Securitized Migration: Russian Policies in Dealing with Labour Migrants from Central Asia

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Glossary of Abbreviations

CA	Central Asia
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CU	Customs Union, ceased to exist with the foundation of the EAEU
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community, ceased to exist with the foundation of the EAEU in 2015
FMS	Federal Migration Service, Russia's agency for migration affairs. Abolished in April 2016, its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Interior
GUVM	General Directorate for Migration (Glavnoe upravlenie po voprosam migratsii)
MMTs	Multifunctional Migration Centre (Mnogofunktsional'nyi migratsionnyi tsentr), Moscow
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs
RF	Russian Federation
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialistic Republic
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialistic Republics

Glossary of Russian terms

Administrativnoe vydvorenie: administrative expulsion, deportation from the country. Russian legislation has the term ‘deportation’ as well.

DPNI (Dvizhenie protiv nelegal’noj migratsii): Movement Against the Illegal Immigration

Gastarbajter: a guest worker, labour migrant with a derogative tone in Russian context.

Litsa kavkazskoj natsional’nosti: people from the Caucasus part of Russia.

Nelegal: an illegal, irregular migrant.

Patent: a work permit.

Perestroika: the program of economic and political reform in the Soviet Union initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986.

Propiska: a system of registering at one’s address.

Sootechestvenniki: Russian compatriots living outside the country.

Uchastkovij: an officer responsible for policing a certain residential area.

Vid na zhitel’stvo: a residence permit.

Vid na vremennoe prozhivanie: a temporary residence permit.

Note on the Transliteration

In transliterating Russian words, I have used 'i' to denote 'и,' 'j' to denote 'й,' ' ' ' to denote 'ь' and 'ъ,' 'yu' to denote 'ю,' 'ya' to denote 'я,' 'e' to denote 'э,' 'kh' to denote 'x,' 'zh' to denote 'ж,' 'ts' to denote 'ц,' 'ch' to denote 'ч,' 'sh' to denote 'ш,' and 'sch' to denote 'щ.'

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Abstract

Russia maintains visa-free regime with most of the post-Soviet countries and keeps its doors open to millions of labour migrants. On the one hand, Russian authorities often adopt restrictive and prohibitive laws to appease to anti-migrant sentiments popular among general population. Scholars argue that migration in Russia is securitized, however, how this process takes place when Russia still needs migration and maintains visa-free regime with Central Asian republics needs to be further explored. In this regard, this dissertation asks: how has the Russian government dealt with the conflicting pressures of migration and security needs with regard to labour migrants from Central Asia? Why has the Russian government taken such measures?

Using the framework of Copenhagen School's securitization theory, the thesis argues that migration in Russia is securitized in a different way. Russian authorities try to find a balance between migration and security needs. While economic, social and geopolitical factors push the authorities to keep admitting migrants, the government needs to ensure that its security interests are maintained. Ageing population and other demographic problems pressure Russian authorities to attract immigration. The need for cheap labour and the segmentation of labour market (most local people do not want to work in menial and low-profile jobs) also necessitate the need for labour migrants.

At the same time, notwithstanding the popular calls within the country, in order to maintain its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space, Russia keeps its borders open to Central Asian migrants by visa-free regime and offering preferential treatment to nationals of Moscow-led integration organization of Eurasian Economic Union.

On the other hand, there is a strong pressure in society against the presence of labour migrants. This pressure is manifested in anti-migrant xenophobia with occasional violence, fears shared by many that racially Other migrants present a threat to the cultural identity (therefore societal security as explained by securitization theory) of and security threat to the host society. The government also has to appease to the public pressure by introducing various bans and restrictions, tightening rules of stay and work, imposing sanctions against migrants. All this results for the majority of labour migrants from Central Asia in the state of difficult living and working conditions, abuses, semi-legality, and xenophobia. The fact that general

population perceives migration as a threat to Russian society and a popular belief among many in Russia that foreign migrant workers must immediately and completely assimilate with the host society are related to the relative novelty of migration phenomenon.

The thesis further advances Philip Bourbeau's 'securitized migration' concept adapting it to the context outside the Western societies, in our case – Russia. In particular, an indicator of societal pressure added to have more comprehensive assessment of the level of securitization of migration.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Background

The Soviet Union's collapse provoked an increase in mobility and in a very short time changed the statuses of people, turning former citizens of one country into foreigners in relation to each other, i.e. it created entirely new ways of talking about migration (Abashin 2017a). If in the 1990s it was mostly ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking people who moved to Russia, starting from the early 2000s more and more citizens of Central Asia, South Caucasus, and Eastern European countries have been migrating to Russia, mostly, in search of jobs.

For the last several years, Russia has been one of the largest destinations for international migrants. There were approximately 10 million foreigners at a time with a stay of more than three months in the country as of September 2017 (CSR, 2018). Of this amount, around four million people have indicated 'work' while entering the Russian territory, in other words, as labour migrants (*ibid.*).

The majority of these labour migrants come from Central Asian countries. Currently, there are 1.9 million people from Uzbekistan, 1.06 million people from Tajikistan and 0.62 million people from Kyrgyzstan in Russia (RANEPA 2017). Deteriorated living conditions, poverty, lack of jobs and other adverse economic conditions pushed millions of migrants to search for jobs in Russia. At the same time, improved conditions in Russian economy in early the 2000s led to the increased demand for labour, especially in the sectors of construction, services and transport. These reasons acted as push-pull factors for migrating to Russia for millions of people, especially from Central Asia.

The necessity of migration in Russia is due to economic, demographic, social and other factors. Cheap labour provided by migrant workers from Central Asia and South Caucasus has been one of indispensable factors contributing to the growth of many Russian companies and, respectively, Russia's economy. Russian expert community has been alarming that the country's population is shrinking and the continuing depopulation in some areas could pose not only economic, but also politico-security threats to Russia (Ryazantsev, 2013; 2016; Malakhov et al., 2015; CSR Demography Report, 2017). Many believe that the population

number could be sustained only by accepting more migrants. According to various estimates, Russia would need 20 million immigrants by 2050 in order to prevent the adverse consequences of depopulation (Aleksashenko, 2015).

The migration regime in Russia has experienced dramatic changes since the end of the Soviet regime, moving from a laissez faire approach in the early 1990s to restrictive immigration laws in the early 2000s. Since then, Russia's immigration policies have been a site of tension between an acute need for additional labour forces and anti-migrant sentiments in public (Hoang 2015). The issue of national security has been deployed by both anti- and pro-migration voices to justify the need to tighten or relax Russia's immigration legislation.

Since the 1990s, especially the early 2000s, the securitization of migration has become widespread not only in Western societies, but also in other rapidly developing parts of the world, including Russia. Linking the external threat of terrorism to migration, Russia's migration regime began to be securitized as migrants, in Russia's political and social discourse, were increasingly viewed as threats to Russia's national security.

> …the Russian nationalist media and segments of the scholarly community, viewing an influx of non-ethnic Russians as destabilizing and as an unhealthy addition to the demographic composition of the nascent Russian nation-state, began to grow more alarmist in tone and called upon the Russian state to take efforts to control migration. The Russian Federation's trend towards a more restrictive immigration regime is in step with the increasingly anti-immigrant posture adopted by the United States and Europe in the last few years (Robarts, 2008: p. 6).

As Pecoud (2013: p. 7) puts it, 'the disciplining of immigrants is not solely a matter of bans, restrictions, control, deportation, administrative barriers, and the use of force but also about the representations, world views, ideologies or discourses that rationalize those governmentality techniques and make them possible'. In Russian media and government reports, irregular and illegal migration, especially from Central Asia, has been associated with growing organized crime, mounting shadow economy, anti-hygienic working and housing conditions, extra burden on social services, etc. (Yudina, 2005; Malakhov, 2007; Mukomel, 2014).

It is interesting to note that in 1990s and early 2000s, Chechens and other ethnic groups from Russia's North Caucasus (*litsa kavskazskoj natsional'nosti*) were portrayed as the main enemy of Russian society: they were attributed the qualities of criminal, impudent, culturally alien people (Cherkasov, 2007; Dubin, 2014; Gudkov, 2003). Starting from mid-2000s the

media started the active cultivation of a negative image of migrants from Central Asia (Shnirelman, 2007). Labour migrants are presented 'as criminal, immoral, illegal, deceitful, opportunistic and naturally causing negative emotions in the local population' (Popova, 2012: p. 370).

Such a negative portrayal of migrants leads general population, activists, right-wing groups to urge government agencies to reinforce stricter control of migrant inflows and even the use of force in anti-immigration campaigns. According to a poll, the idea that immigration must be limited was supported by up to 80 percent of respondents in mid-2010s compared to that of 45 percent in 2002 (Levada, 2017). Events such as Manezhnaia riots (2010), Moscow mayoral election (2013), Matveevsky market (2013), Biryulyovo riots (2013), terrorist attacks in St Petersburg (2017) and their aftermath have shown strong level of anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia among the local population.

Anti-immigrant sentiments are, nevertheless, not expressed in the form of blanket hostility to all foreigners but particularly directed to the racial Other coming from Central Asia[1]. What is specific to the case of migration securitization in Russia is that one can see the change of rhetoric depending on developments in and around Russia. From the mid-2000s to the early 2010s, Central Asian labour migrants were perceived as potential criminals, job stealers and carriers of alien identity. Now, for the last couple of years in the wake of recent events, Russian media has portrayed labour migrants as terrorists and extremists posing threat to the country's security. This tendency has rocketed with April 2017 terrorist attack in St Petersburg and Russian security chief's naming Central Asian labour migrant communities as 'hotbed of terrorism in Russia'[2].

Statement of the Problem

Currently, Russia has a visa-free regime with most of the CIS countries and millions of people from different parts of the post-Soviet space have migrated to Russia. Central Asians constitute a significant portion of the labour migrants. However, Russian laws prescribe a range

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[1] This hostility is partly also against Chechens and other people from the Caucasus, the majority of whom are Russian citizens. However, this research focuses only on labour migrants from Central Asia.

[2] Russia Today (2017) "*Migrant communities hotbed of terrorism in Russia – FSB chief*". April 11. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.rt.com/news/384314-migrant-workers-terrorism-russia/.

of restrictions on foreigners, including the registration of residence within three days of arrival, the limitation of temporary stay to three months, a quota regime, the restriction of hiring of foreigners to licensed employers, and the mandatory requirement for foreign employees to hold a work permit. While these laws are already prohibitive, pervasive red tape and corruption in their implementation further restrict foreign migrants' ability to secure employment in the formal economic sector. Residence registration alone requires numerous endorsements at different levels. Overall, Russia's immigration policies have been characterized by 'a discrepancy between restrictionist and protectionist rhetoric on the one hand and a rather liberal approach to the admission of immigrants and their access to the labour market on the other hand' (Malakhov, 2014: p. 1075).

Hoang (2015) argues that given the state of affairs in Russia, the country's 'mobility disciplining strategies essentially reflect security concerns and nationalist sentiments' (p. 3). Russia's government agency responsible for migration and citizenship issues, formerly known as the Federal Migration Service's core mandate of providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced people in 1990s started to change to immigration controlling and policing in the early 2000s. President Putin's decision to abolish the agency and transfer its functions to the Ministry of Interior in 2016 also reflects the government's view of migration issues through policing prism. Overall, 'institutional and societal manifestations of xenophobia in Russia work together to demand and justify restrictive immigration policies despite the economic and demographic need for migrant labor' (Schenk, 2010: p. 108). The state, she argues, provokes and reinforces these nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies and practices. Schenk (2018b) also argues that Russian government is in a situation when it must juggle multiple demands. Anti-migrant sentiments must be addressed because they affect the regime's legitimacy. Economic demands must be addressed because the government has staked its reputation on economic growth.

Given this situation, one can notice a dilemma in Russia's policies in dealing with migration. On the one hand, Russian authorities are adopting restrictive laws (to name some, residence registration within three days, extremely difficult requirements to obtain a work permit, etc.) to appease to calls and discontent among general population. On the other hand, Russian authorities maintain visa-free regime with most of the post-Soviet countries and provides millions of migrants from these countries a relatively easy access to its labour market.

Based on the above, this thesis asks following **research questions**:

How has the Russian government dealt with the conflicting pressures of migration and security needs with regard to labour migrants from Central Asia?

Why has the Russian government taken such measures?

Research Gaps

As Ilgit and Klotz (2014) rightly point out, many countries outside the West are routinely ignored in both the immigration and securitization literatures, even though the majority of population flows take place outside advanced industrial economies. For the last couple of decades, the securitization theory, developed by Copenhagen School, has been widely used to explain state and societal interaction with the influx of migration[3] in the Western countries. Its main tenet is that by stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival (Buzan *et al.,* 1998). 'It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one' (Wæver, 2004: p. 13). The issue then ceases to be in normal politics and becomes emergency politics, where securitizing actors deal with it without normal rules and regulations. Scholars see security as a social and intersubjective construction. The proponents of this theoretical framework established that there are three components to determine if securitization is successful or not. They are 1) the identification of existential threats, 2) emergency action (extraordinary measures), and 3) effects on inter-unit relations by the breaking free of rules (Buzan *et al*., 1998).

Although not clearly and boldly stated, recent literature suggests that labour migration in Russia is strongly securitized (Hoang, 2015; Prokhorova, 2017; Schenk, 2017). However, if by extraordinary measures we assume the closing of borders (strongly controlled visa regime), mass deportations of migrants, one may not be persuaded enough that migration is securitized in Russia. The country has visa-free regime with the most of the CIS countries (except Georgia and Turkmenistan). Although, hundreds have been deported and several hundred thousand people were banned from entering Russia for three to five years, there is no mass deportation of migrants. At the top political level, Russian authorities have not clearly presented migration as an imminent threat to the society.

Here we find a somehow contradictory situation in what concerns the applicability of

[3] This study uses the terms 'migration'/'migrant' and 'immigration'/'immigrant' interchangeably. More detailed clarification is given in the methodology part.

the securitization theory. The theory suggests that existential threats must be identified and extraordinary measures must be adopted for successful securitization. But so far Russian authorities have not officially, at least at the discourse level, perceived labour migration as an existential threat to Russian society's survival and, accordingly, have not taken extraordinary measures. However, as it was demonstrated above, migration, especially labour migration from Central Asia, has been securitized in Russia. Because securitization theory came to the arena in the West, developed and updated both by proponents and critics during its application in the Western contexts, when it comes to autocracies outside the West, the theory needs to be further developed and adapted. Noting a 'constructivist deficit' in Copenhagen School theory, recent literature has also started debate on what constitutes extraordinary emergency measures and who defines the success of securitization (Floyd, 2015).

Although recent scholarship on securitization theory has much advanced, so far literature has not tackled how states find balance between the need for labour migration and internal pressures in society to limit migration and treat it as a threat. Bourbeau (2011) argues that the application of security framework to the movement of people can be observed in many contexts: both 'classic countries of immigration' such as Canada and 'reluctant countries of immigration' such as France. He calls this phenomenon a ***securitized migration***. Since migration is securitized in almost all contexts, 'there is a considerable variation in the *levels* of securitization' (Bourbeau, 2011: p. 11). This author has developed indicators of securitized migration – criteria to evaluate the levels of securitization. Bourbeau used two categories of indicators: institutional indicators and security practices. Based on this, Bourbeau (2011) concluded that in Canada the level of securitization of migration is weak, whereas there is a strong level of securitization in France. However, Philippe Bourbeau's framework seems to have problems in its application to Russia's case. First, Bourbeau gives a priority attention to the security element of the migration/security nexus. The author did not explore the contextual factors that may necessitate the need for migration. Whereas in Russia, there is an interplay of the need to keep accepting migrants and the need to ensure state security, including the need to appease pressures in society to curb migration. Moreover, Bourbeau did not much pay attention to the concept of 'societal security'. He did not foresee the rise of anti-immigrant populism in Western countries (BREXIT vote in the UK, the election of Donald Trump as US president, the rise of right-wing parties in many European countries). Whereas in Russia's case, there is a strong level of anti-migrant sentiments at the societal level.

Also, Bourbeau's two levels of securitized migration (weak and strong) are applicable to 'representative democracies characterized by highly developed, industrial, and capitalist economies' (Bourbeau, 2011: p. 13). It is problematic to 'measure' the intensity of migration securitization in countries which do not belong to that group, however, due to their current economic development, have a large number of immigrant population, namely in Russia. Importantly, Bourbeau's framework does not indicate societal pressure, epitomized in the form of strong anti-migrant sentiments, xenophobia and calls for halting migration. He has used two types of indicators (institutional and security practices) to show variation in levels of securitization, but it lacks an indicator of pressure coming from within the society to take extraordinary measures, which is present in Russia's case.

As Tesfahuney (1998) noted, the question of differential access to space on the basis of race, class, gender had geopolitical implications. Issues of who moves, where, how and why rank high in the geopolitical priorities of Western states. Hyndman (2012) argued that the securitization of migration was a defining issue of current geopolitics. Scholars have seen geopolitics as the West's migration governance strategy with its neighbours (Weber, 2006; Ashutosh & Mountz, 2012; Collyer, 2016; Allen *et al.*, 2017). However, there are very few works that would actually analyze how a country's geopolitical interests may impact its own internal migration policies. A few authors mention in the passing how Russia's willingness to achieve its foreign policy goals may influence the country's migration policies (Kangaspuro & Heusala, 2016; Schenk, 2016). However, how Russia has used migration as a tool to exert pressure on or encourage particular actions of its neighbouring countries needs to be thoroughly explored.

Argument

This research argues that migration in Russia is securitized in a different way. While economic and geopolitical factors push the authorities to keep admitting migrants, the government needs to ensure that its security interests are maintained. Economic factors are represented by the demographic pressure and the need for cheap labour. Notwithstanding the popular calls within the country, in order to maintain its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space, Russia keeps its borders open to Central Asian migrants by visa-free regime and offering preferential treatment to nationals of Moscow-led integration organization of Eurasian Economic Community. On the other hand, there is a strong pressure in society against the

presence of labour migrants. This pressure is manifested in anti-migrant xenophobia with occasional violence, fears shared by many that racially Other migrants present a threat to the cultural identity (therefore societal security as explained by securitization theory) of and terrorist threat to the host society. The government also has to appease to the public pressure by introducing various bans and restrictions, tightening rules of stay and work, imposing sanctions against migrants. All this results for the majority of labour migrants from Central Asia in the state of difficult living and working conditions, abuses, semi-legality, and xenophobia. The fact that general population perceives migration as a threat to Russian society and a popular belief among many in Russia that foreign migrant workers must immediately and completely assimilate with the host society are related to the relative novelty of migration phenomenon.

Significance

This research is significant for several reasons. First, it aims to cover both theoretical and empirical gap in the scholarship. There is an abundant literature on securitization theory, perception of immigration as a threat and state security practices. However, much of the literature is based on the case studies of migration securitization in Western countries, and not much has been explored about securitization of labour migration in Russia. Since there are significant socio-political differences between Western and post-Soviet societies (non-democratic state policies, large shadow economy, mostly malfunctioning and corrupt institutions, widespread xenophobia), we cannot assume that theoretical perspectives (of securitization theory) developed in the Western contexts may be directly applicable in the illiberal political regimes such as Russia. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that securitization of migration may have different forms and *modus operandi* depending on socio-political context, economic and cultural factors. This research aims to explain how Russia maintains its policies between the factors that necessitate labour migration and the factors that push for securitization. Addressing this research gap is important when considering that Russia hosts one of the largest migrant population in the world and it has not been adequately covered in migration securitization literature.

Second, although the link between geopolitics and migration policies was established, in a few occasions have scholars analyzed how a country's geopolitical interests form differential access to space for foreigners based on their nationality, ethnicity, skills, etc. The

thesis explores how Russia's integration policies within the Eurasian Economic Union impacted migration landscape in the country and how Russia from time to time used the issues of citizenship, deportation, treatment of migrants in exerting influence on its neighbours. Thus, the research will contribute to the scholarship on the role of geopolitics and foreign policy goals in shaping an immigration country's migration policies.

Third, the thesis further develops Bourbeau's concept of 'securitized migration' and adapts it to make it applicable to countries of immigration outside the Western context. It adds another indicator of societal pressure to take into account the cases when a government has to restrict migration by imposing restrictions and toughening punishment for any infringement in order to appease public anti-migrant sentiments. Moreover, a variation in levels of securitization is offered to take into account different situations of migration regime in a particular country.

Last, but not least, humanitarian, or refugee crisis of 2015-16 in Europe contributed to the growth of anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia in many Western countries. Apart from the Brexit vote in the UK and the president Trump's anti-immigrant stance, the role and influence of nationalist, rightist political forces have grown across Europe (even in traditionally tolerant societies of Scandinavia). In this regard, the need to explore migration policies in societies outside the West becomes even more important especially in the aftermath of serious challenges and changes international migration has seen in recent years.

Theoretical Framework

Criticizing that there is no theoretical space in securitization theory for distinguishing whether an issue is strongly securitized or weakly securitized, Bourbeau (2011) developed a variation to differentiate between weak and strong levels of securitization. To better understand how migration is securitized, Bourbeau used two categories of indicators: institutional and security practices. Based on these indicators, migration in countries with large immigrant population is either strongly or weakly securitized.[4] But variation in the level of securitized migration was developed mostly for the liberal, democratically advanced countries in North America and the Western Europe.

[4] Details of Bourbeau's framework are provided in Chapter 7.

Exploring the peculiarities of the process of securitization of migration in countries outside the West – in (rapidly) developing countries without well-established and fully functioning liberal and democratic institutions and with large immigrant populations – shows a gap in fully variating these countries with either weak or strong levels of securitized migration. For this end, a typology is developed to show that migration can be and is securitized not only either weakly, or strongly (as Bourbeau argued), but 'securitized migration' can be of different strength in mostly non-democratic, non-Western countries depending on different contextual factors. Most rapidly developing countries offer combinations of strong and low levels of securitization. Of course, there are states with large immigration population which may fall in none of the categories or may have characteristics of more than one category. In categorizing 'securitized migration' regimes, several contextual factors such as the character of the political regime, the peculiarities of relationships with the most migrant-providing countries, the relationship between foreign policy goals and migration policies, etc. will also be considered.

In order to differentiate the levels of securitization in different contexts, an additional indicator – societal pressure – should be added into Bourbeau's framework. As was initially offered in the development of the securitization theory, and what is missing in Bourbeau's framework, a society can react to the perceived threat of migration through activities carried out by the community itself or by trying to move the issue to the political sphere addressing the threat at state level through legislation and border control (Buzan *et al.,* 1998). Adding a societal pressure to the perceived threat of migration in measuring the process of securitization allows us to integrate non-Western countries, Russia in our case, into the framework of securitized migration (Table 1).

Table 1. Indicators of securitized migration in Russia.

Adapted from Bourbeau, 2011.

Indicators		*Russia*
Institutional	Legal (*I*-1)	Yes
	Policy Statement (*I*-2)	Yes
	Saliency (*I*-3)	Low
Security practices	Interdiction (*P*-1)	Yes
	Detention (*P*-2)	Low
Societal pressure		Strong
Securitization outcome		Intermediate

This thesis also discusses the link between geopolitics and migration. As it will be demonstrated, Russia uses migration as a geopolitical tool to exert influence on its neighbours. Providing citizenship to secessionist regions, (a threat of) deportation of a particular country's citizens from Russia or particular bans and prohibitions on them were used to exert pressure on other post-Soviet states. On the contrary, preferential treatment is offered to citizens of those countries who become members of the Russia-led integration organizations. Thus, by demonstrating a clear link between geopolitics and migration, it is hoped that the study contributes to the fields of neorealism and international political economy as well.

Thesis Outline

Chapter two explores the emergence and further development of critical security studies within different schools and the basic tenets of the securitization theory. It also explores current literature on securitization theory with analyzing the critique of the theory. The chapter also provides an overview of academic literature on migration and securitization in Russia.

Chapter three discusses the methodology and methods of research. In particular, it justifies the use of discourse analysis in explaining the phenomenon of securitization in Russia. The chapter also explains how the data were collected and how they were analyzed and utilized throughout the research.

Chapter four contextualizes migration in Russia in general and labour migration from Central Asia, in particular. It starts with the brief history of migration regime in the Soviet Union and proceeds with the emergence of new migration policies in 1990s and 2000s. The chapter continues with an exploration of the contemporary migration regime in Russia and labour migration from Central Asia.

Chapter five analyzes factors that make Russia keep accepting labour migrants. In particular, it focuses on two aspects. First, economic reasons are explained as a factor of need for cheap labour force as well as demographic factor to minimize depopulation. Second, the chapter discusses the impact of Russia's foreign policy goals to maintain its geopolitical influence on its migration regime.

Chapter six, on the other hand, draws on the discussion of factors that push for strong securitization in the society. The chapter first starts with the analysis of restrictive legislative system which pushes labour migrants into illegality. The chapter proceeds with the discourses presented by selected media that frame migration, especially labour migrants from Central Asia,

as a threat to Russian societal security. Securitization of labour migration through xenophobia, anti-migrant sentiments as well as corruption and extortion are also analyzed in this chapter.

In Chapter seven, I have explored Philippe Bourbeau's framework of 'securitized migration', variation in the levels of securitization. The shortcomings of the framework are shown in its applicability to countries outside the Western context. In order to be able to apply the framework in the context of countries such as Russia, adaptation and further development in the variation of securitization is offered. At the same time, the chapter analyzes how Russian authorities are trying to keep a disproportionate balance between the need to keep migration and the need to securitize it.

Chapter eight – the conclusion – summarizes and discusses the results of this research. It also draws on the limitations of the thesis and indicates further possible avenues for future research.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter discusses the literature migration, securitization, and securitization of migration both in the world in general, and in Russia in particular. First, after briefly analyzing migration theories, it proceeds to the discussion of migration in Russia. In particular, literature examines why Russia needs migration. Second, the origin of critical security studies, Aberystwyth, Copenhagen, Paris, Singaporean schools, as well as their critique are given. Especially, the emergence and development of Copenhagen School's securitization theory is thoroughly analyzed. Then, the chapter thoroughly analyzes securitization of migration in the Western countries and in Russia. Scholars mostly discuss how institutional and societal xenophobia justify the need to impose restrictions on labour migration from Central Asia.

2.1. Migration

The topic of migration has become a focus of disciplinary and interdisciplinary studies in sociology, anthropology, geography, demography, politics and international relations. As a result, there is a lot of empirical knowledge about diverse population movements and an eclectic mix of approaches in terms of theoretical explanation of migration (Bommes & Morawska, 2005).

One of the pioneering theories of migration originated from neoclassical economics is push-pull theory (Dorigo & Tobler, 1983). George Ravenstein (1889, in King, 2012) presented laws of movement according to which people moved from densely to less populated areas, from poorer to richer countries and from low-wage to higher-wage jobs. Thus, favourable and unfavourable economic conditions serve to push and pull people in particular directions. In the contemporary world, with the emphasis on economic conditions other factors may be acknowledged: wars, political oppression, poverty, risk of diseases and poor living conditions may push individuals to leave a country or a place of origin. Political freedom, higher living standards, a demand for labour can attract migrants to another place of living as pull factors.

New economic theories of migration emphasize the central role of push and pull factors at the same time recognizing variables that may facilitate or hinder one’s movement. These variables may include networks of acquaintances, middlemen, agencies (Massey *et al.*, 1993). However, it should also be noted that economic and/or push-pull model of migration overlooks several factors that may impact on why people move, including, but not limited to, historical relations, family and community dynamics, individual feelings, cultural differences, and importantly, the role of states in recruiting labour, allowing exits from/entries to a particular country, policies on refugee and citizenship issues (O’Reilly, 2015).

If economic theories of migration focus more on individuals, world systems theory sees the whole world as a single capitalist system in which poorer nations, the periphery, provide a constant supply of cheap labour to support the powerful and wealthy nations at the core of the system (Wallerstein, 1974 in King, 2012). Drawing from Marxist political economy, it emphasizes global inequalities and views migration as a central feature contributing to the perpetuation of the system (O’Reilly, 2015). The world systems theory focuses more on economic aspects without paying proper attention to political and cultural processes (Faist, 2000).

Historical-structural models (such as world systems theory, dual labour market theory, and dependency theory), mostly inspired by the Marxist interpretation of capitalism and development, see the roots of ‘international migration as lying within the realm of historically formed macro-structural forces, and stress the inherently exploitative and disequilibrating nature of the economic power shaping global capitalism’ (Morawska, 2012: p. 55). However, they are criticized for regarding migrants as ‘little more than passive pawns in the play of great powers and world processes presided over by the logic of capital accumulation’ (Arango, 2004: p.27).

Human capital theory has also been one of the leading theories used by economists, economic geographers and sociologists of immigration to analyze employment in general and employment of migrant workers in particular (Becker, 1964; Greenwood, 1985; Sweetland, 1996; Iredale, 2001; Taylor & Martin, 2001;). The proponents of human capital theory proclaim that education enhances a person's skills and it leads to a higher productivity level in the workplace, which in turn will bring a higher wage to the person (Tan, 2014). Labour market outcomes, that is how much a worker earns, are the result of the combination of what he or she (a worker or a migrant worker) offers to the labour market (such as skills, educational

qualifications, abilities) and/or his or her rational choices (concerning a mix of status, job conditions and earnings). Thus, the price of a worker's (migrant worker's) labour is the result of investments into one's human capital (Samers & Collyer; 2017).

According to dual labour market theory, it is not so much 'push factors' in sending countries but 'pull factors' and namely the presence of a dual labour market in receiving countries that drives migration (Piore,1979 in: Samers, 2010). This dual labour market consists of a primary and a secondary sector. The primary sector is dominated by 'native' workers and is characterized by high wages, good working conditions, stable employment. The secondary sector, on the other hand, is characterized by low wages, poor working conditions and job insecurity. Because it is difficult to attract native workers into secondary sector (due to low pay and poor working conditions), usually migrants fill these jobs. The primary and secondary labour markets can also be described in terms of core and peripheral workers. Peripheral workers have less stable working conditions due to temporary employment (Berntson, Sverke & Marklund, 2006).

However, literature criticized dual labour market hypothesis for employing simplistic categories and proposed more advanced labour market segmentation theory (Reich *et al.,* 1973; Wilkinson, 1981; Bauder, 2005; Samers, 2010; Samers & Collyard, 2017). Samers (2010) criticized dual labour market hypothesis for entirely focusing on the demand for labour generated by employers (by paying very little attention to the state and other institutions) and attributing to labour market only two sectors – primary and secondary.

Reich *et al.*'s (1973) labour market segmentation theory described how different rules of operation within firms governed different 'cells' (a segment or a grouping of job positions) within labour markets. In this regard, workers were slotted into certain segments partly based on their education, qualifications, language and other skills, as well assumptions about their suitability for work and productivity based on the colour of their skin, their nationality, their gender, and other ascribed characteristics. Segmentation of labour market, according to Peck (1996), involves the intersection of 'production imperatives' (demand for workers by employers), forces of regulation (states' and other quasi-states' regulations regarding migration and migrants' life) and 'processes of social reproduction' (supply: how workers are socially re-produced, in other words, the role of families, housing, remittances and other factors in making migrants available for work).

For the last decades, there have been attempts to provide different theories and approaches to understand and explain migration using the prisms of migration systems and networks (Gurak & Caces, 1992; Castles & Miller, 2009), assimilation and multiculturalism (Alba, 1997; Bloemraad, Kortewag & Yurdakul, 2008; Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010), transnationalism (Vertovec, 2009; Schiller & Faist, 2010), flows and mobilities (Urry, 2007; Kivisto, 2001), post-colonial relationship in migration (Talbot & Thandi, 2004; van Amersfoort, 2009; Mains *et al.,* 2013), feminist-informed migration studies (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000; Pessar & Mahler, 2003), structuration model (Morawska, 2001; 2012), practice stories approach (O'Reilly, 2012; 2015) and so on. Scholars have also debated about the need for a single unifying theory for migration (O'Reilly, 2015). However, recently experts have argued that a search for a framework or unifying theory of migration is unnecessary (Castles, 2010; Portes, 2010).

Although migration issues have long been discussed in the scholarship in Western countries, the topic is relatively new in Russia. Of course, literature, both in the Soviet Union and beyond, explored the issues of population mobility throughout the XX century. However, as will be discussed later, both the nature and scale of migration during that period was very limited, state centralized and, most importantly, internal – within the Soviet Union. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of newly independent states on its ruins that made tens of millions of former citizens of a whole country into foreigners overnight and started the period of mass migration within this vast territory. Approximately ten percent of former Soviet citizens (28 million) have moved to another country since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Laruelle, 2013). If six to seven million people have left the post-Soviet space, more than twenty million have moved within the post-Soviet space (*ibid.*). The centre of these population movements was Russia, as this research focuses on. Since this study explores migration in contemporary Russia, it aims to examine the scholarship most relevant to the topic. Russia as a relatively new country with large immigration population has gained attention in recent migration literature.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, among others, brought to the creation of the Eurasian migration system. Eurasian migration system, according to Ivahnyuk (2008) who coined the term, has following characteristics: sustainable migration flows between former Soviet republics, common historic past and long-term relations within the single state, emergence of the migration system centre (Russia, as well as recently Kazakhstan), Russian language as migration opportunity and etc. The argument that migration flows follow colonial links

(Castles & Miller, 2009) has proved true in the post-Soviet space as well: Russia has become the centre of Eurasian migration system. Abashin (2014) calls Russia's policy as a 'new strategy of domination of the newly redefined "center" over the inhabitants of the Central Asian "periphery"' (p. 18).

Russia surpasses all other former Soviet republics in terms of economic and labour market potential. Ryazantsev (2014) argues that 'politically Russia is interested in strengthening integration in the post-Soviet space and considers interaction with CIS countries a priority of its migration policy' (p. 10).

Scholars indicate common culture and history, visa-free regime between the CIS countries, geographic proximity and relatively well-functioning transport infrastructure as pull factors of labour migration within the CIS region (Ivahnyuk, 2006; Ryazantsev, 2014). Yet the most important factors of migration have been economic. Availability of jobs, higher salaries, demand for labour force as a result of ageing and shrinking population in Russia have become pull factors for millions of labour migrants not only in Central Asia, but also other parts of the post-Soviet space. On the other hand, high rates of unemployment, low wages, falling living standards, overpopulation and economic stagnation have pushed many in Central Asia, especially in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to seek opportunities in other countries, mostly in Russia followed by Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, countries in the far abroad (Laruelle, 2013; Sadovskaya, 2013).

Most of Central Asian migrants travel to Russia for seasonal work: depending on the availability of jobs, many migrants return to their home countries in winter and travel again to Russia in spring (Olimova, 2013). Laruelle (2007) distinguishes two age groups of migrants: young people in their twenties, who have to pay for a wedding or the building of a house; and older men in their forties or fifties, who need more sporadic financing for family celebrations such as children's weddings, circumcision ceremonies, or the expansion of the family property. Most of the migrants from Central Asia in Russia are employed in low-paid, low-skilled and socially inferior jobs in construction, trade, transport, and housing services. The overwhelming majority of migrants live in appalling conditions (Gorst, 2011). Most of the labour migrants are undocumented which impedes their adaptation to local contexts.[5] They are often subject to police checks and have to bribe law enforcement and other government officials. The health of

[5] The issue of migrants' undocumented, or 'illegal', status will be discussed in a separate section further.

most Central Asians deteriorates during their stay in Russia as they are routinely exposed to bad living conditions, poor hygiene, lack of or limited access to health care, etc. (Marat, 2013).

Varshaver and Rocheva (2014) have conducted an ethnographic study of migrant communities in Moscow to see how they (migrant communities) serve as environment for the integration of Central Asian migrants in Russian society. In particular, researchers examined compatriot/ethnic (*zemlyacheskie*) communities from Samarkand and Muslim communities and found out the following:

> Compatriot communities arise when links formed before migration are transferred to Russia. Intensive kinship, neighbourhood ties, even old conflicts – all this becomes the basis for building up ties here, in conditions where it is necessary to build up social capital in a new place. Compatriot communities can be an effective buffer for newcomers who do not know Russian well, who are not oriented in social, as well as physical, space of a new big city (Varshaver & Rocheva, 2014: p. 80-81).

Labour migrants send considerable amount of their earnings to their families back in Central Asia. Labour migration has ambiguous implications for sending countries, presenting both opportunities and risks While migration's positive economic effects are relatively easily measurable in terms of remittances (Kireyev, 2006), negative effects on family values, on well-being of left-behind family members (in Central Asia, they are usually women and children) are less tangible (Malyuchenko, 2015).

As it is happening in many Western countries, Russia is also facing the ageing of population. Although the return of ethnic Russians and other Russian speaking people from other post-Soviet republics in 1990s slowed the population decrease, overall it could not prevent depopulation, especially in the country's vast eastern areas. The causes, dynamics and implication of the demographic crisis have been discussed by different authors (Vishnevsky, 2009; Eberstadt, 2010). Moreover, rapid economic development in the first decade of 2000s required more and more labour force in Russian economy (CSR Demography Report, 2017).

