

Social Order in World Politics

Adem Seifudein

College of Social Sciences

“We should encourage scholars to ask new questions. Problematizing the things that communities have naturalized is at least as important a function of science as finding the right answers.”

Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999).

INTRODUCTION

In this essay, we share Alexander Wendt’s aspiration in our own way by striving to “problematize” the deeply “naturalized” assumption of anarchy in International Relations (IR)¹ and subjecting it to a reasonably rigorous formal analysis.² Penetrating into the inner postulates of this assumption and examining its logical coherence and empirical accuracy are our principal objectives. It may be

-
- 1 Following the convention, International Relations or IR would denote the study or the discipline whereas the practice would be designated in the lower case.
 - 2 By formal analysis we mean, adopting Danziger’s (1991 : 385) usage of the phrase, the intellectual process of trying to specify a reality that corresponds to abstract concepts and vice versa.

useful here to make our premise clear. Although only imperfectly comprehensible, a knowable objective reality does exist. On the basis of this core premise we try to produce a more informed and reconstructed understanding of the issues revolving around the questions of what international anarchy is and what it is not. In our endeavor to assemble the syllables that would hopefully form tentative answers, we will make consecutive use of positivist and post-positivist methodologies in inconclusive way. We first attempt to 'verify' the proposition that anarchy is the fundamental characteristic feature of international politics. Then, we try to falsify it. We do not however subscribe to the dualist/objectivist epistemology.³ We concede that a completely detached inquiry in social sciences is virtually impossible and values do indeed interfere with the process of observation. And yet, we should like to stress, reality as it is out there is knowable.⁴

3 For a discussion relevant to this point see, Jones (1993: 175).

4 As W. G. Runciman (1990: 67) points out, this does not however mean that social science is inherently 'ideological' in some sense that natural science is not. Elaborating on this point, Runciman writes: "Celestial mechanics was ideological in the time of Copernicus and Galileo; biology was ideological in the time of Darwin and, later, of Lysenko. They ceased to be so not just because the opponents certain of their findings came to change their politics but because the grounds of those findings were such that they had in the end to change their beliefs. No doubt those findings and therefore beliefs must, like all scientific findings and beliefs, be regarded as susceptible in principle to some sort of possible revision. But in this there is no distinction between the science of man and of nature. It was also in this vein that Charles Jones commented on neorealist theory as being "much less a passive representation of an unalterable condi-

Our perspective at once goes along with some and rejects other elements of the major approaches in IR. We share different propositions of the various sects of the constructivist school which John Ruggie has recently classified into neoclassical, postmodernist and naturalistic.⁵ The essay also endorses some elements of the arguments of the idealist, realist and neoliberal schools. Like realists, for instance, we subscribe to the idea that states follow their self-interest. We however cast out realism's ontological foundation that states exist (and interact) in a condition of anarchy.⁶ Also, we do not accept the materialistic bias of realism.⁷ The essay thus adopts

tions of the social world it treats than a means to active shaping of that world.”

5 Ruggie (1998: 880–882).

6 There is a growing literature upholding the contrary view. For example see, Strange (1999: 345).

7 We disagree with the claim made by some writers that (neo) realism is not strictly materialistic in this sense. David Dessler (1999: 132–133), for instance, advances such a view: international structure is defined not only by material elements, but by anarchy, an ordering principle that is as much a part of the ‘shared structure of knowledge’ in international politics as any of the norms, values or identities that constructivists emphasize in their explanatory accounts. Dessler also mentions that theories that emphasize the influence of material factors in social life (as neorealism does) necessarily presume the existence of social relationships and structures. Dessler’s second statement appears to us to make sense only insofar as one does not use it, as Dessler does, to conclude that neorealism is therefore not strictly materialist. If neorealism is not materialist then what is? In other words, such a generalization is no more true than say the view that Marxian historical materialism is not strictly materialist theory because it recognizes the role of production relations in influencing social transformation along with the means of production.

an eccentric approach in its theoretical orientation. We do not know therefore what to call our own paradigmatic orientation which is a result of such an assortment of different perspectives and paradigms.⁸ We shall therefore let the reader decide at the end, if he/she so wishes, what school or approach has decisively influenced our analysis. Let us now look more closely at what the major schools in IR have to say about international anarchy in the wider theoretical context.

ANARCHY IN IR

With varying degrees of emphasis and shades of meaning, different schools of IR embrace the view that the international system is anarchic. Political idealism advances the idea that international anarchy is one of the causes of war between states.⁹ Interstate war is encouraged, according to idealism, by the anarchical nature of international politics.¹⁰ At the same time idealism emphasizes the role ideas and institutions play in shaping individual and collective behavior. Political realism is an IR school that stands at the forefront in defense of the assumption of anarchy in international politics. In fact, some would say the very idea of international anarchy

8 According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 99) a paradigm is a basic set of beliefs that guide action and define the world view of the researcher. Perspectives, in contrast, are not as solidified, or as well unified, as paradigms, although a perspective may share many elements with a paradigm, such as a common set of methodological commitments. Our usage is the same as theirs.

9 Wilson (1998: 9).

10 Kegley (1995: 4).

itself originated in realist thought. Neoliberalism concedes international politics is anarchic. It however adds that this does not rule out the possibility of cooperation among states.¹¹ Social Constructivism also shares the view, perhaps regretfully, that “international system is not a very ‘social’ place”.¹²

Despite the apparent transmethodological consensus about the centrality of anarchy in IR, however, different aspects of it have occasionally been challenged : including its implications ;¹³ the extent of its role ;¹⁴ its sources and the reason for its persistence ;¹⁵ and the place of moral principles under the circumstances.¹⁶ Almost all critics seem however to concur that states interact under conditions of

11 As Charles Lipson (1984 : 22) puts it, “[c]ooperation is, indeed, a fragile enterprise... [y]et rule-guided and norm-governed arrangements are far more common than the usual insistence on an international ‘state of nature’ would suggest.”

12 Wendt (1999 : 2) elaborates this view thus: “The international system is a hard case for constructivism on both the social and construction accounts. On the social side, while laws and norms govern most domestic politics, self-interest and coercion seem to rule international politics. International law and institution exist, but the ability of this superstructure to counter the material base of power and interest seems limited. This suggests that the international system is not a very “social” place, and so provides intuitive support for materialism in that domain.”

13 Milner (1993: 143-169).

14 Wendt (1992: 394) stated his position thus: “...selfhelp and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and ...if today we find ourselves in a selfhelp world, this is due to process, not structure.

15 Brown (1992: 2).

16 DeVires (1994: 2).

anarchy with little, if any, empirical substantiation of its presumed existence.¹⁷ For all her persuasive attack on the assumption of anarchy, in IR, Helen Milner thus concluded: “Anarchy is an important condition of world politics.” She added, however, that “it is not the only one.”¹⁸ Therefore, no serious student of IR would be expected to deny the paramount ‘significance’ of anarchy in contemporary IR. The widespread consensus about international anarchy has thus given rise to the tendency of glossing over the need to examine it. We should like to preface our dissent from the prevailing consensus with a brief methodological considerations.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Induction and deduction are the two positivist methods available to a scientist for constructing a theory.¹⁹ Put simply, in the case of induction, we start with specific observations and arrive at a generalization or set of generalizations whereas in the case of deduction a premise precedes a generalization. Deductive method pre-

17 Those who had tried to challenge the ontological status of anarchy, according to Jervis (1998: 975), seem to have been motivated by the hope for a better world more than the results of investigation.

