Migration, Regional Integration and Security (1)

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I. Introduction

For most of the postwar period, the interrelationship between migration, regional integration and security has been approached from the point of view of the state. Apart from theorists of the realist schools,[1] high-ranking decision-makers in military matters and foreign policy down to the early 1990s have given priority to the security of the state as a sovereign political entity over regional integration and have ranked the perceived interests of states above the interests of migrants. Among the many instances that provide evidence for this contention are the failure of LAFTA in 1980 as only one of the several regional integration schemes in Latin America that gave way to persisting perceived state interests under pressure from military governments in the area,[2] the dissolution of the EAC which had been paralysed from 1971 by the lack of willingness of the rulers of the involved states to build common security regimes,[3] the negative impact of interstate and domestic warfare in Southeast Asia on regional integration schemes such as Maphilindo and the early ASEAN,[4] the lack of involvement of the European institutions in the process of the merging of the two German states in 1989 and 1990,[5] the lack of willingness of the governments of many states to allow or promote schemes of dual citizenship and the use of security argument against demands to that extent,[6] as well as such incidents as the establishment of checkpoints on the Czech-Slovak border in

consequence of the German demand to control immigration from Eastern European states.[7]

However, from the late 1980s, voices have become more frequent which have articulated different perceptions. Demands have been voiced that notions of citizenship should be extended to make possible participation in local politics by resident aliens on the one side[8] and, on the other, to link citizenship to universalistic principles from which rights and obligations can be derived irrespective of loyalty to a particular institution of statehood.[9] Observers of what has come to be termed 'new immigration' have pointed out that the administrative capability of the governments of sovereign states to control migration has declined as non-state actors, such as NGOs and MNCs as well as regional institutions and international organisations, have acquired more influence on migration processes.[10] For example, international organisations such as the ILO advanced proposals for international regulations apt to reduce the decision-making capability of institutions of sovereign states with regard to immigration rules. These proposals formed the basis for the international Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families that was approved by the UN General Assembly in 1991. It has been the purpose of this convention to secure the provision of essential human rights to immigrants who are found to have violated immigration rules.[11] Likewise, regional institutions such as the EU have granted the freedom of movement to all nationals of the EU member states and have simultaneously forced governments of member states to take measures for the rigorous control of immigration from non-EU states.[12] Private NGO's such as Amnesty International have requested the freedom of emigration as a human right and intellectuals have demanded that the right to emigrate should be supplemented by an internationally guaranteed right to immigrate.[13] Apparently, a multitude of private organisations exist able to bring almost anyone

anywhere for pay, usually outside the bounds of legality.[14] Serious arguments in favour of these activities except for the latter are that the notion of citizenship is state-centric and may do little to convey an identity on a person and that, consequently, personhood and the complex of subjective wishes, perceptions and opinions should be taken into consideration rather than purportedly objective standards that are deemed to inform the administration of citizenship and laid down in passports as official documents.[15] Migration has thus emerged as a process and an issue that has begun to impact on affairs of the state as well as civil society. Neither do state institutions continue to be solely legitimised to deal with migration nor has civil society so far acquired sufficient legitimacy to replace institutions of the state. But, state institutions and civil society can be in a position where they compete with regard to migration regulation and frequently take opposing attitudes to the making and implementation of migration policy. The dividing line, which frequently separates institutions of statehood from groups acting as parts of civil society, is state security.

Moreover, in practical terms, the possibilities of differentating authoritatively between immigrants on the one side, and refugees as well as asylum-seekers on the other, have diminished. By convention, some social scientists used a temporal threshold of one year to separate the two categories of migrants. According to this standard, an immigrant was a person who stayed in a foreign country for more than one year whereas the refugees were to stay for no more than a year in a state different from that of their origin. Yet asylum-seekers have never been categorised in accordance with that standard, mainly because they have represented a category that is not universally recognised. The standard has proved of little value because it was arbitrary, left unrecognised the reasons that led migrants to cross international boundaries and could not be supported by stringent arguments why refugees should convert into immi-

grants when passing across the one-year-threshold.[16] Instead, demands have been raised that the subjective consciousnesses and intentions of migrants should be given priority over ultimately arbitrary administrative standards.[17]

Finally, the conventional, ultimately nineteenth-century perception that migrations result from certain pull and push factors which were taken to be measurable, has been called into question. Instead of viewing migrations as linear finite processes connecting a sending and a receiving state, migration systems have been constructed within which migration takes place over longer periods and in various directions. These migration systems can deterritorialise culture, lead to hybrid or multiple identities and define areas within which migration has occurred frequently and has followed established patterns.[18] Within these migration systems, the capability of the involved governments of sovereign states to control migration is reduced. This effect of migration systems has been amplified by the fact that migrants have become accustomed to operate within networks that convey a degree of autonomy in the decisions about their movements.[19] These migration networks provide sources of information about immigration procedures and help accommodating migrants in their target areas. Hence, it is no longer possible to differentiate unequivocally between sending and receiving states and to apply to migrants the ultimately nineteenth-century images of uprootedness (Oscar Handlin). Migration systems and migration networks are interactionistic devices through which migrations can continue indefinitely, without any particular direction, allow migrants a fair degree of autonomy of action and thus become less subject to government surveillance.

