

DIVIDED TERRITORIES AND THE ORIGIN OF THE COLD WAR IN ASIA *

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I

Despite the fact that the primary point of friction in Japanese postwar diplomacy remains the unceasing problem of territorial disputes, this issue has yet to receive adequate consideration from the field of Cold War research. Scholars have made much of Soviet proposals of 1945 such as the division of Japan into four parts or the two part division of Hokkaido, and, removed from their original context, have regarded them as proof of Soviet "expansionism". Why is it that territory considerations continue to be the Achilles' heel of postwar Japanese diplomacy? Even without considering the islands of Takeshima and Senkaku, why was Okinawa divested from Japan, and why are the Southern Kuriles still divided? Despite the development of Cold War historical research in recent years, its approach to this fundamental problem of Japanese foreign affairs remains unjustifiably abstruse. The territorial dispute has previously been isolated from the formation process of Japan's peace treaty and viewed as a separate dimension of the origin of the Cold War in Asia⁽¹⁾. Doesn't the origin of this myth lie in an attempt to justify the conservative's approach to postwar diplomacy? This myth revolves around the belief that the Communist countries sought to harden the Cold War by altering the status quo, thus making the separate peace and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (hereafter referred to as Ampo) seem an inevitable product of fate.

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This myth is nothing more than an illusion created by an unrealistic assessment of the diplomatic provisions that should have led to world peace and neutrality⁽²⁾.

Using documents recently made available to the public, and my own research compiled from a series of interviews, I will trace the groping evolution of policy among the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union as concerns Japan's territorial dispute, demonstrating the falseness of this myth which has been taken as the basis for Japan's rearmament. Research has revealed that since before the end of the war, Soviet fears and anxiety were rooted in American anti-status quo behavior, following which both the U.S. and Japan opted for a separate peace long before the 1947 phase was reached whereby Ampo supposedly became inevitable. Also, the hardliners in both Japan and the United States were preoccupied with circumstances that made a separate peace the only option despite the existence of cooperation by some Soviet policy toward the United States and the conciliatory stance taken by softliners within the U.S. Department of State toward the Soviets. It also appears that the Japanese leaders in control of the newly reorganized establishment formed the hardline anti-Soviet faction which, entangling territorial concerns with other requirements, opposed the initiative of the Soviet softliners in obtaining a "general peace". My research into the origin of the territorial dispute and rearmament will show the prototype of Japanese-American postwar relations as well as the pitfalls of recent diplomatic disagreements which have again raised a clamor over the threat from the north.

This paper's focus will be concentrated on the unfolding of American policy. This is done in order to ensure adherence to historical fact and avoid any unwarranted speculation without the historical documents.

I. The State Department's Initiative: Wartime Planning

Considerations regarding Japanese territory were being formulated within the U.S. State Department as early as 1942, only one year after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

These postwar policy preparations were being developed by the East

Asian Group of the Special Studies Division of the State Department. After January of 1944, the East Asian Group's de facto successor, the Far Eastern Area Committee, continued these deliberations. This group was composed of Far Eastern specialists who were guided by the ideals of the Atlantic Charter and dedicated to the principle of opposition to territorial annexations which required the divestiture of any territory acquired through military force. These ideals were reaffirmed by the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union at the Cairo meeting in November of 1943. These principles were subsequently embodied in the Potsdam Declaration communicated to Japan immediately before the end of the war. Japan eventually accepted this document which included, as one of the surrender conditions, Article XIII; "The Japanese Sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine...".

Despite the general principles of opposition to territorial annexations, actual plans were being drawn up in the State Department to determine exactly what was meant by the phrase "minor islands" in the Potsdam Declaration. In this process, the most heated debate concerned the disposition of the Ryukyu and Kurile archipelagoes and the Southern Pacific Islands, principally the League of Nation's Mandated Islands, including the Bonins (Ogasawara) and the Izu Islands. Compounding the problem was the urging of the American military to place the Ryukyus and the Southern Pacific Islands under American jurisdiction, on one hand, while it was anticipated that China and the Soviet Union would press their claims on, respectively, the Ryukyus and the Kuriles.

As the meeting between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union approached, the State Department, from November of 1944 through January of the following year and indeed, up until the night before the Yalta conference, had come to the following conclusions about the postwar disposition of the two archipelagoes. The Kurile from Etorofu south were considered on historical and geographical grounds to be Japanese territory. The middle and northern Kuriles, which Japan had received in 1875 from Russia in exchange for Southern Sakhalin, were considered to be Russian, and consideration was given to placing them,

should the Soviet Union agree, under U.N. trusteeship. Moreover, special attention was paid to Japanese fishing rights in the northern Kuriles. The Southern Pacific Islands, including the Bonins, were to be placed under U.N. trusteeship since there was no objection to the establishment of U.N. military bases there. By all accounts the Ryukyus were Japanese territory, but in case China should urge strongly their reversion to China, or in case the residents strongly desired a transfer of sovereignty from Japan, there should be created an international committee to which the final decision would be entrusted. To be sure, in this case as well, nothing prevented the establishment of U.N. bases there⁽³⁾.

In the process of discussion, the Bonins got lumped together with the old mandated territories as territories under American trusteeship, and the committee considered the possibility of placing military bases in the Ryukyus. These developments took place because of the bitter fighting with militarist Japan in the Pacific, which led the Americans to appreciate the military value of these islands in terms of guaranteeing Allied security against Japan. In this case too, the bases were for the sake not of the American military but of the International Police Force envisioned at that time. Parenthetically it is worth noting that the committee considered the strategic value of the Ryukyus far inferior to that of Taiwan.

In any case, these were considered territories which should revert to a defeated Japan, not territories Japan had gained by conquest; the principle prevailed that there should be no annexations and that Japan should be restricted to her "proper territory". There was no thought given at that time to the value of the islands as strategic bases against the Soviet Union.

II . F.D.R.'s Intervention: The Yalta Agreements

These plans for the postwar disposition of Japanese territory were reviewed by two other committees within the State Department: first the Inter-Divisional Committee, which was then preparing a peace treaty for Japan, and then, since prewar Japanese territory included dependent areas, the Dependent Area Committee. These committees largely confirmed the

policy described above.

The existence of secret Yalta agreements concerning the Kuriles, made public in February 1946, constituted something of a shock. This, followed by the development of a Soviet-American confrontation in Europe, began the American military's vigorous insistence on annexation, not reversion, of the Southern Pacific Islands and the Ryukyus or, failing annexation, at least possible use of these islands as military bases.

The secret agreements exchanged between F.D.R. and Stalin in February 1945 at Yalta contained the promise to "hand over" the Kuriles. This included the Southern Kuriles which had previously been counted as Japanese territory. This secret agreement exchanged with the Soviet Union can hardly be said to reflect the postwar policy toward Japan developed by the Far Eastern specialists within the State Department. Specifically, subtle discrepancies in policy existed in counting the Southern Kuriles as Japanese territory whereas Yalta had promised to hand over all the Kuriles to the Soviet Union.

