

POLITICAL REFORM AND
REALIGNMENT IN ITALY (II)
The Dynamics of The Italian Electoral
Reform And Its Transitional Outcome

Hideko Magara^{(*)(**)}

INTRODUCTION

A REVOLUTION UNDER DEMOCRACY

Italian society is experiencing a process of large-scale self-reorganization in which numerous social, professional, cultural and economic groups have begun competing with each other in pursuit of various resources and rewards. Present Italy is in the midst of transition from the corrupted post-war politics controlled by the DC to a certain new form of politics whose nature is still unclear. This transformation, unlike that of the regime changes from non-

(*) I would like to show my special appreciation to Ugo Ascoli, Salvatore Biasco, Carmelo Cedrone, Caterina Ginsburg, Claudio Ligas, Sauro Magnani, Stefano Micossi, Massimo Paci, Michele Salvati, Silvano Scaiola and Bruno Trentin for their *gentilissimo* cooperation during my research stay in Italy. The University of Tsukuba financially supported my project.

(**) Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Institute of Social Sciences, The University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan.

democratic polity to democracy, is conducted within a democratic regime. However, it could be equally significant as the regime changes, depending on what its outcome will be.⁽¹⁾

The Italian political system has been complicated. Political parties were heterogeneous with each other. They kept stable relationships with civil society by maintaining close ties to specific social groups. Voters, too, have been stable for a long period.⁽²⁾ In the 1980s, however, Italian society became increasingly more informed, more easily mobilized : it appeared to be somehow satisfied but more selfish. It became more demanding and more politically intolerant. "Italian society is more alert, more attentive, more impatient, and more suspicious exactly because it has become aware that a lot of its well-being depends on political decisions, and that a lot of its rewards go through political channels."⁽³⁾ Italy finally experienced a "revolution," a large-scale political transformation in the 1990s. Italian politics once characterized by the DC-led *partitocrazia* began a process of transition to some other form of politics, although still unclear

-
- (1) For the same view, Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transition to Democracy. Political Life after Authoritarian Rule*. Johns Hopkins University Press.; Hideko Magara. 1992. *Seiō Demokurasi no Chōsen (Democratic Challenges in West Europe)*. Waseda University Press.
 - (2) Luciano Bardi and Leonardo Morlino. 1994. "Italy : Tracing the Roots of the Great Transformation." in Richard Katz and Peter Mair, eds., *How Parties Organize : Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London : Sage. p. 244.
 - (3) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1993. "Introduction : A Case of Regime Crisis," in Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy, eds., *The End of Post-war Politics in Italy : The Landmark 1992 Elections*. Westview. p. 9.

about whether it would be a form of full *democrazia* or “*videocrazia*”⁽⁴⁾. The traditional dominant parties disappeared. New parties were born. The electoral system changed. There were many new faces among political leaders. The Italian citizens even felt as if a series of political changes were substantive when they put an end to the First Republic and said hello to the Second Republic. Is it correct, then, to conclude that such a “revolution” in Italian politics can be considered as a real system-change in a strict sense, and that it could turn Italian society in a more democratic direction?

The stream of radical change in Italian politics up to the March 1994 elections can be divided into three phases. The first is the period between 1990 to 92 in which traditional parties tried to renovate their own identity (e.g. PCI/PDS), and at the same time, relatively new forces (*la Lega, i Verdi, la Rete*) expanded their power. The second phase, 1992-93, saw the extinction of the traditional parties which had already been involved in a blizzard of confusion and had lost their *raison d'être*. In the third phase, 1993-94, more radical and definitive transformation of the parties and the party system became a reality. Adoption of the new electoral laws, no doubt, heavily influenced such an overall collapse of the old party institutions.⁽⁵⁾

Such transformation of Italian politics cast one basic question : What brings on such a drastic change? What kind of factors brought mutation to Italian politics which had been “frozen”⁽⁶⁾ since the

(4) Giovanni Sartori's term, here referred by Bobbio. Norberto Bobbio e Romano Prodi. 1995. “Dialogo sull'Ulivo,” *Micro Mega*. 5/95. p. 19.

(5) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994. “Dai partiti ai poli. La politica delle alleanze,” *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*. No. 3, anno xxiv. p. 497.

post-war era? The notable factors in the Italian case is that new pressures from outside the party system, the EU and the prosecuting magistrates in particular, promoted the change. Yet, the decisive factor that forces parties to transform is, in many cases, electoral defeats.⁽⁷⁾ The political actor which has realized the harshness of defeat makes the maximum efforts to avoid a possible future defeat. The PDS, for instance, began to promote seriously not only its own further renovation but also the reformation of Italian political institutions, as a matter of life or death, in response to the devastating defeat at the 1992 elections. The Italian case also shows that motives of avoiding defeat are not limited to the traditional politics. The self-made media mogul Silvio Berlusconi, whose business had come to a fatal standstill, tried to bypass immediate business defeats by entering the electoral market and by grasping political power to kick off his business stalemate.⁽⁸⁾

Did Italian parties, then, experience a real transformation through a process of political reform? The political party must be considered as an independent force in two senses. Firstly, the political party is a strategic actor. It is located in a position in which it can start a change at its disposal and can assume the helm of the change.

(6) Of course in Lipset and Rokkan's sense. S. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments : An Introduction," in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* New York : Free Press.

(7) Piero Ignazi. 1991. "Attori e valori nella trasformazione del PCI," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, no. 3, anno xxi, pp. 523-524.

(8) *L'Espresso*, 11 marzo 1994, Dieci buone ragioni per non fidarsi di Berlusconi.

Secondly, the political party is an adaptive actor. It reorganizes itself in order to secure its own survival in response to ever changing circumstances.⁽⁹⁾ The political party constantly mutates. What is the criteria to assess whether such mutation is a short-term or limited or more general? Ignazi emphasizes that there are two types of transformation of the political party. The one is *articolazione*, in which parties reinforce their party organization by altering the immediate strategies to break a deadlock without adding any significant change in their formal goals and ideology. The other is *sostituzione* which means fundamental change in the very ideology of the parties, substitution of their ultimate goals.

Such a process of transformation entails a physical change in leadership composition. The elite in the old dominant alliance may well be substituted with new leaders refreshed with new ideology through a configurational change in the dominant alliance. Such an organizational innovation forces the parties to redefine their ultimate goals. "The true motive for change may lay in the necessity of fundamental ideological renovation."⁽¹⁰⁾ Therefore, the real change of parties can be recognized by a thorough renovation of ideology on the one hand and substitution of leaders on the other. Ideological change is the real change of parties, which is clearly distinguished from short-term or limited changes of parties.

(9) Gordon Smith. 1989. "A System Perspective on Party System Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 1 (9), pp. 349-363.

(10) Piero Ignazi. 1991. "Attori e valori nella trasformazione del PCI," p. 524.

REDEFINING IDEOLOGY, REBUILDING PACTS

Whether or not the ongoing Italian political transformation finally will bring democratic outcome is still unclear. What is clear at this point is that a prerequisite for a democratic system change is the formation of collective identity shared by most citizens.⁽¹¹⁾ In the case of Italian transition, a party system change may lead to a broader macro change which would include the reorganizing of the relationship between the state and markets, between the public and the private. The party system, of course, is not merely a sum of many organizations composing the system. The parties, with their own ideological, organizational profiles and propaganda or with coalitional strategies, determine the structure of the coming system. The party system, thus, can be determined only through the strategic interaction among the parties with regard to their own identity and alignment which each of them defines.⁽¹²⁾

In promoting their own projects, the parties propose the societal images with which electorates can share their identity. The more successful are the parties in doing this, the stronger influence they cast the electorates.⁽¹³⁾ In a society whose political structure is changing, political mobilization becomes particularly important for the formation of a new identity since the old identity has been already

(11) Hideko Magara. 1992. *Seiō Demokurasi no Chōsen (Democratic Challenges in West Europe)*.

(12) Salvatore Vassallo. 1995. "La politica della coalizioni. Da un sistema partitico all'altro," in Gianfranco Pasquino, a cura di, *L'Alternanza inattesa. Le elezioni del 27 marzo 1994 e le loro conseguenze*. Rubettino Editore.

(13) Gordon Smith. 1989. "A System Perspective on Party System Change."

lost.

Parties' organizational mutation is deeply affected by changes in the social bases the parties have been depending on and by various restraints of the institutions in which they are located. However, the transformation of each party and long-term changes in voters' political culture alone cannot fully explain structural changes of party system. It is very possible that unexpected factors bring uncertainty to the party system and indispose the conventional way of recognition and decision-making process. When uncertainty increases, political leaders no longer can resort to their traditional actions and are driven to shift their strategies to new and more adaptive ones. They are compelled to redefine the very structure of competition. In such a phase, a party's own identity becomes the object of the game.⁽¹⁴⁾

Electoral reforms, whose impact on actual politics is enormous, often cause a significant change in the balance of power among actors. The party system, thus, loses short-term stability. In such an unstable and uncertain circumstance, actors manage to reach a kind of pact in order to make the coming new institutions the most favorable for themselves.

Pacts are supposed to play significant roles during the process of regime change and it is argued that pacts are not indispensable for democratization within the democratic regimes.⁽¹⁵⁾ However, it is no wonder that pacts play an important role, though indirectly and

(14) Salvatore Vassallo. 1995. "La politica della coalizioni. Da un sistema partitico all'altro," pp. 52-53.

(15) Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transition to Democracy. Political Life after Authoritarian Rule.*

implicitly, in such an unstable and fluid situation as the Italian “revolution” in which most of the former government members fell from power, and the actors who had played only marginal roles suddenly stepped up to the center of the political arena as indispensable protagonists. The institutional reforms in Italian politics can be considered as one variety of modern pacts. Behind these pacts, it is possible to recognize the emergence of new actors such as prosecutors, local politicians, businessmen, left-wings and right-wings who used to be the minority in politics. These new actors often break the socio-political equilibrium.

During the transition of a political system, the political leaders locate themselves in hard conflicts in which they struggle to reorganize and redefine the symbolic constructions to crystallize the electorate’s political perception.⁽¹⁶⁾ These severe conflicts, on the other hand, may well promote the formation of partial coalitions aiming at a bigger future victory. In the Italian case, some political forces once in mutual rivalry (e.g. PDS, PSI and RC on the one hand, and AN and Lega on the other) reached new alliances. Such a process of coalition-building can be viewed as a process of the partial pact formation.

The dramatic shift of Italian politics up to the 1994 elections can be grasped as a process of identity-redefinition and pact-building among various political parties. Whether this shift goes to a more acceptable direction or not depends on whether the parties are able to define new democratic identity relied on and sympathized with by citizens and to obtain their sufficient consensus to maintain it. In the

(16) Salvatore Vassallo. 1995. “La politica delle coalizioni. Da un sistema partitico all’altro,” p. 54.

following article, I will review how the Italian parties, the PDS in particular, proceeded such a process under uncertain conditions. I will also examine how the results of the 1994 elections should be evaluated in this respect of democratization.