Simultaneously with 'new migration', the notion of 'new regionalism' has emerged. The notion suggests a shift in theories about regional integration and demands recognition that regional integra-

tion may proceed in a variety of ways that differ from the assumptions that had been shared by theorists of the 1950s and 1960s.[20] 'New regionalism' came into existence in response to manifest regional integration processes which were ongoing or in the making from the 1980s when theorists had neither explanations for them nor even an analytical instrumentarium to study them.[21] 'New regionalism' emerged from the challenge that these new or newly intensified integration processes provided for the making of international theory. Specifically, it turned out to be of importance to take seriously the variety of impacts that regional integration processes might have on the existence and continuity of sovereign states. Whereas old style regional integration theory had focused monistically on the prediction that regional integration processes were to absorb existent sovereign states into larger polities, advocates of 'new regionalism' suggested that integration processes might take a variety of directions and that the intended or accomplished results might not be uniform or drawn on one single model only.

Moreover, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the restructuring of security thinking. The new security discourse demanded the substantial widening of the then conventional concept of security to cover not only military and foreign-policy issues but also environmental matters, economic, social and cultural factors. Theorists began to suggest that the concept of security should not be limited exclusively to affairs of the state but should include a human dimension and a selection of issues related to personhood or the affairs of the individual.[22] Notably, migration and regional integration have begun to feature within the security discourse.

The question that needs to be raised at this point is what is so new about 'new migration', 'new regionalism' and 'human security' in the light of a long-term perspective on the history of international theory.[23] Is the migrants' capability to sidetrack government migration

restrictions a new phenomenon? Is regional integration in theory and practice peculiar to the twentieth century? Is human security an invention of the 1990s? Although it may well be that persons desperately willing to immigrate into or emigrate from a certain state have at their disposal today a wider range of technological means and organisational strategies than in previous periods, the principal observation nevertheless holds true that the general history of government migration control has been the history of its failure. At the very best, governments of sovereign states have, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, been able to limit temporarily the numbers of persons crossing international boundaries in the one or the other direction. In a few cases, governments of sovereign states were able to develop regimes of surveillance apt to maintain a degree of border control that was close to perfect. But these states, most notoriously the German Democratic Republic, paid the highest thinkable price for this accomplishment, namely the risk of their own destruction. For the surveillance required funds and manpower to an extent that rendered impossible economically sound fiscal policies. When, finally late in 1989, the East German government gave in and allowed border crossing without much control, the irony became recognisable that the number of the persons who sought to emigrate from East Germany immediately was marginal, namely below 5% of the total population. The maintenance of extensive bureaucracies for the management of border control undermined the legitimacy of the government and enhanced the collapse of the state. Without the risk of self-destruction, no government has empirically been able, neither before nor since the nineteenth century, to completely suppress undocumented migration. The reason appears to be plain and obvious. Unlike refugees and expellees, migrants move voluntarily across boundaries of recognised significance and must therefore count as determined and highly motivated persons many of whom will have the intellectual, economic and technical means to carry out their plans in one way or

another and sooner or later. Consequently, what is new about 'new immigration' is neither a larger number nor some increased capability of migrants to get where they want to go but the admission by government institutions of the fact that migration control cannot be complete.

But is this admission the result of a declining capability of government institutions to control migration? If we take a long-term historical perspective, we notice that, up until the end of the eighteenth century, governments displayed little interest in curbing migration. Instead, governments were willing to cope with and tolerate situations in which about 10% of the resident population would be constantly on the move,[24] conducted active immigration policies[25] and did little to control emigration beyond often vain attempts to prevent the desertion of trained soldiers.[26] It seems that the demand that governments should control migration was informed by the nineteenth-century European conceptualisation of statehood that awarded to governments the task of moulding or maintaining the coherence or integrity of the nation.[27] From the same time, as migrants came to be regarded as poor and were criminalised, controlling immigration came to be considered as a part of a more comprehensive set of measures designated for the provision of security to the resident population as the group of nationals living within the boundaries of a state. Correspondingly, these boundaries were understood as the skin of the body politic[28], whence migration control obtained the status of an instrument for the preservation of the security of the nation through the activities of the government. Nineteenth-century nationalism shaped a political legacy which continued to be characteristic mainly of European states or states shaped on the European tradition. Outside Europe, the Soviet Union, China, the USA and the former British Dominions, few states developed policies of migration control before the 1990s.

