

Sino-Soviet Relations : 1949-1966

Hiroto HIGASHINO

(I) Introduction

This essay is concerned with the period in Sino-Soviet relations from 1949 to 1966, breaking down the period into its major political developments. Along with the process of chronological examination, I will discuss the two authors, Donald Zagoria and David Floyd, and their interpretations, to grasp a total picture of the relations as a consensus of their argument. At the same time, I will contrast their analyses to lead me to answer the following questions. What was the nature of the dispute? What was the consistent and essential issue throughout the period? To what extent did ideological controversy and personality contribute to the dispute? Realizing the difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between these issues and various factors which might provide reciprocal impacts on the states' relations, I intended to examine these questions in this paper.

(II) The Period of Friendship and Co-operation, 1949-55

—Treaty of Friendship and Other Agreements (February 1950)

As David Floyd mentioned, "whatever Stalin thought privately about the victory in China of a revolution which owed relatively little to Russian aid and which was led by a man who was in no sense Moscow-trained, he had no choice in public but to welcome the development."¹ The case was quite the same for Mao and China. "(H)owever Mao regarded Stalin and the Russian Communists' treatment of China, the simple fact was that Russia was the *only* possible source of the considerable financial and

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1 David Floyd, *Mao against Khrushchev*, p. 10.

economic and China must have if the new regime was to consolidate its grip on the country.”¹

Under the circumstances, Mao went to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin two months after the proclamation of People’s Republic of China in October 1949. Negotiations between the two governments lasted for two months, and the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was concluded in February 14, 1950.

Besides the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the negotiations concluded with the signature of (i) an agreement providing that after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, and in any case not later than the end of 1952, the Soviet Union would transfer free of charge to the Chinese Government all of its rights in the joint administration of the Manchurian (Changchun) Railway, together with the property belonging to the railway, and would withdraw its troops from the Port Arthur naval base, whose installations would be handed over to China ; (ii) an agreement on the granting of long-term credits to the amount of 300,000, 000 U.S. dollars by the USSR to China, to enable China to obtain industrial, mining, and railway equipment from the USSR.²

Notes were also exchanged on the issues of the independence of Outer Mongolia and the transfer of Japanese property mostly confiscated in Manchuria by the Soviets. Further agreements which were signed on March 27, 1950 included the establishment of joint-stock companies to exploit petroleum and non-ferrous metals and of a joint-stock civil aviation company. In addition, a Sino-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed on April 19, 1950.³

The treaty and agreements which were concluded between Stalin and Mao were closely modelled on the previous treaty of August 14, 1945 that was concluded between Stalin and the Chiang Kai-shek. In order to

1 *ibid.* p. 10.

2 Keesing’s International Studies, *China and the Soviet Union 1949-84*, p. 1.

3 John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, p. 43.

discern the relations between the two, I will briefly discuss the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.

Main issues of the treaty included territorial controversy on Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, Xinjiang, and Outer Mongolia. Regarding the three eastern provinces of Manchuria, Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, declared China's full sovereignty. Russia's pledge not to interfere in China's internal affairs extended to Xinjiang province.¹ Stalin appended the treaty with the pledge that Soviet troops would begin withdrawal from Manchuria three weeks after the capitulation of Japan and would complete the withdrawal in a maximum of three months.² In a note to Molotov, Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Foreign Minister, also declared that China would agree to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia if, following the defeat of Japan, a plebiscite of the people there confirmed their desire for independence.³ In reply, Molotov stated that Russia would respect the political independence and territorial integrity of the People's Government of Outer Mongolia.

With respect to the administrative city of Dairen, the military base of Port Arthur, and the main railways in Manchuria, the Soviet Union intended to hold the same privileges which she had before her defeat of the war with Japan in 1905. Dairen was to be a free port open for the trade and shipping of all nations. Half of the port installations and equipment would be leased, free of charge, to Russia. The agreement stated that administration in Dairen be exercised by China. However, a Russian would be appointed as the chief of the Port by the manager of the Changchun Railway in agreement with the mayor of Dairen.⁴ Likewise, Port Arthur was to be under joint use as a naval base for the two powers. The civil administration which was managed by the Chinese Government had to take account of the Soviets' interest in time of emergency.

