

Migration, Regional Integration and Security (2)¹

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III. Regional Integration as an Impediment of Security?

I assume that official activities in international relations can take place at five levels. These are: international institutions operating at the global level; regions above sovereign states or other polities; the sovereign states or other polities themselves; regions below the sovereign states or other polities; and local communities. Four of these five levels are less than global, define collective identities and demarcate them in more or less loose terms. In the course of the twentieth century, actors in, and theorists of, international relations have been concerned with these four levels of regionality or regionalness unequally.² The sovereign states or similar types of polities have attracted most attention, even where they were contested, and the largest number of activities in international relations has been launched from the level of the sovereign states. This is the empirical background against which, from the turn of the twentieth century, realists have devised their theoretical position that states are paramount actors in international relations. However, this position is untenable when applied to previous periods of history and Eurocentric when related to the experiences of population groups outside Europe and North America.

The level of regionality or regionalness that has been neglected most in its impacts on international relations is that of regions

above and below the sovereign states or other polities. Between the end of World War I and the end of the 1980s, most international theorists concerned with these levels of regionality or regionalness have assumed that the formation of institutions above or schemes of cooperation among sovereign states as aspects of regional integration emerged in Europe only during the immediate postwar period, were rare in earlier parts of the twentieth century and unknown in Europe as well as to the world at large in previous centuries.³ But this assumption is far from true. The sole reason that it could have existed is the lack of historical interest on the part of the theorists who studied regional integration.

Up until the superimposition of European colonial domination in Africa, South and Southeast Asia as well as Oceania in the course of the nineteenth century, the world was a world of regions, and notions of statehood played only a marginal role. Some of these regions came into existence through the use of force, such as the expanded Qing Chinese Empire of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,⁴ the Russian Empire which was expanded to the Pacific coasts, Central Asia and the Black Sea in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,⁵ the Ottoman Turkish Empire which was no longer expanding during the eighteenth century but, in many areas, was successfully defended against external pressure,⁶ the Spanish colonial empire in America which was extended to include much of California in the eighteenth century,⁷ the Mughal Empire in India⁸ or the empires of the Ashanti,⁹ Dahomey¹⁰ and the Zulu¹¹ which emerged during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Other regions were integrated through more peaceful means, mainly the acceptance of common legal norms and rules, the exchange of goods and the practice of cooperation among rulers. This was not only the case in central, western and southern Europe during the eighteenth century¹² but also in the Interlacustrine area of East Africa during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-

turies,¹³ among the polities joined into the “Kula Ring” in the Pacific by the nineteenth century if not before,¹⁴ and institutions established among Native Americans such as the Iroquois League of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹⁵

That is to say that regional institutions and schemes for regional cooperation have a much longer tradition than most of the sovereign states that exist today. The same applies to institutions of governance at levels of regionalness below the sovereign states. Often these institutions are successors to polities with a tradition longer than that of sovereign states and with population groups sharing a collective identity stronger than the population groups that make up the group of citizens of subsequent sovereign states. There were three processes that reduced the significance of these institutions and schemes: first the globalisation of the European international system through imperialist colonialism at the turn of the twentieth century; second, the simultaneous creation and strengthening of international institutions; and, third, the conceptualisation and establishment of national states in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Imperialist colonialism was detrimental to regional institutions and schemes for regional integration because it created or enhanced demands for global military, economic, political and cultural competition. This strategy was pursued by military planners, business leaders, diplomats and other decision-makers in government who displayed their readiness to perceive international relations as under the impact of global conflict and strove to analyse global interdependencies among actions of governments, armed forces and the various business communities.¹⁶ The pursuit of peace through global international organisation was positioned against regional integration because regional institutions appeared to obstruct global cooperation under the goal of accomplishing peace in the world. Activists of the international peace movement, some journalists and non-partisan intellectuals favoured his strategy for the pur-