By contrast, is the increasing concern for migrants' motives and goals new? Put differently, have governments only recently become willing to acknowledge the possibility that there can be a gap between migrants' strategies and government-enforced policies? Much evidence supports the assumption that this is so. First, there is, in the academic world, the widening recognition that generalising external categories are insufficient means for an understanding of migration. That is to say that the previous positivist conviction has waned that migration must be defined objectively and authoritatively without recourse to the subjective perceptions of the migrants. More recently, scholars have adopted more circumspect approaches suggesting that precise theory-based definitions cannot be superimposed upon the diversity of migration processes.[29] Post-positivist admission of a lack of certainty in academic research has fully impacted on migration studies calling into question the justice of a procedure by which analysts could claim to be able to deal with migration only from an external, as it were, bird's-eye-perspective.[30] Increasingly, attention has shifted to the subjective cultures of migrants, and methods pertaining to anthropology as well as history have obtained a significance in migration research equal to those of sociology and economics.[31]

This shift includes a focus on migrants' perceptions of boundaries. If the premise has to be accepted that migrants' perceptions of boundaries can differ from what governments may take for granted and if migrants' perceptions can be culturally specific and change over time,[32] the consequence is that governments of sovereign states as well as the international community of sovereign states loose part of their legitimacy to request unconditional respect of existing international boundaries. This is so because migrants may not see any requirement to recognise boundaries which were drawn by former colonial powers or through international agreements at the end of wars without respect for daily needs and desires of local popula-

tion groups in areas where boundaries were established. Therefore, migration renders threadbare one important definitory element of the state, namely its boundary, if the perceptions and attitudes of migrants are taken into consideration. The coming into existence of new states over the past twelve or so years and the plethora of secessionist movements in many parts of the world point towards the salience of taking seriously migrants' perceptions of international boundaries rather than continuing to insist that the making of international boundaries should be the privilege of governments.

Consequently, afore-mentioned international convention was signed in 1991 on the human rights of undocumented migrants.[33] The convention, once it will become valid in terms of international law, obliges governments to grant unalienable human rights to persons who have managed to emigrate from and immigrate into a state without proper documentation. The convention thus forces governments of sovereign states to give proper treatment to persons who have been found to have violated state laws and therefore reduces the rights of these governments regarding border control. It takes into account the fact that, empirically, most undocumented migrants eventually accomplish the legalisation of their status, of they manage to stay on long enough. These are grim prospects from the point of view of conventional realist international theory but they are not necessarily so from the point of view of constructivism (or, for that matter, deconstructivism) as the latter demands recognition of perceptions, motives and intentions of individuals.[34]

Likewise, the question is legitimate what is new about 'new regionalism'? As in the case of 'new migration', the notion of 'new regionalism' represents a theoretical refinement of the transformations that can be sparked by regional integration processes. Which are these transformations? The conventional regional integration theory of the 1950s and 1960s had been state-centric in the sense that it

had proceeded from the assumption that regional integration must be launched from the platform of existing sovereign states. Hence, the prospects of regional integration vis-à-vis the believed perseverance of institutions of the sovereign state had been a central issue of this brand of regional integration theory.[35] Proponents of this theory had assessed the prospects of regional integration most cautiously.[36] In the world picture shared by these theorists, national identity had a paramount status that would admit only loyalties to the institutions of the national state. Hence the moulding of national identities into regional identities was considered to be a difficult task.

By contrast, recent theorists have taken into account actors other than institutions of the sovereign state, among them local governments,[37] NGOs[38] and MNCs,[39] and have included the broad spectre of institutions and associations thought to represent civil society[40] as private or privately organised agents of regional integration. Moreover, whereas conventional regional integration theory had confined regional integration to processes of institutionalisation, recent theory has ranked contractualisation equal to institutionalisation as means to promote regional integration.[41] The admission that there is a choice of instruments for the promotion of regional integration has had implications for the specification of goals that were considered to be achievable through regional integration. For contractualisation makes it possible to construct regional integration as a process the end of which is not the absorption but the continuity of existing state institutions together with the promotion of the ultimately free movement of persons, goods and services across the boundaries of regionally integrated states. Thus, 'new regionalism' has been constituted as a body of theory that takes into account migration as one factor of regional integration and thereby shifts the focus from concerns of the state to the wishes and desires of the people.[42]

Only the conceptualisation of international boundaries as skins of sovereign states made it possible to juxtapose regional and national identities of population groups. Against this nineteenth-century logic, it can be shown that, up until the end of the eighteenth century, states were far away from being conceived as autonomous entities with no more than necessary interconnections with the rest of the world. Up until the Napoleonic Wars, Europe consisted of more than three hundred polities most of which had at least some attributes of sovereignty or could claim to be under the control of sovereign rulers. The populations over which these rulers were invested were made up of multifarious groups whose members shared multiple identities and cultivated multiple loyalties to a variety of institutions and persons.[43] Changes of loyalties were frequent, specifically for military personnel, so that the degree of control by rulers over the ruled was limited.[44] Therefore, what is new about 'new regionalism' is not the seeming appearance of the possibility of multiple identities and loyalties but the admission, by theorists and decision-makers in government, that multiple identities and loyalties exist.