1. REFORMING A PARTY, REFORMING ITALIAN POLITICS

OCCHETTO'S REFORM PROJECT

The renovation of the PCI/PDS was a process in which the party integrated the two trends, its own in-party renewal on the one hand and an overall party realignment with external political forces on the other, into one main stream of Italian political reform. The party was above all forced to cancel out internal confrontation among factions. At the same time it needed to explore how it ought to build new relationships with other parties. The leaders of the PCI/PDS were obliged to forge the consensus of opinion for change internally and to lead the entire leftist forces externally.

In retrospect, it was never an easy task to renew the PCI to the PDS, not to mention to reform the Italian political system as a whole. Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, it became clear to every Italian voter that the retreat of the PCI was inevitable. The PCI's vote, which had reached 34.4% in the 1976 elections, dropped to 26.6% in the 1987 elections. The severity surrounding the party was obvious. Firstly, there was a harsh reaction from the intra-party left concerning the failure of Berlinguer's *compromesso storico* which had forced the party and the allied unions to concede to the conservatives but yielded no fruit. Secondly, owing to

escalating terrorism, which engulfed the entire Italian society with apprehension during the second half of the 1970s, in particular the *brigate rosse's* kidnapping and murdering of ex-Prime Minister Aldo Moro, made the Italian citizens allergic to the left. Thirdly, the structural change of Italian society caused by the increase of soft work such as information, communication and service industries weakened the traditional basis which had supported the left. Owing to these factors, which functioned multiply, the PCI's vote monotonously declined. Alessandro Natta, successor of Berlinguer, recognizing the difficulty of such a situation, appealed the necessity of a self-renovation of the party. However, his project of reform was limited only within the existing framework of the PCI.⁽¹⁷⁾ A more radical change, or "Copernican" conversion, which later lead to the entire political reform and realignment in Italy, was promoted for the first time by the next party leader Achille Occhetto.⁽¹⁸⁾

Occhetto's family background greatly affected his political attitude. His father worked for Einaudi Publishers and kept close contacts with intellectuals such as Natalia Ginsburg, Cesare Pavese and Italo Calvino. In such an atmosphere, it was natural for him to study philosophy at the University of Milan and then enter the PCI. Upon being elected Secretary of the PCI in June 1988, Occhetto immediately proclaimed a "discontinuity". He was extremely active in promoting reforms, and appointed young and talented people with middle-class intellectual backgrounds including Walter Veltroni and Mas-

(17) Leonard Weiberg. 1995. *Transformation of Italian Communism*. Transaction Publishers.

(18) Piero Ignazi. 1992. *Dal PCI al PDS*. Bologna : Il Mulino.

simo D'Alema as his brain. He advocated "strong reformism" by which he appealed that the party should not ignore but transcend the traditional class cleavages. Following the British case, he constructed a "shadow cabinet" by which he criticized the existing government and proposed a realistic alternative to the conservatives. Being influenced by Bobbio and Dahrendorf, he tried to redefine his party as a "liberal" party.⁽¹⁹⁾

Such a scenario led by the middle-class intellectuals incurred a strong reaction from the in-party laborists. Occhetto and his young brains actively responded to this opposition by campaigning enthusiastically and persuasively around the party's local branches all over Italy. There were four major factions within the party at that time. Napolitano's faction on the right end asserted an alliance with the PSI. At the center, Occhetto was seeking further support for the party renewal. On his left hand, the Ingrao-Natta faction insisted on limited reform only within the PCI framework. On the left end, Cossutta's faction still believed in Marx-Leninism and was strongly opposed to any scenario of reforms.

The intellectuals inside and outside of the party also were divided into two groups. While the majority which consisted of the traditional intellectuals harshly blamed Occhetto's project, the new groups including Paolo Flores D'Arcais, Massimo Cacciari and Norberto Bobbio formed leftist clubs outside the party and showed their active support for reforms. The CGIL, the union closest to the PCI, initially was skeptical of Occhetto's reform scenario, and four sevenths of its

(19) Leonard Weiberg. 1995. *The Transformation of Italian Communism*. Transaction Publishers.

sub-federations were opposed to it. However, Luciano Lama and Bruno Trentin, leaders of the CGIL, recognized the significance of Occhetto's efforts and strongly supported them. Backing by the foremost leaders in the labor sector like Lama and Trentin was definitely important for the self-renewal of the PCI/PDS. In addition to the active support by such eminent thinkers and unionists, opinion among the leftist youth which was initially divided showed an increasing sympathy to Occhetto, particularly to his assertions on ecology, global inter-dependence, peace and disarmament.⁽²⁰⁾

In addition to such an intra-party renovation, Occhetto aimed at closely linking his own party's renewal to the renovation of Italian politics. He intended to locate his party at the very center of Italian politics through a process of reforming and realigning Italian party politics. Occhetto's project contained his strong intention to increase the power of the leftist forces led by the PDS to the maximum by achieving electoral reforms.

INITIATING THE ELECTORAL REFORMS

Electoral reforms had already been considered in Italy during the 1980s by the so-called Bozzi Committee (1983-1985). The claim of reform promoters represented by Gianfranco Pasquino, a political scientist and Senator from the *Sinistra Indipendente*, however, was soon wiped out, and a great deal of time passed before it came to be seriously examined. This was partly because the Italian economy recovered in the middle of the 1980s without requiring any effort to

(20) *Ibid.*

renovate Italian politics. It was possible in Italy to promote economic restructuring on the initiative of business managers, not by political initiative. The Fiat strike in 1980, for instance, can be viewed as a sign of the economic leaders' initiation of economic restructuring. In such a situation, the PCI, at the beginning, strongly opposed electoral reforms claiming that the proportional representation was the fort of democracy. The PSI, too, was clinging to the existing institutions to maintain the party's upward electoral waves and was anxious about the reformers' proposal for change which would be advantageous only for the two large parties, the DC and the PCI.

However, in the 1990s, several factors accelerated Italian political reforms. One is the issue of European integration. Unstable Italian politics faced with the severe problems of inflation and a vast deficit figure impressed the EC member countries with Italy's sheer vulnerability. In order to adapt itself to the institutional framework of an integrated Europe such as the EMS and to acquire other member nations' trust, Italy needed to reform its own politics. Just like Spain and Portugal in the 1980s which achieved political regime changes in order to obtain the EC memberships, Italy was driven to democratize its politics to adapt to the EU.

It should be noted that there had been a significant change in the balance of power among Italian political actors prior to the incipience of Italian electoral reform. Such a change can be interpreted as Craxi's legacy, which later incurred a resurgence of the Italian far right. Rehabilitation of the right in the historical 1994 elections was not achieved overnight. The rightist forces had firmly built their base under the Craxi government during the 1980s. Craxi's policies defi-

nately contributed to the future rightist developments.

THE CRAXI GOVERNMENT AND THE RESURGENCE OF THE ITALIALIAN RIGHT

The neo fascist electorates consisted of the unemployed in the southern big cities and suburban bourgeoisie, small shop owners and artisans, lower middle-class and authoritarian skilled workers. The MSI (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*), turning its back on actual politics, once was completely isolated from political disputes on economic and social policies, since other parties did not recognize it as a reliable negotiator. However, in the 1980s many parties began to pay attention to the MSI considering it as a potential partner of coalitions. How and why could the MSI jump into the very center of Italian politics? Ex-prime minister Bettino Craxi's strategy of political realignment helped the far right's resurgence.

The Craxi government, which pursued neo-liberal policies and political modernization, was backed mainly by urban professionals. Its modern image might not suggest any trait of reactionary neo-fascist culture. Then prime minister Craxi, however, had watched for a chance to assume the reins of government by breaking down the "imperfect bipolarism" of the DC and the PCI upon the pretext of ending the paralysis of Italian politics and by collecting small parties around the PSI instead of the PCI. Craxi then asserted that the only way to enhance governability of Italy and to stabilize and activate Italian politics was to fortify the competence of the President, making a strong state and concentrating power. This project was exactly what was expected by the neo-fashist. There arose then the

most direct opportunity for the MSI to get out from the political ghetto and become a “normal” party aiming at the government like most other parties when Bettino Craxi gave his inauguration speech in 1983.⁽²¹⁾ Craxi claimed that he needed a broader discourse with various political forces including opposition parties and referred to the necessity of institutional reforms. The MSI took this opportunity to actively appeal itself to a wider range of electorates beyond its traditional neo-fascist constituency.

Out of a shared recognition that Italian politics did not function sufficiently, the Bozzi Committee led by chairman Aldo Bozzi started in October 1983. Serious consideration of institutional reforms including the possibility of amending the National Constitution began. Neo-fascists tried to grasp these waves for reforms as an opportunity to extend their own influences. The committee required each minority opposition party including the PCI and the MSI to submit their reports in order to obtain broader consensus on institutional reforms. The MSI proposed constitutional reforms by which it asserted that its own party should be legitimized. What the MSI stressed in its report was the importance of the strong state, the purity of the nation, a moral identity backed by a compelling power. The party clearly showed its political stance in that institutional reforms should be promoted in the framework of traditional fascism. It blamed the existing party system and proposed an idea of an utterly new constitution. The MSI wanted to build a corporatist political system based on compulsory labor unionism in the framework of the strong and

(21) Paul Furlong. 1992. “The Extreme Right in Italy : Old Orders and Dangerous Novelties,” *Parliamentary Affairs*. vol. 45, no. 3, p. 348.

centralized state. It also proposed direct elections for the head of state with seven year terms in office, stronger executives, and more limited roles of parties.

New Secretary Gianfranco Fini had an opportunity to access Craxi at the party head meeting on institutional reforms. After the talk, Craxi repeatedly claimed the necessity to consult with every party leader in order to promote the reforms. By that time the PSI had already confirmed its policy to realize the direct election of the President. Though the range of consensus between Craxi and Fini was limited, they came to share common interests concerning the stronger rule of the President.

The problem of strengthening the President's power through direct elections became even more of a political matter in the 1990s. The President of Italy had traditionally been located outside party politics. Since the power of the presidency was limited by Constitution, the president's role normally was only nominal. However, Francesco Cossiga, who had been President since his inauguration of 1985, broke with tradition and began strongly intervening into party politics. His intervention expressed his anti-PCI anti-DC stance so clearly that both parties criticized that the President abused his power. Cossiga openly supported the project of directly electing the President. There emerged almost a coalitional relationship among Cossiga himself, the PSI, the neo-fascists and the PLI which could be termed as the "President Party".⁽²²⁾

(22) *Ibid.* pp. 345-356.

THE LEFTIST REACTION

Under such a condition, the PCI decided on a radical shift including the change of party name and symbol in October 1989. However, its in-party disputes were excessively intellectual and far from the general electorates. Faced with such a situation, Occhetto, with the Rimini Congress as a turning-point, judged that institutional reform was the best way to strengthen his own party and seriously began embarking on electoral reforms.