18 It should be noted that Milner’s (1993: 167) conclusion seems to clearly contradict with (and hence does not logically follow from) her powerful argument in opposition to the assumption of anarchy in international relations.

19 David Dessler (1999: 128–130) discusses this set of logic respectively under the name of generalizing and particularizing strategies of explanation calling the latter the reconstructive approach, whatever that means.

supposes that we assume or hypothesize a premise whose validity has already been established, or after the due scientific process, would hopefully be established. Inductive method does not require *a priori* commitment to any hypothesis or assumption. The relevance of this basic scientific fact to our discussion could be stated as follows.

Many of the complex set of generalizations in IR are the result of deductive logic based on the premise of anarchy in the international system. It ought to be noted that deductive method does not help us determine if the premise is true, it merely tells us what follows from that premise. Formulated in this way, the questions which arise with respect to international anarchy include how we can empirically establish, rather than merely assume, that the international system is anarchic; whether we can legitimately assume anarchy to be a feature of world politics when its validity is not established beyond a reasonable doubt; and if the premise is not established as true how we are to accept the arguments that deductively follow from such premise?²⁰ We certainly share the view that “consensus plays a crucial role in the process of accumulation of knowledge in the social sciences, especially in the face of the absence of “some external and arguably objective measure”.²¹ And yet we propose to argue that in international relations, and more specifically in relation to the assumption of international anarchy, an

20 On scientific method see, among others, Russel (1974: 43).

21 Jervis (1998: 973).

objectively knowable social reality does exist.

The point of departure of this paper, therefore, is that we challenge the validity of the premise of international anarchy rather than merely questioning what follows from it. For positivists and postpositivists, if a thing is more or less knowable, that means it exists. For social constructivists, there are things that 'exist' only because we believe that they do. Our own position in this regard is that the voluminous writings to the contrary notwithstanding, international anarchy is neither an empirical given nor a social construct or 'an institutional fact' the presence of which is not provable beyond a shadow of doubt. This also means we do not wish to equate, as some did,²² the observability of the effects of a presumed phenomenon with a proof that it is 'real' and vice versa. As much as predominant ideas influence behavior, the assumption of anarchy and the analytic and prescriptive studies based on it would however have major implications and consequences for the practice of international relations.²³ If states as well as nonstate actors interact with the 'belief that they are in anarchic environment, we would be

22 Eric Rigmar (1997: 273) succinctly summed up this brand of (in our view, flawed) argument: "There is no essential ontological differences between, say, a molecular structure in physics and a generative structure of in international politics since the effects of both can be observed".

23 In this respect we share Elizabeth Hanson's (1992: 46) observation that theories affect the world political process whether or not the particular theorist intends to do so and sometimes in ways that are not anticipated."

bound to witness a particular set of behavior which might not have been the case if the 'belief' was otherwise. And yet the fact that the 'belief' in the prevalence of anarchy influences behavior of actors cannot be taken in itself as a conclusive evidence that the phenomenon exists. The influence could in part be explained by the undisputably greater proximity²⁴ between the realm of scholarship and that of policymaking as a result of the abiding concern of scholars in practical issues of policy²⁵ and/or because of the allure of the material gains that come with becoming involved in this 'profitable business'.²⁶

It is not the objective of this essay however to thoroughly analyze the effects of the assumption of anarchy on state behavior and, by so doing, get embroiled in the perennial epistemological issue of the nature of the relationship between the object and the subject of scientific inquiry. We are not also making the counter-claim, as Inis L. Claude had done, for instance, that as orderly civil society has been established on a national scale, it is attainable on international scale.²⁷ Of course, doing so would be tantamount to a capitulation to the idea that central authority is a prerequisite for inter-

24 "In social sciences," observed Jon Huer (1990: 68), "the more one 'knows' about a subject, the more one gets involved with the subject. The more one gets involved with the subject, the more one becomes biased about the subject, unable to render objective assessment."

25 R. Rothstein (1992: xiv).

26 E. W. Said (1994: 322).

27 Mentioned in Jackson (1994: 9).

national order. In fact, we would argue below that the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between a central authority and order, be it international or domestic, is itself fallacious. In this study we shall merely try to demonstrate that the very assumption of anarchy as a permanent systemic characteristic of contemporary international system is inaccurate and that the 'anomaly' is of a sufficient weight to be simply disregarded by the scientific community. This task is surely formidable. It is not however hard to justify the endeavor.²⁸ A careful examination of relevant IR literature would lead one, unless s/he is a determined maverick, to willy-nilly embrace the deep-rooted assumption that anarchy underlies international politics. Anarchy in this sense is a unifying premise in IR, for all the schisms in the discipline. Perhaps it is the broadness of the transmethodological consensus in this regard which prompted one analyst to comment recently that rather than setting realism apart from other international theories, the assumption of anarchy sets International Relations apart from other disciplines.²⁹

In the following pages we question the validity of the major de-

-
- 28 As Mourtizen (1997: 79) reminds us, as assumptions deal with something 'out there', it is evidently meaningful to discuss their degree of correspondence with this something.
- 29 Guzzini as cited in Largo and Moravscik (1999: 21). In a similar fashion, Lipson (1984 : 22) went as far as to assert that "The idea of anarchy is, in a sense, the Rosetta stone of international relations : a heuristic device for decoding its basic grammar and syntax. But what was once a blinding insight-profound and evocative-has ossified and so become blinding in the other sense of the word-limiting and obscuring."

rivatives and ingredients of this assumption-an assumption that, as indicated above, has attained the status of a universal truth. These include the view that the absence of a world government and the prevalence of international anarchy are inseparable companions and that domestic politics is more orderly than international politics because the former is blessed with a central government. In parallel, we then advance two rival hypotheses. First we hypothesize that the idea of international anarchy and absence of a world government as two sides of a coin does not stand to logic and empirical scrutiny and that domestic politics is potentially as well as actually more disorderly than international politics. We would then go a step further and argue that contemporary international politics is more hierarchic than it is anarchic.

This is how we shall proceed with the task of tackling these issues. In the first part we discuss what is meant (and what we mean) by international anarchy. Then we focus on demonstrating how logic and empirical evidence render the anarchy assumption unsustainable. We would also try to demonstrate that contemporary interstate system is hierarchic and that an enhanced 'intersubjective knowledge' of this state of world politics could provide the basis even for more social order and cooperation among states. We shall follow in the most part of the essay a deductive style of reasoning which, as stated above, also happens to be the favorite choice of the predominant schools in IR.