Finally, what is new about human security thinking? It can be said that much security theory from the 1950s to the 1980s dealt with military and foreign policy matters in the context of the East-West controversy. This was done so on defendable grounds. For one, the UN charters allocated matters of defence to the competence of the sovereign states.[45] Even so various notions of comprehensive and collective security were deliberated at some time or another during the period[46] and partly formed the basis for the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,[47] the UN were not generally regarded nor even accepted as an institution that could alone safeguard the security of its member states.[48]

Against this background, human security thinking has cast into

terms the demand that security should be sought and provided for not mainly by institutions of the state (such as through national armies) but through international regimes, institutions and organisations which appear to be capable of maintaining the political, social, economic and physical environment in a sustainable equilibrium.[49] While some theorists concerned with new security thinking take the view that this demand can be fulfilled only through the cooperation of state institutions within international organisations (Critical Security Theory; Copenhagen School),[50] others are convinced that 'comprehensive security' emerges primarily from concerns over environmental, economic, political social and cultural matters over which control cannot be accomplished merely by governments of sovereign states even if they cooperate.[51] The latter theorists thus insist that regional integration together with the strengthening of international organisations are necessary requirements for the provision of 'comprehensive security'. The major reason why these theorists take this view is that environmental catastrophes, economic disasters, political problems such as structural injustice, social problems resulting from inequalities and cultural deprivation can trigger migration processes as they may leave to individuals few options other than emigrating from their places of settlement. In including migration into the core factors of insecurity or threats to the stability of particular states and to the sustainability of various aspects of the environment in general, proponents of 'comprehensive security' have turned migration from an issue of sociology into one of international relations.

I leave out the question whether 'comprehensive security' or 'human security' (as it is sometimes called) is actually new in the sense of having been considered only from the end of the twentieth century (I have doubts that this is so).[52] Instead, I turn to the problem how migration and regional integration have emerged as core issues in the security debate and what the gains are that we have when we

continue this debate.

II. The Emergence of Migration as a Security Issue

Categorising migration as a factor of insecurity and a threat to the stability of the world and the states therein is not self-evident. On the one side, it is arguable that the governments of states have the task and ought to be given the means to control migration.[53] However, because the history of government attempts to control migration is the history of its failure,[54] there seems to be a lack of aptitude of government institutions to accomplish this task. On the other side, most voluntary migrants move in perfect legality and often with encouragement from government institutions. Moreover, most undocumented immigrants, that is, persons who are found to have violated immigration laws, eventually accomplish government recognition of their status as immigrants. Obviously, governments respecting human rights are under constraints not to fully exploit their legal rights to control migration. The implication is that the formulation and execution of anti-migration policies, justified on the grounds that migration is a factor of insecurity, follow not from considerations of migrant's interests but the mindsets of those who devise these policies and are informed by negative attitudes towards and perceptions of migration. The government attitudes and perceptions are frequently in conflict with the attitudes and perceptions of the migrants themselves.

As long as it remains possible to differentiate between voluntary migrants as persons who change their places of residence across a boundary of recognised significance, on the one side, and, on the other, refugees, asylum-seekers as well as other kinds of forced migrants, it can be assumed that voluntary migrants, especially those moving across longer distances, are highly motivated and risk-prone persons. This assumption can easily be confirmed from studies on

the history of migration that, up until the nineteenth century, displays solitary migrants as highly appreciated persons, holders of high office, gifted professionals and otherwise influential people.[55] The twentieth century has witnessed as well as the present is witnessing circumstances under which solitary migrants or small groups appear most frequent as the actors in migration processes, and there is no obvious reason why these migrants should be less risk-prone today than in previous periods. Hence, the expectation is sound that there will be many migrants who will do their very best to accomplish the goals that they have set for themselves by whatever means and sooner or later even if they have to evade or ignore existing restrictions. This tendency seems to apply to migrants of various statuses and degrees of financial affluence. Specifically, it can be shown to have applied to people who were categorised by the authorities as belonging to the poor. There are records of eighteenth -century beggars who were repeatedly expelled from several places and still were able to lead a relatively decent life with some degree of business success.[56] Even threats to punish returning beggars seem to have little effect of keeping them at bay.[57] Likewise, bureaucratic policies aimed at criminalising migrants were hardly preventive of migration. Instead, migrants became wary of society, tried their utmost to avoid police and made every effort to stay clean rather than stay at places that they considered unfavourable for themselves.[58] Thus, over a long period, migrants' willingness and ability to evade administrative prohibitions have been far more substantive than the available means of bureaucratic control.

However, government institutions have frequently resorted to simplistic or simplifying perceptions of migrants over the past two hundred or so years. Migration policies have sought to categorise migrants rather than understand or recognise their specific motives and goals. Ever since the nineteenth century, governments in Europe, North America and the European settlements in the South

Pacific have applied heterostereotypes which described migrants as lonely, marginal, uneducated, lazy, disobedient, poor people who were expected to commit themselves to unlawful actions. The primary source for these heterostereotypes has been a social theory, widespread in nineteenth-century Europe, according to which residentialism was taken to be the seemingly natural condition of life.[59] Within the bounds of this social theory, migrants were identified as persons who renounced residentialism and preferred to live either outside society (as permanent migrants) or switch membership from one to another society.[60] The former decision was construed as unnatural at best and criminal in the worst case, the latter decision was understood as evidence for the lack of loyalty.[61]

