

# *Domestic Anarchy : Towards A Constitutive Model of State Disintegration*

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## ***Introduction***

This essay is a companion to another one appeared in this journal (No. 29/ 2000) bearing the title 'Social Order in World Politics'. In the course of comparing the nature of political units that make up the international system, that essay touched upon issues pertaining to the characteristic features of individual 'citizens' in contemporary states and the relevance of this to social disorder in domestic politics. In this essay we take that discussion further by shifting the level of analysis to collectivities of individuals or communal groups within contemporary states. Our main concern here will nevertheless be limited to a demonstration of the dialectic of domestic anarchy rather than a comparative analysis of social order in domestic and world politics.

Even though it can be argued that domestic politics has always been potentially more anarchic than its international counterpart, it was only in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War that the fear of such a phenomenon assumed a global dimension.<sup>1</sup> The international situation in the last decade seemed also to have borne out such a fear, although authoritative voices which claim that 'ethnic warfare is on the wane,'<sup>2</sup> or that 'ethnic war essentially does not exist'<sup>3</sup> have gradually begun to be heard. And yet in a number of places different groups still continue to challenge states and defy

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their authority.<sup>1</sup> Examples of such places include, some Andean countries, South East Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Sri Lanka and India.<sup>5</sup>

With varying degrees and forms, similar challenges could be observed in most of 'the post-colonial states,' which G. Sorensen has defined as, 'the weak and unconsolidated states in the periphery, which are often in an ongoing state of entropy.'<sup>6</sup> The list notably includes many states in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the twenty or so states that came into being after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and 'most of which have no tradition of statehood or practice in self-government'.<sup>7</sup> Thus, it may indeed be true to say that the world has witnessed in the last decade the deepening of the trend towards domestic anarchy.

It sounds a little hyperbolic, but some analysts have even argued that in the wake of the end of the Cold War the world has experienced its first period of turbulence since the birth of the state system some 350 years ago.<sup>8</sup> Such views in part explain the surge in interest among international relations analysts in domestic anarchy, a subject that had hitherto been mainly the preserve of the disciplines of comparative politics and area studies. The growing interest also reflects the significant transformation in the notion of international security itself. Yet there still seems to be greater concern with the immediate, albeit undoubtedly important, question of what ought to be done about states that have failed, or are poised to fail, as a result of domestic anarchy than with the more academic and demanding task of trying to comprehend the dynamics of domestic anarchy itself.<sup>9</sup> Our own purpose in this essay is to attempt to take a small step towards bridging this gap by carefully trying to put together the relevant pieces of the works by various political scientists, and deductively constructing what may be called a constitutive model<sup>10</sup> of domestic anarchy. When we say a deductively constructed model, we mean one that can be methodologically defended

on the basis of what James Rosenau has called 'potential obsrevability'.<sup>11</sup>

### ***What is Domestic Anarchy?***

We use the term domestic anarchy here in the most basic sense. It is used interchangeably with state failure to denote a situation in which a central government's power to discharge its 'crucial' functions is progressively eroded or curtailed as a result of revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides or politicides and/or adverse or disruptive regime changes.<sup>12</sup> The 'crucial' functions of a government include :

sovereign control of a territory ; sovereign supervision (though not necessarily ownership) of the nation's resources ; effective and rational revenue extraction from people, goods and services ; the capacity to build and maintain an adequate national infrastructure (roads, postal services, telephone systems, railways and the like) ; the capacity to render such basic services as sanitation, education, housing, and health care ; and the capacity for governance and the maintenance of law and order.<sup>13</sup>

The relationship/distinction between the concepts of state failure, state disintegration and state collapse also needs to be clarified. We might think of the phenomena represented by these terms as being situated respectively on a continuum in which state failure comes before both state disintegration and state collapse since a significant breakdown in any one of the 'crucial' functions listed above could be regarded as symptomatic of state failure. Consequently, for a state to disintegrate the breakdown in those 'crucial' functions should encompass more or less all spheres of its activities. Put simply, a state collapses when it is unable to sustain itself as a state.

A broad consensus exists to the effect that the proliferation of

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communal movements<sup>14</sup> that challenged state authority in recent years is explicable in terms of the reawakening/rekindling of ethnic and national sentiments which had hitherto been smothered by Cold War politics. At various levels of generalizations, different explanations have been advanced to make sense of the circumstances that foster or inhibit these movements. One theory maintains that the process of economic modernization leads to a division of labor which has the potential to replace organically integrated society with mechanically integrated society.<sup>15</sup> Ethnic identification, having been rendered dysfunctional, will therefore disappear. For the proponents of the opposing view modernization, rather than resulting in a new form of integration, increases ethnic group interaction that may heighten conflict. The reasoning involved in this aspiration is to the effect that as ascriptive ties lose their political relevance, un-integrated citizens, looking for an anchor in a sea of change, will grab hold of an increasingly anachronistic ethnic identity, which bursts onto the scene and then recedes as the process of structural differentiation moves toward a reintegrated society.<sup>16</sup>

History does not seem to vindicate the universality of either of these arguments. Underlying both theories is the implicit assumption that ethnic or cultural heterogeneity or dualism is a *sin qua non* for ethnic conflict.<sup>17</sup> We argue otherwise.<sup>18</sup> We maintain that cultural homogeneity does not guarantee social peace. This view, while less popular, has a long pedigree.<sup>19</sup> This does not of course mean that 'modernization' arguments are irrelevant to the analyses of domestic anarchy. Instead, what this means is that these arguments are more or less plausible depending on individual cases and that a more useful theory should be able, or at least aspire to be able, to account for the phenomena over time and across societies.

At a lower level of abstraction, some analysts have focused on the precipitating causes of violent communal conflicts and singled

out different sets of factors that purportedly account for the eruption of intrastate violence. Richard Shultz identified five major characteristics of groups involved in ethnic conflicts: that the groups are part of a severely divided society; that they see their differences with other ethnic groups as irreconcilable; that ethnicity is a principal form of identification; that, in the extreme form, such groups lay claim to a specific piece of territory; and that the groups are subject to the manipulation of the elite.<sup>20</sup> S. W. R. de Samarasinghe also pointed out that in general, the dynamics of ethnic conflicts suggest that given the appropriate conditions such as a culturally homogeneous group, a 'homeland', a common set of grievances, political leadership and political mobilization etc.- a separatist movement with modest aims that do not extend beyond devolution of power within the existing state can easily evolve into a full blown secessionist movement.<sup>21</sup> Druckman similarly observed that extreme attachments to ethnic, religious, national or clan identities lead to inhumane acts toward those perceived to be the enemy.<sup>22</sup>

We propose to attempt below, among other things, to advance a more parsimonious explanation anchored in--and based on--both positivist--not in the more metatheoretically rigid and unimaginative sense--and postmodernist epistemological foundation.<sup>23</sup> Our aspiration is not to advance a causal explanation of domestic anarchy.