ANARCHY: ORISMOLOGICAL AND ETYMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

What constitutes “anarchy”? Elaborate answers have been given in different ways and for our purpose we single out only the following. Anarchy is a complete disorder and utter confusion.³⁰ It is a condition of possibility for or ‘permissive’ cause of war.³¹ It is the lack of a society-wide rule-making and rule-enforcing institution.³² Or, it is situation in which states have to protect and look out for themselves and must rely on themselves to ensure order and obtain needed resources.³³ The definition of anarchy as complete disorder and confusion is surely too restrictive and its usage certainly misrepresents the notion as understood by students of IR and therefore we shall disregard it without any further discussion.

We shall use “anarchy” here to refer to what is denoted by the less restrictive variants of the definition since they are closer to the classical Hobbesian as well as Lockean understanding of “the state of nature”. For Thomas Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war where “men live without a common power...the nature of war, consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto.”³⁴ John Locke’s coceptualization of ‘the state of nature’ is

30 Strand (1999: 21).

31 Cited in Wendt (1992: 395).

32 Brown (1992: 17).

33 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 14).

34 See, Thomas Hobbes. *Leviathan*. In Richard Tuck (1991: 89).

not also markedly different from that of Hobbes.³⁵ As he put it, “[t]hose who are united into one Body, and have a common established Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and punish Offenders, are in civil society, one with another: but those who have no such common Appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of Nature, each being, where there is no other, Judge for himself, and Executioner, which is...the perfect state of Nature.”³⁶ It can be safely argued however that unless anarchy is used to denote one phenomenon in one place and a different phenomenon in another it had indeed been used-including by prominent IR scholars-to denote disorder and complete confusion. By adopting the less restrictive definition therefore we can hope to make sure we engage the assumption of international anarchy in its most coherent and strongest shape.

Implicitly or explicitly, virtually all of the dominant definitions equate anarchy with a self-help system, and/or with the absence of a central authority capable of making and enforcing international rules. In the case of international politics this central authority is, we are told, a world government. Although a fine, and yet, obvious distinction exists between the two ways of understanding the term and despite the different presumptive theoretical purposes behind

35 For a detailed elaborate discussion and a slightly different interpretation see, Wendt (1999: 246-308).

36 John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government,” in *Two Treatises of Government*. Ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.88.

each, the definitions of anarchy as a self-help system and as the absence of a central authority are not mutually contradictory. In other words, the former descriptively answers the question as to what constitutes anarchy in international politics, the latter why this is so. Although such definitions have decisive advantage in some respects, they are nevertheless only of a limited utility for clarifying the concept.

In a sense perhaps intended to acknowledge the imprecision of the concept, some scholars have made attempts to come up with different typologies of international anarchy. Nicholas Onuf has identified two forms. The first one, so called formal anarchy, refers to the type of anarchy that evolved along with 'the quest for internal legal legitimacy emerging among the developing democracies around the turn of the nineteenth century'. Substantial anarchy, on the other hand, implies not just the formal absence of a head of state but a much more farreaching understanding: 'the absence of guidance provided by virtue, rights and manners'.³⁷ Drawing on recent studies, Seyom Brown has made the distinction between a 'relatively benign anarchy' and 'anarchy of a belligerent kind' respectively corresponding to a condition of abundance in the sought-after values and their scarcity.³⁸ In the same vein, Alexander Wendt has argued that international anarchy follows different logic depending on the nature of the states that constitutes the system.

37 See Wind (1997: 242-243).

38 Brown (1992: 20-21).

Wendt has summarized his thoughts as follows: [t] he logic of anarchy among revisionist states takes the form of a fight to the death ; among status quo states, arms racing and some brawls ; among collectivist states, perhaps heated but ultimately nonviolent arguments about burden sharing.³⁹ Wendt, building on the works of earlier analysts, correspondingly classifies the notion of anarchy as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian anchored respectively in the shared ideas of enmity, rivalry and friendship.⁴⁰ In general, these typologies certainly proffer an additional advantage of clarity of meaning. But we should like to reiterate that it is the very assumption of international anarchy which is misleading and inaccurate however defined and typologized. We would try to substantiate our position in this regard after a brief review of the history of the concept.

If Hedley Bull's observation is to be relied upon, in the Western world the concept of international anarchy-understood basically in the less restrictive sense of the term-gained popularity only following First World War after having been made famous by Goldsworthy L. Dicinson.⁴¹ Different views circulate however when it comes to an account of its origin. Some analysts trace the idea to the writings of international lawyers and theorists of the nineteenth century.⁴² Others maintain that the idea is traceable to much earlier period of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and fur-

39 Wendt (1999: 106).

40 For an elaborate discussion of each see Wendt (1999: 246-312).

41 Bull (1981: 46).

42 One such analyst is Nicholas Onuf. See Wind (1997: 236).

ther elaborate what went on at the time as follows: "...when the universal political organization of Western Christendom was still in process disintegration, and modern states in process articulation, the three patterns of thought purporting to describe the new international politics, and to prescribe conduct within it, first took place."⁴³ Still others are firmly of the opinion that it was only in the middle of the nineteenth century that for the first time academics "conceptualized the state in the context of an anarchic arena containing similarly constituted units."⁴⁴ We do not claim at the moment to adequately answer the question of the origin of the concept. It may take some time, it should be conceded, before historical research adequately settles this issue.

In any case many IR scholars, most of them realists, make reference to Hobbes as one of the intellectual predecessor of their school of thought, especially in regard to the assumption of anarchy in international politics. Hedley Bull for example wrote of Hobbes: "[a] long with Machiavelli and Hegel, from both of whom he differs profoundly, Hobbes provides the principal impetus of what may loosely be called the Realist tradition, which presented world poli-

43 By 'the three patterns of thought' Bull (1977: 23) was referring to the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalistic tradition; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which view international politics as taking place within international society

44 Cited in Little (1999: 293).

tics as essentially the struggle for state power.”⁴⁵ When we examine what Hobbes himself had to say in this regard, however, it becomes clear that for him relations among states were only of a marginal concern. Yet this fact had not hampered many realists, especially those whom Rose has called “aggressive realists,”⁴⁶ from using the analogy of the Hobbesian state of nature to explain contemporary world politics. In our view, rushing headlong into superimposing the Hobbesian depiction of relations among individuals in a hypothetical “state of nature” on relations among states is a fallacy that retards the enhancement of a better understanding of contemporary international affairs. A few analysts have indeed openly challenged this analogy, more or less profoundly.⁴⁷

It appears that one of the reasons why Hobbes is so appealing to many modernday realists in this regard is that his philosophy moralizes the immoral since the notions of right and wrong, justice

45 See Bull (1981: 719).

46 Rose (1998: 146).

47 Richard Little (1993: 137) is one of them : “ [t] he logic is different in the two cases because the nature of the units in the two systems is different. In the state of nature, the logic of the system is seen by Hobbes to generate a situation of absolute and unbearable insecurity. Each member of the system is seen to live in a constant fear of being killed by another member. The critical point about Hobbes’s state of nature is that even limited cooperation is ruled out.” We are of the view that Hobbes could be regarded as a proponent of the realist school of international politics only to the extent that the notion of the ‘security dilemma’ and ‘the natural right of states to self-preservation’ in the absence of a central power in the conduct of interstate politics has been very much central to the study and practice of international politics in the 20 th century. Also see, Milner (1993).

