

Japanese-Yugoslav Diplomatic Relations in the Cold War, 1952-1980

A Dissertation

Submitted to the University of Tsukuba

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International and Advanced Japanese Studies

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2017

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Acknowledgments

This dissertation could not have been completed without the great support that I have received from so many people over the years. I wish to offer my most heartfelt gratitude to my advisor, Professor Liang Pan, for his advice and support throughout the preparation of this dissertation, for all the help and encouragement. My sincere thanks also goes to Professor Leslie Tkach-Kawasaki, who always supported me and motivated me to work harder. Additionally, I would like to thank my committee members for their interest in my work.

I would like to thank to my family and friends in Serbia and Japan for their support and encouragement over the past four years. Lastly, I am forever grateful to my parents and brothers for believing in me.

Abstract

Within the broader context of the Cold War, Japan, a major capitalist country, and Yugoslavia, a major Communist country, represented two distant countries with opposing ideologies and utterly different socio-political-economic systems. Nevertheless, throughout the years they have been working on the development of their bilateral relationship. Moreover, the two countries have found interests in pursuing the development in order to achieve their respective national interests. As two geographically distant countries, Japan and Yugoslavia were not high on each other's foreign relations priority list. Both of them had far more important diplomatic partners to think about. Moreover, the two belonged to two ideologically opposed sides of the Cold War. Yugoslavia was a communist country which, although not a member of the Eastern bloc, ideologically supported most of the bloc's policies. On the other side, Japan was a democratic country which supported the American fight against Communism in Asia.

However it may be, Yugoslavia was the first Communist country to establish diplomatic relations with Japan after World War II (in 1952) and started relations four years before the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries (in 1956). Over the years the two countries exchanged numerous high-level visits, among which President Josip Broz Tito's visit to Japan in April 1968 which was the most important event in their bilateral relations. President Tito thus became the first Communist leader from Eastern Europe to visit Japan.

Relations between Japan and Yugoslavia during the Cold War were based on their respective national interests. Economically, Yugoslavia needed Japan's technology and capital in its efforts to modernize the economy. On the other hand, Japan needed to diversify its export markets, and Yugoslav raw materials to some extent were useful for raw materials deficient Japan. Politically, Yugoslavia needed Japan, which was an industrialized country and a member of the Western club, to boost the support for the Non-aligned Movement, as well as to diversify its allies in order to assume more power vis-à-vis the superpowers. In contrast, Yugoslavia was a regional and political power among the third world with global importance. Japan needed Yugoslavia's support in its drive for a major political role in global and regional politics.

Japanese-Yugoslav relations were examined as a part of the Cold War international relations. This dissertation argues that minor actors in the Cold War often had to choose rationality over ideology in order to survive and develop further. Yugoslavia usually sought the development of relations with Japan when was trying to prove its capability to the United States or the Soviet Union of having another outstanding (and economically prominent) partner or when it was attempting to increase its political power and become a factor of influence between the blocs. On the other side, Japan as well was seeking strengthening ties with Yugoslavia mostly because of interest to balance its foreign relations between the blocs. The case of Japanese-Yugoslav relations also shows that the blocs were not monolithic and unified in their fight against each other and, moreover, that the Cold War was not a war of ideologies, but in fact, a war where ideological differences were often eclipsed by national interests.

Abbreviations

Archives of Yugoslavia (AY)

Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)

Communist Party of Japan (CPJ)

Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)

Consultative Group and the Coordinating Committee (CoCom)

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (DA MOFAJ)

Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (DA MOFARS)

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)

Foreign Relations of the United States Series (FRUS)

General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (SOHYO)

German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Japan Business Federation (*Nihonkeizaidantairengōkai* – or Keidanren)

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) [Japan]

Ministry of Finances (MOF) [Japan]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFAJ)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (MOFARS)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia (MOFAY)

Most Favored Nation (MFN)

National Security Council (NSC)

Non-aligned Movement (NAM)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

People's Republic of China (PRC)

Republic of China (ROC)

Republic of Korea (ROK)

San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT)

Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY or Yugoslavia)

Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ)

Introduction

After World War II, Japan, once an American enemy, became one of the greatest American allies. It became a foothold of the United States (hereinafter also referred to as the US) army and its supporter in the fight against Communism in Asia. After the two countries had concluded a peace treaty in September 1951, not only had Japan become dependent on the United States for providing its security, but also the relationship with the United States became one of the most important for the Japanese postwar economic recovery.

Since Japan has been relying on the United States to support and guide its restoration and development in many spheres, the vast majority of academic literature regards Japan from the perspective of its alliance with the United States, and, more often than not, regards Japan as a passive political actor in the international relations.¹ Japan's relations with Eastern European communist countries² have always been under the shadow of relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the Soviet Union) or investigated as a part of that relationship. Although it is indisputable that the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern

¹ Perceptions and evaluations of Japan's position in the world politics and its diplomatic relations will be discussed further in the first and fourth chapter.

² For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms "Eastern European communist states" or "Eastern European socialist states" are used as common names for the group of Communist states geographically located in the central-eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia). All those states except from Yugoslavia were *de jure* independent states but *de facto* under the control of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, members of the Warsaw Pact, and therefore are referred to as "Eastern bloc" and "satellite states," while Yugoslavia is considered to be outside of that group. Albania, due to its rift with the Soviet Union in 1961, is also not considered to be a satellite state.

Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania) were under the strict surveillance of Moscow, they did manage to adopt relatively independent foreign policies toward Japan. Within the group of Communist countries in Europe, Yugoslavia was a particularly intriguing case as it did not belong to the group of the Soviet satellites. Thus Yugoslav foreign policy towards Japan was absolutely independent of that of the Soviet Union.

This dissertation is a study of the diplomatic relations between Japan and Yugoslavia within the context of the Cold War. It argues that despite the differences in their socio-political-economic systems, they have shown the will to work on the development of their relations so as to achieve their respective national goals. As previously mentioned, Japanese political and trade relations have been with the United States and the Western world. However, throughout the Cold War, Japan was attempting to diversify its diplomatic relations. It has consistently worked on improving relations with countries other than the United States. It should be noted that the United States remained its dominant trading and political partner but the point to be highlighted here is that Japan was looking to diversify, both its trade partners as well as its diplomatic partners. However, when it was dealing with communist countries, most of the times, Japan encountered hurdles due to the differences in political and economic systems with those countries.

Some of those communist countries were Eastern European communist countries. From the Japanese side, all Eastern European communist countries were treated as part of the group since they all had similar socio-political-economic systems. In that regard, Yugoslavia as well was considered to be an Eastern European communist country. More often than not, Japan developed and pursued the same foreign policies towards the group of those countries, i.e., if a trade agreement was

signed with one of them, it was also signed with the others. However, despite geographical proximity and same ideology, there are in fact major differences between Eastern European communist countries and Yugoslavia. Although it was a communist country belonging geographically to Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, different from the satellites, distanced itself from the Soviet Union. Moreover, Yugoslavia developed relatively good relations with the United States and the Western bloc. It cooperated with the both superpowers, although sometimes had strained relations with them. Moreover, because of its close relations and connections with both the Eastern and Western blocs, Yugoslavia was a valuable source of information about the blocs for Japanese officials. Therefore, although was a communist country, Yugoslavia was a useful communist country to Japan.

As two geographically distant countries, Japan and Yugoslavia were not high on each other's foreign relations priority list. Both of them had far more important diplomatic partners to think about. Moreover, the two belonged to two ideologically opposed sides of the Cold War. Yugoslavia was a communist country which, although not a member of the Eastern bloc, ideologically supported most of the blocs' policies. On the other side, Japan was a democratic country which supported the American fight against Communism in Asia.

However it may be, Yugoslavia was the first communist country to establish diplomatic relations with Japan in 1952 after World War II and started relations four years before the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Over the years, the two countries exchanged numerous high-level visits, among which President Josip Broz Tito's visit to Japan in April 1968 was the most important event in their bilateral

relations.³ Tito thus became the first Communist leader from Eastern Europe to visit Japan.

Tito has become well known to the world at the beginning of the 1960s for his travels around the world and meetings with numerous world leaders. As one of the leaders of the Non-aligned Movement (hereinafter also referred to as NAM) and an influential figure in East-West relations at the time, Tito visited many countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union. He was focused on increasing his political power within the NAM as well as on an international level. Japan, as the most prominent economic power in Asia (and the third largest economy in the world), was a logical target for his ambitions. Furthermore, Japan was an influential country in Southeast Asia, in a region where Tito had strategic interests as a leader of the Non-aligned Movement. However, how did Tito's ambition fit into Japan's national interests? Why would Japan, which was supporting the American fight against Communism in Asia, warmly invite and welcome a Communist leader to its capital? What were the motives for both countries behind this visit and what implications did it have on their respective domestic and foreign policies?

Given the above-mentioned developments in Japanese-Yugoslav bilateral relations, there are two main research questions that guide this research: 1) How did the diplomatic relations between Japan and Yugoslavia develop since 1952 when they were established? 2) What motives did two unrelated (even ideologically contradictory) regimes have to pursue the development of diplomatic relations and what did these two geographically, historically, politically and socially distant countries find in common under the Cold War (1952-1980)?

³ Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) was the President of Yugoslavia from 1943 until his death in 1980. His form of Communism is known as Titoism.

Taking these questions into account, the aim of this thesis is to analyze bilateral relations between Japan, a major capitalist country, and Yugoslavia, a major Communist country, within the broader context of the Cold War. In particular, the thesis focuses on Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations from 1952, when the two countries had reestablished diplomatic relations, until 1980, when Yugoslavia's lifelong President Tito died. Investigation regarding the both Japan and Yugoslavia sheds light on minor actors in the Cold War and their attempts to find their place in the world while pursuing their national interests within the framework of East-West relations. Aside from the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union, the other countries were minor actors on the international diplomatic scene. Their mutual diplomatic relations were often neglected or considered less significant compared with their respective relations with the superpowers.

Reasons to expand the research of Japan's relations with Yugoslavia, a communist country, during the Cold War are numerous. First of all, without understanding Japan's relations with the countries from the opposite bloc, we have a whole missing part in the understanding of Japan's foreign relations during the Cold War. Moreover, while Japan's relations with the two biggest Communist countries, the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China (PRC or China), are well investigated, relations with these smaller Communist countries, are not. Among the Communist countries of the Eastern Europe Yugoslavia had a particularly peculiar position and power in regional and international relations. Moreover, Yugoslavia played an especially important role in Japan's information-gathering regarding both the Soviet Union and China, since it maintained strong relations (at times intensely good and intensely bad) with both of them, and moreover, it always kept an eye on them, thus always possessed relevant information.

Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of Yugoslavia and Japan's relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union. As both Japan and Yugoslavia were very much influenced by the superpowers, their relations with the superpowers represented a major part of their diplomatic efforts. Moreover, Japanese-Yugoslav relations and its development were also considered from the perspective of their relations with the superpowers. Yugoslavia usually sought the development of relations with Japan when was it trying to prove to the United States or the Soviet Union how it was capable of having another important (and economically big) partner or when it was attempting to increase its political power and become a factor of influence between the blocs. On the other side, Japan as well was seeking to strengthen ties with Yugoslavia mostly because of interest to balance its foreign relations between the blocs. The case of Japanese-Yugoslav relations also shows that the blocs were not monolithic and unified in their fight against each other and moreover, that the Cold War was not a war of ideologies but in fact a war where ideological differences were often eclipsed by national interests.

Additionally, this research makes a contribution not only to Japanese Cold War historiography but Yugoslav Cold War historiography as well. Former Yugoslav state archives, although completely opened to the public and highly organized, are relatively unexplored. Particularly, vast number of documents regarding areas of Yugoslav relations aside from those with the Soviet Union, the United States, and non-aligned countries are mostly untouched.

In the following pages, the process by which the two countries recognized their common goals while pursuing their respective national goals will be carefully studied. The chapters contain concrete discussions as to how and why Japan needed Yugoslavia and how Yugoslavia fit into Japanese national goals. The role that

relations with Japan played in Yugoslavia's efforts to achieve its national goals will also be examined.

The dissertation is divided into seven chapters, alongside the introduction and the conclusion. Following the introduction, the dissertation continues in Chapter One with a review of the relevant literature and introduces the methodology and analytical framework. The analysis of archival documents was conducted based on unpublished materials obtained from both countries. As this thesis represents the first attempt to describe and closely examine Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations, previous literature on this topic does not exist. The chapter focuses on existing literature related to the Cold War, East-West relations and Japan and Yugoslavia's diplomatic histories in a general sense during this period.

Chapter Two provides the setting for Japanese-Yugoslav relations, which is located within the background of international relations during the Cold War period. The Cold War and its system of bipolar division and confrontation imposed certain norms and rules on all diplomatic relations at the time. The chapter illustrates "the bigger picture," the general framework of the Cold War and East-West relations, which influenced Japanese-Yugoslav bilateral relations.

Though this dissertation focuses on the bilateral relationship between Japan and Yugoslavia, Chapters Three and Four focus on Yugoslavia and Japan separately. This was done because one of the main objectives of this study is to show that both Japan and Yugoslavia had specific positions in the international relations order and that in that specificity (and uniqueness) they shared some common characteristics. Chapter Three examines Yugoslavia's position within the Cold War. Yugoslavia's balancing between the superpowers, and its good reputation and relative power status among the countries of the Third World are the main factors that beckoned Japan's

interest in this country located half the way across the world. This chapter sheds lights on Yugoslavia's relations with the superpowers and its balance between them to pursue its national interests. The story of Yugoslavia's involvement in the Non-aligned Movement is also included, as it represents the very essence of Yugoslav politics of balance.

Viewing Japan from a different perspective, Chapter Four examines Japan's position in the world during the Cold War. Japan came a long way after the defeat in the World War II, becoming the world's third largest economy within a span of twenty years. Moreover, while the alliance with the United States was beneficial to Japan, particularly in the economic sphere, it imposed many restrictions on Japan's bilateral relations with many countries. Therefore, while it was maintaining a beneficial alliance with the United States and pursuing their combined common interests, Japan at the same time was looking for ways to pursue interests which were not shared with the United States. Developing relations with communist countries was part of those endeavors.

Through Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, the dissertation examines Japanese-Yugoslav bilateral diplomatic relations. Chapter Five, titled "The Reestablishment of Diplomatic and Trade Relations" explores the origin of the bilateral relationship. It explains the circumstances and developments, and discusses the motives of the developments in the Japanese-Yugoslav bilateral relations, focusing on economic and political events throughout the 1950s. Chapter Six "Tito's Visit to Japan," examines the bilateral relationship in the 1960s with particular attention to Tito's visit to Japan in 1968. The events that preceded the visit are analyzed and the effects of the visit on both countries and the international community are also examined.

The last chapter, entitled “Further Developments in Relations” discusses the relations in the aftermath of the visit, offering insight into Japan’s policy of establishing trade committees with Eastern European Communist countries. Already in the previous decade, Japan made an initiative to develop relations further with the communist countries. During the 1970s, this initiative was further implemented and trade committees with all the Eastern European countries, including Yugoslavia, were established. This chapter also discusses the Japanese Crown Prince’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1976 and its political significance.

In the Concluding section, the research questions posed in the Introduction are revisited in the form of analytical context demonstrated in the later chapters of the dissertation. The motives of these two ideologically disparate but possibly complementary countries are also briefly discussed as part of the broader dialogue involving the Cold War. Further avenues for study in this area are also briefly explored.

CHAPTER 1: Methodology, Literature Review and Analytical Framework

In Chapter 1, this dissertation introduces literature on Japanese and Yugoslav Cold War historiographies and other relevant works, thus creating an analytical framework for the research. It also describes methodology upon which the research was conducted.

1.1 Methodology

Studies of the Cold War history focus almost exclusively on the confrontation between the two superpowers, overlooking the roles of smaller states. Also, literature that regards smaller states as a main actor in analytical accounts usually includes one or both superpowers as an important factor in the smaller state's diplomacy. Before the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was not possible to gain access to communist archives. Disclosure of archival materials has gradually started in 1991, enhancing the opportunities for us to get insights from the communist perspective as well.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, we have witnessed the opening of Russian and other Warsaw Pact members' archives. Regime changes and the process of democratization in many countries have created the preconditions for their opening to the public. Until the end of the Cold War, all Soviet-related archives were restricted to the public and therefore all the research was

done on the subject of the Soviet Union relied on Western archives. That was rather problematic, given that the West (and foremost, American archives which were always the most popular due to their openness and the enormous amount of materials they possess) was against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Therefore western reports, opinions, and impressions of Soviet Union were biased, and completely inaccurate at times (as later access to the Eastern archives showed). Chinese archives as well became gradually accessible by the end of the century. Finally, the other side of the story and materials was available to fill in the blanks.

The materials from Soviet, East European, and Chinese archives have provided us with new information about the Cold War and have spurred new approaches and analytical frameworks. The most influential work among those probably is John Lewis Gaddis' *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, in which not only the new perspectives on the Cold War were brought, but Gaddis also questions the time and methodology appropriate for approaching historical topics. He drew on new materials to deeper explain relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, stating how both superpowers established empires after the World War II, making that period as the origin of the Cold War. Gaddis brings many fresh observations to matters of the Cuban Missile crisis, German issue, nuclear weapons, showing how compromised solutions marked the most of the period.¹

Another book, written around the same time, at the turn of the century, also brings new perspectives into the Cold War. It is *Reviewing Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, by a group of authors, led by Odd Arne Westad.² This book

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1997).

² Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory* (London ; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2000).

too points out how the access to newly opened archives has brought some new perspectives into our understanding of the Cold War.

As an example of one of those “new Cold War,” historiography research is an article “Lost in a Triangle: U.S.-Soviet Back-Channel Documents on the Japan Factor in Tripartite Diplomacy, 1969–1972,” written by Vladislav Zubok,³ bringing new insights to the Japanese role in American and Soviet foreign policy objectives. By contrasting and comparing old (already available) American documents with newly accessed documents from Moscow’s archives, Zubok investigates Japan’s role in the tripartite diplomatic relations among the United States, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Aside from the article’s conclusion that Japan had only minor importance in both superpowers’ calculations, the main significance of this article for this thesis is its analytical methodology. That is, that it combines multiple archival sources and, additionally, uses newly opened documents from the communist archives in order to show new insights of the Cold War.

Next, a review essay, written based on the new materials from the former Soviet, now Russian, archives —Leffler’s *Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened*. Though it was written before the theoretical approaches of Westad and Gaddis, it fits into the category of studies born after the opening of communist archives and, moreover, it provide us with new information and perspectives. According to Leffler, the Soviets did not have ambitious plans to make Eastern Europe communist, but rather opposite — they tried to avoid any more casualties. Moreover, most Soviet actions were reactions to outside events.⁴

³ Vladislav Zubok, “Lost in a Triangle: U.S.-Soviet Back-Channel Documents on the Japan Factor in Tripartite Diplomacy, 1969–1972,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 2 (April 2013): 51–71.

⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (1996): 120.