Why, as a strategic actor, did the PCI/PDS, which once adhered to the proportional representation as the fort of democracy, turn to oppose it and choose the majoritarian system instead through the process of institutional reforms? The proportional representation system was now considered as the institution that only deepened the leftist fragmentation. The PCI, which had been in difficulty in terms of organization, party members, finance and ideological solidarity, became too vulnerable to unite the leftist forces politically and to assume hegemony. However, the PCI, which thought that the leftist solidarity was still imperative although political unification of the left was impossible, clung to its last hope of institutional solidarity that could be attained through the majoritarian system which would divide all the competing actors into two big confrontational blocks. The impact of such a policy-change of the second largest party in Italy was significant. The project of majoritarianism, which had simply been the "*obscur objet du desir*" among a handful of reformers, suddenly turned to be a clean and clear strategy for the PCI.

Occhetto placed political reforms high on his objectives when he promoted the transformation of the PCI into the PDS. He embraced

a scenario that a leftist government would become a reality by way of electoral reforms. His party's renovation was inseparably related to the reforms of Italian politics. For him, therefore, the success of political reforms was a necessary precondition for the success of his own party's renewal and survival.

TOWARD THE REFERENDUM

When not only the 9th legislature but also the 10th faced the crisis of dissolution, the very form of government itself came to be questioned. The renewal of the electoral system and amending the Constitution began to be argued. While Mario Segni of the DC suggested the introduction of the French style double ballot system, Mino Martinazzoli (DC) and Massimo D' Alema (PCI) agreed to the idea proposed by constitutional scholars to utilize the referendum to abolish the existing electoral system. While the main stream of the DC led by Giulio Andreotti opposed these institutional reforms, about one third of the Christian Democratic MPs including De Mita's faction, the centrists and the moderates supported the reforms. In February 1990, an extra-partisan committee of referenda promotion asked the Court of Cassation Office to enforce a referendum to eradicate the on-going electoral law of the Senate. The chairman of the committee was Mario Segni. The Committee, which consisted of the DC, PLI, radicals, PRI, Independent Left and PCI, was literally an extra-partisan political group. The Committee also tied civil society to politics in that many voluntary groups such as Italian Christian Workers Association, the National Women Voters' Association, etc., participated in it.⁽²³⁾

To carry out the referendum, no less than 500,000 people's signatures supporting the shift of three fourths of the existing proportional representation districts into the majoritarian system were required. It was assumed that such a change would make the role of individual candidates more substantial. At the same time, it was expected that coalitions among parties and political groups would be formed to back these candidates on both local and national bases. While the personalities of the candidates themselves were supposed to become definitely important, the parties still maintained strong influences. On the local level, it was proposed that electorates would choose local governments through directly electing their mayors. However, collecting signatures of more than 500,000 citizens was a much more difficult task than expected. In spite of ardent appeals for the referendum by Mario Segni and ex-Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita, the centrists and leftists within the DC were not easily mobilized. Even the factions which had usually been progressive strongly opposed the referendum. The Christian Democratic mobilization of electorates was conducted on individual candidates' bases. Thus, in Segni and De Mita's constituencies they collected sufficient signatures, but in other districts the situation was quite unsatisfactory.⁽²⁴⁾

The other key actor beside Mario Segni that promoted the referendum was the PDS. The PCI, as a defender of the Italian constitution, constantly safeguarded the political system based on the multi-

(23) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1992. "The Electoral Reform Referendums", in Robert Leonardi and Fausto Anderlini, eds. *Italian Politics. A Review Vol 6*. New York : Pinter. pp. 9-11.

(24) *Ibid.* pp. 14-17.

party proportional representation in spite of its vulnerability as a form of parliamentary government. Occhetto was the first leader of the PCI that pointed out the necessity of fundamentally reforming the political institutions. He did so not only by attributing dysfunctions of the Italian political system simply to the coalitional governments but also by showing the infelicity of the very institutions of Italian politics : Occhetto made it broadly recognized that the reforms were truly imperative. For Occhetto, the success of the referendum was essential for the success of his new party. However, the conservatives (leftists) within the party harshly criticized Occhetto who did not hesitate in urging a discontinuity from the traditional Togliatti line in order to rebuild the party's new relationship with a broader civil society. Ingrao's faction in particular attacked him saying that Occhetto's project lacked sociality and was not at all different from that of the PSI.

The PCI as a whole supported the referendum finally at the national congress. Yet the task of collecting signatures did not go smoothly because of the friction between the reformers' group backing Occhetto and the opposition within the party. Occhetto and his supporters actively reacted and gathered 190,000 signatures. However, the signature-collecting campaign was so dull in general that the PCI needed to mobilize fund raising campaigns at its *l'Unità* festival. In August 1990, the signatures finally reached 500,000. Behind this difficulty there was strong resistance among many politicians to the electoral reforms. The PSI was in the central position of such rebellion. Giuliano Amato of the PSI negated the very legitimacy of the referendum in that it proposed new laws

instead of abolishing the existing laws. Craxi expected the direct election of the President rather than the introduction of the majoritarian system. He embraced a scenario in which he himself would become the President endowed with a centralized power and elected by the nation.

There was, at the same time, serious misgiving that the small parties would vanish with a shift to the majoritarian system. Also the PCI was under the apprehension that such a change would bring about a vast loss of its own votes. The in-party reformers ardently tried to persuade their colleagues that the PCI would become able to change its old and negative image of persistent opposition and to increase its votes by forming an effective coalition instead of simply losing votes.⁽²⁵⁾

Meanwhile, chairman of the referendum promoting committee, Mario Segni, was isolated within the DC. Segni's supporters, which consisted of catholic groups outside the DC such as ACLI and FUCI, were usually close to the in-party left. However, Segni himself was not leftist in the DC. Furthermore, the Christian Democratic leftist leader Ciriaco De Mita's reform stance was quite inexplicable. In his term of office as Prime Minister he did not pay any particular efforts for electoral reforms. During the referendum campaign period, he suddenly withdrew his support of Mario Segni.

Just at that time, ominous clouds began to gather over the coalition government. The Italian economy was deteriorating. The growth rate of the GDP was only 2%, but the inflation rate jumped to 6.5%.

(25) *Ibid.* p. 19.

In October 1990, the Gladio scandal was revealed and the citizens' distrust of the DC deepened. While abstention increased at the local election of May 1990, the *Lega Lombarda* which rebelled against the traditional party politics leapt to 20.2%.

THE RISE OF THE LEGA

The *Lega Nord*, which originally stemmed from the rightist nationalist movement claiming anti-*Mezzogiorno* and immigrant ostracism, became socialized at the general elections by thoroughly attacking *partitocrazia*, party control of politics and society. Being initially protected by the proportional representation system, the *Lega Nord* rapidly increased its votes. The Italian electoral law, i. e. the proportional representation without any entry hurdle, provided the best condition for local parties like the *Lega Nord* to enter into national politics.⁽²⁶⁾

The rise of the *Lega Nord* was helped by the fact that the MSI was going against the political current of the times. Most parties, both new and old, appealed to decentralization and local autonomy. The MSI that aimed at rebuilding the strong state and national identity impressed Italian voters with its backwardness. Contrary to the MSI, the *Lega Nord* emerged from the decline of traditional culture and value systems. The Italian political map was once clearly divided into two : the North East controlled by the DC and the Middle Italy controlled by the PCI. Until the 1970s it was possible for the DC

(26) Mauro Calise. 1993. "Remaking the Italian Party System : How Lijphart Got It Wrong by Saying It Right," *West European Politics*. Vol 16, No. 4. (Oct. 1993). pp. 545-560.

to appeal various groups of electorates for ideological solidarity upon the pretext of anti-communism. However, the DC lost its centripetal force in the 1980s when the communist menace was weakened and the necessity to present a common front against the PCI to prevent a birth of communist government disappeared. Moreover, the waves of anti-DC and anti-*partitocrazia* grew radically owing to the reveal of political corruption and citizens' distrust of politics.

As an economic background which accelerated this current, the tax reform carried out in the first half of the 1980s had considerable influences. It became difficult to maintain the Italian welfare state after the economic crisis of the 1980s and a phenomenon called "tax reaction" emerged. Since the Italian direct and indirect tax systems were complicated and the administration was inefficient, it was easier in Italy to evade taxes compared with other European countries. However, thanks to a series of tax reforms at the beginning of the 1980s, tax collection became effectively monitored and conducted more compulsorily. Tax evasion became difficult. When the self-employed who had evaded taxes were forced to pay heavy taxes, they turned to become the anti-welfare forces claiming that the wealth they had made in the north was wasted by the "poor and idle" southerners.

The *Lega Nord* was based not on the racial identity but on the negative identity of people in northern communities. The dependent south, the drug addicted immigrants, corrupted politicians and inefficient bureaucrats in Rome—such negative mobilization of the northern Italians to say "No" to all these things yielded exceptional effect. The mobilization was based on the material structure of their inter-

ests which was clearly different from mere protests and the racial identity. The effect of “tax reaction” was intense. Moreover, the *Lega Nord* was successful in establishing a positive identity, i. e. diligence, respect for family, local autonomy. The identity the *Lega Nord* coined was a conservative identity of the people who had been betrayed by the traditional parties and menaced by the outsiders such as foreign countries, immigrants and the *Mezzogiorno*.⁽²⁷⁾

Contrary to the preceding European social movements such as feminism and peace movements which were developed in the urban areas utilizing the social and organizational networks and sought a base for their own legitimacy within the existing political framework, the *Lega* emerged in a small town in northern Italy and rebelled against every institution linked to the power structure of Rome. Its rise reflected the inadequacy of the Italian state, political corruption, and the ineptitude of the political system itself. The *Lega* was a rational response to the cultural crisis caused by the collapse of collective identity, and it properly filled the ideological vacancy without offering any effective solutions to these problems.⁽²⁸⁾

The *Lega Nord* which rapidly grew under the institutional protection of proportional representation seemed unquestioningly to support maintaining the system. Therefore, in the early autumn of 1992, the *Lega* hit the Italians by surprise when it agreed to reforming the

(27) Paul Furlong. 1992. “The Extreme Right in Italy : Old Orders and Dangerous Novelties,” pp. 345-356.

(28) Carlo E. Ruzza and Oliver Schmidtke. 1993. “Roots of Success of the Lega Lombarda . Mobilization Dynamics and the Media,” *West European Politics*. Vol. 16, no. 2, April 93. pp. 1-23.

electoral system into a majoritarian one. Behind such a decisional shift, there was Umberto Bossi's shrewd calculation based on the electoral system theory : the majoritarian system would turn to the advantage of locally concentrated parties like the *Lega* if the bipartitism was not yet well-structured.⁽²⁹⁾

The Italian citizens agreed to the reduction of the existing elections of the Deputies from three or four preference votes into one at the referendum of June 9, 1991. The turnout of the referendum was 62.5%. If the persistent attack by the majority of the DC and the PSI is taken into account, citizens' participation was not low. The result itself showed a high level of support (95.6%) in spite of the low tone of the pre-referendum media campaign. The Italians strongly wanted a political system change.