single central authority resembling a national government, although even this seemingly accurate statement is not as quite unproblematic as it might first appear.⁵¹

What should be less contentious is that the absence of a central authority however defined, in itself is not *ipso facto* empirical equivalent of the prevalence of anarchy. Realists and others point out that anarchy was institutionalized by the general acceptance of the norm of sovereignty.⁵² The statement to the effect that sovereignty is institutionalized is true but explains nothing for, on the one hand, it merely tells us what is presumed to be an accompanying characteristic of anarchy rather than its defining feature. On the other hand, it is hard to refute such tautological statement thus making it incapable of passing one of the tests for establishing whether or not a scientific proposition is genuinely empirical: the conceptual possibility for it to be false.⁵³ Similarly, we venture to ask, does the prevalence of “more” order necessarily presuppose the existence of a central government? Our answer is definitely not.⁵⁴

51 Robert Dahl (1999: 928), for instance, has recently pointed out that there is a growing proliferation of an alarmingly powerful and undemocratic ‘international governments’, such as the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which he defined as systems of decision-making by political and bureaucratic elite that operate with a very high degree of autonomy, within limits set by charters, treaties or other international agreements.

52 See Suhr (1997: 105).

53 For a discussion of these issues in IR see Nicholson (1996: 70-104).

Waltz states :

“Nationally as well as internationally, contact generates conflict and at times issues in violence. The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it....A government has no monopoly on the use of force is all too evident. An effective government, however, has monopoly on the *legitimate* use of force, and legitimate here means that public agents are organized to prevent and counter the private use of force. Citizens need not prepare to defend themselves. Public agencies do that.. A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is.”⁵⁵ (Italics original)

Let us assume that Waltz’s observation about the existence at the domestic level of a body that has the monopoly of the legitimate use of force is correct. Even so, was Waltz not on a less solid ground when he went on to state that “a national system is not one of self-help. The international system is,” unless what is meant by self-help. is different from the conventional understanding of the term. Our point is that international politics is at least no more

54 Marlene Wind (1997: 244) reminds us that the idea of linking order to the fear of punishment in strict causal terms originates from Galileo and classical physics, and later was reinforced by Newton’s law of gravity, where the mechanistic prediction of movements was related directly to the invocation of force.

55 Waltz (1979: 103-104).

'self-help' system than domestic politics. If international politics were truly a 'self-help' system to the extent claimed by Waltz, would one not expect the community of states, for example, to stand by and watch Iraq swallow its smaller neighbor, Kuwait.

True, international reaction in the Iraq-Kuwait case might have been diluted by economic and strategic considerations. But even in other less clear-cut cases, states do not assume a position of passive on-looker if a fellow sovereign state is in a danger of 'dying' because of what could be regarded as unjustifiable or improper move by another state. In addition to economic issues and vital interests, states do come to assist one another for moral or humanitarian reasons. Consequently there is low 'death rate' even among those inchoate political units sometimes also referred to as 'quasi-states'. In the international system a number of cases could be mentioned where states in some sort of economic or security trouble are bailed out of their difficulty by other governments or non-governmental or inter-governmental organizations. It can perhaps be argued that in domestic politics, individuals are less disposed to come to the aid of a fellow individual merely on humanitarian and moral reasons. Therefore, is it not unpersuasive to conclude that "a national system is not one of self-help ; the international system is" ?

Now, how do we substantiate our claim that world politics is more orderly than it is anarchic? A step towards an answer can be taken first by elaborating on what exactly we mean by 'order'. Alexander Wendt identifies two ways of understanding the concept.

Politically, order refers to a situation under which people can be made to work towards a mutually beneficial end by reducing violence or increasing trade. This could be called the Hobbesian definition of order since this is what 'political theorists going back to Hobbes have usually meant by the problem of order'.⁵⁶ Sociologically, the term simply denotes the existence of a stable pattern of behavior, whether cooperative *or* conflictual.⁵⁷ Also, the distinction between Wendt's sociological and political definition of order corresponds to A. James's definition of the same concept as substance and process.⁵⁸ What Wendt has called the sociological definition (or problem, as he put it) of order has in the same way a close affinity with Rosenau's understanding of the concept.⁵⁹ But in world politics order does not presuppose justice and/or legitimacy. And there appears to be a widespread consensus in IR to this effect with few notable exceptions.⁶⁰ In our usage, therefore, the term order refers to social (by and large cooperative) order which we believe prevails in contemporary world politics. Our concern here, in other words, is more with empirically demonstrating that international politics is characterized by social order rather than normatively prescribing

56 Wendt (1999: 251).

57 Wendt (1999: 251).

58 See Clark (1989: 3-4).

59 See Rosenau (1995: 50-51).

60 In an otherwise cogent and careful analysis of the assumption of anarchy in IR, Milner (1993: 152) states: "Legitimacy, more than institutions or laws, is what distinguishes domestic and international politics. Lack of legitimacy seems in the end to be what many international relations scholars have in mind when they talk about anarchy."

what ought to be done to transform this order into another (and presumably a better) form.

It should be reiterated that there is no one-to-one correspondence between justice and order. Put differently, an orderly system must not necessarily be a just system.⁶¹ As far as state aspirations and refusal of others to accede goes it appears that there is less of such a phenomena now than, say, three decades ago. Therefore, in this sense too contemporary global politics is more orderly (and hierarchic) than it had been in earlier periods. Viewed in this way, it may indeed be true that stateless nation would be disorderly, specially if it had one. But order does not emanate from the institution of state alone. As we pointed out above, it is logically hazardous to readily embrace the idea which equates the absence of world government with the prevalence of anarchy in the international system. Put simply, the absence of world government and anarchy in the international system are not inseparable.

61 Rosenau (1995: 50-51) makes the mistake of conflating the two. He writes: What makes today's order [the second understanding as discussed above] so chaotic is many of the basic patterns presently at work in global politics are marked by intense contradictions and erratic fluctuations. One looks out on the world scene and sees upheaval within countries and tensions between them, abject poverty in the Third World and extensive wealth in the First world; and whatever the geographic context, the scene is marked by shrill demands and counter-demands as various groups assert aspirations to which others refuse to accede.

Despite his Grotian idea of international society, Hedley Bull argued along these lines: [t]he international system is still anarchic, in the sense that it is marked by the absence of a central authority.⁶² Bull seemed to be suggesting that the notions international anarchy and international society are not incompatible. Others have also pointed out that the absence of a higher authority means *anarchy*;⁶³ or in the absence of a central government, political organizations take an anarchic form.⁶⁴ In a book misleadingly entitled, *The Hierarchy of States*, Ian Clark has pointed out: "...although the dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy can be understood, the description of the state system as hierarchical in this book is not intended to deny its 'self-help' anarchical characteristics; hierarchy, thus viewed, collectivizes decision-making within the rank of Great Powers while retaining the anarchical form of politics as between that rank and the others."⁶⁵ Our trouble is not only with the fact that the absence of a central authority is equated with anarchy in most IR scholarship. What is also troubling to us is the fact that this is taken to be a constant feature of world politics. For many of the scholars following this tradition of analysis, it

62 Hedley Bull (1981: 736) also did in fact write about a society of states (or international society) which he defined as a group of states which, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

63 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 14).