In support of Neimark's findings is Pechatnov's reports from the 1944 and 1945, which he disclosed during the 1990s, finding that in the Soviet archives there is evidence of Stalin's expectations to continue cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom after World War II, dividing the world into spheres of influence among them.⁵

As a sub-group of "new Cold War history" is a current from the Eastern European scholars who place the focus on the role of their countries in East-West relations. Though these works may seem pretentious, due to giving too much credit to very small countries (most of them having been under the Soviet control), they provide us with an interesting insight into the small powers' diplomacy. They give us evidence as to how the East-West relations were not all "black and white," and that some of the smaller powers balanced among the superpowers (used their confrontation) to their benefit.

Bekes also deals with the smaller states, naming Hungary, in his study *Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the impact of a small state within the Eastern Bloc*.⁶ Recent Hungarian history research has gone into this direction of proving that Hungary was not a completely passive player under the Soviet leadership. Hungarian authors like Bekes and Borhi took a task of analyzing newly opened Hungarian archives and showing to the world what Hungary was like during the Cold War. In his book, Borhi noted until recently the Eastern Europe was a subject of historiography research only in the context of Sovietization and anti-Soviet

⁵ Vladimir Olegovich Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the United States and Great Britain." (Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), 17.

⁶ Csaba Bekes, "Hungary and the Warsaw Pact, 1954-1989: Documents on the Impact of a Small State within the Eastern Bloc," Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 2003, www.isn.ethz.ch/php. 2003 (accessed 13.10.2015.).

movements, with very few exceptions. His book explores Hungarian relations with not only the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, but also with the United States, based on archival materials from Russia, Great Britain, France, and the United States. It links Hungarian domestic politics during the Cold War and the policies of the superpowers towards Hungary.⁷

Although the newly opened archives provided access to the researchers and influenced the creation of many academic works during the past 15 to 20 years, a considerable amount of documentary materials related to the Cold War period still remains unavailable to the public for one reason or another. For example, the Russian State Diplomatic Archives are closed again after they were opened to the public in the mid-1990s. Also, some of the other archives have no capacity to process and release all documents that were set for the release, as it was the situation in the Japanese archives.

The analysis of Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations in this dissertation is based on the newly declassified documents. Unpublished materials from Japan and Serbia's state archives – documents from the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (DA MOFAJ), and the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (DA MOFARS),⁸ and materials from the Archives of Yugoslavia (AY) were used.⁹ In addition to these published materials this dissertation incorporates documents which were published in serial form: the Foreign Relations of the United States Series (FRUS),¹⁰ and Diplomatic Bluebooks from the

⁷ *Ibid.*; László Borhi, *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Budapest ; New York: Central European University Press, 2004).

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia is successor of Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore the diplomatic records from the Yugoslav era are kept there.

⁹ The Archives of Yugoslavia holds the Presidential Archives of Josip Broz Tito.

¹⁰ Available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments> (accessed: 01.08.2016)

MOFAJ,¹¹ and published volume of MOFAJ Diplomatic Documents' titled "Treaty of Peace with Japan, Signing and Entry into Force."¹² It also includes newspapers articles as well as the relevant literature on Japan and Yugoslavia.

Official state documents are considered to be reliable sources since they were written for the government's internal purposes and kept undisclosed at the time of making. Compared to information obtained from interviews with state officials, the documents are detached from subjective opinions. However, there are the downsides of relying on the documents as well, since they had also been created by men and thus potentially subjective. Also, folders in the archives may not include enclosed all related documents (used at the time of creating that document) and one (isolated) document cannot provide a detailed and completely accurate testimony of an event.¹³ Therefore, cross-matching documents from two or more archival sources make the historical research more reliable.

The methodology applied in this thesis contains few steps. The first step when approaching the research of Japanese-Yugoslav relations was to consider from a broader perspective and to make research questions. According to Trachtenberg, historical events need to be approached actively, meaning that questions need to be asked. Without (research) questions, original materials represent a mountain of unconnected information and endeavors to connect them into a meaningful and logical academic work would be like "looking for a needle in a haystack."¹⁴ This dissertation began with two main and several minor research questions which focus

¹¹ Available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/index.html> (accessed: 27.11.2016)

¹² MOFAJ, "Nihon gaikō bunsho. San Furanshisuko heiwa jōyaku chōin, hakkō (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Signing and Entry into Force)" (Gaimushō hensan, 2008).

¹³ Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 147.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vii; 79.

on the motives behind the development of Japanese-Yugoslav relations during the Cold War, potential benefits from it for each side and the role of their bilateral relations in their respective foreign policies.

The second step was the analysis of previous works related to Japanese and Yugoslav socio-political-economic status in the world at the time and their diplomatic relations with other countries. This step is also crucial since the arguments from these previous studies create an analytical framework for the current study.¹⁵ In this case was selected literature that regards Japan's position in the Cold War *vis-à-vis* the superpowers and its relations with other communist countries, literature regarding Cold War Yugoslavia and its international relations. In addition to the above, in order to provide a background (international setting) to the Japanese-Yugoslav relations, this dissertation employs literature that dealt with the East-West relations and the Cold War itself.

The next step was focused research in the Japanese and Serbian diplomatic archives. In principal, in both countries by law, the archival documents may be accessed 30 years after they have been established.¹⁶ In the case of the Serbian archives, after the democratic government replaced the previous socialist regime in 2000, diplomatic documents from the previous period, including the Cold War, were all made available to the public within few years, almost without exception. The diplomatic archives documents were gradually made available to the public, starting from 2001. On the other hand, many documents from the MOFAJ DA are still undisclosed. Regardless of the "30 year rule" many documents remain unavailable to

¹⁵ Ibid., 51–52.

¹⁶ MOFARS, "Diplomatic Archives," accessed October 2, 2015, <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/archive>; MOFAJ, "Diplomatic Archives of the MOFAJ," accessed January 8, 2016, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/index.html>.

the public. The explanation from the Diplomatic Archives is that some documents have not yet been processed. Documents which are related to the low priority relations for Cold-War Japan, such as those concerning Eastern European countries, are certainly not a priority for the reviewing procedure by the Diplomatic Archives. However, it is possible to speed up that procedure, and during the research for this dissertation, upon the request of the author, a portion of the documents regarding Yugoslavia and other Eastern European communist countries became available.

Cross-reference analysis of Japanese and Serbian diplomatic archives, first of all, requires access to Japan's and Serbian diplomatic archives, and second of all, knowledge of both Serbo-Croatian and Japanese language. By fulfilling these requirements, this dissertation provides us with unique insight into Japan's and Yugoslavia's bilateral relationship. The author of this dissertation has spent little over three years in the MOFAJ DA and two two-month periods in the MOFARS DA in order to collect all relevant documents. During that time, the documents were browsed and carefully selected, based on the pre-set research questions. The documents were then analyzed in order to reconstruct the development of Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations since the beginning in 1952 until the end of the Tito Era in 1980.

This dissertation creates a new page in the diplomatic history of Japanese-Yugoslav relations since it represents the first analytical account of their bilateral relations. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature on Japan and Yugoslavia during the Cold War, bringing new insight into their respective diplomatic relations during that period.

Since it is based on unpublished (and for the most part unused) materials from Japanese and Serbian diplomatic archives, this dissertation reveals new evidence to the Cold War historiographies of Japan and Yugoslavia. In particular, it presents new

information and perspective on Japan's relations with Communist countries from Eastern Europe during the Cold War, shedding light on Japanese Cold War diplomatic relations. Moreover, this dissertation is an attempt to analyze bilateral relations between countries believing in opposing ideologies and belonging to opposing blocs – a Communist country and a capitalist country during the Cold War. However, based on the later studies, it was shown that Japan was rationally pursuing its own national interests, and in that regard employed various foreign policy strategies, rather than simply following the instructions.

1.2 Literature Review

The vast majority of studies regarding the Cold War international relations and diplomatic history is focusing almost exclusively on the confrontation between the two superpowers, overlooking the roles of smaller states.¹⁷ In addition to that, in the literature about smaller states, the main focus is put on their relations with the superpowers.¹⁸ Although the relations between the superpowers were the core of the Cold War and, accordingly, the main reference in the Cold War literature, some works shift the importance to the Asia and the East Asian region in particular. Some of the

¹⁷ See Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, 2nd ed, *Rewriting Histories* (New York: Routledge, 2005); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008); Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991* (London: Routledge, 1996); Vladislav Martinovich Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, Fourth pr (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Pr, 1999); Westad, *Reviewing the Cold War*; Gaddis, *We Now Know*.

¹⁸ See Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II*, Twayne's International History Series (New York : Toronto : New York: Twayne Publishers ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992); Borhi, *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956*; Beatrice Heuser, *Western "containment" policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1989); John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and after* (Houndmills, Hampshire : New York: Macmillan ; St. Martin's Press, 2001).

most noteworthy academic works in that regard come from Japanese authors. A pioneer of the study of American-East Asian relations, Akira Iriye's researches aim at explaining East Asian international relations and bringing a new viewpoint to the Cold War historiography dominated by the Western authors and perspectives. In his works such as *Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction*, and co-edited, *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, Iriye has certainly brought a new perspective into the historiography of the Cold War. Different from all previous works that focused on Europe, he analyses the Cold War in Asia, how it shaped diplomatic relations among the Asian countries and the role of the Western powers in it. These new perspectives show us how Asian countries had little or no say in shaping their regional politics (before and after the World War II). However, the main actor in his works remains the United States, as it indisputably was the country with the most influence during the Cold War, even in Asia.¹⁹ Furthermore, Yonosuke Nagai traces back the origins of Cold War in East Asia back to the World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union became involved in the war in that region. In other words, the East Asian Region by its involvement in World War II became an interesting area for big powers after the war as well.²⁰

One of the newest works on the topic of the Cold War in East Asia is a book edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945 – 1991*, which adds the importance to the East Asia to the whole environment of the Cold War. The authors, each following different events, show how the relations between the

¹⁹ Iriye, Akira. *The Cold War in Asia; a Historical Introduction*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1974; Nagai, Yōnosuke, and Akira Iriye, eds. *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977.

²⁰ Nagai Yonosuke, *Reisen no kigen: Sengo Ajia no kokusai kankyō (The Origins of the Cold War: Post-war Asian International Environment)* (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1986).

superpowers and East Asian countries influenced the currents of the Cold War in Europe as well.²¹

The literature on Japan's modern history predominantly deals with Japan's relations with the United States or the Soviet Union.²² This is logical considering that throughout the Cold War, Japan was closely connected to the United States, and as a close neighbor of the other superpower, was heavily influenced by their mutual (conflicting) relations. In the case of Yugoslavia, as well, due to its geopolitical position Yugoslavia was under the effect of policies from Moscow and Washington and therefore literature regarding Cold War Yugoslavia deals predominantly with its relations with the superpowers.²³ In this dissertation, the abovementioned literature

²¹ Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, ed. *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991*. Cold War International History Project Series. Washington, D.C. : Stanford, Calif: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 2011.

²² See Makoto Iokibe and Robert D. Eldridge, eds., *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011); Rodger Swearingen, *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response*, Hoover Institution Publication (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, A Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival, 1950-1960*, Luther Hartwell Hodges Series on Business, Society, and the State (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Joseph P. Ferguson, *Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907-2007*, 1st ed, Routledge Contemporary Japan Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 2008); Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace* (London; New York: Routledge, 2003); Glenn D. Hook, ed., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies / Routledge Series (New York: Routledge, 2012).

²³ See Darko Bakic, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu : odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955 (Yugoslavia in the Cold War: relations with the superpowers 1949-1955)* (Zagreb, Croatia: Globus, 1988); Aleksandar Životić and Dragan Bogetić, eds., *Jugoslavija U Hladnom Ratu: Prilozi Istraživanjima: Zbornik Radova (Yugoslavia in Cold War: Collection of Articles: Supplements to Research)*, Biblioteka "Zbornici Radova," Br. 6 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010); Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Heuser, *Western "containment" policies in the Cold War*; John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Nobuhiro Shiba, *Yūgosuravia gendai-shi (Modern History of Yugoslavia)*, 1996; Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradship, Confrontation, 1953-57*, Cold War History Series 26 (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2011); Bakic, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu : odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955 (Yugoslavia in the Cold War: relations with the superpowers 1949-1955)*.

was used to obtain the understanding of Japan and Yugoslavia and their respective international positions and foreign policies during the Cold War.

The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan, first published in the Japanese language in 1999 and later translated into English, represents the first comprehensive work on Japanese postwar diplomatic history.²⁴ It points out the most important events in Japanese postwar history, focusing on differences from the previous period, underlining how postwar Japan, still with the same goal – to achieve advancement and power in the international order – this time was taking a different approach, focusing on the economic development rather than the military expansion. The book further shows that Japan went through the phases of its development and that the 1960s were a period of stability and development in Japan. This decade is particularly important for this dissertation as the main focus was the decade of the 1960s when Japan and Yugoslavia had the most developments in their bilateral relations.

One more important academic encounter of Japan and its international position during the Cold War is Yoshihide Soeya's *Japan's 'Middle Power' Diplomacy: Postwar Japan's Choices and Conceptions* (written in Japanese). Soeya defines Japan as a “middle power” based on the size of its economy and political influence in the world as compared to the other countries such as the United States and the People's Republic of China. He founds that Japan, although became capable of influencing other countries in economic dimension of the diplomatic relations, was not aiming at exercising the influence in political matters. Moreover, in his opinion, Japan did not aspire to challenge the major nations regarding hard power capabilities.²⁵

²⁴ Iokibe and Eldridge, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

²⁵ Yoshihide Soeya, *Nihon No “midoru Pawā” gaikō: Sengo Nihon No Sentaku to Kōsō*, Chikuma Shinsho 535 (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 2005).

In addition to the abovementioned works on Japan's diplomatic relations during the Cold War there exist the ones that regard Japan's diplomatic relations with Communist countries. They are predominantly focusing on Japan's relations with the two greatest Communist countries – the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

While describing Japan's relations with two major Communist countries, Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, authors tend to bring one specific Japanese foreign policy - *seikei bunri*. *Seikei bunri* ("separating politics from the economy") is a policy created as a way to justify development and maintaining of economic relations with countries with which Japan had no or had bad diplomatic relations.²⁶ Hara uses the *seikei bunri* as part of her story about a rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union.²⁷ For sure, in the beginning, the *seikei bunri* policy was invented for the purposes of Japan to justify its trade relations with the People's Republic of China. Until the normalization of the relations in 1972, Japan and the People's Republic of China focused on the economic dimensions of their relationship. Consequently, most of the studies regarding this bilateral relationship concentrate on unofficial channels of the Sino-Japanese trade. Many authors agree that Sino-Japanese trade was beneficial for Japan, as long as the politics and their diplomatic relations were kept aside.²⁸ Jan found that Japan-based its trade on the

²⁶ See for example: Hughes, Christopher W. "Japan's policy towards China: domestic structural change, globalization, history and nationalism." In: Christopher M. Dent, ed., *China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia* (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2008).

²⁷ Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*.

²⁸ Toshio Oshikawa, *Sengo Nitchū Bōeki to Sono Shūhen: Taikenteki Nitchū Kōryū: Dokyumento (Postwar Japan-China Trade and Its Surroundings: Experiential Intercultural Exchange: Document)* (Tōkyō: Tosho Shuppan : Gogatsu Shobō, 1997); Christopher Howe, ed., *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*, Studies on Contemporary China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); George P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China," *Asian Survey* 9, no. 12 (December 1969): 900–918.

seikei bunri policy, with a goal to avoid political commitment while obtaining economic benefits,²⁹ while Wang wrote about the origins and detail explained the reasons and goals of the *seikei bunri* policy for Japan. He expressed that as soon as Japan regained its independence at the beginning of the 1950s, the government had to satisfy various pressure regarding the China relations issue, coming both from outside, the United States and domestically, from business circles.³⁰

Gordon, while attempting to predict the future for Japanese-Soviet trade cooperation, found that the cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s was booming. It was based on Japanese need for resources, and while all projects were resources-based, most of them were about the oil extraction from Soviet resources.³¹

And while the *seikei bunri* politics is an applicable explanation to Japan's relations with economically bigger countries, such as the PRC and the Soviet Union, in the case of Yugoslavia, it is a little bit different. Yugoslavia was a small country by its economic volume, and it was not rich in natural resources. In addition to that, Yugoslavia had a state controlled type of the economy, meaning that politic and economy were closely connected and inseparable. However, the system of trade was quite the same towards all communist countries (Yugoslavia included). Namely, Japan preferred to avoid direct government involvement in such businesses, therefore establishing special corporations to deal with the state-owned companies on the other side of the trade. However, as it will be shown in later chapters, more often than not, Japanese government officials, when paying state visits, had meetings with

²⁹ Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China."

³⁰ Weibin Wang, "1950-Nendai nitchū ryōkoku gaikō seisaku no keisei to tenkai - 'seikei bunri' to 'seikei fukabun' ni kansuru kenkyū (Japan-China Relations in 1950s and Foreign Policy Formation and Development - Study on 'separating politics from the economy' and 'Political and Social Inefficiency'" (PhD dissertation, University of Kyoto, 2000).

³¹ Gordon Smith, "Resent Trends in Japanese-Soviet Trade," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 5 (1987): 111-23.

representatives from Yugoslav (state owned) companies or representatives from the Yugoslav Export-Import Bank.

There have been a few attempts to investigate Japan's relations with East European countries during the Cold War based on the materials available through various Western and Japanese institutions, all of which focusing on the trade dimension of the relations. Terada looked into Japan's trade with Eastern European countries (excluding Yugoslavia) from the Japanese perspective, with a focus on Japan's interests into that kind of trade. He found that Japan was aiming at establishing closer relations with countries which could supply it with natural resources. In that regard, Japan established trade committees with Eastern European countries in the 1970s.³² Stankovsky also covered the same area, describing a system of trade, explaining the differences between the socialist economic system, a system of economy conducted in communist countries, and the Japanese capitalist system. The main point of his paper is that Japan and the Comecon countries (here he included Albania, but not Yugoslavia) have a common enemy, so to speak. Both sides suffered discrimination in European markets, and that is the point on which Japan and Eastern European communist countries would build mutual trust and deepen economic cooperation.³³

On the other hand, very few scholars from Eastern Europe have written about their countries' relations with Japan. Unfortunately, those work are written in their native languages and thus it is not possible to thoroughly review them.³⁴

³² Yataro Terada, "The System of Trade between Japan and the East European Countries, Including the Soviet Union," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, East-West Trade: Part 1, 37, no. 3 (1972): 429–47.

³³ Jan Stankovsky and Michel Vale, "Japan's Economic Relations with USSR and Eastern Europe," *Foreign Trade* 12, no. 1 (1976): 58–107.

³⁴ For example: Ildikó Farkas, et al, eds. *Tanulmányok a Magyar-Japán Kapcsolatok Történetéből* [Studies in the History of the Hungarian-Japanese Relations]. (Budapest: ELTE Eötvös, 2009).