pose of counterbalancing the politics of imperialistic expansion, and advocated the promotion of world organisation through world organisations.¹⁷ Nationalism was inimical to institutions and schemes of regional integration because it favoured statemaking and nation-building at the expense of communication among neighbours within a region. Nationalists assumed that international state boundaries were significant dividing lines in military, economic, political and cultural respects, advocated the fortification of these boundaries in service of the perceived security of the states which they strove to organise as autonomous self-sufficient entities, and they demanded that the boundaries of the states should overlap with the areas each of which were inhabited by only one group that was perceivable as a single, homogeneous, social coherent and politically uniform nation.¹⁸ Nationalists could perceive relations with neighbours in the region merely under the guidance of power politics and were fearful that regional integration could weaken the defense capability, make the governments of sovereign states subject to political and economic pressures at the hands of their neighbours and thereby increase the vulnerability of the sovereign states. Keeping close watch over the population of the state under its control was regarded as the prime government task as the lack of government capability to provide for domestic stability could jeopardise the external security of the state.¹⁹ Therefore, the regional concerns that were considered to be possible by the nationalists were focused on the exercise of power by one government over its neighbouring states, such as the designs that were enshrined in the German *Mitteleuropa* policies.²⁰ Hence, while imperialism and colonialism promoted competition and global internationalism sought to absorb states and regions into the future world community, nationalism was divisive and prioritised the self-sufficiency of the sovereign states. But global internationalism and nationalism shared the common belief that the world as a whole together with the national states represented or should represent integrated and well-“functioning” organisms wherein the whole

was larger than the sum of its parts and wherein the operations of all parts were considered to have to be supportive to the whole.²¹ Hence the political language of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century internationalists as well as nationalists abounded with biologicistic metaphors drawn on the model of the living body. Likewise, international boundaries were likened to the skin of the state, integrating all units in the state while sealing off the state against its environment,²² and the entire world was equated with the comprehensive system that could “organise” relations among specific units and integrate them into an overarching superstructure.²³ Therefore, global internationalists as well as nationalists could easily agree that institutions and schemes of regional integration were dangerous because they ignored the purported “national desires and passions” and obstructed the integration of the world into only one single international system. Both parties could then easily denounce institutions and schemes of regional integration as part of the dusty legacy of *Ancien Régime* mechanicism.²⁴ If regions were conceivable at all in biologicistic terms, they did so as the fertile ground on which nations as well as international organization could “grow”.²⁵

Consequently, most twentieth-century international relations theorists have had a distanced relationship with regional integration. Realists ignored it because it was dangerous for the state.²⁶ Functionalists as theorists ignored it because it was dangerous for global integration.²⁷ Functionalists in office made efforts to prevent it.²⁸ Although neofunctionalists shifted the focus of their theoretical inquiries from global to regional integration, they conceived regional integration solely as a process of the absorption of national states into larger polities²⁹ but remained skeptical about the likelihood of the success of regional integration processes.³⁰ The neofunctionalist approach had immensely negative consequences for the regional integration processes of the 1950s and 1960s because it suggested that the degree of success of regional integration should be measurable

according to the ascertainable capability of regional institutions to “incorporate” institutions of existing sovereign national states. As most regional integration processes of the time displayed few ascertainable results of “spill over” effects of state bureaucratic decision-making onto the advancement of regional integration theorists passed negative verdicts on the work of regional institutions. Bureaucrats and political decision-makers followed suit and began to bicker over relative gains and losses on the various sides of the parties involved in regional integration processes. In Latin America, these disputes contributed to the collapse of institutions of regional integration in the course of the 1960s,³¹ in East Africa, the East African Community, which had been modelled on the European Economic Community of the 1950s, ceased to operate in the 1970s and was formally dissolved in 1984.³² Moreover, neofunctionalism appealed primarily to political and administrative elites who tended to conceptualise regional integration as a process of inter-government negotiation and accommodation among sovereign states without taking seriously popular attitudes and perceptions.³³ The consequence of this bias was that regional integration could hardly proceed if disagreement arose among the governments involved. For example, when Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere refused to sit at the same table with Ugandan leader Idi Amin after the latter had seized power through a military coup-d’etat in 1971, the East African Community could no longer proceed.

Whereas neofunctionalist theory and its practical application remained unconcerned with security issues, realist opposition against regional integration was fed by security concerns. Realists were contractualists who tied the legitimacy of a government to the existence of a sovereign population group within the boundaries of a state.³⁴ Hence realists assumed that it was the legitimate task of governments to provide for the security of the population under their control. Therefore, within the confines of realist theory, gov-

ernments were to be sole providers of security, domestically against crime and other disturbances and internationally against threats from other states, and security was to be defined essentially in military terms.³⁵ Insofar as realism was informed by contractualism, it was and had to be state-centric. Realists could accept neither regional or global nor civil society institutions as security providers because these institutions could not be legitimised by contractualist means. Therefore, the lack of possibility of providing security through institutions above, below or beside the sovereign state became the core realist argument against multilateralism or multipolarity and regional integration.³⁶ In consequence, the perceived security concerns of states obtained priority over the “human” aspect of security in the course of the nineteenth century.³⁷