64 Little (1993: 139).

65 Clark (1989: 2-3).

is difficult to see that the underlying principles of international politics are different from those which Hobbes sets forth.⁶⁶

We might then ask, in what way should we view the array of bilateral and multilateral agreements that states enter into. A realist would readily respond that in making such agreements, states explicitly confirm each other's sovereignty and therefore actively help to reproduce the deep structure of the international system. Treaties and acts of cooperation all intentionally serve to reconfirm and reproduce the anarchic system of independent states.⁶⁷ The problem with such circular argument is that at the end of the argument we know no more than at the beginning. In addition, and perhaps even more crucially, the view which attributes the 'prevalence' of the structure of 'international anarchy' to the fact that each state comprising the international system enjoy sovereignty is hardly sustainable. As indicated earlier, that contemporary states are sovereign and that they recognize each other is a fact that is not contentious at all. But this phenomenon *ipso facto* engenders international anarchy is far less convincing. In other words, even if it were true that states began to expect more violence and conflict in their interaction when sovereignty was institutionalized, this mere fact cannot justifiably be used as a proof of one causing the other even though such *post hoc* reasoning may help to fill the explanatory vacuum. In fact the very same point could logically lead to the

66 Bull (1981: 737).

67 For a discussion along this line, see Little (1993: 152).

opposite conclusion. In such instances the situation seems to be bearing out Wendt's observation that states that recognize each other's sovereignty tend not to conquer each other, not because they cannot, but because recognition implies a willingness to live and let live.⁶⁸ Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the explanation of anarchy in terms of sovereignty is illogical to its very roots.

Put in another way, rather than confirming the prevalence of anarchy in the international system, inter-state agreements, including on the principle of sovereignty, signify the existence of 'the element of international society'. Thus, it can be argued that theoretically as well as in practice the absence of a central authority results in anarchy only when there is a widespread disagreement as to the basis of order or hierarchy in the system of states and that the 'inter-subjective knowledge' of the place of self and other guarantees stability and hierarchy in the system. This notion somewhat corresponds to the social constructivist concept of 'social structures' the partial definition of which is a shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge,⁶⁹ none of which is perfect or complete ; but neither is it wholly unreliable or irrelevant.⁷⁰

EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Hierarchy rather than anarchy characterizes contemporary international politics. By hierarchy, we simply mean "a social ar-

68 Wendt (1999: 209).

69 The other elements of social structures are material resources and practices. Wendt (1995: 73).

70 Wendt (1999: 108) further elaborates the notion in his most re-

rament characterized by stratification.”⁷¹ It is not of course true that there is one, universally agreed upon, system of hierarchy of states. Different sets of hierarchies of states have existed in different issue areas and at different times. On this point, we concur with Joseph S. Nye that “no single hierarchy describes adequately contemporary world politics.”⁷² As indicated above, anarchy does not mean chaos; neither does it mean, by any stretch of the imagination, order or hierarchy. The two categories represent ideal types and, for all intents and purposes, they are opposite although it is open to debate, depending on how one defines the concepts, exactly what type of opposition this represents. Our own position in this regard can be best illustrated by visualizing a diagram. Let us suppose we have on the negative side of the x-axis anarchy (defined here, and only here as complete chaos) on the other side there is hierarchy (similarly defined as elaborate rank and order in a stable system). Regardless of the definitional variations such as that exists in the academic discourse, subsequent to a careful empirical observation it ought to become evidently clear that contemporary

cent book in this way: “contemporary states have been interacting for dozens, even hundreds of years, during which they have accumulated considerable knowledge about each other’s interests. They know something about each other’s grievances and ambitions, and thus about whether they are status quo or revisionist states. They know something about each other’s styles of dispute resolution. And they even know something about the condition under which these conditions might change.”

71 The definition is adapted from Clark (1989: 2).

72 Nye (1992: 88).

international system is much more closer to hierarchy and is farther from anarchy than the other way round.

One source of hierarchy which is based on the inter-subjective understanding among states in different spheres of international affairs could be what international relations scholars call regimes the main function of which is “the creation of a pattern within sets of issue areas *which approximate legal liability* whereby states conform to agreed rules due to converging expectations and due to the enhancement of coordinated sanctions against defectors.”⁷³ (Italics added) Racial, geographic, economic and cultural indicators as well as the so called national characters had also been in use for bestowing on or withholding from a state a status in the international hierarchy.⁷⁴ One set of such indicator, namely the quality of health, education and welfare, according to Henry Barbera’s taxonomy, constitutes, ‘the development hierarchy of nations’.⁷⁵ There are also less explicit sources of hierarchization in the international state system. What we should like to emphasize here is that there are relatively durable-as opposed to fragile and fleeting-hierarchies virtu-

73 Attributed to Robert Keohane, see Suhr (1998: 98).

74 For an excellent discussion of the analytic interpretation based on these variables see O’Neil (1982). Clark (1989: 23) also broadly identifies a few types of hierarchy in the international system: “...hierarchy is commonly assigned in terms of politico-strategic power, yielding the traditional groupings of Great Powers, medium powers, and small powers. It may equally be described in economic terms, yielding the stratification into first, second, third and fourth worlds. Outside a statist perspective, it may be analyzed in terms of centers or cores, semi-peripheries and peripheries. Its key theme is that disparities in capability are reflected, more or less formally, in the decision-making of the society of states.”

ally in all areas of potential conflict and cooperation among states. These hierarchies are established through 'voluntary agreement' or through 'tests of will and strength' among rivals. Sometimes, the place a state occupies could simply be bestowed upon it and the status thus attained or assigned could be more or less attuned to what that particular state would wish it to be.⁷⁶ Alexander Wendt attributes the widespread compliance, or respect for international hierarchy, respectively to coercion, self-interest and legitimacy.⁷⁷

It appears that human beings naturally tend to rank and order events, peoples, states and other collectivities however more or less elaborate or systematic the process may be.⁷⁸ The point is human beings tend to perceive groups of individuals or collectivities in a context of hierarchy-imagined or real-and thus it makes sense if we regard ourselves as *Homo Hierarchicus*.⁷⁹ And intended or not, this human predisposition contributes to stability in the interaction and

75 Barbera (1973: 1).

76 Russia's recent admission to the G 7 may be considered as an instance of a bestowal of a higher status on a state in the hierarchy of nations. In fact, Russia is neither a full-fledged liberal democracy nor a 'wealthy' industrial nation to qualify objectively to join the club. On the other hand, the denial to the newly-formed state of Somaliland an international recognition despite the fact that the government there enjoys internal legitimacy and that the territory is more orderly and viable than many other mini-states may be an instance of the withholding of from a political unit the status of sovereign statehood which is the minimum requirement to join the hierarchical interstate system.