In the case of Japan's relations with Yugoslavia, there are no published academic works on this topic. Even though Yugoslavia was mentioned a few times in some of the works regarding the Eastern Europe, none of them have thoroughly considered Yugoslavia. The reason is that Yugoslavia's case is a little bit different from the other Communist countries of the Eastern Europe. Eastern European countries have not been an active participant in the international relations during the Cold War. They were powerless due to the situations they were put in – having been caught in a fight between the superpowers. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, in 1948 escaped from this situation, having been expelled from the Cominform, and therefore having been left outside of the Soviet control. Therefore, looking into Japan's relations with Yugoslavia brings us an insight into Japan's way of dealing with a communist country that was not with a Soviet's puppet.

Explaining Yugoslavia and its diplomatic relations during the Cold War is an essential piece of the puzzle for this dissertation. To begin with, there are no many works from the Japanese authors that regard Cold War Yugoslavia. Many of them studied the Yugoslav way of Socialism and Workers Self-management.³⁵ Also, some of the books about Yugoslav socialism were translated from the native Serbo-Croatian language into the Japanese language.³⁶ In the area of historical research, only one

³⁵ See for example: Iwata Masyuki, *Bonjin-Tachi No Shakai Shugi – Yūgosuravu-ia Pōrando Jishu Kanri (Socialism of Ordinary People - Yugoslavia and Poland's Self-Management)* (Chikumashobō, 1985); Nobuhiro Shiba, *Yūgosuravia no jikken: Jishu kanri to minzokumondai to (Yugoslav experiment: the self-management and the ethnic problems)*, 1991; Masayuki Iwata, *Yūgosuravia — shōtotsu suru rekishi to kōsō suru bunmei (Yugoslavia - conflicting history and conflicting civilization)*, 1994; Iwata Masyuki, "Jishukanrishakaishugi-Ki No Sho Minzoku Shugi (Nationalisms in the Era of Selfmanagement Socialism)," *Chiba University Economic Research* 19, no. 3 (December 2004).

³⁶ For example see: Kardelj, Edvard, *Jishukanrishakaishugi to hi dōmei: Yūgosuravu-ia no chosen* [Self-managed Socialism and Non-Alliance: Challenges for Yugoslavia], translated into Japanese by Hiroshi Yamasaki, Ohtsuki Shoten, Tokyo, 1978; Drulovic, Miloško, *Shiren ni tatsu jishu kanri: Yūgosuravu-ia no keiken* [Self-management stand the test: Yugoslav experience], translated into Japanese by Takaya Sadakuni, Yamasaki Hiroshi Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1980.

Japanese name appears and that is the name of the University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus Nobuhiro Shiba. His book *Modern History of Yugoslavia* (written in Japanese) represents the only historical analysis of Yugoslav state. However, he focuses on the nationalism issues, such as the Croats position and problems in Yugoslavia, and conflicts among the Yugoslav nations in general. Nevertheless, it is very perceptive analytical work regarding Yugoslav biggest issues.³⁷

Outside of Japan Yugoslavia was a topic of many academic works, especially in the light of its non-aligned policies and related international relations. Rubinstein thoroughly explained the unexpected event of Yugoslavia's rise during the 1950s and 1960s in the Non-aligned Movement. He argues that by maintaining friendly relations with countries outside of the blocs, Yugoslavia managed to survive in times of deteriorated relations with the United States or the Soviet Union.³⁸ As it will be shown in later chapters, many representatives from the Japanese Embassy in Belgrade and MOFAJ expressed their interest in this side of Yugoslav foreign policy.

Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War by Lees is based on newly declassified documents and describes a role that Yugoslavia played in the United States foreign policy towards the Eastern bloc. This book shows how important Yugoslavia was to the American containment policy at the beginning of the Cold War.³⁹ Similarly, a collection of works written by Serbian authors presents Yugoslavia's relations with various countries throughout the Cold War.⁴⁰ In

³⁷ Nobuhiro Shiba, *Yūgosuravia gendai-shi (Modern History of Yugoslavia)* (Iwanami Shoten, 1996).

³⁸ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1970).

³⁹ Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*.

⁴⁰ Selinić, Slobodan, ed. *Spoljna Politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.: Zbornik Radova (Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1950-1961: Collection of Articles)*. Biblioteka Zbornici Radova, knj. br. 3. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008.

this collection, it is shown how Yugoslavia developed and maintained relations with different countries, from smaller ones to superpowers, and thus may indicate why Yugoslavia and Tito appeared as suitable partners to Japan. Furthermore, Bogetic dedicated his life to explaining how Yugoslavia was balancing between the superpowers, maneuvering the situation the best it could in order to achieve its national interests.⁴¹

In No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment Rajak's major argument is that Tito's Yugoslavia was a driving force behind the formation of the NAM. Also, Rajak provides us with insight into Tito's NAM policy claiming that Tito had no inclination towards an independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union prior to his country's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. After 1948 the Yugoslav foreign policy was mostly improvised, created in the process of survival. Later, Tito looked for allies among the Third World countries.⁴² What we can clearly see here, is that Tito, even though a hard-core communist, showed an incredible level of pragmatism. Furthermore, Yugoslavia, by becoming a United States ally as early as 1948, showed its capability to cooperate with democratic countries.

⁴¹ Dragan Bogetic, "Jugoslavija Izmedju Istoka I Zapada (Yugoslavia Between the East and West)," in *Jugoslavija U Hladnom Ratu*, Biblioteka "Zbornici Radova," Br. 6 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), 13–36.

⁴² Svetozar Rajak, "No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest, The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 146–179.

1.3 Analytical Framework

Many scholars have characterized Japan as being “a reactive state,” suggesting how it rather reacts to that influences international politics⁴³ or a state with a “reactive nature” which came as a product of careful policy planning,⁴⁴ or “defensive.”⁴⁵ However in his book *Japan between Asia and the West: Economic Power and Strategic Balance* Ming Wan found that in the aftermath of World War II Japan behaved strategically, which was reflected in two-track foreign policy: one for the West and one for Asia. Moreover, in East and Southeast Asia, Japan at times undertook actions on the foreign policy level that the United States did not approve and therefore they had problems with them.⁴⁶ This refers to Japan which goes further than simply responding to external influences in its diplomacy. Furthermore, in the book he co-authored with Susan Pharr, they argue that this principle of Japan’s “independent” foreign policy stands only for its Asian relations.⁴⁷ Although this may be the truth, when it comes to Japan and its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, this perspective of analysis where Japan is active in finding the ways to pursue its national goals independently and proactively seems suitable as well. In this dissertation, it is argued that Japan implemented similar – proactive and independent - policies towards Yugoslavia as well. Moreover, based on the Wan’s conclusion that Japan is behaving

⁴³ Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” *World Politics* 40, no. 4 (July 1988): 517–41.

⁴⁴ Kenneth B. Pyle, “In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 7

⁴⁵ Susan J. Pharr, “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burdensharing,” in *Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993).

⁴⁶ Ming Wan, *Japan between Asia and the West: Economic Power and Strategic Balance* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

⁴⁷ Pharr, Susan J., Ming Wan, Hideo Sato, and I. M. Destler. "Japan's Leadership: Shaping a New Asia." In *Leadership Sharing in the New International System: Japan and the United States* (1996), 134

strategically and for that purpose created a two-track cooperation policy system, it will be argued that in its relations with Yugoslavia, Japan has developed specific strategy how to cooperate with a country with opposing ideology and poor economy, with a goal to achieve its national goal of balancing its position vis-à-vis the superpowers and obtaining power.

Although Yugoslavia had close relations with another country which was not Communist – the United States, their diplomatic relationship was based on the interest and pragmatism, rather than ideological alignment and therefore was not the solid one. Moreover, Japanese diplomats did not look into American incentives regarding their actions towards Yugoslavia. If anything, the biggest external factor of influence in this relationship was the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia's relationship with it. As will be described later, Japan often used Yugoslavia as a source of information about the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. In addition to that, Yugoslavia's influence over the Southeast Asian countries also proved to be an incentive for Japan to maintain friendly relations with Yugoslavia, despite ideological disagreements and lack of economic interest.

And while Wan examined the use of economy as a way for Japan to manipulate Asian neighbors (the use of aid and sanctions what Wan calls “economic statecraft”), here I propose to examine not only the volume of economic relations (including investments, trade, and various related agreements) but also the volume of diplomatic relations (including state visits and official meetings) to examine Japan's policy towards Yugoslavia. Furthermore, I suggest that a “two-track foreign policy” was also implemented in East European communist countries, and in this case, Yugoslavia in particular. The two-track policy was applied to the West on one side (meaning the United States and free-world democratic states) and not only to

Southeast Asian countries but also to the communist countries of Asia and Europe in general.

This dissertation includes studies on Japanese modern diplomatic relations which help us to understand Japan better. As described above, those works analyze Japan in the context of the Cold War and mostly look into the most influential countries during this period – the United States and the Soviet Union. Although analytical accounts regarding Japan's relations with other countries also exist, there are still significant gaps in Japan's Cold War historiography of the diplomatic relations, as far as the diplomatic relations with communist countries are concerned. One example of that is Japanese-Yugoslav relations. Therefore, this dissertation aims at filling in that gap and contributing to the better understanding of Japan's modern diplomatic history.

Since Japanese-Yugoslav relations during the Cold War were greatly influenced by the Cold War tensions between the superpowers and their national interests, it is essential first to introduce the external environment where Japanese-Yugoslav bilateral relations occurred. Chapter 2 introduces the Cold War, its characteristics, main events and general framework under which international relations functioned.

In continuation, chapters 3 and 4 explain Cold War Yugoslavia and Japan and their diplomatic relations with countries other than each other. The United States and the Soviet Union represented the most influential factors in both Japanese and Yugoslav foreign politics.

Chapter 2: The Cold War International Environment

Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations, as well as their respective positions in the world during the Cold War, should be observed as a part of that world. The relations between the superpowers and related blocs created a specific environment and setup a basic framework for the international relations. Therefore, it is rather important to introduce the Cold War international environment in order to better understand Japanese-Yugoslav relations during that period. Although the Cold War started independently from either Japan or Yugoslavia, soon it affected both. However, while Yugoslavia was ideologically invested in the East-West confrontation and participated in it willingly and calculatedly, Japan was pooled into the confrontation by becoming an American ally.

Soon after World War II ended in 1945, an increasing number of disagreements between the former allies, the Western powers on one side and the Soviet Union on another, led to the partition of Germany and creation of the “Iron Curtain” in the middle of Europe. Within a few years the disagreements expanded outside of Europe. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China under the Communist regime in 1949, it became apparent that Communism was spreading all over the world, and thus the Americans decided to expand their containment strategy to East Asia as well. The Cold War was on.

2.1 Spheres of Influence and Division of the World

The end of World War II brought a major revolution in international relations and change in international environment. Already during the war, the Soviets, the Americans, and British discussed the post-war architecture of Europe. During one out of three big wartime conferences, the Yalta Conference (February 4 – 11, 1945), the Allied powers' leaders, the “Big Three”—Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin—agreed upon how they would handle war-devastated Europe. However, despite the previous agreement, after the end of World War II relations between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated. Due to economically exhausted Great Britain and rest of European countries, the Soviet Union became a dominant power on that continent. Accordingly, the Soviet Union took under control recovery of devastated and poor countries of east and central Europe, imposing control over them at the same time. After the experience of fighting, not one but two major wars initiated by Germans within less than forty years, Soviets aimed at securing their borders from potential future attacks imposing their influence over the countries on its border lines in Europe. In addition to securing Soviet borders, Joseph Stalin¹ saw East European countries as a starting point for a further spread of Communism into the Western European countries.² The Soviet Union did not impose its rule on Eastern European countries instantly after the war.

¹ Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin (1878-1953) was a leader of the Soviet Union from the mid-1920s until his death in March 1953. He ruled the Soviet Union as the General Secretary of the Communist Party until 1941, and from 1941 until 1953 as the Premier of the Soviet Union. His form of Communism is known as Stalinism.

² Silvio Pons, “Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 2 (May 2001): 27.

However, as early as March 1946, British Prime Minister Churchill³ warned the world in his famous speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri that “iron curtain has descended across the Continent” [of Europe].⁴

Imposing control and planting the Communist governments in countries of central and east Europe started gradually and it was based on previous relations of the Soviet Union and those countries. In Yugoslavia and Albania, the creation of people’s democracies (how Communist political systems in Eastern European countries were called) preceded to those of other Eastern European countries, as this process came naturally after the role Communist movements had in the liberation of these countries during the war. The Soviet Union had only a minor role in liberations of Yugoslavia and Albania and the Red Army entered the territory of Yugoslavia only after the Nazis had been expelled, and never even set foot on Albanian territory.⁵

In the rest of Eastern European countries, the situation was different. A role of the Soviet Red Army in the liberation of all of the central and east European countries and its presence on their territories in the aftermath of the war enabled the Soviet Union to impose the establishment of the communist regimes. Poland was the first one to experience Soviet involvement in the establishment of the government. The government was formed by Polish Communists who spent some time in Moscow, formally recognized by Moscow.⁶

³ Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (1874-1965) was a British Prime Minister from 1940 to 1945 and again from 1951 to 1955.

⁴ Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956* (New York: Anchor Books, a division of Random House, Inc, 2013), i.

⁵ Geoff Swain and N. Swain, *Eastern Europe since 1945*, 4th ed, The Making of the Modern World (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 22–25.

⁶ Norman Naimark, “The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953” in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, “The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1” (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 178.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR), which had already been under the Soviet occupation when it was established in 1949, was officially led by the GDR's Socialist Unity Party, but unofficially put under the Soviet control. In Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia as well, emerging communist parties played a leading role in the formation of Communist governments. At first, communist parties in those countries were only a part of broader socialist-democratic coalitions (in the case of Czechoslovakia and Hungary communist parties were a minority in those coalitions), and only later gained leadership. At first, in all Eastern European countries, communist parties cooperated with socialist movements, democrats, and workers unions jointly forming people's democracies.⁷ However, for the communist movements in the Western Europe, such as Italy, France, and Greece, Soviet communists followed the rules of democracies.⁸

The Soviet Union formed Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947 for the purpose of strengthening the Communist power and bringing together Eastern European communist parties (as well as other communist parties in Western Europe, such as French and Italian communist parties) under the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party.⁹ Although Cominform was established due to Soviets' need to create greater control over Eastern Europe and to use it as a control mechanism, Cominform's establishment was also a response to American insinuations regarding the Cold War and the division of the world into two confronting camps. During this conference, the Soviet Union and the newly (formally) established Eastern bloc denounced Tito and Yugoslavia from their group.

⁷ Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, eds., *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997), 16–28.

⁸ Swain and Swain, *Eastern Europe since 1945*, 29.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 30.

With people's governments of Eastern Europe having been established, Americans as well made plans for increasing their influence over the remaining countries in Europe. The American President Truman¹⁰ proposed a plan for providing military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in March 1947 (called Truman Doctrine). In addition to “attempt to kill communism with kindness,” the United States created a European Economic Recovery Program—Marshall Plan in July 1947, setting up the American determination to fight against spreading of Communism. All Eastern bloc countries rejected to be part of the Marshall Plan under the instructions of Stalin. Even though that some of the countries like Czechoslovakia wanted to accept it, they all obeyed the instructions. Recovery funds became unavailable to the communist countries in east Europe which destiny accordingly became even more connected to the Soviet Union. Since it still belonged to the Eastern bloc at the time, Yugoslavia initially rejected the recovery program as well. However, after the rift from the bloc the following year, Yugoslavia became an only Communist country recipient of the Marshall Plan.¹¹

Therefore, starting from 1947, the Cold War confrontation became evident and international relations took its true form, which would remain the framework of international relations for the next 42 years. On one side of the confrontation was the Eastern bloc comprised of the countries in central-east Europe which gained their independence from Nazi Germany with help from the Soviet Union—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania. In the beginning, Yugoslavia and Albania also belonged to the group. However, Yugoslavia as early as

¹⁰ Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) was the President of the United States (1945-1953).

¹¹ Swain and Swain, *Eastern Europe since 1945*, 4–5; this was further explained in Chapter 3.

in 1948 parted from the bloc. Albania was outside of the bloc in a period during Khrushchev's leadership, 1955-1961.¹²

Additionally, some countries from outside of Europe also had Communist governments and allied themselves with the Eastern bloc — Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPKR), Mongolia, Yemen, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (from 1954), the People's Republic of China (until 1960), Cuba (from 1960), Afghanistan (from 1979), and Cambodia (from 1979). However, these countries were not under the direct control of the Soviet Union as the Eastern European countries were, but they were rather partner countries. However, with the victory of Mao Zedong¹³ and Chinese Communist Party on 1 October 1949, the Cominform nations' gained valuable allies on another continent. Developing relations between the Eastern bloc on one side and the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on another marked spreading of Communism across the continents.

On the other side, the Western bloc was comprised of countries with the capitalist economic system and democratic political system. In general, all countries from west Europe belonged to this bloc, with exceptions of Austria, Switzerland, and Finland, which remained neutral. Additionally, Western European democratic countries together with the United States formed a security alliance establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1947. Japan, Australia, New Zealand were countries outside of Europe which were part of the Western or the "Free" World.

¹² Nikita Sergeyeovich Khrushchev (1894-1971) was a leader of the Soviet Union, serving as the First Secretary of the Communist Party from 1953 to 1964, and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, or Premier, from 1958 to 1964.

¹³ Mao Zedong (1893-1976) was a Chinese communist revolutionary and founding father of the People's Republic of China, which he ruled from 1949 until his death in 1976. His politics (his form of Communism) is known as Maoism or Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

The United States used countries within its sphere of influence to contain the further expansion of Communism and Soviet power. On the other side, the Soviet Union used its influence over the satellites and cooperation of its allies to prevent the United States from expanding its influence over the Eastern bloc. Although the two superpowers previously agreed over the spheres of influence, they were in constant fear of invasion from one another, and thus kept accumulating power and kept competing in the arms race. The two sides had utterly different ideologies, political and economic systems and while trying to prevent the other side from imposing its ideology, the both superpowers' ultimate goal was to impose their own.

It should also be pointed out that although the intensity of the confrontation varied throughout the Cold War, the basic concept of bipolar confrontation between the two blocs remained unchanged. The bipolar confrontation at times escalated into "hot wars" in Korea (1950-1953) and Vietnam (1955-1975) and came as close to the full-scale nuclear war in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the Cold War never truly escalated into a military confrontation between the two superpowers. However, the superpowers were building their respective military, political and economic power, fearing from one another.

2.2 Divisions within the Blocs

In addition to a confrontation between the blocs, the Cold War witnessed confrontation within the blocs as well. The first division within the Eastern Bloc occurred at the very beginning of the Cold War in when Yugoslavia was excommunicated by from the bloc. Yugoslavia, which had been one of the strongest postwar allies of the Soviet Union, was expelled from the Cominform and publicly

denounced in a Cominform meeting in 1948. The tensions between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been developing behind-the-scenes for months, and the alliance finally broke down in March 1948.¹⁴

The next departure from the Eastern bloc was Albania. This occurred after Stalin's death and during the Khrushchev's presidency. After Tito-Stalin split, Albania remained loyal to the Soviet Union and did not appreciate Khrushchev's rapprochement with Tito in the mid-1950s. In the light of this rapprochement, Albanian President Enver Hoxha¹⁵ started publicly criticizing Soviet's foreign policies, especially ones towards Yugoslavia. He even turned against the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. When the Soviet Union made an intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Albania formally left the Warsaw Pact, though it never actively participated in its actions. However, it stayed a member of Comecon, where, again, it has never been an active participant.¹⁶

The final and the biggest dispute and departure from the Eastern bloc that heavily impacted not only on the inter-bloc matters but the international relations in general, was the one between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in 1960. The Sino-Soviet dispute, which began earlier in the late 1950s became visible to the world in the early 1960s. It was primarily caused by the differences over national interest and ideology between the two Communist powers.¹⁷

¹⁴ See more about this in Chapter 3.