These government-sponsored heterostereotypes created negative images about migration and migrants and demanded the search of reasons of migration. Already late in the nineteenth century, social scientists began to devise research projects designed to determine migration factors. Rather than investigating why people stay, the sole heuristic question leading these projects was why people move.[62] Moreover, the heterostereotypes were to be applied generally to all migrants, irrespective of what may have been true in a given case. Nevertheless, although the research paradigm informing migration studies has recently been changing to the effect of calling into question the wisdom of nineteenth-century social theory,[63] the perception of migration as a threat to the stability of the world and the states therein has continued to be informed by the residentialist bias of nineteenth-century social theory but has little connection with the perceptions and attitudes of the migrants themselves. How did the gap between migrants' attitudes and perceptions and government perceptions on migrants come about?

Obviously, answers to this question depend on the specific sociocultural systems within or in between which migrations have taken

place. Within a European setting, it is remarkable that a persistent government migration policy has been on record only since the late seventeenth century. Instead, well into the seventeenth century, territorial rulers and governments of towns and cities conspicuously abstained from efforts to control migration although they might on occasions resort to measures of expulsion. At times of crisis, such as during the period of the Black Death in the middle of the fourteenth century, an estimated 20% of local populations were permanently on the move where they joined professional travellers such as merchants, apprentices, roving bandits, lordless mercenaries and regular warrior bands. The image of a 'feudal' population confined to the soil belongs to the realm of nineteenth-century academic mythology and has nothing to do with the Middle Ages and the early modern period.[64]

The revocation by Louis XIV in 1685 of the toleration edict of Nantes of 1589 indicated the beginning of a change of attitudes to wards migration. This was so because the plight of the Huguenots triggered positive responses from territorial rulers elsewhere in Europe. Some of these rulers, such as the Elector of Brandenburg, later King in Prussia, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, invited the expellees to settle in their lands at dedicated places and gave them special privileges. These rulers did so because of a cluster of motives among which political digs at the rule of Louis XIV, anti-Catholic religious partisanship and a deliberate population policy featured most prominently.[65]

Only the third motive deserves closer scrutiny in the present context. The emergence of a systemic population policy has to be seen against the background of contemporary demographic and political theories that formulated hypotheses about population change. Throughout the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth centuries, these theories were drawn on the Bible. According to the Book of

Genesis, all humankind had descended from the primordial couple through Noah and his sons. The biblical creation myth thus supported the assumption that all humankind had spread across the world through migration since the Flood. As the mythology contained in the Book of Genesis was taken for granted, how human beings all over the world could have descended from Noah. The theorists attempting to provide an answer derived from the information in the Book of Genesis the argument that the earliest of Noah's descendants had been gifted with extreme longevity and superfecundity so that they could accomplish unproportionately high population growth rates. The rapid growth appeared to allow the dissemination of the human species through migration. With the spreading of human settlements all across the inhabitable surface of the earth, longevity and superfecundity would decline together with the growth rate and accomplish a stability of populations through a balance of birth and death rates.[66]

However, this postulate of theory militated against empirical evidence that was recognised already in the late seventeenth as displaying declining populations.[67] Theorists concluded that the postulate of theory remained unfulfilled, not because the information provided by the Bible should have been wrong, but because many individuals through carelessness or on purpose ended their lives prematurely or were put to death before their time through natural disasters or acts of human violence. Theorists derived the practical advise from their observations that rulers should devise active population policies so as to end the population decline and accomplish a stable population in their territories. They demanded that the population decline should be reversed through proper education, the prevention of epidemics, the improvement of health care, the avoidance or at least the limitation of war and, when all these measures proved insufficient, a policy of immigration stimulation.[68] It was the latter of these demands that was taken up eagerly by rulers who

used domestic political crises in territories of other rulers to lure qualified migrants into their territories by granting them special privileges of the freedom of religious practice, exempting them from taxation and allocating to them land for settlement at favourable conditions.[69]

Moreover, rulers' toleration of a substantive degree of migration was supported by contractualist theories of the legitimacy of government. These theories was drawn on the assumption that the population of a territory constituted one or several political groups with social bonds and ties that were strong enough to act as the conveyors of legitimacy to their government through some hypothetical contract. Contractualism had been advocated as a theory of legitimacy from the early fourteenth century[70] but it was only in the course of the eighteenth century that migrations came to be understood as acts of voting by the feet to the advantage of the rulers in whose territories the number of immigrants exceeded the number of emigrants.[71] Consequently, rulers could enlist groups of new immigrants simply as an addition to the groups of subjects on territories under their control. The absence of nationalism prevented rulers and political theorists from categorising immigrants as a threat to the security of their territories and a jeopardy of national identity.