1 Henry Wei, *China and Soviet Russia*, p. 182.

2 *ibid.* p. 182.

3 *ibid.* p. 182.

4 *ibid.* p. 183.

The railways in question were the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, both of which were built by Czarist Russia for the purpose of imperialistic expansion. The new agreement of 1945 granted that the two railways (The Changchun Railway) be operated as a purely commercial transportation enterprise, with profits divided between China and Russia.¹ The general manager was to be a Russian, while the president of the board of directors was to be a Chinese. On August 24, the Chinese National Defense Council and the Legislative Yuan ratified the treaty and the related agreements, ten days after of their conclusion in Moscow.

The issues discussed in the treaty of 1950 were basically the same as those in the treaty of 1945.²

(i) Manchuria. The Changchun Railway was to be returned to China by the end of 1952 at the latest and without compensation, and the Russians were to give back Chinese property which was seized from the Japanese.

(ii) Port Arthur. The Russian command was to be replaced by a Soviet-Chinese commission by the end of 1952. But the Chinese were to pay for installations.

(iii) Dairen. No change was agreed in the status of the port. But the civil administration, as well as some Japanese property, were to be given back to the Chinese.

(iv) Xinjiang. The Russians recognized de facto Peking's sovereignty over the area, and secured agreement to the creation of joint companies for the exploitation of Xinjinag's oil and mineral resources under Soviet experts.

(v) Outer Mongolia. The Chinese had no choice but to recognize the independent status of this area, in which the Russians were firmly entrenched.

Among these, the most touchy issue between the Soviets and China

1 *ibid.* p. 183.

2 Following statements were basically from *op. cit. Mao Against Khrushchev.* pp. 11-12.

seemed to be the question of Outer Mongolia. In fact, Klaus Mehnert insisted that he has "no doubt that the leading Communists, including Mao, desired eventually to annex Outer Mongolia for the Chinese People's Republic."¹ To support the argument, Klaus introduced a quote of Mao in an interview with Edgar Snow in the summer of 1936: "It is China's immediate task to win back all the territories we have lost, not merely to defend our sovereignty on this side of the Great Wall." (Both Inner and Outer Mongolia are situated beyond the Great Wall.)

As a matter of fact, Peking went further to strengthen its relations with Outer Mongolia. In July 1950 ambassadors were exchanged. A year later Peking dispatched a delegation to Ulan Bator for the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Mongolian revolution; six months later dispatched a further delegation to the state funeral of Choibalsang. In September 1952, Zhou Enlai and Tsendenbal met in Moscow, and a tripartite pact was concluded on the building of the railway among the Soviet Union, China, and the Mongolian People's Republic. Klaus guessed that "Stalin was not particularly interested in the project, because Ulan Bator had already been linked by rail with the Soviet Union since 1949, and therefore he might feel that was sufficient."² Stalin did not give consent until negotiations between Zhou and Tsendenbal were fairly far advanced. In October 1952, the Chinese Government signed a ten-year treaty with Tsendenbal in Peking in an attempt to extend economic and cultural cooperation.

—After Stalin's Era (1953-55)

"Khrushchev is later reported to have said that the 'main reason' for his visit to Peking in 1954 was 'to remove causes of tension.'"³ Khrushchev observed that "Stalin had jeopardized Sino-Soviet relations by 'demanding too much in return for aid,' and Mao had been 'extremely

1 Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow*, p. 264.

2 *ibid.* p. 264.