In order to obscure the difference between pre-existing State Department policy and Yalta on the disposition of the Kuriles, a number of remedies were suggested. The most realistic solution available was to redefine the terms of Yalta by dividing the Southern Kuriles and then stipulating exactly which islands were to be considered Japanese territory. In the end, rather than argue that the Yalta agreements required substantial revision, the State Department chose instead to respect the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union⁽⁴⁾. Feeling that even secret international agreements should be respected, the State Department ceased making an issue of the redefining of the Kuriles, and when the Soviet Union agreed that the Southern Kuriles, defined in the most restricted sense meant that the island of Shikotan and south should revert to Japan, the State Department dropped its opposition⁽⁵⁾. As a final note, it can be said that realization of the State Department's territorial settlement plan for Japan depended on the coexistence of both a general principle prohibiting territorial expansion and a general policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union

As far as the Southern Pacific Islands were concerned, the State Department rejected the military's opinion that, except for the Izu Chain, all

islands, including the Marcus, Bonin, and the Volcanic Islands, be placed under the "exclusive sovereignty" of the United States. It did so on the grounds that this proposal contravened the policy of no annexations. The State Department held tenaciously to the position that these islands, defined as "...territories not yet ready for political self-government,..." were to be placed under U.N. trusteeship with the United States as "administering authority". To be sure, the question of whether the Southern Pacific Islands should be designated "strategic areas" in which military bases could be established would have to await agreement with the military, but the emphasis at that time was on restricting "strategic areas" as much as possible.

As for the Ryukyus, the military held that all the islands south of the 30th parallel including Okinawa, should be placed under American jurisdiction, and that at the very least permanent American bases should be established on some of them, particularly Okinawa. The State Department rejected this position recommending instead that the Ryukyus, as a unit, "...should be considered territories to be returned to Japan..." relying on the argument that the retention of the Ryukyus by the United States would fly in the face of earlier assertions that the United States opposed "territorial expansion". Moreover, to turn Okinawa into a permanent military base would constitute an overt threat to China and particularly the Soviet Union.

The establishment by the United States of a permanent base in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Ryulyu Islands would be likely to provoke serious international repercussions.....The existence of such a base, in addition to the other Pacific bases to be held by the United States and in such a proximity to the China coast, might come to be regarded by the Soviet Union as a provocative threat rather than as a proper defensive move by the United States ⁽⁶⁾.

In this case the logic of the doctrine of international cooperation was closely linked to the principle of nonexpansion. Moreover, the postwar

First Secretary of State, James Byrnes, had applied this logic to his own political philosophy, and not confining himself to the proposals of only middle eschelon officials, used this logic to form the basis of the State Department's own territorial settlement policy toward Japan. Geroge H. Blakeslee, the central figure among the State Department's Far Eastern specialists, patterned himself after the idealistic internationalism of President Wilson. This, combined with the fact that Byrnes and former Secretary of State Hull envisioned the possibility of a second Wilson and recalling that Roosevelt had actually served as Undersecretary of the Navy in the Wilson government, demonstrated the influence of Wilsonian logic within the State Department⁽⁷⁾.

III. The Draft Peace of March, 1947 and the Soviet Union's Response

The views of these East Asian experts within the State Department carried over into the draft which was drawn up by the committee for a Japanese Peace Treaty in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in October 1946, one year after the termination of hostilities⁽⁸⁾. This was only natural, for the chairman of that committee was Hugh Borton, then Acting Chief of the Japanese Division, who had been Blakeslee's right-hand man throughout the wartime planning for postwar Japan. Four members of the existing committee inherited by Borton also provided support for the policies dealing with the peace initiative toward Japan. The other supporters included John K. Emmerson, who had organized an anti-war movement among exiled Japanese Communists in Yenan during the war and following the war had taken part in the determination of territorial issues as a member of the Inter-Divisional Committee, as well as Edwin K. Martin who participated in Roosevelt's economic reform movement and Warren S. Hunsberger, an East Asian economist with strong internationalist leanings. Also included was Ruth Bacon, an international lawyer who had worked previously with the League of Nations. Moreover, the policy was reinforced by John Carter Vincent, head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, who was rumored to be in line for the first Ambassadorship to China af-

ter the restoration of diplomatic relations had he not been forced out of the State Department during the McCarthy era⁽⁹⁾.

The disposition of territories was the first item to be agreed upon in the draft peace treaty of March 1947. In Chapter I, the territories over which Japan must renounce sovereignty and those over which Japan should remain sovereign were stipulated in nine articles. The only change from previous State Department policy concerned Japanese sovereignty in the Kuriles which stated that Japanese territory did not end at Shikotan, but included the two islands Kunashiri and Etorofu as well. This modification in the definition of the "Southern Kuriles" rested on the so-called "1875 concept" and was little more than a return to the State Department's wartime planning for Japan to which we have already referred⁽¹⁰⁾.

Early in March 1947, having completed the draft that included the chapter which focused on territorial issues, Borton went to Tokyo with legal counselor Ruth Bacon to sound out MacArthur and U.S. political advisor to SCAP, George Atcheson. When their opinion had been taken into account, the punitive flavor of the original draft was diluted. Then, in the first part of July, according to established procedure, the call went out to the eleven governments which constituted the Far Eastern Commission for the opening of a Japanese Peace conference, and in early August the completed second-stage draft was sent to Secretary and Undersecretary of State. In January of 1947, secretary of State Byrnes was replaced by General Marshall, former Secretary of the Army, while the Undersecretary of State position was filled by Lovett who was the former Undersecretary of the Army. It was proposed by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs that the peace conference should open in Washington in late August or early September.

This summons, however, met with strong resistance from the Soviet Union and China. Chinese resistance, aimed at extracting American aid to China and at strengthening the Chinese voice in the matter of reparations from Japan has led to the assumption that, for the Chinese, the real issue was presumably bargaining power. By contrast, the Soviet resistance was more substantial. If the Japanese peace treaty was submitted to the eleven-nation conference as opposed to a Four Power consisting of the U.S., U.K.,

U.S.S.R., and China, the Soviet Union would have no veto power and fear rose that it would be forced to swallow the American draft. Hence the Soviet Union was most concerned about the possibility that at such a conference the promises of Yalta concerning Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would be broken.

In a July 22nd aide-memoire to Secretary Marshall, Semen K. Tsarapkin, representative to the Far Eastern Commission, alluded to the agreements of Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam, continuing to stress the maintenance of the wartime agreements as a point of discussion specifically for the four-power Foreign Ministers Conference^(1.1). This allusion outlines the substantial content of Soviet fears.

Following the surrender of Japan, the Soviet Union took every opportunity to remind the Americans of the Yalta agreements, succeeding at least in part in obtaining an informal commitment from the United States to abide by those secret agreements. On August 18, 1945, immediately after the end of the war, Stalin requested that the Kuriles be placed under the jurisdiction of Soviet occupation authorities in accordance with the decisions made by the Big Three at Yalta; Truman answered that he was in complete agreement with the above proceedings^(1.2). Secretary of State Byrnes, at a press conference in early September, made clear the intention of the United States to abide by the Yalta agreements^(1.3). In December of that year, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Byrnes responding to Molotov's inquiry, reiterated that the United States intended to abide by the Yalta promises concerning Sakhalin and the Kuriles^(1.4).

Byrnes, however, used both meetings as opportunities to suggest that the final legal recognition of territorial changes would have to wait for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, possibly compromising the validity of the Yalta agreements by reserving judgment on certain provisions. For this very reason, when a peace treaty with Japan became the order of the day, it was impossible for the Soviet Union not to pay extraordinary attention to the promises concerning the northern territories.

The intention of the Soviet Union regarding the disposition of the northern territories was to gain an American commitment to abide by the Yalta agreements.