77 Wendt (1999: 286).

order in the system.

“ [T] he distribution of power in world politics,” Joseph Nye observed not so long ago, “has become like a layer cake. The top military layer is largely unipolar...The economic middle layer is tripolar...The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power.”⁸⁰ More recently, David Held and Anthony McGrew have similarly this to write on today’s world military order : “ [i] t is stratified in that there is broadly a first tier (with superpower status), second tier (middle-ranking powers), and third tier (developing military powers); and it is institutionalized in that military-diplomatic and multilateral arrangements define regularized patterns of interaction.”⁸¹ We might then ask in what sense it could still be true that world politics is anarchic. In our view, such statements about the international distribution of power can only be read as a systematic account of the dynamics of hierarchy in different spheres of world politics. Following the trail blazed by other prominent IR scholars,⁸² however, neither Nye nor Held and McGrew openly endorse the idea of the hierarchy of states.

78 This may be due to the quest for what Wendt (1999: 131) has called ‘ontological security’ defined as the human predisposition for a “relatively stable expectations about the world around them. Along the need for physical security, this pushes human beings in a conservative homeostatic direction, and to seek out recognition of their standing from society.”

79 For a detailed discussion of the concept, see Dumont’s (1980) book of the same title.

80 Nye (1992: 88)

81 Held and McGrew (1998: 222).

Power is one of the central concepts in international politics and has been analyzed in a variety of ways. The moment we start talking about distribution of power in the international system, be it structural or relative, soft or hard, the key issue becomes, acknowledged or not, the dynamics of hierarchy of states and not its counterpart. Embedded even in the very notions of multipolarity, bipolarity, unipolarity as well as the balance of power principle is the idea of hierarchy. By the same token, when we talk about developed countries versus developing countries or the core versus periphery, the point of reference is a well-established hierarchy of states. In general, a careful reading of even realist texts reveal that the major themes of their analyses revolve around the questions of what type of hierarchies exist, which ones have what effects and why and how they change.

To be sure there are, and will always be, instances where hierarchy is contested, and sometimes forcefully, for it is 'shared-knowledge' rather than an 'external body' that effectively restrains interstate behavior. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is a clear example. But such aberrations are rather limited, much less limited than transgression of rules and norms within states.⁸³ In 1998 out of the twenty seven major armed conflicts in the world all but two²¹³ ethose between India and Pakistan and between Eritrea and Ethiopia-were domestic.⁸⁴ In fact, there has been a steady decline

82 One is left with similar impression after reading such classic texts as Paul Kennedy (1987); and Robert Gilpin (1981) etc.

in the number of interstate wars in the international system since 1648,⁸⁵ whereas the percentage of countries with ethnic wars has been on a more or less steady increase since 1955.⁸⁶ In short, interstate politics is characterized by a relative peace more than intra-state politics. Most states follow most international law most of the time.⁸⁷

On Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, some writers have remarked, and correctly so, that despite its scientific claims most of its propositions are self-contradictory and not falsifiable. His statement on anarchy seems to clearly elucidate this inadequacy. For him to Waltz, the existence of more violence or expectation of violence at domestic level could not be taken as an indicator of its be-

83 In fact, some analysts, such as M. Ayoob (1991: 88-89) have argued "conflict in the Third World during the postWar decades was actively encouraged by superpower policies largely aimed at testing one another's political will and power projection capabilities in areas of the globe peripheral to the vital concerns of the superpowers themselves."

84 See SIPRI (1999: 7). It should be noted that the short-lived conflict between India and Pakistan is in essence the spill over of a long-standing domestic conflict rather than a fullfledged interstate conflict. In the case of Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict too neither side openly challenged the 'sovereignty' of the other. The problem instead pertained to the different interpretation of the physical confines of the sovereignty.

85 See Holsti (1991) and (1996).

86 Gurr et al. (1999: 53).

87 Wendt (1995: 76), For an elaborate statement of a similar idea see Bull (1977: 42).

ing more anarchic than international politics because of the existence in the former of a body with the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.⁸⁸ Such statement unmistakably contradicts one of the pillars of his theory that “[a]mong men, as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence.”⁸⁹ This is simply because if we pursue this line of argument, the logical conclusion would be that the larger the number of occurrences of violence, the more anarchic the system is. Waltz states his position in these terms :

Since world politics, although not formally organized, is not entirely without institutions and orderly procedures, students are inclined to see a lessening of anarchy when alliances form, when transactions across borders increase, and when international organizations multiply. Such view confuses structure with process.⁹⁰

It appears therefore that for Waltz an increase as well as a decrease in interstate violence, or an increase or a decrease in the expectation of it, and an increase in the level and magnitude of cooperation among states do not undermine the validity of the assumption of international anarchy. In his eagerness to give coherence to

88 “To discover qualitative differences between internal and external affairs one must look for a criterion other than the occurrence of violence. The distinction between international and national realms of politics is not found in the use or the non-use of force but in their different structures.” Waltz (1979: 103).

89 Waltz (1979: 102).

90 Waltz (1979: 14).

his theory, Waltz's statement lays bare the Achilles Heel of neorealism-its insistence that the structure of international anarchy is permanent, and an unalterable. A devoted neorealist may accept Waltz's views in this regard as a matter of faith, but we are not one of them. We are told that if we try to clearly distinguish between structure and process, we would be able to see the truism of Waltz's position on this score. But why is it that significant changes in a process (such as the decrease in the occurrence of violence among states) do not affect the structure (of international anarchy) within which they take place. Our own position in this regard is that significant changes in social processes engender changes over time in the structure while at the same time also reflecting these same changes. Otherwise, one will be confronted with the type of choice Jean Piaget once talked about, the choice between structureless genesis on the one hand and ungenerated wholes or forms on the other.⁹¹

For Waltz, what makes domestic politics inherently different from (and less anarchic than) its international counterpart is the existence in the former, at least as far as effective governments are concerned, of a body which has a 'monopoly on *the legitimate* use of force'. Such statements could also be challenged first in light of the fact that the very concept of legitimacy has undergone change even in places where there were effective governments. Perhaps this is attributable to what some have called the 'relocation of authority'.⁹²

91 Piaget (1973: 9).

It is becoming increasingly clear that even an effective, elected government cannot take for granted that it can effectively employ its monopoly on the legitimate use of force whenever it so desires. In other words, there are growing challenges to a government's monopoly on the use of legitimate force from competing groups whose position is gradually being recognized. Waltz has argued that he might feel unsafe walking along the street. Is that different from saying that domestic politics despite the government's monopoly on the use of legitimate force, is at least as anarchic as international politics in the sense of increased expectation of violence? Of course, we know by now that when confronted with such a challenge, Waltz would refer us to the all-purpose conceptual dichotomy of structure and process.