3 *Op. cit.*, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.*, p. 57.

embittered' by Stalin's insistence on joint-stock companies and mining and industrial concessions."¹ Therefore, in less than two years after Stalin's death, the relations between the two Communist countries were to a certain degree restored with the efforts of Khrushchev. Thus, the beginning of 1956 saw the Moscow-Peking axis as a powerful combination in world politics which would grow stronger rather than break up.²

(III) The Beginnings of Disagreement, 1956-1957

—The 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956)

- 1) the repudiation of Stalin in Khrushchev's secret speech of February 24-25, 1956
 - * an uncomfortable analogy with the cult of Mao Zedong
- 2) Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence as the "fundamental principle" of Soviet diplomacy and on the "parliamentary road" as a viable means of transition to socialism
 - * distortion of Marxist-Leninist doctrine
 - * reflection of an incorrect and over-optimistic evaluation of the nature of US imperialism and at the same time under-evaluation of support for national-liberation movements

—The Crisis in Poland and Hungary (1956)

Chinese statements basically criticized the policy's implication of Soviet "big national chauvinism" on the Hungarian and Polish crises. China approved of national variations in the road to socialism in such countries as Poland and Yugoslavia.

For example, Mao was reported to have urged the Poles to "follow absolutely the search for an autonomous internal policy and develop their own social system as Yugoslavia had done" in talks with the Polish delegate Ochab (First Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party) during the

1 *ibid.* p. 57.

2 *Op. cit., Mao against Khrushchev.*, p. 31.

8th Congress of the CCP (Sep. 15-27).¹ In October when the Polish crisis worsened, China rejected a Soviet proposal to condemn Poland at a meeting of fraternal parties.²

The Hungary crisis seemed to be created similarly by the Chinese at first ; however, the line changed abruptly as soon as the Nagy government declared neutrality for Hungary and proposed to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. China now welcomed Soviet intervention in Hungary. In summation, China's strategy was to support polycentrism in communist nations in order to balance power in the Soviet dominated bloc to the extent that it did not weaken the power of socialist camp as a whole. Zhou Enlai, during the tour of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary in January 1957, stressed the importance of Soviet leadership of the socialist bloc.

—The Moscow Meeting (November 1957)

The Moscow Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties (Nov. 14-19, 1957) discussed the following topics : economic development of the bloc, the struggle for peace and socialism, relations among communist parties, and current international problems. In his speech on November 14, Mao stated that the Soviet Union should occupy a leading role as the head of the states of the socialist camp and of the community of communist and workers' parties.³ Mao's emphasis on Soviet bloc leadership completed the reversal of Chinese policy during 1956-7 towards equality of bloc relations, much to the disappointment of Poland and Hungary. Thus, "revisionism" and "dogmatism" were condemned as dangerous trends in the communist movement.

—Mao's Moscow Speech (November 18, 1957)

Though not fully published, Mao seemed to advocate " a military

1 *Op. cit.*, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.*, p. 69.

2 *ibid.* p. 70.

3 *ibid.* p. 73.

solution of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism” in this speech.¹ The perception of Mao is greatly related to improvements in Soviet military strength—in particular, the launching of the first sputnik and his understanding that imperialist colonial policy, including the Chinese Revolution, had failed since the end of the World War II. As such, the Chinese at that time recognized the international situation with full confidence that the East prevails over the West.

However, the Soviet view—particularly in terms of the impact of the development of advanced weapons such as sputnik (Oct. 4, 1957) and ICBMs (Aug. 26, 1957) in world politics—showed differences from the Chinese. The Soviet leadership was more reluctant to use these as conventional weapons and therefore could not become as optimistic of the Eastern strategic superiority in the nuclear war age as Mao did. This was the crux of the Sino-Soviet debate over tactics towards the West, which was to loom even larger in subsequent years.