However, the realist assumptions are far from obvious. One problem is that the contractualism informing realism has enforced a rigorous though unjustified differentiation between domestic and international security.³⁸ Moreover, the state-centricity of realist international theory has led to the postulate that the population groups inhabiting the territory of the state should be united in one collective identity and should display a single loyalty to the institutions of that state whereas multiple loyalties attached to other institutions, should they persist, ought to be destroyed.³⁹ Realists have categorised states as “actors” speaking, as it were, with one voice.⁴⁰ They have accepted the principal postulate that nation-states should be the only institutional framework for sovereign polities within which class distinctions and ethnic or gender discriminations can be overcome and the democratically controlled rule of justice can be guaranteed.⁴¹ This postulate has induced realists to equate statemaking with nation-building in the sense that the concoction of an inclusive “national” identity and the admission of only one loyalty to be focused solely on the institutions of the state. However, few states are in fact socially and politically integrated to a degree that justifies

their classification as actors in the sense of realist theory. It is difficult to perceive how a theory can be of service if one of its principal elements is difficult to reconcile with the empirical reality. But even more fundamentally, the belief that states are and, of right, should be the only legitimate integrated sovereign polities, has been rendered unwarranted by the fact that communitarian ideologies⁴² and regional identities have persisted for a period that is much longer in most parts of the world than the temporal dimension within which states are on record to have existed.⁴³ These ideologies and identities have enforced the continuity of multiple loyalties and governments of states have met with serious resistance in their attempts to constitute themselves as the only focal points of loyalty. Moreover, regional identities have tended to extend across international boundaries of sovereign states. Under these conditions, the realist demand has been rendered vain that the populations of sovereign states are and should be willing to act as united groups of people under the control of their governments, and the political demand has turned to be unrealistic that these populations should be willing to bear the economic and human costs of the defence of their state. By contrast, admitting the pluralism of potentially competing loyalties and identities, the description of ongoing political processes may not only gain in adequacy but, more importantly, such processes as state succession can be analysed more appropriately as the results of long-term shifts in loyalties and identities rather than as abrupt collapses of institutions. Vice versa, regional integration processes may be understood as similar shifts that can but do not have to entail the destruction of existing state institutions.

As one consequence of this revision of regional integration theory, security concerns can be connected with multiple identities and loyalties and can thus be focused on non-state and civil society institutions which may appear more suitable as security providers. It may be remarked in this context that, up until the end of the eighteenth

century, non-government organizations such as churches and private companies⁴⁴ were accepted as regular providers of the human aspect of security together with governments. Only within the framework of ideologies of the nation-state did governments of sovereign states assume the role of the sole providers of security at the disadvantage of the security concerns of the individual. Consequently, institutions and schemes of regional integration do not have to be classed as security hazards but, instead, as one condition for the provision of security in the human dimension.

V. The Widening Horizon of the Security Discourse

The concept of security has undergone an unexpected change from the 1980s. Members of the Copenhagen School of security studies have become most vocal in articulating their position that the concept of security should be widened substantively. This position has been informed by the observation that some of the seemingly well-established realist assumptions about security do not in fact hold true. Security theorists have objected that there are ecological, military and legal problems that, while impacting on the security of sovereign state, demand for their solution transnational cooperation and international organization at regional levels or at the global level. There has been no doubt that ecological disasters, war and political instability can trigger mass migration and that sudden occurrences of mass migration can impact on the security of citizens and states. Moreover, the Kosovo War has shown that migration policy (in this case, the politics of purposeful mass expulsion) can be turned into a factor of military strategy under the goal of using mass migration to jeopardise the security of neighbouring states. However, security theorists are divided over the question what kind of institutions can deal with such problems. Only a minority of theorists has been willing to place international organisations and regional institutions in charge of handling them. Instead, the major-

ity of theorists, including members of the Copenhagen School, have opted for the governments of sovereign states as the sole agents equipped with the power and the legitimacy to deal with them cooperatively.