The population scarcity in Russia's Asian part has historically been perceived as a serious political, social and demographic challenge and Russian authorities made efforts to increase the number of inhabitants by various measures (Zaionchkovskaia, Mkrtchyan & Tyuryukanova, 2009). Russian expert community has been alarming that the country's population is shrinking and the continuing depopulation in some areas could pose not only economic, but also politico-security threats to Russia (Ryazantsev, 2013; 2016; Malakhov *et al.,* 2015; CSR Demography Report, 2017). Russian experts have long been discussing the

possible ways to increase the population. One of the options was offering the remaining ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking people in other post-Soviet republics a permanent residence (Gosprogramma pereseleniya, 2006). However, the effectiveness of such a state programme was put under question as the number of resettles have not been impressive (Myhre, 2017).

Many scholars see the attraction of controlled labour migration as another tool to reverse the negative consequences of depopulation (Zaionchkovskaia *et al.,* 2009; Mihailova, 2016). There is a widespread consensus in most of the Russian expert community that only immigration can help address the country's demographic challenges (CSR Demography Report, 2017). It is believed that the population number could be sustained only by accepting more migrants. According to various estimates, Russia would need 20 million immigrants by 2050 in order to prevent the adverse consequences of depopulation (Aleksashenko, 2015). However, most labour migrants prefer central and western parts of the country, where the scarcity of human resources is not as acute as in Siberia, the Russian Far East. Russian authorities' efforts to turn migration flows to the east did not bring tangible results (Malakhov *et al.*, 2015; Ryazantsev, 2016).

At the same time, Russians want only qualified migrants to work in the country. However, Russian economy still needs large numbers of low-skilled labour workforce. This can be attributed to dual labour market or labour market segmentation theories (Samers, 2010; Samers & Collyer, 2017) according to which labour migrants fill jobs in the secondary sector of labour market because Russian citizens do not want to work there.

The secondary sector, on the other hand, is characterized by low wages, poor working conditions and job insecurity. Because it is difficult to attract native workers into secondary sector (due to low pay and poor working conditions), usually migrants fill these jobs.

As a result, Russia's immigration policies have been in tension between an acute need of labour for its developing economy and anti-immigrant sentiments of Russian population (Hoang, 2015). Malakhov (2007) argues that rather than discussing how to attract migrants, the focus is on the threats migrants pose to society:

> Villages throughout Russia continue to become extinct, the national economy is short about two and a half million workers every year, and yet, instead of developing measures to attract migrants and help them adapt, the overwhelming dialogue in Russia continues to focus on the threats migrants pose to the country's 'ethno-cultural security' (Malakhov, 2007: p. 116).

Schenk (2018b) calls this situation a vicious cycle, which occurs when

> the public demands increasingly strict regulations, which inevitably increase illegal immigration because policies do nothing to diminish the structural factors causing migrants to move. Increasing proportions of illegal immigrants create ideal conditions for populists to drum up political support through anti-immigration rhetoric, and if politicians are able to make good on political promises, restrictive policy responses produce ever more illegal immigration. And the cycle goes on and on (p 9).

Using simple words, Russia needs migrants, but many in Russia do not want migrants, especially if they are from Central Asia.

Another strand of literature on population movement relates to its link with geopolitics. Contemporary world order and the globalization process have increased international mobility worldwide. A whole layer of tourists, students, labour migrants, immigrants, refugees, professionals, and etc. have emerged. Yet, not all types of mobile people enjoy the same freedom and access to space. As Tesfahuney (1998) argues, issues of who moves, where, how and why rank high in the geopolitical priorities of Western countries: 'Questions of differential mobility empowerments – who moves, where and why – encapsulate many geopolitical issues. Differential access to space on race, class, gender basis has geopolitical implications… The intra- and inter- national mobility of people from the "wrong end" of the social position and/or power axes, is being subjected to racialized systems of mobility regulation and control by national and supranational institutions in the West' (p. 501). Some scholars have also seen geopolitics as the European Union's migration governance strategy with its neighbours both in Africa and Eurasia (Weber, 2006; Collyer, 2016) or other Western countries' strategy toward developing countries (Ashutosh & Mountz, 2012; Allen *et al.*, 2017). Other scholars point to a direct link between colonialism and patterns of migration (Talbot & Thandi, 2004; Castles & Miller, 2009; van Amersfoort, 2009; Bosma, Lucassen & Oostindie, 2012; Mains *et al.*, 2013).

As Hyndman noted that the securitization of migration, in particular, is a defining issue of current geopolitics (2012). Hammerstad (2012) argued that a country's internal migration policies, including the securitization of migration, may affect its foreign policies with regard to neighbouring states. However, this may not be true in other contexts. or may have different trajectory and scale. Going forward, as argued by other scholars (Kangaspuro & Heusala, 2016) and as this thesis also demonstrates, a country's foreign policies may affect its migration policies. Both of the cases do not reject the fact that there is a direct link between geopolitics and migration policies on the one hand, and a link between colonialism and patterns of

migration, on the other. However, the impact of geopolitics and foreign policy goals on a country's migration policies needs to be fully explored.

There are a few works that discuss the relationship between Moscow's foreign policy goals and the country's internal migration policies. For Russian authorities the primacy of politics over economy or pragmatism has been evident in issues of migration as well (Malakhov, 2016; Gulina & Utyasheva, 2016).

Gulina (2017) notes that Russia uses migration as both a carrot and stick in order to encourage or discourage certain actions of countries in post-Soviet space: 'Russia's ruling elites use institutions and mechanisms of migration law with varying degrees of activity and success, such as the granting of citizenship, asylum, the right to stay and reside, in the interests of its foreign and domestic policy. The migration policy is imprisoned for servicing the changing foreign policy tasks and priorities' (Gulina, 2017).

As an effort to maintain its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space Russia fostered integration processes, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) being one of the important policies of Moscow. Russia encouraged the joining of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan by offering preferential treatment of their citizens – labour workers on its territory. However, scholars have pointed at the conflict between Russia's foreign policy goals and its labour market conditions: integration efforts of Moscow are challenged by 'a deeply embedded nationalistic and anti-migration popular opinion' in Russia (Kangaspuro & Heusala, 2016: p. 46). Russia's active promotion of integration within the EAEU causes popular discontent as the influx of Muslim migrants from Central Asia, namely from the current member Kyrgyzstan and potential candidates for membership. However, for Russia geopolitical benefits are more important than economic (Dragneva & Woczuk, 2017). '[T]he EAEU is nominally about economic cooperation, yet economic relations with Eurasian members only matter for Russia as a precursor to achieving its political and geopolitical aims' (*ibid.* p. 7). Gulina (2017) also noted that the country's migration policy has become hostage of Moscow's foreign policy goals. At the same time, 'Russia would use changes to migration policy as a major lever of foreign policy action. The scope and depth of changes to migration policy indicate varying commitment to putting pressure on other states' (Schenk, 2016: p. 477).

2.2. Securitization Theory: Origin, Schools, Criticism

2.2.1. The emergence of Critical Security Studies

In late 1980s and early 1990s, there were strong debates in the field of security studies. If until that time, security studies were limited to military threats and war, a number of scholars argued for widening these studies to include non-military issues, ranging from environment, economics, identity to migration (see Huysmans, 2006). Debates focused also on what is to be secured; until then security studies were state-centric, i.e. it is the state whose security should be protected. These debates divided scholars between the traditional security studies, namely realist and neo-realist and critical security studies.

Traditional security studies, mainly realism and neo-realism, exclusively focus on state and military issues (e.g. Walt, 1991). According to the proponents of traditional security thinking, security studies are 'the study of the threat, use and control of military force' (Walt, 1991). In this regard, security refers to the absence of military threat and the survival of state is an ultimate goal. Thus, in traditional security studies, the essence of the concept of security is not problematic; simply, 'the concept of security is not present in the analysis as such' (Waever, 2004: 15). What concerns the migration/security nexus, traditional school of security studies have not usually provided a comprehensive analysis from this angle. This is mostly because traditional security studies have mostly focused on the 'high politics' of war and military threats, whereas the issue of migration was regarded as a part of 'low politics' and did not have much attention (Togral, 2012).

Global developments of late 1980s and early 1990s, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, revealed the limitations of traditional security studies in analyzing international developments. Ethnic, religious or identity related conflicts in many parts of the world (such as Rwanda, Yugoslavia) or integration processes (especially in Europe) became difficult to explain from the prism of traditional security studies. Critical security studies or critical approaches to security have emerged in this context. In contrast to realist/neorealist schools of traditional security studies, critical security studies are composed of different approaches with different theoretical orientations. Scholars have attempted to

cluster these approaches and one of these attempts was a collective name as CASE, Critical Approaches to Security in Europe (CASE, 2006). Waever (2004) classified critical security studies under three schools: Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris. Later, so-called Singaporean school also emerged to show non-traditional security studies in Asia (Emmers *et al.*, 2006). Particularly, Copenhagen and Paris schools of security studies have mostly contributed to the analysis of migration/security issues. This research mostly uses the framework of the securitization theory of Copenhagen school. Before analysing this school, we will shortly examine other approaches.

2.2.2. Aberystwyth School

Also known as Welsh School, the Aberystwyth School has its roots in Marxism. Pioneers of this approach, Ken Booth (1991) and Richard Wyn Jones (1995), were strongly influenced by Gramscian critical theory and Frankfurt School of social theory. Cox and Sinclair (1996) note that their approach 'does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but call them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing' (p. 206). In a sense the Aberystwyth School is orientated toward social transformation by exploring and elucidating human emancipation's barriers and possibilities. Emancipation is

> [T]he theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as individuals and collectivities from contingent and structural oppressions. It is a discourse of human self-creation and the politics of trying to bring it about. Security and community are guiding principles, and at this stage of history the growth of a universal human rights culture is central to emancipatory politics. The concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity (Booth, 2005: p. 181)

Through advancing emancipation, the school maintains a 'critical' reflection widening security agenda in order to include other non-state security issues, such as poverty, environment, identity, etc.

The Aberystwyth School supporters do not accept that system and actors are pre-given and assert that these very 'realities' are socially constructed. Political understanding of these very 'realities' of security are navigated through different cultural maps, contextual and historical structures (Fierke, 2007; Booth, 2005).

It is argued that security should not be seen as a 'good' thing or as a desirable goal; indeed, for the Aberystwyth School, one's security is achieved at the cost of other's security and the concept of security has always conservative connotations. Therefore, the School does not support unlimited or unconscious widening of security agenda; rather it is a moral and ethical critical stance towards the widening debate and a proponent of politicization rather than securitization (Togral, 2012).

Regarding the migration/security nexus, for the supporters of the Aberystwyth School, traditional security understanding which sees state as the natural protector of its citizens with a legitimate right to control over its borders and frames citizens and non-citizens in security terms, limits the scope of criticism over undemocratic practices of states. Especially, for them, it is neglected that states can be also a source of insecurity for their own citizens. For example, refugees are persecuted by their own governments and are forced to leave their country. Likewise, states can threaten human security, 'where migrants, gypsies, minority nations, and indigenous peoples, among others, do not enjoy the protection of the rule of law or barred from enjoying the political and other rights that full members of the community already have' (Linklater, 2005: p. 116).

2.2.3. Copenhagen School

Researchers at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute were also dissatisfied with the traditional understanding of security. The main supporters of this school, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, contributed to the widening and deepening of security studies to cover wide range of issues. Similar to the Aberystwyth School, Copenhagen School's departure point is that they contend that security is socially constructed vis-à-vis the objectivist understanding of security by traditional security studies. However, Copenhagen School supporters do not fully disregard the issues of state and military, but integrate certain premises of traditional school of thought. For them, state is identified as an important referent object and security is freedom from threat (Waever, 1993).

> The analyst in [Aberystwyth School] takes on a larger burden that the analyst in our approach: he or she can brush away existing security constructions disclosed as arbitrary and point to some other issues that are more important security problems. Our approach links itself more closely to existing actors, tries to understand their modus operandi and assumes that future management of security will have to include handling these actors... Although our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to

> always be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is, in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions. This stands in contrast to the 'critical' purposes of [Aberystwyth School], which points towards a more wholesale refutation of current power wielders (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: p. 35).

For the Copenhagen School, securitization happens when leaders begin to talk about an issue and gain public attention; securitization is a more extreme version of politicization.

> It is the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning that the state does not deal with it, and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision); through politicized (meaning that the issue is part of public policy requiring governmental decision and resource allocation or more rarely some other form of communal governance); to securitized (meaning that the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). In principle, the placement of issues on this spectrum is open; depending on circumstances any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum (Buzan *et al.,* 1998: pp. 23-24).

In other words, securitization is the successful construction of an issue as an 'existential threat' to the designated referent object through 'speech acts' of securitizing actors, which justifies extraordinary security policies (Buzan *et al.,*1998; Waever, 1993). The securitizing move, uttering the wording of security (Waever, 2003), is very important in the securitization process.

For Copenhagen School,

> The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship) (Buzan *et al.,* 1998: p. 26).

In identifying what constitutes 'real' threats, the Copenhagen School argues that it is difficult to distinguish what are objective (real) and subjective (perceived) threat and there are no objective criteria of defining an issue as a threat. In this regard, definition and criteria of securitization is determined through intersubjective process whereby 'a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded as a threat' is considered by 'speech acts', discursive practices (Waever, 2000: p. 26). Thus, the study of securitization depends on the analysis of discourses and political constellations.

Securitization is considered as such when it is successfully carried out. 'Successful securitization is not decided by the securitized but by the audience of the security speech act'

(*ibid.,* p. 31). Securitization is successful as long as 'significant' or 'certain' amount of population accepts the issue as an existential threat. By this acceptance, actors are permitted to take extraordinary and exceptional measures.

The Copenhagen School examines the securitization of migration as societal security. As Theiler (2003) puts it,

> To securitize is to identify an alleged threat to the survival of the community and to the shared identity it sustains, its presumed origins and perpetrators, as well as a strategy to ward off that threat and thereby render society secure again. Given that these are perceived to be existential threats to something whose survival is sought as an end in itself and is afforded absolute priority, effective securitization often leads to defensive measures that go beyond the limits of what qualifies as politically or morally acceptable conduct in normal circumstances (p. 251).

Societal security is different from social security which is related to economic concerns and on individual level (Buzan *et al.,* 1998). Societal security relates to the security of identity, especially ethno-national identity. Migration is viewed and/or represented as a threat to societal security, when

> X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population (e.g., Chinese migration into Tibet, Russian migration into Estonia (Buzan *et al.,* 1993: p. 121).

In this regard, here is how the securitization of migration happens according to the Copenhagen School: migration is presented as an 'existential threat' to societal security/identity through 'speech acts' of certain actors, e.g. politicians, media, public, and if this securitizing move is accepted by a 'significant' or 'certain' amount of audiences, extraordinary measures, which were previously not 'legitimate', can be taken (Buzan *et al.,* 1993; Waever, 2003).

However, scholars have pointed out at a vague definition of identity and measures, although Waever (1993) divided such measures/responses to threat as offensive and defensive. As offensive responses, states may impose restrictive policies (there can also be racist attacks on migrants in society). Defensive responses can be a development of a more tolerant approach and government support of integration projects to minimize threat arising from migrants. However, these defensive measures could not 'minimize the securitization of migration; even sometimes they could reinforce this process and exclusion of migrants' (Togral, 2012: p. 31).

Before summing up the analysis of Copenhagen School's securitization theory, it seems relevant to define key terms used in the process of securitization, namely, security, securitizing actors, referent objects, specific audience, and the speech act. Here, we bring the definition as provided by Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (2006: pp. 23-24).

- *Security.* A socially constructed concept about survival wherein an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object. It is securitized when articulated by a securitizing actor.
- *Securitizing Actors.* These are governments, international organizations or civil society actors that securitize an issue by articulating the existence of threat(s) to the survival of specific referent object.
- *Referent Objects.* These can be individuals and groups (refugees, victims of human rights abuses, etc.) as well as security issues like states (military security), national sovereignty or an ideology (political security), national economies (economic security), collective identities (societal security), or species or habitats (environmental security) that possess a 'legitimate' claim to survival and whose existence is ostensibly threatened.
- *Specific Audience.* The act of securitization is only successful and complete once the securitizing actor succeeds in using the language of security which is the 'speech act' to convince a specific or significant audience e.g. public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, etc. that a referent object(s) is/are existentially threatened.
- *Speech Act.* This is an important part in the process of securitization. According to Waever (1998), with the help of language theory, we can regard 'security' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of an interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security,' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.

However, definition of the main terms provided by the Copenhagen School did not satisfy all scholars and raised certain questions on methodological consistencies of the approach. They will be separately discussed in the section of critiques of the theory.

While discussing the securitization process it is important to make distinction between the politicization of migration and the securitization of migration. If securitization relates to the process of bringing migration discursively and institutionally into security frameworks that

emphasize policing and defence, politicization refers to bringing the issue of migration into the public arena (Huysmans, 2006). Politicization of migration can be both positive and negative.

> This is not to say that there is no 'politics' in the securitization process or that the two processes are not related – the politicization of migration could lead to the securitization of migration and vice versa… (A) politicization of migration does not necessarily equate with a securitization of migration; an agent can politicize and issue without securitizing it (Bourbeau, 2011: p. 43).

Quite a lot of scholars were influenced by the securitization theory of Copenhagen School when studying migration/security nexus. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and their supporters have hugely contributed to the literature in analyzing the discursive construction of certain issues as security threats. At the same time, Copenhagen School was strongly criticized since its emergence and this has contributed to the enrichment and at the same time revealed weaknesses of the securitization theory of Copenhagen School.

2.2.4. Paris School

The Paris School of Security Studies is usually associated with the academic journal *Cultures et Conflits* and is said to be inspired from the works of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Proponents of the school are known of applying a sociological approach to the securitization process. Even though the securitization theory of Copenhagen School was a departing point for Paris School, it has criticized and revised the latter in line with its own analytical approaches (Diez & Huysmans, 2007).

Didier Bigo and his supporters argued that the Copenhagen School, though analyzing the securitization as a speech act, ignores everyday routine securitization practices and underestimates respectively the role of power in this process (Diez & Huysmans, 2007). According to Bigo (2002), security technology, professional security knowledge and bureaucratic practices, not the discursive practices and speech acts, are the driving forces of the securitization process. It must be noted that discourse is differently understood in the two schools. While Copenhagen School restricts the discourse or speech to linguistic acts, Paris School follows a Foucauldian understanding of discourse meaning that discourses come into being through the exercise of power, and create a specific economy of 'truth' or knowledge' (Diez & Huysmans, 2007: p. 12). The production of truth or knowledge through discourse results from the exercise of power.

According to Bigo (2002), not the democratic public deliberation, but highly secretive, decentralized, un-transparent and private world of bureaucratic bodies conducts politics as well as securitization. Thus, if for Copenhagen School, 'politics of exception' is a central issue, what matters for the Paris School is that technocratic practices invoke a 'politics of unease' – which is not framed through emergency situation, but which may distribute and fabricate fear, and in turn justify certain governmental practices (Bigo, 2002). For Bigo, the securitization results from

> the creation of a continuum of threats and general unease in which many different actors exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society. The professionals in charge of the management of risk and fear especially transfer the legitimacy they gain from struggles against terrorism, criminals, spies, and counterfeits toward other targets, most notably transnational political activists, people crossing borders, or people born the country but with foreign parents (2002: p. 63).

In contrast to Copenhagen School, the central element in the securitization process is 'not the constitution of crisis situations and the introduction of emergency measures but rather the institutional and discursive intervening of different policy areas by means of applying routines, institutionalized knowledge, and technologies to the regulation of these areas' (Diez & Huysmans, 2007: pp. 9-10).

The proponents of Paris School also criticize the Copenhagen School's view that securitization can be analyzed by studying discourse and political constellations. Instead, Paris School promotes 'security as practice' focusing on the role of practices in the securitization process. Running ahead, currently, the academic debate on securitization relies mainly on two camps. The logic of exception (Copenhagen School) understands securitization as combatting existential threats via exceptional measures, while the logic of routine (Paris School) analyzes securitization as routinized and patterned practices carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals (Bourbeau, 2016).

As we can see, conceptualization of the securitization by the Paris School has refined the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework and contributed significantly to the literature on the securitization of migration, especially in Europe. At the same time, this approach also was also criticized and pointed at its weak points.

2.2.5. Singaporean School of Non-traditional Security Studies

Although, not very much present in Western literature, there have emerged so-called Singaporean School of security studies. At least researchers from Singapore-based Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre) claim it to be a separate school (Emmers *et al.,* 2006; Curley & Wong, 2008; Caballero-Anthony, 2015). They argue that Euro-centric securitization framework developed by Copenhagen School is not concerned with assessing the effectiveness of securitization policy in Asian setting and they seek to move the concepts of securitization to policy analysis and prescription by engaging governments, regional institutions, and civil society actors in developing a better understanding of, and approaches to, NTS challenges (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers, 2006).

For Singaporean School there is no clear distinction between politicization and securitization because given the nature of politics they can differ from one country to another, securitization is therefore highly context-dependent and its degree depends not just on the issue area but also on the nature of the political system and their leadership (Adiong, 2009). Since securitization involves the 'speech act,' it is important in the context of developing Asia to conduct discourse analysis on the language employed to refer to any as a 'security threat,' because nuances in the language can greatly affect in the operationalization of securitization (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers, 2006).

Although Russia is considered a European country, when it comes to the issue of migration policy, there are certain aspects which is peculiar to Russian context due to its history and its relationships with migrant-exporting neighbours. In this regard, the Singaporean School's notion that securitization is highly context-dependent seems relevant in explaining the process of migration securitization in Russia and will be referred to when needed. The peculiarities of Russia's migration regime will be examined in a separate chapter.

2.2.6. Critique of theories

As we have seen in previous sections, all mentioned schools provided with fundamental insights into the securitization of migration issue, or in other words, migration/security nexus. At the same time, scholars have revealed certain loopholes and problems of all these schools in terms of analytical and methodological framework. A range of scholars have strongly criticized the theory of securitization (*inter alia:* McSweeney, 1999; Hansen, 2000; Knudsen,

2001; Williams, 2003; Aradau, 2004; Balzacq, 2005; McDonald, 2008; Ciuta, 2009; Lupovici, 2014).

Some analysts have argued that securitization theory does not unpack how and whether migration has come to be dealt with as a security issue; it treats migration as an objective threat and reifies the securitarian discourses and approaches (Togral, 2012). For many scholars in this field 'migration is always security-sensitive because migration often changes societies and societies often change migrants' (Miller, 1998: p. 25). Bourbeau argues that 'the structural deterministic scholarship that underlines the alarmist point of view [in traditional security studies] constitutes an uncertain foundation for theorizing about the migration-security nexus, despite the fact that some politicians have found the alarmist statements attractive' (2011: p. 37).

One of the points that the critics of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory pay central attention is the 'speech act' as a vector of securitization. It is widely contended that without being explicitly talked as a security issue or without being accepted by certain 'audiences', an issue can be transformed into a security question (Leonard, 2004). McDonald argues that focusing on the speech of dominant actors 'excludes a focus on other forms of representation (images or material practices), and also encourages a focus only on the discursive interventions of those voices deemed institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of a particular collective, usually a state (2008: p. 564). Williams also claimed that a 'focus on speech acts and linguistic rhetoric are limited as tools for understanding process of contemporary political communication in an age when that communication is increasingly conveyed through electronic media, and in which televisual images play an increasingly significant role' (2003: p. 525). Imagine the role of these 'televisual images' in the contemporary age of rapid development of communication technologies.

For McDonald, the context of the speech act is defined narrowly in the securitization theory of Copenhagen School, focusing on the moments of intervention only: 'The potential process for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed, and the question of why particular representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under-theorized' (McDonald, 2008: p. 564).

Securitization theory has difficulties in identifying 'securitizing actors' (whose discourse is important in the securitization process), 'audiences' and the share of 'certain' or 'significant' amount of audience in general population (Diez, 2006). Waever (2003) defines

securitizing actors mainly as political leaders who engage in securitizing moves. However, he notes that 'even the solid position of authority and motivation of leaders are not determinant points; they can only influence political interaction, which ultimately takes place among actors in a realm of politics with the historical openness this entails' (Waever, 2003: p. 14). Here it is not clear whose discourses are determinant in analyzing the securitization process. Concerning audiences, scholars point at both methodological and theoretical limitations.

> Implicitly, the audience seems to be equivalent to the national public – a securitising move is successful if the large majority of the national demos accept it and therefore legitimates extraordinary measures. However, neither theoretically nor empirically does the national public necessarily have to be the audience of a securitising move. Their equation only works for the nation-state, in which securitisations serve the imagination of the nation (Anderson, 1991) ... In theory, however, each securitising move has its own specific audience. (Diez, 2006: p. 4).

Although Copenhagen School proponents argue that audience 'decides' a 'successful securitization,' critics argue that one seldom meets clear examples of cases that meet the overriding assumption that an (observable) audience has agreed with the securitizing claims.

At the same time, the Paris School's identification of potential securitizing agents also has difficulties. Bigo (2002) restricts the scope of securitizing agents to security professionals. However, in order to present an issue as a threat an agent does not have to be a security professional – most environmentalists who have successfully presented environmental pollution and degradation as a global security issue are not security professionals for example (Bourbeau, 2011). Moreover, several works have argued that other than security professionals, media (Hansen, 2011), religious actors (Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010) as well as NGOs (Barthwal-Datta, 2009) may become securitizing actors.

Speaking of audiences, Côté (2016) criticizes the securitization theory for characterizing the audience as 'agents without agency', marginalizing the theory's intersubjective nature. Although audiences are important in the process of securitization, they are not able enough to engage actively:

> This not only analytically prevents the audience from having any significant effect on the nature and outcome of securitization processes but also dilutes the intersubjective disposition of securitization theory, producing a linear and rigid view of the securitization process that conflicts with the empirical literature regarding security threat construction (Côté, 2016: p. 3).

Through a meta-synthesis of 32 empirical studies of securitization, the author contends that audience is best defined as ‘the individual(s) or group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practices (Côté, 2016: p. 8).

Messina defined securitization process as the ‘antithesis of the methods and procedures by which elites normally seek the public’s support for their preferred policies’ (Messina, 2014: p. 531).

Copenhagen School’s view of securitization in ‘exceptional' terms also raises criticism especially by Paris School proponents in applying the theory to less extreme cases, where the threat is not presented as such. According to the Paris School, ‘the securitizing move is not a speech act asserting an existential threat to the nation but rather takes the form of building a general context of unease within which it may be justified to introduce a particular governmental technology’ (Diez & Huysmans 2007: p. 10). Bourbeau criticizes both schools for shortcomings in the issue of continuity and change:

> Focusing only on moments and places of exception neglects the numerous ways in which security practices reproduced consistently across time and space. Unless we accept the proposition that we are living in permanent state of exception where exception itself is the rule, the CoS [Copenhagen School] model is ill equipped to deal with the idea that mechanisms of security are proliferating and generating a constant sense of insecurity, fear and danger. Conversely, an exclusive focus on routine practices does not allow room to account for change, critical junctures or the impacts of ‘windows of opportunity’ on contemporary security affairs… The logic of routine has so far failed to produce guiding principles to make sense of key moments of change in the securitisation process, where actors step out of adopted boundaries and transcend the field of action in which they are normally engaged (Bourbeau, 2014: p. 191).

Seeing the incompleteness of both the logic of exception (Copenhagen School) and the logic of routine (Paris School), Bourbeau calls for cutting across the divides between them and focus on those factors that unite security scholars of both sides: ‘Employing one logic to the exclusion of the other leads to a partial and potentially deceptive account of the securitization process. Rather than continuing an endless dispute between rival “schools” … moving forward

together can further enrich our understanding of the securitization process and stimulate theoretical progress' (Bourbeau, 2014: p. 205).

For Thierry Balzacq, securitization stands for the structural-significant components of various empirical phenomena (2014). He argues that there coexist 'various types of securitization, each of which is committed to distinctive ontologies and epistemologies, as well as to "different orientations toward empirical material" … (S)ecuritization – once again, not particular theories – accounts for threat construction in a way that is not situation bound. In other words, the logical structure of securitization is non-contingent, even if the meaning of security is often contextual' (2014: p. 8). In this sense, drawing upon Max Weber's ideal type, Balzacq developed an ideal type of securitization (*not* securitization theories) – a set of essential qualitative features which, when combined, constitute a logical whole. He stresses that the ideal-typical construct spurs various theories of securitization (linguistic or philosophical, sociological, etc.). These theories derive their identity from the degree to which they come close to, or deviate from, the ideal type of securitization (Balzacq, 2014: p. 8).

Table 2. Balzacq's ideal type of securitization

- Threats are social facts whose status depends on an **intersubjective** commitment between an **audience** and a **securitizing actor**
- **Securitizing moves** and **context** are co-dependent
- The drivers of securitizing moves are **knowledge** claims about an **existential threat** to a referent object
- **Power relations** among stakeholders structure both the processes and outcomes of securitizing moves
- Securitizing moves are engraved in **social mechanisms** (persuasion, propaganda, learning, socialization, practices, etc.)
- Securitization instantiates **policy** changes – for example, 'deontic powers' (rights, obligations, derogations **exceptional** or otherwise, etc.)
- Securitization ascribes **responsibility**

Agreeing with Balzacq's notion that there are many theories of securitization, but there is one securitization, however, this research's aim is to demonstrate that the application of the theory to contexts outside Western societies needs to be adapted and refined. The Copenhagen School presents two categories of conditions: facilitating (internal and external) and the audience. However, focusing on facilitating conditions leads research to explore 'the conditions that *facilitate* the securitization process; it overlooks contextual factors that *limit* or *constrain* a successful securitization' (Bourbeau, 2011: p. 40).

Theoretical framework of securitization was developed and improved through analysing the cases of mostly European nations as a country as well as the European Union as a whole. But exclusive focus on European societies makes it difficult for us to comprehend how the securitization of migration has developed in other contexts. This stems from the author's understanding that securitization of migration or its absence as well as its occurrence is dependent on so many national factors.

We must also note that a certain amount criticism of securitization theory comes from misunderstanding of the theory. Christina Boswell, one of the well-known critics of the theory, questioned the very existence of securitization of immigration in Europe: 'while there may be some evidence that securitization has occurred in a number of cases … there is no reason to expect politics to be driven exclusively by an interest in encouraging public unease or introducing more stringent security measures' (Boswell, 2007: p. 592). She gave three reasons for why states or governments in the European continent would be cautious to securitize immigration:

> The first reason … is that securitization can create unfeasible expectations about the state's capacity to control migration. By depicting migration policy as part of a counterterrorism strategy, states are effectively raising the stakes of migration control. If they fail to deliver on targets of migration control, they expose themselves to quite serious accusations about their capacity to provide security. … Pursuing a strategy of securitization may also jeopardize other goals of the state, such as ensuring a sufficient supply of migrant labor to guarantee the conditions of economic growth. … The third reason why European states appear to have resisted the securitization of migration control relates to the cognitive constraints. … Governments need to offer coherent and credible accounts of the causes and nature of the terrorist threat and the sorts of interventions that can best respond to them (Boswell, 2009: pp. 102-103).

On the other hand, Aradau (2001) understood securitization as well as de-securitization as a technique of government. Hansen (2000) criticizes securitization scholarship for marginalizing the security needs of salient actors who cannot utter their insecurity. Usually,

this kind of criticism comes from the scholars of gender studies and and focuses on the absence of moral and ethical goals and even the falseness of any such goals. In this regard, one should clearly make distinction between securitization as a theoretical framework and securitization as a government practice.

Criticizing that the theory does not allow to explore different levels or intensities of securitization of migration in different contexts, Philippe Bourbeau (2011) developed a variation to differentiate between weak and strong levels of securitization. Choosing France and Canada, Bourbeau argued that although migration has been securitized in almost all countries with large immigrant population, 'there is a considerable variation in the *levels* of securitization' (2011: p. 11). To better understand how migration is securitized, Bourbeau used two categories of indicators. Institutional indicators included legal, policy statements as well as the saliency of the link between migration and security within these policy statements. An indicator of security practices consisted of interdiction and detention of immigrants.

Bourbeau demonstrated that both France and Canada score on all indicators of securitized migration. It was the level of the securitization that differed: 'the outcome for Canada, with low saliency and low detention rates, is a weak level of securitization, whereas the outcome for France, with high saliency and a high level of immigrant detainees, is a strong level of securitization' (Table 8, Chapter 7).

This thesis follows Philippe Bourbeau's argument that migration is securitized in almost all countries with large immigration population ('securitized migration') and that contexts play an important role in defining the variation in levels of securitization. However, Bourbeau identified only two levels or 'types' of the securitization of migration: weak and strong. Both of the countries (France and Canada) are Western democracies with highly advanced democratic institutions and post-industrial development. But what about the countries outside the Western world? How about those countries where (im)migration or certain group(s) of immigrants are securitized not as weakly as in countries like Canada, Sweden, Germany, and not as strongly as in the UK, Greece or France? What exact contextual factors can impact the level of securitization? What is the role of democratic/authoritarian regimes in this process? Can securitized migration be only weak or strong? These questions still need to be tackled.

In Chapter seven, this research aims to go further and develop a typology of countries with different levels of securitized migration. In categorizing 'securitized migration' regimes,

several contextual factors such as the character of the political regime, the peculiarities of relationships with the most migrant-providing countries, the relationship between foreign policy goals and migration policies, etc. will also be considered.

2.3. Securitization of Migration

This section slightly explores the most recent developments in the scholarship of migration securitization abroad before proceeding to directly focus on the exploration of literature that concerns Russia.

First of all, as it was mentioned above, the overwhelming majority of the scholarship on securitization theory mostly explores cases in European or North American contexts. Lazaridis' edited book (2011) mostly focuses on how security issues reached unprecedented heights in Western European countries since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US. It explored the ways of rhetorically associating immigrants with cultural, economic, and physical security threats by European politicians; the growing widespread fears in societies and, as a result of successful securitization, increasingly restrictive immigration policies. More recent book edited by Lazaridis and Wadia (2015) continues these debates on how treating immigration as a security threat increased insecurity amongst migrant and ethnic minority populations. In this regard, authors not only structure the very process of securitization of migration, but also explore the consequences of such securitization for those who migrate in terms of both insecurity and violation of human rights.

In the United States, the concept of migration as a security threat emerged since September 11 events (Tirman, 2006). Tirman describes that if before 9/11 migration was mainly considered a threat to social security (jobs, welfare), after 9/11 discourse of terrorism came to the fore which first and foremost affected Arab and/or Muslim immigrants. Along with this the securitization of Mexican immigrants, the largest number of immigrants in the US, also strengthened (Zong & Batalova, 2014).

D'Appollonia (2012) provides with the details of 'exceptional measures' or 'security packages' that the US and European states took as a result of securitization after the September 11 events, including implementation of a 'zero-tolerance approach to immigration offenses, tougher controls on borders, and even extraterritorial controls beyond borders' (p. 72) in these countries.

Scholars have compared the Mediterranean complex (of sea borders) and the US-Mexico border that 'identify security-insecurity processes related to the restriction of borders in the age of globalization' (Ribas-Mateos, 2011: pp. 51-52).

Within the debate of the implications of a securitization of migration, the role of emotions in the process of categorizing migrants as a potential security threat is noticeable. According to Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 'Western societies are witnessing the emergence of many existential and conceptual anxieties and fears about their identity, security, and well-being. … By its transnational character, its dynamic, and its impact on people and institutions at all levels, migration is perceived as posing a serious challenge to the long-standing paradigms of certainty and order' (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002: pp. 21-22).

The politics of fear in the Western societies is mainly constructed in relation to the differences in one's appearance, the undocumented migrant, or the refugee, namely, the 'non-European', the 'Muslim', or the 'Hispanic' (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Togrul, 2011).

Some authors highlighted the role of racism in the process of securitization of migration (Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005; Togral, 2011). According to Maggie Ibrahim, the securitization of migration can be examined as 'discourse through which relations of power are exercised' and is 'racism's most modern form' (Ibrahim, 2005: pp.163-164).

Several scholars have focused on the (mostly negative) effects of securitization of migration on migrants themselves (Freedman 2004; Lazaridiz & Screparis, 2015; Trevino-Rangel, 2016). Other scholars have tackled how security practices are compatible with human rights issues (Crepeau & Nakache, 2006; Devetak 2004; Liotta 2002; Lowry 2002; Watson 2009), whether immigrants are an asset or a threat to receiving societies (Guild & van Selm 2005), rights restrictions as immigration control (Heindl, 2017).

Recently, scholars also took note of how immigration control transformed to disciplining mobility (Geiger, 2013; Geiger & Pecoud, 2013). As Pecoud (2013) put it, the disciplining of immigrants is not only about bans, border controls, deportation and other restrictive measures but also about the representations and discourses that rationalize these above-mentioned measures and make them possible. Geiger (2013) also talked about a new mode of governmentality in immigration control in the contemporary world, where government policies separate the desirable migrants from the undesirable ones.

As a matter of fact, anti-immigrant sentiments are present almost in all immigrant-hosting societies.