2. THE TRANSITION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

THE 1992 ELECTIONS

The impact of the 1991 referendum was enormous. In the strict sense, however, it was between spring and summer of 1992, when the transition of the party system began. At that time, the uncertainty in the electoral market rapidly grew and the relationship among the parties, either rival or coalitional, needed to be fundamentally reorganized. As a matter of fact, even the entries of utterly new actors

(29) Mauro Calise. 1993. "Remaking the Italian Party System : How Lijphart Got It Wrong by Say It Right," pp. 545-560.

(30) Salvatore Vassallo. 1995. "La politica delle coalizioni. Da un sistema partitico all'altro," p. 65.

into the political market became possible.⁽³⁰⁾

The electoral volatility already increased in the elections of May 1990 and April 1992, in which the concentration of votes in the traditional two big parties visibly retreated and fragmentation deepened. Such a situation forced the old parties to transform themselves into new ones (PCI/PDS for instance). At the same time the dynamics of the old regime's breakdown developed into the referendum movements. Mario Segni became a hero.

In retrospect, the 1992 elections clearly showed that Italian politics was drastically changing. Umberto Bossi's triumph in northern Italy, Leoluca Orlando's farewell to the DC and succeeding promotion of network movement, *la Rete*—these phenomena served as a valve of the citizens' distrust of the established parties and their wrath toward political convention and corruption. The Italian nation was anxious about political society and it could no longer withstand the existing politics. While they sought justice, Italians were also controlled by anti-statist sentiments which Umberto Bossi effectively stimulated.

In this period, the PDS under the leadership of Achille Occhetto was experiencing a significant renewal, in which it struggled to obtain support from new social sectors. Unfortunately, however, such an effort should have been made earlier. When the PCI started its own reform, the Italian economy had already entered into a downward curve. The big enterprises resorted to lay-offs and factory rockouts. Under such conditions, it would be a great risk for the PCI/PDS not to stand on the side of workers. Moreover, the PDS was driven to assert the necessity of austerity policies and public expendi-

ture restraint which were quite unpopular among workers. Occhetto after all proclaimed maintaining real wages and continuing the *scala mobile* in order to protect traditional supporters of the party, by which he was driven to confront with the CGIL leader Bruno Trentin who seriously appealed for wage restraint in spite of harsh rebellion among the rank and file workers. This event exposed the nebulosity of the PDS and hurt its image as a potential governing party. In the 1992 general elections the PDS chose the defensive strategy of consolidating the traditional votes instead of the offensive strategy of seeking new support from independent voters. The PDS wanted to be a governing party, but at the same time it wanted to be the opposition. It could not, ultimately, determine which it should choose. The PDS, which lacked determination and unsteadily oscillated, did not at all seem to succeed in making a new identity for itself which was necessary for its own renewal.⁽³¹⁾

In the 1992 elections, some signs toward a party system change already appeared, though still modest at the national level. However, just after the elections an event that shook Italian politics to the roots and later overturned the party alignment occurred. It was the revelation of the *Tangentopoli* scandals and a start of the severe investigation on the part of the prosecution. The investigation brought about

-
- (31) Patrick McCarthy. 1993. "The Italian Communists Divide—and Do Not Conquer" in Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy, eds., *The End of Post-War Politics in Italy : The Landmark 1992 Elections*. Westview. pp. 32-34.
- (32) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994. "Dai partiti ai poli. La politica delle alleanze," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*. no. 3, anno xxiv. pp. 496-7.

a significant change in the relationship between the parties and the institutions and also between the parties and society.⁽³²⁾

THE WAVES OF SCANDALS

Many scholars attribute the development of political reforms in Italy to the breakdown of the cold-war structure. They argue that Italy with the biggest communist party in the Western countries needed to pour enormous political energies to maintain non-communist governments. According to them the end of the Cold War made it possible to convert such energies to political reform. Yet, the driving force of the Italian political reforms could not be found only within the traditional parliamentary arena such as the emergence of new patterns of coalitions and of new leaders.⁽³³⁾ The big waves of scandals surged exactly when the loss of identity among the Catholics and communists just after the collapse of the Berlin Wall triggered the localist waves.

It had been necessary for the political renovation of Italian citizens to overcome two high barriers. One was a bad convention called *partitocrazia*, which meant the suffocation of civil life caused by the governing parties' thorough control of every field in politics, public administration, society and economy owing to the lack of government alternation and consequently fixed the balance of power. The other was conglutination between politics and public administration in which the distorted relationship between politicians and the

二
九
二
八

(33) Patrick McCarthy. 1992. "The Referendum of 9 June," in Stephen Hellman and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds. *Italian Politics. A Review Vol 7*. Pinter. p. 12.

public sector injured the citizens' political and social rights. The governing coalitions clientilistically treated their supporters and scattered vested interests and services through the bureaucratic networks, sometimes beyond the authorized limits of power.

What was particularly unpleasant was the so-called CAF, a secret relay agreement among Craxi, Andreotti and Forlani, which lasted from 1986 to 1992. The bosses of the DC and the PSI secretly agreed to alternate in taking the post as head of the coalition governments in the near future prior to and regardless of the electoral results. The agreement was nothing but the personalization of Italian politics by a small number of party bosses. The arrogant manner in which the most important posts of Italian politics, the Prime Minister and the Presidency, were set beforehand among themselves regardless of the electoral results provoked Italian voters to anger.

The *Tangentopoli* scandals disclosed the evils of Italian politics which covered almost the entire society in the most conspicuous and the most brutal manner. The trivial corruption case brought on by a Milan construction company aiming at public works' concessions developed later on an unexpected and rapid scale into unprecedented bribery scandals that eventually yielded a long list of arrests of the VIP in Italian political and business society. In the Spring of 1993, it became clear that the very core of the Italian economy was depraved when the prosecution began to investigate such huge conglomerates as Fiat and Olivetti which produced about 4% of the GDP. Being examined by the prosecution, Cesare Romiti, President of Fiat, indicated the deep structure of corruption : "...even Fiat, the biggest company in Italy, cannot but pay money if demanded by the politi-

cians.” Among politicians, the sequential Prime Ministers of coalition governments led by the DC and PSI, ultra big names including Giulio Andreotti, Arnaldo Forlani, Bettino Craxi, Ciriaco de Mita were investigated. Andreotti who led seven coalition governments as Prime Minister was suspected of his alleged link to the Mafia.

THE MAY 1993 REFERENDUM AND THEREAFTER

A move toward the electoral reform was spurred on in order to wipe out such political corruption. At the referendum of May 1993, Italian people agreed to the proposal to ease proportional representation and shift the electoral system to mainly a majoritarian one. What was more significant with the referendum, which recovered the gradually declining electoral turnout and made no less than 2.9 million people regardless of age and sex respond “yes”, was that, through its process, it substantially consolidated the movement for institutional reform as a response to the crisis of Italian politics which lacked effective government alternative. Compared with the 1991 referendum, many old guard politicians had already disappeared because of the scandals. The groups which publicly opposed the referendum had shrunk. In the 93 referendum, the PSI headed by Giorgio Benvenuto, the DC led by Mino Martinazzoli and even the *Lega* supported the changes.⁽³⁴⁾ An electoral reform initiative by which 75% of the Senate would be shifted from the PR system to the majoritarian

(34) Piergiorgio Corbetta and Arturo M. L. Parisi. 1995. “The Referendum on the Electoral Law for the Senato : Another Momentous April.” in Carol Mershon and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds., *Italian Politics : Ending the First Republic*. Westview. p. 76.

system gained overwhelming support of voters (83%). Mario Segni who organized the referendum became the “Italian Clinton”.

The political map at that time was divided into three parts : the *Lega* controlled northern Italy, the PDS Middle Italy and the Catholics the south. The electoral reform was intended to avoid deepening these existing geographical political cleavages (the 25% PR system remained in order to save the small forces, in particular the centrists which could hardly win under the majoritarianism), while it needed to respond to the national demands to overcome the problems surrounding the PR system which had been indicated in the referendum. Electoral reform became thus a space of severe competition among the parties for their survival.⁽³⁵⁾

What should be stressed with the referendum movements was that its crosscutting nature yielded a success. The referendum appeals were conducted in a mixing-cards manner with a subtle avoidance of the traditional axis of left-right confrontation.⁽³⁶⁾ Through such a process of referendum promotion, the politically and socially heterogeneous actors could cooperate with each other.⁽³⁷⁾ In such a new trend, it was asserted that the left was neither to be renovated, nor

(35) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1995. “Premessa. Le regole e gli attori,” in Gianfranco Pasquino, a cura di, *L’alternanza inattesa : Le elezioni del 27 marzo 1994 e loro conseguenze*. Rubettino Editore. p. 14.

(36) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994. “Dai partiti ai poli. La politica delle alleanze,” p. 496.

(37) Salvatore Vassallo. 1995. “La politica delle coalizioni, Da un sistema partitico all’altro,” pp. 61-63.

(38) Paolo Flores d’Arcais. 1993. “La sinistra da inventare.” *Micro Mega* 2/ 93, pp. 7-20.

to be rebuilt, nor to be reconsidered, nor to be reformed, but it should be radically recreated from the beginning.⁽³⁸⁾ A coalitional project totally different from the traditional one thus emerged.

THE LEFTIST REALIGNMENT

The evolution of the Italian left in 1993 showed some sort of inevitability or logic. As time passed on, the opportunity for the leftist reclamation lessened and the possible range of choices rapidly became narrower. In this context, the formation of the *progressisti* was a logical consequence. "By year's end only three real choices remained for forces spanning the progressive center and the Left : alliance, merger or oblivion."⁽³⁹⁾

The *progressisti* took a tortuous course until they reached the formation of the *Alleanza progressista* in February 1994. Even after then, the alliance had various difficulties, not to mention ideological diversity, so it was not free from structural vulnerability.

The Carlo Azeglio Ciampi government that was formed after the closing of Giuliano Amato Government (July 1992 to April 1993) attracted much attention as a government of non-politicians and technocrats. The Ciampi government of professors can be grasped as the government that determined the direction of the transition toward the reforms necessary to renovate Italian politics.⁽⁴⁰⁾ This last government of the First Republic provided the Italian left with an

(39) Martin Rhodes. 1995. "Reinventing the Left : The Origins of Italy's Progressive Alliance". in Carol Mershon and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds., *Italian Politics : Ending the First Republic*. Westview. p. 114.

(40) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1995. "Premessa. Le regole e gli attori," p. 8.

opportunity, though indirectly, to form a coalition.