Zagoria's Interpretation

With respect to Soviet Global Strategy, the following two points which Khrushchev introduced at the 20th Congress were important. First, he mentioned that peaceful coexistence was not a mere tactical expedient but a “fundamental principle” of Soviet foreign policy.² He furthermore concluded that there was no alternative to peaceful coexistence: “either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.” Second, Khrushchev modified the Marxist-Leninist dogma that wars are inevitable as long as capitalism survives that “war is not a fatalistic inevitability.”³ As such, Khrushchev believed in the possibility to progress along a “peaceful revolutionary” line.

As a successor who denied the brutal dictatorship of Stalin, Khrushchev had to unify the international communist bloc with less violent

1 *ibid.* p. 79.

2 Zagoria, Donald S. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*, p. 40.

3 *ibid.* p. 40.

measures and coercive power, while allowing for the different national perspectives and interests of the various communist states and parties. Thus, Khrushchev's posture seemed to be based upon a comparatively "realistic" perspective, which in Mao's eyes came to be reflected as a "revisionist" or "right" wing strategy.

In the meantime, the political development of the CCP between June and November 1957 was also important in considering the radical shift to "left" wing policy both in domestic and external policy of China. The results were incarnated in the policy of the "Great Leap Forward" with the introduction of communes and the abandonment of the Bandong spirit effective since 1954. Zagoria analyzed the main reasons of the shift to be consequences of the "hundred flowers movement" and a desperate economic situation, mainly due to collectivization, in the summer of 1957. Zagoria concluded that "the left wing gained the ascendancy in the summer and fall of 1957 after the dramatic failure of the 'hundred flowers' campaign, and advocated a breakneck pace of economic development as the 'only way out.'"¹

Floyd's Interpretation

Floyd shared Zagoria's idea on Khrushchev's view towards war with capitalism; that is, Khrushchev considered that wars were outlawed and that the communist world must even think in terms of collaboration with the capitalists.² This originated from the recognition that a war with modern weapons would mean the end of communism as well as capitalism.

With respect to the ambivalent stance of China in the world communist arena, Floyd had the same perspective as Zagoria: "(T)hey (the Chinese) supported the apparently contradictory demands for unity in the camp and greater autonomy for its members."³

1 *ibid.* p. 68.

2 *Op. cit., Mao against Khrushchev.*, p. 34.

3 *ibid.* p.44.

The internal causes which drove the Chinese to the left, in Floyd's analysis, were also quite similar to those of Zagoria: "a serious economic crisis as well as a wave of opposition and criticism which had been released by Mao Zedong's hundred flowers' experiment."¹

(IV) The Beginnings of Disagreement, 1958-1959

—Yugoslavia Becomes the "Mirror" of Revisionism (1958)

In 1958, Yugoslavia first assumed ideological neutrality in Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union. Increasingly however, the word "Yugoslavia" was synonymous with the words "Soviet Union" in Chinese use of terminology; just as from 1960-1 on, "Albania" in Soviet parlance was often interchangeable with "China."

China's first major criticism of Yugoslavia appeared in the People's Daily on March 5, 1958 as a response to her shift in relation to Soviet policy. The characteristics of the event were that whereas Soviet criticism of Yugoslavia left the door open for a future improvement in relations, the Chinese argued that uncompromising struggle must be waged against Yugoslavian revisionism, and that there was no possibility that the latter would change for the better.² In September 1958, China withdrew her ambassador from Belgrade. In January 1959, Peking published a bitter attack on Yugoslavia's attitude toward the Taiwan question.

—The Taiwan Straits Crisis (August-October 1958)

Presumably alarmed at Sino-Soviet differences, Khrushchev had an unscheduled visit (July 31-August 3) to Peking and talks with the Chinese leaders. However the communique issued at the end of his trip failed to mention the Taiwan issue at all. Chinese propaganda on the liberation of Taiwan, which had died down during and after Khrushchev's visit, was

1 *ibid.* p. 46.