Another, more fundamental objection against the realist security discourse has emerged from the request that the principal unit of security should not be the state or some other form of polity but the individual. Supporters of the request have argued that justice and equality follow from the respect for personhood rather than the recognition of nationality and can only be established and maintained if the needs and desires of the individual are taken seriously as matters of public policy.⁴⁶ Supporters of the request have been found in a variety of camps, ranging from the activists around the Hague Appeal for Peace, who were at the core of the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, to migration researchers who suggest that undocumented immigrants should be granted basic human rights even though they have been found to have violated valid laws, and that migration policies are illegitimate which do not recognise an individual's right to immigrate. Moreover, an increasing number of security theorists have betrayed their willingness to consider Mahbub ul-Haq's request that security should be defined in terms of the safety of the individual against starvation, loss of property, violations of bodily integrity, torture and other forms of aggression together with the protection of the integrity of states. The demands of these activists and theorists thus suggest a paradigm shift from state security to human security as the more comprehensive security concept that combines the security interests of the individual with those of the state.

While the paradigm shift in the background of the widening of the concept of security is of utmost political significance in the current world, as, among others the demonstrations in Seattle in 1999 and

the responses to the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 make clear, it is more important in theoretical and historical contexts to provide an answer to the question whether or not the widening of the security discourse is a new process, unique at the turn of the twenty-first century. The most widely accepted perception is that the process began in the 1980s and has been fuelled by the several cases of state succession in the 1990s, the tripling of PKOs since 1988 from 13 in the period between 1948 to 1987 to 39 from 1988 to 2000, the increasing vulnerability of civilian non-combatants in military conflicts, with the number of civilian war casualties rising from 10% of the total of the war dead in World War I to more than 90% of the total of the war dead in the Bosnian War, and, last but not least, the deepening sense of the urgency of the prevention of further global ecological devastation. However, much as these indicators are straightforward, the perception that concerns for what has been termed human security after Mahbub ul-Haq is not self-evident. The evidence that the notion of human security, not the word, may have a longer tradition behind it can be grouped into three categories: First, sources earlier than the 1980s show that human security concerns were on the agenda of diplomatic negotiations even though the word 'human security' was not then in use. Second, sources before the turn of the nineteenth century put on record that the protection of the individual was considered to be the prime task of rulers and a powerful means of constraining warfare. Third, sources of medieval origin disclose that the accomplishment of peace as a condition for the temporal security of the individual and the perennial welfare of humankind was a demand enshrined in the ideologies of universalism and, in this respect, the provision of human security was a religious concern.

Sources of the first category can be discussed here in brief. It is well known that human security concerns were made explicit as early as in the Mouraviev Memorandum of 1898 beginning a series of diplo-

matic negotiations that lead to convocation of the Hague Peace Conference of 1899.⁴⁶ There are further traces of the notion of human security in Mitrany's peace proposal of 1943.⁴⁷ Recent reinvestigations into the Helsinki process have yielded proof that all major items enshrined in Mahbub ul-Haq's notion of human security were already on the agenda of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.⁴⁸ Debates about the notion of human security in this forum were not always controversial although they were not always discussed in distinction from controversial issues, such as those concerning human rights. Moreover, they featured strongly in a variety of reports by international commissions whose work followed the Helsinki Accord.⁴⁹ Therefore, the 1994 UNDP report making official Mahbub ul-Haq's definition, concluded a process that had already begun at the very end of the nineteenth century and had then consolidated itself for some twenty years when the term appeared in official records.

The second category of sources show that the conceptualisation of human security during the second half of the twentieth century has replaced another process which might be referred to as the militarisation of security and which began at the end of the eighteenth century. This process is innately connected with the surge of nationalism and the militarisation of society in consequence of the French Revolution of 1789. Thus early nineteenth-century military theory provided the first general theory of war ever in a European context and defined war as a contest among "nations in arms".⁵⁰ The dialectics of the buildup and resolution of friction and tensions appeared to demand the subordination of the interests of the individual to those of the nation as a whole and to position the pursuit of national security as the sole guarantee of the safety of the individual. Early nineteenth-century legal philosophers concurred and were most vocal in insisting that personhood was to be determined through nationality so that the personal identity of the individual

should be a derivative of the national identity.⁵¹ It was thus a consistent conclusion to request that the individual should be ready to risk his or her life in service to the nation, and, up to World War II, this request for sacrifice met with a surprising degree of popular acceptance.⁵²