Initially, Romano Prodi, ex-president of the IRI, was the first candidate to succeed Amato. Ironically, however, the PDS blocked Prodi at this point in that he was too close to the DC. In any case, the coming Prime Minister must have fulfilled the following two conditions. First, he/she needed to be a person who was not a professional politician that had totally lost the citizens' trust because of a series of scandals. Secondly, he/she had to be a person capable enough to solve the severe economic problems and to recover the credibility of the Italian economy in international markets. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the President of the Bank of Italy, not only satisfied these two conditions, but also had utterly no relationship with any scandal in past. In constructing his Cabinet, Ciampi neither parted completely from any party nor neglected the demands of each party. He did not resort to any outrageous political marketing in determining the ministry posts, and appointed many university professors. Noteworthy was the fact that he opened a way for the PDS to commit itself in a future government by providing several leftist scholars with Cabinet posts : Luigi Spaventa from the *Sinistra Indipendente* (Independent Left) was assigned as Budget Minister, Augusto Barbera from the PDS as Parliamentary Relations Minister, Vincenzo Visco as Treasure Minister, Luigi Berlinguer, cousin of Enrico, as Education and Science Minister, Francesco Rutelli from the *Verdi* (Greens) as Minister of Environment. Ciampi's cabinet formation attracted attention in that it for the first time crushed the basic consensus of the post-war conservative politics in Italy by not making the PCI/PDS take part in the government. Such a breakthrough, however,

soon collapsed when three ministers from the PDS and Francesco Rutelli furiously resigned their posts in response to the Deputies' negating the request of the Milan Prosecution to litigate Craxi. Yet, this event made the PDS and the *Verdi* approach each other, and both of them began to show clear support for the Ciampi government thereafter.⁽⁴¹⁾

THE IMPASSE OF THE PSI

One of the most direct factors that generated the dynamics of the leftist realignment was the sudden self-disruption of the PSI which had been located at the very core of the political power in Italy. The first dissonance within the party began in February 1992 when the Milan scandal was revealed. The retreat at the April 1992 elections spurred such discord. There were three major factions in the PSI at that time: Craxi's faction, the reformers' faction led by Claudio Martelli, and the centrist faction. When the unprecedented *Tangentopoli* scandals were disclosed, Craxi withdrew from the front but tried to play the role of king maker. However, when the investigation of the prosecution suggested a high possibility that even Martelli, a young leader who was supposed to take over Craxi, was involved in the Banca Ambrosiano scandal, the PSI was soon forced to the verge of organizational breakdown. Giorgio Benvenuto, ex-Secretary of the third largest trade union UIL, was installed as the leader of the PSI after Craxi on February 12, 1993. The situation for Benvenuto was

(41) Gianfranco Pasquino and Salvatore Vassallo. 1995. "The Government of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi." in Carol Mershon and Gianfranco Pasquino, eds., *Italian Politics : Ending the First Republic*. Westview. pp. 58-61.

simply harsh. Craxi's control of the party still continued in spite of his absence, and it soon became clear that Benvenuto was merely a nominal leader. To make the matters worse, the debt of the PSI was by far greater than expected. A knotty problem concerning how to cope with the financial difficulty heavily bent over the new leader. Yet, Benvenuto struggled to resuscitate the PSI and tried to reform the party to erase the scars of the scandals. But his efforts for reform collapsed, being strongly blocked by the Craxi faction. With regard to electoral reform, Benvenuto supported the idea of French-style double ballots, while the Craxi faction opposed even the political reform referendum itself. Benvenuto resigned the Secretary on May 20, only 100 days since his installation, without making any substantial demonstration for change.⁽⁴²⁾

On May 28, Ottaviano Del Turco was elected the new Secretary of the PSI succeeding Benvenuto with 82% support. Del Turco, originally from the largest trade union CGIL, tried to wipe out the Craxi color just as Benvenuto did, and proposed a new party coalition strategy. However, the PSI lacked the ability of self-renewal.

THE DILEMMA OF THE PDS

It was very possible for Occhetto to locate his own party's reform in a wider framework to renovate the entirety of Italian left, if it was taken into account that Craxi's PSI which had enjoyed a strong leadership was almost disappearing from the Italian political scene. Among the main traditional parties, the PDS was the only party that

(42) Martin Rhodos. 1995. "Reinventing the Left : The Origins of Italy's Progressive Alliance," pp. 116-117.

did not suffer fatal damages of the scandals. Such a big merit, at the same time, put on the brakes for the organizational renewal of the PDS. Logistically speaking, the “anti-CAF” concertation with Mario Segni et al. brought a certain success on the one hand. Nonetheless, such a success, on the other hand, retarded the PDS’s in-party restructuring that was required to renovate its relationship with other parties and groups. The leaders of the PDS did not have any suspicion about the feasibility of their scenario in which the PDS should lead the leftist realignment taking advantage of the opportunity of the electoral reform, while maintaining each group’s autonomy. As a matter of fact, Occhetto, who expected the realization of double tour system, was optimistic enough to consider that he could build a coalition by the time of the second ballot, even after the first ballot would have been carried out. When the proposal for the double tour was rejected in June 1993 in the Senate (383 to 134), Occhetto was forced to reconsider his coalitional strategy.

The difficulties of the PDS were often related to the *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC) which had been formed in February 1991 by ex-communist hard-liners who did not approve of the shift of the PCI to the PDS. From spring to summer of 1993, the RC was so influential that it almost seemed to rob of the PDS’ votes. The RC severely blamed the PDS in that the latter was too concessive to Amato and Ciampi and that the CGIL leader Bruno Trentin agreed to abolish the *scala mobile*, and asserted that only the RC could protect the workers’ interests. The *Verdi* and the *Rete* supported the RC. The PDS was again faced with a leftist dilemma through the process of its own renewal.

The biggest problem for the PDS was to what extent it could abandon its hegemony to be on the same par with other center-left groups. The other crucial problem was related to whether a further coalition, which was required in the competition under the majoritarian system, could overcome the ideological divergence among the participating groups.⁽⁴³⁾ As a matter of fact, not a small number of people in the PDS still embraced a dream to seek the old leftist alliance without the centrists.

Its relationship with the *Alleanza Democratica* (AD), Segni's Pact and the RC was particularly thorny. Occhetto's relationship with Segni was deteriorating. The two cooperated with each other until the 1993 referendum was carried out. Nonetheless, by the end of the referendum, they had already lost a shared base and only contradictions stood out. When Segni joined a coalition with the AD in June 1993, Occhetto began to be driven by misgivings that the reformist initiative might be plundered by the centrists. Segni actually claimed that the PDS must be reshuffled to form a new reformist center-left. Occhetto did not hide his discomfort saying that Segni's project was just like Craxi's. Some pro-AD groups within the PDS felt anxious that the discord between Segni and Occhetto might hurt the possible formation of wider leftist alliance including the centrists and stressed that the both sides should make mutual concession.

(43) *Ibid.* p. 125.

THE LOCAL ELECTIONS OF 1993

The June local elections were carried out in such a situation. The decline of the centrists was outstanding. While the PLI, PRI and PSDI barely survived, the decay of the DC and the PSI was obvious. Contrarily, the right was stable, and so was the left. The *Lega* gained the biggest success. Not only did they triumph in Milan, the *Lega* also seemed to establish hegemony across northern Italy. It was very plausible that the *Lega* would expand its influence further. What was striking at the June local elections was that the moderate voters increasingly changed their voting patterns. The elections also suggested the possibility that the personalization of competitions would diffuse. The confrontation between the well-knowns such as Rutelli vs. Fini in Rome or Bassolino vs. Mussolini in Naples seemed to become more prevalent⁽⁴⁴⁾. In such a context, the June local elections were seen as a chance for new politics to emerge: Anti-statist *Lega*'s hegemony in northern Italy and the neo-protectionist peronists' control of the South. The confrontation between these two conservatives on the one hand and on the other hand the *progressisti*—a new national coalition among the left, environmental protectionists, reformers, democratic Catholics—was interpreted as the essence of the 1993 local elections.⁽⁴⁵⁾

In the June local elections which were carried out under the new rule of double tour by which electorates could directly choose their

(44) Giacomo Sani. 1994. "Una vigilia di incertezza," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, no. 3 anno xxiv, pp. 411-413.

(45) Francesco Rutelli. 1993. Un progetto per Roma, un segnale per l'Italia. *Micro Mega* 4/93.

Mayors, the PDS won a greater success than expected. The June and November local elections of 1993 were the appropriate test case to observe how various political groups would grasp the restrictions and possibilities of the new system and how quickly they would react and adopt themselves to such a change. This test particularly assessed the ability of the political leaders to find out the best formula for alliances that corresponded to the new electoral logic. The test also drew particular attention in terms of technical and operational concerns on how electorates would respond to the new electoral system.⁽⁴⁶⁾ The mayoral elections were grasped as the test for coalitional strategies for the general elections in the near future. The PDS showed persistence. By flexibly building various alliances with the republicans, *Verdi*, *Rete* and *Patto Segni* according to the diverse situations of each district, the PDS acquired many victories. These results made the importance of leftist coalitions firmly recognized.

IN PURSUIT OF NEW COALITION

Meanwhile, the decline of the PSI became inevitable. After the devastating defeats in the June local elections, the PSI was forced to vacate its symbolic headquarters at via Corso, Rome, on July 4 because of the financial difficulties. The prominent and indispensable ex-colleagues had already left the party. While Benvenuto was seeking for some new form of relationship with the PDS and AD, Del Turco, rejecting Occhetto's approach, pursued cooperation with the centrist AD. Del Turco's strategy seemed to anticipate the future,

(46) Giacomo Sani. 1994. "Una vigilia di incertezza," p. 409.

particularly when Mario Segni and the Catholic reformists merged in the AD in July. Nonetheless, other leaders of the PSI did not support Del Turco's centrist line. Most of them judged that the coalition with the PDS was the only choice left for them. Within the PSI, the Craxi faction was determining its own line that would later lead to the conservative merger toward *Forza Italia*. Those who otherwise might have backed Del Turco had already left the PSI. Those who remained in the PSI were often fence sitters interested in joining other parties also. However, the situation suddenly changed when Mario Segni parted from the AD and again returned to the Catholic right. The final place for Segni was, after all, a merger in the old DC. After the electoral reform yielded some fruit, Segni approached Mino Martinazzoli of the DC and left the AD. He later formed a centrist group, the *Patto per l'Italia*.

For the groups which remained in the AD, it became clear that they could not take office without cooperating with the PDS under the majoritarian system. Segni's farewell to the AD, on the one hand, enabled Occhetto to discard his hesitation in cooperating with the centrists. These events decisively influenced on Del Turco. For him, only one choice was now possible : coalition with the PDS. At the beginning of November 1993, no fewer than 1000 socialists gathered to form the *Unione dei socialisti verso l'unità dei progressisti*. Del Turco could not but join such a trend.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Segni's separation from the AD, on the other hand, brought a

(47) Martin Rhodes, 1995. "Reinventing the Left : The Origins of Italy's Progressive Alliance." pp. 118-121.