It is instead to take the first step towards this end by identifying what appear to be the dialectical components of domestic anarchy and sorting out the underlying patterns that link them. Once a model of what constitutes state failure is in place, we hope that a causal relationship among the variables could be sought out, and the dynamics of domestic anarchy, despite the 'presence' of a central authority, elaborated more easily. This should ultimately pave the way for empirically ascertaining the correspondence between the derivatives of the model and the realities in the politically turbulent

areas of the globe.

### ***Elements of Domestic Anarchy***

The ultimate source of communal conflicts, which in many cases lead to domestic anarchy and emerge under a variety of circumstances and take various forms,<sup>24</sup> is perhaps reducible to *the crises of citizenship and legitimacy*.<sup>25</sup> When these crises reach an acute level, they could lead to the total collapse of the institution of state. In the following pages we will demonstrate the processes and stages through which the transformation of the crises takes place. But first it is appropriate to clarify the building blocs of our hypothesis : its key concepts.

A citizen is defined here quite simply as a member of a political community, entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities are attached to membership.<sup>26</sup> As citizenship is such an expression of membership in a community, its real meaning has varied widely depending on the community and the historical period.<sup>27</sup> One of the basic questions which arises therefore is whether we can refer in the same way and across societies to citizenship as the bonds that bind individuals into political community.

We answer in the affirmative with some qualifications. Although it had not been in vogue at the time, J. P. Nettl had argued decades ago that for analytic reasons stateness should be viewed as a quantitative variable according to which one could speak of a political entity as having more or less qualities of stateness.<sup>28</sup> In this sense, it may be truer to refer both to the principle and the real meaning of citizenship as similarly more or less developed. That is to say that the condition of citizenship ought to be judged by the degree to which its constituent elements are present.<sup>29</sup> But it would be incor-

rect to regard the notion of citizenship as something totally irrelevant to or absent in the minds of the 'peripheral' people. Citizenship implies full status in a political community, and it is developed to the extent that all sections of the population subject to common authority have certain political rights in common, including the right to participate in political life.<sup>30</sup>

The other key concept in which our leading argument in this paper anchors itself is legitimacy.<sup>31</sup> In the Weberian tradition of analysis, power relations are legitimate where those involved in them, subordinate as well as dominant, believe them to be so.<sup>32</sup> David Beetham provides an alternative definition: 'for power to be legitimate, three conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs; the express consent of the subordinate, or the most significant among them, to the particular relations of power.'<sup>33</sup> We would use the Weberian definition here, despite the criticism leveled at it by some<sup>34</sup> rather than Beetham's since the former is as adequate as and yet more parsimonious than the latter and is therefore more useful in tackling the issue of legitimacy across historical societies.

Less abstractly, there are two interrelated ways by which legitimacy of a government can be better evaluated and understood.<sup>35</sup> One way is by considering how a government came into being or the mechanism through which the political leaders assumed power. In this sense, governments which assume power through constitutional/legal means are legitimate and those which do so otherwise are illegitimate. Legitimacy could also be judged on the basis of the policy outputs of those who govern. As S. Scharr notes, the regime or the leaders provide the stimuli, first in the form of policies improving citizens' welfare and, second, in the form of symbolic materials which function as secondary reinforcements, and the followers respond by assuming either a favorable or unfavorable attitude to-

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ward the stimulators.<sup>36</sup> In short, the central issues involved in political outputs pertain to the questions of what values will be allocated and who will benefit from them and who will be burdened by the particular configuration of value allocations.<sup>37</sup>

Judging the legitimacy of a ruling group by its policy output assumes greater significance especially in 'post-colonial states' where government administration is generally less concerned with public goods and where both in theory and practice the state is 'a source of power, prestige, and enrichment for those clever or fortunate enough to control and staff it.'<sup>38</sup> There is also a growing indication that a trend is now emerging in which people increasingly judge the legitimacy of their leaders on the basis of policy outputs instead of solely on the mechanism by which political leaders assume power.<sup>39</sup> Clearly this has implications for theories that equate the presence of a central authority with order and its absence with anarchy.

This essay postulates, it should be reiterated here, that there is a constitutive link between the crises of citizenship and legitimacy on the one hand and the onset of domestic anarchy that, in some cases, could lead to state failure and its eventual collapse. What are the alternative mechanisms by which the mutation of peaceful communal movements into domestic anarchy can be forestalled and, if conflicts somehow erupt, may be regulated? The tentative answers to these questions will be given towards the end of the essay, but first it is helpful to lay down the framework for analyzing the distinct stages and the intricate processes that link the twin crises of citizenship and legitimacy on the one hand and the phenomenon of domestic anarchy on the other.



### ***Process Analysis of Domestic Anarchy***

The origin of communal conflicts could be traced to at least as far back as the time of the Assyrians, around 610 B. C, when a coalition of Babylonians, Medes, and Chaldeans began a rebellion against Sardanapalus to end the Assyrian rule.<sup>40</sup> For analytic and practical purposes, however, the dialectical process of state failure could be thought to begin when a state comes into being in national or imperial form. Generally, a state comes into being through institution or acquisition. J. P. Nettl characterized the two processes of state formation as that of implosion and explosion respectively representing a particularization or narrowing of sovereignty into ethnically homogeneous or at least ethnically defined areas, and an extension of central authority across ethnic boundaries and particular, hitherto sovereign communities.<sup>41</sup>

More than how states are created, however, it is how they are ruled, or more precisely how their rule is perceived by those who are ruled, which conditions the emergence of communal movements. Almost invariably, states that came into being as a result of imposition from above or outside are multi-communal or have political boundaries that do not coincide with cultural boundaries. This means two things. First, it means that free institutions are next to impossible to mold under the circumstances.<sup>42</sup> This difficulty also hampers the emergence and consolidation of legal and peaceful ways of airing dissenting views. Second, it means that the authority of the state is likely to be perceived, or misperceived as exclusive, alien, arbitrary or a combination of some or all of these.<sup>43</sup> In spite of this fact, or because of it, political leaders would attempt to promote nationalism<sup>44</sup> with a declared goal of forging a nation coterminous with the state. It must be mentioned in passing that the meanings attached to nationalism in much scholarship and most po-

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litical discourse reveal more about the users of the term than about the phenomena.<sup>45</sup> This definitional problem is compounded by the thinness of the theory of nationalism.<sup>46</sup> Alexander Motyl has thus summed up the various definitions of nationalism :

Nationalism may be a political ideology or ideal that advocates that nations should have their own states (or enjoy self-rule); it may then be the belief that the world is divided into nations and that these divisions are both proper and natural ; it may be love of one's nation ; and, finally it may be the belief that one's own nation should stand above all other nations. In simple terms, these views of nationalism boil down respectively to the beliefs in the nation-state, in self-government, in national identity, in national well-being and in national superiority.<sup>47</sup>

The concepts of nation, state and nation-state are not also without definitional problems. A nation is understood here, in the same sense as Benedict Anderson had defined it, as imagined community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.<sup>48</sup> The term state is used in the Weberian sense : 'a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population 'including all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction.'<sup>49</sup> The ideal nation-state is where the political coincides with the cultural attributes of statehood. In other words, a nation-state presupposes a congruity between the 'national' boundaries of the state and its 'political' boundaries. Needless to say, the concept nation-state has also often been loosely, and sometimes inaccurately, used both in the academic and political discourse.<sup>50</sup>

Coming back to the subject of nationalism, two types of nationalisms could be identified from which political leaders might like to choose : civic and ethnic. As defined by Richard Shultz, civic nationalism is an early variety based on a set of abstract principles of

civic responsibility ; and ethnic nationalism is a form of nationalism based on ethnic, and occasionally religious identity. The first form is more inclusive, that is citizenship is theoretically open to anyone who can meet the requirements for civic duty. In those states which promote the second variant of nationalism, citizenship can not be acquired without the appropriate ethnic or religious stamp.<sup>51</sup> With few exceptions, civic nationalism is therefore the officially preferred nationalism promoted by the ruling elite.