Notwithstanding Waltzian theory, it is our view that domestic politics is markedly closer to potential anarchy than international politics. Even ardent critiques of some of the major propositions of political realism are inclined to reject such an argument out of hand. DeVries, for instance, points out that it is undeniable that there is a lack of a meaningful central authority and hence the greater expectation of violence in interstate relations than in the domestic affairs of many states.⁹³ We, however, argue that in domestic politics there is an alarming lack of 'shared knowledge' as to one's place and this is a potential (as well as actual) source of anarchy. All 'citizens'-regardless of their economic, ethnic, religious or

92 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 37-40).

Social order in world politics

political standing-seriously regard themselves as equals while unfortunately the sad fact is that they are not. For instance, some are richer than others or more educated than others. These distinctions also carry with them a broad ranging consequences both for the social status and privileges of the individuals as well as for conflict and anarchy. To say that such inequality of 'citizens' in the face of a legally 'guaranteed' equality is crucial, however, is only to state the obvious, even if the obvious is often ignored. In international politics, despite the principle of 'sovereign equality' of states ingrained in the Charter of the United Nations-no state seriously considers itself as equal to others. Each state is fully aware that the principle of sovereign equality does not work outside the General Assembly Hall of the UN. The potentials for domestic anarchy on the other hand is also heightened in a different way. As Wendt elaborates,

it may actually be easier to assess the intentions and therefore predict the behavior of states than it is of individuals. Political Realists have often extrapolated from the difficulties of reading the human mind to a supposed difficulty in knowing the intentions of states, and on that basis justified worst case assumptions about the threat posed by those intentions...the structure of corporate "minds" is typically written down in organizational

93 See DeVries (1994: 237). Note that for Waltz even less expectation of violence in international politics does not refute his generalization that interstate politics is more anarchic domestic politics.

charts that specify the functions and goals of their constituent elements, and their “thoughts” can often be heard or seen in the public debates and statements of decision-makers.⁹⁴

Not only is there greater potentials for anarchy in domestic politics, there is some instructive empirical evidence indicating that it has already become so. Waltz writes, “ [i] n any self-help system, units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior.”⁹⁵ It may indeed be an extreme case, but according to a recent nation-wide poll seventy percent of Colombians said that they are afraid of going out at night because they feel insecure.⁹⁶ One wonders if there is a single state, weak or strong, that worries in these terms for its survival. In addition, today individuals are relentlessly confronted with social, political and economic complexities that impel them to forgo their rudimentary premises and replace them with more elaborate conceptions of how to respond to the challenges of daily life.⁹⁷ Due also to what has come to be known as the “third wave of democratization” the world has witnessed throughout the last decade of the 20th century the birth of democracies and partial democracies in different corners of the globe.⁹⁸ There were 86 ‘democratic’ countries in 1997 as compared with only 8 in 1900, with more than half of the world’s population living today under ‘democratic’ governments.⁹⁹ Intriguingly enough, though, democrati-

94 Wendt (1999: 222).

95 Waltz (1979: 105).

96 *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 10, 2000.

97 Rosenau and Durfee (1995: 36).

zation of political systems appears to engender more anarchy domestically while at the same time enhancing order in the realm of inter-state relations.¹⁰⁰

Even before the onset of the “third wave of democratization”, domestic politics seemed to have been characterized, both potentially and actually, by anarchy more than international politics. This statement can be substantiated by taking a state with a citizenry known to be most lawabiding than any other state. Then calculate the rate or percentage of transgression of laws by its citizens and compare it with the rate of transgression of law by states in the ‘international society’. It is reasonable to surmise that such figure would support the argument that the presence of a central, coercive authority is no guarantee for the prevalence of order and that the

98 For a concise summary of the reasons behind this ‘wave’, see Dahl (1999: 920–924).

99 Dahl (1999 : 921–923).

100 Our conjecture is consistent with the result of a recent study (Gurr et al. 1999: 52–55) which found out that autocracies are much less vulnerable to state failure than are partial democracies. In the Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the study concluded, other things being equal, partial democracies were on average 11 times more likely to fail than autocracies. The study defines partial democracy as a country which has some democratic characteristic-such as elections-but also have some autocratic characteristics, such as a chief executive with almost no constraints on his/her power, sharp limits on political competition, a state restrained press, or a cowed or dependent judiciary. And on the basis of this definition, study identifies more than twenty such countries.

absence of an international central authority or world government does not in itself foster anarchy. In addition, whereas it is true that history has not yet ended as Francis Fukuyama had claimed,¹⁰¹ there are, as stated above, more states in contemporary international system which are democratic compared to any other period in human history.¹⁰² This is if anything is likely to enhance the trend towards anarchy at the domestic level and hierarchy at the international level.

To be sure, the claim that democratic states are potentially more anarchic than undemocratic states must however be tempered by the important consideration that democracy seems to be by far the best type of political system, at least as far as domestic governance goes. On the other hand, it should be reiterated that more states are democratic now than in any other period in human history carries with it a significant implication for interaction among states and the concocted idea of international anarchy. It might well have been observations such as these which led Wendt to conclude :

..very few states today are complete black boxes to each other, not least because states are internally related to societies over which they rarely have complete control. The actors and proc-

101 Fukuyama (1992).

102 For why this is so and the future promises to be more of the same, see Dahl (1999).

esses of civil society provide considerable information to other states on their own state's intentions and capabilities, and the spread of democracy will only increase this openness in the future. More and more, in other words, states will be able to literally look inside each other's "heads" in a way that individuals never will.¹⁰³

CONCLUSION

We have sought to demonstrate in this essay that the ossified concept of anarchy in international relations is a theoretical construct which is far removed from empirical reality. While it is true

103 Wendt (1999: 222-223). Contrary to what appears to be the case at first glance, we are not however endorsing the truism of the 'democratic peace theory' which is accorded by many the virtual status of empirical law in contemporary international relations theory. In fact, we are of the opinion that the 'theory' which clearly has a heavy dose of rationalist assumption needs further examination. The underlying assumptions of this 'theory' are that democracy introduces a selection bias in favor of pacific leaders and that Republican constitutionalism restrain leaders from making wars at will. Therefore democracies tend not to fight each other. For its obviously desirable normative consequences, upholding such a view as a socializing principle is fine. But as an objective theoretical explanation of international politics, it appears to be flawed. Democracy is not an international value (or a systemic characteristic of international politics), the fact instead is that democracy is merely a structural process by which a system of governance is organized domestically. It is also about how national decisions are made.

But democracy does not prescribe the type of decision that ought to (or would be) made in democratic countries. Therefore, it is theoretically possible for people to democratically elect

that a degree of abstraction is an unavoidable, and may even be desirable in a scientific project, for a theory to yield fruit its concepts should be able to approximate reality as much as possible. The concept of anarchy fails to do so. To the central question whether world politics is conducted in an elaborate set of hierarchy at every level and issue area, the answer we gave is definitely not. The image of world politics as an uncontrollable anarchy is also absurd.