Nevertheless, the degree of success of active immigration policies remained behind the expectations of the theorists. For obvious reasons, active immigration policies were not feasible without toleration of emigration. On balance, immigration rates as well as emigration rates remained high in many territories, so that populations were in fact unstable rather than stable and difficult to be subjected to efficient and sustained bureaucratic control. A strong general population increase began to occur only towards the end of the eighteenth century and was due to factors that had not been considered by demographers of the time.[72]

New attitudes developed at the turn of the nineteenth century and were closely intertwined with the rise of nationalism. To be sure, throughout the nineteenth century governments continued to tolerate emigration,[73] at times even using emigration as a strategy of poverty alleviation.[74] But migration policy became increasingly interconnected with social and defence policy. The reason was that, in the course of the century, the task of providing social welfare shifted from parishes and other local communities to the central governments of states. Necessarily, already up until the end of the eighteenth century, local communities had tried to reduce the burden of social welfare provision by forcing beggars out and trying to avoid the settlement of poor immigrants.[75] But rulers had been able to counterbalance such measures by allocating newly founded settlements in suburban or even remote areas to immigrants.[76] The nineteenth-century abolishment of special privileges by which immigrants had received preferential treatment made the integration of immigrants in communities of settlers necessary. At the same time, the maintenance of social welfare burdens was increasingly felt to be too costly for local communities so that demands for the nationalisation of social welfare became increasingly vocal.[77] At the central or national level, provision of social welfare then became a means to strengthen national identity whereas, under the previous practice, it had been a benefit extended to certain individuals in need on the spot. The conversion of social policy from an instrument of poverty alleviation to a means proffering national identity entailed the consequence that a debate arose whether and, if so, to what extent, immigrants should be able to receive social welfare benefits.[78]

Moreover, nineteenth-century theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz understood nations as defence communities and argued that wars could only be fought with success if the nations were united behind their armed forces. The image of the 'nations in arms' as contending parties in warfare supported the categorisation of war as a 'struggle

for survival of nations'.[79] Within the confines of this theory, emigration meant a loss of defence capability, whereas immigration could be judged as a process of the admission of people into the state whose trustworthiness in military matters had not been tested. Emigration could be admitted only if the emigrants could be classed as poor 'undesirables',[80] whereas immigration was to be fended off so as to prevent the settlement of allegedly unreliable subjects.[81]

The demand following from both perceptions was that migration should be controlled by governments in order to guarantee the domestic stability and the international security of the nation in its state. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, one of the driving forces behind European colonial expansion resulted from the attempt to channel overseas emigration into areas over which the one or the other European government held some degree of - usually illegitimate - control. Governments with colonial aspirations at the turn of the twentieth century competed over their relative success in the accomplishment of this goal because resettling emigrants in colonial dependencies did not have to counted as a statistical loss of population. The larger the state, the more theorists and practical political decision-makers were ready to assume that nations should be unified so as to convey the image of military strength to the outside world.[82] In the view of these theorists, only small states, such as Belgium or Switzerland, could afford to comprise a heterogeneous population, rely solely on production and trade as sources of revenue and dispense of the sizeable armed forces.[83] By contrast, big states were credited with 'security demands' that were judged as accomplishable solely through a united population and policies of rigid migration control.[84]

The consequence of these government perceptions on migration was that the gap widened between attitudes of governments towards migrants and migration and the attitudes of the migrants themselves.

Governments tended to downgrade the social status and economic achievements of emigrants whereas migrants themselves did not necessary regard poverty as incentives for emigration.[85] Governments tended to class emigrants as manifest or potential delinquents whereas migrants made strong efforts to retain the legality of their status.[86] Emigrants often responded with sensitivity to political pressure and overtaxation and chose to go when they saw no prospect of improvement. Or migrants simply decided to move without having a particular incentive to do so while governments tried to downscale political incentives.[87] Governments thus took the point of view that migration is a type of action that deviates from the assumed norm that people should stay where they were. This residentialist attitude was informed by nineteenth-century evolutionist social theory but was not in conformity with the perceptions and attitudes of migrants.[88] Contrary to historical evidence, social theorists in the academic world as well as political decision-makers in government took for granted a vision of world history according to which mass migration was a phenomenon of relatively recent times.[89] Little has changed in the assessment of long-distance as well as local migration in the context of security policy ever since then.[90] Realist theorists of the state as an integrated actor have relied on nineteenth-century assumptions in so far as they have classed governments of sovereign states as prime actors in international relations and have restricted security theory to a matter of state policy.[91]

Obviously, only a small part of all migration takes place across international boundaries. But international migration epitomises the predicament of the state as long as it remains defined in accordance with realist theories. This is so because realism takes for granted a degree of unity of states so that they can - for the purposes of theory - appear as consolidated actors.[92] But international migration jeopardises this supposition because it displays the populations of

states as heterogeneous, diverse and disunited. In other words, international migration becomes a security issue only within the confines of nineteenth-century social, political and international theory and its twentieth-century adaptations. Rather than using force to secure existing boundaries most of which are arbitrary anyway and can, if understood as contingent products of history, hardly be expected to find general acceptance and approval, it is more salient for governments of states to support schemes of regional integration within areas in which migration is found to have occurred most frequently over a longer period of time. Under this premise, human security would be extendable to those who move and those who stay. The question then remains how and to what extent regional integration can advance human security.