(48) *Ibid.* p. 126.

certain result that strengthened the relationship among the AD and the PDS and other leftist forces.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The confrontation between Occhetto and Segni and then Segni's subsequent return to the right made the leftists feel a load off their shoulders and simplified and fortified the leftist solidarity. Yet, one problem was still left : how to get along with the RC.

Del Turco had clarified his stance not to cooperate with the RC, though he became closer to the PDS gradually. There were two possible alternatives for the PSI. One was cooperation with the PDS. The other was establishing a third force composed of Segni's group, the PSI, Panella's list, the liberals, the republicans, ecologists, which would be located in between the PDS and the DC. The latter scenario, however, was not realized, because the liberals and the republicans were internally divided into the pro-Occhetto group and the Pro-Segni group. In such a situation, Occhetto declared in October that the framework of the *progressisti* should be extended to include the centrists and that the *progressisti* would not use the symbol of the PDS as a common symbol of the coalition during electoral campaigns.

Yet, there remained the problem with the RC. The RC was not such a naive party that it simply indulged itself into nostalgia for the red flag. It shared a common nature with the *Lega* in that both of them were the political forces that embodied citizens' intolerance to the existing regime and orders of political economy.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The *Rete* and *Verdi* clarified that they did not have intention to join a coalitional

(49) Patrick McCarthy. 1993. "The Italian Communist Divide—and Do Not Conquer," p.32.

project which excluded the RC. Moreover, Fausto Bertinotti, new leader of the RC, did not unloose criticizing Occhetto.

The misery of the centrists was reconfirmed at the November local elections. The *Lega* again made an onslaught. It was noteworthy that among the rightist forces the MSI won many victories in the South, which was an unprecedented big change. Among the leftists, the *Verdi* and the *Rete* took a leap forward. The PDS and the RC were stable. The victories of the left at the second ballot of December stemmed from the coalitional strategies of the *progressisti* by which they obtained wide ranged support for their candidates at the commune level.⁽⁵⁰⁾

The biggest problem with the *progressisti* was that they embraced illusions owing to the too dramatic victory in the 1993 local elections, which by no means promised another triumph at the coming general election. The local elections of June and November clearly showed that the relationship among the traditional political groups was experiencing a significant change. First, the political forces that had been controlling Italy for decades suddenly faded away : the PLI soon disappeared ; the PRI were fragmented because of the internal confrontation concerning its strategy of electoral cooperation with the PSI ; the PSI crashed ; the DC was divided into the PPI (*Partito Popolare Italiano*) and CCD (*Centro Cristiano Democratico*). Secondly, the PDS and the MSI, which had been marginal oppositions, came to be recognized as main political parties. Thirdly, new political forces emerged. While the *Lega* and the *Rete* were already active in the 1992

(50) Giacomo Sani. 1994. "Una vigilia di incertezza," pp. 413-414.

(51) *Ibid.* pp. 415-418.

elections, the AD and the *Patto Segni* emerged later and played a central role particularly in the electoral reform campaign.⁽⁵¹⁾

However, the truly new “entity” that exceeded everyone’s expectation entered into the political market from the end of 1993 to the beginning of 1994. It was *Forza Italia*. The rise of *Forza Italia* made a big impact on leftist solidarity. It was true that the existence of the RC was still a difficult matter for the *progressisti*. Yet, the RC now turned to be an indispensable coalitional partner to win the election when *Forza Italia* made a success in establishing the center-right alliances. On the part of the RC, participating in a leftist alliance which included even the “liberals” now could be justified in order to confront the “fascist-Berlusconi alliances”.⁽⁵²⁾

3. THE 1994 ELECTIONS

THE FOUNDING ELECTION UNDER NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

The Italian political system from autumn 1993 to spring 1994 experienced a deep and significant change. The following three factors worked behind this.⁽⁵³⁾ Firstly, voters’ electoral volatility further increased. Secondly, the prosecution’s investigation on political corruption yielded some actual fruit. Thirdly, the new electoral

(52) Salvatore Vassallo. 1995. “La politica delle coalizioni. Da un sistema partitico all’altro,” pp. 79-80.

(53) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994. “Dai partiti ai poli. La politica delle alleanze,” pp. 494-495.

(54) Aldo Di Virgilio. 1994. “Elezioni locali e destrutturazione partitica. La nuova legge alla prova,” *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, xxiv, pp. 107-165.

law was adopted.

As already examined, the local elections, which were carried out 3 or 4 months prior to the March 1994 general elections, already indicated some symptoms for fundamental changes that predicted the results of the general elections.⁽⁵⁴⁾ First of all, the cleavages, which had emerged between the old forces and the new forces, turned so unfavorable to the centrists in particular that they fatally lost their mobilization power. Secondly, a change in voters' preference which radically shifted to both ends of the political spectrum created a space for the far-rightist mobilization. The MSI in particular took an enormous leap forward. Meanwhile, the leftist forces around the PDS built the electoral cartels and won many victories in various cities.

Owing to the amendment of the electoral law, the March 27-28 1994 elections showed a completely different configuration. The AN was located at the rightist end of the spectrum, and *Forza Italia* and *Lega Nord* adjacent to it. The PPI and the *Patto Segni* were situated at the center, and the *progressisti* were on the left. While *Forza Italia* formed the *Polo della libertà* (the Freedom Alliance) with the *Lega Nord* in northern Italy, it established the *Polo del buongoverno* (the Good government alliance) with the *Alleanza Nazionale* in the South. The centrists, PPI and *Patto Segni*, aligned as the *Patto per L'Italia* (the Pact for Italy). The leftist *progressisti* were composed of the PDS,

(55) Even such an historical election that involved radical changes like the 1994 elections showed the validity of Bartolini and Mair's proposition. See Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability : The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985*, Cambridge University Press.

RC, *Verdi*, *Rete*, *cristiani sociali*, AD, *partito socialista*, *Rinascita socialista*. It was broadly anticipated that votes would be volatile, not merely because the electoral law had been changed, but also because both of the two traditional parties, DC and PCI, had already disappeared. The actual electoral competition was developed among the right vs. the center vs. the left. As a matter of fact, the cleavage between the center-right and the left could not be filled up. The voters' volatility emerged only within each block.⁽⁵⁵⁾ The most important point in the March 1994 elections was what the candidates, parties and coalitions proposed. Their leadership and their potential as state managers were ventilated.⁽⁵⁶⁾

BERLUSCONI'S CALCULATION AND STRATEGY

The fact that Berlusconi decided to enter into politics just before the election proved particularly effective, not simply because he could absorb the voters' discontent but also because he did not allow them sufficient time to correctly assess what *Forza Italia* was.⁽⁵⁷⁾

According to the pre-election research conducted by the CIRM, the support for the *progressisti* was about 40%, the PPI 20%, and the *Polo della Libertà-buongoverno* 30% as of January 10. However, by January 28 the *Libertà-buongoverno* alliance took such a large part of the support from the *progressisti* that the former almost caught up with the latter. On February 4, the relation between the two groups

(56) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1995. "Premessa. Le regole e gli attori".

(57) Luca Meldolesi. 1994. Democrazia e intransigenza : un lamento post-elettorale. *Il Mulino* no. 353. 3/94. p. 437.

(58) Giacomo Sani. 1994. "Una vigilia di incertezza," pp. 423-425.

was completely reversed; *libertà-buongoverno* about 40% and the *progressisti* about 35%. The difference kept monotonously growing. On February 24, the *libertà-buongoverno* even invaded into the centrists to gain the 45% of the votes. Contrarily, the *progressisti* were still sluggish at the level of the 35% or less, and they were forced to see the historical elections in such a dull situation.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Since Berlusconi's entrance into the political market, many citizens came to recognize that his electoral strategy was breaking the basic precondition of democracy, i.e. equality among the candidates. He brought the vast wealth he had amassed as a businessman directly into the political arena. His business had a broad effect on almost every field of Italian civil society. By utilizing not only the TV but also newspapers and publishers, he could "edit" the very culture of Italy. Thus, it was simply easy for Berlusconi to make an image as if the reality of Italian society existed in the TV studio and he were able to realize the electorates' dreams.⁽⁵⁹⁾

The impact of the TV on the youth, women and housewives was so immense that it brought a big success in a very short period. Unlike the *Lega* which had grown on the local bases, *Forza Italia* was the "*prodotto politico*" that rapidly grew through mass media. Its influence quickly spread literally all over the country, not being at all limited within the north, the South, or within particular districts.⁽⁶⁰⁾

When entering into the electoral market, Berlusconi developed his unique strategy of political marketing. The Fininvest, a conglomer-

(59) Carlo Freccero. 1994. Il presidente virtuale. *Micro Mega* 2/94.

(60) Ilvo Diamanti. 1994. La politica come marketing. *Micro Mega* 2/94. pp. 66-68.

ate he possessed, covered almost all fields of civil society. He carried such strong and huge corporate organizations directly in the field of politics. The network of about 14 thousand football fan clubs in particular, which consisted of more than one million members, was directly used as the electoral network just like the American Presidential campaigns.

As often shown under the totalitarian regimes, Berlusconi used sports as an instrument. He utilized football fans as the social texture for his party. "It you Italians unite each other just as the national football team does, you can make a goal!" The slogan of his political movement was composed only by vocabulary of sporting journals. He used the Milan fan clubs as a base for political movement. Berlusconi's eloquence transmitted through mass media instantly established his monopoly of words. His words lacked sophisticated expressions and effective arguments. They were merely a narration of the traditional values such as freedom, patriotism, family, company and work. Although these claims were just banal, Berlusconi, as a matter of fact, had already won within the TV screen. His talk on TV did not contain any substantial platforms. Rather, his style of talking was just like a new year's greeting by the "head of the state". Without proposing any concrete policies, the "head of the state" only had to pronounce some solemn words. He could play a role of the "head of the state" without fearing that he were a fake, because he was actually the "head of the state" within the limited space of the TV screen.⁽⁶¹⁾

Berlusconi's votes concentrated on the North and the South (par-

(61) Massimo Gramellini. 1994. Berlusconi, Ovvero la repubblica del pallone. *Micro Mega* 1/94.

ticularly Sicilia). Many of them were female votes (55%), especially those of housewives (32-33%). Also, relatively young voters under 35 years old strongly supported him (40%). Generically, his supporters tended to be decently educated bourgeoisie or more popular strata. These electorates firmly believed in enterprises, either small or big, as the core of the economy. They had a strong tenacity for the institutions regulating the social order (for instance, the judicial system). Most of them trusted in the traditional political framework and at the same time they were ardent Catholic church frequenters. These middle strata still relied on the traditional values and institutions such as family, market and church.