It is thus fair to assume that at least at the level of rhetoric virtually all states promote civic nationalism. That is probably why most communal groups seem to judge the legitimacy of the authority of their governments not against what it says but rather against what it does or is perceived to do. Once ethnic rather than civic nationalism is believed to hold sway in the face of the imagined or real threat emanating from the ethnic or religious self-centeredness of certain groups, political discontent would emerge. When the discontent gets politicized, the beneficiaries of the governmental policy outputs would begin to resent the reaction of the marginalized groups. Correspondingly, the latter groups would feel relegated to a second class-citizen status, while at the same time being maligned as less than patriotic by the former. At this stage, a sense of relative deprivation would begin to develop. Political scientist Ted Robert Gurr authored the theory of relative deprivation and defined its essence as 'actors' perception of discrepancy between their own *value expectations* and their environment's apparent *value capability*.<sup>52</sup> C. D. Hah and J. Martin's less abstract definition of the level of relative deprivation is also based on this conception :<sup>53</sup> the level of relative deprivation represents the balance between the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.

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However, for the sense of relative deprivation to emerge the situation need not necessarily and objectively be bad, in relative or absolute terms. Many advocates of regional autonomy, observed Susan Olzak, tend to indulge in the rhetoric of economic and/or political subjugation, even in regions that are undergoing an economic boom.<sup>54</sup> Neither the presence nor the absence of objective inequality leads to the corresponding appearance or non-appearance of a sense of relative deprivation and political discontent. What is more crucial at this stage is the way the state of affairs is widely perceived. As Hah and Martin underscore, inequality engenders dysfunctional inputs to the political system only to the extent that they cause value expectations to outpace value capabilities. In this case, the elite could play a crucial role in the construction of images and their portrayal to their followers as empirical realities.<sup>55</sup> Once political discontent and widespread sense of relative deprivation are in place together with mutual distrust and wariness among different groups of 'citizens' we can speak of a state as confronted with the *crises of legitimacy and citizenship*, a twin crises that reinforce each other.

After these crises are initiated, the next stage comes to the fore when the marginalized communal groups begin to load the political system with something resembling what Gabriel Almond has in a different context called *dysfunctional inputs* that cause changes in the capabilities of a political system, in the conversion patterns and structures, and in the socialization and recruitment functions.<sup>56</sup> The demands of communal movements, hereafter referred to as dysfunctional inputs or simply inputs, could vary with respect to the direction in which they flow as well as their quantity, substance or content, intensity, source and number of kinds affecting the system at a given point. Also relevant to our analysis here is the nature of the groups who advance these inputs. Ted Gurr identified the fol-

lowing broad categories of groups that are involved in substantial conflict with the state: nations without state, communal contenders for state power, militant sects, peoples of the frontiers and ethnoclass. The orientation of these groups towards the state would be one or a combination of the following: a demand for recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the group, reform of some aspects of the political system, fair representation at the center and attainment of independent statehood. These orientations are re-categorized under the more generic terms of control, access, accommodation, and exit.<sup>67</sup> It is true, however, that a group's orientation towards the state and the nature of its demand could, and in most cases would, change over time. It is to the discussion of the nature and source of these variations that we should now turn.

The environment within which they are situated and operate profoundly affects the behaviors of both states and communal movements. These contextual factors could be placed under the general rubric of the structural attributes of the international system. They include internationally and regionally recognized rules and norms such as those relating to the formation and recognition of states, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and the inviolability of their national borders. The principle of self-determination also falls within this category.

The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, which is ingrained in the charter of the United Nations, is also reflected in the legal documents of other regional organizations. Clearly, this principle works against communal movements that seek to secede from an existing state. It should also be noted that although in theory this principle applies equally to both sides engaged in an internal conflict, the government side is only marginally affected, if at all, in its relations with other sovereign states.

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The other structural attributes of the international system that have had significant bearings on the origin, development and outcome of dysfunctional inputs to a political system were colonialism, Cold War politics as well as its end. Colonialism played a significant role in setting the stage for the crises of legitimacy and citizenship in many 'post-colonial' states<sup>58</sup> through the arbitrary process by which it created these states. A remark by Lord Salisbury, one of the British colonial architects in Africa, illustrates this point :

[we] have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod ; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.<sup>59</sup>

It is thus clear that the disjuncture between state boundaries and that of ethnic groups laid the basis for the crises of legitimacy and citizenship that engulfed many contemporary states. It may also be said that these structural problem also made it difficult to introduce genuinely representative institutions. John Stuart Mill noted generations ago that it is in general a necessary condition of free institution, that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.<sup>60</sup> The fact that state-making process brought different peoples together that have nothing in common except, perhaps, the fact that they had been enemies in the past provided a fertile soil for the sense of relative deprivation to emerge and flourish.<sup>61</sup> Yet despite the widespread awareness about the arbitrariness of colonial borders, post-independence leaders of these states did almost nothing to change the territorial *status quo*. Instead they institutionalized it by creating norms that upheld the principle of the inviolability of the existing borders. Measured by the degree of compliance with regime injunctions, particularly in in-

stances where short-term or myopic self-interests collide with regime rules,<sup>62</sup> the boundary cooperation system has proved to be strong. The logical question which arises, therefore, is that if post-independence leaders were fully cognizant of the fact, as Michel Walzer put it, that good fences make good neighbors only when there is some minimal agreement on where the fences should go,<sup>63</sup> why did they choose to do nothing about it?