However, twentieth-century theorists have been wrong in postulating that the demands of nineteenth-century military theorists and legal philosophers had made explicit perennial truths. This was not the case, first and foremost, because the concepts of nation and state underlying the request for sacrifice to the nation emerged in their current meanings only during the second half of the eighteenth century.⁵³ Moreover, there is positive evidence that, up to the end of the eighteenth century, security had been defined in a broader sense than the mere protection against military attacks on states. Instead, the wide-ranging seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theoretical tracts, diplomatic memoranda and administrative records on the balance of power provide ample evidence for a notion of security that was integrated into the normative framework of policy-making rules and legal as well as moral constraints against the sovereign war-making capability.⁵⁴ Rules for the maintenance of the balance of power were expressed in universalistic terms as norms that theorists claimed to have existed throughout history.⁵⁵ The most elaborate eighteenth-century system of balance of power rules is contained in the work of Emerich de Vattel, the Swiss born legal theorist who portrayed the balance of power in legal rather than in political terms and insisted that breaches of balance of power rules were theoretical reasons for just warfare.⁵⁶ However, Vattel argued in favour of an elaborate casuistry to be employed prior to any decision for war, and this casuistry required much observation on rulers' attitudes, the financial and political capabilities of governments and the general wealth of populations so that, in effect, even a breach of balance of power rules could hardly

serve as a reason for just warfare.⁵⁷ Next to the legalism that Vattel favoured as the theoretical basis for balance of power rules, other theorists were more inclined to follow ethical arguments. These theorists proceeded from the rationalist assumption that it was in the legitimate self-interest of every ruler to act in fulfillment of moral obligations and to abide by the general principles of reason, and they requested caution and constraint in decisions to go to war.⁵⁸ In either case, the salience of the maintenance of the balance of power was defended on the grounds that it was unjust to jeopardise the life and safety of the population subject to the control of a ruler and that upsetting the balance of power was ultimately not beneficial to the ruler who, while ignoring the balance of power rules, was to face dissent and opposition from among the ruled, devastation of the land, emigration of subjects, severe economic disadvantages and, last but not least, political isolation.⁵⁹

These theoretical arguments were of importance not only in arcane academic debates but also in practical politics. For example, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a large variety of rulers exploited the religious dissent which the French king Louis XIV encountered from the time of his revocation of the toleration edict for the Huguenot Calvinist minority in France in 1685. As, at the same time, the French army forcefully expanded into neighbouring territories rulers facing French expansionism counteracted by drawing large numbers of Huguenot refugees into their lands. The gain was twofold. First, many of the Huguenots were highly skilled craftspeople who added to the productivity in the areas of their immigration. Second, rulers attracting Huguenots from France into the territories under their control could use the migration to proclaim their rule as fair and just and could propagandistically categorise the Huguenot migration as an act of voting by the feet.⁶⁰ Migration was ubiquitous because rulers faced insurmountable limitations of their administrative capability to control emigration. Deser-

tion was a normal affair, and rulers issued long series of edicts banning desertion. However, the repetitiveness of these edicts only echoed the lack of executive power of their promoters, and military commanders had few means to prevent it beyond brutal punishments that would usually put deserters to death. But, much as capital punishments and harsh treatments were deterrents, they necessarily resulted in the reduction of the military manpower, and this was not a desirable consequence. Hence, most rulers shared the conviction expressed by King Frederick II of Prussia, that a limited amount of desertion within the limits of what was common within all major armies was tolerable as it relieved armies from unreliable soldiers.⁶¹ In line with this reasoning, rulers encouraged the willingness to desert from an enemy force by declaring their opponents' war aims as unjust and thereby tried to reduce the fighting power of their foes. The criteria of the justice of war aims were derived from balance of power rules. In consequence, the practical implementation of balance of power theories was a forceful constraint against the war-making capability of rulers. Few eighteenth-century rulers realised this consequence more directly than King Frederick II of Prussia. For his undeclared war against Austrian heiress Maria Theresa, which he launched in 1740, he paid dearly not only through direct war expenses but, more dramatically, through a loss of alliance-making capability. Thus, down to the early 1760s, Frederick could rely only on British subsidies and received scarce political support from anywhere whereas the Habsburg side could chose freely among a variety of possible alliance partners. The Austrian eventually agreed to end the war not because Frederick's army should have been of superior military strength but because Frederick, in 1763, was ready to acknowledge his obligation to play by the balance of power rules in the time to come.⁶²