2 *Op. cit.*, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.*, p. 85.

revived in mid-August, and on August 23 Chinese shelling of Quemoy began.¹

—The Great Leap Forward (1958-9)

—Nuclear Weapons and Defence (1958-9)

As Sino-Soviet discord became tense from 1957-8, Chinese efforts to acquire nuclear status became more intensive. During 1958 Chinese leaders began to publicize for the first time their conviction that China would acquire nuclear weapons in the not too distant future.² At the Enlarged Conference of the Military Affairs Committee in May-July 1958, Mao declared that it is entirely possible for some atom bombs and hydrogen bombs to be made in ten years' time.³

—The Sino-Indian Border Dispute (1959)

The incidents which took place on the Sino-Indfan border in July-October 1959 were relatively minor, involving a few isolated skirmishes and the death of nine Indian policemen and one Chinese soldier (in the clash on October 21).⁴ According to the Indian account however, minor disputes with China had occurred at intervals ever since 1954, and Chinese forward movements for expansionism along the border had been noted since 1958. The legality of movements by both sides depends upon the view one takes of the legality of their claims to the disputed areas.

The Soviet Union regarded the border conflict of 1959 as a deliberate manoeuvre by China, aimed at "torpedoing the relaxation of international tension" on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. This Soviet's view seemed to be derived from a fundamental perceptual difference with

1 *ibid.* p. 90.

2 *ibid.* p. 103.

3 *ibid.* p. 104. China's first hydrogen bomb successfully exploded in June 17, 1967.

4 *ibid.* p. 110.

China on the character of the Indian government. China saw India as a capitalist country led by a reactionary bourgeoisie, while the Soviet Union did not see it as such, as was described in Khrushchev's triumphant tour in 1955 and following aid worth over US\$375 million in July 1959.

—Khrushchev's visit to Peking (1959)

Khrushchev's consecutive visits to Peking in 1958 and 1959 underlined the serious deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations during these years. Khrushchev in these years was a strong believer in peaceful coexistence between the West and the East and hence did not support Mao's leftist adventurism at all. But China, heading for left-wing policy both domestically and abroad, did not favor Khrushchev's attempts at a Soviet-U.S. detente, because she feared increasing isolation, diminishing the effective value of alliance with the Soviet Union, and incurring cost to pursuing her own policy in an adverse environment.¹ Under the circumstances, the Taiwan issue emerged as a symbol of the differences between China and the Soviet Union, though there is no indication that China, either then or at any other time since 1950, planned to launch a serious military invasion in order to liberate the island.²

Zagoria's Interpretation

The reasons for Khrushchev's criticism of China's development of communes were, in Zagoria's discussion, rooted in its lack of material incentives and the Soviet's own unsuccessful experiment with agricultural communes in the period immediately after the 1917 revolution. In his November 14 theses on the Soviet Seven Year Plan, Khrushchev inserted the passage: "Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had taught that without material incentives it is impossible to lead tens and tens of millions of people to Communism."³

1 *ibid.* p. 116.

2 *ibid.* p. 117.

3 *Op. cit. The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961.* p. 99.

(V) The Beginning of Open Controversy, 1960-62

—The Opening of Polemics (1960)

The first six months of 1960 witnessed a steady escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The dispute at this time was headed by ideological issues and practical strategy as to how to live with imperialists. *Long Live Leninism*, published a month before the Paris summit meeting, was China's first comprehensive attack in theoretical terms on the Soviet position.¹ Furthermore, an editorial in the *People's Daily* a week later wrote in this way: "The fact is...even after the Camp David talks and even on the eve of the East-West summit conference, we see no change at all in substance in US imperialist war policy, in the policy carried out by the US government and by Eisenhower personally."²

The Soviet replied to *Long Live Leninism* in a speech by Otto Kuusinen on April 22, 1960. "Peaceful coexistence, in Lenin's time as now, was the basis of Soviet foreign policy, and it had been creatively developed by the CPSU at its 20th and 21st Congress."³

—The Bucharest Conference (June 1960)

The Bucharest Conference turned out to provide a dramatic preview of the international meeting, airing Sino-Soviet differences before an audience of fifty party delegations, with a violent clash between the Chinese delegate Peng Chen and Khrushchev.⁴ The attendance at Bucharest was weighted in the CPSU's favour.