Two contending theories address this issue. One is based on the neoliberal notion of 'specific reciprocity', initially advanced by Robert Keohane,<sup>64</sup> and applied specifically to the issue under discussion by Jeffrey Herbst.<sup>65</sup> Keohane defined reciprocity as 'exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior action of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad.'<sup>66</sup> Players are attracted to the principle of specific reciprocity when they realize that mutual cooperation can yield more satisfying results than mutual defection but in which temptation for defection also exists.<sup>67</sup> Jeffrey Herbst adapted Keohane's conceptual construct and argued that structural conditions which made post-independence elite insecure in their position and gave them little control over the nation allured them to embracing the principle of specific reciprocity and created the border cooperation regime.<sup>68</sup> In short, according to this theory, since most of the borders of post-colonial states are artificial and did not reflect demographic realities, the leaders realized that they are all *vulnerable* if the Pandora's box of revising borders was opened up. Hence a mutually unswerving support for the preservation of the borders as demarcated by the 'outsiders' and the corresponding general denial of recognition and assistance to separatist and secessionist movements.<sup>69</sup>

In general, the consequences of the prevailing structural attributes could be systematically analyzed by utilizing George Modelski's

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classificatory schema of the structure of a political system that are split into two in the case of internal war as those of authority, solidarity, culture and resources.<sup>70</sup> An authority structure includes the institutions and peoples that are engaged in authoritative decision-making, their skills as well as the nature of the decisions made. This structure is important in that for a sense of relative deprivation to emerge there should exist among a collectivity a belief that its members are unjustifiably disadvantaged. The elite in this regard play a crucial role in articulating this 'disadvantage' or, if it is not there, in inventing it. The feeling of being disadvantaged is a factor of paramount importance at least in the initial stage of a communal movement. It is perhaps no coincidence that most communal movements make more of the fact that they are (were) the victims of inequality and discrimination than they do of any claim that their group presents the vestige of a nation.<sup>71</sup>

The structure of solidarity, on the other hand, does not coincide with political boundaries. As a rule, it is either larger or smaller than the latter and is very fluid in that the extent of its boundaries depends on the strength of the pressures from the other structures. As Heraclides elaborates,

the primary targets of the secessionist [and also of the central government's] activities for assistance include those that are considered to be within the 'solidarity universe' because of ethnic or national identity, religion, ideology, language, culture, race or history. Then there are those who are seen as likely supporters because they are well known historical enemies of the opponent group.<sup>72</sup>

The structures of culture and communication encompass the language and religion as well as self-image of the actors. This structure is also instrumental in rallying support. The scope of this



structure is influenced by, and is sometimes parallel to, the structure of solidarity. Last, but not least, a political system has a resource structure that also extends beyond its political boundaries. These include domestic resources, international alliances, access to military and economic aid and foreign bases of operations. The aforementioned structures reinforce one another and are thus interdependent. For instance, the availability of a foreign base (an element of resource structure) may depend on the empathy based on religion and ideology (elements of structure of culture). Similarly, the scope of the structure of solidarity would significantly depend on the skill and styles of the decision-makers (aspects of authority structure).

Structural factors influence not only the effects of the dysfunctional inputs on the political system but also their defining features. What ultimate form such an input would take (i.e., whether a group's orientation toward the state will be exit, control, access or accommodation) depends on a host of variables including whether or not economic, political and ideological means are available (part of resource structure) and on whether or not the communal group has compatriots on the other side of the border and could get moral and material support from outside (aspects of solidarity structure).

As indicated above, the structural attributes of the international system play a crucial role in determining and/or regulating involvement by external actors in domestic anarchy. The motive of the outsiders in intervening in a domestic conflict can be analytically divided into an instrumental and affective types :

Instrumental motives include international political (including general strategic) considerations, short-term and long-term economic motives, and domestic political reasons including fear of demonstration effects and short-term military gain. Affective involvement may be for reasons of justice,

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humanitarian considerations, ethnic, religious, racial or ideological affinity or personal friendships between top protagonists.<sup>73</sup>

In a nutshell, the normative structure of the international system influences outcomes of the dysfunctional inputs in either of the following ways : diffusion and encouragement, isolation and suppression, and reconciliation.<sup>74</sup>

States must enjoy a measure of legitimacy in order to survive as states.<sup>75</sup> In dealing with challenges to their legitimacy, the governing elite therefore should and would react in a variety of ways. Gabriel Almond gives three possible modes of reactions, namely adaptive, rejective and substitutive.<sup>76</sup> What Almond classifies as 'adaptive' and 'rejective' patterns of elite behavior respectively correspond to Heraclides' policies of 'acceptance' and policies of 'denial', and are elaborated as follows :

Denial includes strategies such as removal or elimination (extermination, population transfer, expulsion), coercion (subjugation, state terrorism), domination within a framework of institutionalized cultural divisions, assimilation as well as individualization of the problem by way of non-discrimination and human rights. Acceptance includes the following strategies : integration in the sense of equal and joint contribution by both groups involved to a new superordinate nation and culture ; minority protection and safeguards, consociational democracy in a unitary system ; federalism or extended autonomy, very loose federation akin to confederation, redrawing of boundaries with a neighboring country (in case of irredentism) ; and territorial partition.<sup>77</sup>

More often than not, it is not difficult to identify the reactive pattern that is being followed by the elite. In less clear-cut cases, one might consider looking at whether what Stephen van Evera has called the three principal varieties of chauvinist myth making are present. They are self-glorifying, self-whitewashing and other-

maligning.<sup>78</sup> In most cases, these varieties of myth-making exhibit features of rejective pattern of elite reaction to inputs considered dysfunctional. In other cases, they constitute the rejective pattern itself. Theodor Hanf distinguishes between five possible forms of reactive patterns, namely, partition, domination, assimilation, consociation and political syncretism.<sup>79</sup>

There is a good deal of overlap between the different sets of reactive patterns listed above but Almond's parsimonious classification appears to be preferable for the purpose of analyzing the phenomena of domestic anarchy. In general, therefore, patterns of reaction of elite to inputs considered dysfunctional may be identified by answering the following questions: Do the elite yield or adapt to the dysfunctional demands and adjust their policies accordingly? Do they decide to ignore or *reject* the demands and adopt a policy of indifference? Or do they substitute? (i.e., respond positively but not necessarily in a way the initiators of the dysfunctional inputs had sought.) As stated above, the way in which the elite choose to react to an input considered dysfunctional is also mediated by the structural attributes of the system as well as the nature of the dysfunctional inputs itself.

There seems to be no magic formula according to which one could prescribe a particular reactive pattern as being the most 'rational' for dealing with a given dysfunctional input, for effects of any form of reaction depend in large part on the depth of the crises of legitimacy or citizenship, as well as the nature of the dysfunctional inputs they are meant to address. It needs to be stressed, however, that it is the interplay between the changing nature of the dysfunctional inputs, the structural attributes of the system/subsystem and the reactive patterns of the elite that would ultimately determine whether the fate of the state would be consolidation or failure; or whether order or anarchy would prevail. If the latter is the

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case, it is possible that the political unit would fall into a Hobbesian state of nature after which it may well be re-invented. The alternative scenario is a consolidated state. In either case, at this stage, the dialectical process of state formation and domestic anarchy will have come full circle. And yet these phenomena should not be thought of as a process always destined to reach a final, predetermined goal but instead as an ongoing, continuous and extremely uneven process of formation, consolidation and failure and in some cases a total collapse of state.