Firstly, by extracting a commitment from the United States to abide by the Yalta agreements, the Soviet Union would be able to make its as yet legally unsettled sovereignty over Southern Karafuto and the Kuriles legitimate and conclusive. Due to the fact that the Soviet Union possessed sufficient historical grounds for their claim to both Karafuto and Kuriles (excluding the Southern Kuriles), and through a desire of the Soviet government to satisfy the demands of the Soviet people who suffered the loss of twenty million of their fellows during the war, the Soviets sought legal confirmation over these same islands which would function as strategic military bases against Japan, thereby insuring the future security of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the Soviet demand of western compliance with the Yalta provisions served the function of increasing Soviet bargaining power in negotiating a peace settlement with Japan. The reference to "the Kuriles" promised to the Soviet Union in the Yalta agreement, include the Southern Kuriles to which the Soviets possessed no truly legitimate claim and, from the Soviet standpoint, were of only limited strategic value. In this way the Southern Kuriles would serve as a bargaining chip in the negotiations allowing the Soviets to secure a more favorable peace settlement. It was not clear then whether the Soviets intended to include the two islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri among the Southern Kuriles or limit them to the islands of Habomai and Shikotan. In the strictest sense though, the fact remains that the Soviets intended to return this territory as it was obviously of little strategic value since they elected at that time not to establish military bases on these islands⁽¹⁵⁾. Furthermore, at the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in 1956, the Soviet again reiterated their intention to restore these islands to Japan.

If the Soviet Union had no intention to annex these islands for military purposes, what then did they seek to obtain from a peace settlement with Japan? It was a peace that would guarantee Soviet security in the Far East. We could conclude that following the revolution at the end of the First World War, the existence of the Soviet Union had been threatened through military intervention by four powers: Japan, Great Britain, France, and the United States. At that time Japan had sent over

120,000 soldiers into Siberia, occupying a vast region stretching from Northern Karafuto to the shore of Lake Baikal. These "lessons of the past" created an indelible impression upon the Soviets and heightened their determination to guarantee their security in the Far East following the conclusion of World War II.

The Soviet Union made the peace with Japan contingent on the following demands: prevention of resurgence of Japanese militarism, complete democratization of Japan, establishment of an international control system on Japanese military industries, and the freezing at its current level of the American military encirclement of the Soviet Union or a reduction in the number of American bases in the Pacific⁽¹⁶⁾.

The Soviet Union's anxiety over the expansion of American bases in the postwar Pacific was made clear just before the end of the war, in May 1945, at the San Francisco Conference to draft the Charter of the United Nations. At this time the Soviet Union, realizing that the United States planned to establish bases in the Southern Pacific Islands, opposed the United States, asserting that the Southern Pacific Islands should be granted the status of independent nations in accordance with the principle of national self-determination⁽¹⁷⁾. In addition, the Soviet Union insisted that the designation of these as strategic areas with military bases under U.N. trusteeship could only be done by the U.N. Security Council, in which, of course, the Great Power's veto was valued, and sought to frustrate the misuse by the United States of the trusteeship system⁽¹⁸⁾. This Soviet demand materialized as Article 83 of the U.N. Charter.

Despite Soviet anxiety, the United States government, particularly the Army, tried not simply to turn the old mandated territories in the Southern Pacific into trust territories, but planned to annex them in order to decrease the financial and political costs accompanied with trusteeship, and to extend its belt of bases from the Southern Pacific Islands north to the islands south of Japan and west as far as the Ryukyus. With the ending of the war, this intention on the part of the military to sever these islands from Japan and place them under direct military jurisdiction showed signs of being put into effect⁽¹⁹⁾.

To be sure, the State Department, as we have seen opposed the milit-

ary's position, and by compromise between the two sides, the following decision was reached in December 1946: the status of the Ryukyus would be left to future decision and that the Southern Pacific Islands be placed under the strategic trusteeship with the United States as administering authority. This was recognized as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee decision 59/9 of February 1947. The United States, following the procedure of Article 83 of the U.N. Charter, requested that the United Nations Security Council recognize this disposition. In early April while Borton was in Tokyo participating in the drafting of the peace treaty with Japan, the Security Council unanimously approved the American trusteeship of the Southern Pacific Islands. The Soviet Union approved this resolution calling only for an amendment that stipulated this region in the future should "...prepare to advance toward independence"⁽²⁰⁾. As far as the Soviets were concerned, these Southern Pacific islands could function as bases from which attacks could be launched against Japan and might also, at some time in the future, serve as strategic military bases for attacks against the Soviet Union; this, however, was viewed as a relatively minor threat. Agreement with the U.S. on this point may have been designed to send a message to the Americans signaling the existence of a Soviet policy of cooperation or compromise intended to forestall an even greater threat.

That even greater threat was the expansion of the circle of American military installations in the Western Pacific. The Soviet leaders grew increasingly anxious at the prospect of turning Okinawa into a permanent military base. By using Okinawa as a staging area, the United States would be capable of a direct assault on Soviet territory. Furthermore, the United States was in exclusive possession of the most terrible weapon known to mankind, the atomic bomb. Unquestionably what the Soviet Union feared most from the peace settlement with Japan was not only the reemergence of Japanese militarism, but also a scenario in which the Soviet claim to Southern Karafuto and the Kuriles was denied, the location of American bases on Okinawa as well as on the Southern Pacific islands and Japan becoming a link in an anti-Soviet strategy⁽²¹⁾.

Faced with these Soviet anxieties and demands, the United States in

early August 1947 had at least two options to choose between. The first possibility entailed yielding in a partial response to Soviet demands and a Japanese peace settlement formed on the basis of cooperation with the Soviet Union. The second option involved ignoring Soviet opposition while opting for a separate peace with Japan. In other words, the choice was between a general peace and a separate peace.

The concept of a general peace was supported by Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, foremost Russian expert and Yalta advisor Charles E. Bohlen, State Department legal advisor Charles Fahy, and Robert A. Feary of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Immediately after the draft peace plan for Japan was transmitted to Secretary Marshall by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Hilldring recommended that Marshall endorse the Soviet proposal to entrust the peace negotiations to the Council of Foreign Ministers⁽²²⁾. Bohlen appealed to Marshall that, whether established procedure was followed and the Far Eastern Council entrusted with the deliberation or not, the United States should communicate the Soviet Union the fact that there was no change in its intention to respect the Yalta agreements⁽²³⁾. Fahy urged Lovett that the United States should honor Yalta even though a difference of opinion existed over the definition of the two southern Kurile islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri⁽²⁴⁾.

Hilldring, in charge of Germany and Korea, personally felt that the Soviet side would respond quickly to an American cooperationist policy while Bohlen, despite his sympathy with the containment policy of his colleague Kennan, thoroughly understood from previous experience as Roosevelt's advisor on Soviet affairs that continuation of the wartime policy of cooperating with the Soviets was the key to postwar stabilization⁽²⁵⁾. The reason Fahy joined Hilldring and Bohlen in urging the cooperationist approach to the Soviet Union may have been that a few months before, in the U.N. Security Council meeting of February 1947, the Soviet Union, discarding its earlier opposition and not using its veto, had supported the American proposal to place the Southern Pacific Islands under strategic trusteeship with the U.S. as administrator; as legal advisor he witnessed

that event and saw therein that the Soviet Union's Asia policy contained room for cooperation with the United States.

Feary would later echo his concern to other cooperationists Borton and Maxwell Hamilton, State Department Special Advisor for the Japanese peace settlement, over the formula for a peace conference in which the United States had no veto power. It was apparent to Feary that even if the United States succeeded in gaining a two-thirds majority on issues such as Japan's economic recovery and war reparation, the U.S. negotiators would still be required to make repeated efforts to obtain the agreement of the individual nations and the consent of the Far Eastern Commission. However the U.S. desire "to realize military bases on the Ryukyus could be achieved only over the categorical opposition of the Soviets and possibly the Chinese, regardless of how they were approached." Even if the peace treaty would be concluded over Soviet opposition, the Soviet could reject at any time the ratification of such a treaty. In addition Feary emphasized that the Soviet Union led, over all others, in demanding internal reforms in Japan. He also questioned the efficacy of a peace settled by denying the Soviet Union veto power, and wondered whether or not ignoring Soviet opposition would be worth the price⁽²⁶⁾. Feary, the co-author of the draft resolution for land reform with Radezinski, believed that the realization of internal reform was probably the most significant area in the development of policy for Japan⁽²⁷⁾.