> The turn of the twenty-first century has brought a world of mass migration, but this is a reality that the residents of the rich democracies do not like. Often wanting foreign workers, but having much less taste for foreign people who

> settle down, the residents of the rich democracies want their national communities maintained… Keeping membership restricted is of strategic value, especially when the place in question is a wealthy society that attracts the poor. Selfishness is not the only motivation at work; however, the idea of the national community, understood as a broad, family-like group of people responsible for taking care of one another, but not everyone outside the circle, is also an ideal … governments do what their people want, making strenuous efforts to control movements across the border. (Waldinger, 2010: pp. 58, 42)

Associating immigrants with high crime and unemployment levels is common in many countries (Vertovec, 2011). As Tunon and Baruah (2012) note, ‘studies from around the world show that the public generally hold negative perceptions of migration and migrant workers’ (p. 149). Having comparatively analyzed many European contexts, Semyonov, Gorodzeisky and Raijman ‘reveal[ed] strong and mostly negative sentiments toward foreigners and immigrants. … Immigrants often are viewed as a threat to economic success, to national identity, and to the social order’ (Semyonov *et al.,* 2006: p. 432). Scholars have noted that hostility arise from ambiguities about immigration consequences and migrants’ motivations and that framing migration as a national security problem is therefore logical, but counterproductive (Alexseev, 2006).

As we can see, one is aware of an abundant number of literature on securitization theory, perception of immigration as a threat and state security practices. However, much of the literature is based on the case studies of migration securitization in Western countries, and not much has been explored about securitization of labour migration in Russia. It is notwithstanding the fact that Russia hosts one of the largest migrant population in the world (with more than 10 million foreigners after the US and Germany). Since there are significant socio-political differences between Western and post-Soviet societies (non-democratic state policies, large shadow economy, mostly malfunctioning and corrupt institutions, widespread xenophobia), we cannot assume that theoretical perspectives developed in the Western contexts may be directly applicable in the illiberal political regimes such as Russia. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that securitization of migration may have different forms and *modus operandi* depending on socio-political context, economic and cultural factors.

There is a growing literature that focuses on the securitization of migration in Russia. This literature can be conditionally divided into a) restrictive state policies and inconsistent legislation; b) perception and representation of migration as a threat to society; and c) xenophobia, nationalism and abuse of migrants’ rights.

The Russian government's ineffective migration policies have recently been a focus of attention of literature. These policies were labelled as having 'liberal slogans, but illiberal practices' (Gulina & Utyasheva, 2016), 'discrepancy between restrictionist and protectionist rhetoric on the one hand and a rather liberal approach to the admission of immigrants and their access to the labour market on the other hand' (Malakhov, 2014: p. 1075; see also Abashin, 2016b). Malakhov and Simon (2016) also note that Russia's migration policy has been wavering between two logics: police-centric (restrictive) and economy-centric (liberal), with the former prevailing over the latter (p. 6).

Analyzing the reasons behind these ineffective policies, Meilus suggests that

> … many of the seemingly illogical and contradictory aspects of Russian migration policy are not random, but deliberately enacted in a way that allows the Russian policy makers to hide behind a curtain of ambiguity while ensuring that labor migrants remain illegal and vulnerable in order to form and unregulated, cheap, flexible, and mobile labor force (2013: p. 7).

State provokes and reinforces nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies and practices (Schenk, 2010). Alexseev (2011) argued that regional political authorities in many cases play on uncertainty and exploit fears dominant in public discourse in the bargaining power and economic resources with the central government.

Earlier studies on migration in Russia looked at migration/security nexus through the prism of how (irregular) migration might pose threats to national security of Russia (Ivahnyuk & Daurov, 2003; Herd & Puglisi, 2003). Scholarly works that examine directly the issue of securitization of migration in Russia have dealt with Chinese migrants, mostly located in the Far East part of the country (Alexseev 2006, Larin 2012). Discussing the public perceptions of Chinese migrants in Russia, Larin (2012) notes that fuelling the paranoia over immigration might be local authorities' attempt to redirect attention from the shortcomings of the host society itself.

Hoang (2015) analyzed how Russia's mobility disciplining strategies essentially reflected security concerns and nationalist sentiments. Hoang argued that a negative portrayal of migrants (organized crime, shadow economy, social disruptions, etc.) 'serves to justify and reinforce stricter control of mobility and even the use of force in anti-immigration campaigns' (p. 3). 'The protectionist immigration regime is clearly at odds with the demographic and economic realities in the country,' Hoang (2015: p. 3) notes. The author also argues that anti-immigrant and nationalist sentiments in Russia are not expressed against all foreigners but

particularly directed at the racial Other coming from the outside the European part of the former Soviet Union, i.e. mostly people from Central Asian republics.

Russia' punitive and inconsistent legislative system has been pushing many migrants into irregular position. Some call it the 'symbolic violence of the state' as, in the case of Central Asians in Russia, state policies and practices control immigrants by illegalizing and racializing them, thus setting conditions for their mistreatment (Agadjanian, Menjivar & Zotova, 2017). 'The inconsistent rules and procedures followed by different agencies lead to a situation in which sanctions can be applied and other negative consequences can arise for migrants, even when irregularity has not been proved and can still be challenged' (Kubal, 2016: p. 461). This uneven balance between the three sets of rules, practices and provisions is called a phenomenon of a 'spiral effect of the law' (Kubal, 2016).

Linking the external threat of terrorism to migration, Russia's migration regime began to be securitized as migrants, in Russia's political and social discourse, were increasingly viewed as threats to Russia's national security.

> … the Russian nationalist media and segments of the scholarly community, viewing an influx of non-ethnic Russians as destabilizing and as an unhealthy addition to the demographic composition of the nascent Russian nation-state, began to grow more alarmist in tone and called upon the Russian state to take efforts to control migration. The Russian Federation's trend towards a more restrictive immigration regime is in step with the increasingly anti-immigrant posture adopted by the United States and Europe in the last few years (Robarts 2008: p. 6).

Recent scholarship has tried to explain reasons for securitization of migration with the regime legitimation (Kingsbury, 2016). Regimes in authoritarian states often invoke anti-Western populist sentiments in search of support for their legitimacy, offering an image of enemy. Using this logical framework, Kingsbury argued that

> immigrants, as a form of the Other, can be portrayed as the enemy, especially if migrants are demonised as a source of evil, such as crime and terrorism. I propose that the Russian regime utilises xenophobia as a political tool to demonstrate that it is successfully addressing the threat that migrants reportedly create. This is largely an exaggerated threat, a political construction akin to the threat of the West that is used by authoritarian regimes to divert citizens' attention from internal societal problems, such as corruption, the lack of democratic freedoms, and economic stagnation. Xenophobia is utilised to maintain the regime's legitimacy in an effort to prevent contentious collective action (2016: p. 182).

Hostility against labour migrants is not only expressed by individuals in public places or through speeches of political authorities and activists, but also government-controlled mass media also fuel phobias and hostility towards migrants (Shnirelman, 2007; Mukomel, 2011, Ablazhei, 2012; Malinkin, 2013; Kuznetsova, 2017). If in the 1990s Chechens were portrayed as the main enemy, in 2000s the mass media cultivated a negative image of migrants (Shnirelman, 2007). For example, through the analysis of mainstream television channels' coverage of the December 2010 riots in Moscow's Manezhnaia square, Hutchings and Tolz (2012) demonstrated how Russian media essentialized ethnic boundaries between the conflicting sides. During the Moscow mayoral election campaign in 2013, media was characterised as 'producing a coordinated campaign to demonise labour migrants' (Kingbury, 2016: p. 185).

Another study examined Russian TV coverage of anti-immigration campaigns in 2012 and 2013 to find out that, in contrast to earlier approaches to covering migration, Islam was identified in news reports as the main marker of the migrant identity and a threat to Russian culture and society (Tolz & Harding, 2015). Anti-migrant hostility is not present only in TV or press media. It has been quite high in the Russian blogosphere as well (Bodrunova, Koltsova, Koltcov & Nikolenko, 2017). Gaufman (2016) also examined how enemy images – the US, the Ukraine crisis, sexuality as well as migration – are manufactured by authorities and how these threats are articulated by general public in social networks in contemporary Russia.

Kuprina and Sandler (2015) examined stereotypes of perception of migration in Russia (for example, 'Russia is "awash" with immigrants', 'Immigrants take jobs; destroy national identity; commit crimes, …') and tried to identify how they conform to real life and the roots for such kind of beliefs.

Alexseev (2006) extensively explored the concept of (perceived) threat from immigration through analysing how immigration phobia is cultivated in, among others, Russia's Far East. Alexseev stressed that fear (of immigrants) always brings hostility (towards immigrants):

> Immigration phobia in host societies is likely to be more intense, the more acute perceptions of emergent anarchy, the more ambiguous the sense of migrant intentions, and the more distinct and cohesive the perceived 'groupness' of migrants. These three correlates of the interethnic security dilemma represent the political and intergroup logic of fear and hostility. They are intrinsically present in any migration context. Albeit with varying intensity, some people in host societies would perceive the very fact of migration as weakening state

> sovereignty, would harbor suspicions about migrants' intent, and would view even atomized and assimilating migrant communities as distinct, distant, and homogenous entity. The embeddedness of these perceptions in any migration context would explain inevitable exaggeration of fear and antimigrant hostility, even under most benign conditions (Alexseev, 2006: p. 69).

In other words, 'the immigration security dilemma not only better explains extreme anti-migrant hostility than the societal security theory does, but it is a necessary condition for securitization itself' (Alexseev, 2011: pp. 519-520). The author also noted that local politicians exploit public fears of immigration in the bargaining game over power and economic resources with the central government (Alexseev, 2006).

Scholars have pointed to an explicit link between colonialism and patterns of migration (Talbot & Thandi, 2004; van Amersfoort, 2009; Bosma, Lucassen & Oostindie, 2012; Mains *et al.*, 2013). 'Migration, and our knowledge of migration, is profoundly shaped by colonialism and its aftermath. Taking seriously the topic of postcolonial migrations means that we question the basis of our understanding of migration' (Mains *et al.*, 2013: p. 140). Abashin makes an interesting link between Russia's current migration regime and post-colonialism. Speaking of a 'new strategy of domination of the newly redefined "center" over the inhabitants of the Central Asian "periphery"' (Abashin, 2014: p. 18), he contends that 'the status and label of "migrant" has become a new means of colonization, replacing the "alien" (*inorodets*) of tsarist times and the "ethnic minority person" (*natsmen*) of the Soviet period' (p. 19, emphasis in the original). However, interestingly, Malakhov (2016) notes a significant difference between 'us'/'them' dichotomy in other former colonies such as the UK or France and Russia: in contrast to the former 'Soviet citizens' immigrants from former colonies were largely alien to the population of the former metropolitan areas:

> The people that belong to the two sides of this process that are referred to as host society and immigrants were until recently part of the same political and cultural community. What we have observed in the last quarter century is the process of becoming alien, of othering those who, in the memories of generations still living today, were either entirely or partially "ours". In other words, we are witnessing an about−face in the process of constructing and reconstructing symbolic borders, which affects different groups in different ways (Malakhov, 2016: p. 1).

By exploring the representation of Self and Other in Russian discourse of migration in the second half of 2000s, Popova (2012) found out the negativization of Other was continuing and increasing in Russia. The Self legitimization appears on a par with Other delegitimization

‘whereby migrants are presented as criminal, immoral, illegal, deceitful, opportunistic and naturally causing negative emotions in the local population’ (p. 370).

Population’s anti-immigrant sentiments in Russia has been covered by an abundant number of studies (to name a few: Yudina, 2005; Malakhov, 2007; Zaionchkovskaia, Mkrtchyan & Tyuryukanova, 2009; Mukomel, 2013; Mukomel, 2014; Gorodzeisky, Glikman & Maskileyson, 2014; Koptseva, Kirko & Pertishchev, 2016; Kosmarskaya & Savin, 2016). In fact, a lot has been written about xenophobia in Russia. There is a consensus among many scholars, both Russian and Western, that ‘xenophobia is primarily projected at representatives of migrant minorities who are non-traditional to a given location’ (Mukomel, 2013: p. 200).

It is claimed that Kremlin officials not only put up with xenophobic and anti-migrant sentiments, but from time to time encouraged and tried to exploit for their purposes (Shevtsova, 2007; Kingsbury, 2016).

Literature has acknowledged the identity crisis happened in post-Soviet Russia (for example, Gudkov, 2004; Franklin & Widdis, 2006; Oushakine, 2009). The process of identity building in contemporary Russia has not been smooth partly because of the so-called ‘imperial syndrome’ (Pain, 2016). It has been well observed that ever-growing migrantophobia has served as the main source for the nationalist mobilisation (Laruelle, 2010; Kholodkovskii, 2013; Kolsto & Blakkisrud, 2016). Kingsbury (2016) sees xenophobia as an instrument of power legitimation and argues that Russian elites manipulate immigration phobias for political gain: ‘Xenophobia in Russia was artificially stimulated by the regime in order to deflect attention from acute societal problems such as corruption, decaying democratic freedoms and the economic stagnation’ (p. 179). According to Pain (2016), the Kremlin has so far managed to use and manipulate ethnic nationalism in preserving Soviet-type imperial nationalism as the official backbone for its own political survival and legitimacy. Overall, ‘institutional and societal manifestations of xenophobia in Russia work together to demand and justify restrictive immigration policies despite the economic and demographic need for migrant labor’ (Schenk, 2010: p. 108).

Poletaev (2014) analyzes each of stereotypes among Russian population with regard to labour migration in detail (‘migrants take our jobs,’ ‘migrants commit crimes in Russia,’ ‘migrants significantly lower wage levels of local workers,’ ‘migrants establish ghettoes which escalates inter-ethnic hate in urban areas,’ ‘migrants are burden for social welfare services,’ ‘migrant remittances are actually money outflow from Russia, thus it is bad for economy,’

‘migrant children in schools mean useless spending of budget allocations’) and proves how these stereotypes are wrong.

Shevtsova writes that ‘[x]enophobia has always been endemic in Russia, but it was never allowed public expression. It hid behind imperial ideology. Now ethnic nationalism is often fanned by factions within the ruling elite. In its search for external and internal enemies, the elite focuses on [among others] immigrants’ (2007: p. 283).

It is claimed that growing anti-migrant sentiments could bring nationalist organizations to speak in the name of the ethnic majority to the forefront politics (Semenenko, 2015). For example, Russia’s largest nationalist organization since mid 2000s has been the Democratic Movement against Illegal Migration (*DPNI*). Tipaldou and Uba (2014) learned the impact of such radical right movements on Russia’s immigration policies. In this regard, Laruelle (2017) proposes to look at Russian nationalism not through its contents, but through its actors and defines three categories such actors: anti-Putin non-state actors; para-state actors who operate under the state umbrella but not always agree with the Kremlin narrative; and state actors, in particular the presidential administration.

A recent study examined the experiences of ethno-racially motivated harassment among working migrant women from the three countries of Central Asia in Russia, which revealed significant variations, regardless of legal status (regular or irregular), across the three migrant groups, with members of the group that is seen as racially most distinct from the host population having the highest odds of reporting harassment (Agadjanian, Menjivar & Zotova, 2017). Authors conclude that ‘because there is virtually no official or public repudiation of anti-immigrant racism, the ubiquitous racist labels and stereotypes are normalized and become part of the cognitive repertoires of natives and migrants alike. Thus, Central Asian *gastarbajtery* (from the German Gastarbeiter, or guest worker) receive continuous, poignant reminders that they are not only outsiders in a legal sense but also racially alien and inferior’ (Agadjanian *et al.*, 2017: p. 6).

The above-mentioned works in explaining anti-immigrant sentiments could be generally grouped in the so-called cultural theory (Castles, 2010; Putnam, 2007) which is based on the fear of losing cultural purity because of national/racial and religious differences. Scholars have also developed the competition hypothesis (or some call it economic vulnerability) to explain that anti-immigrant hostility stems from the perceived competition for local social and economic resources (jobs, welfare, etc.) (Kischelt, 1995; Semyonov, Raijman

& Gorodziesky, 2006). Bahry's findings show that economic vulnerability and cultural orientations (such as conservatism and low levels of interpersonal trust) play a significant role in shaping anti-immigrant sentiment:

> … the sense of threat from new arrivals has both material and non-material roots. On the material side, vulnerability to economic competition generates greater perceptions of harm, as do both pocketbook and sociotropic assessments of economic conditions. On the non-material side, core dispositions, including distrust of other people and closer adherence to traditional social values, also heighten the sense of threat. Alienation appears to play a role as well, since people who feel more distant from others of their own nationality are more disposed to see immigration in a negative light (Bahry, 2016: p. 900).

Some scholars have gone so far to argue that Russia is the most dangerous country in Europe for ethnic minorities and such violence is more 'systematic' (structured, ideologically coherent, patterned) than in other developed societies (Arnold, 2015).

Precarious everyday lives, discrimination of labour migrants from Central Asia by state bodies, especially law enforcement agencies were also a focus of attention (Chupik, 2014; Round & Kuznetsova, 2016).

Most of literature on migration in Russia focuses on anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia against labour migrants from the South Caucasus and Central Asian republics. Representation of migration as a threat to Russian by media, officials lead to further xenophobia in the society.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the existing scholarship on migration theories securitization theory, migration and migration securitization in Russia. Migration theories were shortly reviewed. It also discussed mostly Russian academic literature on Russia's migration needs, both for economic, demographic and political reasons. Although this research mainly focuses on the securitization theory of Copenhagen School, the analysis also included the criticisms of current scholarship as well as elements of other schools of critical security studies.

How labour migration from Central Asia is securitized is scrutinized in scholarly works of both Russian and non-Russian scholars. Based on the existing literature available on migration and security debate in Russia, we can see that the previous studies focused on more narrow aspects of migration securitization in this country. However, there is no detailed

analysis of how Russia deals with maintaining immigration needs of the country on one hand, and factors that contribute to the securitization of migration, on the other.

Chapter 3. Methodology and Methods of Research

3.1. Methods of research: design, data gathering

The material of this study contains primary and secondary sources. The empirical data is obtained through the following methods: semi-structured interviews with migration experts; informal conversations and semi-structured interviews with labour migrants; and informal observations in the field. Legislation and policy documents of the Russian Federation concerning immigration and citizenship issues as well as publications in Russian newspapers also constitute the part of empirical data for this research.

Semi-structured interviews are characterized by a relatively informal style, which can be described more as 'a conversation or discussion rather than a formal question and answer format' (Mason, 2002: 62). A semi-structured interview with open-ended questions also gives a degree of flexibility for the interviewer to develop the issues as they arise (Denscombe, 2010). This type of interview also stimulates informal conversation, and is thus conducive to building a trustful relationship between researcher and respondent. In my semi-structured interviews, I had a list of questions (separate for experts and migrants, please see in the appendices) which I asked in different orders depending on the flow of the interviews and the dynamics of interaction with the respondent. While I handed my questions to experts before the interview, this wasn't done with labour migrants. Some new questions were added during the interviews since interviewees revealed some new issues which I had not predicted or anticipated.

Migration experts included scholars, lawyers and workers of assistance centres for migrants. While some experts were specialists in Russian (migration and citizenship) legislation, others were knowledgeable in particular issues labour migrants faced in their everyday lives. Most of the experts were based in Moscow and were in contact with labour migrants, other experts, government representatives from stakeholder agencies as a part of their professional tasks on a daily basis. Interviews with lawyers focused on the analysis of legislative framework of Russian migration regime, legal cases of migrants with state bodies and institutions, ongoing changes in the Russian migration system, difficult situations that migrants find themselves. In interviewing scholars, I was mostly interested in dominant

discourses of migration in different sectors of social life. I had interviewed most of the experts and labour migrants in 2017 over online messenger services, including Messenger, Skype and Telegram.

Some of my semi-structured interviews with migrants and informal observations in the field took place before I actually started my PhD study. While working for an international organization in Tashkent, I made several trips to Moscow where I encountered labour migrants from Central Asia. Informal observations were conducted not only in public places, but also in private living spaces in the Russian capital city and its surroundings. These observations provided an additional information about the living and working conditions, lifestyles, migrant experiences, encounters with other social actors.

Later on, after my enrolment into PhD study, semi-structured interviews with migrants took place not only in Russia and Uzbekistan, but also via online messenger platforms (Telegram, Viber, etc.)[6] while the author was in Japan. Conducting interviews with labour migrants, I was interested in interviewees' account of personal experiences of their everyday lives, relations with local population and the representatives of state bodies. The information received through these interviews provided me with an additional insight into the experiences of labour migrants as well as an additional information for the analysis of the Russia's migration policies.

In sampling interviewees, I used 'snowball' technique: they were approached through friends and acquaintances, as well as references by experts. As myself coming from Uzbekistan, I tried to diversify my sample by including citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to make it as more representative as possible.

I also conducted documentary research to have a more comprehensive analysis of the situation. Documentary research treats documents as a source of primary data. Matthews and Ross (2010) define document as written records about people and things that are generated through the process of living.

Documents can exist as written text (e.g., books, articles, reports), digital communication (e.g., web pages, blogs, social network sites) and visual sources (e.g., pictures, audio and video records, artefacts) (Denscombe, 2010).

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[6] Interestingly, very few number of Central Asian labour migrants use Skype.

Documents can be classified as public and private. Webb *et al.* (1984, in Henn, Weinstein & Foard, 2006) identified four types of public documents:

1. Actuarial records on the public, e.g., certificates of births, deaths and marriages;

2. Political and judicial records, e.g., decisions of courts, and by government;

3. Other government records, e.g., records on the weather, hospital records;

4. Mass media, e.g., news content, editorial columns and advertising.

Private documents, as the name implies, are those not originally meant for public scrutiny (letters, diaries, photographs, etc.).

As Denscombe (2010) puts it:

> [D]ocuments … contain information that can be *used* as *evidence* of something. Built into the concept of a 'document' is the idea that the information it contains is of value beyond its literal contents. It stands for something and it conveys something that is significant and useful. This feature is obvious in documents such as contracts, charters, deeds, registers, reports, forms and certificates. For social researchers, though, this suggests that documents can serve as a source of data that can be used to reveal things that are not immediately apparent. Rather than take the contents at face value there are things to be learnt from a deeper reading of the document. Documentary research, for this reason, generally goes beyond the straightforward collection of facts from documents: it tends to involve *interpreting* the document as well, looking for hidden meanings or structures in the work (Denscombe, 2010: pp. 225-226, emphases in the original).

This research predominantly deals with public documents. These include Russian legislation, government policy documents, statistics, results of opinion polls, speeches of public officials and others. Access to these documents was not an issue as most of them (unless mentioned otherwise)[7] were available on the Internet.

The analysis of legislation was used in exploring the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime. It was focused on the national legislation linked with migration and regulation of migrants' stay and work in the country. Russia's main migration policy documents include the Concept of Migration Policy adopted in 2012 (the first one was adopted in 2002)[8], the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation adopted in 2015 as well as

[7] Some particular data, for example, about police abuses or survey results, were provided directly by interviewed experts.

[8] Recently, Russian Ministry of Interior has developed a new draft of the Concept of Migration Policy which is expected to be adopted within this year.

federal several federal documents that regulate the issues related to citizenship, migration and movement of people.

I also analyzed the speeches of the president, prime-minister, government members, parliament members, governors, the FMS and MVD officials regarding migration in general, and labour migrants from Central Asia in particular. It should be noted that here speeches include both verbal and textual utterances broadcast and/or printed.

Table 3. Logic of the use of methods in the thesis

Research tasks		**Methods**
Analysis of context	Context of migration: background, dynamics, current trends and dynamics	Analysis of official statistics and other sources of information Overview of research
Exploration of factors that require migration	Economic and demographic factors	Analysis of official statistics Overview of research Media analysis
	Foreign policy goals	Expert interviews Overview of research Media analysis
Exploration of factors that push for securitization of labour migration	Legislative framework	Analysis of legislation Expert interviews Overview of research Media analysis
	Media discourses	Textual analysis of selected media
	Public perception	Opinion polls
	Migrant experiences	Semi-structured interviews with migrants Informal observations

As shown in the Table 2, I divided my research into three tasks. First, I analyzed the context of migration in general and labour migration from Central Asia in particular. I explored official statistics and other data from different sources including, but not limited to, media texts,

interviews of officials as wells as the overview of literature. Second, I analyzed the factors that make Russia keep accepting the migrants notwithstanding the local population's strong anti-migrant sentiments. Analysis of official statistics, media texts and expert interviews provided material for the accomplishment of this task. Third, I explored the factors that push for the securitization of labour migration in Russia. To this end, I analyzed legislative framework, media discourses, public perception of labour migrants and migrants' living experiences. These tasks were not carried out separately, since the methods used in this thesis informed all the tasks.

One of the important methods of research in this study is the textual analysis of media. Because media, with its capacity to reach to a large number of people, contributes to the construction of social practices. At the same time, one must be aware that mass media representations, even if they are presented as 'voices' from other sites of discourse production, are nevertheless products of the media (Fairclough, 1995 in Carvalho, 2008). Most popular TV and print media are selected to show how they construct discourses of labour migrant identities. These media include talk-shows and news reports on the so-called three 'federal TV channels' that broadcast to all territories of Russia and have the largest number of audience: *Perviy, Rossiya* and *NTV*. Regarding the print media, two newspapers are chosen: *Moskovskij Komsomolets*, a private newspaper with the largest number of circulation in Russia; and *Rossijskaya Gazeta,* Russian government's official newspaper that publishes not only government reports and legal acts, but also interviews, op-eds, columns, etc. with government officials and other public figures. Besides the official web-pages of the media in focus, *Zagolovki.ru,* a website that monitors and archives Russian media publications since January 2007, provides a collection of archives on the topic of migration in the selected media.

The analysis explored dominant images and discourses in Russian media regarding migrants, specifically labour migrants from Central Asia. Selected media resources are non-oppositional and known to be controlled by or keep in general line with the Kremlin policies. In other words, they represent opinions (with relative difference) broadly similar to that of the Russian government.

It should be noted that though this study will be covering the period between 2006 and 2017, the analysis of media texts will mostly focus on selected events that have intensified the discussion of migration issues in public domain. The starting point is Kondopoga events which strongly resonated in Russian society, bringing strong anti-migrant sentiments into media

discourse. Public opinion polls, speech acts of Russian authorities regarding migration will be investigated between this period. Analysis of media texts will mostly focus on important events that have happened within ten years: Kondopoga events (2006), financial crisis and its impact on labour migration (2008-9), Manezhnaia riots (2010), Moscow mayoral election (2013), Biryulyovo riots (2013), death of Umarali (2015). The last event, a blast of bomb in St Petersburg metro in April 2017 which claimed the lives of 15, seems to be a culminating point of intensification of public discussions on migration since investigators announced that the executor of this terrorist act was an ethnic Uzbek from south Kyrgyzstan.

The research has also analyzed public opinion polls conducted among the Russian populations; official statistics provided by the Russian State Committee on Statistics, former Federal Migration Service and the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for the state's migration policy since 2016. Of course, the findings of academic literature on securitization of migration in Russia are extensively used. These findings provide a broad picture of migration situation in the country, dynamics of processes, and comparison with other contexts when needed.

Levada Center, Russia's independent polling research organization, have conducted opinion polls concerning migration, xenophobia, Russians' attitude towards foreigners and migrants since the early 2000s. Results of these polls were used to investigate and correlate with trends in Russian media at particular periods of time. Through the analysis of opinion polls I also explored how representations of migration and labour migrants in media discourses might be different from the attitudes of poll respondents as media audiences towards migrants.

Government-produced statistics are one of the obvious sources for documentary research. Analysis of statistics of national census, reports detailing population movements, citizenship issues, demographic, social, economic trends in Russia as well as migration trends from Central Asia to Russia helped build the general picture of the research. Although some statistical data of different agencies (border services, former FMS, police, etc.,) sometimes contradict each other due to different data collection methodologies, overall, these statistics give a more or less correct picture of migrants. This may represent one of the disadvantages of using official statistics as a research source as mentioned by Henn *et al.* (2006). At the same time, it must be noted that since official statistics count only documented migrants, data about undocumented, or irregular, migrants are only estimates and may not reflect the real situation.

Also, in order not to accept documents at face value, their validity needs to be established and they must be evaluated in relation to four basic criteria: authenticity, representativeness, meaning and credibility (Denscombe, 2010). Every attempt was made to check documents for these criteria before using as a source.

The chosen resources are considered to be reliable and valid. The amount of empirical material is large and represents an overall picture.

3.2. Clarifications and issues for reflection

As was mentioned in the introduction chapter, the terms 'migration' and 'immigration' are used interchangeably in this thesis. 'Migration' is generally a wider term than 'immigration'. People move to places and from places, within countries and between countries. Particular types of movement, such as internal, seasonal or labour migration, implies that people come and go. In other words, having the back and forth movement element, migration generally refers to the movement of people. Whereas 'immigration' means that people move to a foreign country with the aim of permanent settlement. However, in most of the literature that this research focuses on the term 'immigration' ('immigrant') is also often used. In Russia, however, when speaking of people from Central Asia, the majority of whom stay in Russia temporarily, the term 'migration' ('migrant') is more commonly used. Therefore, when particularly focusing Central Asian labour migrants, I use the term 'migration', while the term 'immigration' is also used in referring to general movement of people.

The composition of migration to Russia is diverse. Other than Central Asians, there are hundreds of thousands of migrants from European part of the post-Soviet space, the Caucasus, Central Asia as well as from outside of the CIS countries: China, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Middle East and other parts of the world. Moreover, there is an internal migration within Russia, Russian citizens of both Slavic and non-Slavic origin also move to large urban areas, especially to Moscow. This study particularly focuses on Central Asian labour migrants. The reasons for focusing on Central Asian labour migrants are the following. Central Asian labour migrants (in their absolute majority represented by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) constitute a large portion of Russia's migrant population. The focus of this research has much to do with the reception of migrants in host society. Local population's attitude toward migrants from Eastern Europe is quite tolerant compared to that from Central Asia due to linguistic, cultural, religious and identity factors. Simply put in other words, how people in Russia perceive, for example, Ukrainians and Tajiks is very different. The Otherness of Central Asians is far more explicit. The issue of Central Asian migrants highlights the interconnection between religion, national identity and migration policy formulation in Russia. Additionally, an analysis of the factor of racial Other in Russia's discourse on migration help us more clearly understand the specific features of securitization of migration peculiar to Russian society.

In this study, Central Asians are represented by labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There are no exact numbers of citizens from these countries, however, one of the recent reports estimate (less than other sources) the number of Uzbeks at around two million, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are said to be represented by slightly more than a million and more than 600,000, respectively (RANEPA, 2017). Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan citizens are excluded from this study. The existing small number of labour migration from Kazakhstan is driven by geographic proximity, transport accessibility and, more importantly, represented mostly by ethnic Russians who are employed in other sectors of economy rather than labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan eventually closed its borders and established visa regime with all countries. Thus, both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have very few number of citizens in Russia compared to the other three republics.

Most of Central Asian migrants come to Russia on a seasonal basis; going back to their countries only during winter. Other group of migrants typically stay in Russia for one to three years. Most of migrants choose Moscow or St Petersburg metropolitan areas. Labour migration is mostly represented by males, although female migration (mostly in families) has also become a reality. Many migrants are undocumented and have a poor command of Russian. Of course, not all of people from Central Asia necessarily fall under the category described. There are many Central Asians who are Russian citizens or permanent residents or Russians by ethnicity. However, my research focuses on 'typical' Central Asians who are perceived as 'gastarbajter' by the local population.

Chapter 4. Contextualizing Migration in Russia

Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed background information about the current state of migration in Russia. First, the Soviet Union's migration policies are briefly discussed. This gives us an understanding of particular issues that are relevant to contemporary Russia's case. The legacy of the Soviet Union not only in migration affairs, but also overall situation predetermined the country's migration regime in early 1990s after the collapse of the USSR. The country's immigration regime started to change as Russian economy continued to grow. Migration trends, statistics, directions, and composition in contemporary Russia are provided. The chapter then assesses the scale and dynamics of labour migration from the three republics of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

4.1. Migration in the Soviet Union: Historical perspectives and implication for the current migration regime

International migration has become a new issue in the Russian Federation after the collapse of the USSR. Internal migration in the Soviet Union was conducted in a centralized way throughout the XX century. The country's migration policy was characterized as contradictory. On the one hand, people's freedom of movement was strictly limited by the so-called residence registration system, *propiska.* On the other, voluntary and involuntary large-scale population movements dictated by political, social and economic needs of industrialization (Ivahnyuk, 2009).

The *propiska* system, a compulsory registration of the passport holder at a specific address with a verified stamp of the Interior Ministry, was introduced in 1932 to fully implement the total control of population. A person could live, work, study, etc. only in a place of his/her residence of registration. Only residents of urban areas were entitled to hold a passport, while people in rural agricultural areas (*kolkhozniki*) could not have passports, therefore did not have a right to move to another place.

Notwithstanding these restrictions, there were large-scale employment-led migrations: a large number of population from rural areas were allocated to construction and manufacturing sectors which gradually accelerated the urbanization process. At the same time, especially in 1930s-1950s, mass-scale ethnicity-based (Crimean Tatars, Koreans, Chechens, and others) deportations affected millions of people who were forcefully moved to other places within the Soviet Union.

The decreasing number of population in its Siberia and the Far East parts of Russia was a challenge for Soviet authorities not only in terms of minimizing the scarcity of labour force in vast resource-rich areas, but also a strategic necessity. There was a clear understanding among political establishment on Russian regions' need for migrants both as economic and demographic resources. The notion of attracting population to Siberia, the Far East, Central Russia regions from other parts of the USSR, especially from overpopulated Central Asian republics was included in official government papers. For example, the Communist Party (CPSU) Congress concluded in a report in 1981 that

> … the situation with human resources in a number of places [is worsening]. The implementation of programs for the development of Western Siberia, the BAM zone, and other places in the Asian part of the country increased the influx of population there. Still, people often prefer to travel from north to south and from east to west, although the rational placement of productive forces requires movement in the opposite direction. In Central Asia, in a number of regions of the Caucasus, on the contrary, there is an excess of labour [force], especially in the countryside. So, it is necessary to involve the population of these places more actively in development of new territories of the country (CPSU XXVI Congress report, 1981, cited in: CSR Demography Report, 2017: p. 57).

Overall, in the second half of the XX century, as Chudinovskikh and Denisenko (2017) note, migration between the RSFSR (Russia) and other Soviet republics occurred in two stages. First, from the beginning of the 1950s to the mid-1970s, approximately 2.7 million migrants from Russia moved to Ukraine and Belarus for post-war reconstruction and development, to other parts of the Union (especially Central Asia) to build newly industrialized economies. At a later stage, from mid-1970s till the collapse of the Soviet Union, approximately 2.5 million moved to Russia, mostly to its remote, resource-rich areas of Siberia. These movements intensified in the last years of the country. One source claims that in the 1980s, about 15 million citizens changed their place of residence within the USSR each year (Focus, 2010).

Although the Soviet Union was a 'closed' country, human mobility did not take place only within the borders of the Soviet Union. Tens of thousands of temporary labour migrants from countries of the Socialist Camp (such as Bulgaria, Vietnam, North Korea) worked in the Soviet Union, especially in 1970s-1980s. To illustrate, in 1981, the USSR agreed to receive 100,000 labour migrants from Vietnam annually to work in the Soviet factories (Sokolov, 2016). There were also several thousands of students from developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It should go without saying that these foreigners stay in Russia were also strictly controlled. Illegal migration, if any, was negligible and effectively counteracted by security services (Ivahnyuk, 2009).

With Mikhail Gorbachev's *Perestroika* and the lift of the 'Iron Curtain', hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens emigrated. From 1987 to 1991, 134,000 people moved to Israel, 102,000 to Germany, 15,000 to the United States, and about 20,000 to other countries (Chudinovskikh & Denisenko, 2017).

At the same time, a lot of population movements within the Soviet Union in 1980s. Some scholars believe that immigration into Russia began long before the USSR collapsed. Significant numbers of ethnic Russians started to leave other Soviet republics and move to then RSFSR in late 1970s and 1980s as a result of the growing ethnic nationalism of local elites and, later towards the end of the 1980s, violent ethnic conflicts (Malakhov, 2014). There were more than 700,000 refugees and 'internally displaced persons' in the RSFSR up until the autumn of 1991 (Mukomel, 2005).

In conclusion, Aleshkovski (2006) notes that the Soviet Union's migration management system was a result of the strict system of planning and administrative decisions. Although abolished in mid-1990s, the *propiska* system has had its effect on the post-Soviet Russia. 'The low level of internal migration in the contemporary Russia that impedes development of the national labour market and its progress towards a market economy is psychologically deeply rooted in the artificial restrictions on mobility imposed by *propiska*' (Ivahnyuk, 2009: p. 10).

4.2. Emergence of new migration policies in Russia

The collapse of the Soviet Union seriously transformed the migration landscape within the vast region and new migration policies of the newly independent states of the former USSR. Since the last months of the Soviet Union and the period following its collapse was characterized by ethnic and civil conflicts in some parts of the Union and the collapse left millions of ethnic Russians outside of their country, first migration-related legislation in Russia was on displacement issues. In 1992-93, Russia signed international conventions on the status of refugees and internally displaced people (Chudinovskikh & Denisenko, 2017).

The 1993 law on freedom of movement and choice of residence abolished the *propiska* system in favour of a *registration* system expanding opportunities for internal migration. Although the formal requirements of registration did not change much, the very enforcement of the rules was weakened (Ivahnyuk, 2009). In the same period, Russian law on the regulation of departure from and entry into Russia, among others, canceled exit visa requirements.

One of the positive peculiarities of the post-Soviet space was the visa-free regime. Except for the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia who immediately started the integration with the European Union and some other cases,[9] citizens of most post-Soviet countries can visit other states freely for a certain period of time (up to 90 days in Russia).