What kind of the votes of the 1992 elections did Berlusconi take from in the 1994 elections? According to the exit-poll by CIRM, about 30% of those who had voted for the PSI or DC, and about 50% of those who had supported the PLI in the 1992 elections voted for *Forza Italia* in the 1994 elections. Berlusconi was the perfect vent for the voters who were so fed up with the *Tangentopoli* scandals and reluctantly voted for the *Lega* in the 1993 local elections in spite of its rather radical stance or voted for the MSI in spite of its dark past history. In the electoral campaign, Berlusconi proposed what these voters exactly expected : cuts in financial deficit, creation of new jobs for one million people, recovery of corporate autonomy and enhancement of national pride. These were just vulnerable and naive projects, but were effective enough to make such voters excited. Berlusconi's political proposal precisely corresponded to the expectations and

Table 1 NEW PARLIAMENT 1994 (SEATS)

	CAMERA	SENATO	
Progressisti	213	122	
Pds		115	66
Rif. Com		40	19
Psi		15	12
Verdi		11	7
Rete		9	6
All. Dem.		17	7
Crist. Soc.		6	5
Centro	46	31	
PpI		33	27
Patto Segni		13	4
Lista Panella	6	2	
Polo della Libertà	360	154	
Forza Italia		101	41
Lega Nord		118	58
Ccd.		32	12
All. Naz.		105	43
Unione di centro		4	
Others		5	6
TOTAL	630	315	

source : Corriere della Sera, 30 marzo, 1994

values of the citizens in these social segments. Advocating the “new Italian miracle” seemed as if it could normalize the situation and provide new dreams particularly just after the bad experience of instability and uncertainty during the past several years. Such a stability-oriented claim based on the old tradition was totally different from that of the *Lega* representing the “anti-systemic” values.⁽⁶²⁾

The overwhelming victory of *Forza Italia* indicated the reality to

smash the illusion that civil society was voluntarily and autonomously organized. The rightist triumph was attained by utilizing the already existing strong bases of the *Lega* in the North and of the MSI in the South, in particular, the robust structure of Berlusconi's enterprises and by strengthening these organizations in all directions through the country. It is true that the impact of the TV was definite. Yet, the TV did not explain all of Berlusconi's victory. It was not realized only by his own personality. He carried huge corporate organizations into politics in order to turn *Forza Italia* into a real political party. Politics still organized the territories which could not be structured only through mass media. As a matter of fact, among the *progressisti* the *Rete* which was rooted only in the voluntary young generation ended up with a poor electoral result, while the PDS and the RC performed relatively well. The AD, too, which often appeared in the mass media but did not have any organizational base, produced an unsatisfactory result.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEFTIST DEFEAT

It seemed that the PCI, the historical opposition party, started its transformation into the PDS in order to nip the fruits yielded by the fall of the PSI and the DC. The 1993 local elections must have been a perfect launcher for the accession to power of the PDS. Just after the local elections, the PDS was on the spree as if it won even the next general election.⁽⁶³⁾ However, the March 1994 elections produced a completely different result. Why did the left lose in the 1994

(63) *L'Espresso*. 19 dicembre 1993, "Chi ha paura di Baffo di ferro?," di Claudio Rinaldi, pp. 40-53.

elections? Many explanations have been made thus far. The influence of TV was certainly immense, but history had an equally significant impact.⁽⁶⁴⁾

The left in Italy, like that in Japan, has traditionally been ambivalent from the very beginning. On the one hand, it claimed anarchical revolutionism, but on the other it advocated cooperative reformism. The post-war myth of the PCI, if anything, was made just because its vocabulary was far from the reality of everyday life. Even after the collapse of Berlinguer's *compromesso storico*, in the 1980s, the PCI was different from other political parties. The PCI became a usual party only lately. The PDS, however, was still seen by Italian voters as one variety of the consociationalism of the First Republic in spite of its radical transformation. Ironically, its consociational image in which the oppositions and the government cooperatively administered the state instead of the mutual confrontation became even stronger, although the PCI more ardently tried to promote its renovation than ever especially after the 1992 elections in which the PCI declined and the *Lega* rose. The composition of the 1994 elections was the confrontation between the new forces and the old forces. The PDS was considered as an old force, a protagonist of the First Republic.⁽⁶⁵⁾

The defeat of the *progressisti* in the March 1994 elections was, as often argued, a defeat of the intellectual culture vis-à-vis the consumerism. Berlusconi controlled the *editoria italiana* and transmitted such “culture” through the TV. Nonetheless, the success of Berlusconi's

(64) Piero Ignazi. 1995. Il peso del Pds sul centro-sinistra. *Il Mulino* 3/95 Maggio/giugno. p. 458.

(65) *Ibid.* pp. 458-9.

style does not explain everything of the 1994 elections. The problems existed also on the part of the left itself. The left was not able to brush away the dust of the old and statist First Republic, although it should have appealed to the importance of conscience and morality and should have sought a political project challenging the crime and corruption.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Another cause of defeat could have been the lack of the leadership outside the PDS. The rightist faction might not have won only with the old-type party leaders like Bossi and Fini. Berlusconi's role was definitive for the rightist victory.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The powerful hegemony of the PDS within the *progressisti* stemmed from the fact that other leftist forces lacked organizational rigidity. “*Il carisma forse non è tutto.* (Probably the charisma is not everything.)”⁽⁶⁸⁾ If the strong dominance of the PDS in the *progressisti* continues, it will be difficult for them to win elections.

“*Maggioritario, ma non troppo.* (Majoritarian, but not too much.)” Bartolini and D’Alimonte assessed the results of the March 1994 elections in such words. There was no doubt that the majoritarian system worked. Yet, at the same time, the parliament became divided. The deputies achieved the majority of the seats, but the senates did not, though the majoritarian part of the both reached the

(66) Luca Meldolesi. 1994. Democrazia e intransigenza : un lamento post-elettorale. *Il Mulino* no. 353. 3/94. p. 439.

(67) Gianni Vattimo. 1994. Una sconfitta annunciata. *Micro Mega* 2/94.

(68) *Ibid.* p. 40.

(69) Stefano Bartolini e Roberto d’Alimonte. 1994. “La competizione maggioritaria. Le origini elettorali del parlamento diviso,” *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*. no. 3, anno xxiv. pp. 631-686.

50% excepting the part of PR. Of course the electoral systems were mutually different. However, what affected more was the electoral strategies each coalition developed.⁽⁶⁹⁾

In retrospect, the 1994 elections brought an ironical result. First, the very actors that had promoted the political reforms and held the initiative of introducing the majoritarian system ended up with defeats. The PDS, which had firmly believed its own victory in the coming general election when the 1993 local elections finished, easily missed office just in front of it within only several months. Mario Segni, who came forward as a candidate from Sassari, was defeated in the majoritarian part and was barely saved by the partial PR system. Secondly, the rightist coalition was actually composed by the “old” forces, although it was broadly argued that the new forces had won. It was true that the *progressisti*'s claim and candidates were old fashioned compared with those of the *Forza Italia*. Nonetheless, Berlusconi, as a matter of fact, dragged the legacy of the Craxi government of the 1980s. The AN, too, that still embraced the strong trait of statism, patriotism and reactionalism was about to return to the mentality of the inter-war era.⁽⁷⁰⁾

These elections were, at the same time, the case in which a typical leftist dilemma appeared. The result of the 1994 elections largely derived from the fact that the double tour system advocated by the PDS had been negated in the process of the electoral law amendment. The elections, thus, were trilaterally structured among the left, center and right, rather than bilateral, in which the PDS was again

(70) Actually, the skinheads supporting the MIS violated minorities on street.

faced with the typical dilemma : which of the two should the PDS choose as a coalitional partner, the ultra left (RC led by Bertinotti) or the Center (Segni and Martinazzoli's group)? It did not matter at all for the centrist Mario Segni whether he allied with the left or the right. He just wanted to realize his dream of becoming Prime Minister. Such an ambivalent stance of the centrist allowed the right to attain the absolute majority which might have been easily achieved by the PDS, PPI and Patto Segni if they were allied. The PDS was forced to choose the RC's cooperation since it could not ally with the centrist ; "Our political stance and policies are so different from those of the centrists that we cannot cooperate with them."⁽⁷¹⁾

The electoral result verified that the RC still had considerable influences. The left won overwhelming victories in Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna and Marche. In Turin, Fausto Bertinotti achieved a triumph. The RC, whose share of votes reached almost 10%, was too significant existence for the *progressisti* to break with as a coalitional partner. Nonetheless, the RC was a difficult partner. The leader Fausto Bertinotti repeatedly irritated the Italian voters just before the election by saying "Italy must withdraw from the NATO," and "we need to increase taxes just now." His colleagues publicly declared "We were born communists. We cannot become social democrats."

(71) Interview with Caterina Ginsburg, Ufficio Stampa of the PDS. March 24, 1994. at the headquarters of the PDS, Rome.

(72) Actually, post-industrialization did not realize a paradise. See Massimo Paci. 1992. *Il Mutamento della Struttura Sociale in Italia*. Il Mulino.

THE PERSISTENT CLEAVAGES

As a matter of fact, Italian society was faced with severe problems.⁽⁷²⁾ The unemployment rate did not drop below 12%. While the rate in the north was about 7%, that in the south exceeded 20%. The unemployment among the youth was particularly severe. Those youth who could not find jobs even after graduation from the universities seemed to turn their back to the *progressisti* and to go to the right. While the PDS was not able to encourage a hope among the youth and the unemployed, it lost the trust of those electorates who had voted for the PCI.⁽⁷³⁾

In fact, new confrontational relationships peculiar to the post-industrial society emerged in Italy since the 1980s. Yet, the electoral result indicated that the traditional cleavages, too, still survived in addition to such newly appearing post-industrial cleavages. The socio-political background of the candidates clearly represents the trait of each party.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Table 2 shows the income levels of the candidates of the main parties who ran for the 1994 elections. The highest income rank beyond 150 millions liras was largely occupied by the *Forza Italia*'s candidates. About 53% of the candidates from *Forza Italia* earned 100 millions and beyond, which was well over the levels of the PDS (38.4%), the PPI (40.8%), *Lega Nord* (24.4%) and the AN (24.7%). It is noteworthy that about one fourth of the candidates from the AN were located at the lowest rank, only 34 millions or less. The proportion of those who obtained 50 millions or less were : the PDS

(73) *L'Espresso* 15 aprile 1994. p. 54.

(74) Liborio Mattina. 1994. "I candidati," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*. anno xxiv, no. 3.