¹⁵ Enver Halil Hoxha (1908-1985) was a communist leader of Albania, serving as Prime Minister from 1944 to 1954, and as the First Secretary of the Party of Labor of Albania until his death in 1985.

¹⁶ Swain and Swain, *Eastern Europe since 1945*, 130.

¹⁷ See more about this topic in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963*, Cold War International History Project Series (Washington, D.C. : Stanford, Calif: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 2011); Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Besides these countries that left the Eastern bloc, the other countries remained as they were. However, there were several occasions when leaders of various social movements from those countries attempted to lessen the Soviet influence and change the governments. That was the case in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980, where all three revolutions were brutally crushed by the Soviets.¹⁸

Although we cannot speak about rifts within the Western bloc since the system of cooperation among the countries within was different from the one in the Eastern bloc, some events and facts indicate that the bloc was not as coherent. Aside from differences in foreign trade policies towards the Eastern bloc countries,¹⁹ a security policy was not so solid either. France withdrew from NATO in 1966 and expelled NATO troops from its territory.

2.3 Stalin's Death and Its Influence on the East-West Relations

After the initial few years of confrontation between the blocs, the mid-1950s were characterized by a gradual improvement of the relations. The change was enabled by the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in March 1953. After Stalin's death Soviet leadership decided to decrease tensions. In that regard, Korea armistice was declared in July 1953, and a detente between the East and the West was initiated in a conference in Berlin (25 January 1954 to 18 February 1954), held over the German question.

¹⁸ Swain and Swain, *Eastern Europe since 1945*, 5.

¹⁹ This will be explained later in this chapter, in a section 2.6

As Nikita Khrushchev took over the leadership in 1953, he started pursuing somehow different foreign policy than Stalin did. Accordingly, relations between the blocs became less intense. Khrushchev created a concept of "peaceful coexistence" with an aim to improve the Soviet position in international relations. Although this concept was targeting the emerging Third World countries,²⁰ it also served him well in relations with the United States.

In the light of a friendlier foreign policy, the Soviet Union showed some easing of hostilities towards Japan. The Soviet Union did not oppose Japan's entry into Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1954. In addition to that, through the ECAFE Office, the Soviet Union invited the Japanese delegation to visit the agricultural and manufacturing industries of the Soviet Union together with other South East Asian countries.²¹ Joining ECAFE represented a gradual return of Japan to international society.

On the other hand, the decade of the 1950s also saw a change in Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union. Time of Stalin's death and change in Soviets foreign policy coincided with Japan's reconnecting with the world, with reestablishing diplomatic relations with other countries than those which signed the San Francisco Peace Agreement in 1951. Objectively, the circumstances under which Japan pursued normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries in the mid-1950s were far better than those immediately after the war when the Cold War tensions were escalating.

²⁰ Wilfried Loth, ed., *Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953-1965*, Cass Series--Cold War History 4 (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 14.

²¹ *Sovieta nenpo* (Sovieta nenpō, minshu shugi kenkyūkai-hen, Ōkurashō insatsu-kyoku), Naikaku jōhō chōsa-shitsu (Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office), 667-8.

The Japanese Government in the mid-1950s led by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama²² started improving relations with its Asian neighbors. During his term, Japan as well had started establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries.²³

Also, in the case of Yugoslavia, Stalin's death impelled warming of the relations with the Soviet Union. Since the dispute between Tito and Stalin was the main cause of the rift, Stalin's death was seen as an opportunity to make peace with the Eastern bloc. Yugoslav President Tito and newly established Soviet President Khrushchev signed two declarations, in Belgrade (1953) and Moscow (1956), as a path to reconciliation.

Japan and Yugoslavia also have reestablished and started developing their diplomatic relations in this period. Although they reestablished the relations before Stalin's death, in February 1952, it was not until 1955 that anything was done regarding the development of it.

2.4 Crises and détente of the 1960s

The Cold War world entered into the 1960s with the major division in the communist lines. As previously mentioned, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union had growing ideological disagreements since 1956, but the split did not surface to the outside world until 1961. After few failed attempts to reconcile, the Sino- Soviet split became apparent in the events of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) when PRC called the Soviet Union a "Soviet socialist

²² Ichiro Hatoyama (1883-1959) was Japanese Prime Minister from 1954 to 1956.

²³ However, Japan and the Soviet Union have only reestablished diplomatic relations and have not concluded a peace treaty at the time (and have not done so until this day).

imperialist.” The conflict between them even escalated into a military confrontation when Chinese and Soviet armies encountered on their shared border at Damansky (Zhenbao) Island on the Ussuri River in northeastern China in March 1969.²⁴

Along with increasing problems with the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union started showing the hostile attitude towards the Western bloc, provoking the Berlin Crisis in summer 1961 when gave an ultimatum to the Western bloc demanding the withdrawal of Western armed forces from West Berlin. The crisis ended with the city's partition into two parts and building of the Berlin Wall in late summer of 1961.²⁵

After the Berlin Crisis soon followed the second major crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis in fall next year. It was the most direct American-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War and the closest that the world came to the nuclear war. The crisis started when the Soviets deployed their nuclear missiles on Cuba after failed American invasion of Cuba in fall of 1961 and deployment of American Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey (against the Soviet Union with Moscow within range).²⁶

From 1964 onwards Western European countries started to improve relations with Eastern European countries and to develop economic cooperation. France sought to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the East European states, while, at the same time, West Germany pursued its own policy (known as *Ostpolitik*) of

²⁴ Mayumi Itoh, *The Origin of Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Forgotten Architect of Sino-U.S. Rapprochement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 14. Also see: Odd Arne Westad, *Brothers in Arms*; Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*.

²⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 143.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 279–80.

reconciliation with the Eastern bloc states.²⁷ Great Britain, while cooperating with its allies on the communism containment, sought for improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.²⁸

However, in the late 1960s, the Eastern bloc was shaken by some internal events. The Soviet Union experienced antagonism coming from social movements in Eastern European countries. It all started with protests against the regime in Czechoslovakia in January 1968 and had a spill-over effect on the rest of the socialist countries. Student demonstrations in Poland in March 1968 followed. The Soviets put a stop on all Warsaw Pact social revolts by brutally punishing the Czechs and Slovaks for their disobedience as an example to the others.

After two decades of ideological confrontations (and periodic war scares) a détente, policy of seeking to reduce tensions between the superpowers and their respective blocs, began to bear fruit. It was initiated by the frightening crises of the 1960s when the superpowers reconsidered their policies and directed towards lessening the tensions.

2.5 Nixon and the changing 1970s

The decade of the 1970s somehow brought the focus on Asia, where we witnessed withdrawal of the American troops from Indochina, Sino-Soviet conflict escalation, and American rapprochement with PRC. President Richard Nixon²⁹ and

²⁷ For further information about *Ostpolitik* see N. Piers Ludlow, ed., *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973*, Cold War History Series 16 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007).

²⁸ For further details see Geraint Hughes, *Harold Wilson's Cold War The Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-1970*. (Royal Historical Society, 2015).

²⁹ Richard Milhous Nixon (1913-1994) was the President of the United States from 1969 until 1974.

his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, created a strategy of “triangular diplomacy” in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict to facilitate withdrawal of the American troops from Vietnam as painless as possible.³⁰

This rapprochement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China also initiated a détente, the biggest in the Cold War. The fact is that the détente was the result of a number of events, such as the Korean War Armistice and Stalin’s death in 1953, the neutralization of Austria in 1954,³¹ the Sino-Soviet Split from 1960, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the final straw after which both superpowers realized the possibility of mutual destruction was too high. Following the Cuban missile crisis, which was one of the lowest points in relations, the United States and the Soviet Union have decided to ease the tensions.

Nixon was elected as the American president in November 1968 on the premise of saving the country from the nightmare of the Vietnam War. He also began looking for a way to improve relations with China. The Nixon administration saw in the rift between China and the Soviet Union a new dynamics emerging in the balance of power in East Asia and decided to utilize it to his benefit. The Soviet Union was perceived as the worst threat to American security and therefore the United States government tried to improve relations with the People’s Republic of China and use it as a counterweight vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.³²

³⁰ Vladislav Zubok, “Lost in a Triangle: U.S.-Soviet Back-Channel Documents on the Japan Factor in Tripartite Diplomacy, 1969–1972,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 2 (April 2013): 51.

³¹ After the World War II Austria was divided into four zones, divided among American, British, French and Soviet. The occupation ended in May 1955 by signing of the Austrian State Treaty. Since then, Austria became neutral country in the Cold War.

³² Itoh, *The Origin of Ping-Pong Diplomacy*, 15.

President Nixon first publicly advocated for a change in the American policy toward the People's Republic of China in an October 1967, before he was elected.³³ Later next year, in his acceptance speech at the Republican Party convention, Nixon described his vision for the American foreign policy as a policy of negotiation, aiming at peace and prosperity among all the nations in the world. As he said: "We extend the hand of friendship to all people, to the Russian people, to the Chinese people, to all people in the world,"³⁴ he directly targeted two American greatest Cold War enemies and expressed his intentions to the world.

On the other side, the People's Republic of China also begun looking for a change in its foreign policy toward the United States. The enmity between China and the Soviet Union was more immediate and volatile than the differences between either of them and the United States. In addition to that, China had another factor in East Asia to worry about—the growing economic power of Japan.

Therefore, American and Chinese foreign policies got aligned after the decades of animosities. The two great enemies have decided to overcome their differences for the benefit of achieving other national goals. After President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, and signing the Joint Communiqué (Shanghai Communiqué), the United States and the People's Republic of China vowed to work on improvement of their relations. This had an enormous effect on the whole East-West relations, on the Soviet Union in particular. However, probably the second most impacted country by all this situation was Japan. Japan was completely blindsided in this whole situation. Thus, Japan suffered a huge blow from its greatest ally, the

³³ Chris Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), 1–2.

³⁴ Richard M. Nixon, "Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech," 4president, August 8, 1968, <http://www.4president.org/speeches/nixon1968acceptance.htm>. (accessed 08.05.2016.)

United States. Subsequently, Japan also changed the course of its foreign policy and finally was able to work on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with China openly.

2.6 East-West Trade Relations

Throughout the Cold War, although ideological differences heavily influenced relations between countries belonging to the East and countries belonging to the West, there was no united position on trade relations. The lack of a unified Western position on East-West trade has been a consequence of divergent interests and different conceptions of the relationship between economics and national security. Western Europe and Japan, in general, were more dependent on foreign trade than the United States. For them, trade promotion was as an integral part their national foreign policy strategies.

Originally, during and after World War II, the United States did not plan the postwar division of the international economy into competing blocs. The American officials hoped the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could be a part of the multilateral trade and financial institutions which were to govern global economic relations. American officials encouraged the Soviets to join the Bretton Woods agreement and planned to offer them a sizable postwar reconstruction loan.³⁵ Such initiatives were consistent with the American postwar political strategy toward the

³⁵ See Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*, The Political Economy of International Relations Series (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

Soviet Union, called "containment by integration."³⁶ However, the Truman Administration miscalculated the degree to which the Soviet Union would be dependent on American assistance for its immediate reconstruction.³⁷

The United States Congress approved the \$17 billion for the Marshall Plan. However, in the light of the events when the Soviet Union rejected to be a recipient of this reconstruction program and instructed satellite states to do the same, the Truman administration began to think about the potential risks of American trade with Eastern Europe.³⁸ Although it wanted to control exports which could contribute significantly to increase of Soviet military capabilities, the United States feared that export controls applied for national security purposes could lead to retaliation by the East against Western Europe. Finally, the United States determined that the complete termination of trade with the Eastern bloc would probably be more costly to the West than to the East.³⁹

However it may had been before, once the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union started, economic cooperation between the blocs got more difficult. Even before the Cold War was initiated, the world was divided into two groups of countries, based on the characteristics of their economic system: countries with centrally-planned economy and countries with the capitalist system. In the first

³⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, Rev. and expanded ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9.

³⁷ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, 1970, 645.

³⁸ Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee of the Secretary of Commerce, "Report by the Ad Hoc Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee of the Secretary of Commerce," April 5, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Volume IV, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v04/d343> (accessed 14/11/2015)

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Summary of 'Review of United States Export Control Policy in Relation to East-West Trade,'" FRUS 1950, Volume IV, <https://historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d70> (accessed 14/11/2015)

group belonged the Soviet Union, communist countries of central-east Europe, later established PRC and DPKR and other communist countries. The second group was a group of democratic countries or “the free world,” which included the United States, Japan, countries in western Europe and such.

Different from the American objective for trade with Eastern Europe, the main purpose of West European states in East-West trade was economic. Trade was essential for their recovery and development. However, despite the importance of the economic objective, by 1948 West European states, behind the initiatives of the British and the French, displayed a strong willingness to embargo exports to the East selectively for reasons of national security. The two nations compiled export control lists independently in 1948, but by early 1949 collaborated on what became known as the Anglo-French list.

The Consultative Group and the Coordinating Committee (CoCom) were established in November 1949 and Japan was the member as well. By bringing the European states together, CoCom provided what each desired most: immediate and up-to-date information regarding what all other participating states were willing or unwilling to embargo, and thus the knowledge of whether and to what extent economic sacrifices were strategically worthwhile. However, on the other side of the economic warfare, it enhanced the ability of the Soviets to draw the Bloc closer together and to consolidate its control over the economies of the smaller East European states. The embargo did more damage to the latter, forcing them to become economically more dependent on the Soviet Union.

The United States originally implemented the Export Control Act (1949) which limited export of goods classified as strategic for the country’s security. Due to their good diplomatic relationship, Yugoslavia was the only communist country

which was granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status by the American government. After Yugoslavia, Poland was granted MFN status and the first one to sign a trade agreement with the United States in 1974. Only later in 1962 the United States granted MFN status to other communist countries.⁴⁰

At the beginning of the Cold War tensions Western European countries and Japan, similar to the United States, carefully selected trading partners coming from the Eastern bloc. However, different from the United States, Western European countries were more dependent on a foreign trade and therefore soon renewed the trade with socialist states.⁴¹ Unlike the United States, Western European countries, the United Kingdom foremost, pursued normalization of trade with the Comecon regardless of the current developments in East-West political relations. Moreover, the United Kingdom was Comecon's largest trading partner in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) during the 1960s.⁴²

Trade was a political instrument; or, as Kissinger put it, "expanding trade without a political quid pro quo was a gift; there was little the Soviets could do for us economically."⁴³ There was, however, much the Soviets could do for the United States politically. By 1969, the United States was prepared to extricate itself from Vietnam. The implementation of the Act, however, depended on political concessions Soviets provided to the United States. SALT agreement was reached in May 1971.

⁴⁰ Roland Schönfeld, "The USA in Economic Relations between East and West," *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade* 10, no. 1 (1974): 3–4.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴² Stephen Woolcock, "East-West Trade: U.S. Policy Versus European Interests," *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade; The World Today* 19, no. 1 (1983): 4; above two paragraphs were previously used in a research note: Jelena Glisic, "East-West Trade and Japanese-Yugoslav Relations during the Cold War," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 37 (2015): 119–33.

⁴³ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, First Simon & Schuster trade paperback ed (New York: Simon & Schuster trade paperbacks, 2011), 152.

For the Eastern European countries, the East-West trade was a way to lessen the dependence on the Soviet Union. Their economies were under control of the Soviet Union and moreover, their foreign trade was mainly trade within the Eastern bloc. By conducting trade with countries other than communist, Eastern European countries became less dependent on the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia started with this conducts rather early, in 1948, after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Though Yugoslavia from the beginning pursued independence from the Soviet Union, it is most important trading partner except in years of complete division between the two was always the Soviet Union.

Similarly, Japan's developing trade relations with the countries other than the United States meant the lessening dependence on the United States as well. For Japan, foreign trade was essential, for its restoration and further development. Thus, the trade with any country was crucial if Japan wanted to achieve its development. East-West trade made this goal more possible. For example, from 1952 to 1958, four informal trade agreements were signed between Japan and the People's Republic of China.

An international environment has significantly changed since World War II. Emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, while competing between themselves over which would get a bigger share of the world under its influence, created an environment of ideological confrontation. The confrontation, although had started over Europe, spread over Asia and other continents.

The Soviet Union put countries of central-east Europe under its strict control, with the exception of Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union also had a powerful ally in Asia – the People's Republic of China, until the beginning of the 1960s, when the alliance broke down. The Western bloc, on the other hand, was gathered around the other

superpower – the United States. This bloc was formed predominantly by the countries in western Europe, but was also aligned with Japan through the United States – Japan alliance.

However, the ideological confrontations may have been a complicated and important factor for the international environment, the intensity of confrontation varied through time. The world experienced many crises, such as the Berlin Crisis (1961) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and Korean (1950-1953) and Vietnam War (1955-1975). However, the world also experienced a decrease of tensions in the mid-1950s and at the beginning of the 1970s.

While Yugoslavia and Japan were obviously heavily influenced by the Cold War tensions and superpower relations, they were as well independent countries which were free to pursue their own national interests. In that regard, as the following chapters will show, both countries cooperated with countries from the both blocs, working to the best of their abilities to rebuild after the World War II and further develop their countries.

CHAPTER 3: Yugoslavia in the Cold War

Cold-War Yugoslavia at the same belonged to both worlds — East and West. While being Communist¹ and therefore belonging to the East, Yugoslavia was the only communist country in Eastern Europe expelled from the Eastern bloc. Also, it was the only country in Europe which was an American ally but did not belong to the Western bloc.² Yugoslavia had very peculiar foreign policy during the Cold War and therefore its international position is rather difficult to define. In an attempt to decrease the influence of the superpowers from its domestic and foreign policies, it was balancing between the East and the West. Although by its political ideology it belonged to the Eastern bloc, as early as in 1948 Yugoslavia parted from the Soviet Union and started cooperating with the West. This was the reason that Yugoslavia was never a member of Comecon or the Warsaw Pact. However, it never renounced its ideology, it remained a communist country until the very end of the Cold War.

In light of being torn between ideology and pragmatism in its politics, Yugoslavia's survival and international position were based on politics of balance in relations towards the East and the West, namely towards the Soviet Union and the

¹ The socialist states, or the communist states how they are called in the West (though they themselves claimed that they have not achieved communism and therefore were socialist states), are the states that are governed by a single party adhering to the ideology of Marxist-Leninism (or some variant of it) and in which the state has control over industries and services. On this topic see more in Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics, Politics, and Ethics*, The Ludwig von Mises Institute's Studies in Austrian Economics (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989).

² Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland were neutral European countries, thus did not belong to the Western bloc.