These measures of migration liberalization, in turn, accelerated the ongoing process of emigration of millions of Russians to Western countries, on the one hand, and eased the immigration from other former Soviet states to the Russian Federation, on the other. Millions of former Soviet citizens, ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking people in their majority, flowed to Russia to escape armed conflicts, dire economic crises and de-Russification process in other post-Soviet territories. For example, in1994, the peak year of both immigration and

[9] Due to its policy of neutrality, Turkmenistan soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union closed its borders and imposed a visa regime with all other states. Currently, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also have a mutual visa regime starting from 2001. With the improvement of bilateral relations, in March 2018, the two countries agreed to establish a 30-day visa free regime. Following the 2008 conflict, Russia and Georgia implemented a visa regime. Georgia unilaterally abolished visa requirements for Russian citizens in 2011, which was followed by Russia simplifying its visa requirements for Georgians in 2013.

emigration in 1990s, more than 1.1 million people moved to Russia (Chudinovskikh & Denisenko, 2017). However, these people were not welcomed in Russia:

> The status of those immigrants was undefined, and their social rights were infringed. People came to Russia benefiting from an easy visa-free entrance but were not able to get legalized due to intricate bureaucratic procedures… [T]he over-bureaucratic registration process became a major impediment of legal immigration and a main source of corruption in the immigration process. Labor in-flow from the CIS states, though badly required by Russian industries but clashing against an irrational work permits procedure, has made migrants employment a largely illegal sphere (Ivahnyuk, 2009: pp. 13-14).

Population movements to and from Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union has occurred mostly within the post-Soviet space. Residents of former Soviet republics constituted more than 90 per cent of all arrivals between 1991 and 2015: within this period 11.8 million immigrated to and 5.3 million emigrated from Russia (Chudinovskikh & Denisenko, 2017).

Figure 1. People granted temporary residence permits and permanent residence permit in 2015.

Source: FMS, 2016.

	Holders of temporary residence permit	Share of total permits	Holders of permanent residence permit	Share of total permits
Ukraine	230,586	36.8%	75,428	17.7%
Uzbekistan	82,021	13.1%	56,378	13.3%
Kazakhstan	60,864	9.7%	24,815	5.8%
Armenia	55,988	8.9%	60,079	14.1%
Tajikistan	50,279	8.0%	50,028	11.8%
Azerbaijan	47,461	7.6%	38,068	9.0%
Moldova	35,555	5.7%	24,571	5.8%
Kyrgyzstan	23,252	3.7%	10,932	2.6%
Georgia	8,812	1.4%	10,491	2.5%
Vietnam	3,287	0.5%	-	-
Belarus	-	-	19,027	15.5%

Russian migration policy has gone through a number of periods of development since the 1990s. Several scholars have examined the contemporary history of migration policy dividing it into particular periods or stages (Ivahnyuk, 2009; Gulina & Utyasheva, 2016; Abashin, 2016b). During the first stage, in 1997-2002, a legal framework for regulating migration was created which included the adoption of laws on the citizenship, on the legal status of foreign nationals as well as the concept of demographic development. These laws specified the status of foreigners and stateless people and the types of documents they must have to reside in Russia: *vid na vremennoye prozhivaniye* (temporary residence permit) and *vid na zhitel'stvo* (permanent residence permit).



Figure 2. Ethnic composition of people who have moved to permanent residence to Russia between 1992 and 2007, in percentages.

Source: CSR Demography Report, 2017.

In the period of 2002-2006, migration mechanisms were further developed which included the introduction of employment quotas for labour migrants from the visa-free countries of post-Soviet space, as well as the enhancement and enlargement of the Federal Migration Service (FMS). Partly in response to the issue of shrinking number of population,

Russian authorities simplified the process of granting citizenship to former residents of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Gulina and Utyasheva (2016) note that in this stage state interests within migration policy were defined, as Russia started developing its legislation and policy to further strategic goals and national interests, with more detailed migration policies.

Experts call the third stage, in 2007-2009, a period of 'liberal revolution' (Abashin, 2016b; Mukomel, 2014), when Russia took several measures to relax and relatively liberalize its migration regime. Firstly, rules for hiring and registering labour migrants arriving on the visa-free regime were simplified. Second, employment quotas for these migrants were introduced. And thirdly, certain legislative and policy measures allowed to allocate a part of the migrant workforce from central parts of Russia to other regions (the Urals, Siberia and the Far East).

Some scholars note that two opposite poles of attitude towards labour migration have co-existed in Russia in 2000s (Mukomel, 2014; Abashin, 2016b).

> On the one hand, it [migration] is regarded as inevitable and even necessary for resolving economic and demographic difficulties, while on the other hand, it is seen as dangerous and undesirable from points of view of security and cultural unity, as well as the possible negative economic consequences. At the same time, the migration policy is trying to simultaneously take into account arguments from both sides. In particular, by combining cultural, professional and other attributes, state officials have attempted to design images and categories of 'preferred' and 'non-preferred' migrants out of the former Soviet citizens and descendants thereof, for which different favour regimes are suggested: the former should be motivated to resettle, while the latter should be restricted and ousted by all available means (Abashin, 2016b: p. 31).

Abashin (2016b) further continues on a radical division of notions and expectations in Russia related to migration and migrants:

> All administrative efforts have aimed at a search for some balance between very different desires: from the creation of the 'Russian' state to consolidation of the 'Eurasian' block with other former Soviet republics; from liberal competition on the labour market to protectionism and isolationism that in the end block each other. Here a temptation to use the topic of migration for populist purposes is added, which begins to subordinate the logic of decision-making to rhetoric benefits and selective objectives (pp. 31-32).

One of the important aspects of Russia's migration policy was to invite ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers to move to 'historical motherland'. Dubbed as *sootechestvenniki* (compatriots), ancestors of these people moved to periphery regions of Russian empire and the

Soviet Union (Myhre, 2017). Most of these people have moved to Russia in the 1990s without the government clear policies and incentive programmes. In 2000s, government authorities saw in them preferred alternative to tackle the country's demographic problems, especially in eastern regions with scarce human resources. Special incentive programmes were developed to attract compatriots to different regions of Russia. According to the recent reports, between 2007 and 2017 (November) approximately 675 thousand compatriots, 90 thousand only in 2017, repatriated to Russia under the special government support initiatives (MVD, 2017).

Table 4. Net migration in Russia, 1991-2015 (all former Soviet republics and selected countries outside the region).

Source: Adapted from Chudovinskikh & Denisenko, 2017.

	1991-2000	2001-2010	2011-2015	**Overall (1991-2015)**
Former Soviet republics: Total	**4,280,000**	**1,816,800**	**1,366,100**	**7,462,800**
Kazakhstan	1,497,400	347,400	182,700	**2,027,400**
Uzbekistan	605,000	349,000	202,000	**1,155,900**
Ukraine	341,600	261,500	341,800	**944,900**
Tajikistan	314,700	135,700	129,800	**580,200**
Kyrgyzstan	272,900	179,400	109,700	**562,000**
Armenia	200,000	188,700	140,400	**529,000**
Azerbaijan	298,900	120,500	79,400	**498,800**
Georgia	358,700	70,900	27,400	**457,100**
Moldova	78,500	106,100	93,000	**277,600**
Turkmenistan	116,100	43,200	17,000	**176,300**
Latvia	109,700	6,800	4,300	**120,700**
Estonia	66,400	2,400	3,600	**72,400**
Lithuania	46,600	2,900	2,000	**51,500**
Belarus	-26,500	2,200	33,200	**8,900**
Non-Post Soviet countries: Total	**-871,300**	**-217,300**	**59,900**	**-1,028,700**
United States	-100,200	-23,500	-2,900	**-126,600**

Israel	-176,400	-6,500	300	**-182,600**
Germany	-557,400	-217,300	-300	**-736,000**

In 2010-2015, mechanisms regulating the migration regime were further detailed and enhanced. The government introduced the system of so-called *patents* (work permits), which allowed individuals coming from the visa-free countries to legally stay and work in Russia. Employers were allowed to hire skilled workers beyond the quotas set by the local governments. Responsible state agencies started to fingerprint labour migrants when they were issued work permits.

Another important event of this period was the adoption of the new Concept of Migration Strategy until 2025 (Migration Concept, 2012) in 2012. This document for the first time recognized the government's need for migration in order to address the country's demographic problems, i.e. the decrease of population. The concept 'shifted from being concentrated on 'limiting' migration flows, overcoming 'migration crisis' and seeing migration as a threat to the security and wellbeing of the country, to paying more attention to attracting highly educated migrant pools and increasing the migration profile of the country abroad' (Gulina & Utyasheva, 2016: p. 97).

At the same time, the Concept of Migration Strategy adopted in 2012 has been criticized by many migration experts. For example, Ryazantsev (2013) argued that the Concept did not formulate the goal of Russia's migration policy with sufficient clarity:

> 'To stabilize and increase the permanent population' cannot be the goal of a country's migration policy. This is the goal of demographic policy. The goal of Russia's migration policy should be formulated differently: 'to reduce the outflow of emigrants from Russia and stimulate the inflow of needed categories of immigrants for permanent residence, work, and study in Russia within required parameters' (p. 82).

With the adoption of the Concept, Russia started making agreements with migrant sending countries to ensure a regulated migration regime in the country. Between 2012 and 2015 more than 50 laws were adopted, almost half of which was aimed at strengthening the administrative and criminal penalties violating migration laws. For example, in 2013, Russian government introduced several new regulations: the rule of three-month stays of nationals from the visa-free CIS countries within a six-month period, differentiated penalties for violating immigration rules in different regions, penalties for violating the registration requirements (the

so-called 'rubber apartments', a practice of registering several dozens of people in one apartment) both for Russian citizens and foreigners. Although, these measures helped ease some urgent issues in the migration sphere, they could not solve the main problem Russia has been facing – the issue of irregular migrants, *nelegaly.* During these years, the practice and number of deportations were extended: a labour migrant could be banned to enter Russia from three to five years even for minor administrative infringements (including traffic regulation infringements). Labour migrants from Central Asia constituted the majority of these people.

Until 2015 there were two types of work permit documents in Russia: work permits and the so-called *patents.* Work permits are further divided into regular work permits (*razreshenie na rabotu*), permits for qualified professionals and permits for highly qualified specialists. General work permits are subject to quotas defined by local governments. Introduced in 2010, patents initially allowed citizens of the CIS countries with visa-free regime with Russia to work for individuals (households). New rules were introduced from January 1, 2015, according to which all nationals from CIS visa-free countries have to obtain patents whether they want to work for an individual (household) or an organization. Legally, the introduction of patents for any type of work has eased the access of CIS nationals to the Russian labour market. But in reality, the high cost and bureaucratic ordeals related to obtaining a patent made the lives of Central Asian labour migrants more difficult. Moreover, migrants have to take an exam in the Russian language, history, and fundamentals of legislation. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan are exempt from the requirement of obtaining patents as their country has joined the Eurasian Economic Union led by the Russian Federation.

Russia is now going through the fifth stage, 'characterized by a striking lack of consistency' (Gulina and Utyasheva, 2016). Although government made several policy changes in order to simplify the attraction of skilled workers, several legislative anti-immigrant measures made it difficult for labour migrants to legally stay and work in Russia without being at risk of violating laws and, as a result, becoming illegal (Kubal, 2016).

4.3. Labour migration in contemporary Russia

One can conditionally divide immigration to Russia into two categories of people. The 1990s were the period of intense resettlement of ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking people. Armed conflicts in some parts of the post-Soviet space (Tajikistan, Karabakh, Pridnestrovie, etc.), political reforms in newly independent republics, including language reforms pushed hundreds of thousands of people – not only ethnic Russians and other Russian-speakers, but also refugees and internally displaced persons – to move to Russia. In 1994, more than million people resettled to Russia (Chudinovskikh & Denisenko, 2017).



Figure 3. Migration flows to and from Russia, 1991-2016.

Source: Gosstat Naselenie *(2017).*

One of the particularities of Russia is that a large number of its foreign-born residents were born in other former Soviet countries, while at the same time many people born in Russia reside in other former Soviet countries. Hence, figures on the stock of emigrants and immigrants in the region reflect the change in geopolitical status of their country of birth, rather than actual international migration to and from Russia (IOM, 2008).

Improved conditions in Russian economy in early 2000s led to the increased demand for labour, especially in the sectors of construction, services and transport. At the same time, the living conditions deteriorated and unemployment rates increased in some other post-Soviet countries. These reasons acted as push-pull factors of migrating to Russia for millions of people. According to Chudinovskikh and Denisenko (2017), nationals from post-Soviet states constituted more than 90 percent of all arrivals since 1991 to 2015, which means that about 11.8 million people immigrated to Russia (in contrast to 5.3 million emigrants).

If in the 1990s and early 2000s, people from Ukraine, Belarus and other post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe represented the majority of immigrants, the situation has dramatically changed for the last decade. Currently, nationals from Central Asian countries constitute approximately 40 percent of foreigners in Russia.

As it was mentioned in the previous section, starting from 2015, foreigners from visa-free countries are obliged to get so-called *patents*. Those who come from countries with which Russia has a visa regime should get also another type of work permits, *razreshenie na rabotu.* Citizens of the member-states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan – can work in Russia without any permits. This means that most labour migrants from post-Soviet countries, except citizens of the EAEU, have to get a *patent* in order to legally stay and work in Russia. Another type of work permits, *razreshenie na rabotu,* which is also divided to regular and highly-skilled types, are given to foreigners.

When patents were first introduced in 2010, initially migrants needed them only to work for individuals (households). To work, for example, in a company (organization), a migrant had to obtain work permits. Since January 2015, a migrant from a CIS-country with visa-free regime with Russia has to obtain a patent to work for an individual, a company or any other entity.

Labour migrants from outside the post-Soviet space represent about ten to fifteen percent of the total population of immigrants in Russia. Between 2010 and 2014, approximately

six million work permits were granted to all foreigners. Most of them were granted to citizens of Uzbekistan (about 43 percent), Tajikistan (15 percent), and Ukraine (11 percent) (Denisenko, 2017). Approximately 177 thousand *razreshenie na rabotu* were issued against 1,788 thousand *patents* in 2015 (FMS, 2016). The major contributors are China (about 6.9 percent of work permits), North Korea (2.9 percent), Turkey (2.3 percent) and Vietnam (1.3 percent) (Gosstat, 2015).

Migrant workers from Central Asia are mainly employed in following sectors: construction (almost third of all work permit holders), processing factories, retails, services, households, agriculture, hospitality, transport and others. It should also be noted that work permit holders from the European Union, United States, Japan and South Korea mostly occupy managerial positions in enterprises, organization and agencies.

Majority of labour migrants try to find jobs in the European part of the Russian Federation. About 47 percent of all permissions to work in 2015 were obtained in the Central autonomous district (includes Moscow) and 55 percent of all those who arrived with the purpose of work were registered here at a place of stay (OECD, 2016). In particular, more than half of all the permits given across Russia in 2015 were Moscow and Moscow region (37.6 percent) and St Petersburg and its Leningrad region (14.8 percent) (FMS, 2016).

The ratio of women in labour migration in Russia is small compared to many other immigrant-receiving countries – only 16 percent on average (OECD, 2016). Although contemporary migration to Russia is mostly male-dominated, the sex composition of migration flows has varied substantially for the last two decades, and there is significant variation in the sex composition of flows from different origin countries (Hofmann, 2017). Except for citizens of Thailand and Philippines, men constitute the overwhelming majority among workers of almost all nationalities. For example, in 2015, 68.8 percent of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan were men, 86.6 from Uzbekistan and 90.4 from Tajikistan (OECD, 2016).

The median age of migrant workers in Russia in 2015 was relatively young, 34 years old, but varied from 30 (Vietnam) to 47 years old (United States). Migrants from the largest sending countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, were rather young – median age of those who obtained *patents* in 2015 was 31, 31 and 32 years old respectively (OECD, 2016). At the same time, Russian officials note that among those who held work permits (*patent*) almost half (45.3 percent) belong to the age group of 18-29, while another 45 percent are between 30 and 59 (FMS, 2016).

There were almost 240 thousand international students studying at Russian universities (five percent of all students in the country) (HSE, 2016). Most of the students come from former Soviet Union republics, including Kazakhstan (67,000), Ukraine (22,000) and Uzbekistan (20,000). In 2015/16, the quota for the admission of foreign students for free education in Russian universities was raised to 15 000 annually, from 10 000 in previous years (OECD, 2017).

The exact number of labour migrants in contemporary Russia has been the topic of speculation, since different state bodies as well as experts give different numbers. There were approximately ten million migrants in Russia at the end of 2016 (RBK, 2016), making the country one of the largest destinations for migrants. However, it should be noted that the majority of migrants stay in Russia for a relatively short period of time. In 2016, only 3.8 of 10 million foreigners had been staying in Russia for more than a year (Gosstat, 2017). This gives us a reason to call the current phenomenon mostly a temporary migration. And labour migrants from Central Asia represent the large portion of those who stay in Russia for a relatively short period of time.



Figure 4. Migrant remittances from Russia to CIS countries, 2011-2015 (in billion US dollars).

Source: Central Bank of Russia, 2017.

For most of the CIS countries Russia has been the main source of migrant remittances. Between 2010 and 2015, migrants in Russia sent to their home countries 108 billion US dollars (Figure 5). The lion's share of these remittances were sent to Uzbekistan (31.5 billion US dollars) followed by Ukraine and Tajikistan[10]. The volume of remittances from Russia to CIS countries reached its peak in 2013, when individuals sent to their home countries 24.7 billion US dollars. In 2014, although the volume of remittances was higher than it was a year before in terms of Russian rubles, it was still less in US dollars as the rate of Russian currency fell sharply (Denisenko, 2017). Due to the economic crisis in Russia related with the events in Ukraine, both the number of labour migrants and the volume of their remittances did not reach the same amounts as in 2013-2014.

According to different sources, more than half of those ten million migrant workers are employed in the 'grey' zone of the Russian economy. Officials estimated that there were at least 2.5 million undocumented migrants in 2015 (Romodanovsky & Mukomel, 2015). Those migrants come to Russia legally, but they work illegally. That is why Malakhov and Simon (2016) warn that the expression 'illegal immigration' must be used with some caution in the Russian case.

[10] Figures on annual remittances to each of three Central Asian republics from Russia are provided in the next section.

4.2. Labour migration from Central Asia

The share of people from Central Asian republics participated in the state-controlled mass migration processes during the Soviet Union was less than compared to other parts of the former Soviet Union (Zaionchkovskaia, 2000). In 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of people who left newly independent Central Asian republics to Russia (or even outside the post-Soviet space) consisted mostly of Russians and Russian-speaking people[11]. Local population (mostly in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) started to involve in outgoing migration flows starting from the early 2000s. Deteriorated economic conditions and lack of jobs push millions of migrants to look for jobs in other countries. Today Russia remains the primary destination for migrants from these republics. Along with Russia, tens of thousands of people have migrated (both temporary and permanent) to Kazakhstan, South Korea, Turkey, the Gulf countries, European countries, the US, etc. Often, the choice of destination for migrants depends on their financial capacity: the richer migrate to developed countries, the poorer cross the border into Kazakhstan or Russia (Laruelle, 2007).

Geographical proximity, socio-cultural similarities and a common linguistic space, transportation and communications infrastructure in the post-Soviet space predetermined the directions of migration, Russia and, to a lesser degree later, Kazakhstan.

About four million people from Central Asia live and work in Russia. The absolute majority of these people are nationals of three countries of the region: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as the focus of this research implies. Overall, deteriorated living conditions, poverty and high unemployment rates especially in rural areas in Central Asian countries along with the need for cheap labour force, relatively well-performing economy, the socioeconomic situation in Russia have been main reasons for mass labour migration. Remittances from Russia have been critical source of income for hundreds of thousands of families and a factor for mitigating the economic development problems for governments in the region.

[11] Except for citizens of Tajikistan who fled the civil war in the country in 1992-1997 mostly to Russia.



Figure 5. Population of Central Asian countries and their labour migrants in Russia in 2017 (in millions).

Source: World Bank, 2017; RANEPA, 2017.

Citizens of Kyrgyzstan, a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community organization promoting 'a free movement of goods, services, capital and labour force among member-states', can work in Russia without the need to obtain work permits. When the number of labour migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan fell due to the economic crisis in Russia since 2014, the number of Kyrgyz nationals, on the contrary, rose as the country became a member of the Russian-led integration project. Currently, approximately 700 thousand people out of the total population of six million people are in Russia, who sent 1.74 billion US dollars of money remittances home in 2016 (Figure 7).

Tajikistan is one of the poorest countries in the post-Soviet space. The past civil war (1992-1997), poor economic conditions, extremely high level of unemployment have pushed millions of Tajiks to seek work outside the country. About 1.1 million people out of Tajikistan's total population of 8.7 million live and work in Russia. Remittances from migrants have equalled from one-third to almost half of Tajikistan's GDP in different years. Tajik migrants in Russia sent home 1.92 billion US dollars in 2016 (Figure 7). Zayonchkovskaya

(2016) expects that by 2030, labour migrants from Tajikistan will replace those from Uzbekistan as the largest exporter of labour force in Russia.



Figure 6. Money remittances from Russia to Central Asian republics, 2006-2016 (in million USD).

Source: Central Bank of Russia, 2017.

Uzbekistan, the third largest country in post-Soviet territory in terms of population, is home to about 32 million people. Although, the country has maintained relatively well in terms of economic development, Uzbekistan has been the largest exporter of labour force in absolute numbers among Central Asian republics. Hundreds of thousands of people from Uzbekistan work in such countries as Kazakhstan, South Korea, Turkey, the UAE, the US, but Russia has been the largest destination for millions of Uzbeks. In 2016, about 1.9 million people lived and stayed in Russia (RANEPA, 2017). However, officials stated that only 925,000 of them had work permits (*patent*) by October 2017 (Jahon, 2017). Accordingly, the amount of money sent by migrants in Russia sent to Uzbekistan has been the largest. Money equivalent to more than 2.7 billion US dollars were sent to Uzbekistan in 2016 (Figure 7). 'Migrants send money back

home to meet the immediate need for food, medicine, clothing, debt repayment, and to strengthen social bonds. Remittances, however, have not been able to create new revenues for long-term sustainability, such as for opening small businesses, improving plots of land, or purchasing cattle' (Laruelle, 2013: p. 20).

Although there is a significant amount of labour migration from bordering areas of Kazakhstan to Russia's Urals and South Siberia, it is mostly due to the geographic proximity and transport accessibility. Also importantly, most of those migrants are ethnic Russians and do not fall into a category of migrants this research aims to explore.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan soon declared its international status of a 'neutral state' and closed its borders both for citizens and foreigners imposing a visa regime with all countries in the world. The number of Turkmens in Russia is very small. For these above-mentioned reasons, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are excluded from this research.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have long ago understood the necessity of supporting their migrant communities in Russia. Recognizing their inability to meet the needs of their citizens, governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Laruelle (2013) notes, sent a clear message: migrants have to take care of themselves by finding jobs abroad. For many years under president Karimov's rule, Uzbekistan had denied the significance of its labour migrants.[12] With the change of leadership in late 2016, the government's stance towards migrants has changed. Since then Tashkent has intensified its negotiations with Russian authorities on regulating migration flows and extending migration opportunities for its citizens in Japan, South Korea, Turkey, the Gulf states, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

Most of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia are seasonal labour migrants (Olimova 2013), although the number of those who seek Russian citizenship has grown recently (especially, Kyrgyz people). They may stay in Russia from several months to several years.

Migrants in their majority are alone or, in some cases, accompanied by their male siblings or sons/fathers (sometimes whole families). Around 85 per cent of migrants from Central Asia are male and almost three out of four are younger than thirty (Argumenty i Fakty,

[12] Uzbekistan state TV once demonstrated Islam Karimov calling migrants lazy people: 'There are very few lazy people in Uzbekistan now… I describe as lazy those who go to Moscow and sweep its streets and squares. One feels disgusted with Uzbeks going there for a slice of bread.' (Sidikov & Kjuka, 2013).

2015). Laruelle (2007), though, distinguishes two age groups of migrants: young people in their twenties, who have to pay for a wedding or the building of a house; and older men in their forties or fifties, who need more sporadic financing for family celebrations such as children's weddings, circumcision ceremonies, or the expansion of the family property.



Figure 7. Sectoral employment of labour migrants in Russia, assessed in 2014.

Source: CSR, 2018.

The older generation is statistically more educated and generally has a good command of Russian. As a result of this, they find better and more skilled jobs. The youngest ones, who constitute the largest portion of migrants, are less skilled, have a poor command of Russian, and consequently get low-paying jobs (Laruelle, 2007). Migrants are employed in construction, cleaning services, retail, heavy industry and agricultural works (Marat, 2009). According to more recent data (of 2014), the employment spheres of labour migrants have not drastically changed: they are mostly employed in spheres of construction (34 percent), services (13), manufacturing industries (10), retail (7) and agricultural (7) sectors of Russian economy (Figure 8). It is interesting to note that the percentage of local population employed in the construction sector is 4.4 times less than labour migrants: only 8 percent of all working Russian

citizens were working in the construction sector (CSR, 2018). The percentage of foreign workers in the same sphere should be even higher if we take into account the number of unofficially working labour migrants.

As we can see, labour migrants from Central Asia are employed in almost all spheres. In many cases, companies employ migrant workers but officially record them as Russian workers. As the work of a migrant is much cheaper, the difference between his/her official and actual wages represents the pure profits for such companies (Ryazantsev, 2013).

In recent years, the number of female migrants from Central Asia, especially from Kyrgyzstan, has increased. Women may accompany their family members or seek a job on their own with the help of social ties. Another group of Central Asians in Russia is students. The total population of international students, both from CIS and non-CIS countries, reaches 242,000. The exact number of students from Central Asia is unknown. They study in Russia's higher education institutions either under Russian government scholarship quotas or through self-financing. Given that both women and students constitute a small amount in comparison to labour migrants, this research's focus will be on an average migrant: a male from rural areas of Central Asia with a secondary education.

As a result of large flows of migrants and their failure to meet the criteria to obtain *patent* (work permit), hundreds of thousands of migrants from Central Asia even today remain undocumented. Working in Russia illegally without work permits and permanent residence status is widespread (Gulina & Utyasheva, 2016; Urinboyev 2016). The legislation system's impact on the status of migrants will be analyzed in a separate section.

Migrants' undocumented or illegal – a term widely used both by Russian officials, media and migrants themselves – status makes them very vulnerable to frequent police abuses. Most migrants have to secure a certain amount of their budget to bribe corrupt police officers and other authorities. Migrants save money as much as possible so they could send more remittances to impoverished families in home countries. In order to save money, many migrants choose to live in large groups in small ill-furnished apartments, barracks or even in spontaneously-built construction sites.

Conclusion

The chapter analyzed the current trends of migration in Russia. For this end, the migration policies of the Soviet Union were analyzed. The USSR's collapse and the country's opening up led to the paved a way for large scale immigration in Russia. In 1990s, mostly ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking population moved to Russia escaping ethnic conflicts, the establishment of national governments on the territories of the former empire. However, as the source for return migration exhausted and Russia's economy improved better than in many other post-Soviet countries, the character and scale of migration to Russia changed totally: now the migrants in their majority were people of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in search of jobs as the deteriorating living conditions, poorly-performing national economies and the lack of jobs acted as push factors of migration. The chapter examined specific details about the contemporary labour migration from Central Asia in Russia. This helps to have a general view of the context of migration in Russia.

Chapter 5. Need for Migration

Introduction

Chapter five discusses factors that necessitate Russia's need for migration. First, current demographics in the country are scrutinized. It is demonstrated that given the population decline, low birth rates and high mortality rates, Russia objectively needs the inflow of migrants. Labour migration is necessary for Russia's economy, too: migrants are not very much demanding, ready to take menial jobs and, importantly, offer cheap work. Another section of the chapter discusses why Russia needs migration for geopolitical reasons. It explores how Moscow employs migration as a tool to encourage or discourage certain activities of other post-Soviet countries. Particular cases are given to prove the claim. Russia's policies to integrate the post-Soviet countries within the Eurasian Economic Union also show the country's readiness to change migration legislation.

5.1. Russia's demographic challenges and the need for migration

In early 2017, Russia's total population equalled 146.8 million people. The population of Russia grew from 1950 to 1993 from 101.4 to 148.6 million people and since then the growth has stopped (CSR Demography Report, 2017). Since 1993 the country's population was declining, although there was a slight growth in 2009-2016. It is predicted that the Russian population will decrease to 140.1 million in 2030 and to 132.7 million in 2050 given the local population's negative attitudes towards migrants (experts believe only migration could improve Russia's demographic problems) (UN, 2017). To have a broader view, if Russia ranked fourth (without other USSR republics) in 1950, it fell to ninth place in the world and it is prospected that the country will be 14th in 2050 by the size of population in the world (*ibid.*).

Although Russia has the largest territory in the world, because of the vast areas of unfavourable lands the population is spread extremely disproportionately across the country. 80 percent of the total population lives in the European part of Russia, a quarter of the total

territory (see Table 4). Eastern and north-eastern parts are very scarcely inhabited as they are considered to have severe climatic conditions (70 percent).

The low level of population in Russia's Asian part has historically been perceived as a serious political, social and demographic challenge and Russian authorities made efforts to increase the number of inhabitants by various measures (Zaionchkovskaia, Mkrtchyan & Tyuryukanova, 2009). Although this aim was partly achieved during the Soviet period, for the last three decades the population there decreased. Experts point out that the decrease of population in Asian part of Russia is faster than average in the country (*ibid.*).

Table 5. Ratio of Russia's territory and population in its European and Asian parts, in 2016.

Source: SCR Demography Report, 2017.

	Population		Territory		Population density
	thousand	percent	thousand km^2	percent	
Russian Federation	146,545	100	17,125.2	100	8.6
European part	117,410	80,1	4,346.7	25.4	27
Asian part	29,135	19.9	12,778.5	74.6	2.3

Of the existing fifteen cities with a population of more than a million, only Moscow (12.4 million) and St Petersburg (5.3 million) are large urban areas. The third largest city of Novosibirsk is inhabited by only 1.5 million people (Statdata, 2017).

Currently, the decrease of the number of working population is accompanied by ageing. In 1960s, about 60 percent of a population aged 20-24 belonged to the group of 20-39 years old; in 2015, this share dropped to 47 percent and is set to continue diminishing in the years coming (CSR Demography Report, 2017). The growing share of aged people and the decreasing number of working population means increase of social expenditures.

Low birth rate is one of the main reasons of population decline and can also be seen as a serious demographic challenge. Although it should be noted that low birth rate is a natural

process in many countries of such a level of economic development as Russia. Government authorities are providing economic incentives and at the same time understand that it would not be realistic to expect the high birth rates of developing countries in the global South.



Figure 8. Annual birth increases in Russia, 2000-2015.

Source: CSR Demography Report, 2017.

Birth rates in Russia have actually grown since early 1990s, however, this grow has stopped in recent years (Figure 9). Experts reported that factors which contributed to this moderate growth were temporary and their impact is coming to an end (CSR Demography Report, 2017). It is predicted that by 2030 the number of fertile women (20-40 years old) will decrease by third compared to that of 2010-2012 (*ibid.*).

If low birth rates are more or less same in many other countries in Europe, United States, Canada, Japan, including Russia, the situation with mortality in this country is very different. Russia has been in the top ten of countries with the highest mortality rates in the world (Figure

10). Many factors simultaneously contribute to the high rates of premature death in Russia, including economic and social instability, high rates of tobacco and alcohol consumption, poor nutrition, depression, and deterioration of the health care system (Notzon *et al*., 1998).



Figure 9. Countries with the highest rate of mortality, 2017.

Source: World By Map, 2017.

Russia's life expectancy rates also have long been low compared to many other countries in the world (Figure 11). It is necessary to make a reservation that Russia has improved life expectancy figures recently (Moscow Times, 2017).

Tendencies in Russia's internal migration have also been unfavourable for the last decades. Most people in the eastern part of the country prefer to move to south-western areas. Between the censuses of 1989 and 2010, population of the Asian part decreased by 3.2 million people (10 percent), while population of the European part decreased by almost a million people (0.9 percent) (CSR Demography Report, 2017). Internal migration in Russia, characterized by the westward movement, has led to concentration of population in a small number of regions, while in others it leads to a reduction of already few inhabitants: 27 percent of population lives in a territory of less than four percent (*ibid*.). Rural areas, provincial small

and medium-sized towns continue to lose population to large urban areas with a population of more than a million.



Figure 10. Life expectancy in the world, 2012.

Source: Roser, 2017.

Mainly young people are involved in internal migrations and, as a result, population of urban areas attractive for internal migrants have a chance to overcome the problem of ageing. On the contrary, the opposite is going on in sending provinces: ageing and depopulation are accelerated and local economy lacks labour force. Limited labour market, low salaries, lack of opportunities for further development and self-realization have been the main reasons for the outflow of labour force from Russian provinces (Vishnevsky, 2009).

Russian authorities' attempts to turn migration flows in the right direction so far have not given tangible and serious fruits (Malakhov *et al.,* 2015; Ryazantsev, 2016).

As another response to gloomy demographic prospects, Russia also launched in 2006-2007 the so-called programme for voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad. The programme explicitly stated its intention as to address Russia's need for labour force, to increase its population and at the same time allow people with a cultural attachment to Russia to return to their 'homeland' (Gosprogramma pereseleniya, 2006). Authorities primarily focused on the settlement of compatriots in those provinces which were facing serious population decline and outflow. During its initial years, the programme proved quite ineffective, but with the revisions in 2012 it became more attractive (Myhre, 2017). Around 650 thousand people mostly from post-Soviet countries have acquired Russian citizenship for the last ten years (MVD, 2017).

As it becomes clear, Russia's population will continue to decrease and it seems only international migration could stabilize this decline and thus provide a source of the much needed labour force for national economy (Zaionchkovskaia *et al.,* 2009; Malakhov *et al.,* 2015; Mihailova, 2016).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union immigration has been a tangible demographic resource for Russia. Even when the population decreased in 1993-2008, immigration its natural decline for 60 percent. Over these years, the population decreased by 5.2 million people, but if there were no immigration, then the reduction would be 13.2 million. In 1992-2015, the migration growth in Russia was about nine million people (CSR Demography Report, 2017). The population of the Russian Far East decreased for 1.2 million people only in 1991-2000 (Kontseptsiya Dal'nego Vostoka, 2017).

The role of immigration as the main source of growth in Russia's population will continue to remain important in the future, and the scale of the migration inflow should be quite large. Specialists alarm that Russia would need 20 million immigrants by 2050 in order to prevent the adverse consequences of depopulation (Aleksashenko, 2015).

> Experts and politicians, as a rule, connect the issue of immigration with the labour market, and this is certainly a very important aspect of the problem of immigration. But it [migration replenishing labour market] is not the only one, and maybe even not the main one. … [I]f we consider this under-population [in Russia] as a challenge, then the only answer to it would be the attraction of migrants (CSR Demography Report, 2017: p. 56).

The need to increase population in Russia's areas with scarce human resources were well understood also during the Soviet period. Actually, 'the development of the eastern

territories was a strategic task of the Russian state over the past two centuries' (Kontseptsiya Dal'nego Vostoka, 2017). Soviet authorities tried to move to Central Russia, Siberia and Russia's Far East from densely populated regions of the Soviet Union, mostly from Central Asian and South Caucasus republics. From mid-1970s till the collapse of the Soviet Union, approximately 2.5 million people from other Soviet republics moved to Russia, mostly to its remote, resource-rich areas of Siberia (Focus, 2010).

In contemporary Russia, experts and authorities have for long time been discussing ways to increase the population of the country's eastern areas (Mikhailova, 2016). The government recently adopted a new policy paper which aims to increase the number of population in the Far Eastern Federal District to seven million (from the current 6.2 million) people until 2030 (Kontseptsiya Dal'nego Vostoka, 2017). However, experts believe that this ambition is hard to reach given the current demographic trends in the country: 'Russia does not have demographic resources that could be redirected to the Far East, without migrants from outside and their naturalization, it is impossible to solve the task of replenishing [the region's] population. And it is not only [Russian] Far East that needs additional population, people are needed in huge Siberia territories' (CSR Demography Report, 2017: p. 58).

Besides the demographic potential of migration, there is an economic value in it, too. Russian economy has been experiencing a deficit of workforce. And cheap work of foreigners is much more needed for Russian companies. Labour migrants comprise, according to different sources, from 15 percent to a quarter of the total workforce employed by the Russian economy (CSR, 2018). In Moscow, the capital, the percentage of migrant workers is even higher: 'We cannot do without migrants. The surplus of jobs is about 2 million. They [migrants] occupy a niche that is not profitable for Muscovites. They work as janitors, loaders. Muscovites prefer a more complex and highly paid work. 40 percent of vacant jobs are covered by migrants "(Gazeta, 2018). The majority of labour migrants, especially those from Central Asian republics, are employed in construction, services, retail sectors where local population do not always want to work.[13] For example, the percentage of Russian people working in construction is 4.4 times less than that of labour migrants (8 against 34 percent, CSR, 2018).