Hence, concerns for the security of the individual became an issue of great importance also in military matters. Theorists assigned to

rulers the task of providing security for the population subject to their control and of creating a political, social and economic framework that could allow the pursuit of their happiness. Still at the end of the eighteenth century, a latter-day physiocrat and leading reformer in the Roman Empire could define happiness as the core condition of stability.⁶³ Along similar lines, Kant could articulate his hope that some hypothetical plan of nature should lead to the formation of a cosmopolitan citizenship that could grant equal rights to all humankind.⁶⁴ Moreover, unlike in the sixteenth and the earlier seventeenth centuries, when the ratio of the war dead in relation to the total of combatants in battle could amount to about 50% on the side of the loser, eighteenth-century military organisation made significant and successful efforts to limit the carnage of battle primarily because it was costly and difficult to replace well-trained soldiers killed or turned invalid through battle action.⁶⁵ Instead of using soldiers as cannon fodder, the capabilities of making soldiers execute given commands, preserving the life of the soldiers and of preventing them from deserting in masses were considered the core of the achievement of successful military organisers.⁶⁶ All this adds up to the perception that, prior nineteenth century, the provision of security had been a comprehensive, not merely military concept which had been a core condition of the maintenance of stability and peace as well as a crucial task for rulers.

Lastly, the third category of sources on the history of the concept of human security suggests that this notion did not origin in the particularistic political concerns of rulers of territorial polities but in the theological foundations of late medieval universalism. Late medieval universalism was characterised by a dualism of one divinely willed institution of universal rule ranked as the guarantor of the stability of the world and a plethora of particularistic polities resulting from contractual agreements between rulers and ruled.⁶⁷ The universalistic creed was eschatological in kind and positioned the

Roman Empire as the last of the world empires before Judgment Day. It was fundamental in shaping both the theory of empire and the practical conduct of imperial politics in the later Middle Ages because it demanded that emperors should accomplish the task of providing stability and security for the world in the dual sense of safety of individuals against hazards of daily life as well as safeguarding the tranquillity of the world and securing the continuity of life after death. The combination of diffuse eschatological hopes with manifest political and economic interests emerges from the multitude of late medieval political tracts on the origin and the end of the Roman Empire,⁶⁸ from the more principled treatises on political philosophy written by Dante and Marsilius of Padua in the first half of the fourteenth century on the condition of a general peace⁶⁹ as well as from the widening scope of imperial and territorial peace legislation of the twelfth and the subsequent centuries.⁷⁰ The demand that emperors should be the foremost rulers to provide for peace, stability and security in temporal as well as eschatological terms was thus imbued with religious values and, consequently, biased in favour of the Christian religion. Human security, in this understanding, was a universal category only in so far as it applied to Christian believers, whereas non-Christians, especially Muslims, as well as heretics, such as the Hussites, were excluded from the desired peace regimes and became the targets of the use of military violence or were subject to brutal persecution. Although the notion of divinely willed natural law was used in the theory of war from the thirteenth century,⁷¹ it remained a theoretical construct with little or no impact on the practical matters of human security beyond the confines of the Christian world. The frequency of the appeals to natural law and the preservation of peace in the later Middle Ages have to be judged against the background of the intensification of military activity and the rapid increase of the number of war dead and war-related expenses. Theorists could do little more than deplore these developments, while emperors appeared too weak to be

able to execute their tasks.⁷² It was only in the course of the sixteenth century that the secularisation of political institutions promoted the de-institutionalisation and ethicisation of universalism.⁷³ These processes had the practical implication that the Roman Empire ceased to be an administrative framework for universal rule and was transformed into a territorial polity like all others.⁷⁴ Theorists like Justus Lipsius⁷⁵ and Jean Bodin⁷⁶ responded to these processes by redefining universalism as a set of norms and fundamental rules that they took to follow from the general principles of reason and to have validity without specific enforcement through human action.⁷⁷ It was only in consequence of the de-institutionalisation and ethicisation of universalism in the course of the sixteenth century that the pursuit of human security could emerge as a demand of international law and in application to all humankind.