In the final day of the Conference, Khrushchev raised such explosive issues as the Sino-Indian border dispute, military cooperation, the Great Leap Forward, and Peng Dehuai's dismissal.⁵ The Bucharest Conference

1 *Op. cit.* *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.* p. 120.

2 *ibid.* p. 120.

3 *ibid.* p. 121.

4 *ibid.* p. 123.

5 *ibid.* p. 124.

also witnessed the emergence of Albania as single supporter of China.

—The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts (August 1960)

In mid-July of 1960, a Soviet Central Committee Plenum claimed to rebuff left-wing sectarian deviation and manifestations of narrow nationalistic tendencies.¹ In August, the withdrawal of all 1390 Soviet specialists in China occurred. In agreements of August 1958 and February 1959, the Soviet Union undertook to assist in the construction of 125 industrial projects (in addition to the 211 Soviet-aided projects in progress or completed). But Sino-Soviet trade declined by over 50% in 1961, and has operated since 1963 at a rate less than in any previous year during the 1950-60 period.²

In April 1961 it was agreed that the outstanding trade deficit could be paid off over four years, to be finally liquidated in 1966. China preferred to liquidate the deficit as soon as possible, and all Soviet credits were finally repaid by the first quarter of 1965.³ The consequence was the sharp decline of China's foreign trade with Soviet Union and East European nations to under 30% in 1963, whereas in 1955 it amounted to almost 70%.⁴

—The Moscow Conference (November 1960)

—The 22nd Congress of the CPSU (October 1961)

In his speech to the Congress, Zhou Enlai protested that "open unilateral condemnation of a fraternal party does not make for unity...and could not be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach."⁵ In March 1962, an apparent lull in the dispute set in, and both Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Albanian polemics declined sharply over the next six months.

1 *ibid.* p. 129.

2 *ibid.* p. 131.

3 *ibid.* p. 133.

4 *ibid.* p. 134.

5 *ibid.* p. 154.

Zagoria's Interpretation

According to Zagoria, one of the controversial issues of April 1960 between Moscow and Peking was the question of peaceful coexistence.¹ Gaining confidence in a peaceful triumph in the long run, together with the increasing fear of nuclear war, the Soviets desired a detente. The Chinese, however, did not accept the Soviet coexistence tactics. To the Chinese, putting "peace" before "just" wars was bad tactics.²

Then, how did Soviet view the non-inevitability of war in their strategic thinking? Zagoria answered the question with three points.³ First, the Russians had exhibited both in doctrine and in action a belief that the likely costs of general war in the nuclear era are prohibitive. Second, they appeared to believe they could attain their objectives in the middle run without the risk of general or local war. Third, Moscow's conservative thinking on war seemed intimately related to the instability of the so-called balance of terror. Thus, the perceptual gap existed mainly in the view of warfare in the nuclear age. In fact, Khrushchev reportedly added in the Bucharest Conference that the Chinese knew little about the realities of modern war.⁴

Floyd's Interpretation

Zagoria intended to explain the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute with perceptual difference in the importance of nuclear arsenal in modern warfare and following tactical differences in propelling the international communist movement. Basically sharing the same perspective as Zagoria, Floyd underlined China's strong anti-imperialist sentiment, particularly towards the U.S., with accounts of three prominent Chinese figures.

At a meeting in Moscow in February 1960, Kang Sheng provided a catalogue of America's "double-dealing" and "war plans" in various parts

1 *Op. cit.* *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961.* p. 301.

2 *ibid.* p. 305.

3 *ibid.* p. 312.