Selling *patents*, work permits, to labour migrants brings to Russian budget hundreds of millions in US dollars. As it was noted, obtaining a *patent* is a kind of tax in advance for labour

[13] More details about the spheres of labour migrants' employment are provided in Chapter 4.

migrants in Russia. The price differs from region to region. For example, in Moscow, the largest destination for migrant workers, it costs 4200 roubles (70-80 USD in 2017). In 2016, the city collected 6.8 billion roubles for selling *patenty*, which was higher than the taxes paid by oil companies (Lenta.ru, 2016). In 2017, *patenty* added to Russian budget 42 billion roubles (Mir24, 2017). In the same year, only Moscow city's revenues from work permits reached 15 billion roubles (Gazeta, 2018). Authorities decided to increase the price of *patenty* from 4,200 to 4,500 roubles in 2018 (Mir24, 2017).

As it was demonstrated, there is a common comprehension both among expert community and government officials that Russia's internal resources are not enough to tackle the country's demographic challenges. There is also an understanding that only immigration can help diminish the adverse effects of Russia's demographic challenges. However, many in Russia believe and agree that the country needs only qualified, or skilled, migrants. At the same time, it is unclear how Russian economy can satisfy its need for large number of low-skilled workers in construction, service, retails, and others. Therefore, I would like to finish this section with a quote from a well-known Russian migration expert Vladimir Malakhov, whose words, it seems, will continue to be relevant for years to come: 'Villages throughout Russia continue to become extinct, the national economy is short about two and a half million workers every year, and yet, instead of developing measures to attract migrants and help them adapt, the overwhelming dialogue in Russia continues to focus on the threats migrants pose to the country's 'ethno-cultural security'' (Malakhov, 2007: p. 116).

5.2. Impact of foreign policy goals on migration policies

5.2.1. Russia-Central Asia relations

In the years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia, overwhelmed with its internal issues, paid less attention to its relations with Central Asia except urgent issues of security (Tsypkin, 1995, Dawisha & Parrot, 1994).

Integration processes, although weak, started to take place in Central Asia soon after the collapse of the USSR. The region's newly independent states saw in uniting their efforts a potential for addressing the challenges of nation-building, security, political and economic issues. In 1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan established the Central Asian Union which was later joined by Tajikistan in 1998. Turkmenistan, as a neutral state, did not participate in any integration projects in the region. However, suspicion, rivalry, and the existence of unresolved disputes among Central Asian weakened integration efforts (Roy, 2008). Four republics of the region announced the establishment of the Organization for Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) in 2002.

Moscow's strong involvement with Central Asian politics gained a momentum after Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia. In 2004, Russia joined the OCAC as a full-fledged member and very soon the organization ceased to exist as it was united with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community.

Russia's foreign policies in Central Asia since the early 2000s have focused on three main issues: security and military cooperation (both through the CSTO and on bilateral levels); hydrocarbon energy projects; and the integration processes within the Eurasian Economic Union.

It is reported that in 2012-2017, Russia has provided assistance for the development of the Central Asian region USD 6.7 billion, of this amount USD 4 billion on a bilateral basis and more than USD 2.6 billion through international organizations (MID, 2017). Russia claims that it maintains a position of a major investor: the country's accumulated investments in the region are estimated at USD 18 billion (*ibid.*). The same source states that Russia considers Central Asian countries to be the backbone of the integration processes within the post-Soviet space,

which allow a simplified access to neighbouring markets with a capacity of more than 182 million consumers (*ibid.*).

Figure 11. Central Asia.

Source: Mapsland.com.

Sergey Abashin (2018), a well-known Russian scholar on migration, notes that Russia's relationship Central Asian countries are neo-colonial relationships. For example, Tajikistan, with its poor economic performance, is highly dependent on Russia, where a million of its citizens works. Because, if these workers are made to return to Tajikistan at the same time, the country would be in a very difficult situation (money remittances of migrants to a large extent compensate the state's obligation of social expenditures, moreover, the return of a million of jobless people will sharply increase social protests). Russia is also dependent on these states (like Tajikistan), continues the expert, because they provide with cheap workforce.

> These relations of dependence are, in a sense, neo-colonial in nature, because when Russia introduces or removes a ban on entry from some countries, it does

> so not just for free, but in exchange for political or economic bonuses… for example, in exchange for these dependent countries' vote in certain ways at UN sessions. Migration has become a political bargaining chip in relations between Russia and other post-Soviet states, where this migration is coming from (Abashin, 2018).

For the last decade, Russia tried to minimize all efforts of Central Asian countries to pursue independent foreign policies (Roy, 2008; Cooley, 2012). In this pursuit, Cooley (2012) argues, 'Moscow's main instruments have been neither 'Soviet' nor 'neo-imperial,' but distinct attempts to emulate other successful contemporary regional organizations. Ironically, these new organizations, most notably the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and EurAsEC/Customs Union [*now turned into EAEU* – author], were modeled on rival Western bodies, but in substance have been fashioned to promote Russian leadership in Eurasia' (p. 52). For the focus of this research, Moscow's important policy instrument is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was evolved from the EurAsEC and later from the Customs Union[14].

Of the three principal 'geopolitical spaces' in Russian foreign policy – Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific – Eurasia plays a central role (Svarin, 2016). Russia's aims to dominate and maintain its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space through integration projects, such as, for example, the EAEU, has been a topic of discussion in several studies (Morozova, 2009; Markedonov, 2012; Kirkham, 2016; Svarin, 2016; Dragneva & Woczuk, 2017; Katzenstein & Weygandt, 2017). This section rather looks at the conflicting issues between Russia's foreign policy goals, especially through the prism of the Eurasian Economic Union, and its national labour migration policies inside the country.

Integration processes in the Eurasian region led by Moscow trace its origin to 1995, when Russia and Belarus established the Customs Union, which was soon joined by Kazakhstan and later Kyrgyzstan. The countries signed signed the Agreement on the Customs Union and Common Economic Space was signed in 1999, which then included Tajikistan as well. The agreement aimed to create a single economic space with a single infrastructure and coordinated monetary, foreign exchange, trade and customs policies to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour force (Dogovor TS, 1999).

[14] There is a confusion in the abbreviations of EAEU and EurAsEC. EurAsEC – Eurasian Economic Community – is an integration organization preceding to the EAEU, Eurasian Economic Union. EurAsEC, together with Russia's other integration project, the Customs Union, was abolished with the establishment of EAEU. Russia's integration projects will be discussed in the next section.

Notwithstanding the efforts by Russians, initially these integration processes were ineffective due to several reasons (Kirkham, 2016). In 2000, as an attempt to foster integration initiatives the Eurasian Economic Community was founded by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan was a member for a short period between 2006 and 2008. However, it was only from 2012, did the Eurasian Economic Space start functioning. The organization promoted the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour force with the unification of financial, trade and tax policies (Galiakberov & Abdullin, 2014).

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia created the Customs Union in 2010 to promote free trade. The three countries signed the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in Astana in May 2014. The EAEU officially came into effect since January 2015 and the EurAsEC was abolished. Armenia joined the organization in January and Kyrgyzstan joined it in June of the same year.

Figure 12. Members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Source: www.aseanbriefing.com.

The EAEU was established 'to fully modernize, cooperate and improve the competitiveness of national economies and create the conditions for stable development in order to improve the living standards of the population of the Member States' (Dogovor EAES). It promotes the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour force within the organization (*ibid.*).

Moscow has seen integration in the post-Soviet space an important foreign policy goal. Vladimir Putin, then prime minister, assessed the Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Community (predecessors of the EAEU) as a

> powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the contemporary world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. […] Alongside other key players and regional structures, such as the European Union, the United States, China and APEC, the Eurasian Union will help ensure global sustainable development (Putin, 2011).

The creation of the Customs Union (and later the EAEU) and opening the borders to migrant workers from Belarus and Kazakhstan did not drastically change the migration landscape in Russia. It was mainly because of the fact that both Belarus and Kazakhstan are also recipients rather than senders of labour force like Russia (Lyubov, 2016). However, for citizens of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joining the EAEU opened up opportunities and eased the access to the Russian labour market.

In terms of the free movement of labour force, the citizens of member states of the EAEU are entitled to much more preferential treatment: they do not have to obtain work permits (*patent*) and are to be treated as regular employees according to labour legislation (see Table 5).

Table 6. Some examples of preferential treatment of member-states.

Source: Adapted from Aliev, 2016.

Citizens of the EAEU member-states	**Citizens of other CIS countries with visa-free regime with Russia**
Do not need to obtain work permit	Migrants have to: - obtain medical insurance - pass a test on Russian language, history and legislation - obtain a work permit (*patent*)

Can stay in Russia without residence registration up to 30 days	Depends on country of origin
Can stay in Russia according to a work contract	Can stay in Russia according to *patent* validity
Diplomas and qualifications are automatically recognized	Depends on country of origin
Entitled to emergency healthcare	Must have a medical insurance to access healthcare services

It should be noted that many experts in Russia were sceptical of integration processes and, as its result, the creation of common labour market. For some Russians, the EAEU means Russia's diversion from European identity and culture due to the influx of Muslim migrants from Central Asia, namely from current member Kyrgyzstan and potential candidates for membership (Kangasparo & Heusala, 2016). For other experts, it is a matter of pragmatism. 'Russia will not only lose the possibility to impose any institutional restrictions on immigration within the common free market zone, it will also have to take the obligation to ensure equal rights with regard to employment, wages, and other social and legal guarantees to the citizens of the member states' (Troitskaya, 2012: para. 4). In this regard, Russia has to simultaneously foster integration through common labour markets with the Central Asian states and to manage the consequences of work-related migration (Kazantsev, 2015).

However, Russia's main benefits from the EAEU are political rather than economic: the organization's share in Russia's foreign trade is only five percent (Dragneva & Woczuk, 2017). '[T]he EAEU is nominally about economic cooperation, yet economic relations with Eurasian members only matter for Russia as a precursor to achieving its political and geopolitical aims' (*ibid.* p. 7).

Foreign policy goals of Russia in Central Asia through the prism of the Eurasian Economic Union are challenged by strong nationalist and anti-migrant sentiments in Russia. 'The anti-Islamist mood, the rejection of Central Asian migrants on the basis of threat to Russian culture and society, and its core (national) values … raise potential difficulties for the whole idea of the [EAEU] and in particular the process of deeper integration' (Kangaspuro & Heusala, 2016: p. 46).

This section demonstrated that the Russian Federation sees an integration of post-Soviet republics within the Eurasian Economic Union as one of the main instruments of maintaining its geopolitical influence in post-Soviet space. By promoting free movement of goods, services,

capital and labour, Russia provides incentives for other states to engage in Kremlin's integration projects. The treatment of its citizens as equal participants of the Russian labour market was one of the important reasons for Kyrgyzstan to join the organization. There have been rumours that Tajikistan might also join the EAEU for the same reasons (but so far there were no signs of real steps). For Russia, this means that it has to treat the citizens of member-states as equal at the expense of a certain degree of popular discontent.

5.2.2. Migration as a tool for geopolitical influence

More than a quarter century has passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, there have been several systemic crises on the post-Soviet territories. The more we move forward away from 1991, the more Russia feels that it is losing its leading and uniting position in the post-Soviet space. New independent states that have appeared on the world map as a result of the Soviet Union's collapse have been building, to a different degree of success, independent, multi-vector foreign policies, in which there is less space for Russia as the sole power for orientation. On the other hand, Russia sustains a belief that it has a natural right to pre-eminence in the post-Soviet space. 'The Kremlin reluctantly accepts that things will never be as they were in the Soviet Union and is at times aware of its own limitations, but it retains the ambition to arrest the decline of its influence and to reconstruct it in more modern and acceptable terms' (Nixey, 2012: 15). Russia's sees the CIS countries as one of the most important priorities in its foreign policy (Kontseptsiya vneshnej politiki, 2016). One of the forms of retaining its influence has been using the migration policy to serve this aim. As Katzenstein and Weygandt (2017) noted, the plasticity of Eurasia's geopolitical and civilizational meanings offers Russia welcome latitude in fashioning and justifying its security and economic policies.

Russia's ruling elites use institutions and mechanisms of migration law with varying degrees of activity and success, such as the granting of citizenship, asylum, the right to stay and reside, in the interests of its foreign and domestic policy. 'The migration policy is imprisoned for servicing the changing foreign policy tasks and priorities' (Gulina, 2017).

The Russo-Georgian crisis and the events that preceded it, serve as an example of the use of migration and citizenship issues as a lever of foreign policy. Without going into an explanation of the conflict, it should just be mentioned that from 2002 Russia started to actively grant citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, territories claiming their independence from Georgia. By the time the Russo-Georgian war erupted in August 2008, 90 percent of the populations of these two regions had become Russian citizens (Artman, 2014). Granting citizenship to a large number of population in another country was a key component of Moscow's years-long attempts of reasserting Russian hegemony in Georgia (Muhlfriend, 2010). Littlefield (2009) concludes that Russia granted citizenship to separatist populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to further its own geopolitical interests and not for humanitarian

reasons as it claimed to justify the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008. In fact, 'passportization created thousands of Russian citizens inside the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, on whose behalf Moscow justified the territorial dismemberment of its neighbor' (Artman, 2014, para. 9). However, Nagashima (2017) contends that Russia implemented passportization policy not for aggressive purposes, such as to increase Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space or to further geographic ambitions, but rather in a reactive way, to protect its sphere of influence when it was being threatened.

After Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Georgia as a result of the 'Rose Revolution' in 2004, relations between Moscow and Tbilisi deteriorated. In September 2006, Georgian authorities detained four Russian officers on suspicion of espionage in Tbilisi, which has led to the so-called 'anti-Georgian campaign' in Russia. Among other measures, Russia deported thousands of migrants with Georgian passports and Georgian ethnicity. Migration, police bodies were actively looking for Georgian-looking individuals and filed documents for further deportation. As Georgian authorities claim, between September 2006 to January 2007 more than 2000 Georgian people were detained and expelled from Russia (Akhmeteli, 2014). Russian government officials openly admitted deportations and expulsions of Georgian migrants was a reaction to Georgia's actions. Vyacheslav Postavnin, deputy head of the Russian Federal Migration Service on September 27, 2006 said, among others, the following: 'Of course, this [search for illegal Georgian migrants and their deportation] is at the same time a political decision in the light of the Georgian-Russian conflict – as a response to the actions of the Georgian authorities' (Kommersant, 2006).

The Russian economy's ability to accommodate millions of migrants gives the country a flexibility to use it as a tool of political pressure on other countries. At the same time, the large numbers of Tajik labour migrants and the heavy dependence of Tajik economy on migrant remittances make the country vulnerable to such pressures. Negotiations on the status and rent fees of Russia's largest military base on a foreign territory, 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, had been difficult for both Moscow and Dushanbe. Russia wanted to prolong the presence of the base as long as possible to which Tajikistan was quite reluctant. To put pressure on Tajikistan, Tajik labour migrants in Russia were used as bargaining chip.

Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the Russian parliament, wrote in an influential newspaper that if Tajikistan would not agree to return Russian border guards (201st Military Base) to control Afghan-Tajik border, Russia must ban labour migration for all Tajik citizens (Gryzlov, 2011).

This kind of allegations on undesirability of Tajik migrants in Russia were echoed quite often at different levels through government-controlled Russian media. But the pressure reached its peak in March 2011, when Tajikistan arrested a Russian citizen, a pilot of a commercial aircraft and his Estonian colleague. Russian top officials actively started to discuss the introduction of visa regime with Tajikistan and started to deport hundreds of Tajik labour migrants in Russia. Tajikistan could not resist the pressure for long and yielded soon: the pilots were let free and, importantly, a year later Russia made Tajikistan sign an agreement on the prolongation of the Russian base for thirty more years, until 2042. The frequency of calls to impose a visa-regime with Tajikistan and deport illegal Tajik migrants from Russia, although still continues at a lower level, diminished after Tajikistan freed the Russian pilot and signed the agreement on the base.

More or less the same situation happened earlier in 2004, when Tajikistan wanted to end the Russian military presence. Russian authorities stated that citizens of Tajikistan could visit Russia with only international passports[15]. When Dushanbe agreed to host the Russian military base for the next ten years, Moscow abolished the ban of Tajik internal passports in Russia (Charhi Gardun, 2012).

The crisis in Ukraine in 2014 and its aftermath also serve as an example of migration and citizenship issues being hostages by political issues. As mentioned above, the purpose here is not to assess the politico-military crisis, but to slightly mention the cases when migration was used by the Russian government to put relations with other countries. As it was happening in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, Russia granted citizenship to thousands of residents of Crimea, then a part of Ukraine, and, to a lesser degree, in other eastern parts of Ukraine a few years before the actual crisis emerged. From the legal point of view, states can grant citizenship to whoever they deem necessary. However, as Artman (2014) argues, ‘passportization exists in something of a legal gray area, because it effectively deprives states of their sovereignty over a significant portion of their population’ (para. 4).

Another question here is the issue of Ukrainian citizens, both economic and humanitarian migrants, in Russia. The Ukrainian crisis sparked an influx of Ukrainians into Russia. At the initial stage, Russian government and non-government organizations tried to accommodate Ukrainian refugees as many as 1.1 million people (RIA Novosti, 2015) with temporary shelters, preferential treatment in residence and job applications. However, this

[15] Until 2015, Tajikistan citizens could enter Russia with internal passports, as a part of the mutual agreement between Russia and Tajikistan.

enthusiasm weakened in the coming years as the crisis in Ukraine has become sluggish. Moreover, from November 2015 Russia abolished the preferential migration regime for Ukrainians (except for the residents of the conflict-ridden Donbass region), which was also seen by some experts as a tool of pressure on Ukraine (Visasam, 2016).

When a Russian military aircraft was shot down by Turkish forces on the Turkey-Syria border in November 2015, Russia unilaterally suspended visa-free travel of Turkish citizens to Russia, prohibited employers from hiring Turkish workers as a part of sanctions against Ankara. However, most of these measures were were abolished (or in the process of abashment) as Russian-Turkish relations started to normalize in recent years.

Schenk (2018a) argues that the Russian policy of adding people who have violated Russian laws to re-entry ban lists is not only an issue of domestic policy or border control, but also a tool in its foreign policy. ‘Russia’s entry bans have been salient in its discussions with CIS countries over entry into the Eurasian Economic Union. For instance, Kyrgyzstan successfully negotiated to remove a number of its citizens from the blacklist as a condition for the country’s accession’ (para. 8).

A decision to commemorate the 1916 anti-Russian riot in Kyrgyzstan was met by painful reaction in Russia. Russian parliament members soon adopted a long-discussed law prohibiting driving licenses obtained in foreign countries. Given the fact that a significant number of 600 thousand Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia work in the transport sphere, this law upset Kyrgyzstan, a member of the Eurasian Economic Union which aims at free flow of capital, labour and services among the member-states. After long negotiations though, Kyrgyz citizens were exempted from this law and could use Kyrgyz driving licenses in Russia.

The above-mentioned situations give us grounds to assert that Moscow uses its migration policies to retain its geopolitical sway and at the same time to influence other countries’ policies. As Schenk has argued, ‘Russia would use changes to migration policy as a major lever of foreign policy action. The scope and depth of changes to migration policy indicate varying commitment to putting pressure on other states’ (2016: 477).

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that Russia needs migration for demographic, economic and political reasons. Ageing and depopulation in Russia, especially population decline in its

eastern regions as well as the need for cheap labour make migration an important factor for Russia's economic and security reasons. Russian government understand that only the inflow of migration could address the country's demographic challenges. But general population do not want migrants from Central Asia, the main donor of migration, instead they believe that Russia would need only highly-skilled or European migrants. However, in reality, Russia's economy, together with highly-skilled migrants, needs large number of lowly-skilled migrant workers in construction, services, retails, and others.

Also, the chapter revealed that Russia uses migration as a tool of geopolitics. It scrutinized how Moscow sees an integration of post-Soviet republics within the Eurasian Economic Union as one of the main instruments of maintaining its geopolitical influence in post-Soviet space. By promoting free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, Russia provides incentives for other states to engage in Kremlin's integration projects. The treatment of its citizens as equal participants of the Russian labour market was one of the important reasons for Kyrgyzstan to join the organization. Russia offered preferential treatment of these migrants despite popular discontent. Also, the dividend for Russia in participation in the EAEU is pragmatic rather than political. It was also demonstrated how Russia used the issues of citizenship, deportation (or a threat of deportation) and differential treatment of citizens of particular countries in its territory to exert pressure on neighbouring countries. Thus, a clear link between migration policies and geopolitics is established.

Chapter 6. Need for Securitization

Introduction

The previous chapter explored the factors that necessitated migration in Russia. This chapter aims to scrutinize why and how labour migration is securitized in Russia. The legislation system regulating migration affairs is analyzed. This will help us understand how labour migrants, the majority from Central Asian republics, are pushed to irregular status. Entanglement and inconsistencies in the migration regime are analyzed with the help of interviews with experts who work as migration lawyers. The chapter also provides a critical discourse analysis of selected Russian media, selected speeches of top officials regarding migration in the country. It also examines how anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia push authorities to adopt more punitive and restrictive rules to regulate migration. As a widespread phenomenon in many post-Soviet countries, corruption is given as a coping mechanism of survival for thousands of labour migrants in Russia.

6.1. Current legislation system: a coercion to irregularity?

One of the peculiarities of the Russia's migration system is the large number of undocumented migrants. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Russian case of the so-called 'illegal immigration' is different from that of other Western countries. Migrant workers enter Russia legally, but due to inconsistence in legislation, widespread corruption in law-enforcement agencies, restrictive policies and other factors of institutional environment of migratory regulation push millions of migrants into illegality (see Romodanovsky & Mukomel, 2013; Kubal, 2016; Postavnin, 2017). As a result of the illiberal nature of the political regime the number of decision-makers in migration policies is very limited; the decisions are taken in a non-transparent way (Malakhov & Simon, 2016).

Russian migration expert Zaionchkovskaia (RBK, 2016) claimed that annually four million people indicate work as a purpose of their visit to Russia, however only half of this number obtains work permits. Even if we take into account about 900 thousand people can work in Russia without work papers (nationals from member-states of the EAEC), the remaining number points to the large number of irregular migrants.

To fight irregular migration, Russian authorities constantly change requirements and take practical measures. For the last years, the practice and number of deportations were extended: a labour migrant could be banned to enter Russia from three to five years even for minor administrative infringements (including traffic regulation infringements). Expulsions and deportations increased from approximately 73,000 and 35,000 people in 2013 to 545,000 and 139,000 people in 2014, respectively (Abashin, 2016b). In September 2014 nearly one million foreigners were banned from re-entry to Russia (TASS, 2015).



Figure 13. Work permits (including patents and permits for highly skilled workers) issued to foreign workers.

Source: Chudinovskikh and Denisenko, 2017.

Figure 12 demonstrates that although the number of labour migrants arriving in Russia decreased slightly due to the economic crisis in the country since 2014, the number of issued work permits decreased dramatically in 2015 and 2016.

Even when Russian authorities take efforts to liberalize migration legislation, subsequent actions are usually resulted in tightening of the rules for the majority of migrants. Because of the multiplicity and entanglement of legislation (often in the form of bylaws), rules for migrant workers become confusing – most migrants do not have an opportunity to adapt to them (Ryazantsev, 2016).

In 2013, Russia adopted the so-called 'law on rubber flats' which aimed at fighting the registration (remember the *propiska* system) of dozens and even several dozens of foreigners at the same address. In reality, the law not only contributed to the achievement of its goal, but also even more complicated and worsened the case. It made the lives of those Russian people who registered foreign nationals in their apartments, because they were required to reside at the place of registration. 'Rubber flats' still exist and it is mostly the result of not migrants' malevolence, but of their inability to get registration legally. The law's prohibitions contributed not to the obedience of people to the law, but, on the contrary, their attempts to bypass it (Malakhov & Simon, 2016).

From January 2015, regulations for labour migrants have become especially difficult. Although citizens from visa-free regime countries can visit and stay in Russia for up to 90 days without a visa, in order to legally work, they must obtain a *patent* (work permit) within 30 days of their arrival. Work permit, which is valid for a year, has become especially costly and difficult since January 2015. According to experts, labour migrants spend at least 22,000 roubles (less than 400 US dollars) to obtain a work permit and pay a 4,000 rouble (approximately 70 US dollars) monthly fee (Urinboyev, 2016). To obtain the *patent,* work permit, labour migrant must pass a test on Russian language and history, purchase health insurance as well as provide medical tests for HIV, tuberculosis, and other dangerous diseases. Of the three Central Asian countries under the focus of this research, citizens of Kyrgyzstan are exempt from the requirement of obtaining work permits as the country is now a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). If a migrant cannot obtain a work permit within the 30-day period, he/she will have to re-enter Russia. This last requirement pushes many migrants into illegality as it is very difficult to fulfil all the requirements of obtaining a work permit and legally work in Russia (Migrant Ferghana, 2017).

First of all, the majority of Central Asian labour migrants have a poor command of Russian language, not to mention the fact that most of them are illiterate about labour migration. A lawyer in an interview on migration issues in Russia stresses that mostly because of frequent

changes in the migration legislation and labour migrants' non-acquaintance of these changes in many cases make them (migrants) breaching regulations (Shermatov, 2017). Another important factor is that most of migrants come to Russia with little or no money. Given these factors, it is highly unlikely that they will be able to obtain a work permit within thirty days of their arrival to Russia. As a result, many labour migrants in Russia have irregular status (Urinboyev, 2016).

Even if a migrant gets a work permit, it may be annulled if he/she does not sign a job contract within two months of the issuance of the permit. Given that not all employers are eager to hire migrants officially in order to decrease expenses, the chances for a migrant to become irregular are high. Currently, Russian legislation does not provide for a change in the purpose of a person's visit to the country, which already initially restricts the rights of a foreign citizen. So, if a migrant came to Russia to visit relatives (as indicated in the migration card), but then decided to get a job, then he/she must return to his/her homeland and re-enter Russia. Moreover, if the period of stay reaches 90 days, then he/she will be able to enter only after 90 more days.

The above-mentioned rule came into effect in January 2014 with an aim of minimizing the number of irregular migrants. The essence of the so-called '90/180/90 rule' is that foreign nationals from visa-free countries can legally stay in Russia only for 90 days during any given 180-day period. Then they can come back to Russia only after another period of 90 days. Migration lawyers have indicated that this has increased the scale of corruption among law enforcement agencies. There are many people who go to Russia's closest border checks with Kazakhstan and Ukraine and immediately return back in order to claim that they have not overstayed the ninety-day period. Officers at border control close their eyes since they get bribed.[16] The author has witnessed advertisements of several companies who offer transport services from Moscow/St Petersburg to Kazakhstani/Ukrainian border and back.

Urinboyev (2016) believes that these control measures did not reduce irregular migration, but produced unintended consequences:

> Rather than reducing the number of irregular migrants, they [control measures] have created additional incentives for irregular migration. First, migration laws are just part and parcel of the 'unrule of law' in Russia … which is characterized by the prevalence of informal rules and norms over formal institutions… Second, migrants are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that they might not be able to re-enter Russia if they return home seasonally. Therefore, irregular migrants

[16] Interviews with migration experts. October-November 2017.

> are reluctant to return home, preferring to stay and work in Russia for an indefinite period of time (p. 73).

The situation of coercion to irregularity is well explained by 'the spiral effect of law' (Kubal, 2016), where the law becomes fragmented, unenforceable and at times plainly contradictable and where various 'grey schemes' ultimately expose migrants to inconsistent and punitive law environment.

> [T]he inconsistent rules and procedures followed by different agencies lead to a situation in which sanctions can be applied and other negative consequences can arise for migrants, even when irregularity has not been proved and can still be challenged… This uneven balance between the three sets of rules, practices and provisions results in the phenomenon of a 'spiral effect of the law'. Once even a small rule is broken, migrants find themselves breaking more and more rules, sometimes simply by their continued presence on the territory of the Russian Federation. The system appears to be designed in a way that the different immigration provisions and requirements are intricately connected to one another so that a loss of one permit or a document has debilitating effects on attempts to renew other documents and can potentially lead to a person being stuck in a downward spiral towards irregularity (Kubal, 2016: pp. 461-462).

It is argued that the key players who may influence the decision-making process in the field of migration policy are not interested in a significant reshaping of relations between the state and migrants. 'The peculiarity of these relations is that (a) the overall direction of the legislative process acquires a restrictive character and (b) there is an essential corruption component in law enforcement practice, which is largely due to the design of the laws themselves' (Malakhov & Simon, 2016: p. 8).

It should be pointed out that as long as there is a demand for migrant force, no regulation, no matter how restrictive and punitive they are, can control and contain legal migration.

> As long as there is a strong, stable demand for foreign labour in advanced industrial economies, resourceful immigrants in pursuit of abundant and high-paying jobs (and the smugglers and labour brokers who assist them) will always find a way to circumvent a government's immigration laws, border controls, and any other obstacle placed in their path. Indeed, the more restrictive the immigration policy, the greater the number of migrants who will simply find ways to enter the country illegally in response to employer demand, and the larger the immigration control gap (Cornelius et al. 2004, in Schenk, 2018b: p. 221).

Labour migrants fall into irregular status not only as a result of the inconsistencies in the legislation, but also employers also push them into illegality. The extremely corrupt procedure for obtaining work permit and other registration papers is given as the main reason

for companies to hire irregular, or undocumented, migrants (Tyuryukanov & Florinkskaya, 2012).

In an expert interview, Shermatov says that even if a migrant somehow manages to get a work permit for the profession for which there is a vacancy, employing companies prefer not to sign a written employment contract with the migrant and not to send any notifications to the authorities (migration, labour, tax authorities). First, this (signing a contract and submitting paperwork to relevant authorities) causes an extra burden in terms of time; secondly, not signing a contract gives an employer the possibility to promptly transfer the migrant worker from a place to a place and change the type of activity, which is impossible with legal registration due to the indication of profession and territory/region in the work permit; thirdly, it allows companies to evade taxes; fourthly, not every migrant will manage to defend his/her rights himself/herself or find an assisting organization, which means that a migrant can be exploited with impunity and even may be rejected wages.[17]

Russian experts have also discussed how certain loopholes and inconsistencies in Russian legislation system pushes many migrants to irregularity, at the same time, creating favourable conditions for corruption in agencies controlling migration. These factors include, among others, the breadth of powers of responsible state bodies, arbitrary or selective changes in the scope of citizens' rights, the existence of inflated demands on an individual to exercise his/her right, and the establishment of vague, difficult and burdensome demands on citizens and organizations (Panfilova, 2016).

> Most of experts – especially migration lawyers – during the interviews confirmed how representatives of law enforcement agencies, both police officers and officers of migration service (which also belongs to the Ministry of Interior), deliberately hamper the process of issuing work permits and resident registration, thereby forcing labour migrants to pay bribes. It is usual that police officers stop non-Slavic-looking migrants for ID checks. In most of the cases, they find out that a migrant misses one or several documents that he must carry. Even if a migrant has all the documents, a police officer claims that his document is fake and asks him to go to the police station. If he is lucky enough, he can bribe the police officer and break free. But if migrant does not have money at hand, they let him call – and sometimes even offer their own phones – his friends/relatives to bring money. Many of my clients’ problems with law enforcement agencies started when police officers took them [to police station] even though they had all proper documents.[18]

[17] Expert interview, Botirjon Shermatov. November 2017.

[18] Expert interview, Bakht Ovar. Over Messenger. October 2017.

Meilus (2013) believes that many seemingly inconsistencies and contradictions in Russia's migration policies are not random, but 'deliberately enacted in a way that allows the Russian policy makers to hide behind a curtain of ambiguity while ensuring that labor migrants remain illegal and vulnerable in order to form an unregulated, cheap, flexible, and mobile labor force' (p. 8).

It is interesting to note that different federal governments impose different penalties for administrative infringements by labour migrants. For example, for violating the rules of entry of residence registration, a migrant in Moscow or St. Petersburg will be fined and deported, while in other regions of the Russian Federation, punishment is often limited to a payment of fine. Experts claim that such a norm discriminates foreigners residing in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Gulina & Utyasheva, 2016).

Regulation of detention facilities for foreign citizens, in which migrants are placed before administrative expulsion from Russia, is also criticized: 'The law does not contain descriptions of conditions and guarantees for the maintenance of foreign citizens and stateless persons in special institutions, there is no specific and definite period of detention … foreigners are not provided with the right to appeal to interpreters, as well as there is no specifics about the procedure and cases of using physical force' (Panfilova, 2016: para. 13).

The migration policy is strictly restrictive which narrows the possibilities for the legal presence of migrants in Russia. Thus, labour migrants temporarily staying in Russia, the main part of migrants engaged in seasonal or temporary jobs, find themselves in a situation where, even having fulfilled all the conditions for legal residence in the country, in practice remain one on one with their problems.

> In addition to the fact that the rights of a foreign worker temporarily residing in Russia are incomplete, the current legislation does not provide *gastarbajtery* with the possibility of resorting to the protection of rights in government and local government bodies... Imperfection and contradictions in Russian migration legislation lead to serious restrictions on the rights of migrant workers, including even the basic human rights proclaimed by the UN Convention. At the same time, the duties and responsibilities of *gastarbajtery* are spelled out in detail (Andreeva, 2008: p. 256).

Although in 2012 Russia has adopted a Migration Policy Concept until 2025, recently (June 2017) Russian Ministry of Interior (responsible for migration affairs) has developed a new draft of the concept. Sergey Abashin, a well-known migration expert in Russia, noted a securitizing change of language comparing to the current concept: 'while in the old (current)

concept the word “security” is used 4 times, in the new (draft) one – 10 times, the new (draft) concept uses words “terrorism” and “crime” while the old (current) don’t contain these words; the old (current) concept does not have a word “containment”, while the new (draft) uses it 4 times and proposes a stable formula for migration policy as “containment and regulation”’ (Abashin, 2017).

Russian experts point to the main shortcomings that hinder the legal stay of labour migrants in the country: ‘constant amendment of existing laws; frequent inconsistency of law enforcement practices and existing migration legislation; and a lack of a clear understanding of the direction of the migration policy: steps to liberalize the legislation following the allegations that Russia needs migrants immediately take steps in the opposite direction’ (CSR, 2018).

The analysis of Russian legislation in the sphere of migration found out inconsistencies. The lack of attention to the problems of labour migrants as well as the lack of feedback between labour migrants and government bodies often lead to the violation of migrant workers’ rights and push hundreds of thousands of people into irregular status, which again makes them vulnerable to punishment, deportation, extortion and corruption.

6.2. Media discourses: Representing labour migrants as a threat

When talking about migrants in the media, people usually speak about prejudices also. Today it is already problematic to talk about racism. Traditional expressions of colour and race, which during colonialism were typical expressions of racism, are not used now: the new racism is directed at migrants and refugees. This phenomenon is called Euro-racism, symbolic racism or cultural racism. The discourse of neo-racism is based on the division of people into 'us' and 'them', although explicitly racist terms are not used (Wodak, 2010).

The discursive construction of 'us' and 'them' is the basis for biased or racist discourses. Depending on historical customs, the general levels of tolerance, the public sphere, etc., discursive expressions of prejudice may be implicit, explicit, strong or relaxed. Such a discursive structure first characterizes, then generalizes the negative properties, and then gives arguments to give the right to exclude many and include some of the society (Wodak 2010).

Van Dijk notes that news about immigrants and ethnic minorities is often limited to the following events:

- New (illegal) immigrants are arriving.
- Political response to, policies about (new) immigration.
- Reception problems (housing, etc.).
- Social problems (employment, welfare, etc.).
- Response of the population (resentment, etc.).
- Cultural characterization: how are they different?
- Complications and negative characterization: how are they deviant?
- Focus on threats: violence, crime, drugs, prostitution.
- Political response: policies to stop immigration, expulsion, and so on.
- Integration conflicts (2000: p. 38).

Van Dijk continues that usually these topics have negative aspects in the news – immigration is considered a threat, and only problems, not success, of migration are presented (van Dijk 2000).

There is already an established discourse that is applied to migrants and is usually promulgated by the Russia's most popular media and as they are largely under government control, this discourse can be considered as the official stance of the government as well

(Hutchings & Tolz, 2012; Mikhailova, 2011; Mukomel, 2011; Popova, 2012; etc.). These researches identified xenophobic discursive representation of migrants – such as '**litsa neslavianskoi vneshnosti**' (non-Slavic looking people), **gasterbaiters** and '**vyhodtsy iz Srednej Azii'** (people from Central Asia) – conform to the binary process of 'othering' that has been identified by most discourse scholars (Hansen, 2006; Burnham *et al*., 2008). Hutchings and Tolz (2011) identified several competing discourses in Russian media: friendship of the peoples; ethnic criminality; culture conflict; conspiracy of power. Recently, with Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict, relatively new discourses of 'terrorism' and 'religious extremism' in reference to Central Asian migrants have emerged.

Labour migration in Russia has been a topic of hotly debated issues. There are both pro- and anti-migrant opinions in the country. On the one hand, mostly experts, business representatives agree that Russia needs migration to address economic and demographic challenges. On the other hand, mostly general population, particular media as well as politicians and activists see migration as dangerous and undesirable for security and cultural unity of Russia and the possible negative economic concerns.

> the migration policy is trying to simultaneously take into account arguments from both sides. In particular, by combining cultural, professional and other attributes, state officials have attempted to design images and categories of 'preferred' and 'non-preferred' migrants out of the former Soviet citizens and descendants thereof, for which different favour regimes are suggested: the former should be motivated to resettle, while the latter should be restricted and ousted by all available means (Abashin, 2016: p. 31).