In the preceding pages we have also called into question both the logic and the empirical validity of the assumption of anarchy in international relations and its principal derivatives and ingredients; namely, that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the absence of a 'world government' and the 'reign of anarchy'; that world politics is more anarchic than domestic politics; and that durable and genuine cooperation among sovereign states becomes ex-

leaders that would engineer catastrophic international wars. It can be argued logically, as Onuf and Johnson did, that democracy "can make war easier by making government more efficient and legitimating access to societal resources." In short, there is no logic in democracy that prevents two or more democratically elected governments from going to war against each other if the conflict in their 'national interest' proves so divergent as to make a compromise impossible. If there has been a long peace among democracies during the last several decades, it may be more due to the impact of the 'belief' in democratic peace than the truism of the theory itself.

Logic does not support that democracies do not fight each other especially when and if their vital interests irreconcilably diverge. The paraphrases on the assumptions of democratic peace and citations are from Onuf and Johnson (1995: 179-191).

tremely difficult, if not impossible, under the circumstances.

Our tentative conclusions are that contemporary world politics is more hierarchic than domestic politics and that there are factors such as intersubjective knowledge and shared understandings which in the absence of world government provide the basis for order and stability in the international system. Since the assumption of anarchy in international relations raises such wider questions which have yet to be adequately analyzed, it is our hope that other researchers would attempt to approach them from a variety of ways.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ayoob, M. (1993) "The Third World in a Changing Strategic Context," in Dewit D. et al.. *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security*, Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Barbera, H. (1973) *Rich Nations and Poor in Peace and War. Continuity and Change in the Development Hierarchy of Seventy Nations from 1913 through 1952*, Lexington, Toronto, London, Lexington Books.
- Brown, Seyom (1992) *International Relations in a Changing Global System. Towards a Theory of the World Polity*, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Bull, Hedley (1977) *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*, London: Macmillan.
- (1981) "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," *Social Research*, 48, 717-738.

- Clark, Ian (1989) *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Dahl, Robert (1999) "The Shifting Boundaries of Democratic Governments," *Social Research*, 66, 915-931.
- Danziger, J. N. (1991) *Understanding the Political World. An Introduction to Political Science*, New York & London : Longman.
- Dessler, David (1999) "Constructivism within a positivist social science," *Review of International Studies*, 25, 123-137.
- DeVires, Robert (1994) "A critique of Political Realism," in Kenneth W. Thompson ed., *Community, Diversity and New World Order. Essays in Honor of Inis L. Claude, Jr.*, Lanham : University Press of America.
- Dumont, L. (1980) *Homo Hierachicus*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*, London : Penguin Books.
- Gilpin, Robert (1981) *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Guba, E. G. and Y. S. Lincoln (1994) "Major Paradigms and Perspectives," in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi : Sage.
- Gurr, T. R. et al. (1999) "State Failure Task Force : Phase II Findings," *Environmental Change & Security Project Report*, 5, 49-72.
- Hanson, Elizabeth (1992) "William T. R. Fox and the Study of

- World Politics,” in Robert, Rostein, ed., *The Evolution of Theory in International Politics*, Columbia : Columbia University Press.
- Held, D. and A. McGrew (1998) “The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects of World Order,” *International Affairs*, 24.
- Holsti, K. J. (1991) *Peace and War : Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- (1996) *The State, War and the State of War*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Huer, Jon (1990) *The Fallacies of Social Science. A Critique of the Natural Science Model of Social Analysis*, New York : Peter Lang.
- Jackson, W. D. (1992) “Thinking About *International Community* and Its Alternatives,” in Kenneth W. Thompson ed., *Community, Diversity and New World Order. Essays in Honor of Inis L. Claude, Jr.*, Lanham : University Press of America.
- Jervis, Robert (1998) “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” *International Organization*, 52, 971-991.
- Jones, Charles (1993) “Rethinking the Methodology of Neorealism,” in Barry Buzan et al. eds. *The Logic of Anarchy. Neorealism to Structural Realism* New York : Columbia University Press .
- Kennedy, P. (1987) *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict 1500-2000*, New York : Random House.
- Kegley, Charles (1995) “The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics : An Introduction,” in Charles Kegley, ed.,

Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Krasner, S. D. (1983) ed. *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Laslett, Peter (1989). (ed.) John Locke. *Two Treatises of Government*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Legro, J. W. and A. Moravcsik (1999) "Is Anybody Still A Realist?" *International Security*, 24, 5-55.

Little, Richard (1999) "Historiography and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, 25, 291-299.

(1993) "Rethinking System Continuity and Transformation," in Barry Buzan et al. eds. *The Logic of Anarchy*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Lipson, Charles (1984) "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics*, 37, 1-23.

Milner, H. (1993) "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," in David A. Baldwin, ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Mouritzen, Hans (1997) "Kenneth Waltz: a critical rationalist between international politics and foreign policy," in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, eds., *The future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?* London and New York: Routledge.

Nicholson, Michael (1996) *Causes and Consequences in International Relations. A Conceptual Study*, London and New York: Pinter.

Nye, Joseph (1992) "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs*,

Spring, 83-96.

- Onuf, Nicholas and Thomas Johnson (1995) "Peace in the Liberal World: Does Democracy Matter?" in Charles Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Piaget, Jean (1973) *Structuralism*, (Translated by C. Maschler) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Ringmar, Eric (1997) "Alexander Wendt: a social scientist struggling with history," in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, eds., *The future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?* London and New York: Routledge.
- Rose, Gideon (1998) "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, 51, 144-72.
- Rosenau, J. N. and M. Durfee (1995) *Thinking Theory Thoroughly. Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Rothstein, Robert (1992) ed., *The Evolution of Theory in International Politics*, Columbia: Columbia University Press.
- Runciman, W. G. (1990) *A Treatise on Social Theory. Volume 1. The Methodology of Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruggie, G. R. (1998) "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoliberalism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization*, 52, 855-885.
- Russel, Bertrand (1974) *The Art of Philosophizing and Other Essays*, Totowa: Littlefield.
- Said, E. W. (1994) *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Vantage

Books.

- Smith, T. W. (1999) *History and International Relations*, London & New York : Routledge.
- Smith, B. K. (1994) *Classifying the Universe. The Ancient Indian Verna System and the Origins of Caste*, New York & Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- Strange, Susan (1999) "The Westfailure system," *Review of International Studies*, 25, 3455-353.
- Strand, S. (1999) "Forecasting the Future : Pitfalls in Controlling for Uncertainty," *Futures*, 31, 333-350.
- Suhr, M. (1997) "Robert O. Keohane : a contemporary classic," in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, eds., *The future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?* London and New York : Routledge.
- Tuck, Richard (1991) (ed.) Thomas Hobbes. *Leviathan*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1995) "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," in Charles Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory : Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, New York : St. Martin's Press.
- (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, Mass : AddisonWesley.
- Wendt, Alexander (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- (1995) "Constructing International Politics," *International Security*, 20, 71-81.
- (1994) "Collective identity formation and international state," *American Political Science Review*, 88, 384-396.

Social order in world politics

- (1992) "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization*, 46, 391-425.
- Williams, Michael C. (1996) "Hobbes and International Relations. A Reconsideration," *International Organization*, 50, 213-36.
- Wind, M. (1997) "Nicholas G. Onuf: The rule of anarchy," in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever, eds., *The future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?* London and New York: Routledge.