[1] For a recent case of state-centric security theory see: Robert G. Gilpin, 'No On Loves a Political Realist', Benjamin Frankel, ed., *Realism. Restatements and Renewal* (London, Portland, OR: Cass, 1996), pp. 33–26.

[2] See: Ritter N. Diaz, The Political Economy of Regional Integration in the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). M.A. Thesis. University of Tsukuba, Graduate School of Internatuional Political Economy, 2000. It is a euphemism to say that LAFTA was replaced by LAIA as John McCormick [*Understanding the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999), pp. 23–24] has suggested. This is so because the ending of LAFTA came after the admission that a multilateral design for free trade agreements were not considered desirable by the then involved governments.

[3] For a recent survey see: Stefan Collignon, *Regionale Integration und Entwicklung in Ostafrika* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrikakunde, 1990). Victor Hermann Umbricht, *Multilateral Mediation. Practical Experiences and Lessons* (Dordrecht, Boston: Nijhoff, 1989).

[4] On ASEAN see: Amitav Acharya, *The Quest for Identity. International Relations of Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000). Suthiphand Chirathivat, Franz Knipping, Poul Henrik Lassen, Chia Siow Yue, eds, *Asia-Europe on the Eve of the 21st Century* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001). Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, Hadi Soesastro, eds, *Reinventing ASEAN* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).

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[7] See: Kazu Takahashi, 'Cross-border Cooperation among Local Governments between Western and Eastern Europe), *Roshia nishigawa shûhen ni okeru kannaigai chiiki kyôryoku no kenkyû* (Sapporo: Hokkaidô Daigaku Surabu Kenkyû Sentâ, 1998), pp. 53–82.

[8] On the debate on local citizenship see: Geoffrey Alderman, J. Leslie, V. Pollman Governments, *Ethnic Groups and Political Representation* (Aldershot: European Science Foundation, 1992) (Comparative Studies on Government and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe. 1850 - 1940. 4.) Veit Bader, 'Citizenship and Exclusion', *Political Theory* 23 (1995), pp. 222–235. Thomas Faist, 'How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse. 1978 - 1992', Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Martin A. Schain, eds, *The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe* (London: Cass, 1994), pp. 50 –71. Faist, 'Transnationalization in International Migration. Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23 (2000), pp. 189

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[9] See: Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership of Europe* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Soysal, 'Citizenship and Identity. Living in Diasporas in Post-War Europe', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23 (1999), pp. 1–15.
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[12] Treaty on European Union, Maastricht 7 February 1992, Art. 8a.

[13] See: Anthony Fielding, 'Migration and Culture', Tony Champion, ed., *Migration Processes and Patterns,* vol. 1 (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), pp. 201-214. Fielding, 'Migrations, Institutions and Politics. The Evolution of European Migration Policies', Russell King, ed., *Mass Migrations in Europe. The Legacy and the Future* (London: Belhaven Press, 1993), pp. 40-62. Aristide R. Zolberg, 'International Migration in Political Perspective', Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, Silvano M. Tomasi, eds, *Global Trends in Migration* (Staten Island: Center for Migration Research of New York, 1981), pp. 3-27.

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[17] Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 59–99. Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis. Challenge to States and to Human Rights* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1995). Aristide R. Zolberg, 'The Next Wave. Migration Theory for a Changing World', *International Migration Review* 23 (1989), pp. 403–430.

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[21] Specifically in Africa and the Asia Pacific where, until then, such processes had not attracted the attention of scholars in the Western world.

[22] For work on human security see below note 51.

[23] For a summary see: Harald Kleinschmidt, *The Nemesis of Power* (London: Reaktion Books, 2000).

[24] Carsten Küther, *Menschen auf der Straße. Vagierende Unterschichten in Bayern, Franken und Schwaben in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983).

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[26] See: Michael Sikora, *Disziplin und Desertion* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996).

[27] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Der geschloßne Handelsstaat* (Tübingen: Cotta, 1800), pp. 58–59 [ed. by Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky, Fichte, Werke. 1800 – 1801 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1988), p. 69 (Fichte. Gesamtausgabe. I/7.)].

[28] Friedrich Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, 3rd ed., ed. by Eugen Oberhummer (Munich, Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1923), p. 434 [first published (1897)].

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[30] Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[31] See: Kleinschmidt, *Menschen* (note 25), Chap. I. Keiji Maegawa, 'An Anthropological Approach on Social Change in the Modern World-System', *Rekishi Jinrui* (History and Anthropology) 22 (1994), pp. 49–88. Maegawa, 'From Articulation to Translative Adaptation. Methodological Inquiries into the Localization Process of Western Culture', *Journal of Asian Pacific Communication* 9 (1999), pp. 131–143.

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筑波法政第三十五号（二〇〇三）

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[33] See above note 11.

[34] Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 33–65.

[35] Especially Ernest B. Haas, Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration', *International Organization* 18 (1964), pp. 705–737. Haas, 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 5 (1966/67), pp. 315–343.