Russian media often covers the issues related to labour migration as one of the most hotly discussed topics in the society. But for the reasons mentioned in the methodology part of the research, selected articles from the two newspapers *Rossijskaya Gazeta, Moskovskij Komsomolets* as well as other media sources are analyzed to show how media in Russia represent and recreate discourses about migration, especially labour migration from Central Asia.

One of the most widespread and common words to define migrants in Russia is *gastarbajtery.* A loan word from German, it originally means a guest worker, a person with temporary permission to work in another country. However, this word was started to be actively used by Russian media regarding labour migrants from Central Asia and Caucasus and became a common word in the society. Unlike in German, in Russian the word has a negative connotation.

For example, in the following titles of articles by *Moskovskij Komsomolets,* the negative valuation is present: ‘Гастарбайтер твой сосед, Некоторые из них ведут себя как в тылу врага’ (Gastarbeiter is your neighbour, Some of them behave like behind enemy lines)[19], ‘Азартный гастарбайтер убил пенсионеров играючи’ (Gambling gastarbeiter killed pensioners playfully)[20], ‘Гастарбайтер пошел на убийство за метал’ (Gasterbeiter went to kill for metal)[21], ‘Гастарбайтер напал на водителя скорой помощи в Москве’ (Gastarbeiter attacked an ambulance driver in Moscow)[22], ‘Патриарх недоволен гастарбайтерами: “Станут жителями наших городов”’ (Patriarch dissatisfied with gastarbeiters: ‘They will become residents of our cities’)[23].

Although less frequent than *Moskovskij Komsomolets,* the word *gastarbajter* is used with a negative tone in *Rossijskaya Gazeta,* official government newspaper, too. Some examples to illustrate: ‘Гастарбайтер не конкурент. В любой ситуации интересы российских граждан должны быть на первом месте’ (Gastarbeiter is not a competitor. In any situation, the interests of Russian citizens should be in the first place)[24], ‘Гастарбайтер без болячек. Работающих мигрантов обяжут покупать медполисы’ (Gastarbeiter without sores. Working migrants will be obliged to buy health insurances)[25], ‘Гастарбайтер-нелегал получил 15 лет колонии за убийство женщины’ (Gastarbeiter-illegal received 15 years in prison for killing a woman)[26], ‘Внутренний голос приказал. Гастарбайтер из

[19] Moskovskij Komsomolets, June 27, 2007. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.mk.ru/old/article/2007/06/27/96667-gastarbajter-tvoy-sosed.html.

[20] Moskovskij Komsomolets, October 19, 2009. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.mk.ru/incident/article/2009/10/19/370322-azartnyiy-gastarbajter-ubil-pensionerov-igrayuchi.html.

[21] Moskovskij Komsomolets, May 4, 2010. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.mk.ru/incident/article/2010/04/05/462180-gastarbajter-poshel-na-ubiystvo-za-metall.html

[22] Moskovskij Komsomolets, August 8, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://tv.mk.ru/video/2016/08/16/gastarbajter-napal-na-voditelya-skoroy-pomoshhi-v-moskve.html.

[23] Moskovskij Komsomolets, October 26, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/10/26/patriarkh-nedovolen-gastarbajterami-stanut-zhitelyami-nashikh-gorodov.html.

[24] Rossijskaya Gazeta, November 7, 2008. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2008/11/07/ezrabotnie.html.

[25] Rossijskaya Gazeta, January 18, 2013. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2013/01/18/migranti-site.html.

[26] Rossijskaya Gazeta, April 14, 2015. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2015/04/14/napal.html.

Таджикистана за двойное убийство получил пожизненный срок' (The inner voice ordered. Gastarbajter from Tajikistan for a double murder received a life sentence)[27].

In both newspapers, a private outlet with one of the largest number of circulation and the government's official media, *gastarbeiter* is often associated with crime, someone of alien culture. It should be reiterated that *gastarbajter* is mostly referred to labour migrants from Central Asia and Caucasus, but not to Slavic people.

Society usually develops stereotypes both in relation to Other and Self, but it is the image of Self that turns out to be especially distorted, one-sided and biased (Fiske, 1993). This pattern can be traced in Russian discourses on labour migrants as well. The analysis of the main components of Russian media discourses about labour migrants show that almost all media in Russia have common stereotypes of labour migrants. For them, labour migrants

- are mostly from Central Asia and Caucasus;
- have an untidy appearance;
- often infected with dangerous diseases (tuberculosis, HIV);
- do not have education and professional qualifications, they take menial jobs;
- do not know Russian well or at all;
- do not respect 'our' rules of conduct, customs and culture;
- may be involved in criminal activities (most incriminated crimes are robbery, drug trafficking, murder, etc.);
- are willing to take any of the heaviest and dirty jobs for a much lower salary;
- live in their 'closed' ethnic communities;
- are extra burden for social services (healthcare, education, etc.);
- send money earned in Russia to home countries, thus contribute to outflow of money from Russia.

Below I aim to find out what representations about Central Asian labour migrants are being built in the Russian press. Since a significant number of media texts consist of the discourses of authoritative individuals and build ideologies (Fairclough, 1995), I will focus in part on the opinions of politicians and officials representing the government's official position.

[27] Rossijskaya Gazeta, August 10, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2017/08/10/reg-cfo/gastarbajter-poluchil-pozhiznennyj-srok-za-dvojnoe-ubijstvo.html.

Thus, we can assume that such discourses are created by the authorities, and that they have interrelations with each other.

Found and analyzed discourses are divided into different representations of labour migrants from Central Asia. Since representations are ways to describe a reality using language, a special attention is paid to the choice of words in the texts. Representations not only reflect reality, but rather create their own variants (Fairclough 1995: 136), and therefore one will also have to consider who has a voice in these texts, and how this voice is used. Since on a broad level discourses create the social world through representations, they also create social identities and social relations (Fairclough, 1992; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).

During the period under discussion, the general representations of labour migrants have not changed. However, the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, the crisis in Ukraine and its impact on Russian society as well as particular events (anti-migrant riots, migrant-involved serious incidents, etc.) made adjustments to the frequency and acutance of such representations.

Negative attitudes toward labour migrants were implicit in most of the chosen texts. These attitudes were typically associated with crime, diseases, competition for jobs, threats to society, etc. In certain cases, empathy toward labour migrants is also present when discussing their living conditions, abuse by employers. The representations are conditionally divided into specific labelling.

Superfluous migrants

Discussing the Russian government plans to allow up to four million foreigners to work in Russia in 2009, then Rossijskaya Gazeta (RG) wrote in November 2008:

With all due respect to foreign citizens and understanding their important role in the economy of our country, it would be, to put it mildly, strange to make our first duty to take care of 'guests', and after that care about own family.

При всем уважении к иностранным гражданам и понимании их важной роли в экономике нашей страны было бы, мягко говоря, странным первым долгом заботиться о 'гостях', а уже потом о своей собственной семье.[28]

[28] Rossijskaya Gazeta, November 7, 2008. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2008/11/07/ezrabotnie.html.

Later that year, when the global economic crisis hit Russian economy seriously, government plans started to change and it was first the labour migrants who were to lose their jobs. In January 2009, the government decree reduced the number of foreign workers in Russia by half. Media discussed this decision from a negative point of view to migrants, but this is most evident from the attitude towards the decision to cut quotas. In this discourse, labour migrants are considered ‘superfluous’ (lishnie), some vain victims of the economic crisis. For example, as Yuri Luzhkov, then mayor of Moscow wrote in RG:

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced a two-fold cut in quotas for migrants. Absolutely justified and timely measure, taking into account real trends in employment in the country.

Председатель правительства России Владимир Владимирович Путин объявил о сокращении квот на мигрантов в два раза. Абсолютно обоснованная и своевременная мера, учитывающая реальные тенденции в сфере занятости в стране.[29]

The opinions of the authorities are most often supported in newspaper articles, sometimes even aggressively. In the example above, the government's decisions are personified on Vladimir Putin – his name is used to strengthen this statement. At the same time, power is strengthened, which takes absolutely justified decisions. There is a naturalization of opinion, which has an ideological character. Although such discourses do not relate negatively to migrants, it can be said that with such discourses the feeling is reinforced that the reduction in the number of migrants is justified and timely, without argumentation. They are superfluous, which is clearly visible also in the following examples:

For example, Russia has already announced a reduction in quotas for foreign labour. It must be said that today almost the whole of Europe is tightening up its migration policy: no one needs ‘extra’ hands.

Например, Россия уже объявила о сокращении квот для иностранной рабочей силы. Надо сказать, сегодня практически вся Европа ужесточает миграционную политику: «лишние» руки никому не нужны.[30]

[29] Rossijskaya Gazeta, January 14, 2009. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2009/01/14/krizis-luzhkov.html.

[30] Rossijskaya Gazeta, February 9, 2009. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2009/02/09/trud.html.

In the above text, Russia's decision is justified by the actions of other countries. The authorities are again supported and the right to these measures is given. Toughening migration policy is considered natural: again, naturalization takes place. Migrants are considered ‘superfluous’, unnecessary.

... in times of crisis, ‘extra’ gastarbajters become a criminal problem. And an unplanned load on our hospitals, kindergartens, schools. They are not designed for migrants. As a result, the labour of migrants becomes very cheap for the employer and too expensive for the society.

... в условиях кризиса «лишние» гастарбайтеры становятся криминальной проблемой. И незапланированной нагрузкой на наши больницы, детсады, школы. Они не рассчитаны на мигрантов. В итоге труд мигрантов становится очень дешевым для работодателя и слишком дорогим для общества.[31]

The representation of extra, superfluous migrants was closely linked to the economic crisis and burden on social infrastructure. Also, the expression ‘extra’ repeats the discourse of uselessness. Migrants are necessary only when they work, otherwise they are superfluous. The discourse of uselessness, supe is used in different contexts also:

Today, in conditions of instability in the labour market, there is a growing danger that migrant workers will not go home, but remain in Moscow and ‘retrain’ into robbers. The capital may already be crowded with unnecessary foreign labour.

Сегодня, в условиях нестабильности на рынке труда, возрастает опасность, что гастарбайтеры не уедут домой, а останутся в Москве и ‘переквалифицируются’ в грабителей. Столица и так может оказаться переполнена невостребованной иностранной рабочей силой.[32]

In addition to being unnecessary, the unwillingness of migrants to return home is considered a negative phenomenon. The stay in Moscow of labour migrants is considered a possible cause of their becoming robbers. They will have to go home sooner, because they are no longer needed. Migrants also saw the heavier for Russia:

- We need to be prepared for a situation when there will be a large number of people who have lost their jobs. So that they do not hang out here, they should be sent home quickly,

[31] Komsomol’skaya Pravda, May 26, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.kp.ru/daily/26534.4/3550750/.

[32] Rossijskaya Gazeta, February 11, 2009. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2009/02/11/srok.html .

Zhukov said and noted that many migrants do not have money to buy a ticket, so the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FMS must be ready to deport foreigners.

- Нам надо быть готовым к ситуации, когда будет большое количество людей, потерявших работу. Чтобы они здесь не болтались, их надо быстро отправить домой, - заявил Жуков и при этом отметил, что у многих мигрантов нет денег на покупку билета, так что МВД и ФМС должны быть готовы к депортации иностранцев.[33]

The speedy departure of migrants is highlighted above. Migrants should not only be sent home, but also quickly. If unemployed migrants stay in Russia, they hang out: they go around idly, hang out. Their unwillingness to leave Russia is considered a threat. The word 'migrant' is used synonymously with the word 'foreigner'.

The topic of extra migrants arose in connection with the maintenance of power and its orders. The decisions of the authorities to reduce the number of migrants were considered absolute, perfect. The labour migrants are considered unnecessary; therefore they must leave Russia quickly. The stay of migrants in Russia was considered a threat because of their criminal tendencies.

Criminal Migrants

A discourse about criminal migrants has been prevalent in Russia for the last two decades (Mukomel, 2011). General discourses of labour migrants can be divided into irregular (nelegaly) and criminal migrants. Discourses of 'a criminal migrant' are further 'divided' into categories of offenders, drug-dealers, terrorists, etc.

As mentioned in earlier chapters, the use of the word 'illegal' in the Russian migration regime context has a different connotation. Migrants from Central Asia do not need a visa to enter Russia. However, in order to legally stay and work, migrants need work permits (patent) and register at a place of residence. Unlike in Western countries, a Central Asian migrant can enter Russia legally, but may become illegal, or undocumented, if he or she overstays the allowed period (90 days) and/or works without proper documents. The estimated numbers and reasons for becoming undocumented, or illegal in Russian terms, were discussed before.

The thesis found some common features of the material concerning illegal immigrants. The responsibility of employers was an important factor when assessing illegal migration from

[33] Komsomol'slaya Pravda, May 26, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.kp.ru/daily/26534.4/3550750/.

the point of view of society. The employer is responsible for illegal immigrants, who are described in the texts as passive objects. In the below texts we can see that the illegal immigrants themselves are not condemned, but employers. Migrants are profitable for employers, because they are cheaper than a Russian employee. This contains implicit information about the reification of migrants: they are almost like goods that you can buy and compare prices:

… there is an economic interest of employers for whom it is more profitable in existing legal and economic realities to continue breaking laws to maintain the profitability of their business or to obtain additional profits than to employ legal labour migrants.

… существует экономический интерес работодателей, которым в существующих правовых и экономических реалиях выгоднее идти на нарушение законов для сохранения рентабельности своего бизнеса или получения дополнительной прибыли, чем использовать труд легальных мигрантов.[34]

The labour price of migrants, [money] they get paid directly by the employer, is less than the cost of work of local residents. This is a plus for the economy. And a huge plus for business, which tries to squeeze out of migrants all that is possible.

Цена труда мигрантов, непосредственно того, что им платит работодатель, меньше, чем себестоимость работы местных жителей. Это плюс для экономики. И огромный плюс для бизнеса, который пытается выжимать из мигрантов все что можно.[35]

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[34] Rossijskaya Gazeta, May 27, 2013. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://rg.ru/2013/05/27/migraciya.html.

[35] Komsomol'skaya Pravda, December 18, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.kp.ru/daily/26771/3804223/.

Figure 14. Police raid to find 'illegal' migrants, 2016. (author caption)

Source: Sputnik News. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from https://ru.sputniknews-uz.com/migration/20160519/2844013.html.

Another view of reification is that migrants are instruments of the employer to violate established rules (15) and, thus, to act against the state. In example (16), even migrants are compared with fighters of the invisible front, referring to the personnel of the KGB, or other intelligence services. It is assumed that illegal immigrants act against the interests of Russia. They are opposed to other residents of Moscow.

There was also a discourse of including illegal immigrants in criminal activities. It is asserted that illegal migrants without a job can become a criminal, who poses threat to a society. It is believed that without a work permit, migrants are likely to commit crimes: either violent or bureaucratic. Illegal migrants are associated with a crime related to bringing into Russia more illegal migrants:

[Law enforcement agencies] liquidated a stable ethnic organized group, consisting of citizens of the Central Asian region. Criminals specialized in organizing large-scale channels of illegal stay of foreign citizens in Russia.

[Правоохранительные органы] ликвидировали устойчивую этническую организованную группу, состоящую из граждан Центрально-Азиатского региона.

Преступники специализировались на организации масштабных каналов незаконного пребывания иностранных граждан на территории России.[36]

One of the most common discourses in Russia regarding labour migrants is the discourse of the criminal features of migrants. It was believed that after the loss of jobs, migrants easily turn into criminals. In some cases, labour migrants are perceived as potential criminals. The articles often used statistics to emphasize the likelihood of criminal migrants. Government officials have also opined about the link between 'migrants' and 'crime'. Thus, stereotypes about criminal tendencies of migrants are born. Stereotypes easily become facts that affect the lives of these specific groups (Goodey, 2003).

The statistics are depressing: half of the illegal actions are committed by non-residents [of Moscow] ... According to Yakunin [head of Moscow police department], foreigners account for about a third of the robbery, blunder and rape of the total number of disclosed crimes, and about 18 percent of the murders. We catch intruders almost every day. Anatoly Yakunin also lamented the fact that ethnic [criminal] groups are being created in Moscow, whose members steal cars, sell drugs, attack money carriers and rob apartments.

Статистика удручающая: половину противоправных действий совершают иногородние… По словам Якунина [начальника ГУВД по Москве], на долю иностранцев приходится примерно треть разбойных нападений, грабежей и изнасилований от общего числа раскрытых, и около 18 процентов убийств. Ловят злоумышленников чуть ли не каждый день. Анатолий Якунин посетовал также на то, что в Москве создаются этнические группировки, члены которых угоняют автомобили, торгуют наркотиками, нападают на перевозчиков денег и грабят квартиры.[37]

With the help of statistics, criminal trends of migrants were interpreted. These analyzes were still often biased: migrant workers are considered foreign, but statistics re non-residents of Moscow, hence we do not know how many of them are Russia's internal migrants. The meanings of the words 'foreigners' and 'non-residents' are mixed. Depending on the context, the reader may erroneously assume that foreigners commit the half of all crimes. Also, a detailed analysis of the situation is not given, the statistics were only figures without comment:

> The report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on crimes in 2015 says that foreign citizens and stateless persons in the territory of the Russian Federation committed 46.4 thousand crimes (not 58 thousand, as claimed by Patrushev). The increase in the number of offenses amounted to 4.4 percent, and not '5-6

[36] Komsomol'skaya Pravda, November 17, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.rostov.kp.ru/daily/26759.7/3789028/.

[37] NTV, July 23, 2013. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/634021/.

> percent', as the Secretary of the Security Council said. It should be noted that the number of crimes against foreign citizens and stateless persons increased by 17.5 percent in 2015. And the total number of crimes registered in Russia increased by 8.6 percent compared to the same period last year. Hence, it is easy to see that the growth of crimes committed by foreigners is almost two times behind the overall growth of crime in the country (Ferghana, 2016: para. 5-6).

Another notable discourse was that migrants do not want to leave Russia, but they want to stay in Russia and commit atrocities:

Thousands of labour migrants became another destabilizing factor. Having lost a job, they have neither the desire nor the opportunity to return to their homeland and often begin to engage in a banal gop-stop.

Ещё одним дестабилизирующим фактором стали тысячи трудовых мигрантов. Потеряв работу, они не имеют ни желания, ни возможности вернуться на родину и нередко начинают заниматься банальным гоп-стопом.[38]

Serious concerns over the potential to commit crimes by labour migrants (referred to illegal migrants) are expressed at the top political level and further conveyed to the general public through media:

Criminal groups, drug traffickers, foreign special services, as well as emissaries of international extremist and terrorist organizations are trying to take advantage of illegal channels of migration... Serious concern is caused by the not decreasing crime rate among foreign citizens ... I ask our departments to seriously strengthen operational and preventive work on the fight against crime in the migration environment.

Нелегальные каналы миграции пытаются использовать в своих интересах преступные группировки, наркоторговцы, зарубежные спецслужбы, а также эмиссары международных экстремистских, террористических организаций... Серьёзное беспокойство вызывает не снижающийся уровень преступности среди иностранных граждан... Прошу наши ведомства серьёзно усилить оперативную и профилактическую работу по борьбе с преступностью в миграционной среде.[39]

Thus, the use of phrases 'criminal groups,' 'drug traffickers,' 'extremist terrorist organizations,' 'crime,' 'foreign citizens,' and 'migration' in one context gives and impression that they are interchangeable at times and accompany each other.

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[38] AiF, January 28, 2009. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.aif.ru/incidents/8914.

[39] Vladimir Putin, March 31, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51618.

It seems that a sharp increase of xenophobia in 2013 as a result of the Moscow mayoral election, Biryulyovo riots, Matveevsky market incidents affected discourses of migration at the top political level in Russia. For example, we can see a change in Putin's stance in relation to migration and multi-ethnic society. In 2012, Vladimir Putin, then prime minister, said that

… if a multi-ethnic society is struck by the bacilli of nationalism, it loses its strength and stability.

… если многонациональное общество поражают бациллы национализма, оно теряет силу и прочность.[40]

However, two years later his rhetoric has changed:

*We know that this [migrants] breeds **crime, interethnic tensions and extremism**. We need a **greater control** over compliance with regulations covering migrants' stay in Russia.*[41]

Известно, что это [мигранты] питательная среда для преступности, для возникновения межэтнической напряженности, проявлений экстремизма. Необходимо усилить контроль за выполнением правил пребывания мигрантов в России.[42]

Thus, Putin drew connection between migrants' irregular status and crime and ethnic tensions.

Discourse of criminal properties of migrants contains assumptions about the ability of migrants to turn into criminals after losing their jobs. Migrants were often called foreigners, and both meanings of the word 'migrant' were used in parallel, although this causes misunderstandings in the interpretation, for example, of statistics on the crime of migrants. Compared with anxious discourses, migrants are active subjects regarding crimes: they commit them. Adding criminal properties to migrants, one can assume that journalists greatly influence the relations in the country.

It is no secret that many labour migrants, instead of working, are engaged in drug trafficking, freely moving around in Russia, settling in colonies near megacities. Since this year, the cage was closed – Russia legalized the deportation of foreigners who committed

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[40] Vladimir Putin, January 23, 2012. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html.

[41] The emphasis is mine.

[42] RIA Novosti, November 20, 2014. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://ria.ru/society/20141120/1034333285.html.

administrative violations related to drug trafficking. Labour migrants are called upon to fill the internal shortage of workers. Indeed, with poor demography, it is impossible to develop an economy without guest workers. But how can it [migration] be good, if they [migrants] carry a narcotic infection?

Не секрет, что много трудовых мигрантов вместо труда промышляют наркоторговлей, свободно перемещаясь по России, селясь колониями у мегаполисов. С этого года вольницу прикрыли – Россия узаконила депортацию иностранцев, совершивших административные правонарушения, связанные с незаконным оборотом наркотиков. Трудовые мигранты призваны восполнить внутренний дефицит рабочих рук. Действительно, при плохой демографии развивать экономику без гастарбайтеров невозможно. Но как ей быть хорошей, если те несут наркотическую заразу?[43]

In the above text, Boris Gryzlov, then the chairman of the Russian State Duma (parliament), equalizes labour migrants with drug-dealers. Top-level official does not give any statistical or any other data to prove this claim, but it can be understood from the whole text that he is referring to labour migrants from Tajikistan, with which Russia at that time was holding difficult negotiations on guarding the porous Afghan-Tajik border by Russian military personnel. Gryzlov justifies the need to guard the border by Russians with the inability of Tajik border guards and the influx of drugs brought with the help of Tajik migrants into Russian cities. However, the discourse of migrants-drug dealers is created through such texts.

On April 3, 2017, a terrorist attack exploded on the Saint Petersburg metro claiming the lives of fifteen people and injuring several dozens. Akbarjon Jalilov, a Russian citizen who is an ethnic Uzbek born in Kyrgyzstan, was named by security forces as the perpetrator of the attack. The fact that the suspect was originally from Central Asia, though with Russian citizenship, opened the way for the strengthening of the migrant-terrorist discourse in Russian society. Although, it must be stipulated that one could observe in Russian media a discourse that migrants could plot terrorist attacks before the April 2017 attack, too, in light of the several terrorist attacks committed by migrants (or their descendants) in European cities. However, this discourse strengthened since April 2017, especially after the FSB director's following statement, which was broadcast by all Russian media outlets:

Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation Alexander Bortnikov said that the main backbone of terrorist groups in Russia is beginning to be made up of labour migrants and natives from the CIS who came with them. 'To prevent attempts of militant to penetrate into Russia, it is required to provide for additional measures of the border regime

[43] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 2, 2011. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2011-08-02/7_drugs.html.

on the state border, on the channels of entry and exit and in the passenger traffic with respect to persons suspected of involvement in terrorist structures,' Bortnikov stressed.

Директор ФСБ РФ Александр Бортников заявил, что основной костяк террористических групп в России начинают составлять трудовые мигранты и выходцы из СНГ, прибывшие вместе с ними. «Для предотвращения попыток проникновения боевиков в РФ требуется предусмотреть дополнительные меры пограничного режима на государственной границе, на каналах въезда и выезда и в пассажиропотоке в отношении лиц, подозреваемых в причастности к террористическим структурам», — подчеркнул Бортников.[44]

If before Central Asian labour migrants were mainly associated with crimes, job rivals, poverty, alien and lower culture, after the terrorist attacks the terrorist labelling began to prevail.

The FSB detained migrants suspected of preparing new terrorist acts in Saint Petersburg. All alleged terrorists came from Central Asia.

ФСБ задержала мигрантов, подозреваемых в подготовке новых терактов в Петербурге. Все предполагаемые террористы приехали из Центральной Азии.[45]

Migrants recruited by the IS[46] *prepared terrorist attacks for the New Year. Gastarbeiters with a criminal background received detailed instructions on how to conduct a 'war' in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.*

Мигранты, завербованные ИГ, готовили теракты на Новый год. Гастарбайтеры с уголовным прошлым получали подробные инструкции, как вести «войну» в Москве и Петербурге.[47]

In the Moscow region, a gang of migrants from Central Asia, armed to the teeth, was detained. Arrested basmachis[48] *are under 20.*

В Московской области задержана вооруженная до зубов банда мигрантов из Средней Азии. Арестованным басмачам до 20 лет.[49]

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[44] Izvestiya, April 11, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://iz.ru/news/681185.

[45] Komsomol'skaya Pravda, July 28, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.kp.ru/daily/26711.7/3735799/.

[46] The Islamic State.

[47] Komsomol'skaya Pravda, November 16, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.kp.ru/daily/26606/3624031/.

[48] *Basmachis* are members of the anti-Soviet revolt movement against the Red Army in Central Asia in 1920-1930s.

[49] Komsomol'slaya Pravda, September 19, 2017. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/26732/3760056/.

In all the above-mentioned texts, migration is seen in the context of security. Equalization of migration to terrorism and extremism can be observed. Migrants are dangerous who have conspired *prepare* an attack on Russians, hence they are threat to the Russian society.

In this section, I have analyzed the main discourses with regard to labour migration, and particularly Central Asian labour migrants, in Russia. Migrants are associated with being 'alien,' 'superfluous,' 'criminal,' 'dangerous,' etc. In this regard, both the government officials and mass media are the main producers of anti-migrant discourse, as they constantly reproduce and represent the discourse of an alien. Xenophobic sentiments, speculatively replicated by the media and exaggerated by government officials, and vice versa, penetrate into the mass culture and lead to more xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments in the society.

6.3. Securitization at a society level

6.3.1. Public xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments

Scholars note that xenophobia in Russia has several dimensions, of which the most important are: ethnic (ethnophobia), migratory (migrantophobia), religious and confessional (Islamophobia, primarily) and civil (presence / absence of Russian citizenship) phobias (Gudkov, 2006; Mukomel, 2014). Ethnophobia and migrantophobia today are aimed primarily at representatives of 'visible minorities' visually different from the Russian ethnic majority.

An important role in shaping the image of Other is played by his 'alienness' (*prishlost'*), which overlaps ethnic minorities, exacerbates anti-migrant sentiments, and since the host population is mainly confronted with other ethnic migrants, migrant phobias also have a clear ethnic etiology.

Russian scholars argue that xenophobia is not a new phenomenon for post-Soviet Russia, as some have claimed, but it was present in the USSR which had its specific roots.

> During the Soviet period, the existence of xenophobia was sanctioned by official ideology. The Soviet Union and Soviet society were proclaimed the highest achievement of human thought and practice, the bearers of ideals to which all peoples and cultures should strive. Sociologist A. Malashenko stresses that this was the root of the fundamental basis of the general Xenophobia with a capital letter, which sacrificed the rejection of any cultural, social, spiritual component that did not comply with the Soviet standard. In the official Soviet xenophobia, specific directions emerged: a religious phobia in the form of atheism; social phobia, expressed in the Stalinist idea of exacerbating the class struggle, and ethnophobia, in particular, anti-Semitism. At the domestic level, residents of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in addition to the Jews, were the objects of ethnophobia (Soldatova & Makarchuk, 2006: para. 30).

The growth of xenophobia in the 1990s was explained, firstly, by a traumatic shock caused by the radical socio-political and economic transformations of Russian society, and secondly by the liquidation of a restraining law-enforcement principle. Gudkov (2003) claims that social and national sentiment became one of the main factors that activated and revived the previously suppressed mixture of xenophobia and aggressive isolationism, as a result moral and intellectual depression caused an increase in ethnophobia.

As it was mentioned earlier, migration influx into Russia in 1990s was mostly constituted of ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking population. Although, the anxiety towards the 'new competitors' was high, there was an overall understanding among the local population

that these people have come to Russia escaping political and ethnic crises in their previous places of residence and do not pose a serious threat to Russian society. With the growth of Russian economy and deteriorating living conditions in other parts of the post-Soviet space, migration processes went through transformations starting from early 2000s. These transformations were accompanied not only by an increase in the number of labour migrants, but also change in the structure of flows. For example, the share of labour migrants from Central Asia increased from 6 percent in 2000 to 71 percent in 2011, replacement of seasonal migration by circular and long-term migration (Mukomel, 2013a). In the public discourse, the emphasis has been exclusively on the scale of migration and the ethnic composition of migrants.

In addition to the influx of people from the 'near abroad' (post-Soviet countries), residents of non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus have moved to the most of all major Russian cities as a result of relatively higher standards of living conditions. 'Russian nationalist discourse often does not distinguish between labour (im)migrants from the near and the inner abroad, but lumps them together as one group of "aliens" who allegedly threaten to dilute the (ethnic) Russian character of their neighbourhoods' (Kolsto, 2016: p. 4).

Anti-migrant sentiments have become a constant factor in public life and public discourse in Russia since the early 2000s. As Pain (2007) claimed, the level of xenophobia and ethnophobia in Russia is so high that the phenomenon has lost the characteristics of a social anomaly in the eyes of the majority group. It would be a simplification to explain the growth of xenophobia solely by the growth in the number of 'aliens', primarily by the increased scale of migration, competition with migrants for resources, and socio-cultural shock. The reasons for the prevalence of xenophobia are deeper. The growth of xenophobia in its various manifestations is conditioned not only by external factors, but also by deep, fundamental factors of the functioning of Russian society.

Mukomel considers xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments in the context of the social structure of contemporary Russia. A low level of interpersonal, intergroup and institutional trust, which eroding traditional values of Russians, forms new group solidarity. In the conditions of the mobilization society, such group solidarity is directed against 'aliens', primarily against ethnic migrant minorities (Mukomel, 2014).

According to Bahry (2016), anti-migrant sentiments in Russia have both cultural and economic roots. On the one hand, vulnerability to economic competition generates greater

perceptions of harm. On the other, core dispositions, including distrust of other people and closer adherence to traditional social values heighten xenophobic feelings.

Opinion polls conducted for the last fifteen years show that Russians believe that the influx of migrants threatens social stability, provokes conflicts between the host population and migrants; that migrants do not respect the traditions and norms of behaviour adopted in Russian society.

Levada Center's one of the surveys has monitored since 2004 on Russians' opinion towards foreigners. People were asked the question 'whose accommodation in Russia should be limited?' It must be noted that if in early 2000s the hierarchy of hostility was headed by the 'natives of the Caucasus', then the 'natives of Central Asian republics' gradually equalled with the people from the North Caucasus in terms of the level of negativism by Russians (Table 6).

	August 2004	August 2007	October 2013	July 2014	August 2015	July 2016	July 2017
Natives of the Caucasus	46	44	54	38	29	34	22
Natives of Central Asian republics	31	25	45	29	29	29	19
Gypsies	32	25	32	23	22	21	17
Chinese	39	41	45	33	24	24	15
Vietnamese	39	41	45	33	24	24	15
Ukrainians	8	6	5	8	14	13	8
Jews	15	10	8	8	7	6	4
All except Russians	15	10	14	14	15	18	17
No limits should be imposed on anyone	21	23	11	21	25	20	28
Difficult to answer	5	8	8	10	10	10	18

Table 7. Responses to a question 'Whose accommodation should be limited in Russia?' 2004-2017. Multiple choice question, in percents.

Source: Levada Centre, 2017. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from: https://www.levada.ru/2017/08/23/16486/.

Table 7 shows the attitudes of Russians to the influx of foreigners. Levada Center has conducted the survey with the question 'What do you think, the Russian government should try

to limit the flow of foreigners or should not put any administrative barriers on them and try to use them for Russia's well-being?' from as early as 2002 to 2017.

	Jul. 2002	Aug. 2004	Oct. 2005	Aug. 2006	Aug. 2007	Oct. 2008	Nov. 2009	Jan. 2011	Aug. 2012	Oct. 2013	Jul. 2014	Aug. 2015	Mar. 2016	Feb. 2017
Try to limit the flow of foreigners	45	54	59	52	57	52	61	68	70	78	76	68	80	67
Not to put any administrative barriers on them and try to use them for Russia's well-being	44	38	36	39	32	35	30	24	20	14	16	23	10	19
Difficult to answer	10	7	6	9	10	13	9	8	10	8	8	9	10	13

Table 8. Survey on what should be done about the flow of migrants, 2002-2017.

Source: Levada Centre, 2017. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from: https://www.levada.ru/2017/04/28/otnoshenie-k-trudovym-migrantam/.

One of the indicators of the attitude towards migration and labour migrants is usually the desire or unwillingness of local residents to accept migrants or limit their presence. Figure Figure 13 shows attitudes of Russian people in summer 2017 towards labour migrants from different parts of Russia and post-Soviet countries.

Almost every second Russian has a negative attitude towards one or another category of labor migrants coming to Russia. More than half, on the contrary, demonstrates a good and or neutral attitude towards immigration. Moreover, when a respondent shows his/her negative attitude to two or more categories of migrants, he/she has stronger anti-migrant feelings (Levada, 2017).

The most intolerant attitude among Russians is noted to labour migrants from the North Caucasus and Central Asia. Hostility towards labour migrants from Ukraine increased significantly after the Ukraine crisis broke out. Overall, the Ukraine events contributed to the rechannelling of the attention of Russian public and the xenophobic feelings towards Central

Asian labour migrants moderate decrease. However, it must be noted that the last such opinion poll was conducted before the terrorist attack in St. Petersburg took place in April 2017[50], which may not capture the growth in anti-migrant attitudes after the events.



Figure 15. Attitudes of Russians to labour migrants from other parts of Russia and post-Soviet space, percent.

Source: Levada, 2017. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from: https://www.levada.ru/2017/04/28/otnoshenie-k-trudovym-migrantam/.

However, despite the fluctuations in public opinion in recent years related with different political events in and around Russia, in general there is a tendency showing the reluctance of Russians to accept migrants in the country. In 2017, two-thirds of the respondents support restrictive measures by the Russian government aimed at limiting the influx of foreigners (see Table 7).

Xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments reached one of its peaks in 2013. In that year, the concern of the local residents, especially in Moscow, over the influx of migrants increased sharply: 78 percent of people were strongly of an opinion to limit the presence of labour

[50] Although the poll results were released in April, 2017.

migrants, whereas only 14 percent supported the idea that migrants are useful for Russia's well-being. To compare, in 2002, the percentage of those who supported the migrant's presence and who were against were almost the same (See Table 7). It is interesting to note that the rise of xenophobia was not a result of the increasing number of labour migrants (over the past three years the number of labour migrants working in Russia had stabilized at 4.5-6 million people) and Russia's economy had almost recovered after the global economic crisis of 2008-2009.

Apparently, the outbreak of xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments were a result of the Moscow mayoral election campaign, the events in Biryulyovo, the Matveyevsky market, etc, accompanied by heated discussions and 'hysteria' (Mukomel 2014) over the migration-related issues.

Figure 16. Police detain migrants during a raid in Moscow, 2013.

Source: Radio Svoboda. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: https://www.svoboda.org/a/28692654.html.

The inadequate reaction of the mass media and politicians to the events of summer 2013 (Matveyevsky market, the election of the Mayor of Moscow, Biryulyovo) served as a catalyst of xenophobic feelings. Labour migrants from Central Asia were used as convenient 'scapegoats'. For politicians, this was a way of channelling social discontent and gaining

popularity.[51] The government-owned ‘Rossiya 1’ channel was blamed for ‘systematic excitation of xenophobic sentiments in the political programmes’ (RIA Novosti, 2013).

Migration was one of the most discussed topics in the Moscow mayoral election campaign in 2013. All candidates (especially the sitting mayor Sobianin and his main opposition rival Navalny) criticized migration policy focusing on threats and dangers caused by migrants during the three-month campaign.

> Most of the expressed proposals had a repressive and to different extents limiting nature, and the rhetoric of all of the participants had elements of ethnic phobias, so it is not a coincidence that in all debates names and images of predominantly Central Asian and partially Caucasian migrants were used. All of this created a wave of really rather openly racist statements in the media and on the Internet that now was somehow being legitimised by the political discussion of migration… the general level of the negative perception of foreigners, migrants, aliens in Russian society dramatically increased as a consequence of the elections (Abashin, 2016b: p. 28).

It must be noted that both three events, although happened in Moscow, the rise of xenophobia was observed all over Russia. It is mostly because as the political, financial and economic centre of Russia, Moscow plays an important role and events related to its life are well covered by national media that resonate throughout the whole country.