United States.³ Tito stated many times that Yugoslavia wanted a good relationship with all the countries in the world, regardless of the political system,⁴ although he was aware that this was impossible to achieve. Every time Yugoslavia achieved closer cooperation with one of the superpowers instantly lost the trust of the other and ruined relations with all the countries from that bloc.

3.1 The Second Greatest Communist Country and Its Road to Disgrace

The formative period of the “Yugoslav way” of Communism was during the first decade after the end of World War II between 1945 and 1955. In some way, this period is what Yugoslavia and Japan have in common. For both countries, it took about ten years to find their place within the post-war international system. The difference is that due to the external factors, Japan was not at liberty to decide regarding its own way for the first seven years. On the other side, Yugoslavia did have liberty to pursue its own interests, though this was hardened by external circumstances.

During the first ten years in Yugoslavia’s post-war history occurred everything that influenced and shaped the “Yugoslav way” of communism and Yugoslavia’s foreign policy: state economy decentralization was implemented and workers’ management system introduced; military intervention by the Eastern bloc was prevented; by 1955 Yugoslavia reconciled with the Soviet Union; Yugoslavia overcame political and economic blockade imposed by the Eastern bloc and came out to international stage; the Western bloc and predominantly the United States provided

³ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1970), 75–80.

⁴ Josip Tito Broz, *Josip Broz Tito: Izbor Iz Dela - Jugoslavija U Borbi Za Nezavisnost I Nesvrstanost (Josip Broz Tito: Selected Works - Yugoslavia in Fight for Independence and Non-Alliance)* (Sarajevo: Svijetlost, 1980), 291–95.

extensive financial and military aid; in the process of seeking for alliance Yugoslavia signed and then cancelled Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey and then redirected to look for an alliance of higher international profile.

Before all these events, Yugoslavia was politically and economically fragile country. Soon after World War II, its relations with its Western war allies deteriorated due to Yugoslav Communist orientation and alliance with the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia suffered isolation from the West only to be expelled from the Soviet bloc a few years later. It found itself completely unwanted and isolated from the both blocs.

The biggest disagreements between Moscow and Belgrade were over Yugoslavia's Balkan policy. Tito avoided consulting with Stalin and waiting for his explicit approval before taking any steps to develop cooperation with Bulgaria and Albania. After Yugoslavia had signed a treaty with Bulgaria in August 1947, Stalin sent a secret cable to Tito denouncing the treaty as a "mistake" and "premature."⁵ As a consequence, the Soviet Union and its East European allies imposed economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and adopted some political measures to destabilize and precipitate the collapse of Tito's regime.

In the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia belonged to the winners club — Allied Powers and came out of the war as a winner. It was only logical to expect that from that point on Yugoslavia's development should turn for the better. However, the ending of World War II brought up on the surface some unresolved issues between the winning allies. Problems between the two continued to grow in the events of unsettling peace treaty negotiations over Trieste territorial issues. Moreover, in light

⁵ Archives of Yugoslavia (AY) Presidential Archives (PA) AJBT-KMJ, I-2/17, Staljinov telegram Drugu Titu [Stalin's cable to Comrade Tito]

of the incidents in 1946 when Yugoslav military took down two American C-47 transport planes which had flown over Yugoslav territory, the problems escalated.⁶ Finally, Yugoslavia, same as the other Eastern bloc countries, rejected the American Marshall Plan aid and thus indisputably aligned itself with the Soviet Union. However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, Yugoslavia ultimately accepted the Marshall Plan eventually.

Having been a communist country Yugoslavia naturally belonged to the Eastern bloc. It was second only to the Soviet Union regarding the development and implementation of socialism.⁷ During the first few post-war years, Yugoslavia was heavily influenced by Soviet politics and political literature regarding the international environment, political systems, contradictions between capitalism and socialism, etc. Domestic politicians and political writers wrote under this influence.⁸ Moreover, the whole Yugoslav political system was based on the Soviet model. Even before World War II, Yugoslav communist party members were educated in the Soviet Union. Moreover, during World War II, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union jointly fought against fascist Germany, which deepened their bond.

Tito and the Soviet leader Stalin signed the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and After War Cooperation in Moscow on April 11, 1945. The Soviet Union signed the same treaty with all East European communist countries within the

⁶ John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 20.

⁷ Aleksandar Životić and Dragan Bogetić, eds., *Jugoslavija U Hladnom Ratu: Prilozi Istraživanjima: Zbornik Radova = Yugoslavia in Cold War: Collection of Articles: Supplements to Research*, Biblioteka "Zbornici Radova," Br. 6 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), 14.

⁸ Ljubomir Dimic, "Istoriografski putokazi, Istoriografsko nasledje o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije u hladnom ratu (Historiographical signposts, historiographical legacy of Yugoslavia's foreign policy in the Cold War)," in *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.: zbornik radova*, Biblioteka Zbornici radova, knj. br. 3 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 28.

next two years, connecting them into a group of communist countries.⁹ Furthermore, East Europe communist countries established the Communist Information Bureau (or Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, short - Cominform) on September 27, 1947, as a body for coordination of all European communist party actions. It was originally located in Belgrade, but due to Yugoslav expulsion from the Cominform already the next year, it was moved to Bucharest, Romania. Although the Cominform was dissolved in 1956, the Soviet bloc had other organizations serving the purpose of coordination between the communist countries of Eastern Europe. Such are the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), formed on January 5-8, 1949 for dealing with economic matters and the Warsaw Pact (the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance), formed on May 14, 1955, for security-related issues.

Even though during that period Yugoslavia was building its own country following imputes from the Soviet Union, at the same time it was trying to decrease Soviet influence on its domestic and foreign policies. Different from other Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia fought the Germans from its territory by itself with minor help from the Soviet Union. The other Eastern European countries got freed from the Germans by the help of the Soviet Red Army. The Red Army entered Yugoslav territory only after the war, causing more problems than benefits and thus provoking disputes between the two allies. By the time when the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union became evident and the Cold War started, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had piled up quite a few disputes, and their

⁹ Later, in 1955 Soviet Union under the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance gathered together eight East European communist countries under the Warsaw Pact (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union).

alliance broke off. In addition to the Red Army's crimes over Yugoslav population on Yugoslav territory, a few other events created problems between the communist allies. Namely, Tito's actions towards the creation of Balkan Pact with Albania and Bulgaria under his initiative angered Stalin, who saw it as Tito's move towards separation from the bloc. Tito signed the Bled Agreement on 1 August 1947 with the Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov, which went in the direction of creating the Balkan Federative Republic and enhancing Tito's power. Formation of such a state would mean that Yugoslavia aimed at strengthening its position within the communist bloc, even challenging Soviet supremacy one day in the future.¹⁰

As a consequence of Tito's independent foreign policy, Stalin attempted to overthrow Tito from his leadership position but failed, and the two leaders finally broke up good relations. Therefore Yugoslavia found itself being a communist country outside the Eastern bloc. It was left without all the funds for restoration and trading partners, both of which was needed for the recovery of the war-destroyed country. Thus, Yugoslav foreign trade, which was predominantly tied to Eastern Europe, completely collapsed.

3.2 A "Reliable" Western Ally

Being in economic isolation from the major trading partners, the Informbiro States, and being under the constant fear of the Soviet military intrusion, combined with a few bad crop productivity years in the row, Yugoslavia decided to turn to the West for help. The economic blockade from Informbiro countries was devastating for

¹⁰ Vladimir Cvetkovic, "Spoljna Politika Jugoslavije I Zemlje Narodne Demokratije U Susedstvu 1953-1958 (Yugoslav Foreign Policy and Neighbouring Peoples' Democracies 1953-1958)," in *Jugoslavija U Hladnom Ratu: Prilozi Istraživanjima: Zbornik Radova (Yugoslavia in Cold War: Collection of Articles: Supplements to Research)* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), 78-79.

Yugoslavia. Exports to the Soviet Union amounted 48% in 1947 and 51% in 1948, only to drop down to 14% in 1949, and reached zero by 1950.¹¹ In this situation what seemed like the only solution was that Yugoslav leader asks for help from the West. Under these circumstances, although it originally had rejected it, Yugoslavia accepted Marshall Plan aid. Moreover, it became a recipient of the assistance coming from many Western countries. Yugoslavia received USD 299 million from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as well as grants and loans from individual states – Britain’s contribution in 1949 was 36 million USD and 20 million USD from the American Export-Import Bank.¹²

Due to Yugoslavia’s previous close relations with the Soviet Union, Americans were suspicious regarding Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the Marshall Plan. Relations between the United States and Yugoslavia were so much deteriorated that Tito had problems to convince the United States in a sincerity of his motives behind accepting it. Americans had difficulties to believe that the Tito-Stalin split was genuine. The distrust on both sides was probably the biggest problem they had between them.

Similar trust issues existed on the other side as well. Tito had to defend his reasons to accept help from a non-socialist country in front of the Yugoslavs. In his speech, he explained how the United States offered and gave aid to Yugoslavia not with the intention to break up the socialism, no matter that they never liked socialism

¹¹ Beatrice Heuser, *Western “containment” policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1989), 215.

¹² *Ibid.*, 219.

and never pretended otherwise, but because Yugoslavians were on the verge of hunger and to help them to fight for their independence against Stalin.¹³

However, from Yugoslavia's point of view, accepting the aid did not mean fulfilling the Marshall Plan's ultimate goals – to eliminate Communism. Tito accepted aid because of merely practical reasons, without any intention to give up his ideology and change the Yugoslav political system. Although the Americans were aware of this fact, they approved the aid to Yugoslavia. American motives for granting the aid were stated in the National Security Council's *US Policy Toward Yugoslavia* document where it was written that Yugoslav departure from the Eastern bloc served the United States interests since this event showed disunity of the Eastern bloc, as well as it denied access to strategically important positions to the Soviet Union.¹⁴ All this help was provided to Yugoslavia not because the United States suddenly started thinking that Tito is an ally, but because he had a potential to become a tool for defeating the Soviet Union.¹⁵ For the United States, Yugoslavia's independence was a major factor in containing the Soviet influence over Europe. Moreover, Yugoslavia made a good model for other East European socialist countries, which undermined the coherence and strength of the Eastern bloc. For Tito, support from the United States represented a basic factor in maintaining independence, giving him a counterbalance to Soviet Union politics.¹⁶

¹³ Josip Broz Tito, *Govori I Clanici (Speeches and Articles)*, vol. XIII (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1959), 253–245.

¹⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2 › Document 120, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/d120> (accessed: 10/04/2015)

¹⁵ Lampe, Prickett, and Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World War II*, 85.

¹⁶ Djoko Tripkovic, "Vracanje Balansa U Politici Jugoslavije Prema Supersilama Krajem 60-Tih Godina 20. Veka (Bringing Back the Balance to the Yugoslav Policy toward Superpowers in Late 1960s)," *Tokovi Istorije*, no. 2 (2010): 84.

However, this sudden turn in Yugoslav foreign policy and development of good relations with the United States were peculiar, no matter the logic of interests on both sides. Tito's action represented closing to the Western bloc, and turning his back to the Eastern. Among Serbian scholars, it is considered to be a unique phenomenon in Cold War history for a communist country to cooperate with a country of completely opposite political ideology.¹⁷

Finally, in 1949, the United States decided to give the aid to Yugoslavia, without political constraints and with the acknowledgment of the Yugoslav political system as it was. Additionally, during the next year, when a horrible drought hit Yugoslavia, faced with starvation of the people, Tito requested aid in food supplies from the United States. In order to respond to this request, President Truman called for a special session of the Congress, and by enacting Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act, Yugoslavia was granted with 50 million USD of food aid. Yugoslavia also received aid from many Western European countries, exceeding 15 million USD. From the beginning of the aid until it stopped in 1958, Yugoslavia received over 1.5 billion USD of military and economic aid.¹⁸

At the beginning of the 1950s, Yugoslavia took a step further into adjusting its economic system to the Western one. This step also distanced Yugoslavia further from the Soviet Union. The centrally planned economic system was changed to some degree, directing Yugoslavia's economy to a market type socialism, a step between the original socialist centrally planned economy and market economy. In this economic system, instead of the ministry of central planning, workers' councils were

¹⁷ Životić and Bogetić, *Jugoslavija U Hladnom Ratu*, 17.

¹⁸ Lampe, Prickett, and Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World War II*, 32-33-228.

introduced as the chief decision-making bodies regarding economic planning.¹⁹ This and many other steps Yugoslav Government undertook by mid-1950s distanced Yugoslavia from the Soviet model of economy and the Soviet influence itself, and more importantly, made trade with the Western world possible. In 1953 American imports took over one-third of all Yugoslav imports.²⁰

In addition to economic assistance, Yugoslavia and the United States were negotiating the possibility of Yugoslavia getting military aid as well, due to the fear that the Soviet Union would invade Yugoslav territory. Both economic and military aid were precedent in already Cold-War-divided Europe. One socialist country under the communist regime was to ally itself with a democratic superpower. For both sides, there were interests involved and potential benefits. However, before all that, there was a lot at stake. Both sides' public opinion and political groups could react badly regarding this. Therefore the negotiations were conducted in secrecy.²¹

In 1951, negotiations with Western countries regarding weaponry supply became more intensified, and soon Yugoslavia started receiving military aid. By the end of the year, the United States and Yugoslavia signed the Military Assistance Pact. This pact was a part of the United States strategy for military assistance for countries endangered by the Soviet Union (Military Assistance Act, 1949), which was later developed into the Mutual Defense Aid Program. This military aid had political significance, having been the support for opposing Soviet pressure as well as a tool for diminishing the strength of the Eastern bloc. Both, the United States and

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

²¹ Dragan Bogetic, "Jugoslavija Izmedju Istoka I Zapada (Yugoslavia between the East and the West)," in *Jugoslavija U Hladnom Ratu*, Biblioteka "Zbornici Radova," Br. 6 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), 18.

Yugoslavia had these goals in common when they became allies, both were in need to weaken the power of the Soviet Union. For the United States, this was a necessity in order to become the greatest superpower in the world. As for Yugoslavia, weakening Soviet Union power was necessary in order to survive.²²

Military assistance was followed by intensive political and military negotiations regarding Yugoslavia's position and role within NATO. However, Yugoslavia was hesitant to join NATO since it would send a clear message to which bloc it belonged, and it this was never part of the plan. As a way of cooperating with NATO but not being a member, Yugoslavia turned to Greece and Turkey, which became the newest NATO members in 1952. Together with them, Yugoslavia formed the Balkan pact. All three states were strategically important for NATO for defense from further expansion of communism in Europe. Furthermore, since they were the only countries in the region which were not in the Soviet Union system, it was only logical to join their forces in order to maintain the situation. Yugoslavia was the only one which did not want to become a formal member of NATO, and therefore this Balkan Alliance was more important for it. Also, since Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952, Yugoslavia became isolated in a way, having the East bloc as an enemy and with the treat of attack from it, and also, having not been a part of the Western bloc military alliance. However, the Balkan pact very soon became more of a means for gaining political significance among the Western bloc then it was the security mechanism from potential attack from the East. In 1953, due to Stalin's death and regrouping at the top of the Soviet Union government, it became certain that the Soviet Union would not attack Yugoslavia.²³

²² *Ibid.*, 19–20.

²³ *Ibid.*, 18–20.

The idea of Balkan pact had quite a few enemies. For starters, Italy did not like strengthening Yugoslavia's military power in the region, due to the two countries' territorial dispute. The United States itself did not like the idea of three regional countries joining a military alliance without its supervision. If the alliance would be under the framework of NATO, then it would be more under control. Therefore, the Balkan Pact agreement, signed in 1952, omitted any related military agreements.²⁴

This status of the agreement remained for a couple of years, when Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey signed a contract in Bled in 1954, clarifying the terms of military cooperation. According to this contract, three countries obliged themselves to react in the case then one of them was attacked.²⁵ With committing to this Pact, Yugoslavia gained guarantees for security in the event of the Soviet attack, without committing to and formally joining NATO.

However, this Balkan Pact episode was rather brief. Very soon after signing it, the pact lost its meaning. Circumstances from the region affected Yugoslavia's intensity for involvement, since at this time Yugoslavia sought improved relations with the Soviet Union after Stalin died, and it seemed like this improvement was possible. Also, the conflict between Greece and Turkey about Cyprus in 1955 weakened that side of the tripartite relations. Therefore, Balkan Pact was a rather short episode in Yugoslav foreign policy.²⁶

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 19; Bojan Dimitrijevic, "Jugoslavija I NATO 1951-1958, Skica Intenzivnih Vojnih Odnosa (Yugoslavia and NATO, Draft of Intensified Military Relations)," in *Spoljna Politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.: Zbornik Radova*, Knj. Br. 3 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 260.

²⁵ Dimitrijevic, "Jugoslavija I NATO 1951-1958, Skica Intenzivnih Vojnih Odnosa (Yugoslavia and NATO, Draft of Intensified Military Relations)," 266.

²⁶ Bogetic, "Jugoslavija Izmedju Istoka I Zapada (Yugoslavia between the East and the West)," 21-22.

Even though a mutual interest in developing and upgrading military cooperation between the United States and Yugoslavia existed, it was constantly followed by many disagreements which prevented it from happening. The two sides had different perspectives and different ideas about how this cooperation should look like and how it should function. Yugoslavia was seeking guarantees that the West would provide assistance and support in case of attack from the Soviet Union on Yugoslav territory. The United States and West European countries were seeking an extension of NATO-covered territory.²⁷

This Yugoslav-American alliance had been carefully calculated by both sides. It was an alliance created out of interests of both sides which were not necessarily the same. Also, it was a temporary solution, at least looking from the Yugoslav perspective. Yugoslav leadership controlled the level of economic and military aid in order not to allow too much influence on the Yugoslav way and its ideology.

Tito had worries regarding too close a relationship with the West without balance from the opposite side. This meant a gradual shift in many aspects of the political and social system for Yugoslavia and gradual entering into the Western military alliance, thus losing the independency in making foreign policy decisions.²⁸

This “Western episode” in Yugoslav history was never supposed to progress further from the initial considerations and basic alliance. The differences were simply too big to overcome. Moreover, at that point, Yugoslavia was still dreaming of reconciling with the Eastern bloc. In the event of Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, this Yugoslav dream got new hope.

²⁷ Dimitrijevic, “Jugoslavija I NATO 1951-1958, Skica Intenzivnih Vojnih Odnosa (Yugoslavia and NATO, Draft of Intensified Military Relations),” 263.

²⁸ Dimic, “Istoriografski putokazi, Istoriografsko nasledje o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije u hladnom ratu (Historiographical signposts, historiographical legacy of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy in the Cold War),” 32.

3.3 A Brief Trip “Home”

Stalin’s death had been the first beam of hope for reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The reconciliation had begun with secret correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev in 1954, continued with the signing of the Belgrade (1955) and Moscow (1956) Declarations. Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade in 1955 and signing the Belgrade Declaration made favorable conditions for Yugoslavia to improve relations with other European socialist countries as well. The Informbiro countries followed the sign from the Soviet Union, and even within first few days after signing the Belgrade Declaration accepted Yugoslavia’s socialist country invited Yugoslav representatives in their respective countries to formal meetings, etc.²⁹ The Declaration granted the right to interpret Marxism in a different way from all the socialist countries and ensured equal relationships amongst all satellite states and the Soviet Union.