I have traced the history of the concept of human security very roughly backwards from the Helsinki Accord of 1975 to the later Middle Ages, as if, so to speak, to turn the clock back. I have done so in order to show the changeability of the concept in its European context and in what appears to be a time span of about 900 years. The concept of human security reflects the experience of human insecurity together with the expectation that human insecurity can be turned into human security through human efforts. Both, the increased sense of human insecurity and the increased demand for the provision of human security were a consequence of the intensification of warfare during the high and late Middle Ages. Within the *longue durée* of little less than a thousand years, the period of less than two hundred years during which the concept of security was militarised and focused on institutions of statehood rather than on human individuals as its prime units appears as an aberration. In the Middle Ages, the European concept of human security had been tied to a universalistic institution with a strong bias in favour of Christianity. Whether it is still so today might be decided on the ba-

sis of a comparison between the legacies of universalism in Europe and the Atlantic World on the one side and, on the other, China and the island worlds of Western Pacific.

VI. Conclusion

If the sovereign state represents the triad of unities of population, government and territory, the frequently observed “decline of the state” has been caused not primarily by economic activities and the patterns informing economic actions. Instead, the sovereign state has come under pressure because two of the three unities constituting it have been disclosed to be programmatic rather than factual. Rather than assuming that states comprise a united population (in the tradition of realism), political theorists as well as practical decision-makers in government have been forced to admit that migration flexibilises the population and that the government capability to counteract the flexibilising effects of migration are limited. Moreover, rather than perceiving resort to border surveillance and the resulting regional disintegration as proper means to counteract the flexibilising effects of migration, governments of sovereign states have been induced to contribute to schemes of regional integration or cooperate in institutions of regional integration, although recognising that that institutions and schemes of regional integration have the effect of flexibilising institutions of government.

As a result, it has become more difficult for governments of sovereign states to act as main or even as sole providers for domestic stability and external security. The term “welfare state”, as Nicholas Onuf has recently remarked,⁷⁸ has become an oxymoron and, that means in political terms, a nuisance. While the sovereign states have remained the sole legitimate providers of external security, the private sector through MNCs has emerged as a powerful competitor to the state as an agent for the provision of domestic stability. As

the private sector does not have to face legitimacy constraints and as it is not tied to serve its clientele only within the territory of only one state, it easily becomes integrated into regional or even global networks that in turn reduce the range of activities of the governments of sovereign states. Likewise, organisations making up civil society (as this term is currently understood) through NGOs operate with an explicit intention of contributing to domestic stability and external security and thereby emerge as further checks against the activities of government of sovereign states. As transnational institutions, these MNCs and NGOs can, and frequently do, intervene into the domestic as well as international affairs of sovereign states at times of crisis. Migration is a factor supporting if not originating these processes. Migrants may create transnational spaces within which MNCs, civil society organizations and regional institutions can operate. Consequently, regional integration cannot be conceptualised on the basis of residentialist models of the state but must incorporate the flexibilising effects of migration. Moreover, the concept of security has become inapt as a means to respond to the flexibilisation of populations and government institutions of the sovereign states as long as it is narrowly defined in terms of safety against military threats towards the state. Therefore, the comprehensive concept of human security is innately regional in kind. Governments of sovereign states have the choice between redefining domestic stability and external security along the idea and concept of comprehensive human security or live with a widening gap between the demand for the provision of security and the declining capability and legitimacy to provide for it.

¹ Part 1 of this article has appeared in *Tsukuba Hôsei (The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Political Science)* 35 (2003), pp. 1-35.

² Harald Kleinschmidt, 'A Preparatory for a New Regional Integration Theory', Mikiko Iwasaki, ed., *Varieties of Regional Integration* (Munster, Hamburg: LIT, 1995), pp. 47-71.

³ See: Ernest B. Haas. *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) [2nd ed. (ibid., 1968)].

⁴ Jeremy Black, *Why Wars Happen* (London: Reaction Books, 1998), p. 99. Eva Kraft, ed., *Zum Dschungelkrieg im 18. Jahrhundert. Berichte des Generals Funingga* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1953).

⁵ James Forsyth, *History of the Peoples of Siberia. Russia's North Asian Colony. 1581 - 1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁶ See on the Ottoman Turkish Empire: Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973) [new ed. (London: Phoenix, 1994)].

⁷ *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, 6 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984-). C. de Parrel, 'Pitt et l'Espagne', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 64 (1950), pp. 58-98.

⁸ *The Cambridge History of India*, 6 vols, new ed. (Dehli: Chand, 1987).

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²⁸ Woodrow Wilson, *The Public Papers*, vol. 40 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 535-536, vol. 45 (ibid., 1984), pp. 534-535, vol. 53 (ibid., 1986), pp. 532, 599. Cf. Kwame Nkrumah [*Africa Must Unite* (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1963)], who equated regional integration with balkanisation.

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