The fact that residents of those communities where there are no migrants are more prone to xenophobia can also serve as an evident that xenophobia was mostly ignited by politicians and media (Mukomel, 2014).

As Tesfahuney noted,

> The ‘visible’ presences of the ‘Others’ in the cultural, economic and national ‘body’, epitomize the loss of the sense of security provided by the ‘old way of life’. In as much as international migrants embody the transgression of cultural, social and national boundaries, they become the objects of surveillance and control by nation-states, the embodiment of threat, and a priority concern for media, experts and politicians (1998, p. 508).

[51] To give an example, Moscow mayor, who was running in the election for his second term, Sergei Sobyanin said: “I believe that Moscow is a Russian city and so it should remain. Not Chinese, not Tajik and not Uzbek ... For people who do not speak Russian well, who have a completely different culture, it is better to live in their own country. Therefore, we do not welcome their adaptation in Moscow. I believe that, most likely, these are seasonal workers who, having worked, must go to their families, to their homes, to their countries” (May 20, 2013. Retrieved February 10, 2018 from: http://www.aif.ru/society/305921).

The authorities and the media in Russia are the main producers of xenophobic discourse, constantly reproducing and pedaling the discourse of the split society, opposing the supporters of some values to others. According to one study, of the approximately 120,000 news messages related to migrants in Russia in 2016, 98,000 news messages were about criminal chronicles (Novaya Gazeta, 2018b). Xenophobic sentiments, speculatively replicated by the media, exaggerated by public politicians, penetrate into the mass culture and become an integral component of public consciousness.

Hostility towards migrants is very high compared to other countries in the world. According to the Migrant Acceptance Index, created by Gallup to gauge people's acceptance of migrants based on increasing degrees of personal proximity, Russia ranked 125 out of 139 countries with a score of 2.60 out of possible 9 (Gallup, 2017). Russia shares almost the same levels of migrant acceptance with most of the Central European countries, where the humanitarian crisis of 2015-2016 affected the local population's opinion towards both economic and humanitarian migrants.

The belonging (or assignment) of a labour migrant to a particular nationality or country of origin affects his/her potential for integration into the receiving society. Many reasons contribute to the growth of xenophobia, but the result for migrants is always the same – the deterioration of their situation and the impossibility of integration. The reasons for the emergence and growth of anti-migrant sentiments may be numerous and diverse, they affect different strata of both interpersonal relations and relations between the state and society itself. However, the end result is disappointing for migrants, as they become scapegoats: they are to blame for the growth of crime, they take jobs, they threaten security, they corrupt morals, national culture, etc. The positive aspects of migration in the public sphere are practically not voiced:

> Local population – receiving, as a rule, considerable benefits from the presence of migrants – everyone who comes in contact with *'gastarbajtery'* as an employer, a landlord, a consumer of goods and services, even a 'law enforcement officer' gets a benefit – they usually are not inclined notice these benefits. But they willingly see in foreigners the dangerous competitors, the source of their own economic and social problems, although these problems have always existed without any migrants. The unresolved nature of these problems prompts the search for the guilty, and the foreigners serve as a very convenient 'material' for becoming the 'enemy image,' which is also acceptable to many politicians (Vishnevsky, 2009a: 8).

According to Kolsto and Blakkisrud (2016), widespread and growing migrantophobia in the Russian population became the main motor behind the nationalist mobilization. It is no

coincidence that the largest Russian nationalist organization for a long time was the Movement against Illegal Immigration (*Dvizhenie protiv nelegal'noj immigratsii, DPNI*). One of the manifestations of xenophobia in Russia is a violence of nationalist groups such as DPNI. Officially, Russian government bodies do not have separate statistics for xenophobic- or racist-related crimes. The Sova Centre, a Moscow-based human rights organization provides reliable data on xenophobic violence in Russia. The Centre has been monitoring the situation across the country since 2002.[52] Although it must be noted that since the organization collects information from open sources and it may not know all the incidents of violence. According to Sova (2018), the peak of racist and anti-migrant violence occurred in 2008, when 486 people were attacked of which 102 people died. Residents of Central Asian republics were one of the main targets of these attacks: 49 people from this region fell victims to racist violence. Some specialists noted that the total number of skinheads reached 60,000-65,000, or roughly half the world's total skinhead population, with organized groups in some 85 Russian cities (Arnold, 2015).

In the consecutive years, although the level of violence remained high, a systematic police crackdown on extremist-nationalist groups, the shift of public attention to foreign policy activities of Russia eventually contributed to the fall in the scale and numbers of violence against non-Russians. For the last decade, 2017 saw a serious reduction in violent racism acts: at least seven people died in at least 71 confirmed attacks. More than half of the victims are from Central Asia (Sova, 2018). However, the Centre notes that every-day xenophobia has been as high as previous years. As experts observe a decline in the number of violence, one cannot say if it is a general trend or a temporary phenomenon which may change at any time. As Arnold (2015) noted, statistics on the number of racist crimes do not capture the qualitative differences between Russia and other OECD countries.

[52] All annual reports reports of Levada Centre 'Racism and xenophobia in Russia' from 2002 to 2017 are available at http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/?n=9 (Retrieved May 9, 2018).

Figure 17. Participants of 'Russian March' – members of the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) carry placards with calls to impose visas with Southern Caucasus and Central Asian republics, 2016 (author caption).

Source: IA Rosbalt. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.rosbalt.ru/blogs/2016/10/15/1558844.html.

What concerns every-day xenophobia, experts believe that it is a widespread phenomenon across Russia. 'Tong Jahoni', a center that protects the rights of labour migrants in Russia, examined almost 50,000 ads in Russian media devoted to renting out. Only one in twelve ads had no xenophobic allusions. In the majority of cases, landlords want to let in 'citizens of Russian population' (50 percent), 'Slavic people' (28 percent) and 'ethnic Russians' (7 percent). In the case of vacancy announcements, the situation is even worse. The centre studied 20, 000 vacancies and found out that only one in twenty vacancy announcements did not contain xenophobic allusions: more than half (56%) of employers were looking for 'Slavs', another 35 percent wanted to see 'citizens of the Russian Federation' in their workplace (Novaya Gazeta, 2018).

> Xenophobia is not new in Moscow. But the combination of a laissez-faire wage policy (with a race to the bottom for undocumented labour), together with excessive restrictions on legally documented labour, and the widespread use of bribes to circumvent administrative regulations has allowed for the normalisation of a casual racism in which discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is justified through concerns for security and comfort—or protection against 'illegals'. One commercial website offering temporary accommodation to non-Muscovites, for instance, cites its own policy of ethnic selection in the following terms: 'we don't have racist prejudices, but today the situation has developed such that the largest demand for a place to stay in Moscow comes from Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians. In accordance with the existing demand for inexpensive hostel accommodation in Moscow, we attempt only to house people of Slavic appearance (*litsa slavianskoi vneshnosti*), for the comfortable living conditions of all residents, and in so doing avoid any conflictual situations' (Reeves, 2013b: para. 7).

This situation is typical, human rights activists say, no one, by and large, does not want to change it. The media, in turn, warm up the atmosphere: of about 120,000 messages related to migrants, news searchers in 2016 devoted most of the criminal chronicle (almost 98 thousand news items).

Xenophobia is hatred for fear. Even if these fears were contrived, they become a socially significant problem, because it is perceived as such by public opinion. Xenophobia is also hate without reason, based on stereotypes and myths.

6.3.2. Corruption and extortion as gatekeepers for labour migrants

Corruption has affected almost all aspects of life including governance, law enforcement, education and healthcare in Russia (see, for example, Levin & Satarov, 2012; Schultze, Sjahrir & Zakharov, 2016). According to the Transparency International's corruption perception index, Russia ranks 135 out of 180 countries in 2017 (Transparency International, 2018). Corruption in institutions that deal with labour migrants is widespread and migrants have to rely on informal practices in their every-day lives (Urinboyev, 2016). This section, mostly relied on interviews with experts and labour migrants, tries to demonstrate that corruption and extortion by law-enforcement agencies and other institutions make the living conditions of labour migrants even worse and push into, in many cases, illegal activities.

Due to high prices and inaccessibility of air flights, the majority of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan come to Russia either by railways, or more often, by buses, minibuses and taxi drivers crossing the border between Kazakhstan and Russia, as they are much more cheaper compared to other means of transport. While not all migrants reach their destination on their way to Russia,[53] those who cross the border experience extortion and corruption as soon as they step into the country.

A migrant from Uzbekistan who has been going to Russia early in summer and returning back home in winter for the last three years says that 'it is regular that drivers of buses along with bus fares and other travel-related fees, collects money for police officers both in Kazakhstan and Russia. People already know about this and secure certain amount of money for "solving the problem on the spot." But in many cases it happens that people have paid their last money for the fare and will have to borrow from someone else.'[54]

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[53] Because they have to cross long and deserted steppes of Kazakhstan, extremely cold in winters and extremely hot in summers, some cars may break down and passengers may have to face accidents. One of the recent such accidents happened in January 2018, when a bus collapsed in fire and almost all passengers, 52 people from Uzbekistan, died in a flash without having a slightest chance of getting out of the bus.

[54] Interview with Akmal, 35, migrant from Uzbekistan. Over Telegram. September 2017.

Road police is well-known among drivers and their passengers – labour migrants from extorting money. A lawyer working with labour migrants explains how it works when people cross the Kazakhstan-Russian border:

> Russian road police officers stay just behind the bars of the border crossing point of Orsk, which is illegal according to rules. They stop a bus or a minibus that have just crossed the border. In this case, either a driver or so-called 'guide' comes out and pays the bribe depending on the number of passengers and proceeds further into Russia or police officers start checking the documents and ask for health insurance papers. Asking for this illegal because citizens of countries which have a visa-free regime with Russia do not have to have health insurance. Not to mention the fact that passengers could not possibly get health insurance policy because they have just crossed the border. However, none protests to this illegal demand (most of the passengers-to be migrants do not even know about it). Anyways, police either ask for bribes or fine the passengers for 2000 roubles for 'not having an insurance policy'. And all of these fines are registered in a database. According to Russian laws, two administrative violations are enough to deport a foreigner into his/her home country. Those passengers who are well informed about such extortions may get off from buses and instead take taxis right after crossing the border. But this is expensive, thus unaffordable to many and may not save from police stops who are also aware of such 'contrivances'.[55]

Those who cannot reach agreement with police officers (in other words cannot pay their bribe) are taken directly to a court. Valentina Chupik, a well-known lawyer of migrants and a director of an NGO that works to defend the rights of labour migrants, described to a newspaper how courts make simple decisions to deport people who have just entered Russia. She happened to be near the border crossing point in Sol'-Iletsk, when police stopped 232 people from several buses. They were taken to a court. A judge ordered to deport the first one of those people, but when Chupik, the lawyer, stated she would appeal against this decision, the judge changed his mind to make the same decisions on the rest of detained people. As a result, the remaining 231 people were saved from expulsion from the country and continued on their way (Novaya Gazeta, 2018a). Also, the newspaper found out that even at airports labour migrants are forced to buy medical insurance certificates right at the airport (not later when they apply for work permit, *patent*) and exactly at certain companies; migration centres also would not accept such documents from other companies (*ibid.*).

Crossing the border and reaching the destination of work are not the most difficult parts of migrants' ordeals in Russia. As it was described in the previous chapter, apart from having

[55] Expert interview. Over Messenger. November 2017.

a *patent,* a migrant must be registered at a certain address. Interviewed experts stated that there is a lot of corruption and illegal activities in registering an address. It is extremely difficult for a migrant to register at a place of residence as the law (Rubber apartments law since 2013) prohibits a fictitious registration of several dozens of people at one address. Usually, the host (*prinimayuschaya storona* in Russian legislation), either an individual or a company, must register the employee(s) at a certain address. But most companies do not want to take care of their employees' registration due to various reasons. For an individual also registering someone at his apartment is also an extra burden. The host, labour migrant in this case, cannot get a registration by himself. As a result, the guest, a migrant in our case, has to register at an address using different 'contrivances' such as turning to companies that provide bogus registration documents to hundreds of people.[56] According to one source, 90 percent of migrants in Moscow 'buy the registration': the place of their actual residence has nothing to do with the address indicated in the registration (Ferghana, 2017). This is a trap for a migrant and can serve as a ground for an administrative fine or even an expulsion from the country. In 2016, Moscow courts (not across Russia) deported 14,000 migrants for living in a place other than specified in a registration document (Novaya Gazeta, 2018b).

Even if a migrant manages to getting registered at an apartment legally this may not guarantee his legal stay. The Russian parliament is preparing a new law (on Rubber offices, or the Yarovaya law), which bans registration at companies and allows a landlord to cancel a tenant's registration without his knowledge at any time (RBC, 2018). If the law will be adopted it may push more migrants into irregular status: a labour migrant may think he is properly registered while his registration is already cancelled by his landlord without notification. Only after does a police officer stop the migrant and checks his registration on the database, he may find out he has violated the law. He may be liable to deportation and even, in extreme cases, three years of imprisonment (*ibid.*).

[56] For example, authorities reported that at an address of personnel centre 'Vostok' with an area of 34 square meters 3,300 migrants were registered, or a trade union 'Zaschita' registered 56 thousand migrants at his office (RBC, 2018).

Figure 18. Police stop people of non-Russian appearance in front of the Kremlin, Moscow, 2016.

Source: Ferghana.ru. Retrieved May 9, 2018 from: http://www.fergananews.com/articles/9133.

In interviews, both experts and labour migrants stated that ID check by police officers at public spaces is almost inevitable especially in large urban areas.

> We [Uzbeks] are the most disadvantaged here [in Russia] compared to citizens of any other states. In Moscow, more than ninety percent of people [migrant workers] do not live where they are actually registered. And because everyone knows this, we are very often stopped in metro, buses, streets [by police officers] for ID checks. For example, my job requires me to spend most of my time in public places and I am stopped every second or third day (I am 'used to' it). If, for example, there happens to be a Kyrgyz [citizen] next to me who is also stopped, he is let go easily, but it is difficult for us [Uzbek citizens].[57]

A common and widespread practice of police when people of non-Russian appearance, Central Asians in their majority are scrutinized as particularly untrustworthy, particularly liable to fakery, and, thus, particularly legitimate targets for document checks, fines, and threats of deportation is well documented by Madeleine Reeves (2013a). One of the experts, a legal adviser for labour migrants with a Central Asian origin, informed that he himself was several

[57] Interview with Doniyor, 30, migrant from Uzbekistan. Over Telegram. July 2017.

times stopped by police officers to check his documents.[58] Here is how a majority of ID checks take place in Moscow explained by another expert:

> It is very rare when police officers stop Slavic-looking people. In most cases, they stop people of Central Asian origin, migrants, in other words. Your every document must be in place and you must be bold enough and have a proper level of Russian skills to question the reason for stopping. Which is a very rare case for migrants from Central Asia. Police officers may find any reason to take him to a police station. If a migrant cannot 'make an arrangement on the spot', he is taken to the closest police station. There, migrant's documents are checked on databases and in many cases they [police] may find out that he's not working as stated in his patent, or may be living in a place other than registration, or something else. They usually find some 'violation'. He may be intimidated by deportation (or even really detained for further deportation), sometimes even insulted, but at the end he is made to bribe. Usually, he does not have the necessary amount of money with him. In this case, he calls his friends/relatives to bring the money and take him out. I know the situations when police officers themselves have offered their phones to call if a migrant did not have his. There may be other kinds of developments, but this is one of the most widespread schemes I have come across with.[59]

In 2016, Moscow courts deported from Russia 12,000 migrants for not carrying required documents when they were stopped for ID check (Novaya Gazeta, 2018b). Valentina Chupik, the lawyer for migrants, describes the whole situation in Russia with violation of migrants' rights by police officers:

> The main problem is the self-assigned right by the police to check documents of migrants for any reason, and to check their migratory status. A police officer can establish the migratory status of a foreigner only if he/she has been detained in accordance with the law and is being verified in the framework of other actions. But in reality, migrants are detained without any reason, police make illiterate protocols, accusing migrants of uncommitted violations and forcing them to pay fines. [Migrants'] passports are seized even without protocols. We studied the fines and accounts to which money is paid. These are not the accounts of the Federal Treasury bodies, but quite different; among them there are even accounts of individuals. Corrupt officials are so confident in their impunity that they practically do not hide. Thus, the main task in the field of migration today is a direct ban on the police officers to carry out migrant checks (Ferghana, 2018, para. 32).

Most of the interviewed migrants confessed they were at least once made to pay a bribe to police officers at various public spaces. One of the interviewees informed that he had to offer different gifts and payments to a local police officer (*uchastkovij* – officer responsible for

[58] Expert interview, Bakht Ovar. Over Messenger. November 2017.

[59] Expert interview, Rustamjon Urinboyev. Over Telegram. October, 2017.

policing a certain residential area) for the latter's loyalty and good attitude: 'I have to keep good relationship with him. He would anyways plague me if I didn't offer some money "for holidays"'.[60]

Both labour migrants and experts noted almost all organizations that provide services to or somehow are involved in controlling labour migration (police, health-care facilities, migration centres, other government agencies) have different levels of corruption when they deal with labour migrants. 'Tong Jahoni', a Moscow-based NGO working for the rights of migrants, registered more than 2,000 corruption cases, when migrants had to bribe government officials. Labour migrants had to bribe police officers in 1814 cases, or 86.3 percent, officers of migration centres 196 cases (9.3 percent) and representatives of other government agencies (Novaya Gazeta, 2018b). These are only the cases when migrants confessed when they had to seek a legal advice at the centre within one year in and around Moscow. Tong Jahoni also received nearly 7,000 complaints from migrants who were extorted by 'checking' IDs (5304 cases), arbitrary interpretation of law (896 cases), intimidating by falsification of administrative cases (340 cases), imposing unnecessary 'services' (196 cases), etc. (*ibid.*).

This section has demonstrated how corruption and extortion in law enforcement agencies and organizations responsible for migration work hand in hand to worsen the lives of Central Asian labour migrants push into more illegality in Russia. Situations mentioned here do not cover the cases of corruption in the process of getting a *patent,* a work permit for citizens of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan[61].

Conclusion

Chapter six analyzed the factors contributing to securitization of labour migration in Russia. First of all, the legislation regulating migration affairs is analyzed. As expert interviews and migrants' experiences showed, the legislation is so complicated, difficult to comply and constantly changing that hundreds of thousands of migrants find themselves easily trapped in irregular status. Prohibitive and punitive regulations make even law-abiding migrants vulnerable to infringement and, as a result, to punishment in the form of fines, deportations,

[60] Interview with, Zamir, 39, a labour migrant from Kyrgyzstan. Over Telegram. July, 2017.

[61] As mentioned earlier, citizens of Kyrgyzstan are exempt from obtaining a patent as their country is a member of Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.

entry bans and even imprisonment. On the other hand, police officers and many other officials, controlling the migration regime in Russia, use extortion and corruption to intimidate and take advantage of labour migrants, citizens of Central Asia in their majority. The latter has to bribe them to escape deportations.

This, in turn adds to a high level of anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia among general population. Media's portrayal of labour migrants as criminal, dangerous, culturally alien people is exacerbated by public officials' xenophobic speeches and statements. With the use of critical discourse analysis, the chapter examined representations of Central Asian labour migrants in selected media, namely *Rossijskaya Gazeta* and *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* newspapers, speeches of high ranking officials. The analysis of dynamics of Russian public opinion regarding migration and foreigners found out that although xenophobia reached its peak in 2013-2014, the deterioration of Russia's relations with Ukraine and the West contributed to rechannelling of hatred towards foreign enemies as Russian media redirected its focus on international agenda. However, the level of anti-migrant sentiments, especially against those from Central Asia, remain high in the society.

Chapter 7. ‘Securitized Migration’: A disproportionate balance

Introduction

This chapter analyzes how Russia maintains its policy vis-à-vis given its conflicting interests of security and the need for migration. First, Philip Bourbeau’s framework of ‘securitized migration’ is scrutinized to show that it is mostly applicable to Western democracies. Migration securitization in different contexts are assessed for this aim. Here, I offer an adapted version of the framework, which, it is hoped, should reflect the contexts with mostly non-liberal societies. Then, the chapter proceeds to discuss how Russia maintains a disproportionate balance between the need for security and the need for migration in the country.

7.1. ‘Securitized Migration’

7.1.1. Bourbeau’s ‘securitized migration’: variation in the levels

It was earlier demonstrated that the securitization theory does not allow to explore different levels or intensities of securitization of migration in different contexts. This research uses the analytical framework offered by Philippe Bourbeau (2011) that possesses space to analyze and explain variation in levels of securitized migration. As Bourbeau stated, until then the only variation that the securitization theory provides had been along the spectrum of non-politicization, politicization, securitization, and de-securitization. Bourbeau argued that securitization of migration – the application of a security migration to the movement of people – can be observed in all countries of immigration.

One of the leading scholars in migration theories, Alexseev (2006), also notes that logic of fear and hostility against migrants is intrinsically present in any country with immigrant population:

> Albeit with varying intensity, some people in host societies would perceive the very fact of migration as weakening state sovereignty, would harbor suspicions about migrants’ intent, and would view even atomized and assimilating migrant communities as distinct, distant, and homogenous entity. The embeddedness of these perceptions in any migration context would explain inevitable

> exaggeration of fear and antimigrant hostility, even under most benign conditions (Alexseev, 2006: p. 69)

Criticizing that there is no theoretical space in securitization theory for distinguishing whether an issue is strongly securitized or weakly securitized, Bourbeau developed a variation to differentiate between weak and strong levels of securitization. To demonstrate it, Bourbeau chose as cases a 'classic country of immigration' (such as Canada) and a 'reluctant country of immigration' (such as France). Dubbing it 'securitized migration', the author's argument is that although migration has been securitized in almost all countries with large immigrant population, 'there is a considerable variation in the *levels* of securitization' (Bourbeau, 2011: p. 11).

To better understand how migration is securitized, Bourbeau used two categories of indicators.

The first category is the institutional indicator (indicator *I*) which offers both a binary measurement and a degree measurement. The legal component (indicator *I-1*) was supposed to refer to the most important immigration acts/laws as well as provisions relating the linkage between migration and security. Another indicator explored whether immigration was seen as a security concern in policy statements that relate to security, foreign affairs, and immigration (indicator *I-2*). The existence (or absence) of a particular government body or its division in charge of border control and national security in which immigration is seen as a key element was also taken into account. Third measurement was the saliency of the link between migration and security within these policy statements (indicator *I-3*): this requires a careful reading of how the migration/security nexus was conceptualized in these statements. Particularly, it included finding answers to the following questions: Is the migration-security nexus at the core (or not) of the document? Is the movement of people discussed under a distinct subheading or is it mentioned only alongside other existential threats? Is migration referred to as one of the most important existential threats?

The second category of indicators of securitized migration concerns the security practices relating to the migration/security nexus (indicator *P*). This includes interdiction (indicator *P-1*) and detention of immigrants (indicator *P-2*). As a set of practices that seeks to stop the flow of immigrants by prohibiting, intercepting, and/or deflecting them while they are in movement or before movement is initiated, interdiction includes the imposition of sanctions on carrier companies that transport illegal or irregular travellers; the requirement that travellers

acquire a visa; the placement of immigration officers in foreign airports for detection purposes; the interception of marine vessels; and the return of refugee claimants to countries of transit through the use of the concepts 'safe third country' or 'country of first asylum' (Bourbeau 2011: pp. 19-20).

The second indicator, the detention of immigrants (indicator *P-2*) is seen as a security practice both in terms of absolute number and in terms of the percentage of detained immigrants among the immigrant population. Detention of immigrants by completely merging the movement of people with security measures constitutes a central piece of a framework that emphasizes police and repression. For Bourbeau, both security practices – interdiction and detention – are powerful instruments to measure the phenomenon of securitized migration.

Using his own categorization of indicators to measure different levels of migration securitization on the cases of Canada and France, Bourbeau demonstrated that both countries score on all indicators of securitized migration. What differs here is the variations on the level of the securitization: 'the outcome for Canada, with low saliency and low detention rates, is a weak level of securitization, whereas the outcome for France, with high saliency and a high level of immigrant detainees, is a strong level of securitization (Table 8).

Table 9. Indicators of securitized migration in Canada and France as of 2005 (Bourbeau, 2011).

Indicators		*Canada*	*France*
Institutional	Legal (*I*-1)	Yes	Yes
	Policy Statement (*I*-2)	Yes	Yes
	Saliency (*I*-3)	Low	High
Security practices	Interdiction (*P*-1)	Yes	Yes
	Detention (*P*-2)	Low	High
Securitization outcome		Weak	Strong

As mentioned above, Bourbeau has criticized Copenhagen School's securitization theory for overlooking the importance of contextual factors. 'Securitizing moves both percolate from the environment in which they are made and are constrained by the same environment. As such, agents' securitizing moves have to be analyzed within the context in which they have been made' (Bourbeau, 2011: p. 44). For him, the power of structural/contextual factors

operates through social processes embedded in the historically contingent and multifaceted cultural settings.

> The power of contextual factors is best understood as a continuum ranging from the power to *enable* to the power to *constrain* securitizing agents. Socio-historical contexts not only enable (or constrain) particular agents to make security speech acts at a particular point in time. For instance, the power of the audience resides precisely in its social capacity to either enable an agent to make securitizing attempts or constrain a securitizing agent who attempts to securitize migration—although the same audience could be an enabling force at a particular point in time and a limiting force at another point in time (Bourbeau, 2011: p. 46).

This research subscribes to Philippe Bourbeau's concept that almost all countries with large immigration population has gone through the securitization of migration ('securitized migration') and that contexts play an important role in defining the variation in levels of securitization. However, Bourbeau identified only two levels or 'types' of the securitization of migration: weak and strong. Both of the countries are Western democracies with highly advanced democratic institutions and post-industrial development. But what about the countries outside the Western world? How about those countries where (im)migration or certain group(s) of immigrants are securitized not as weakly as in countries like Canada, Sweden, Germany, and not as strongly as in the UK, Greece or France? What exact contextual factors can impact the level of securitization? What is the role of democratic/authoritarian regimes in this process? Can securitized migration be only weak or strong? These questions still need to be tackled.

Hammerstad (2012) used three levels of securitization: successful securitization, partially successful securitization and weakly successful securitization. However, her framework does not provide measurement tools and does not take into account all contextual facilitating and constraining factors.

Taking this into account, this research aims to go further and develop a typology of countries with different levels of securitized migration. In categorizing 'securitized migration' regimes, several contextual factors such as the character of the political regime, the peculiarities of relationships with the most migrant-providing countries, the relationship between foreign policy goals and migration policies, etc. will also be considered.

7.1.2. What about the middle? A typology

As demonstrated in the previous section, a variation in the level of securitized migration was developed mostly for the liberal, democratically advanced countries of the West. As Bourbeau himself put it, both countries of his comparison and categorization, 'Canada and France are representative democracies characterized by highly developed, industrial, and capitalist economies' (2011, p. 13). Exploring the peculiarities of the process of securitization of migration in countries outside the West – in (rapidly) developing countries without well-established and fully functioning liberal and democratic institutions and with large immigrant populations – shows a gap in fully variating these countries with either weak or strong levels of securitized migration. In other words, if we accept Bourbeau's framework (for weak and strong levels of securitization) as ideal types, one will not be able to fully assess the variation in such non-democratic countries as Russia or the Gulf countries due to the specific factors which will be discussed below. Following the example of some scholars in social sciences[62], this study brings out a small typology which aims to tackle the above-mentioned problem.

Table 10. Securitization of migration in democratic and non-democratic countries.

Securitization in liberal democracies		Securitization in non-democratic countries
Weak	Strong	Mixed/intermediate
Canada, Germany, etc.	France, UK, etc.	Russia, Gulf states, Mexico

The typology we develop here does not pretend to be comprehensive in terms of covering all countries with large immigration population (Table 9). Also, this typology does not aim to analyze all aspects of migration regimes in countries with large immigrant population, though general information to show how and to what level migration has been

[62] Evans (1995), for example, explored the 'intermediate' states (India and Brazil) that were neither 'predatory', nor 'developmental'.

securitized will be touched upon. What this research wants to do is to show that migration can be and is securitized not only either weakly, or strongly, but 'securitized migration' can be of different strength in mostly non-democratic, non-Western countries depending on different contextual factors.

First, we briefly discuss countries with weak level of securitized migration. Then, countries where migration is strongly securitized will be succinctly analyzed. After that, we will explore the countries in-between, that is to say that it is difficult to define the level of securitization as weak or strong. It should be stipulated that countries mentioned here do not constitute a comprehensive list of states with securitized migration.

Weak level of securitized migration in liberal democracies

Although the list is not exhaustive, countries like Canada, Sweden and Germany serve as just examples of contexts with weak level of securitized migration. As shown in the Table II, what usually distinguishes weak securitized migration from strong securitized migration are the differences in saliency of the migration/security link within immigration legislation and policy statements of officials as well as detention (and deportation) of irregular immigrants.

As Bourbeau (2011) has demonstrated in the cases of Canada and France, with regards to the level of saliency of the link between migration and security in policy statements the latter 'presents a low level in the context of securitized migration… [The interviewees] acknowledged, with tangible discomfort for some, that migration is in fact securitized in Canada, only to add hastily that it is a "mild," "low," or "weak" securitization' (p. 23).

As a 'nation of immigrants', Canada has been considered by many to have had a welcoming policy for admission of permanent immigrants. For decades, Canada's immigration policy sought to expand the population, grow economy and develop society (Reitz, 2003). It has been one of the largest destination countries for asylum seekers globally among industrialized countries (Reynolds & Hyndman, 2015).

Although, scholars note a change in Canadian immigration policies towards securitization in late 2000s and early 2010s (Soennecken, 2014, Moffette & Vadasaria, 2016; Morcier, 2016), Canada still maintains relatively open immigration policies to attract highly skilled immigrants. It is mostly the asylum seekers and refugees who are framed as something

negative and unwanted. Therefore, there we can see a low level of securitized migration in Canada.

For years, along with Canada, Sweden was regarded by many as a humanitarian leader by offering shelters to asylum seekers. The number of asylum seekers in the country grew between 2000 and 2014 from 16,303 to 81,301 and in 2015, this number rocketed to 162,877 (Lika, 2016) triggered by conflicts in the Middle East which led to the so-called humanitarian crisis.

Although, a relatively immigrant-welcoming country, Sweden was not that isolated to remain un-impacted by events happening in the European continent. The response to this ‘crisis’, moreover, was argued to be measures that in different ways would reduce the number of asylum seekers (Nielsen, 2016: p. 179).

As Ginsburg (2017) eloquently puts it,

> Most Western countries’ approach to refugees is two-faced. On the one hand commitments to human rights and international solidarity suggest an openness to accepting refugees, however many and wherever they come from. On the other hand, the settlement of refugees has become a quite large-scale form of immigration, which is constructed by some as undermining social cohesion and hard-won living standards. Nowhere are these contradictory perspectives more glaring than in Sweden (p. 20).

Although some have criticized the recent restrictive measures in the country’s immigration policies, overall securitization of migration in Sweden still remains at a relatively low compared to many other countries with immigrant population. The country is considered by many as having a relatively open and welcoming immigration policy among Westrern nations.

Literature on the migration/security nexus in Germany notes that migration has been securitized in this country as well (Diez, 2006; Fauser; 2006; Kaya, 2009; Togral, 2012; Vollmer, 2017). Along with most of other EU countries, this securitization took ‘the form of building a general context of unease within which it [was] justified to introduce a particular governmental technology’ linking migration directly to security concerns (Diez & Huysmans, 2007: p. 10).

How Germany dealt with the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015-6 deserves mentioning. As a country which received the highest number of new asylum applications, more than 476,000 in

2015 (BBC 2016), Germany's stance towards asylum seekers and refugees were quite welcoming especially in comparison to other EU countries, such as Hungary, Greece, Italy, etc.

At the same time, in Germany, the concept of *Willkommenskultur* is supported by a broad coalition of leftists, liberals, churches, minority ethnic and refugee NGOs, and even some football fans; the most liberal asylum legislation in Europe (Ginsburg, 2017). However, at the same time, Islamophobic and other racist constructions are not by any means confined to the far right. As elsewhere in Europe, they have a limited support within the 'mainstream' (Foroutan, 2013). Although anti-immigrant voices gained some publicity recently in the wake of the 'refugee crisis', overall they remain marginalized in public debates. This leads us to conclude that migration (or certain types of mobility) has a low level of securitization in Germany.

It must be elaborated that migration as a whole has not been securitized in Germany, as well as in many other contexts. To put it in other words, only certain groups of immigrants have become subject to the securitization process:

> One of the striking characteristics of the contemporary discourse on migration in the European Union is the contrast between a negative portrayal of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and talk about the necessity of increased economic migration to support growth and welfare provisions. Despite the obvious difference between repressive and permissive migration policy that plays out in this contrast both policy positions share a desire to control population dynamics for the purpose of optimizing a society's well-being by keeping the unwanted out and integrate the needed into the labour market (Huysmans, 2006: pp. 48-9).

In conclusion, as noted above, the differences of weak and strong levels of migration securitization in liberal democratic countries are mainly manifested in the following factors. Although government bodies responsible for immigration management as well as media frame immigration as a threat and something unwanted, the saliency between these statements and immigration legislation is not high. At the same time, although countries try to minimize irregular immigration with all possible measures, sanctions against irregular immigrants (detention, deportation, etc) are not widespread and prevalent in state policies.

Strong level of securitized migration in liberal democracies

According to Bourbeau's variation, any country with a strong level of securitization could fall under this category. However, given how Bourbeau explored the participation of

securitizing agents (including, but not limited to, prime ministers, foreign and immigration ministers, media) together with *constraining* and *facilitating* contextual factors (Bourbeau, 2011), this gives us to conclude that this kind of intensity in levels of securitization happens only in liberal countries with fully functioning democratic institutions.

In order to see how migration is strongly securitized in, for example, France and UK, when compared to other countries, some selective peculiarities are touched upon below.

The issue of securitized migration in France has been extensively discussed in academic literature. As one of the countries strongly associated with securitization of migration, France has attracted the attention of many scholars (e.g., Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002; Freedman, 2004; Huysmans, 2006; Fekete, 2009; Bourbeau, 2011; Lazaridis, 2011; Togral, 2011; Kaya, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2013; Bourbeau, 2017, etc).

Framing migration as threat to the French society began as early as in 1990s with the passage of Quilès law (1992, institutionalization of detaining irregular migrants) and statements of French officials such as 'We cannot welcome all the misery of the world' by the French prime minister Rocard (in Wolff, 2017). The process of securitization of international migration, reflected both discursive framing and security practices, gradually grew in France later in 1990s (Tsoukala, 2011). An analysis of speeches of president Sarkozy and interior ministers illustrate that their speech acts contributed to the ongoing securitization of migration (Bourbeau, 2014) in 2000s as well.

The 2010 Grenoble riots, the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks in 2015 have deepened in French society fears of immigration and gained more support for populist, right-wing organizations. In 2017, the presidential election polls showed that 61 per cent of the French people were in favour of suspending immigration from Muslim countries, above the average of 55 per cent of Europeans (Wolff, 2017). During the presidential campaign, extreme-right Marine Le Pen's National Front emphasized the 'Christian roots' of France and stopping 'uncontrolled' immigration was its selling slogan.

Unexpectedly to many in France, Emmanuel Macron, a pro-immigration politician, won the presidential election. However, in its current form, the securitization of migration in France remains strong and it needs to be seen how immigration (regular and irregular) will be framed and treated in the coming years.

The United Kingdom as a country with a long history of immigration also serves as an example of securitized migration with high intensity. British political elites have treated the immigration issue as a societal security as early as 1960s.[63] Immigrants and asylum-seekers have long been presented as a threat to British society (Huysmans, 2000; Fauser, 2006; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Seidman-Zager, 2010; Simon & Beaujeu, 2017, Vollmer, 2017).

Immigration, especially asylum seekers and refugees, is strongly securitized both in France and the UK. One of the differences of the UK is that, unlike France, the main focus of framing immigrants and refugees as threats is not the cultural aspect because of Britain's tradition of multiculturalism: '[T]he racist political discourse is produced by manipulating and provoking the economic fears of the society' (Gustavvson, 2006: 15). For example, a 2006 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees detailed that *The Sun, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Star* had together produced 8,163 scare stories about asylum-seekers in the five years from 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2006 (Guterres, 2006).

If in 1990s securitizing agents tried to associate immigrants with abuse of British welfare system, the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 and the 2005 London terrorist attacks resulted in numerous attempts (mostly successive) of linking immigration with terrorism (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). Successive UK governments exploited anti-immigrant sentiment which led to the Brexit recently (Tilford, 2016). The Brexit, a process initiated by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union as a result of a vote in July 2016, has happened mostly because of the British people's fear of immigration.[64]

Compared with countries of low levels of securitized migration, there has been a strong saliency of the link between immigration and security in immigration-related legislation and political leaders' public speeches. This is clear both in the cases of France and the United Kingdom.