Secretary Marshall and Undersecretary Lovett, however, chose not to take the option of a general peace which was based on cooperation with the Soviet Union. They, as representatives of the military, overestimated the Soviet threat, and desiring the enlargement of the belt of military bases for use against the Soviets, rejected the option of a general peace which would include their "supposed" enemy, the Soviet Union.

Both Marshall and Lovett were influenced by the ideas of another Russian expert George F. Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff for the State Department, and believing that his theories were largely correct, drew heavily on Kennan's logic in formulating department policy. Actually they received the Japanese peace treaty draft from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and with advice from Bohlen asked for Kennan's opinions on

the matter. The Policy Planning Staff was then requested by Marshall and Lovett to reevaluate the policy of the United States towards Japan⁽²⁸⁾. This demonstrates clearly the role Kennan and his staff would play in the “reverse course”, switching from a general peace and demilitarization to a separate peace and rearmament.

IV. The Soviet Spectre: George F. Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff

On August 9, 1947, in response to an inquiry from Secretary Marshall, Kennan evinced strong dissatisfaction with the Office of Far Eastern Affairs draft peace treaty calling its contents regrettable. Thereafter, via an initiative of the Policy Planning Staff, Kennan urged the reworking of the basic principles of the Japanese peace and of Japanese policy. Having gained the approval of Marshall and Lovett, from mid-August on, Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff devoted themselves to what would be the largest undertaking since the Marshall Plan three months before.

This took about eight weeks during which Kennan was helped primarily by John Patton Davies Jr., another Far Eastern specialist who had relaxed with Mao Tse-tung in Yen-an as had Emmerson and later, while serving in Moscow, had come under the strong influence of Kennan. In six drafts they rewrote the basic principles of policy on the Japanese peace. In that process, Kennan took into account the opinions of the highly conservative “Japan crowd”, people like former Ambassador Joseph Grew, the “spearhead of the Hirohito clique”, his assistants J.W. Ballantine and Eugene Dooman who asserted the danger of the communists, and drew also representatives of the army and navy into the discussion; outside the Department, Kennan contacted Navy Secretary Forrestal and Army Secretary Loyall, adopting to a very great extent the opinions of these men.

During that time the Policy Planning Staff not only readdressed the problem of Japanese territories from the point of view of strategy toward the Soviet Union, but also recommended a change in American security policy toward Japan, favoring a revision of the “democratization” policy

then in force in Japan. It was a recommendation for a change of policy in the broadest sense; from territorial issues to war crimes to the purge. For this reason it is clear that this recommendation was no merely a difference between the cooperationist approach to the Soviet Union and the confrontationist one, that is, a difference between foreign policy options, but also a difference rooted in political views that included domestic policies.

The Policy Planning Staff grasped Japan's territorial dispute from the point of view of its anti-Soviet strategy basing it on the containment policy against communism.

The Policy Planning Staff recommended that the phrase from the Potsdam Declaration "...minor islands as we determine..." in the vicinity of Japan be disposed of in accordance with the strategy of opposition to the Soviet Union. They realized that "minor islands" like the Southern Ryukyus and particularly Okinawa would make effective strategic military bases against the Soviet Union, therefore those island, although properly Japanese territory, would have to be separated from Japan and placed under the administration of the United States. This administration would preferably be in the form of direct rule, entailing only slight financial burden for the United States, but in view of the trend of world opinion against such acquisitions, a secondary or fallback policy would be to place the islands under United Nations strategic trusteeship with the United States as administrator. In other words, the proposal was for such a separate peace without the Soviets that would utilize the Southern Kuriles and the Ryukyus as instruments to manipulate Japanese public opinion.

Beginning with the Ryukyus, the United States would, in the first stage of peace treaty negotiations, call for the divestiture from Japanese sovereignty of not only the Southern Ryukyus, which including Okinawa would be of important strategic value in confrontation with the Soviet Union, but also the Ryukyu islands north of the 29th parallel. Reasoning that if the Soviets would consent, in the course of the negotiations, to restore the Southern Kuriles to Japan then the American side would agree to return the Northern Ryukyus, in this way the return of the Southern Kuriles would be accompanied by the result of neutralizing any Soviet policy of amity toward Japan.

However, if the Soviet Union would not agree to restoration of the Southern Kuriles, the United States would resist negotiations concerning the Northern Ryukyus, using them as an instrument to establish friendly sentiment among the Japanese. In the final phase of negotiations, the U.S. would propose placing the Southern Ryukyus under U.N. strategic trusteeship and that, in exchange for Japanese assent to this proposal, the U.S. would return the Northern Ryukyus, since they had only limited strategic value to the United States. By establishing this pretense of concession for the "restoration" of the Northern Ryukyus, the American side hoped to create "...the appearance of American amity..." in the minds of the Japanese people⁽²⁹⁾.

A decision by the Soviet Union not to return the Southern Kuriles to Japan would be more desirable than if they elected to restore these same islands. "if the Southern Kuriles became an irredentist issue...there will then exist a cause for popular Japanese resentment against the U.S.S.R. offsetting to a considerable extent the effects of future Soviet propaganda in Japan..." and have the result of "...embarassing the Japanese Communist Party in its efforts to serve Soviet ends⁽³⁰⁾."

Moreover, it was desirable as far as tactics against the Soviet Union were concerned, in the process of obtaining a separate peace, to stipulate that the Southern Kuriles belonged to Japan and then to force the Soviet Union to resist this claim. It would be undesirable to give the Japanese side the impression that what made Soviet participation impossible was a procedural formality. For example, the United States refused to agree with Soviet proposals on voting or on convening a Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference. This information would provide the Japanese with an impression of the uncooperative nature of the American side and would implant the illusion that Japan might receive a more generous peace if the Soviet Union were involved and instill a false hope that the Soviets would offer Japan more generous terms in a separate peace later. However, if the Southern Kuriles were stipulated in the treaty to be Japanese territory, and if the Soviet Union were not a party to the treaty, it would lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union did not participate because it had no intention of restoring the Southern Kuriles to Japan. In this way no bother-

some illusions would be created about the Soviet Union⁽³¹⁾.

The Policy Planning Staff's proposal for a territorial settlement interfered with the proposals submitted by the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Policy opposition arose in the contradiction between a separate peace and a general peace, between cooperationist policy and confrontationist policy, originating in differing assessments on the possible revival of Japanese militarism and the threat of Soviet communism.

The Office of Far Eastern Affairs, fearing a revival of Japanese militarism, urged the supervision of Japanese disarmament as a means of uprooting militarism by either a Four Power administration or, in a weaker form, by the eleven nation Council of Ambassadors. The Policy Planning Staff though, fearing the threat of Soviet communism more than the revival of Japanese militarism, preached the importance of defending Japan against the Soviet threat. The Office of Far Eastern Affairs urged the continuation of the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan and wrote into the military clauses of the draft peace the exclusion of conditions which would obstruct demilitarization, but the Policy Planning Staff, even though allowing for supervision by the eleven-nation Council of Ambassadors, further emphasized the need to defend Japan against the Soviet Union and communism.

The Soviet strategy toward Japan was to utilize Japanese communists to initiate the communization of politics in Japan. The Soviet Union "...is systematically penetrating Japanese society in the familiar communist pattern of preparation for revolution and seizure of power." For this purpose the Soviets were preparing "...approximately six hundred thousand Japanese prisoners of war..." in Siberia as "...agents for expansion of Soviet influence." In response to advancing communization within Japan, the Soviet Union would respond with military aggression against her⁽³²⁾.