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[37] Harald Kleinschmidt, *Württemberg und Japan (Stuttgart: Fay, 1991)*. *Kazu Takahashi, 'Political Reorganization and Regional Cooperations in "East Europe"', Mikiko Iwasaki, ed., Varieties of Regional Integration* (Munster, Hamburg: LIT, 1995), pp. 117–135.

[38] See: Andrew Hurrell, Benedict Kingsbury, eds, *The International Politics of the Environment* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). Vandana Shiva, 'Ecological Balance in an Era of Globalization', Paul Wapner, Lester Edwin J. Ruis, eds, *Principled World Politics* (Lanham, MD, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 130–149. Oran R. Young, *International Cooperation. Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1989).

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[40] See for a review: Louise Fawcett, Andrew Hurrell, eds, *Regionalism in World Politics* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[41] Harald Kleinschmidt, 'A Preparatory for a New Regional Integration Theory', Mikiko Iwasaki, ed., *Varieties of Regional Integration* (Munster, Hamburg: LIT, 1995), pp. 47–71.

[42] Sarah Collinson, *Beyond Borders. West European Policy Towards the 21st Century* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993), pp. 100–104. Collinson, *Europe and International Migration,* second ed. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp. 43–63 [first published (1993)]. The conventional view was upheld by Mark Gibney ['The Citizenship and Freedom of Movement and the Welfare State', Gibney, ed., *Open Borders? Closed Societies?*

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[43] For a description see: Harald Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1998).

[44] See: Gerhard Oestreich, *Strukturprobleme der frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Brigitta Oestreich (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980). Oestreich, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State,* ed. by Helmut Georg Koenigsberger, Brigitta Oestreich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[45] Charter of the United Nations, Art. 2(1). For a wide-ranging study see: Sabine Jaberg, *Systeme kollektiver Sicherheit in und für Europa in Theorie, Praxis und Entwurf* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1998). I owe this reference to the kindness of August Pradetto, Hamburg.

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[47] Krisztina Vigh, Helsinki and After. The Invention of the Concept of Human Security. M. A. Thesis (University of Tsukuba, Graduate School of International Political Economy, 2000), pp. 49–60.

[48] For the exceptional position that the Japanese government took in its formulation of a UN-centric security policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see Pang, Cooperation (note 46).

[49] See: Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

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[51] Mahbub ul-Haq, 'Global Governance for Human Security', Majid Tehranian, ed., *Worlds Apart. Human Security and Global Governance* (London, New York: Tauris, 1999), pp. 79–94. Nana K. Poku, Neil Renwick, John Glenn, 'Human Security in a Globalising World', David T. Graham, Nana K. Poku, eds, *Migration, Globalisation and Human Security* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 9–22.

[52] I have discussed the evidence pointing towards a long conceptual history of human security in a paper to appear in *Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen*.

[53] Particularly from the point of view of contractualist theories of legitimacy. See, for an example, the British Alien Act of 1905 [5 Edward VII, c. 13], printed in: Myer Jack Landa, *The Alien Problem and Its Remedy* (London: s.n., 1911), pp. 299–308.

[54] For a review of immigration restriction policies see: Gary P. Freeman, 'Can Liberal States Control Unwanted Migration?', Mark J. Miller, ed., *Strategies for Immigration Control* (Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage, 1994), pp. 17–30 (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. 534.) Mark J. Miller, 'Towards Understanding State Capacity to Prevent Unwanted Migration. Employer Sanctions Enforcement in France, 1975 – 1990', Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Martin A. Schain, eds, *The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe* (London: Cass, 1994), pp. 140–167. Rotte, 'Immigration Control' (note 14). Christian Joppke, 'Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration', *World Politics* 50 (1998), pp. 266–293. Myron Weiner, 'Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration', *International Migration Review* 30 (1996), pp. 171–197.

[55] Kleinschmidt, *Menschen* (note 25).

[56] Among others see: Thomas McStay Adams, *Bureaucracy and Beggards. French Social Policy in the Age of the Enlightenment* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Olwen H. Hufton, *The Poor in Eighteenth-Century France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). Ingeborg Titz-Matuszak, 'Mobilität der Armut', *Plesse-Archiv* 24 (1988), pp. 9–338. Otto Ulbricht, ?Die Welt eines Bettlers um 1775', *Historische Anthropologie* 2 (1994), pp. 379–398.

[57] Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, Abt. 268, Nr 650.

[58] Lucy Luck, 'A Little of My Life', *London Mercury* 13 (1925/26), pp. 354–373. For a study of the behaviour of poor migrants see: Edith Saurer, *Straße, Schmuggel, Lottospiel* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), pp. 137–216. Elisabeth Schepers, 'Regieren durch Grenzsetzungen. Struktur und Grenzen des

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[59] Johann Baptista Fallati, 'Die Genesis der Völkergesellschaft', *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 1 (1844), pp. 183-184. Albert Schäffle, *Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers,* vol. 4,2 (Tubingen:, 1881), pp. 216-219. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* vol. 1 (New York, London: Appleton, 1910, pp. 449-453.

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筑波法政第三十五号（二〇〇三）