In conclusion of this segment of our discussion, we seek to re-emphasize that, first, the presence of a central law-making and law-enforcing body does not make domestic politics any less anarchic than international politics in which such legal mechanism is obviously lacking. Second, we have also sought in this essay to shed some light on the dynamics of domestic anarchy by identifying the constituent variables and then sketching the relationships among them. From a methodological standpoint, these tasks could be thought as representing an initial step toward developing a plausible explanation of the phenomenon of domestic anarchy. The next task involves converting these variables into indicators that are more amenable to quantitative analyses and determining the extent of correlation and causation, or their absence, among them. The result of this process would be the vindication or falsification of the hypotheses constituting the deductively developed model that would contribute to a better understanding of domestic anarchy. From the point of view of the logical consistency of the major propositions and their premise, if the model makes sense future researchers might wish to proceed to refine it along the steps broadly suggested above and empirically ascertain the correspondence between the derivatives of the model and the reality. Furthermore, it might be useful to consider using quantitative and qualitative analysis of events

and historical data to determine which combination of these variables results in which outcome and under which circumstances. The cumulative result of more refined comparative analyses should provide the basis for developing a causal theory of domestic anarchy which would be useful for a better understanding of the dynamics of domestic anarchy. What we have tried to do in this essay is merely to suggest a general constitutive model of domestic anarchy the variables of which could be broken down further to make them amenable to a more rigorous analysis.

Constitutive and causative models could be thought to represent two consecutive steps in a scientific process in which case the former becomes incomplete without the latter ; the latter becomes impossible without the former. And as such, although analytically separable, the two are closely interrelated in practice. Moreover, as the preceding discussions indicate a given constitutive model almost always implies a causative relationship among the component variables although we have attempted to make it a little more explicit. Similarly, in the following paragraphs we shall clarify by way of conclusion the normative implications of such a model.

### ***Conclusion***

Over the years a plethora of measures have been suggested as possible cure for the problem of state failure and domestic anarchy. At the risk of oversimplification,<sup>80</sup> it is worthwhile noting that realist, liberal, functionalist and legalist schools in International Relations respectively approximate the broader paradigmatic orientations of the views discussed below.<sup>81</sup> For dealing with state failure, one variant of realism suggested 'strategies that would involve significant changes in international legal and diplomatic practices.'<sup>82</sup> This

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school considers unquestioned support for the principle of the inviolability of existing borders as the major cause of the problem: 'if secession was a viable threat [in Africa], as had been during the pre-colonial period, politicians would have a profound incentive to reach accommodation with disaffected populations, especially those that were spatially defined, lest they threaten to leave the nation-state.'<sup>83</sup> Liberals also make a case for supporting secessionist causes, but for a different reason: 'in particular cases,' the argument goes, 'liberal values may be served by those who seek to break up multinational states rather than by those who seek to preserve them.'<sup>84</sup> In general, for realism the ultimate criteria for recognizing a given communal group as a state is to be based on who is actually providing order. Neofunctionalists and legalists concur with realists and liberals in identifying the discrepancy between the juridical and the empirical attributes of statehood as constituting the core of the crises. Functionalists and legalists uphold the view that most of today's weak states, as created by the colonialists and inaugurated on the day of independence, have proved inherently incapable of coping with the economic, political and security demands of the modern era, and that the way to overcome this problem is to integrate these states into some regional (i.e. continental) or sub-regional entities.<sup>85</sup> Where the two schools diverge from realism's line of argument is in the constitutional or peaceful means they suggest: 'it is desirable for a group of these states to band together into an economic community that will also be a security community and, eventually, a political community with sovereign rights.'<sup>86</sup>

Which of the above suggestions makes more sense both in theory and practice? It seems almost certain that solutions based on force or on the realist criterion of who is actually controlling larger territory and providing order entail deeper moral and practical problems. Morally, the solution is unacceptable to many simply be-

cause it is based on the iniquitous idea of 'might makes right'. Let us also remind ourselves that it is not always easy to accurately determine who is effectively providing order, when and where.<sup>87</sup> Realist solutions also make the states more vulnerable to what is called the domino theory of secession *in extremis* in which 'if a society had a right to proclaim its will and secede from the major unit, every district, every town, every village, every farmstead could declare itself independent.'<sup>88</sup> The 'widespread mingling of peoples' further complicates this matter.<sup>89</sup> While in the long run the idea of regionalism merits serious consideration, it appears that building a viable state within the existing framework ought to precede other steps for dealing with the challenges of state failures and domestic anarchy.

It has been pointed out above that realism offers a solution that essentially boils down to a proposal for the granting of international recognition to whoever is providing political order over a territory with a significant size and population. Such a prescription is logically sound and persuasive. In practice, however, it raises more problems than it solves and fails to address the problem of legitimacy and citizenship discussed above. The alleged solution could be conceived as the outcome of a zero-sum game. In effect, order may not provide answer to all the issues relevant to domestic anarchy. As the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau aptly asked very long ago, 'Life is tranquil in jail cells, too. Is that reason enough to like them?' This same question seems to underlie the beliefs of millions of people who take up arms to challenge the central authority.

It can be said that forceful incorporation of groups of people to one's territory, which is essentially what the realist solution boils down to, is also misguided and dangerous. It is misguided because it is not directed at the twin crises of legitimacy and citizenship, which we have identified above as constituting the core of the prob-

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lem. It is dangerous because it will allow the problem to go on unabated, and most likely, in an expanded form. Even if it were theoretically established that the panacea for the problem of domestic anarchy lies in traversing along such Darwinist path, the human and material costs of waging a war would certainly outweigh the alleged gains. The modernity and easy accessibility of weaponry even to the weakest states also make such a project extremely costly.

In what appears to be a twist of historical irony, realism in this case seems to advocate a return to the old era when 'might made right'. Even if the groups enjoying the upper hand at a particular point in time could provide a sort of political order over a disputed territory and are internationally recognized as the legitimate representatives of the state, the process of domination (real or perceived) and resistance is likely to continue. The changing balance of power that feeds on the changes in the structure of the international and domestic political systems make it more, rather than less, likely for the vicious circle of the crises of legitimacy and citizenship to continue *ad infinitum*, thereby taking the 'states' much more closer to the Hobbesian 'state of nature'. Conquering a weak neighbor might bolster the extractive capacity of the conqueror. But it is not self-evident that this would help the newly invented state to forge a common identity, not least because wars of this kind leave in their wake a memory that could not easily be deleted, especially in the minds of the vanquished. The newly amalgamated people are also bound to perceive the new state as their prison, not their home, and the leaders as conquerors, not emancipators.

The idea that political boundaries should be revised so that sub-regional communities will replace the current arrangement based on nation-states is excellent and attractive one. This functionalist prescription, which is based on the theoretical supposition that behaviors could be explained in terms of their effects, appears to have



identified one of the sources of the chronic crises that have afflicted many states as being the arbitrary, and sometimes forceful, incorporation of territories and peoples that had nothing in common. But when it comes to the mechanisms of implementing such a proposal, several problems are likely to arise owing again to the processes by which these states had been created and maintained. In other words, for legalistic-functional solution to work, in addition to a strong political will towards this end, the political economy of the states ought also to be of such a nature that it is able to sustain regional integration. But today that does not seem to hold true in many cases.