Consequently, in order to confront this "threat from the north", the Policy Planning Staff sought the recommendation of a concrete proposal.

First, the Policy Planning Staff advocated the establishment of a constabulary, coast guard, and a security force to deal with an invasion from outside, meaning the Soviet Union. Concomitant with domestic unrest, these forces were in the future "...to be susceptible to expansion and used

in accordance with the decision of the American military⁽³³⁾.

Secondly, in order to deal with domestic unrest or an invasion from without which could not be handled by the above-mentioned Japanese defense forces, the Policy Planning Staff stipulated that the United States would offer military forces to Japan and that Japan would offer the United States military "facilities" to make possible the use of these forces. The bilateral agreement for military cooperation would have to be ratified by the two nations simultaneously with the signing of the peace treaty.

The constabulary designated in this bilateral agreement, the prototype of Ampo, eventually became the Police Reserve Force, the forerunner of the Self-Defense Force created in exchange for the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

V. Indigenous Forces and Exogenous Threat

The disparate proposals of the Policy Planning Staff and the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on the relationship between the peace treaty and the settlement of territorial issues did not originate simply on the foreign policy level, but could finally be traced back to the issue of the importance of indigenous political forces, particularly domestic political reforms then underway in Japan.

The office of Far Eastern Affairs evaluated the independence of indigenous political forces as follows: the native political forces, given the proper conditions, could function in their own internal logic. Therefore, for example, even if Japanese communism became strong, one need not fear that it would function as a fifth column of Soviet communism. What was necessary was to carry out fully the "democratization of Japan". The "democratization" would entail the increased political participation of the people both quantitatively and qualitatively and this increased participation, with the proper political education, would help to nurture political forces free of narrow nationalism and sufficiently resistant to foreign influence.

These perceptions were expressed, for example, by John K. Emmerson in October 1946:

...if the U.S.S.R. is successful and the Japanese communist Party becomes a political force to be reckoned with, the military domination of Japan by the Soviet Union is yet a more difficult task...The long range objectives of American Policy in the Far East will be best served by vigorous and unswerving pursuit in Japan of the objectives already set before us. Our acts in Japan should not be conditioned by fear of Communism so strong that we lean toward the very elements that we have set out to destroy. We shall assure ourselves of a "favored position" in Japan if we succeed in effecting lasting reforms, in giving impetus to a genuine liberal movement, and in starting the process of democratization in Japanese education⁽³⁴⁾.

Borton agreed with these opinions holding that in view of the "anti-Soviet and anti-Communist feelings" innate to the Japanese, "...it was not necessary to fear communist attack...", and the urgent thing, he emphasized tirelessly, was to facilitate the maturation of a democratic political structure within Japan⁽³⁵⁾. The fact that there was no change in his thinking about communism and democracy is clear from a memorandum he sent two years later, when the confrontation line based on the thinking of the Policy Planning Staff had begun to take effect, to the new head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, W. Butterworth, under the mask of the opinion of the British Consul H.A. Grave⁽³⁶⁾.

That men like Borton, Emmerson, and Vincent valued the indigenous political forces and saw the completion of "democratization" as a necessary condition for making Japan a stabilizing influence in Asia can be seen already in the plans for postwar Japan which they developed during and after the war. For that reason they were able to give positive support to the various reforms being advanced at that time by SCAP and in particular by the reformers of the Government Section, known as the "New Dealers". This was the broad program of "democratization", which began with stripping the Emperor of his political role, the dissolution of the military and the Zaibatsu, land reform, and reaching even to the reform of

education and women's suffrage.

However, the Policy Planning Staff did not give these domestic reforms their warm support. They were firm in their anti-communism, and they held a *polar-centric* view of power politics which saw the great powers as the center of international relations and were therefore not able to appreciate fully the role of the indigenous political forces. Hence they considered Japanese communists to be the Trojan Horse of the Soviet communist party, and thought that the political threat of Soviet communism might easily transform itself, through the medium of the growth of communist forces in Japan, into a Soviet military threat. In fact, as we have already seen, as early as the spring of 1946, J.P. Davies had written the Department of State from Moscow, ringing the tocsin of the communist takeover of Japan following the withdrawal of Allied troops.

While it is undoubtedly true that no evidence has come to hand showing direct connections between the Japanese Communist party and the U.S.S.R., We must, in our own interest, assume that such connections do exist.....If we withdraw from Japan without having assured ourselves of a favored position there, Japan may in all probability sooner or later be captured by the Soviet Union ⁽³⁷⁾.

For people like Davies, a disarmed Japan was as helpless as a babe in the woods. The Policy Planning Staff endorsed the power-vacuum theory that John Forster Dulles would later develop, and preached the dangers of disarming Japan as follows:

The fact that Japan will be disarmed means that its territory will become a power vacuum when U.S. troops are withdrawn, unless some means is found to offset this⁽³⁸⁾.

For this very reason, they proposed on the one hand the establishment of constabulary, coast guard, and police forces "...to be susceptible to expansion and use in accordance with American military decision..." and on

the other hand proposed the establishment of American military bases in the vicinity of Japan and, if conditions permitted, in Japan itself.

For them Japan's political stability was to be found in a different dimension than "democratization". "Democratization" benefited domestic radicals and in fact set political stability at risk. What was needed was to entrust Japanese politics to the pro-American factions, which favored strong military, political, and economic ties with the United States to build a political structure under their leadership and to transform Japan into an "Asian workshop" by reviving Japanese capitalism.

Thus, the Policy Planning Staff denounced completely the postwar reforms proposed primarily by the Government Section of SCAP, favoring instead the release of the Zaibatsu businessmen who had been purged, the retrial of war criminals; they pointed out the excesses of land reform and called for the establishment of a strong central police force ignoring the danger of a possible revival of the secret police. It is inconceivable that old Japan hands such as Grew could support ideas like these.

To be sure, in the mind of the realist Kennan, the Soviet military threat and the communist political threat were clearly separate. Moreover, as in his policy toward Europe, so in his policy toward Japan, Kennan warned against the folly of exaggerating the military threat of the Soviet Union. On this point, Kennan's theory on the Soviet threat was far more sophisticated than that of the military; it contained the potential for confrontation with the thinking of the military, which placed the military threat in the center of the picture. In early March 1948, having developed the broad outlines of a Japanese peace, Kennan went to Tokyo to learn the intention of SCAP and to survey the actual conditions in Japan. In Tokyo he met with MacArthur, the "Eastern Caesar" and came into contact with MacArthur's thoughts on Japanese neutralization. Thereupon Kennan realized again the foolishness of exaggerating the Soviet military threat. On March 15, Kennan sent a telegram while vacationing in Manila to Secretary Marshall which made clear the desirability of the neutralization of Japan⁽³⁹⁾. To be sure, he linked that neutralization with the idea of making Okinawa into a permanent base, but that was due to his sophisticated view of foreign policy. Thus, on the spot there developed a harmonization

of the keen insight of the old Shogun, who while retaining Okinawa as a base did not exaggerate the military threat of the Soviet Union, and the pet theory of the young Russian expert, who grasped the Soviet threat as primarily political.

Still, the approach of Kennan, who separated political and military threats and emphasized the former, exaggerated the political threat of communism itself as much as did the military, and should he decide that the Soviet Union had crossed the threshold of risking war, he could easily assimilate the position of the military. Looking at the political unrest in Italy, Kennan recommended in the telegram of March 15, 1948 from Manila to Secretary Marshall that "...the Italian Communist Party be outlawed..."; this stance is tracable to the former emphasis⁽⁴⁰⁾. Until the fall of 1949, before he began the conflict with the military and the Hawks in the State Department, he had functioned as an informal diplomatic advisor for the military; this harmonization stems from the latter emphasis⁽⁴¹⁾.