What concerns detention and deportation of irregular migrants, in countries with strong level of securitization, these numbers are considerably high in proportion to the general

[63] In his 1968 speech of 'Rivers of Blood', British Conservative MP Enoch Powell called for the extreme urgency of action by predicting that already 1985 the British-born immigrant descendants would constitute the majority (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

[64] A survey found out that nearly three-quarters (73 per cent) of those people voted for the Brexit in July 2016 were worried about immigration, compared with 36 per cent of those who identify the issue as a concern (Independent, 2017).

population. France deported approximately 33,000 people only in the year of 2011 (Daily Mail, 2012). In 2015, almost 41,000 people were removed from the UK (Migration Observatory, 2016). It should go without saying that even democratic states face criticism for human rights abuses in detention and deportation facilities (Bosworth & Vannier, 2016).

Mixed or intermediate levels of securitization

As we saw in the examples of countries with different variation in the levels of securitized migration, states with large migrant population can either have low or strong level of securitization. What is the level of securitization in Russia? Some scholars believe that labour migration from Central Asia is strongly securitized in Russia (Hoang, 2015; Prokhorova, 2017; Schenk, 2017), while others contend, without denying the presence of securitization, that there is a discrepancy between restrictionist and protectionist rhetoric on the one hand and a rather liberal approach to the admission of immigrants and their access to the labour market on the other hand (Malakhov 2014).

As mentioned above, the two levels of securitized migration developed by Philippe Bourbeau are applicable to 'representative democracies characterized by highly developed, industrial, and capitalist economies'. But how can we 'measure' the intensity of migration securitization in countries that do not belong to that group, however, due to their current economic development, have a large numbers of immigrant population? We are referring here to such countries as Russia, Mexico, South Africa, the Gulf states.

One of the important indicators of security practices to measure securitization in Bourbeau's framework is interdiction. He defined interdiction as a set of practices that seeks to stop the flow of immigrants by prohibiting, intercepting, and/or deflecting them while they are in movement or before movement is initiated, which, *inter alia,* implies the requirement of entry visas for citizens of certain countries. According to Bourbeau's framework, countries with both low and strong levels of migration securitization by all legal means try to minimize the number of economic migrants and asylum seekers, including by imposing visa requirements. However, in reality and outside the Western world, not only countries close their borders to economic migrants from their neighbouring countries, but due to the scarcity of labour force to foster economic development maintain their borders open. However, this does not mean that migration is not securitized once migrants are inside the country.

Russia presents a clear example of such a country. Having a visa-free regime with almost all countries of the CIS, more than 90 per cent of Russia's approximately 11 million foreigners constitute the residents of post-Soviet republics (Chudinovskikh & Denisenko, 2017).

'The fact that most labor migrants can enter the country without difficulty as a result of a visa-free policy with CIS countries might make it appear welcoming. But once migrants are inside Russia, they encounter a legal framework designed to push them into a vulnerable state of semi-legality. They often find themselves on the wrong side of contradictory regulations they were unaware of' (Matusevich, 2017: para. 3). Peculiarities of Russian migration regime and how it securitizes labour migration will be thoroughly examined in the coming chapters.

The oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf host a large number of labour migrants. Although the GCC[65] countries require visas for most of the sending countries, the demand for labour force, especially domestic workers, make these countries relatively accessible for millions of migrants from the Middle East and South Asian. Being situated among the top twenty countries where non-nationals outnumber national citizens (Kamrava & Babar, 2012), approximately 18 million legal migrants resided in GCC in 2013 (Malit & Naufal, 2016). However, international organizations, including the UN bodies, have several times criticized the countries for systematic abuse of workers' rights as well as the exploitative *kafala,* sponsorship, system (HRW, 2015). The International Labour Organization estimates that some 600,000 migrants are victims of forced labour in the region (ILO, 2017). Governments of the Gulf countries legally enforce economic, ethnic, socio-political and to some extent, spatial separation between their citizens and migrant workers (Fargues & De Bel-Air, 2015).

Davis' (2006) account of the hard living and working conditions of migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates vividly illustrates the overall picture of migrant rights in the Gulf countries:

> Dubai's police may turn a blind eye to illicit diamond and gold imports, prostitution rings, and shady characters who buy 25 villas at a time in cash, but they are diligent in deporting Pakistani workers who complain about being cheated out of their wages by unscrupulous contractors (p. 66 in: Samers & Collyer, 2017: p. 238).

[65] GCC, the Gulf Cooperation Council, include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.

As a result of political troubles in Zimbabwe, millions of Zimbabweans could enter South Africa in late 1990s and 2000s. However, notwithstanding this relatively easy access to South Africa, popular xenophobia and maltreatment of Zimbabwean migrants took place for more than a decade (Hammerstad, 2012; Ilgit & Klotz, 2014).

As we can see in the cases of mentioned countries, one of the important indicators in security practices – interdiction (Table III) is relatively non-present. If an individual fulfils concrete required procedures (e.g. passing the border with legal travel documents, apply for work permit or secure a work contract with an employer, etc.), he/she can relatively easily become a labour migrant. This cannot be said in regard to Western countries, where economic migrants (unless highly skilled) are strongly discouraged to enter with high interdiction measures.

Table 11. Indicators of securitized migration in Russia (adapted from Bourbeau, 2011).

Indicators		*Russia*
Institutional	Legal (*I*-1)	Yes
	Policy Statement (*I*-2)	Yes
	Saliency (*I*-3)	Low
Security practices	Interdiction (*P*-1)	Yes
	Detention (*P*-2)	Low
Societal pressure		Strong
Securitization outcome		Intermediate

If the indicator of interdiction is barely present in such countries as Russia or the Gulf states, then why is the level of securitization so high? Here, we assume that the reaction of society epitomized in strong anti-migrant sentiments with occasional violent actions against migrants should be paid attention. In other words, in order to differentiate the levels of securitization in different contexts an additional indicator – societal pressure – should be added into Bourbeau's framework. As was initially offered in the development of the securitization theory, and what is missing in Bourbeau's framework, a society can react to the perceived threat of migration through activities carried out by the community itself or by trying to move the issue to the political sphere addressing the threat at state level through legislation and border control (Buzan *et al.* 1998). Adding a societal pressure (usually negative) to the perceived

threat of migration in measuring the process of securitization allows us to integrate non-Western countries, Russia in our case, into Bourbeau's framework (Table 10).

Here, we do not want to unconditionally claim that it is only because of the strong anti-migrant sentiments in the country, that leads to a high or intermediate level of securitization. According to the original understanding of the tenets of securitization theory, securitization would lead to adoption of extraordinary measures, such as, among others, imposing visa regime, deportation of large number of foreigners. The fact that Russia, although deported several thousands of labour migrants, maintains visa-free regime with Central Asian countries (except Turkmenistan, which is out of scope of this research) does not mean that securitization is non-existent in Russia. Two main reasons can explain Russia's open borders with the region: the need for cheap labour and geopolitical or foreign policy goals (discussed below). One of the manifestations of securitization in such countries is the systematic abuse of migrants' rights. Particularly in Russia's case, it is the 'institutionalized forms of exclusion, human rights abuses and xenophobic violence' (Matusevich, 2015).

One more factor distinguishes Western democracies with non-Western countries in what concerns the securitization of migration. Although in terms of the capacities of democratic institutions these countries vary from being liberal (South Africa) to monarchies (the Gulf states), one of the peculiarities they share is the potential impact of the country's foreign policy goals or geopolitical situation around it. To put it in other words, foreign policy goals or geopolitical situation in the region may push a country to alter, facilitate or restrict migration from all or certain countries.

Scholars have explored significant links between South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe and its immigration policies towards Zimbabweans (Hammerstad, 2012: Ilgit & Klotz, 2014). For most of the 2000s, she writes, the official approach to the influx of 1.5 to three million Zimbabweans

> was one of 'benign neglect', ignoring widespread resentment and fear within South Africa towards immigrants in order to pursue a foreign policy strategy of (elite) African solidarity and quiet diplomacy towards the Zimbabwean regime. This policy was driven by the foreign and security policy elite, especially in the President's office. It can be described as a 'non-securitising' silence more than a desecuritising discourse, since there were few attempts at counteracting anti-immigrant sentiments displayed by other parts of the political elite and at grassroots level (Hammerstad, 2012: p. 28).

In 1990, as a response to the reaction of Palestinian leaders to the First Gulf War, Kuwait expelled 350,000 Palestinians. For the same reason, Saudi Arabia deported 800,000 Yemenis from the country (De Bel-Air, 2016). The UAE preferred non-Arab force from mainly South and South-East Asia, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, etc. The Arab Spring events made the Gulf countries, the largest employers of migrants from other Middle East countries (such as Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia), again shift their migration policies. The Gulf countries selectively expelled large number of migrants from countries that were affected by the Arab Spring events. For example, in July 2013 when the counter-revolution led to the overthrowing of Mohammad Morsi by the Egyptian Army, Saudi Arabia deported approximately 300,000 Egyptians out of 900,000 working and residing in the country (De Bel-Air, 2016). Moreover, the Gulf countries implement quotas of labour migrants from one single country so that 'no single foreign nationality will be able to gain primacy and therefore be in a position to challenge local authorities' (De Bel-Air, 2016: p. 15.).

Although Russia's case clearly serves as an example of foreign policy goals' impact on migration policies and constitutes one of the focuses of this research, superficial mention of some features helps to comprehend the issue being discussed here. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been using migration as a tool of 'carrot and stick' to influence the geopolitical dynamics in the post-Soviet space. By offering a free movement of labour force (along with other factors as well), Russia pushed for membership of countries in the Eurasian Economic Community, Russian-led integration project. This meant, for example to Kyrgyzstan, legalization of Kyrgyz irregular migrants, preferential treatment of its citizens in Russian labour market. On the other hand, Russia's conflict with other countries such as Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine have resulted in mass expulsion of foreigners from Russia or mass handing over of Russian citizenships to certain groups of population from these countries. Radical shifts in foreign policy affairs have affected legal statuses of millions of migrants in Russia. Scholars have gone so far to name migration issue as Russia's 'geopolitical weapon' (Gulina, 2017).

These peculiarities of migration securitization in this group of countries make them different from securitization processes in liberal democracies, no matter the level or the intensity of such securitization. For this reason, we have brought a such kind of typology in order to be able to situate these countries in a certain framework.

Most rapidly developing countries offer combinations of strong and low levels of securitization. Of course, there are states with large immigration population which may fall in none of the categories or may have characteristics of more than one category.

7.2. Russia's conflicting interests of security and migration

After the collapse of the Union, migration in Russia was largely a spontaneous process, especially in the first half of the 1990s. Transformations of the policies gradually streamlined the migration processes in the country. Nevertheless, Russian authorities have declared both care for all visitors from the former Soviet republics and a negative attitude towards those who 'flooded in' the country at the same time. For some time, post-Soviet Russia has become a heaven for residents of many former Soviet republics, as well as for refugees. Gradually, Russia's migration policy has developed and relations between migrants and the state changed: indulgent attitude on the part of state officials to the lack of necessary documents for migrants became different after the development and adoption of laws that are binding on both migrants and officials. Despite the regular adoption of legislative and by-laws that should regulate the migration process, as well as their abundance, experts note the weakness of regulation, the absence of well-thought-out mechanisms for monitoring and influencing migration flows, as well as undiminished corruption in this area. The current migration policy in Russia is considered as inconsistent. This is mainly due to the fact that there is no clearly defined policy goal in the field of migration.

The incompatibility of Russia's population number and its vast territory has been a concern not only for the Russian Federation, but also for the Soviet Union. According to estimates, since the USSR's collapse the population decreased by 5.2 million people, but if there were no immigration, then the reduction would be 13.2 million (CSR Demography Report, 2017). Russian experts have long been sounding alarm on decreasing number of population. Emigration, low birth rates, high mortality rates are main reasons for the decline.

Internal migration in Russia, characterized by the westward movement, has led to concentration of population in a small number of Russia's western regions, while in others it leads to a reduction of already few inhabitants. Rural areas, provincial small and medium-sized towns continue to lose population to large urban areas. Russian authorities' attempts to turn migration flows in the right direction so far have not given tangible and serious fruits.

As it becomes clear, Russia's population will continue to decrease and it seems only migration from neighbouring countries could stabilize this decline and thus provide a source of the much needed labour force for national economy. Specialists alarm that Russia would

need 20 million immigrants by 2050 in order to prevent the adverse consequences of depopulation (Aleksashenko, 2015).

At the same time, Russia's economy needs labour migrants. Many Russian citizens are reluctant to work in places with poor working conditions, low wages which are associated with socially non-prestigious jobs. On the other hand, the majority of labour migrants are undemanding in terms of living and working conditions, are ready to take menial and low-paying jobs, which is very convenient for most employers. Besides providing cheap labour to Russian companies, Russia profits a lot from taxes labour migrants pay in the form of *patent* obtaining.

As Smolin (2013) noted, there are two key reasons Russia can't just shut down its borders with the Central Asia republics and refuse entry to migrant workers: geopolitics and the economy.

Russia's foreign policy goals also necessitate migration in the country. The integration of post-Soviet states through the Eurasian Economic Union has been one of the foreign policy priorities of Moscow. Russia sees the EAEU as a 'powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the contemporary world' (Putin, 2011). By promoting free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, Russia provides incentives for other states to engage in Kremlin's integration projects. The treatment of its citizens as equal participants of the Russian labour market was one of the important reasons for Kyrgyzstan to join the organization. There have been rumours that Tajikistan might also join the EAEU for the same reasons (but so far there were no signs of real steps). For Russia, this means that it has to treat the citizens of member-states as equal at the expense of a certain degree of popular discontent. Foreign policy goals of Russia in Central Asia through the prism of the Eurasian Economic Union are challenged by strong nationalist and anti-migrant sentiments in Russia. However, Moscow's main benefits from the EAEU are political rather than economic.

In the post-Soviet space, Russia 'retains the ambition to arrest the decline of its influence and to reconstruct it in more modern and acceptable terms' (Nixey, 2012: 15). One of the forms of retaining its influence has been using the migration policy to serve this aim. Providing citizenship to populations of separatist territories in former republics (passportization policy, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Crimea and Ukraine's eastern regions, etc.) were perceived as serving Russia's national interests affected not only the migration status of hundreds of thousands of people, but also affected Russians' attitudes towards foreigners, migrants and national identity. At the same time, although changing migration rules for and

deporting citizens of a chosen state or threatening to do so (Tajikistan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan) were aimed at exerting pressure on other states' actions, it affected thousands of labour migrants inside Russia. As Schenk has argued, 'Russia would use changes to migration policy as a major lever of foreign policy action' (2016: 477). Moscow uses its migration policies to retain its geopolitical sway and at the same time to influence other countries' policies.

For a state interested in increasing both the number of labour migrants and its permanently resident population, the migration policy should be aimed at encouraging migration, creating simple and understandable conditions for migrants in obtaining work permits and, possibly, in the future, in settling in the country.

However, this does not happen for many reasons. As a well-known Russian migration expert Vladimir Mukomel noted, there are many problems that the Russian migration authorities cannot solve: it is the lack of a clearly formulated migration policy and, as a result, the inconsistency of the events that are dependent on the short-term benefits of politicians. It is also an ideology of migration policy based on the opinion that, except for Russia, *gastarbajtery* do not have other place to go (2009). Added to this is the Soviet-era attitude to the state as the main and all-powerful regulator of everything. Any policy, including migration, is built in such a way that the main manager there is the state with its desire to take everything into account and control everything. This attitude surpasses the need to observe human rights with respect to migrants.

Along with factors that necessitate the need for migration in Russia, there are other factors which challenge this need and hamper the flow of migration.

One of these factors are complexity of and inconsistencies in Russian legislation. The country's migration rules are strictly restrictive which narrows the possibilities for the legal presence of migrants. Migrant workers enter Russia legally, but due to inconsistence in legislation, widespread corruption in law-enforcement agencies, restrictive policies and other factors of institutional environment of migratory regulation push millions of them into illegality.

Labour migrants fall into irregular status not only as a result of the inconsistencies in the legislation, but also employers also push them into illegality. The extremely corrupt procedure for obtaining work permit and other registration papers is given as the main reason for companies to hire irregular, or undocumented, migrants.

'In addition to the fact that the rights of a foreign worker temporarily residing in Russia are incomplete, the current legislation does not provide *gastarbajtery* with the possibility of resorting to the protection of rights in government and local government bodies... Imperfection and contradictions in Russian migration legislation lead to serious restrictions on the rights of migrant workers, including even the basic human rights proclaimed by the UN Convention. At the same time, the duties and responsibilities of *gastarbajtery* are spelled out in detail' (Andreeva, 2008: 256).

The lack of attention to the problems of labour migrants as well as the lack of feedback between labour migrants and government bodies often lead to the violation of migrant workers' rights and push hundreds of thousands of people into irregular status, which again makes them vulnerable to punishment, deportation, extortion and corruption.

The absence or very difficult possibility of protecting their rights leads to the fact that the problems faced by migrants are weakly articulated by both migrants themselves and the host society and, therefore, are not reflected in legislation. This leads to greater closeness and isolation of migrants (not only foreign, but also coming from other regions of Russia), and also to the fact that problems without the possibility of their articulation and ways of solving are simply not realized as affecting the entire society - they remain only the problems of the migrants themselves. Of course, this approach is dangerous both for migrants and for the society in which migrants are forced to survive, adapting to constant changes. Contradictions in legislation pushes migrants from the sphere of state control and regulation to other, poorly controlled spheres (informality, Urinboyev 2016): migrants use personal connections and bribe officials, and this, in turn, contributes to the growth of corruption, as well as the closure of migrant communities and, as a result, difficulties with integration.

The closeness of the majority of migrant communities leads to the fact that the receiving society treats as distorted the very fact of their closeness, linking it with ethnic origin, seeing in it the unwillingness to be 'like us' (access to the public sphere for migrants is fraught with risks, which are higher the more complex and complicated the legislation and the more agencies involved in the regulation of migration).

The thesis also analyzed the main discourses of migrants, especially Central Asian labour migrants in Russian media, public space and officials' speeches. Negative attitudes toward labour migrants were implicit in most of the chosen texts. These attitudes were typically associated with crime, diseases, competition for jobs, threats to society, etc. The

representations of migrants are divided into specific labelling, such as poor migrants, superfluous (unwanted, unnecessary) migrants, criminal migrants, migrants as potential terrorists (especially after the terrorist attack in April 2017 in St Petersburg, where people of Central Asian origin were found convicted). In most of the analyzed texts, migration is seen in the context of security. Migrants are dangerous who have conspired prepare an attack on Russians, hence they are threat to the Russian society.

In Russia, threats that foreigners may represent to the society have long been the reason for political speculation about the allegedly huge number of irregular migrants. Figures and stereotypes replicated by media and unscrupulous politicians are the fruit of their own imagination, not supported by official data or research results. The threats that migrants can present are today the result of manipulating statistical data, rather than reflecting reality. Numerous studies do not confirm the growth of crime among migrants, and the main crimes of migrants are administrative violations (mostly incorrectly issued and overdue documents) (Mahsumov, 2011; Himo & Sattori, 2012). This is one of the consequences of Russia's conflicting migration needs and security interests.

As it was demonstrated, both the government officials and mass media are the main producers of anti-migrant discourse, as they constantly reproduce and represent the discourse of an alien. Xenophobic sentiments, speculatively replicated by the media and exaggerated by government officials, and vice versa, penetrate into the mass culture and lead to more xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments in the society.

Anti-migrant sentiments have become a constant factor in public life and public discourse in Russia since the early 2000s. As Pain (2007) claimed, the level of xenophobia and ethnophobia in Russia is so high that the phenomenon has lost the characteristics of a social anomaly in the eyes of the majority group. Opinion polls conducted for the last fifteen years show that Russians believe that the influx of migrants threatens social stability, provokes conflicts between the host population and migrants; that migrants do not respect the traditions and norms of behaviour adopted in Russian society.

The most intolerant attitude among Russians is noted to labour migrants from the North Caucasus and Central Asia. Xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments reached one of its peaks in 2013, when almost 80 percent of polls participants were against labour migrants. Moscow's mayoral elections, the race among the candidates for being the most anti-migrant mostly contributed to the sharp rise of xenophobia and ant-migrant sentiments. Although the Ukraine

events and Russia's deteriorated relations with the West rechannelled public attention, xenophobia against Central Asians still remains high in Russia.

Concerns that Russia really needs migration not only for fostering the economic development, but also for the prevention of depopulation are raised mainly by the country's expert community (see, for example, Malakhov *et al.,* 2015; Ryazantsev, 2016; CSR Demography Report, 2017). In the public sphere though (TV, newspapers, etc.), it is hardly said that for the coming decades migration, or more precisely, immigration, is the only way to at least support today's population, not to mention to increase it. As a separate section discussed, media mainly portrays labour migrants as someone other potentially threatening the Russian society. Migrants are constantly present in the discourse of the media and politicians. At the same time, accentuation of the media's attention to the nationality of criminals and, consequently, linking social problems to the ethnicity, nationality and culture of migrants leads to even greater xenophobia among the population. The reluctance of government authorities to counteract xenophobia in society may entail an even greater division of the population into 'us' and 'them'.

The belonging (or assignment) of a labour migrant to a particular nationality or country of origin affects his/her potential for integration into the receiving society. Many reasons contribute to the growth of xenophobia, but the result for migrants is always the same – the deterioration of their situation and the impossibility of integration. The reasons for the emergence and growth of anti-migrant sentiments may be numerous and diverse, they affect different strata of both interpersonal relations and relations between the state and society itself. However, the end result is disappointing for migrants, as they become scapegoats: they are to blame for the growth of crime, they take jobs, they threaten security, they corrupt morals, national culture, etc.

There may be different reasons for anti-migrant sentiments, but the end result for these migrants is the same – the deterioration of their situation as they become scapegoats of blaming for the growth of crime, lack of jobs, threats to national culture and so on.

In order to appease to public anti-migrant sentiments and boost regime legitimacy, Russian authorities often try to demonstrate that the government is controlling migration:

> Security-oriented control mechanisms such as migration raids, administrative expulsion or deportation, and large numbers of people added to re-entry ban lists are a visible and measurable way to present migration control to the public. These, coupled with the publication of low official numbers of legal migrants,

another byproduct of control-oriented policies, are used by the government as important tools to project the image of immigration control (Schenk, 2018a: para. 7).

Corruption and extortion also have been one of the main gatekeepers for migration in Russia. Corruption has affected almost all aspects of life including governance, law enforcement, education and healthcare in Russia. Based on interviews with experts and labour migrants' experiences I demonstrated that corruption and extortion by law-enforcement agencies and other institutions make the living conditions of labour migrants even worse and push into, in many cases, illegal activities.

Both labour migrants and experts noted almost all organizations that provide services to or somehow are involved in controlling labour migration (police, health-care facilities, migration centres, other government agencies) have different levels of corruption when they deal with labour migrants. Many labour migrants from Central Asia are extorted as soon as they cross the Russian borders. They are made to pay bribes when obtaining permit documents, the process itself is long, complicated, expensive and sometimes opaque, when stopped for ID check in public spaces (mostly non-Slavic looking are stopped in these quite widespread checks). The difficulty of obtaining all documents and staying legal was indicated above. However, many Central Asian migrants, even having fulfilled all the conditions for legal stay, in reality may become vulnerable police intimidation and abuse.

Ryazantsev (2013) notes three key contradictions in Russia's migration policy: the inconsistency between migration regulations and demographic policy; significant contradictions between the federal and regional levels of migration policy; and unwillingness of a considerable part of the Russian population to receive migrants.

Due to various reasons, security issues have almost all the time come to the forefront in Russian society, and migrants as outsiders become one of the embodiments of imaginary threats in this sphere and, consequently, an undesirable group for society. The focus of Russian public opinion has recently changed its direction on events outside events as Russia is going through difficult relations with Western countries over the issues of Ukraine and other events and attention at the issue of labour migration as a threat to Russian society has slightly diminished in recent years. However, this does not withdraw migration from the most acute issues in Russia. And the urgency of the topic will grow year by year.

Conclusion

The chapter provided an updated and adapted version of Bourbeau's framework of 'securitized migration' to reflect migration securitization in contexts outside of the Western societies. I argued that securitization cannot be only strong or weak, as argued by Bourbeau but there may be a variation in the level as well as a combination of both strong and weak. Given the fact, that the majority of international migrants live outside the Western democracies, where the securitization theory was mostly developed. As an additional indicator of securitization, societal pressure is added to have more or less accurate picture of the situation in Russia.

It was argued that Russia holds a disproportionate balance between its security and migration needs favouring more the security interests. There are objective reasons why Russia needs the inflow of migration. These include demographic, economic, and geopolitical reasons. Based on the realities of current affairs mostly people from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could be the main force of such migration. However, most Russians do not want Central Asians to come to Russia. Xenophobia against people from Central Asia and anti-migrant sentiments are so high that presses the government to introduce from time to time restrictive, prohibitive and punitive laws to appease to nationalist and populist demands. Besides that, Russia's inconsistent legislation and widespread corruption also work hand in hand to make the lives of labour migrants even worse. The securitization of migration in Russia emanates differently. Although no extraordinary measures are taken to deport migrants and/or ban migration, it is nevertheless strongly securitized. The result is securitized migration.

Chapter 8. Conclusion

This thesis contributes to the field of securitization framework by adding Russia's case to scholarship. Developing Philip Bourbeau's framework of 'securitized migration', it argued that securitization of migration occurs differently in many contexts. With a few exceptions, literature on securitization and migration routinely ignore many countries outside the West, although a large amount of international movement takes place in developing countries (Ilgit & Klotz, 2014).

The research provided a context of migration in Russia. The USSR's collapse and the country's opening up led to a large scale immigration in Russia. In 1990s, mostly ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking population moved to Russia escaping ethnic conflicts, the establishment of national governments on the territories of the former empire. However, as the source for return migration exhausted and Russia's economy improved better than in many other post-Soviet countries, the character and scale of migration to Russia changed totally: now the migrants in their majority were people of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in search of jobs as the deteriorating living conditions, poorly-performing national economies and the lack of jobs acted as push factors of migration. Specific details about the contemporary labour migration from Central Asia in Russia helped to have a general view of the context of migration in Russia.

Thesis also demonstrated that how Russia needs migration for demographic, economic and political reasons. Ageing and depopulation in Russia, especially population decline in its eastern regions as well as the need for cheap labour make migration an important factor for Russia's economic and security reasons. Russian government understand that only the inflow of migration could address the country's demographic challenges. But general population do not want migrants from Central Asia, the main donor of migration, instead they believe that Russia would need only highly-skilled or European migrants. However, in reality, Russia's economy, together with highly-skilled migrants, needs large number of lowly-skilled migrant workers in construction, services, retails, and others.

Russia uses migration as a tool of geopolitics. I examined how Moscow sees an integration of post-Soviet republics within the Eurasian Economic Union as one of the main

instruments of maintaining its geopolitical influence in post-Soviet space. By promoting free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, Russia provides incentives for other states to engage in Kremlin's integration projects. The treatment of its citizens as equal participants of the Russian labour market was one of the important reasons for Kyrgyzstan to join the organization. Russia offered preferential treatment of these migrants despite popular discontent. Also, the dividend for Russia in participation in the EAEU is pragmatic rather than political. It was also demonstrated how Russia used the issues of citizenship, deportation (or a threat of deportation) and differential treatment of citizens of particular countries in its territory to exert pressure on neighbouring countries. Thus, a clear link between migration policies and geopolitics is established.

Thesis analyzed the factors contributing to securitization of labour migration in Russia. First of all, the legislation regulating migration affairs is analyzed. As expert interviews and migrants' experiences showed, the legislation is so complicated, difficult to comply and constantly changing that hundreds of thousands of migrants find themselves easily trapped in irregular status. Prohibitive and punitive regulations make even law-abiding migrants vulnerable to infringement and, as a result, to punishment in the form of fines, deportations, entry bans and even imprisonment. On the other hand, police officers and many other officials, controlling the migration regime in Russia, use extortion and corruption to intimidate and take advantage of labour migrants, citizens of Central Asia in their majority. The latter has to bribe them to escape deportations.

This, in turn adds to a high level of anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia among general population. Media's portrayal of labour migrants as criminal, dangerous, culturally alien people is exacerbated by public officials' xenophobic speeches and statements. With the use of critical discourse analysis, the chapter examined representations of Central Asian labour migrants in selected media, namely *Rossijskaya Gazeta* and *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* newspapers, speeches of high ranking officials. Migrants are associated with being 'alien,' 'superfluous,' 'criminal,' 'dangerous,' etc. In this regard, both the government officials and mass media are the main producers of anti-migrant discourse, as they constantly reproduce and represent the discourse of an alien. Xenophobic sentiments, speculatively replicated by the media and exaggerated by government officials, and vice versa, penetrate into the mass culture and lead to more xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments in the society. The analysis of dynamics of Russian public opinion regarding migration and foreigners found out that although xenophobia reached its peak in 2013-2014, the deterioration of Russia's relations with Ukraine

and the West contributed to rechannelling of hatred towards foreign enemies as Russian media redirected its focus on international agenda. However, the level of anti-migrant sentiments, especially against those from Central Asia, remain high in the society.

An updated and adapted version of Bourbeau's framework of 'securitized migration' is offered to reflect migration securitization in contexts outside of the Western societies. I argued that securitization cannot be only strong or weak, as argued by Bourbeau but there may be a variation in the level as well as a combination of both strong and weak. Given the fact, that the majority of international migrants live outside the Western democracies, where the securitization theory was mostly developed. As an additional indicator of securitization, societal pressure is added to have more or less accurate picture of the situation in Russia.

It was argued that Russia holds a disproportionate balance between its security and migration needs favouring more the security interests. There are objective reasons why Russia needs the inflow of migration. These include demographic, economic, and geopolitical reasons. Based on the realities of current affairs mostly people from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could be the main force of such migration. However, most Russians do not want Central Asians to come to Russia. Xenophobia against people from Central Asia and anti-migrant sentiments are so high that presses the government to introduce from time to time restrictive, prohibitive and punitive laws to appease to nationalist and populist demands. Besides that, Russia's inconsistent legislation and widespread corruption also work hand in hand to make the lives of labour migrants even worse. The securitization of migration in Russia emanates differently. Although no extraordinary measures are taken to deport migrants and/or ban migration, it is nevertheless strongly securitized. The result is securitized migration.

The significance of the research is believed to be in the following reasons. The thesis attempted to cover both theoretical and empirical gap in the scholarship. Much of the literature is based on the case studies of migration securitization in particular Western countries (mostly North America and Western Europe), and not much has been explored about securitization of labour migration in Russia, although the country hosts one of the largest foreign-born population. Significant socio-political differences between Western and post-Soviet societies would not allow us to assume that theoretical perspectives developed in the Western contexts may be directly applicable in the illiberal political regimes such as Russia. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that securitization of migration may have different forms and *modus operandi* depending on socio-political context, economic and cultural factors. This research explained

how Russia maintains its policies between the factors that necessitate labour migration and the factors that push for securitization.

Previous literature discussed the link between geopolitics and migration policies, but it was only in a few occasions to demonstrate how a country's geopolitical interests form differential access to space for foreigners based on their nationality, ethnicity, skills, etc. The thesis explored how Russia's integration policies within the Eurasian Economic Union impacted migration landscape in the country and how Russia from time to time used the issues of citizenship, deportation, treatment of migrants in exerting influence on its neighbours. Thus, the research contributes to the scholarship on the role of geopolitics and foreign policy goals in shaping an immigration country's migration policies.

The thesis further developed Bourbeau's concept of 'securitized migration' and adapted it to make it applicable to countries of immigration outside the Western context. It added another indicator of societal pressure to take into account the cases when a government has to restrict migration by imposing restrictions and toughening punishment for any infringement in order to appease public anti-migrant sentiments. Moreover, a variation in levels of securitization is offered to take into account different situations of migration regime in a particular country.

As any other research, this study has its limitations. First of all, I could not have extended and follow-up field trips to Russia. The fact that most of the expert interviews took place relatively recently is hoped to diminish the impact of this shortcoming. Second, it was literally impossible to take into account all texts produced on our subject matter to provide as much objective picture as possible, although every attempt was taken to analyze the main discourses on migration in the Russian society.

I believe that the research opens areas for further investigation. First of all, as it was demonstrated, securitization of migration process takes place in many contexts outside the Western societies and they are mostly understudied. As economies in South-East Asia, the Gulf, some African and Central/South American countries continue to rapidly grow, they have attracted large numbers of migrant population. The peculiarities of migration securitization in these contexts should be further analyzed and explored.

Another area for possible research would be to advance the study of the impact of geopolitics on a country's migration policies. Russia's case demonstrated that a country could

easily make changes to its migration regime if the foreign policy goals and geopolitics necessitated such need. This would help to make further contributions to studies in the fields of neorealism and international political economy. Phillips (2011) found it ‘both striking and curious that the field of international political economy has neglected the study of global migration.

One last note. The refugee crisis of 2015-16 in Europe contributed to the growth of anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia in many Western countries. Apart from the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in the US, the role and influence of nationalist, rightist political forces have grown across Europe. In this regard, the need to explore migration policies in societies outside the West becomes even more important especially in the aftermath of serious challenges and changes international migration has seen in recent years.

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Appendices

Official documents

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List of interviewed experts[66]

Sergey Abashin – scholar, European University at St Petersburg.

Izzat Amon – lawyer, Renaissance Construction, Moscow.

Umid Bobomatov – journalist at RFL Uzbek Service, migrant rights activist, Moscow.

Valentina Chupik – migrant rights activist, head of NGO “Tong Jahoni,” Moscow.

Dmitriy Oparin – scholar, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

Bakht Ovar – independent lawyer, Moscow and Dushanbe.

Vyacheslav Postavnin – former deputy head of Russian Federal Migration Service, president of the Fund “Migratsiya XXI vek”, Moscow.

Botirjon Shermatov – lawyer, LexMobile, Moscow.

Rustam Urinboev – scholar, Lund University.

Komiljon Yorov – independent lawyer, Moscow.

[66] Interviews were held between July 2017 and March 2018 either face-to-face or via online messenger (audio/video) platforms. Experts have given their consent to be cited in this thesis.

List of questions for experts

- On what issues do migrants (from Central Asia) seek advice from you (for lawyers)? What do you think are the main problems, challenges Central Asian migrants face in Moscow, in other Russian cities?

- According to different sources, there is large number of undocumented labour migrants in Moscow, in other regions of Russia. What do you think is the root cause of this situation: difficult and complicated process of obtaining/processing documents, high costs or other factors?

- What measures should the government of the Russian Federation take in order to legalize the maximum number of labour migrants?

- Research, opinion polls, and reports show a high level of migrantophobia in Russia. What are the roots and causes of anti-migrant sentiments and how are they manifested in media, in politics, in everyday life?

- How do media shape public opinion with regard to migration? What is the role of media, in your opinion, in enlarging/reducing anti-migrant sentiments in the society?

- From time to time, Russia uses migration as a carrot and stick tool against its neighbours in the CIS (for example, the expulsion of Georgians during the Georgian-Russian conflict of 2008, the amnesty of Tajik migrants on the blacklist after certain agreements were reached with the government of Tajikistan, the proposed bill prohibiting the use of Kyrgyz driving licenses, in response to the so-called 'anti-Russian law' in Kyrgyzstan, and many others). Does this mean that Russia's migration policy serves the foreign policy interests of the country?[67]

[67] Translated into English. Questions were asked mainly in Russian and, in some cases, in Uzbek. This is not an exhaustive list, as specifying and leading questions were asked in the course of interviews.

List of interviewed labour migrants[68]

1. Temur, 28, Kyrgyzstan.
2. Murat, 35, Kyrgyzstan
3. Zamir, 39, Kyrgyzstan.
4. Daniyar, 23, Kyrgyzstan.
5. Farruh, 37, Tajikistan.
6. Sohibjon, 30, Tajikistan.
7. Rustam, 20, Tajikistan.
8. Mirzosharif, 28, Tajikistan.
9. Abdullo, 26, Tajikistan.
10. Khurshed, 35, Tajikistan.
11. Hasan, 35, Uzbekistan.
12. Bakhtiyor, 24, Uzbekistan.
13. Normo'min, 47, Uzbekistan.
14. Ulug'bek, 19, Uzbekistan.
15. Aziz, 30, Uzbekistan.
16. Doniyor, 30, Uzbekistan.
17. Saidumar, 29, Uzbekistan.
18. Akmal, 35, Uzbekistan.
19. Alisher, 23, Uzbekistan.
20. Murod, 34, Uzbekistan.
21. Samandar, 36, Uzbekistan.
22. Umid, 43, Uzbekistan

[68] All names are changed for the safety of respondents.

List of questions for labour migrants

- How would you describe your experience of obtaining/processing documents in Russia as a migrant (*patent,* registration, bank papers, etc.)?

- How much would you be ready to pay for *patents* and all other required documents in order to work legally? (to migrants who does not have a valid *patent* or

- How would you describe your encounter with public officials (migration centre staff, police officers, social agencies staff, etc.)?

- Have you or your close friends ever experienced an interaction with police officers? Have you or your close friends experienced extortion by police officers? (If yes,) please describe.

- How would you describe your relationship with your employer(s) and co-workers?

- How would you describe your relationship with local people (as a customer, as a service provider, as a co-worker, as a neighbour, in public places)?

- If there was a chance, what you change in Russia's migration regulations and why?[69]

[69] Translated into English. Questions were asked mainly in Uzbek and Russian. The list is not exhaustive as it does not include questions about personal details (age, sex, place of origin, job, working and living conditions, etc.) as well as specifying and leading questions.