After the rather extended visit to the Soviet Union in 1956 and making many compromises on both sides, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia generally looked like it took a good direction. Both sides tackled the issue with hopes and readiness to compromise in order to bring the two former allies together again.³⁰ However, the Belgrade Declaration only initiated resolving some

²⁹ Vladimir Lj. Cvetkovic, “Jugoslavija I Odjek Beogradske Deklaracije U Susjednim ‘informbirovskim’ zemljama (Yugoslavia and the Echo of the Belgrade Declaration in the neighboring ‘Informbiro’ countries),” in *Spoljna Politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.: Zbornik Radova*, Biblioteka Zbornici Radova, knj. br. 3 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 199–205.

³⁰ Jan Pelikan, “The Yugoslav State Visit to the Soviet Union, June 1956,” in *Spoljna Politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.: Zbornik Radova*, Biblioteka Zbornici Radova, knj. br. 3 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 115.

minor problems in respective bilateral relations and left significant issues for later.³¹ Also, the agreement reached in the Moscow Declaration and during the Yugoslav statesmen's visit to the Soviet Union was harder to implement in reality.³² Although some improvements were evident, the Declarations had limitations, which all surfaced with the Soviet intervention in Hungary in October 1956.

Due to the Yugoslav stance towards the Hungarian Revolution, which it initially supported, the Yugoslav-Soviet relations once again reached a low point. Although at the end Yugoslav leaders betrayed their Hungarian communist friends and gave them to the Soviets, the Soviet Union decided to tighten control over Yugoslavia. The Soviets organized a conference on the occasion of the celebration of 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, in Moscow in November 1957, with a goal that twelve communist countries sign a declaration for the creation of a new Cominform. Yugoslavia refused to sign the declaration. Furthermore, as a response, it adopted a CPY program in May 1958, which underlined Yugoslavia's right for independence in decision-making.³³ This Yugoslav decision resulted in a decrease in the volume of trade and cancelling previously signed credit arrangements with the Soviet Union. Also, the Soviets again initiated the anti-Yugoslav campaign, as in the Stalin era.

³¹ Cvetkovic, "Jugoslavija I Odjek Beogradske Deklaracije U Susednim 'informbirovskim' zemljama (Yugoslavia and the Echo of the Belgrade Declaration in the neighboring 'Informbiro' countries)," 205–6.

³² *Ibid.*, 115.

³³ Dragan Bogetic, "Drugi Jugoslovensko-Sovjetski Sukob, Sudar Titove I Hruscovljeve Percepcije Politike Miroljubive Koegzistencije (The Second Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict, Coallision of Tito's and Khrushchev's Perceptions on the Politics of the Peacefull Coexistence)," in *Spoljna Politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.: Zbornik Radova (Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia 1950-1961, Collection of Works)*, ed. Slobodan Selinić, Biblioteka Zbornici Radova, knj. br. 3 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 50–51.

On the other side, while Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union were improving, relations with the West were deteriorating. During that time, the Trieste crisis (1953-54) occurred, which resulted in a decrease in military aid from the Western bloc temporarily stopped during the Trieste crisis. The aid finally completely stopped upon request from Yugoslavia in 1957-58.³⁴

Therefore, once again, Yugoslavia found itself distanced from both superpowers. This time, the isolation was not complete, but it became evident that there was no place for Yugoslavia in either of the blocs.

3.4 The Non-aligned Years

About the same time when Tito destroyed his good relations with the West in order to improve those with the East, he created a completely new direction in Yugoslav foreign policy – upgrading relations with Third-World countries. Tito started exploring additional options, looking for countries which were outside the blocs. He traveled in India and Burma in 1954. Also, soon after his return from the Soviet Union in 1956, Tito met with Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser³⁵ and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru³⁶ on the Yugoslav island of Brioni, which was later regarded as the most important meeting informing of the Non-aligned Movement. The Non-aligned Movement was formed in 1961 and was aimed at promoting the principles of self-determination and sovereignty of Third World countries. The first Non-aligned Movement conference, held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia,

³⁴ Dimitrijevic, "Jugoslavija I NATO 1951-1958, Skica Intenzivnih Vojnih Odnosa (Yugoslavia and NATO, Draft of Intensified Military Relations)," 269.

³⁵ Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (1918-1970) was the second President of Egypt, serving from 1956 until his death.

³⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was the first Prime Minister of India, serving the office from 1947 until 1964.

in September 1961, was organized soon after the Berlin Wall was built (August 15, 1961) and after the Soviet missile test. The next year, the Bay of Pigs incident occurred, followed by the Cuban missile crisis, an episode in Cold War history when a confrontation between the superpowers was the most probable.

At the Belgrade Conference, there was no consensus among the participants regarding the Movement's role in world politics. They debated whether it should represent the third bloc (which Tito wanted) or to be only a way of protest for bloc politics and not to position itself in a confronting position vis-à-vis the blocs (as Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno wanted).³⁷ Nehru was already powerful enough in the Asian region, having been the leader of the second largest country in the world by its population number. He already enjoyed a certain amount of reputation and power and was not threatened from the blocs. His foreign policy was based on principles of equidistance from the blocs, and he did not intend to confront them. On the other hand, Nasser who himself was powerful in the Middle East, saw himself as a leader of the Arab world and had no particular interest for the rest of the Third World.³⁸

Also, for Tito and Nasser anti-colonialism was the primary goal of the Non-aligned Movement, while Nehru thought it to be the Cold War mediation.³⁹ Nevertheless, the first conference in Belgrade contributed to the prestigious position of Yugoslavia among Third World countries, and set the basis for further Tito to persuade Third World countries to join in the Non-aligned Movement.

³⁷ Bogetic, "Jugoslavija Izmedju Istoka I Zapada (Yugoslavia between the East and the West)," 22.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 22–23.

³⁹ Robert A. Mortimer, *The Third World Coalition in International Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 13–14.

The idea of joining the Third World countries which did not belong to any of the two existing blocs had existed before Tito decided to push that idea further. Tito was influenced by this idea in 1954 during his trip to Burma and India when he met Nehru for the first time and learned about concepts of “peaceful coexistence” and “non-commitment.”⁴⁰

Long before Tito organized the Belgrade Conference, the third world countries organized the Asian-African Bandung Conference in Indonesia in April 1955, with a goal to unite against the blocs and colonialism. They wanted to express their attitude of not belonging to any of the blocs and wanted to join against neocolonialism to remain neutral. The conference itself did not have much success or results, to begin with, and Yugoslavia did not even participate, but Tito saw the potential for forming the new “neutral” alliance in it. His idea was that such alliance would serve the Third World (developing) countries to fight pressure coming from the Cold War world order torn between two superpowers, rather than only claiming their neutrality.⁴¹ Furthermore, the group of non-aligned countries was supposed to support each other in their respective fights for national liberation and gaining independence, based on peaceful coexistence.⁴²

Japan sent a delegation to the Bandung Conference. This was Japan’s first participation in an international conference since the restoration of sovereignty. The delegation consisted of government officials, nongovernmental leaders, professional diplomats and various party personnel, who carried out various activities inside and

⁴⁰ Svetozar Rajak, “No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest, The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 147.

⁴¹ Bogetic, “Jugoslavija Izmedju Istoka I Zapada (Yugoslavia between the East and the West),” 22.

⁴² Mortimer, *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, 12.

outside the conference. The chief representative was a Minister of State and Chief of the Economic Deliberative Agency, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, an advocate of Japan's trade relations with South East Asia.⁴³ The obvious goal was for Japan to improve relations with the Southeast Asian countries, to establish a better relation and bigger trade exchange.

In order to realize his idea from initiation to full operability of the Non-aligned Movement, Tito came the long way. It took him about five years to organize the Third World conference in Belgrade and another nine years for the movement to become well organized and formally established. Tito did so by paying a series of visits to African and Asian countries. It was not until the Lusaka meeting in 1970 that the Movement gained more structured nature and concrete action plans. At the Lusaka Conference, the leaders who opposed Tito in his idea to create a more logical organization with concrete action plans — Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno — were no longer presidents of their respective countries. This created favorable circumstances for Tito to push forward his idea.

Since NAM's attitudes were closer to the Eastern than to the Western bloc, Americans once again had their suspicions over Yugoslav foreign policy goals.⁴⁴ However, Tito managed to persuade the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia George Kennan and President John Kennedy of his neutrality. He sent a letter to President Kennedy expressing Yugoslav determination to stay aside from the blocs and, moreover, to improve deteriorated relations with the United States.⁴⁵ In May 1963,

⁴³ "Information on Japan's Participation in the Asian-African Conference," 1955, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 207-00085-24. Obtained by Amitav Acharya and translated by Yang Shanhou. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114719>

⁴⁴ Dragan Bogetic, "From Disputes to Cooperation: Tribulations of Normalization Yugoslav-American Relations during 1963," *Istorija 20. Veka* 27, no. 2 (2009): 116–17.

⁴⁵ FRUS, 1961–1963 Volume XVI, Eastern Europe, doc. 156. *Memorandum of Conversation., Letter from President Tito to President Kennedy, Belgrade, April 7, 1963*; MIJ, KPR, I-1/1098.

United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk paid an official visit to Yugoslavia, and later the same year in October, Tito visited Kennedy. He spent ten days in what was called an “unofficial visit,” even though he got the “21 gun red carpet treatment.”⁴⁶

However, the truth is, no matter how good relation between Yugoslavia and the United States were, regarding all the key world issues (Vietnam War 1955-1975, Arab-Israel conflict in 1967) Yugoslav and Soviet’s opinions were aligned. In those events and particularly regarding the critique of the American Vietnam war policy Yugoslavia was a step closer to the Soviet Union and a step further from the United States. There were some issues in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations as well, such as Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, different from the past, disputes with either superpower did not result in isolation of Yugoslavia, but those differences were rather discussed among them.

In the attempt not to disturb the balance of relations and its international position vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union, Yugoslav leadership started carefully and intentionally using terms like “peaceful coexistence” and “indivisibility of peace” and to conduct politics of equidistance towards aggressions and conflicts, no matter who had the right to do so.⁴⁷ Yugoslavia finally found the perfect balance between the blocs at the beginning of the 1970s Yugoslavia. The decisive Lusaka Conference in 1970 defined position and scope of activity for the Non-aligned

Poruka Predsednika FNRJ Josipa Broza Tita, Predsedniku SAD Džonu Kenediju, u vezi sa odnosima i saradnjom između Jugoslavije i SAD/ A note from the president of FNRJ Josip Broz Tito to the president John Kennedy regarding relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and US, as in Bogetic, “From Disputes to Cooperation: Tribulations of Normalization Yugoslav-American Relations during 1963,” (2009), 125.

⁴⁶ Bogetic, “From Disputes to Cooperation: Tribulations of Normalization Yugoslav-American Relations during 1963,” 118.

⁴⁷ Dragan Bogetic, “Jugoslovensko-Američki Odnosi U Svetlu Vojne Intervencije U Čehoslovačkoj 1968 (Yugoslav-American Relations in the Light of Military Intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968),” *Istorija 20. Veka* 25, no. 2 (2007): 85.

Movement. It brought more respect from the Soviet Union to the Movement, since at the end of the day, they both had anti-imperialistic aspirations.

Yugoslav-American relations also improved. At the end of the 1960s and beginning of 1970s, during the term of Richard Nixon, Yugoslavia kept receiving American attention and support. According to statements of the United States President Nixon, it was in the United States' interest that Yugoslavia maintains its independence and that the United States would work to support that. An agreement with Yugoslav non-aligned foreign policy was also underlined.⁴⁸ After a few high-level meetings (visit of the United States Under Secretary of State Nicolas Katzenbach to Yugoslavia in 1968; meeting between the United States State Secretary Dusk Rhino and Yugoslav ambassador to the United States Bogdan Crnobrnja in 1968; meeting between the United States President Nixon's chief political advisor Henry Kissinger and Vice-President of Yugoslavia Koca Popovic in 1969; economic relations related visit of Yugoslav President of the Government Kiro Gligorov to Washington in 1969; meeting between Tito and the United States State Secretary William Rodgers in 1970), economic cooperation and trade exchange increased.⁴⁹

Developing countries of the Non-aligned Movement shared the same foreign policy principles of not belonging to any bloc (military or ideological), nurturing equal relations between all nations, and peaceful coexistence in resolving issues.⁵⁰ For Yugoslavia, belonging to the Non-aligned Movement served many purposes. Once Third World countries gathered together with the same goals, they voted in the United

⁴⁸ AY, 507, ACK SKJ, IX, 109/V-71, 29.05.1969, Information regarding the US attitude toward Yugoslavia in the matter of military intervention of Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia, according to official statements of the US president., as in Tripkovic, "Vracanje Balansa U Politici Jugoslavije Prema Supersilama Krajem 60-Tih Godina 20. Veka (Bringing Back the Balance to the Yugoslav Policy toward Superpowers in Late 1960s)," 81.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 81–82.

⁵⁰ Rubinstein, 80.

Nations, mutually supporting each other. Therefore, Yugoslavia gained support for pushing its agendas at international organizations. Also, this framework provided Yugoslavia with a solid background when facing pressure from the blocks, giving it more bargaining power vis-à-vis the East and West blocs. The Non-aligned Movement created a possibility for Yugoslav politics of not being economically dependent from any bloc.

Yugoslavia, which was the greatest Soviet ally in the aftermath of World War II, soon became the only communist country in Eastern Europe to be outside the Eastern bloc. Since the first half of the 1950s, Yugoslavia maintained good relations with the Western bloc and the United States in particular. However, while Yugoslavia became a Western ally, its political system and ideology remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism.

After Stalin's death, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union reconciled, although Yugoslavia remained to be outside of the Soviet influence. Starting from 1961, Yugoslavia became co-founder and Tito a leader of NAM, the third group (but not bloc) in the Cold War environment. Through the NAM, Yugoslavia gained more relative power in the international relations vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 4: Japan in the Cold War

After a devastating defeat at the end of the World War II in 1945, Japan's economy and military power were destroyed, its territory was occupied, and it had little choice but to ally with the United States. What started as forced occupation and alliance, changed swiftly under the new plan for restoration of Japan created by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-7, 1949-55). His plan became later known as Yoshida doctrine in which, based on the internal and external circumstances, Yoshida formed a tactical plan to utilize American military shield in order for Japan to rebuild its economy. The three main points of the doctrine were: 1) economic rehabilitation of the country as a major national goal, 2) Japan should avoid involvement in international conflicts and in that regard should be only lightly armed, and 3) as a guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the United States military.¹

Due to the outburst of the Cold War in Europe in 1947, and in the events of the establishment of the People's Republic of China under communist rule in 1949, and the outbreak of the hot war on the Korean Peninsula in 1950, the United States changed original plans for Japan's future and designed Japan as a bastion against Communism in Asia. In exchange for allowing the American military to remain on its soil and technical support for the American troops in its containment strategy, she gained open access to the American market and full military protection. Therefore,

¹ Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2007), 233–38.

Japan gained an opportunity to rebuild its economy at a faster pace than previously expected. Prime Minister Yoshida set up basic principles for what was to become the core of Japanese foreign policy throughout the Cold War.

According to the first published Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook from 1957, preserving a peace was set as the most important element in Japanese diplomacy. Furthermore, Japanese foreign policy had three pillars: UN-centrism, cooperation with free nations, and adherence to its position as the member from Asia. UN-centrism was related to the fact that the UN was the highest authority in the world order, under which all free nations were cooperating on various issues as well as working on maintaining peace. Moreover, it was the system where all countries were recognized as equals and treated each other as such. Japan relied on this system. Cooperation with free nations was based on United Nations principles. Japan pursued diplomatic relations with all free countries in the world which respected these principles. Moreover, third pillar, the Asia-centrism, was focused on Japan's geographical and historical ties with the Asian nations and according to that aimed at cooperation with that community. Foremost, the aim was to maintain peace in Asia by developing friendly relations among the countries in the region.²

Japan reentered the world community only on April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was ratified, and Japan regained its sovereignty. The Treaty was signed by 48 countries in San Francisco eight months earlier, on September 8, 1951.

² MOFAJ, "Gaikō seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957," 1957, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1957/s32-contents.htm>. (accessed 2015-04-07)

4.1 Regaining Sovereignty, Peace Agreements and Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

On September 4, 1951, delegates from fifty-one countries gathered at the San Francisco Opera House to discuss the peace treaty with Japan. Four days later, the Treaty was signed by forty-eight countries (plus Japan). It represented the end of hostilities between the signatories, provided for the termination of the six-years-long occupation of Japan, and specified the details of the settlement of war-related issues.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was not only a peace treaty but rather a document which established the military and economic basis for the American foreign policy interests in Asia. As the United States were the sole occupation body in Japan (different from the German case), they were the only creator of the peace treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan. Therefore, the United States created it according to their needs and foreign policy goals. The SFPT was a platform based on which Japan became an American military ally as a response to the rising powers of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.³ Though the content of the treaty had been prepared for years during the occupation, Japan had little say in it.

As said previously, forty-eight countries signed were signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. On that list, there were only twelve countries that actually encountered Japan during the war, meaning that most of the signatories had nothing to do with Japan during the war. On the other hand, some countries fought with Japan during the war and were not the signatories of the treaty. The reasons were various.

³ Akira Iriye, *The Cold War in Asia; a Historical Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 182.

Though they participated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference, the Soviet Union and its satellites (Czechoslovakia and Poland) refused to sign it. Some countries refused to attend the conference or did not show up for some other reasons (Burma, India, Yugoslavia). Some of Japan's immediate neighbors were not even invited (the People's Republic of China, Republic of China, Republic of Korea, DPRK).

Among other reasons for not inviting either of the Chinese states, one is that the United States and Great Britain could not agree upon which one to invite and neither accepted the other's suggestion. Moreover, as a compromise, they invited neither. Also, it was quite apparent that the People's Republic of China was against the treaty draft, similar to the Soviet Union, and was harshly speaking against it. Therefore, it does not seem logical to invite the country which was already against it.

Since the United States did not recognize the People's Republic of China, but the ROC as the only Chinese state, Japan also signed separate peace treaty (Treaty of Taipei) with the ROC on April 28, 1952. Furthermore, Japan signed the Treaty on Basic Relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) as late as on June 22, 1965, which represented formal reestablishment of the bilateral diplomatic relations. The peace treaty itself was never concluded between the two countries.

From the beginning of the conference, the Soviet Union expressed vigorous opposition to the treaty draft. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Andrei Gromyko stated that the treaty had not been provided resolution to many issues and harmed Soviet and the People's Republic of China's territorial rights. According to him, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union's sovereignty was harmed by ambiguity on the territorial issues (Taiwan, Pescadores, the Parcels and "other islands" to the People's Republic of China and Southern Sakhalin and the

islands adjacent to it, as well as the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union). Furthermore, the treaty neither provided compensation to the countries that suffered from Japanese militarism nor assurances that Japan would democratize and not to remilitarize.⁴ As a consequence of disagreements over the treaty, the Soviet Union and communist satellites, Czechoslovakia and Poland, did not sign the SFPT.