Regardless, even while recognizing a subtle difference between political and military threat, Kennan argued for a change in policy toward Japan, recommending that Okinawa be made an American base and that the Southern Kuriles be used in a bargaining strategy against the Soviet Union, and while criticizing the ideas of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, argued for the confrontationist option toward a separate peace and rearmament.

To the extent that bureaucratic rather than ideological factors were involved, the conditions at that time favored the side of Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff. In the internal reform of the State Department in September 1947, those favoring cooperation with the Soviet Union saw their influence weakened and those favoring confrontation rose to new prominence.

Vincent, the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, was reassigned to the American Embassy in Switzerland, Borton was given a meaningless sinecure, and Emmerson was sent to Moscow. Career diplomat John Allison, who succeeded Vincent, was appointed head of the Japanese division, and Butterworth, a friend of Kennan since their Princeton days, was appointed Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, re-

sulting in the complete dissolution of the Borton group. Hildring, a long standing supporter of Borton, was replaced by C.E. Saltzman, who had come to the State Department from Wall Street. As if synchronized with the personnel changes in Washington, George Atcheson, who had developed into the most effective liason between SCAP and the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, was killed August 17 in an airplane crash. He was replaced by Annapolis graduate William Sebald who was well acquainted with the "good old days" of prewar Japan. Finally certain Japanese actions in Tokyo, reinforcing these personnel changes, contributed to the overall triumph of the ideas of the Policy Planning Staff.

VI. "The Message from the Emperor"

In March when Borton traveled to Japan, MacArthur made his decision clear, in line with the thinking in Washington, to push for an early peace. In response, the Japanese Foreign Ministry established, under the supervision of the Foreign Minister, a Peace Treaty Liaison Board and an International Committee. The preparation of a draft peace distinct from the American draft took place under conditions of strict secrecy in the Council of this committee.

The broad outlines of the draft treaty which emerged ran parallel to the intentions of SCAP and the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Although it made demilitarization and security through the U.N. the basis of Japan's post-peace security, there were subtle differences from both Washington and SCAP on the territorial issue. Basing itself on the premise that Japanese territory should revert to Japan, it included the following disposition of territories: the reversion to Japan of all the Kuriles, if that proved impossible, the reversion to Japan of the Southern Kuriles (the islands of Etorofu and south). The Northern Kuriles would be placed under U. N. trusteeship. The southern islands such as Okinawa and the Bonins should revert to Japan or, if all else failed, be placed under U. N. trusteeship.

This draft peace drawn up by the Foreign Ministry received the support of the Katayama Cabinet, Japan's first postwar Socialist-moderate

coalition government, and in particular the strong support of Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi. It had been less than two years since the Japanese surrender, and for a defeated people wishing to recover their national pride, the recovery of the lost territories constituted the most important objective. Moreover, the Japanese economy had been in a pronounced depression since early spring of 1947 and the recovery of the lost territories appeared to offer the one hope of surmounting the economic difficulties of the post-peace years. From the dynamics of domestic politics it was only natural, given the popular movements for the recovery of the lost territories which began to flourish at this time, for the Socialist Party and particularly Ashida, who aspired to be the next prime minister, to embrace the thinking of the Foreign Ministry⁽⁴²⁾.

SCAP was irritated by Japanese actions centering around Ashida. Although it did not share the fear of a communist takeover within Japan which was the belief held by the Policy Planning Staff, SCAP, basing its view on the realism gained from the bitter fighting in the Pacific, still considered the minimum condition of defending a demilitarized Japan to be the turning of Okinawa into a permanent base. This thinking matched precisely the thinking of the military and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had advanced the Western Pacific defense perimeter west as far as the offshore islands of the Eurasian continent⁽⁴³⁾.

Committed to the demilitarization of Japan, SCAP worked to persuade the Japanese government to agree to the turning of Okinawa into a military base, which meant the renunciation of Okinawa. Three factors made this persuasion effective. First, the mainstream within the postwar Foreign Ministry consisted of those who, since prewar days, had been pro-Anglo-American. Second, even though it contained a pro-communist left wing, the Katayama Cabinet's main faction was a right wing Socialist group which did not hide its anti-communist colors and was formed by a coalition with the nationalistic Democrats. Third, the precarious political system which followed the collapse of the old order allowed loose political groupings formed by the Imperial House, SCAP, and the governing political leaders to function effectively⁽⁴⁴⁾.

Ashida recognized the political advantages of the movement for the

recovery of the territories, but under pressure from SCAP and supported by his own anti-communism and the ideas of the pro-Anglo-American faction, he gradually moved right, accepting Okinawa as in fact lost; then shifting on the issue of Japanese security from protection by U. N. security guarantees to protection by American security guarantees which entailed a move from a general peace to a separate peace.

On September 13, 1947, just about the time that a change in Japan policy was being argued in the room of the Policy Planning Staff at Foggy Bottom, Washington, the turn to the right within the Japanese Foreign Ministry bore fruit. The fruit took the form of a message from Ashida via Suzuki Tadakatsu, then Chief of the Central Liaison Office (Foreign Ministry), to Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, who had been in Japan with MacArthur as the Commander of the Eighth Army and who would later become the right arm of Undersecretary of the Army Voorhees, a military staff officer assigned to promote a separate peace treaty. Ashida proposed that, instead of collective security through the United Nations, Japan should have its security guaranteed instead by the United States, by permitting the U.S. to establish military bases on the islands in the vicinity of Japan⁽⁴⁵⁾.

It is not likely that this message from Tokyo, transmitted to the military via Eichelberger, fully satisfied the military in Washington, for the memorandum could only be read in one way: that the establishment of a base in Okinawa presupposed that Okinawa itself was Japanese territory and that a peace treaty had already been concluded. The military, though, had something more ambitious in mind: not simply borrowing bases in Okinawa but turning Okinawa itself into a permanent base and, beyond that, establishing bases in Japan proper. Moreover, the military hoped that the United States would occupy Japan for an extended period of time, hopefully until the Soviet threat ceased to exist.

In this sense, the message received one week later was much more to Washington's liking. This message came from Terasaki Hidenari, advisor to the Emperor and formerly Counselor in Washington; it reached the State Department via Acheson's successor Sebald.

By May 6 of that year, on his third interview with MacArthur, the

Emperor, expressing his concern over the difficulty of defending Japan following the conclusion of a peace treaty, asked MacArthur directly, "...who will defend Japan following the withdrawal of the American Army⁽¹⁶⁾?" In the middle of September, Terasaki visited Sebald to convey the Emperor's thoughts on the future of Okinawa:

Mr. Terasaki stated that the Emperor hopes that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. In the Emperor's opinion, such occupation would benefit the United States and also provide protection for Japan. The Emperor feels that such a move would meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who fear not only the menace of Russia, but after the Occupation has ended, the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might give rise to an "incident" which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan.

The Emperor further feels that United States military occupation of Okinawa (and such other islands as may be required) should be based upon the fiction of a long-term lease...25 to 50 years or more...with sovereignty retained in Japan. According to the Emperor, this method of occupation would convince the Japanese people that the United States has no permanent designs of the Ryukyu Islands, and other nations, particularly Soviet Russia and China would thereby be estopped from demanding similar rights⁽¹⁷⁾.

Although retaining formal Japanese sovereignty, the long-term lease of Okinawa to the U.S. as well as the long-term American occupation and militarization of Okinawa was the crux of the original framework of the Ampo system linking Okinawa to U.S.-Japanese anti-Soviet military cooperation. This was requested by Japan for the purpose of insuring Japanese security following the installation of the peace treaty. Terasaki provided his own opinion, distinct from that of the Emperor, regarding the relationship between U.S.-Japanese military cooperation and the peace treaty.