4 *ibid.* p. 325.

of the world.¹ In a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions on June 1960, Zhou Enlai said: "Peace can never be achieved by begging it of imperialism."² In the same conference of June 1960, the Chinese delegate Liu Chang-sheng, Vice-Chairman of the All China Federation of Trade Unions and a Vice-Chairman of the WFTU, mentioned the Chinese attitude toward war in greater detail: "(I)t was true to say that there was a possibility of preventing the 'imperialists' from unleashing such a war, although 'it is entirely wrong to believe that war can be eliminated for ever while imperialism still exists'."³

Thus, Floyd's work suggested that how the Chinese feared being threatened by imperialists. Presumably, China feared this more than the Soviet Union did. It is therefore safe to believe, though ironically, that China's excessive anxiety against the U.S., a common adversary with the Soviet Union, helped to create a division in the camp.

(VI) Intensification of the Conflict, 1962-64

—The Sino-Soviet Border (1962-64)

The Czarist Russia acquired vast areas in the Far East, previously under at least nominal Chinese suzerainty, through the treaties of Aigun (1858) and of Peking (1860).⁴ (The Qing government refused to ratify the treaty of Aigun, but its essential provisions were included and enlarged in the treaty of Peking.) These included all the territory north of the Amur river and east of the Ussuri river—now known as the Soviet Maritime Province. The treaty of Ili (1881) ceded part of Chinese Turkestan Republic—now Xinjiang—to Russia. It is now incorporated in the Kazakhstan Soviet Republic. Part of the 1500 mile Soviet-Xinjiang frontier has

1 *Op. cit.* *Mao against Khrushchev.* p. 98.

2 *ibid.* p. 100.

3 *ibid.* p. 101.

4 Following information in this section is based on *Op. cit.* *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.* pp. 158-161.

never been delimited by any agreement.

In March 1963, the Chinese government first stated publicly that the treaties of Aigun, Peking, and Ili among others were "unequal treaties," and that they raised "outstanding issues" which, when the time was ripe, should be settled peacefully through negotiations. Until such time they were prepared to maintain the status quo.

Although the Chinese may always have been dissatisfied with these frontier arrangements, the immediate cause of complaint seems to have arisen over Xinjiang. Soviet interest and influence in Xinjiang had been considerable before 1949, and had been dominant during the governorship of Sheng Shih-zai in 1937-42. Since 1949 China has exercised effective control of Xinjiang, and has sought to sinify the Kazakh, Uighur, and other semi-nomadic minorities there on a considerable scale. First frontier incidents were admitted by both sides in 1960 and after in 1962.

The even more explosive issue of Outer Mongolia was raised by Mao in July 1964, and was played up vigorously in the Soviet press to substantiate charges of Chinese "expansionism." Though the independence of Outer Mongolia had been definitively confirmed in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, Mao revealed that China had attempted to reopen the question during Khrushchev's visit to Peking in 1954.

--Attempts at Mediation (1962)

--The Cuban Crisis and the Sino-Indian War (1962-63)

China's argument, that the Soviet Union was guilty of "adventurism" in sending the missiles to Cuba, and of "capitulationism" in withdrawing them, touched the Soviet leadership on a sensitive spot.¹

--The Test-Ban Treaty and the Open Break (July 1963)

The definitive break between China and the Soviet Union finally

1 *ibid.* p. 176.

occurred in July 1963, with the signing of the Test-Ban Treaty, its denunciation by China, the indefinite postponement of Sino-Soviet bilateral talks, and the opening of totally overt polemics on both sides.¹

Floyd's Interpretation

Floyd attempted to overview a series of disputes, by breaking them down into six aspects. They were economic, military, diplomatic, two ages of revolution, two different men, and ideological features.² Among these, Floyd seems to place less significance on the ideological aspect than the role of two personal cults weighted, as the title of his book suggested. In his understanding, "ideology has always played a secondary role in the dispute."³