Table 2 ANNUAL INCOME OF THE CANDIDATES BY PARTY
as of 1992 in million liras (%)

income rank	Pds	Ppi	Fi	Ln	An	total
below 34	18.2	8.3	12.5	18.9	24.7	20.1
35-50	13.7	21.3	9.4	13.5	18.5	14.9
51-75	9.1	15.7	3.1	21.6	18.5	14.4
76-100	20.6	13.9	21.8	21.6	13.6	18.1
101-150	29.3	27.8	18.8	16.3	16.1	19.6
150 and beyond	9.1	13	34.4	8.1	8.6	12.9
total	100	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(44)	(108)	(32)	(37)	(81)	(302)

source : Liborio Mattina. 1994. "I candidati," p. 553.

31.9%, the PPI 29.6%, *Forza Italia* 21.9% and *Lega Nord* 32.4%, the AN 43.2%. *Forza Italia* had the smallest number of the candidates with relatively low income, while the AN had the largest number of such candidates.

Table 3 shows the candidates of each party categorized by their profession. The PDS had a relatively high proportion of professional politicians (20.9%). *Forza Italia* produced many candidates whose background was as entrepreneurs (20.9%), doctors (16.4%), lawyer (11.8%). *Lega Nord* had a large group of candidates from the private service sector (16.2%). The proportion of teachers and university professors was next highest to the professional politicians, and the candidates in these three categories occupied about 60% of the total candidates from the PDS. The AN had a high proportion of lawyers (21.6%) and the private service sector (12.7%). Generally speaking, *Forza Italia* was based on entrepreneurs, and *Lega Nord* and the AN represented the interests of the self-employed, and the PDS was a

Table 3 PROFESSION OF THE CANDIDATES BY PARTY (%)

profession	Pds	Ln	Fi	AN
lawyer	2.4	11.6	11.8	21.6
doctor	7.3	8.9	16.4	8.8
other professionals	4.1	12.5	5.5	4.4
teachers	15.4	9.8	5.5	7.5
university professor	16.3	4.5	4.5	1.3
judge	4.9		1.7	0.4
entrepreneur		8.9	20.9	8.4
manager	0.8	5.4	6.4	2.2
commerce/craftsmen	0.8	8	2.7	4.8
private service sector	3.3	16.2	7.3	12.7
professional politician	29.3	5.4	3.5	4.8
journalist	3.3	2.7	4.5	4.8
employee in public sector	4	2.7	4.5	5.3
trade unionist	2.4			1.8
pensioner	3.3	1.8	0.9	6.2
others	2.4	1.8	0.9	4
total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(123)	(112)	(110)	(227)

source : Liborio Mattina. 1994. "I candidati," p. 564.

party of professional politicians.

One of the handicaps for the *progressisti* was that it produced too many candidates with professional politicians' background who still dragged in the so-called old regime. Contrarily, *Forza Italia* was truly born afresh by those who entered into politics for the first time. It was literally a start from zero for *Forza Italia* since there were no professional politicians. Instead, the marketing specialists created the party.

What, then, did the relationships between the candidates and the

Table 4 THE CANDIDATES REPRESENTING INTEREST GROUPS
(in absolute number)

interest groups	coalitions			total
	Pgr	Ppi	Pdl-Pbg	
Cgil	12			12
Cisl	4	5		9
Uil	2			2
Cisnal	4			4
trade unions				27

Confindustria	1	3	4	8
Confapi			1	1
managers'assoc.				9

Confagricoltura		2	2	4
Coldiretti		6		6
Conf. coltivatori	1	1		2
agricultural assoc.				12

Confcommercio				1

Confartigianato	1	3	1	5
Cna	1			1
craftsmen's assoc.				6

Total	22	20	13	55

source : Liborio Mattina. 1994. "I candidati", p. 576.

interest groups look like? Table 4 shows how many candidates the main interest groups prepared for each coalition. Among the 27 candidates coming from the trade unions, 22 candidates ran on the *progressisti* ticket, while 5 candidates ran on the centrist PPI's. There was no unionist candidate on the rightist coalition, which clearly indicated the unions were unrelated with the right. Concerning the managers' side, out of the 7 candidates sponsored by *Confindustria*, 4

candidates ran on the rightist coalition's banner, 3 on the centrist's, but only one on the *progressisti*'s. Quite contrary to the unions whose candidates concentrated on the *progressisti*, the managers had clear inclinations to the right or the center. Compared with the unionists and the managers, the agricultural organization and craftsmen's organization tended to be centrist.

The candidates showed the same cleavages as the social cleavages among the voters : whether they sought a more public dimension in the contents of government activities or they pursued the private dimension to the maximum ; whether they agreed to the maintaining of the welfare state and providing the workers with social benefits or they supported the independent workers. In the actual elections the confrontational axis like those "public vs. private" "dependent workers vs. independent workers", appeared, crossing with the regional issue of "federalism vs. centralism". The leftist progressive alliance, which was composed of candidates of politicians and professionals, represented the former stance of the confrontational axis. The rightist alliance, which consisted mainly of professionals, entrepreneurs, independent workers, asserted the minimizing of the labor market regulation. The candidates of the PPI were located just in between the left and the right. Among the PPI's candidates, those from the public sector were closer to the left, while those with the liberal professional background were more inclined to the right. Therefore, under the new majoritarian system, the centrists itself were contradicted. Not only the electoral result indicated the cleavages among the voters, but also there were clear cleavages in the very composition of the candidates. The former was the direct outcome of

Chart 1 PARTY'S POSITION IN 4 DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICTS

	politics vs. markets ideological (a) non-ideological (b)		individualism vs. family value		EU Integration vs. neo-statism	strong federalism vs. weak federalism	
	(a) pol.	mkt	(b) pol.	mkt	indiv. family integ.	state	strong weak
RC	x				x		x
Pds			x		x		x
PpI			x		x	x	x
Patto			x		x	x	x
Lega				x	x	x	x
FI				x	?	x	x
An	?		?		x	x	-

source) Paolo Segatti. 1994. "I programmi elettorali e il ruolo del mass media," p. 472.

the latter.⁽⁷⁵⁾

What kind of characteristics did the electoral programs of each party show? Whereas at least up to the 1980s the partisan confrontation during elections concerned ideology,⁽⁷⁶⁾ Segatti's analysis indicated that the 1994 elections were lacking in ideological disputes compared with the elections in the past. Here, ideology is defined as the programmatic options and arguments presented from a grandiose world vision to resolve contemporary problems. The parties except the RC and the MSI-AN lightened their ideological color, and rather made efforts to present feasible answers to the actual problems the

(75) *Ibid.*

(76) Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability.*

Italian government was faced with. However, it does not mean that the stance and policies of each party converged. With regard to the economic problems in particular, the clear divisions emerged. Each party had a different stand concerning the relationship between economy and politics, or more concretely, the problems of unemployment, financial deficit, and welfare reforms.

During the 1994 electoral campaigns, the PDS totally supported broad privatization. Just like the PPI, the PDS respected the autonomous function of markets and saw it indispensable for economic growth and social renovation in claiming :“We need the creativity based on the moral and material incentives, the boldness to take risks freely, and the culture to recognize the specialty of work.” Yet, at the same time, it emphasized that the markets were not the final goals and that the problems unsolved only within the markets must be handed over to politics. This point definitely distinguished the PDS from the market supremacist *Forza Italia* and *Lega Nord*.

Segatti pointed out that the conflict between the left and the right with regard to the role of the state and markets was blurred by the existence of the statist AN. According to him, the cleavage, which separated the left insisting on the necessity of the state’s function to compensate for the market mechanism from the right pursuing of market mechanism at the maximum, became vague because of the AN that shared its statism with the left.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Such a view, however, should be reexamined more carefully. Segatti’s image of the left-right confrontation was single-dimensional, “market vs. welfare state”. If

(77) Paolo Segatti. 1994. “I programmi elettorali e il ruolo del mass media.” *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*. anno xxiv, no. 3.

the new issue, "autonomous individualism vs. authoritarian collectivism", was taken into account simultaneously just as Herbert Kitschelt suggested,⁽⁷⁸⁾ the confrontation would be two-dimensional and the cleavages between the left and the right would be clearer. The center-left targeted broadly from the left-libertarians to the centrists, while the right wanted to coopt the wide area from the right authoritarian to the center. The authoritarian statism of the AN was totally different from the welfarism of the left.

CONCLUSION

Politics is a mirror which precisely reflects society. Italian politics is not an exception. The DC government continued for such a long period because it represented the electorates, most citizens and the very Italian society. It may be difficult for Italian society that has constantly been led by the parties to change politics by its own initiative.⁽⁷⁹⁾ As a matter of fact, the Italian citizens did not develop an ardent movement for change (with some exceptions like *la Rete*, anti-Mafia movement in Sicily) even at the flux of the reform process. The electoral reform was promoted mainly through the moderate

(78) Herbert Kitschelt. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

(79) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1993. "Introduction : A case of Regime Crisis," in Gianfranco Pasquino and Patrick McCarthy, eds., *The End of Post-war Politics in Italy : The Landmark 1992 Elections*. Westview. p. 9.

(80) For this point, see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transition to Democracy : Political Life after Authoritarian Rule*. Johns Hipkins Uniuersity Press.

pacts set forth by the political elites as often the case with a democratization process under polyarchy⁽⁸⁰⁾. The key actors of the Italian reform were obviously the political leaders, in particular Achille Occhetto and his colleagues.

For the reform promoters, the electoral reform was a severe struggle for their survival. Without any particular efforts, their collapse might have been inevitable. The political reform was literally a problem of life and death for the PCI/PDS. The situation was not so much different for the PSI and the Catholic left which had initially opposed the reform but later joined the reformist trend advocated by the PDS. The reform, therefore, can be viewed as a logical outcome based upon the rational calculation of each actor within extremely limited space of choices, even though the onset of the reform happened to be stimulated by the scandals.

The Italian case provided a clear pattern of the confrontation between two rival groups, as the press word *RossoNero* (red-black) indicated. However, this does not mean that there was no internal conflict within each camp, the left and the right, not to mention the breakdown of the Berlusconi government that happened within the same year of his inauguration because of the political contradictions among *Forza Italia*, *Lega Nord* and *Alleanza Nazionale*. What should be noted is that the PDS, the core partner of the *progressisti*, failed to arbitrate the policy friction between the centrists (PPI and Segni's group) and the old left (*Rifondazione Comunista*) and could not coopt the center. The electoral defeat mainly stemmed from this fact.

(81) Adam Przeworski. 1985. *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

The founding election of 1994 brought a bitter result to the PDS, the main actor who had promoted the electoral reform. It was the 1994 elections that clarified the difficulty for the PDS, just as Przeworski theoretically argued,⁽⁶¹⁾ to activate the Italian economy to obtain the support from the largest middle class, while protecting the interests of the citizens in periphery. Actually, as already examined, the traditional political cleavages still persisted in Italian elections. Yet, the outcome of the 1994 elections was still transitional. Just after the elections, Massimo D'Alema, the would-be successor of Occhetto, keenly recognized the sheer necessity to form a broader center-left coalition in order to govern Italy from the left.

(to be continued)