As to procedure, Mr. Terasaki felt that the acquisition of "military rights" (of Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus) should be by bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan rather than form part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan. The latter method, according to Mr. Terasaki, would savor too much of a dictated peace and might in the future endanger the sympathetic understanding of the Japanese people⁽⁴⁸⁾.

On September 20, Sebald transmitted this message in his memorandum to General MacArthur and two days later forwarded its summary to Secretary of State Marshall with a copy of the memorandum.

Whether "the Emperor's message" was produced under the Emperor's direction or that of his advisors, including Terasaki, cannot be determined until the Japanese documents are made public. It is important to note, however, that the Emperor's staff had an extraordinary fear of communization in postwar Japan which was a continuation of the fear felt during the war. In the occupation era, the Emperor's staff formed amorphous political groups of bureaucrats within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enlarging the circle to include SCAP officials and powerful men in government. These individuals continued to insist to SCAP the dangerous nature of the "threat" from the domestic communists and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and Australia continued to demand that the Emperor be tried as a war criminal before the Military Tribunal of the Far East (IM-TFE); thus the problem of trying the Emperor as a war criminal had not yet been resolved⁽⁴⁹⁾.

This message from the emperor, however, is significant because it greatly influenced the American policy makers' decisions on the disposal of the Ryukyus. The Emperor's message justified not only SCAP's position but also the Policy Planning Division's position, especially in the eyes of the Japanese. This justification had increased significance because it was made through the symbol of the Emperor. The Policy Planning Division's position envisioned the full use of Okinawa as a permanent bridgehead against alleged political infiltration and military invasion of Soviet Com-

munism, urging strongly U.S.-Japanese military and economic cooperation through a separate peace treaty without the Soviet Union. The lease of Okinawa with the latent potential for Japanese sovereignty was a highly preferable alternative to the strategic use of the island through a U.N. trusteeship for the top ranking officials of the U.S. Army and the State Department who were worried over the heavy expenditures required to govern Okinawa⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Secretary of State Marshall transmitted this material immediately to George F. Kennan who wrote the special recommendation on Okinawa which was to be an addendum to the peace initiative toward Japan, emphasizing the significance of the message.

The Policy Planning Staff accepted the principle of U.S. control over the Southern Ryukyus, noting that the Emperor of Japan has been represented as suggesting that the United States should continue military occupation of Okinawa and such other islands as may be required on the basis of a long-term lease, twenty five to fifty years or more, with sovereignty retained by Japan. The Staff feels that this formula might well be explored as an alternative to strategic trusteeship⁽⁵¹⁾.

Early in March 1948, concurrent with Kennan's visit to Japan, the State Department received a message which requested the American's reconfirmation of the East Asian Defense perimeter "for defense against Soviet invasion and infiltration", and asking them to redefine, "South Korea, Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and, if possible, Formosa as the American Perimeter⁽⁵²⁾".

On the other hand, as we have already seen, Kennan set off for Tokyo and evinced a temporary sympathy for MacArthur's proposal that Japan be demilitarized. But at the same time, Kennan met also with men like General Eichelberger and Undersecretary of the Army Draper, who hurried to Tokyo from the crisis in Berlin. Kennan echoed their apprehensions over the inadequacies of Japan's domestic order and the threat of communism, and he arrived at a clearer sense of the military im-

plications of the political threat of Soviet communism as they concerned Japan. So, having strengthened his confidence in the constabulary idea which was his pet theory and in the idea of turning Okinawa into a base, Kennan turned to the idea that a peace treaty should not be concluded immediately, that it should be postponed and the Occupation army remain in Japan at least until Japan had settled down enough domestically so that it had the ability to resist communism, and that Japanese defense forces should be created.

Three weeks prior to Marshall's receiving the Emperor's message and shortly after Kennan's staff initiated discussions on a Japanese peace treaty based on an unyielding policy of opposition to the Soviets, the Soviet Union announced, at the end of August 1947, its decisive refusal to the American supported proposal on elections for the unification of Korea. This refusal marked a clear departure from the conciliatory policy followed by the Soviets in response to the designation of the Southern Pacific Islands as a strategic area under the trusteeship of the United States. Following this change in policy, conditions in Korea worsened, leading eventually to the outbreak of war less than three years later.

Between the spring and fall of 1948, the recommendations of the Policy Planning Staff concerning policy toward Japan gained the approval of the leaders of the military, the executive branch, and the State Department. They became the internal consensus of the U.S. government, which came to fruition in NSC Series 13. Subsequent policies on the territories and on the peace proceeded along the lines debated and recommended up to this point.

In later years Kennan, ironically enough, reminisced about the connection between the turn to a separate peace with Japan, which he himself had been instrumental in bringing about, and the Korean War.

Official Washington appeared, particularly at that time, imperious to any understanding of the possible effect of its own acts and policies on Soviet behavior...I have seen no evidence that the possibility of a connection between our decision to proceed independently to the conclusion of a separate Japanese peace settle-

ment, involving the indefinite retention of an American military presence in Japan in the post-treaty period, on the one hand, and the Soviet decision to unleash a civil war in Korea, on the other, ever entered the mind of anyone in Washington except myself⁽⁵³⁾.

If the observation of Kennan as a historian are correct, we should take a new look at the hardening of U.S. policy and its selection of a separate peace which caused the Soviet rejection of Korean elections in the summer of 1947. We should also take into consideration the American behavior and its function in the hardening of the Cold War in Asia.

In September 1951, at the San Francisco Peace Conference, the United States acquired Okinawa, with Japan formally retaining sovereignty and the continuance of military bases there was approved, as was suggested in the "emperor's message", and, to deal with the threat of Soviet communism, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was concluded. It was stipulated that the Kuriles were to be, against the Policy Planning Board's recommendation, severed from Japan. It was added, however, that should Japan give the Soviet Union an advantage with respect to the Kuriles, it must give the same advantage to the United States as well. This clause virtually prohibited bargaining with the Soviet Union over the Kuriles.

In the intervening thirty-two years Okinawa has been restored to Japan, but the military bases remain. The desposition of the northern territories persists as an enigma with no solution in sight. Even in an era of post-Yalta system territorial considerations continue to dominate Japan's international relations.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) The following articles are rare exceptions: Yamagiwa Akira, "Amerika no Sengo Koso to Ajia" (American Postwar Thought and Asia), *Sekai* (September 1967) and Takano Yuichi, "Ryodo Mondai to Nisso Kankei no Shorai" (The Territorial Question and the Future of Japan-Soviet Relations), *Sekai* (January 1978). See also M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1983) and Hosoya Chi-