Cautioning the reader to regard the dispute between the Soviet Union and China as mainly a dispute between the two leaders, Floyd nevertheless maintained that "it would be equally wrong to ignore the extent to which the dispute is a reflection of the conflicting characters of these two men."⁴ The reason was that "(t)he regimes over which they hold sway are highly centralized dictatorships in which the personality of the man at the top is of vastly more importance than in the case of the leader of a democratic regime."⁵ Basically, I agree with his idea ; "too unpredictable and too arbitrary"⁶ Khrushchev was strongly suspicious of Mao, a dictator in a highly centralized nation, as his own remarks described that "(d)uring my (Khrushchev) visit to Peking, the atmosphere was typically Oriental. Everyone was unbelievably courteous and ingratiating, but I saw through their hypocrisy."⁷ In his apprehension, he went further to say

1 *ibid.* p. 184.

2 For more details, see *Op. cit. Mao against Khrushchev.* pp. 194-199.

3 *Op. cit. Mao against Khrushchev.* p. 199.

4 *ibid.* p. 192.

5 *ibid.* p. 192.

6 Ulam, Adam B. *Expansion and Coexistence.* p. 630.

7 Khrushchev, Nikita S. *Khrushchev Remembers.* p. 466.

that "it's always difficult to know what the Chinese are really thinking. It's difficult to figure out whether China is really for or against peaceful coexistence."¹

(VII) The Post-Khrushchev Period, 1964-66

—Vietnam and Sino-Soviet Relations (1965-67)

An account on the People's Daily of February 20, 1967 considered the proposal by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to force the Vietnamese people to surrender as a big conspiracy.² In April 1967, the Chinese argued that "opposition to Soviet revisionism was the most effective aid to the Vietnamese people, and criticized those people who call themselves Communists but...parrot the line of the Soviet revisionists and spare no efforts to preach united action with them."³

(VIII) Conclusion

As I examined Sino-Soviet relations from 1945 to 1966 with main political events and two writers' analyses, there were a variety of aspects in this dispute. These included territorial controversy on Outer Mongolia, border question of Xinjiang, the ideological issue, and security strategy. More complicatedly, there seemed to be no single fundamental issue, which was disputed throughout the period, but a focus on the controversy seemed to show arbitrary changes. Furthermore, the ideological controversy, the most touchy and crucial aspect through which we understand the essence of the dispute within the same bloc, was conducted through "estoric language," making it extremely difficult for outsiders to follow.

However, if one puts what seems to be the "root" of the dispute into

1 *ibid.* p. 473.

2 Summary of the article is available in *Op. cit. Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute.* p. 269.

3 *ibid.* p. 260.

historical context, the nature of Sino-Soviet relations, which took shape during this period, appears with certain clarity. In other words, the essence of their relations existed far beyond either the time span of post 1949 or understanding within the framework of communism. For example, China's border issue with the Soviets can be traced back to the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 on record. In addition, in Mao's mind, annexation of Outer Mongolia had already existed as part of his political agenda in 1936. Moreover, strong distrust of Moscow-led revolutionary line must have already existed in the 1920s, as, despite "authoritative" guidance from Moscow, numerous attempts to "liberate" urban China ended in total failure at that time.

Thus, China's revolutionary success was heavily reliant on Mao's own militarily strategy, political ideology, and personal cult. Therefore, it is safe to believe in the possibility of clash between strong personalities—Mao against either Stalin or Khrushchev, whenever these leaders were faced with inherent political agenda such as territory issues and discussed abstract concepts, their views of which originated in their own experiences and/or personality. As such, various controversial factors seemed to be amplified by dictators with strong cults of personal and by the "esoteric" language that they used.

This research eventually suggested to me the difficulty in drawing a "neat" picture of Sino-Soviet relations based on sound logic, and emphasized the need to utilize long standing historical perspective. It also suggested the danger of states in which personal cult could matter more than anything else, and barren discussion, using "esoteric" communist language, which could not solve any concrete issues at all.

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