–206. [Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the order followed here correspond to the chapters 3, 1, 2 and 4 in Miyasaka's edition.]
- PVin II *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.
- PVin III *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 3 (Parārthānumāna) (Tib.): D 4211 (Tshad ma, Vol. 1, Ce 152b1–230a7).
- PVinṬ *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) (Tib.): D 4229 (Tshad ma, vol. 14, Tshe 1b1–178a3).
- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4217 (Tshad ma, vol. 2, Che 1b1–326b4).
- PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli, ed. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes*. Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.
- PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam ācārya-Manorathanandikṛtayā vṛtṭyā saṃvalitam (Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin)*. Appendix to *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (Patna) 14–16 (1938–40).
- SVṬ *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* (Anantavīrya): Mahendra Kumar Jain, ed. *Śrīmad-Bhaṭṭākalāṅkadeva-praṇītasya savṛtti-Siddhiviniś-cayasya Ravibhadrapādopajīvi-Anantavīryācārya-virācitā Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*. 2 vols. Benares, 1959.
- T J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, eds. *Taisho shinshu daizokyo*. 85 vols. Tokyo: Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai.
- TBh *Tarkabhāṣā* (Mokṣākaragupta): H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, ed. *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*. 2nd ed. Mysore, 1952.
- WZKS *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*.
- WZKSO *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*.

ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
DENKSCHRIFTEN, 281. BAND

Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy

Proceedings of the
Third International Dharmakīrti Conference
Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997

Edited by
Shoryu Katsura



VERLAG DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
WIEN 1999