- hiro, *Sanfuransisuko-kowa Yeno Michi* (The Road tu San Fransico) (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1984), although it has not dealt extensively with the early phases of the territorial problems. Wada Haruki, *Hoppo-ryodo o Kangaeru* (Considering on the Northern-territories) (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1989) Shindo Eiichi ed., *Nisso heiwa no jyoken* (The Conditions of Japan-U.S.S.R. rapprochment), (Tokyo; Ningensha, 1987).
- (2) Nagai Yonosuke, *Heiwa no Daisho* (The Price of Peace), Chuokoron-sha, 1967. This is also confirmed by him in his *Reisen no Kigen* (The Origins of the Cold War), Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1987, and Y. Nagai and A. Iriye. *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press, 1977).
 - (3) CAC-401, CAC-304, CAC-333, CAC-353, Notter Paper, National Archives.
 - (4) PR-40 Pre, Feb. 1, 1946, RG 353, SWNCC Papers, National Archives.
 - (5) DA-49, June 11, 1946, RG-353.
 - (6) SWNCC 59/12, p.20-21, RG 353.
 - (7) For Blakeslee, see Blakeslee papers, Clark University, also intervsiw with Hugh Borton at Conway, Mass., October 21, 1979. For Byrnes, see R.L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and Origins of the Cold War*, (University of North Carolina Press, 1982), as well as the Byrnes Papers, Clemson University.
 - (8) For the process of formation of early plans for the peace and its implications, see Igarashi Takeshi, *Tainichikowa to Beikoku* (The Peace Settlement with Japan and the Unitited States) (Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press, 1987).
 - (9) Interviews with John K. Emmerson at Nikko, Japan, October 21, 1979, and October 6, 1983. Interview with E.K. Martin, at Washington, D.C., October 20, 1978.
 - (10) "Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan", August 5, 1947, Decimal Files. Interview with Hugh Borton at Conway, Mass., Oct. 21, 1979. The assignment of Takeshima for return to Korea was confirmed. Also, the assignment of Pinnacle (Kahei Shoto) to China does not imply agreement with assigning Senkaku to China.
 - (11) Tsarapkin to Marshall, July 22, 1947, Decimal File, National Archives (Washington, D.C.).
 - (12) Stalin to Truman, August 16, 1945; Truman to Stalin, Aug. 18, 1945, Leahy File, RG 218, National Archives.

- (13) Sept. 4, 1945. RG 59, National Archives.
- (14) Memorandum of Conference among the Three Foreign Ministers, Dec. 24, 1945, H-123, Document R. State Dept. Papers, NatZonal Archives. See also R.C. Messer, *op.cit.*, pp.119-25, 169-70.
- (15) For example, see "Peaceful Islands", *New York Times* (April 16, 1946), filed in the records at British Public Records Office.
- (16) For the Soviets behavior in Japan and East Asia during the early Cold War period, see my "An Alliance Dissolved" in *Occupation of Japan in World History*, ed. by Sodeii Rinjiro (Tokyo: Nihonyoron -sha, 1984). See also Hashimoto Setsuko, "Soviet Strategy Toward Japan During the Years of 1946-1948", (Georgetown Univ, M.A. Thesis, 1980).
- (17) Stettinuis to Grew, May 12, 1945. RG. 59, National Archives.
- (18) Stettinuis to Grew, may 14, 1945. RG. 59. See Also William H. Runde, *Trusteeship during and after the World War II*. (Ph. D. thesis, 1975).
- (19) The development of the Military's thinking on the disposition of Japanese territories is concisely followed in Yamagiwa, *op.cit.*.
- (20) Dorothy Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol. 3, p.41.
- (21) Conservative historians have based their arguments on an underestimation of the threat of the atomic bomb. Therefore, they brush aside Soviet fears and emphasize Soviet "expansionism" alone. Nagai, *op.cit.* pp.147-178. Also Ikibe Makoto, *Beikoku no nihonsenryo Seisaku* (The U.S. Policy on Occupation of Japan) (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 198), zuols.
- (22) Hilldring to Marshall, Marshall to Lovett, Aug. 5, 1947, 740. 0011 PW (P) 18-747, Decimal File, State Department Papers, National Archives.
- (23) Bohlen to Lovett, Aug. 12, 1947, Decimal File, National Archives.
- (24) Fahy to Lovett, Aug. 12, 1947, Decimal File.
- (25) As to Hilldring, see Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo.. As to Bohlen's outlook on Russia and diplomacy, interview with J.K. Emmerson, *op.cit.*. Bohlen stayed at Emmerson's residence for a month on Bohlen's way from Moscow to Washington D.C. Mar. 1940. See also Ruddy Thomas Michael, "Charles E. Bohlen and the Soviet Union, 1929-1969" (Ph.D. Thesis, 1973), and Takemaye Eiji and Amakawa Akira, "Interview with J.K. Emmerson" Tokyo Keizai Daigaku Gakkaiho, May 1975.
- (26) Feary to Hamilton and Borton, Oct. 29, 1947, Decimal files. Interview

- with Feary, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1978.
- (27) See the following for Feary's role: R.P. Dore, *Land Reform in Japan*, Oxford University Press, 1969.
 - (28) Marshall to Lovett, Aug. 8, 1947; Kennan to Lovett, Aug. 12, 1947. Decimal File, National Archive.
 - (29) PPS 65th Meeting (Sept. 22, 1947), p.9, p.32. PPS Papers, National Archives.
 - (30) *Ibid.*, p.17.
 - (31) *Ibid.*, pp.11-12, 19-23; PPS 10, Oct. 14, 1947.
 - (32) PPS 65th Meeting (Sept. 22, 1947), p.5.
 - (33) PPS 48th Meeting (Aug. 25, 1947), p.4.
 - (34) Emmerson to Vincent and Borton, Oct. 9, 1946, Decimal Files.
 - (35) Borton to Vincent, Oct. 7, 1946. Decimal File.
 - (36) Borton to Butterworth, Mar. 19, 1948. Decimal File.
 - (37) Memorandum by Davies, Aug. 10, 1946. Decimal File.
 - (38) PPS 65th Meeting, p.18.
 - (39) Kennan to Marshall, Mar. 14, 1948. Decimal File.
 - (40) Kennan to Marshall, Mar. 16, 1948. Decimal File.
 - (41) See, for example, Kennan Papers, Princeton University.
 - (42) For Ashida's actions, see for instance Acheson to Truman, June 19, 1947. Decimal File. It also could be confirmed by E. Shindo and M. Shimokobe, ed. *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki* (Ashida Hitoshi Diary), Vol.2 (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1987), pp.4-5. Also Ashida's memorandum in May 1947, Ashida Collection.
 - (43) For MacArthur's thinking, see Report by Kennan, PPS, 28, Mar. 1938. Decimal File.
 - (44) This reasoning has been confirmed also by Koseki Shoichi, *Shinkempo no Shuppatsu* (The Start to the New Constitution) (Chuokoron-sha, 1988), based on the Australian diplomatic papers.
 - (45) The whole text is printed in Shindo and Shimokobe ed. *op.cit.* Vol.7. pp.398-404.
 - (46) *New York Times*, May 7,9,10, 1947. Eichelberger Diary, Eichelberger Papers, Univ. of North Carolina.
 - (47) Sebald to MacArthur, Sept. 20, 1947; Sebald to Marshall, Sept. 22, 1947, RG 84, National Archives.
 - (48) *Ibid.*
 - (49) For Sebald's, behavior, see interviews with Sebald at Naples, Aug. 15-

- 18, 1978, and Aug. 14-16, 1980.
- (50) It should also be kept in mind that the Japanese Communist Party was then pouring all its energy into criticizing the Emperor system. For the role and meaning of the Emperor's message, see the comments by Miyasato Seigen in *Ryukyu Sinpo* and my article corresponding to it, "Tenno messeiji Sairon", *Sekai*, Oct. 1979. pp.150-165. For Emperor's role, see Hata Ikuhiko, *Hirohito Tenno no Itsutsu no Ketsudan* (Tokyo: Bungeishunju-sha, 1984). Takahashi Ko, "Shocho-Tenno no Tanjyo", in *Sengoshi no Shoten* (Focuses in Postwar History) ed. by Kimbara Samon (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1985), *Shocho-Tenno* (The Emperor as a Symbol) (Tokyo: Iwanishoten, 1987).
- (51) PPS 10/0, Oct. 15, 1947, National Archives.
- (52) Sebald to Marshall, Feb. 27, 1948. RG. 84, National Archives. This message, unlike the previous one, is designated as Terasaki's individual opinion, but Sebald asserted that he had reason to believe the message grew out of discussions among several powerful members of the imperial household, including the Emperor.
- (53) G.F. Kennan, *The Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p.305.