Some countries, such as Indonesia and Philippines signed the treaty but did not ratify it 1958 and 1956 respectively. Both countries were more interested in settling the war reparations with Japan and thus preconditioned them to the peace treaty.⁵ Only when they had got satisfied with the war reparations Japan agreed to, a peace treaty and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Japan became possible.

A situation with the countries who were signatories to the SFPT did not ratify it until they negotiated reparations deals with Japan imposes a question of the significance of the treaty. Undoubtedly, it had significance for the United States which created the text of the treaty according to their interests. It was also significant for Japan as Japan after the conference again became a sovereign state. However, the vast majority of the countries participated in the conference did not encounter Japan during the war and therefore did not have a real reason to care about the treaty. It appears that they were invited to the conference for the sake of the appearance of the conference. We can conclude that some countries with no interests regarding Japan and its peace what so ever participated in the conference.

⁴ *Nihon gaikō bunsho, heiwa jōyaku no teiketsu ni kansuru chōsho dai 3-satsu* (Japanese Diplomatic Documents, Working papers on the conclusion of a peace treaty Vol.III (Collection of Official Foreign Statements on Japanese Peace Treaty (Tokyo, 1951), Vol. II, 60.)

⁵ *Nihon gaikō bunsho Sanfuranshisuko heiwa jōyaku chōin hakkō* (Japanese Diplomatic Documents, San Francisco Peace Treaty – Signing and Coming into Effect), (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 2009) 115-136.

Aside from the obvious significance for Japan, the treaty caused, or at least did not resolve, many issues. It left Japan to deal with countries which requested war reparations by their own conditions (like Indonesia and Philippines). Moreover, it left Japan with unresolved issues with immediate neighbors and with countries that had the most hatred against Japan after the war. Also, it left Japan bewildered about what to do and how to handle reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the new phenomena in international relations – communist countries.

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One of the consequences of having the peace conference without many countries approving it, was that Japan's relations with some countries developed at a slow pace. As he was balancing between Japanese national goals and American pressure, Prime Minister Yoshida often had conflicting statements. That is how at one article he wrote, he said: "Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers."⁶ However, only after Yoshida was replaced with the new Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama (1954-6) Japan and the Soviet Union signed Joint Declaration (1956). Hatoyama attempted to distance himself from Yoshida's policy line by pursuing a more independent foreign policy. Hatoyama saw an improvement of relations with communist countries as a way to

⁶ Shigeru Yoshida, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, 1951, 179.

break dependence on the United States. Also, during the term of Nobusuke Kishi⁷ Japan signed Trade and Maritime Agreements with all Eastern European communist countries.

Hatoyama introduced “a two-headed” foreign policy. He was pursuing the Japanese interests regardless (and usually going against) the American interests, while he was using his Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu, who was pro-American, to clear the misunderstanding with the Americans. Hatoyama apparently even said that “Japan will not dance to the music from the Washington or Moscow” at the press conference on Jun 6th, 1956.⁸

When Hatoyama set reaching a peace agreement with the Soviet Union as his goal, Yugoslav diplomats particularly favored the momentum of the United States lack of power to put a veto on that. As stated in the report regarding the situation in Japan in 1955, the United States though was against this momentum, could not push much to stop it due to the fear that that would push Japan straight to the Soviet hands. Moreover, if Japan and the Soviet Union would make a deal to exchange disputed territories and islands, that could cause Japan to demand the return of Okinawa and other Japanese islands which were under American command.⁹

Since the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland refused to sign the SFPT, Yugoslavia became the first communist country to terminate the state of war and reestablish the diplomatic relations with Japan, in 1952. The Joint Declaration between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed in 1956, after which the agreements with satellites followed. Though with this declaration two countries did not

⁷ Nobusuke Kishi (1896-1987) was the Japanese Prime Minister from 1957 to 1960.

⁸ MOFARS DA, 1956, F41F41S414654, Izvestaj o Japanu (Report on Japan) by YMOFA, 1956.

⁹ AY, Arhiv Predsednika Republike KPR I-5-b - 46-1, Situacija u Japanu (Situation in Japan) 1955.

conclude peace, they agreed upon putting efforts to reach that goal. A peace treaty was not signed until this day and remains a point of friction.

4.2 Allies, International Organizations and Japan's Place in the World

Japan had a very significant position for the United States geostrategic goals in Asia. Due to Japan's geographical position, it was a strategically good place for keeping an eye on North-East Asia, so as for protecting the United States from potential threat coming from that area (as it happened during the Pearl Harbor attack). Americans directed the occupation regarding those goals, setting Japan to be a foothold for American military forces in East Asia, from where the United States could easily control the situation in their Asia-Pacific area of interest. The 1949 communist revolution in China and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 confirmed the importance of fully incorporating and retaining Japan as the key East Asian member of the Western, democratic camp.¹⁰

The signing of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the simultaneous signing of the United States-Japan Security Treaty brought Japan very firmly into alignment with the capitalist world. Nonetheless, the Japanese government in the early 1950s was keen to avoid being integrated into the United States alliance system in East Asia in terms of military cooperation and displayed caution in subsequent talks with the United States on rearmament.¹¹

As previously mentioned, by signing the security treaty with the United States in 1951 Japan has secured its country's safety. Although by the end of the Allied

¹⁰ Makoto Iokibe, ed., *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia 49 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2008), 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 4.

Occupation this became an only solid option for Japan to provide security to its people, Japanese officials had considered one another option as well.

After what were decades of disappointment in the international institutions, as soon as World War II had ended and Japan accepted its defeat, Japanese officials decided to grant a second chance to a newly established international institution – the United Nations. Many Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Yoshida, were considering an option of relying on the UN regarding Japan's security. However, this option soon proved to be more idealistic than realistic.¹²

Whereas dismantling the Japanese war machinery was the main goal of the Allied Powers in the early years after Japan's surrender, rearming Japan was now seen as a key to the United States containment policy in Asia. Under the security treaty, the United States would provide physical security for Japan; in return, Japan would allow the United States troops to be stationed in Japan for an indefinite period and to make use of military bases in Japan in times of military conflicts in the region. By signing the security treaty, Washington hoped to use Japan as a strategic foothold to contain the spread of international communism in the wake of the Korean War. Washington also hoped that Japan could rebuild its military in some fashion so as to be able to defend its homeland and to allow the United States to divert its manpower from Japan to the Korean battlefield. However, the United States demand was rejected by the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who was mainly concerned with post-war economic reconstruction in Japan. However, Tokyo made a compromise to strengthen the Japanese National Police Reserve and to change it into the National Safety Force.

¹² Liang Pan, *The United Nations in Japan's Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992: National Security, Party Politics, and International Status*, Harvard East Asian Monographs 257 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center : distributed by Harvard University Press, 2005), 15–33.

Moreover, the United States government also urged Japan to support the United States anticommunist strategy by promoting economic development in Southeast Asian countries through foreign trade.

As previously seen, not all countries recognized Japan's peace treaty nor reestablished diplomatic relations with her. By the time of the San Francisco Peace Conference, the world was already deeply into the Cold War confrontation, divided between East and West. Japan's belonging to the West was not decided there and then, in San Francisco. It was decided long before that. It was already decided at the very beginning of the occupation.

Although during the occupation period Japan had no sovereignty and formally no diplomatic relations, this was the period when the basis for Japanese foreign policy was created. The occupation, who conducted it, the way it was conducted, and the period in history when it occurred made a deep footprint at the core of Japan's postwar foreign policy.

Different from the occupation of Germany, which was divided between four countries (France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union), the United States was the sole occupying force of Japan after Japan's surrender. She planned the occupation long before the end of the war. This way of thinking, in advance, was in line with the American planning the post-war order in general. One of its first landmarks was when American President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, on August 14th, 1941, a few months before the United States entered the war.

Japan signed the "unconditional surrender" on August 14th 1945. However, again different from the German case, it was the "unconditional surrender" with some modifications. Namely, not Japanese people, but Japanese army was the one that was

blamed for the war and thus the army was the one that surrendered. Also, the Emperor remained in power.¹³ Keeping the Emperor was a strategic decision, the factor that provided peaceful surrender of all Japanese people, later bureaucrats' cooperation, etc. That is how Americans did not encounter any resistance when entered on Japanese soil and initiated occupational reforms.¹⁴

The occupation itself was organized beforehand as thoroughly as possible. The occupation was to make sure that Japan never again pursues militarism. In that line, the United States implemented an occupation plan which would democratize Japan, setting the two main goals: demilitarization and democratization. Thorough political, economic and social reforms were conducted with these goals. As a crown of the reforms conducted Japanese people got a new constitution, promulgated on November 3rd, 1946 and approved on April 28th, 1947.

With this constitution, the Emperor, though remained in power, became a symbol of the Japanese people, and the formal ruler of Japan became the Government with Prime Minister as a head of the state. With its famous Article 9, Japan renounced war, the Imperial Army and Navy were abolished, and veterans were demobilized. In this manner, goals of restoration of Japan's economy in order to make it a stable democratic country were set.

Originally, military armaments and equipment were destroyed, and the manufacture of weaponry was banned. However, due to the escalating tensions between the superpowers, a course of the occupation so as its goals changed. Japan restored its military industry, and moreover, its military capabilities. With the 1949

¹³ Makoto Iokibe, "American Policy Towards Japan's 'Unconditional Surrender,'" *The Japanese Joournal of American Studies*, no. No 1 (1981): 52–53.

¹⁴ Makoto Iokibe and Robert D. Eldridge, eds., *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011), 21.

communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the June 1950 outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula, the United States changed the course of the occupation. Japan was ordered to restore its military industry for the needs of the Korean War and – to form a military again. Also, the negotiations for the peace treaty and restoring Japan’s sovereignty speeded up.

Although Japan had already been a strategically valuable ally of the United States in East Asia since the beginning of the occupation, the Korean War increased its value even more. With the emerging Cold War, it became evident that the United States needed a foothold in East Asia in order to conduct the “containment policy” against the Soviet Union. Japan was well, and the United States army was already stationed there. Therefore, Japan quickly needed to restore its sovereignty, to become a stable democracy and to provide support for the American Cold War policies in Asia. In July 1950, General McArthur asked from Japan to put 75000-man under arms when the Korean War broke. Prime Minister Yoshida was reluctant to give in to these demands. In his opinion, it would be difficult to rearm Japan due to the several reasons: public opinion of Japanese people who went through war devastations; a burden for Japan’s economy; and fears of renewed militarism. However, Japan formed the National Security Force (NSF) in August 1952 was formed. Later on, in May 1954, NSF became the Self-Defense Force (SDF). By the mid-1950s, Japan had emerged as a key American military ally in East Asia. With the help of the United States military aid through the Mutual Security Assistance program, Japan started developing a modern military force.¹⁵

¹⁵ Iokibe, *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s*, 34–35; Makoto Iokibe and Robert D. Eldridge, eds., *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011), 50–51.

Shidehara, who served as a Foreign Minister for five cabinets in the 1920s and was known for his anti-militaristic policies and peaceful cooperation with Asian neighbors, was chosen to be a Prime Minister. However, Japan did not fully restore its military capabilities, nor its SDF forces set foot on foreign territory during the Cold War. Rather, Japan's security was provided by the United States by terms of the Japan-United States Security Treaty. The treaty was concluded the same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, on September 8, 1951. While the original Security Treaty was not guarantying that the United States would defend Japan in the case of attack, the sole presence of the United States military on Japanese soil was enough to prevent any enemy from attacking Japan.¹⁶

Meanwhile, National Security Council of United States created an assessment of Japan's value to the United States at the time ("United States Policy towards Japan" (NSC 6008/1), June 11, 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, XVIII). Since the Cold War and Soviet-American confrontation was still very much alive, the value of Japan also remained as it was at the beginning of the Cold War. It was considered to have more and more impact on the region, and that it is in the United States interests to keep that growing industrial power within the Western bloc, or otherwise the Soviet Union might use it for its interests. Though it would not be likely for Japan to become a military power or factor of security in the region or world, it had a significant logistics value for the United States and would have the same for the Soviet Union in the case it decided to switch sides. As a matter of fact, the renewal of the Security Treaty which bent towards Kishi's requests was a compromise in order to keep Japan as an ally and prevent its potentially harmful interests (such as closer economic cooperation

¹⁶ Iokibe and Eldridge, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*, 2011, 31–33;54.

with the China and the Soviet Union) from happening. It served alongside with further expansion of trade volume.¹⁷

Revision of United States-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 was followed by many opposition and difficulties to accomplish it. Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke during the negotiations for the renewal aimed at gaining equal position vis-à-vis the United States. That meant that Japan would gain more responsibilities as well, and this encountered many obstacles. Japanese public on a domestic level and the Soviet Union on the external level were the loudest opponents of the renewal. Peace-prone Japanese public was afraid of possible rearmament and involvement in the war. Various movements, trade unions, activists, intellectuals under the People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty joined¹⁸ in what are the most massive protests Japan has ever seen. However, the security treaty got its renewal on January 19, 1960.

The renewal of the Security Treaty in 1960 displeased the Soviet Union as well. Though the Soviet Union reacted harshly to this (the Soviet Union conditioned Japan that all foreign bases must be returned before they return any of the disputed islands back to Japan), in the following year, the Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan came on an official visit to Japan and from then on, the bilateral relations took the turn for the better. At the time, the Sino-Soviet dispute was escalating, and this stirred the Soviets to try to improve relations with Japan.¹⁹

¹⁷ “Document 175 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian,” accessed January 15, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v18/d175#fn-source>.

¹⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. 3, 3, (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 160–61.

¹⁹ Hisanari Yamada, “The Multipolarization of the Communist World and Japan,” in *Japan in Current World Affairs* (The Japan Times, Ltd., 1971), 64.

Peace Treaty and moreover Security Treaty provided Japan with American assistance in economy and security matters. Both, economically strong and security-wise safe and stable Japan served American interests as much as Japanese ones. Because of its own interests, the United States made its goal to help the development of Japanese economy in order to create a solid, strong country which would not fall over into communist camp and moreover would serve as an ally in the fight against the communism. The United States supported Japan to enter into international economic institutions and, perhaps more important – opened its market for Japanese exports. Japan became world's third-largest economy in 1968 (after the United States and the Soviet Union), only 13 years after starting its recovery.

As a part of the process of Japan's reentering onto the World scene, Japan gradually was accepted into the international institutions - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1952, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955, UN in 1956 and OECD in 1964. Acceptance into all of these institutions was supported by the United States. The acceptance into the UN was prolonged and made difficult due to the Soviet opposition. Only when Japan and the Soviet Union decided to initiate rapprochement and signed a joint declaration, Japan got the Soviet approval.

As a function of the alliance, the United States provided Japan with access to the Western markets.²⁰ Moreover, during the occupation period, Japan's economy got a boost by making procurements for United States military in the Korean War.

Realizing that she could grow stronger only through economic recovery and development, Japan set economic development as one of the three main goals of its foreign policy.²¹ The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 coincided with this

²⁰ Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 99.

²¹ MOFAJ, "Gaikō seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957."

Japanese goal. Procurements for the United States needs in Korean War boosted Japanese economy sooner than expected. Also, Korean War pointed out the geostrategic significance of Japan for the United States interests in Asia.

The most important diplomatic relations for Japan always was the South East Asian region, where she belonged. Soon after regaining its independence, Japan set improving relations with the countries of the region as one of the highest priorities. Although in a very bad economic state at the time, the South East Asian countries were geographically-wise natural trading partners to Japan. Economically, it was an opportunity to enter into those markets. Politically, it was a chance for Japan to rebuild herself as a regional power, surrounded by those countries. Diplomatic Bluebook 1957 describes South East Asian peoples as racially, culturally similar to the Japanese, peoples who share a “strong psychological ties” with Japan.²²

Later on, in the 1960s, Japan committed further to the development of the countries from the region, initiated multilateral meetings with this goal (for example the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia in 1966, increased involvement in Asian Bank, etc.).

4.3 Between Pragmatism and Idealism – Japan’s National Interest

Japan saw the Cold War environment as superficially calm, with the potential of escalating into full war at any time. Although by the nature conflicts between blocs were indirect, hot wars were happening (Korean War, Indochina’s civil war, Soviet’s interventions into the Eastern European countries’ domestic issues, etc. Japanese government described the international situation with a term “unstable peace.”²³ Officially Japan presented herself as a “peace-loving nation,” a country that

²² *Ibid.* Wagakuni gaikō no kichō.

²³ *Ibid.* Kokusai jōsei no suii.

denounced war and as a country that seeks friendly diplomatic relations with all peace-loving countries in the world. Unofficially and seldom even officially Japan presented herself as a neutral country while supporting the endeavors of the United States in the fight against the communism. In many YMOFA archival documents, there are statements from various Japanese officials, recorded during unofficial conversations as well as during official meetings, expressing Japan's desire to achieve neutrality in foreign policy.

The main backing for the ideology of neutrality lied within Japanese intellectual elite. Gathered around the magazine *Sekai (The World)* promoted neutralism and antimilitaristic policies as what should be the core of Japanese foreign policy. These ideas were also supported by Japanese Socialist Party and, according to an opinion poll of 1958, 68 percent of Diet members, including a majority 52 percent of LDP members, agreed that Japan should chart a neutral course between the United States and the Soviet Union, as far was possible.²⁴

The neutral politics, which insisted that Japan pursue unarmed neutrality, relying on the United Nations for defense, and resist all pressures to participate in collective security arrangements, had been developed in the 1950s by Maruyama Masao and the other scholars in the "Peace Problems Symposium" (*Heiwa Monday Danwakai*), and had found adherents from across political spectrum.²⁵ Also, during many official as well as unofficial meetings between the representatives of Yugoslavia and Japan, the ideology of neutrality came up frequently.

Americans themselves feared that Japan is going toward more independent foreign policy. However, they were not afraid of Japan going neutral as much as

²⁴ Yamagiwa Joseph, "Literature and Politics in the Japanese Magazine, Sekai," *Pacific Affairs* 28, no. 3 (1955): 268.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

going, communist. Moreover, they feared that Japan after regaining its sovereignty might exploit United States-Soviet confrontation in order to gain leverage in its bilateral relationship with the United States.²⁶

Fear from Japan falling into communist bloc provoked some the United States government actions towards preventing the conclusion of the peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. According to intelligence documents from the Yugoslav embassies in Moscow and Tokyo, the Americans were working on both sides implanting distrust between Japan and the Soviet Union. Namely, they were warning the Soviets not to trust Japan since she might restore its imperialistic aspirations and take back not only the disputed islands but go even further.²⁷ At the same time, the United States was advising Japan not to trust too much in Soviet promises regarding the possibility of returning the islands.²⁸

However, final American position regarding improving Japanese-Soviet relations was to accept it, as long as Japan stops there and do not go further to improve relations with PRC. After all the United States had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and therefore their opposition for Japan to achieve the same would be fruitless.²⁹

Looking from the Japanese perspective, concluding peace and reestablishment of the relations with the Soviet Union as well as with other countries which were not

²⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. China and Japan (in two parts): Volume XIV, Part 2, Document 588, 1302-4, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p2/d588> (accessed 03.09.2015.)