It has also been argued above that the structural attributes of the international system play a crucial role in influencing the outcome of the crises of legitimacy and citizenship that take the form of a challenge to a state. The normative framework of the international system does not, however, play a primary role in the inception of the crises. Therefore, while recognizing the fact that normative attributes of the international system do affect the transformation of dysfunctional inputs over time, it is neither productive nor prudent to place the main focus on the external environment in dealing with domestic anarchy.

Moreover, even if evidence suggests that external factors play more crucial role than domestic factors in regard to the problem under discussion, curative measures should be more inward-looking since it is easier to influence domestic political systems than the former which include international legal and diplomatic practices. Again, even if international rules and norms could be '(re) constructed', given the political will of a large number of states (or at least the most powerful among them), the task would prove to be complex and time-consuming. Outward-looking measures are not also worth the while since, as indicated above, the problem could be

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best tackled more effectively and directly if the cure is sought from within the political system just in the same way as an effective vaccine to an ailment is developed from the vector. And yet, it is useful, for a fuller diagnosis of the problem and its metamorphosis overtime to look also into the workings of the normative framework of the international system in relation to their subtle influences.

In a nutshell, our principal tentative conclusion is that neither secession nor war of conquest is likely to solve the problems of domestic anarchy. Different communal groups engage in challenging their states because they do not believe their rulers have the right to rule them and/or they believe that they do not enjoy an even-handed rule. Regionalism is premature for the reasons discussed above. Decentralization of political power may be the realistic option. The structural barriers that stand in the way of undertaking genuine decentralization in these states should not be underestimated, however. It is also worthwhile noting that our specific suggestion of decentralization of power as a possible cure to state failure is in no way definitive. This is due, in part, to the fact that although a decentralized government is theoretically the preferred form of government, even such liberal thinkers as J. S. Mill did not advocate for its application under all circumstances. Mill wrote in this regard :

When nations, thus divided, are under a despotic government which is stronger to all of them, or which, though sprung from one, yet feeling greater interest in its own power than any sympathies of nationality, assigns no privilege to either nations, and chooses its instruments indifferently from all ; in the course of a few generation, identity of situation often produces harmony of feeling, and the different races come to feel towards each other as fellow countrymen.<sup>90</sup>

As for solutions that are oriented towards democratization of the political system, recent empirical findings do not appear to offer a solid support for its curative effect on domestic anarchy under certain conditions.<sup>91</sup> It nevertheless appears that generally inward-looking measures will have to be taken both as a curative and preventive medicine against the phenomenon of domestic anarchy because the essential ingredients i.e. *the crises of legitimacy and citizenship*, are generated from within.

### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Helman and Ratner (1992-93); Shultz ((1995); Sorensen (1997).

<sup>2</sup> See, Gurr (2000 : 61). However, Gurr also points out in the same article : 'The world system emerging from the settlement of ethnic and regional conflicts is more complex than its Cold War predecessor. So containing ethnic conflict requires more foresight and better-coordinated international responses...'

<sup>3</sup> Mueller (2000 : 42) argues that 'ethnic warfare more closely resembles nonethnic warfare, because it is waged by small groups of combatants, groups that purport to fight and kill in the name of some larger entity.' We have serious doubts about the solidity of this argument since the fact that 'elites'—broadly defined -- initiate an 'ethnic war' does not make the war less ethnic. Neither does the number or identity of the initiators. What matters most in the end is whether these 'thugs' manage to mobilize their ethnic compatriots for a greater action. All major revolutions had also their beginning in the initiatives of small group of people. The group in most cases serves merely as the vanguard of the ethnic masses. The Tigray ethnic movement in Ethiopia, which ultimately defeated the Ethiopian army in 1991, the largest and most equipped army in Black Africa at the time, began in 1975 by ten Tigrayan students with five outdated guns. See, Hammond (1999 : 56).

<sup>4</sup> In 1998 all but two of the twenty-seven major armed conflicts were domestic. See, SIPRI (Stockholm, 1999). About three quarters of the world's refugees estimated at nearly 27 million only a few years ago, were in flight from or have

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been displaced by these and other ethnic conflicts. See, Friedman (1998 : 244).

<sup>5</sup> Shultz (1995 : 76).

<sup>6</sup> Sorensen (1997 : 255).

<sup>7</sup> Helman and Ratner (1993 : 5).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 196.

<sup>9</sup> For elite centered theory, for example, see Arfi (1998 : 15-42).

<sup>10</sup> The objective of a constitutive (as opposed to a causative) theory is 'to account for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist.' See, Wendt (1998 : 105).

<sup>11</sup> Rosenau (1990 : 27). This concept of 'potential observability' introduces a new dimension to the ways of acquiring and evaluating a scientific knowledge. As such it makes scientific knowledge more flexible in methodology and broader in scope. Rosenau (1990 : 27) explains the essence of potential observability as follows :

In this procedure [a methodology which might be called potential observability] each step in the construction of a model is taken only after a determination of whether its components are at least theoretically susceptible to being observed, even if some innovation in observational technology must first be made. If such susceptibility cannot be specified with respect to any component--if say, a component is conceived in mystical terms--then the method of potential observability requires that it be reformulated or abandoned. Accordingly, while the model may be abstract and speculative, it is grounded in hypothetical observables that may or may not uphold its propositions.

<sup>12</sup> This definition is my adaptation of categories of control cases for analyzing state failures given in Ted Gurr et al (1999 : 50); and Mazrui (1994 : 28).

<sup>13</sup> Mazrui (1994 : 28).

<sup>14</sup> A communal movement is a collectivity of people that defines itself on the basis of ethnicity, religion, region or other social attributes and is engaged in some form of political activity.

<sup>15</sup> The terms mechanical and organic society are used here in the same sense as Kenneth Waltz (1986 : 324) used them in a different context. According to him, a mechanical society rests on the similarity of the units that compose it ; an organic society is based on their differences. In other words, mechanical societies are loosely linked through the resemblance of their members ; organic societies become closely integrated through the differences of their members.

<sup>16</sup> In this regard, one analyst observed : 'the differences in the two articulations at least partly arise out of the differing focus on the unit of analysis. If the

modernists focus on the individual and conceive collectivity as an aggregation, the primordialists concentrate on collectivities and take an organic view of society.' See, Oommen (1997 : 10).

For a generally similar view also see, Tilley (1997 : 499). A detailed discussion of this subject is also found in Hah and Martin (1975); and Neuman (1991). For a more comprehensive classification see, Heraclides (1991).

<sup>17</sup> An example of a work that saw ethnic homogeneity and political stability as two sides of a coin see, Laitin and Samatar (1987). For a post facto argument that ethnic homogeneity may be a necessary condition but not a sufficient one, see McFerson (1995).

<sup>18</sup> Perhaps it should be pointed out here that except for Iceland, Metropolitan Portugal, Norway and one or two other countries all the rest of the 170 more or less sovereign countries in the world today are ethnically heterogeneous. See, Ra'anan (1991 : 4).

<sup>19</sup> More than two centuries ago, philosopher John Stuart Mill observed, 'Switzerland has a strong sentiment of nationality, though the Cantons are of different races, different languages and different religions. Sicily has, throughout history, felt itself quite distinct in nationality from Naples, notwithstanding identity of religion, almost identity of language, and a considerable amount of common historical antecedent.' For Mill, a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any other—which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to live under the same government and desire that—it should be government by themselves, exclusively. See, Dahbour and Ishay (1995 : 98).

<sup>20</sup> Shultz (1995 : 77-78).

<sup>21</sup> Samarasinghe (1990 : 2).

<sup>22</sup> Druckman (1994 : 44).

<sup>23</sup> Positivism focuses on quantification and empirical relationships between phenomena whereas postmodernism underscores the role of rhetoric in constructing both power relations and bodies of language. For a concise elaboration of postmodernism in relation to other schools in international relations see, Porter (1994 : 105-127). On positivism, Popper (1968 : 34) had this to say : 'The older positivists wished to admit, as scientific or legitimate, only those concepts (or notions or ideas which were, as they put it, 'derived from experience'; those concepts, i.e., which they believed to be logically reducible to elements of sense experience.'

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<sup>24</sup> For a summary of the different forms ethnic and other movements can take see, Jalali and Lipset (1992 : 586).

<sup>25</sup> This hypothesis is arrived at through a combination of deductive as well as inductive reasoning. For a clear discussion the distinctions between the two see Popper (1968).

<sup>26</sup> See, Walzer (1995 : 10); and Warner (1995 : 45-47).

<sup>27</sup> In the Aristotelian (Greek) understanding of citizenship, the notion signifies a person who both rules and is ruled. It excludes slaves and women. In a sense, the Aristotelian understanding was thus political. Five centuries later, there evolved the Roman understanding of the concept in which legal aspect was emphasized : 'the status of a citizen came to denote membership in a community of shared or common law, which may or may not be identical with a territorial community.' See, Pocock (1995 : 29-52). There are crucial differences in the meanings attached to 'citizenship' even in countries known today as liberal democracies. For a well-documented and concisely comparative analysis of the different conceptions of citizenship in four liberal democracies see, Safran (1997 : 313-315).

<sup>28</sup> Netti (1968 : 561). For this reason, the notion state is unfitting and its usage needs reconsideration. For such reconsideration, Sorensen's (1998 : 256-264) recent typology of contemporary states into post-colonial, Westphalian and post-modern state could be an excellent starting point.

<sup>29</sup> Warner (1995 : 45-47) separates these elements into three : civil, political and legal. 'The civil element of citizenship is a positive form which, on the basis of equality, people can make certain claims against each other and/or against the government. The political element is that which allows an individual to participate in the decision of the government or to be a member of that government. Both the political and civil elements are part of what could be called the 'objective' elements of citizenship. In terms of political theory, it could be argued that the objective political and civil elements are part of the vertical contract between citizens and a government. The social element of citizenship is the horizontal contract in society, the subjective element in citizenship.' In Europe, as elsewhere, the three elements of citizenship did not emerge at the same time. According to T. H. Marshall, quoted in Warner (1995 : 49), the civil rights belong to the formative period of the eighteenth century, political rights to the nineteenth century and social rights to the twentieth century.

<sup>30</sup> Kornhauser (1964 : 151)

<sup>31</sup> State legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens should be distinguished from inter-

national legitimacy and in this paper by legitimacy it is meant the former which denotes 'the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society.' See, Scharr (1984). The latter is referred to as international recognition, or simply recognition. For a discussion of the distinction between the two see, Jackson and Roseberg (1982 : 7).

<sup>32</sup> Quoted in Beetham (1991 : 6). Janos (1964 : 132) offers a definition which roughly resembles that of Weber. Legitimacy, for him, is the ability to evoke compliance short of coercion. It is a psychological relationship between masses and elites, involving acceptance by the masses a claim by an elite to act in the name of the community.

<sup>33</sup> Beetham (1991 : 19)

<sup>34</sup> At one point, Beetham (1991 : 23-25) refers to Weber's theory of legitimacy as 'one of the blindest of blind alleys in the history of social science.'

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of the different dimensions of legitimacy and the problems associated with them see, *Ibid.*, 3-41.

<sup>36</sup> Scharr (1984 : 109). The notion of popular reaction to stimulators is consistent with James Rosenau's idea of 'skill revolution' as a result of which individuals tend to judge the legitimacy of their rulers on the basis of the policy outputs rather than through the mere criterion of the mechanism by which leaders assume office. 'Historically,' declared Rosenau and Durfee (1995 : 76), 'the authority structures have been founded on traditional criteria of legitimacy derived from constitutional and legal sources...the sources have [now] shifted from traditional to performance criteria of legitimacy.'

<sup>37</sup> Danziger (1991 : 374).

<sup>38</sup> Sorensen (1997 : 260).

<sup>39</sup> Rothchild and Groth (1995 : 78).

<sup>40</sup> See, Flexner and Flexner (2000 : 6).

<sup>41</sup> Nettl (1968 : 590-591).

<sup>42</sup> This representation is from John S Mill. See, Dahbour and Ishay (1995 : 590-591).

<sup>43</sup> Exclusive authority is authority that is believed to be inaccessible to large section of the population, alien authority is authority that is believed to be foreign rather than indigenous to the society especially authority imposed from without and displaying symbols of an alien culture; arbitrary authority is authority that is believed to be capricious and irresponsible. For discussions, see Kornhauser (1964 : 134).

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<sup>44</sup> A cautionary note is here in order regarding the problematic concept of 'nationalism'. Hah and Martin (1975 : 360) defined nationalism as 'consisting of organizationally heightened and articulated group demands, directed toward securing control of the distributive system in a society.' The usefulness of this definition is its amenability to operationalization. But a stricter application of the definition will lead one to believe that a trade union movement or an army revolt could be considered as constituting a nationalist movement. In fact, this is not necessarily so. Such definition diminishes the utility of the concept for our purpose. Furthermore, we would avoid reference to this term as much as possible because when the existence of a fully developed state itself is questionable, it does not make much sense to talk about nationalism. As Gellner (1994 : 4) notes, '[t]he existence of politically centralized units, and of a moral-political climate in which such centralized units are taken for granted and are treated as normative, is a necessary though by no means a sufficient condition for nationalism.

<sup>45</sup> See, Motyl (1991 : 3). For a brief review of the different views on the origin, essence and manifestations of nationalism see, Kellas (1991 : 34-50).

<sup>46</sup> According to Stokes (1978 : 150), one reason for the thinness of a theory of nationalism, despite the enormity of the literature on the phenomena, is the fact that until a short time ago most of the investigators of the subject have been historians, who, as a group tend to be more interested in description than explanation.

<sup>47</sup> Motyl (1991 : 1-24).

<sup>48</sup> Anderson (1995 : 6).

<sup>49</sup> Weber (1964 : 156).

<sup>50</sup> Ra'anani (1991 : 8) thus clearly summarizes the widespread (albeit wrong) view with regard to the evolutionary development of the institution of the nation-state : 'Most economic and political planners of the 1940s and 1950s argued that the concept of the modern nation-state was born during the 16<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, in the bureaucratically centralized, post-medieval societies of Western Europe—Britain, France, the Netherlands. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century, so they claimed, following the French revolutionary elaboration of the idea of 'la nation', and the reaction to the Napoleonic expansionist drive for conquest, nationalism had reached Central Europe, leading eventually to the formation of unitary states in Germany and Italy, and then had moved eastward to the Balkans, east Central and Eastern Europe, which became known, par excellence as the hotbeds of national strife. By the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the wave had moved still farther, to



the so called Middle East, and eventually it had reached the rest of colonial Asia and Africa.’

<sup>51</sup> See, Shultz (1995 : 79). Kupchan’s (1995 : 1) typology of nationalism into civic and ethnic also runs along the same lines. For him, ethnic nationalism defines nationhood in terms of lineage. Civic nationalism defines nationhood in terms of citizenship and political participation. Civic nationalism does favor social cohesion and political equality in ethnically heterogeneous political communities. Similarly, Rothchild and Groth (1995 : 69-82) identify the following as the two principles of what they called ethnonationalism : ‘the exclusiveness of the national group’s definition based upon particular criteria ; and the maintenance of internal cohesion and loyalty to the group on the basis of perceived threats from those outside its confines.’

<sup>52</sup> Gurr (1968 : 245-248).

<sup>53</sup> Hah and Martin (1975 : 380).

<sup>54</sup> Olzak (1998 : 1).

<sup>55</sup> Hah and Martin (1975 : 380). For a good review and analysis of this subject see, Fearon and Laitin (2000 : 845-877).

<sup>56</sup> Almond (1986 : 41-72).

<sup>57</sup> Gurr (1980 : 191-209). For a different classification, see Olzak ( 1998 : 192-197).

<sup>58</sup> As Samatar (1997 : 695) relates this explanation to the situation in Somalia, ‘...unlike the old pre-colonial order in which the elders did not control either a coercive machine or economic power over the community, the imposition of colonialism on Somalia removed the major social means of restraining those in position of power.’

<sup>59</sup> Quoted in Herbst (1987 : 64).

<sup>60</sup> Mill (1861) in Dahbour and Ishay (1991 : 101).

<sup>61</sup> As Rothchild and Groth (1995) noted, ‘the problem of psychological displacement of deprivation, frustration and uncertainty is likely to be most acute among the so called divided nationalities. For those groups classified as majoritarian within a particular area, the minority entities are easily identifiable, visible, and tangible targets for this displacement. The psychologically ‘helpful’ enemy does not have to be invented. He is there for all to see.’

<sup>62</sup> Haggard and Simons (1987 : 496).

<sup>63</sup> Walzer (1992 : 323).

<sup>64</sup> Keohane (1986 : 1-27).

<sup>65</sup> Herbst (1989 : 673-692).

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<sup>66</sup> Keohane (1986 : 8).

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>68</sup> Herbst (1989 : 690).

<sup>69</sup> A contrasting argument was advanced by Saideman (1997 : 722): 'the ethnic ties (or enmities) between a politician's supporters and the combatants in ethnic conflicts in other states help to explain the policies of states toward secessionist crises.' I have elsewhere tried to demonstrate that Saideman's thesis is not supported by the situation in the Horn of Africa. See my, *Conceptualizing the Processes and Structural Determinants of State Formation and State Disintegration : A Case Study of the Horn of Africa*, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Tsukuba, 1999, especially pp. 72-73.

<sup>70</sup> Modelski (1961-124).

<sup>71</sup> Heraclides (1991 : 71).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

<sup>74</sup> Modelski (1961 : 19).

<sup>75</sup> After studying the nature of the early African states, Donald Kurtz (1981 : 177) concluded that the legitimacy of the authority structures of early states was essential for their survival and their legitimation is an exorable and integral part of the process of early state development...states have to attain legitimacy if they are to rule by means other than naked force and long survive the tests of history.

<sup>76</sup> Almond (1986 : 68-69).

<sup>77</sup> Heraclides (1991 : 11).

<sup>78</sup> Evera (1995 : 150-151).

<sup>79</sup> Hanf (1991 : 40-43).

<sup>80</sup> For a different classification of IR theories in regard to their positions on the issue of self-determination, see Freeman (1999 : 335-370).

<sup>81</sup> It should be clear that the classification of each idea into one or another school in IR is made solely on the basis of the judgment of this writer and hence it could be at variance with classifications by others. For example, Freeman's (1999 : 365) description of what a realist theory of self-determination is significantly different from mine. For him, such theories have two properties 1) they endorse only those conceptions of the right to national self-determination that could be accepted by the power-holders (particularly, states) in the contemporary world ; 2) they accord priority to the stability of the existing state system. For a detailed discussion of the taxonomy see, Freeman (1999 : 355-370); for a co-

gent analysis of this theme from a world systems perspective see, Olzak (1998 : 187-217).

<sup>82</sup> Herbst (1997 : 120).

<sup>83</sup> Herbst (1997 : 120).

<sup>84</sup> Lind (1994 : 87-112).

<sup>85</sup> Mukisa (1997 : 24). Riggs (1998) elaborates another reason why secession does not provide an answer to the problem of divided societies : '...ethnic nationalism prevails among marginalized communities in modern states whose members reject citizenship and demand sovereignty. They normally have a territorial base or 'homeland' which, in fact or fantasy can anchor the state they wish to establish by liberation or secession. However, population mobility has led to a widespread mingling of peoples, not only in cities but also in rural areas, seriously hampering efforts to carve independent states out of the enclaves which ethnonational movements claim for themselves.'

<sup>86</sup> Mukisa (1997 : 24).

<sup>87</sup> In addition to geographical fluidity of the territorial space, in temporal terms as well the issue is not as clear-cut as it appears at first glance. In the case of Algeria for example, there are claims 'that certain suburbs of Algerian cities are under the control of the authorities during the day and the control of Islamic militants at night.' See, Mazrui (1994 : 28).

<sup>88</sup> Osterud (1997 : 70) ; L. C. Buchheit refers to this notion as the problem of 'indefinite divisibility.' Quoted in Freeman (1998 : 360).

<sup>89</sup> Riggs (1998 : 278)

<sup>90</sup> Dahbour and Ishay (1995 : 103). For a brief discussion of why Mill's prescription is irrelevant to our times see, Walzer (1992 : 324-325).

<sup>91</sup> Smith (2000 : 34) concluded that the findings of his empirical research on Africa 'allow us neither to accept nor to reject the hypothesis that democratization leads to lower ethnic conflict.' Gurr et al (1999 : 5) also summed up the result of their own extensive empirical work in these terms : '...in sub-Saharan Africa, other things being equal, partial democracies were on average 11 times more likely to fail than autocracy.'

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