²⁷ MOFARS DA, 1955 Japan, F31 D16 S 413606, 01/10/1955

²⁸ *Ibid.*; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1, Document 18, Page 29, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/d18> (accessed 03.09.2015.)

²⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1 › Document 8 (Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan, Washington, January 26, 1955), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/ch1?start=91> (accessed 03.09.2015.)

signatories to the peace treaty, was a practical and realistic move towards complete restoration of Japan in the world. Moreover, behind the wish of reestablishing the relations with the Soviet Union lied economic interests. In the end, the Hatoyama administration was working on improving relations with communist countries, while still cherishing the alliance with the United States.

4.3.1 Economic Interests

With Japan's security tied down to the United States interests in East and North-East Asia, Japan was safe and free to focus on what its leaders really longed for- economic recovery. United States-Japan policy changed in 1947 due to the change in United States-Soviet relations. Therefore, the external factor influenced and dictated Japan's future. Instead of establishing non-military, democratic, stable country of Japan, the United States policies changed according its needs and Japan needed to be established as an economically strong democratic country in order to provide foothold and support in the fight against the communism in Asia.

But, before the Korean War, among other factors, there were two essential historical factors for the future of Japan. First, after more than fifty years of expansionistic policies and conquests in South-East Asia, Japanese people came to an end of their strength to put up with all that. In addition to Pacific War and WWII sacrifices which they had made, the way WWII ended for Japan had a decisive impact on its nation. Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the final drop for Japanese people to surrender and furthermore, to denounce war once for all.

The second factor of great impact on Japan's future was an American occupation. Therefore, the course of Japanese post-WWII foreign policy and correlated diplomacy was rather created under the set of circumstances than ideology

or thoroughly created plan. It was shaped by geopolitical circumstances (not Japan's geopolitical strategy per se, but shaped by the United States geopolitical interests in the Asian region).

By the end of the 1960s, Japan had surpassed several major Western European countries to become the third largest economy in the world, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union. From the end of World War II to 1964, the United States had a trade surplus with Japan. In 1965, Japan's exports to the United States exceeded its imports for the first time.

However, by the end of the 1960's, trade frictions between the United States and Japan escalated as bilateral trade deficits continued to surge, culminating in the explosion of the textile dispute in 1969. Many Japanese businessmen, realizing the risk of overdependence on the United States, began to look for export opportunities elsewhere. In that line, there were create Trade Committees with the communist countries in Eastern Europe.

When at the beginning of the 1970s the United States economy declined and Nixon quit dollar convertibility for gold, and more importantly from the political aspect, Nixon approached communist China. The early 1970s were the introduction to a more fluid international system and a lessening of the Cold War tensions.³⁰ The general easing of the tensions between the East and West created a new environment suitable for cooperation.

This new environment may be caught Japan unprepared, in the regard of rather secretive and fast United States foreign policy changes, but on the other hand aligned with Japan's basic foreign policy of promoting friendly relations with all the countries

³⁰ Glenn D. Hook, ed., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies / Routledge Series (New York: Routledge, 2012), 31.

of the World with similar perceptions and goals. That meant with the socialist countries as well, since “they live in the same international society although their political, economic and social systems are different.”³¹ The goal of this policy was to “make it possible for Japan to have more options and to act more flexibly to promote its national interests.”³²

However, the American foreign policy and the pursuit of its national interests at the beginning of the 1970s had an enormous effect on Japanese foreign policy. The American reconciliation with the People’s Republic of China came so abruptly that it shocked the whole world, but it shocked Japanese the most, leaving them shamed because of their obliviousness.³³

After the First Oil Shock in 1973, Japan initiated “resource diplomacy,” regardless of the United States foreign policy line. Since Japan was heavily dependent from the Middle Eastern Oil, it was only natural to pursue this line of politics in order to survive economically. To many, the Japanese challenge appeared to arise from its mercantilist and free-riding trading policies, which had allegedly eroded the United States economic power and caused bilateral trade friction in the late 1960s and 1970s.³⁴

To add, both Korean and Vietnam War’s greatest impact on Japan was economic. Japanese heavy and petrochemical industries, expanded rapidly as the United States military procured supplies close to the war zones. Also, due to American influence in South-East Asia, Japan became the greatest supplier of

³¹ “Gaikō seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1972,” July 1972, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1971/s46-contents.htm>.

³² *Ibid.* Waga gaikō no kichō/ sho gaikoku to no kankei no zōshin.

³³ Liang Pan, “Whither Japan’s Military Potential? The Nixon Administration’s Stance on Japanese Defense Power,” *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 1 (January 2007): 111.

³⁴ Hook, *Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, 31.

vehicles for those markets as well. Moreover, from the 1970s on, Japan became a major consumer of Southeast Asian, raw materials and a major supplier of finished goods to the region.³⁵

In relations with China and the Soviet Union as well, there were some other factors which hindered stronger and more fruitful relations, as it were the bad memories from the Pacific war. Those bad memories did not exist in the case of (re)connecting with other communist countries of Europe. With China and the Soviet Union-Japan shares hostile past and in recent years after World War II it was only natural that reconnecting and establishing of diplomatic relations would have to overcome some hurdles. Nevertheless, with Eastern European countries, this was not the case. The only hurdles that existed were ideological differences and incompatible economic systems.

4.4 Diplomatic Relations with Communist Countries

On the verge of Japan to regain its sovereignty, at the beginning of 1952, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru stated that "Japan cannot keep company with communist countries, but that Japan would welcome friendly relations with any nations."³⁶ Though he was most probably aiming at the opening of the diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, which was unwanted from the diplomatic perspective at the time, the truth is that Japan did not establish diplomatic relations with any communist country except Yugoslavia during Yoshida's term.

³⁵ Leffler, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. 3, 3, 169.

³⁶ New York Times, January 9, 1952

During the final three years of Yoshida's term, Japan already started to ease export restrictions and travel regulations towards the People's Republic of China.³⁷

Hatoyama worked not only on rebuilding relations with neighboring countries but also sought to reduce what he perceived as Japan's over-dependence on the United States. During his term, Japan even started working on establishing diplomatic relations with the countries of the Eastern Europe.³⁸ Hatoyama wished to pursue a foreign policy which was more realistic in terms of cooperation with the communist countries. He actively worked in the improvement of relations with foremost the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. And while during his term Japan signed Joint Declaration with the Soviet Union, followed with the trade agreement, his efforts towards the People's Republic of China were not so successful. Furthermore, under his leadership, Japan reestablished diplomatic as well as trade relations with all communist countries in Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Kishi continued deepening cooperation with communist countries by finalizing already started processes of concluding trade and maritime agreements with all Eastern European communist countries.

And while the *seikei bunri* policy (policy of separation of the trade from politics) is an applicable explanation to Japan's relations with bigger countries, resources rich countries, such as the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union,³⁹ in the case of Yugoslavia it is a little bit different. Yugoslavia was neither resourced rich, nor the politics were strictly detached from the economy.

³⁷ Shao Chuan Leng, *Japan and Communist China* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1958), 13.

³⁸ Hugh Borton, ed., *Japan between East and West* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1976), 71–72.

³⁹ See more about this topic: Stephen Nagy, "Balancing Trade and Security Relationships in the Asia Pacific: The Advent of a Trilateral Seikei Bunri Relationship between Japan, China, and the U.S.," *Journal of Asian Politics & History*, Forthcoming, 2015, 5–24.

4.4.1 Japan-Soviet Union Relations

The Soviets' delegation's behavior and firm opposing attitude at the San Francisco Conference left Japan and the Soviet Union without the conclusion of the peace treaty. Moreover, Japan's membership application to the United Nations kept being vetoed by the Soviet Union until their bilateral relationship normalized.

The Soviet Union started expressing wishes to reestablish diplomatic relations with Japan in 1953; the negotiations started in 1955, and the Joint Declaration, by which the bilateral relations were restored, was signed on October 19, 1956. The issues related to territorial disputes prolonged the signing of the formal peace treaty. While the negotiations were prolonging, according to the information from the Yugoslav Intelligence service, Americans tried to influence both sides not to reach the agreement. Namely, they manipulated on both sides by saying how the other side has ulterior motives and such.⁴⁰ However, the Soviet Union and Japan decided to leave the territorial disputes aside for the time being and signed the declaration and a trade protocol, accompanied by the earlier signed Fishery Agreement in May same year.

Since the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland refused to sign the SFPT, Yugoslavia became the first communist country to reestablish the diplomatic relations with Japan, in 1952. Later on October 19, 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan signed Joint Declaration, after which similar agreements with Soviet satellites followed. Though with this declaration two countries did not conclude peace, they agreed upon putting efforts to reach that goal. Although the Declaration provided the end of the state of war and enabled restoration of diplomatic relations, a peace treaty was not signed until this day and remains a point of friction. However, the joint declaration

⁴⁰ MOFARS, Note on American Policy.

was accompanied by a trade protocol that granted reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and provided for the development of trade. As a matter of fact, Japan and the Soviet Union conducted trade regardless of their diplomatic regarding the territorial claims.

The first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mikoyan, paid a visit to Japan in August 1961. The occasion was the opening of Soviet trade and industrial exhibition in Tokyo. This visit and the event itself appear to be important in Soviet's efforts to bring Soviet-Japanese relations closer, as it is stated so in Khrushchev's letter to Prime Minister Ikeda.⁴¹ This and other Soviet efforts towards building stronger relations with Japan as a background have Sino-Soviet split. The split started in 1960, and it was only deepening more and more. During that course of events, Soviet Union was rethinking its strict policy towards Japan and started to move in other direction regarding it. In 1963 the trade agreement signed in 1958 was extended for an indefinite time, and Soviet's and Japan's companies expanded business ventures on the Russian Far East and Siberia. It was all accompanied by various cultural exchanges and formation of people's friendship association and establishing of annual ministerial-level consultations (started in 1967). This coincided with Japan's growing economic power and according to growing international profile, as with Japan's new foreign policy course to improve relations with countries other than the United States in order to become more independent from that relationship. However, it was all within the boundaries not to disturb or deteriorate Japanese-American relations.

Coming from the other side of the Sino-Soviet rift, the People's Republic of China was also putting efforts into deepening of good (foremost trade) relations with

⁴¹ International Affairs (Moscow), November 1961, 3-4.

Japan. In November 1962 Japan and the People's Republic of China under the Takasaki-Liao memorandum established trade liaison offices in Beijing and Tokyo and made an agreement on barter trade worth 100 million USD annually. Obviously, Japan benefited from the Sino-Soviet rift and used it to pursue its own agendas. In that regard, Japan started expanding its trade and diplomatic relations further from the two biggest neighbors, to the South East Asia, and even further to Europe. In that line, diplomatic relations and official visits to Yugoslavia intensified, culminating in Tito's visit to Japan in 1968.

We can conclude that despite the ideological differences and disputes remained from the World War II, Japan, and the Soviet Union, both following their own interests, in the 1960s put an effort to deepen diversify their bilateral relations. Surely, all this was enabled by the state of the international environment, the détente and Sino-Soviet rift. If we add the nature of Sino-Japanese unofficial relations undergoing at the time, in spite of their ideological and historical issues, it is logical to conclude that this type of the relationship was realized as acceptable for Japan. Moreover, it became a model for deepening relations with other communist countries.

4.4.2 Japan- People's Republic of China Relations

The last concluded a peace agreement between Japan and one communist country was with the People's Republic of China, which was not reached until August 12, 1978 (the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China). The major obstacle to normalization of Sino- Japanese relations was its alliance with the United States through the United States- Japan Security Treaty. Though the official Japanese Government did not support the restoration of political relations with the People's Republic of China, this attitude was a reflection of

Japan's role as an ally of the United States, given that Japanese Government behind the scenes supported the development of trade relations.⁴² Among the Japanese business circles were established a trade promotion movement as early as the War ended. The movement and its supporters were keen on promoting trade with the People's Republic of China out of the business interest and did not pay much attention to the political constraints this doing might bring. The organizations were more interested in the restoration of trade than in shaping the political direction of Japan's relations with Peking.⁴³

Although, even before Japan restored its sovereignty, formal organizations for the promotion of trade with China started to be organized. Those organizations were supported by a variety of political, business, and intellectual leaders. Naturally, these organizations were more interested in the restoration of trade than in restoration of political relations between Japan with the People's Republic of China. In spite of the hostilities aroused during the Pacific war which inhibited establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries for decades after World War II, considering geographic proximity, historic trade, and cultural relations, looking from Japan's perspective, trade with the People's Republic of China was only logical. Japan set an international trade as the main pillar of its economic recovery and the People's Republic of China was an unavoidable trading partner. Moreover, according to Furukawa, Keidanren's survey from 1949 suggests that a majority of Japanese companies believed that trade with China (China was one, warring country at the time) was a key to Japanese economic recovery.⁴⁴

⁴² Naotaka Matsukata, "Separating Trade and Politics : The Restoration of Japan's China Trade, 1945-1958" (Harvard University, 1996), 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁴ Mantaro Furukawa, *Nicchu sengo kankeishi*, Tokyo : Hara shobo, 1981, 21.

On the People's Republic of China side, as a tool for cooperation with Japan without provoking domestic public as well as international players, the People's Republic of China practice "people's diplomacy." It was a method of cooperation between various subjects from both sides of organizing various unofficial visits and exchanges. On both sides, various structures played this role. On Chinese side those were institutions such as Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, etc.; and on the Japanese side, those were Japan's International Trade Promotion Association, the Japan-China Friendship Association, General Council of Trade Unions and so on.⁴⁵ While in the People's Republic of China those were connected to the government, in Japan they were not. It appears that in Japan developing relations with the People's Republic of China was mainly supported by the business structures, due to their financial interests, and that the government mainly stayed aside. However, during some of these exchanges people from the government participated.⁴⁶

The People's Republic of China's motives behind a wish to reestablish relations with Japan were similar to those of the Soviet Union. As early as in 1954 in Sino-Soviet Communiqué (October 12, 1954) the two countries invited Japan to reestablish relations with them. It was a part of their joint effort to instead implementing hardline policy towards Japan, try a new approach in order to distance Japan from the United States and hopefully remove American troops from Japan's soil.⁴⁷ This line of policy continued throughout various forms of unofficial contacts

⁴⁵ Leng, *Japan and Communist China*, 18–19.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 22–25.

⁴⁷ Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué 1956.

and cultural and economic events until the signing of the peace treaty in 1978.

However, criticism towards Japan and its foreign policy continued.

Although in early post-war period Japan implemented an anti- China policies, at least officially, some of the Government members, like Foreign Minister in the Kishi Government, Fujiyama Aichiro became president of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Restoration of Sino- Japanese Diplomatic Relations.⁴⁸

4.4.3 Relations with Eastern European Countries

Although the relations with Eastern European countries were not a high priority for Japan's foreign relations, Japan did, however, pursue them. That implies that there was some significance in this region for Japan during the Cold War since Japan invested an effort into developing relations with the countries of this region in spite of all differences.

Bulgaria and Japan maintained fairly intense economic, scientific, technological, educational, and cultural exchange during the Cold War. Starting in 1959, when the two countries concluded peace and established diplomatic relations, Japan cautiously but constantly supported the development of the relations, all requests which were coming from Bulgaria, which wished to pursue Japanese model of economic development. The Bulgarians were very much impressed and influenced by Japan's industrial, scientific, and technological policy.⁴⁹

In the mid-1960s Bulgaria signed a contract with one of Japan's biggest electronics companies, Fujitsu Ltd, by which provided a license for the production of

⁴⁸ Mayumi Itoh, *The Origin of Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Forgotten Architect of Sino-U.S. Rapprochement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 24–25;27.

⁴⁹ Kandilarov Evgeny, "Bulgaria and Japan From the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century," 2013, <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/sylff/11996#sthash.2AInyPBo.dpuf>.

electronic devices on its territory. Those devices were later on sold on the Comecon market. Also in the 1960s Japan and Bulgaria initiated the first joint ventures, establishing two joint-venture companies in 1967, which later on in 1971 merged into one trading company, Nichibu Balist.⁵⁰

In 1970 Bulgaria and Japan signed an Agreement on Commerce and Navigation, which was the first of its kind signed with a non-socialist country. According to the agreement, the two countries granted each other MFN treatment. The second stage, a “golden decade,” was a “peak of political and economic activity between the two countries.”⁵¹ This period of the peak in relations between Japan and Bulgaria coincides with a peak in Japan’s relations with all Eastern European countries. This is a period when Japan established most of the mixed trade committees with this region and stepped up its trade relations giving them a slightly political dimension by introducing influential government institutions into the committees.

Such committee between Japan and Bulgaria was established in 1972. Committee were representatives from large Japanese manufacturers, financial institutions, and trading companies. The same year it was established the Bulgaria-Japan Committee for Economic, Science, and Technical Cooperation as well.⁵²

In the mid-1970s the Bulgarian government undertook legislative changes, after which, Japanese companies were able to open their representative offices in Bulgaria, and 10 Japanese companies opened offices in a span of few years. The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) also opened an office in Sofia.⁵³

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

As one of the highest-level visits exchanged between Japan and Bulgaria, was the visit of Japanese Crown Prince Akihito, as the official representatives of Emperor Hirohito, in 1979.⁵⁴

4.4.4 Trade with Communist Countries

Due to the circumstances of the Cold War in South-East Asia, Japan had no chance to distance herself, to even for a moment incline to the East a bit more. But that did not stop its from cooperating with the East, from taking what she needed for its development. While belonging to the West and following the United States lead in foreign relations, Japanese leaders tried to pursue Japan's interests. Therefore, Japanese did not simply gave up and blindly followed instructions, as it is commonly believed,⁵⁵ but rather put effort to work for the best of their country within a given framework (circumstances). Soon after regaining sovereignty, Japan attempted to develop relations with South East Asian countries, to strengthen its position and to earn their markets. Yes, Japan needed the United States help for this goal, since the United States was the one with the money to support this, and yes, the United States and Japan's wishes coincided in this, but the truth is that with or without United States-Japan needs SEA countries. Japan shares culture, history and, regionally-wise, - space with these countries. The region where she belongs represents the most logical are where Japan should conduct trade.

In the pursuit of economic development and conducting the economic diplomacy as one of the three pillars of its diplomacy, Japan first explored

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ For example see: Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," *World Politics* 40, no. 4 (July 1988): 517–41.

opportunities in SE Asian markets. After regaining its independence in 1952, Japan started exploring options for the best way to boost its economic recovery and development. Japan pursued its own interests by exploring trade opportunities with the Southeast Asian countries as the first logical choice, having been the part of the region. Also, Japan explored options of conducting trade with “the other side,” the communist bloc countries and not only the ones in Asia but went even further, to Europe.

Not to be mistaken, there is no region in the world with more importance to Japan and its economy than South East Asia. The United States was the biggest trading and security partner, but SE Asian countries during the Cold War (after the initial few years) were Japan’s second largest export market and source of imports, the second major target of Japanese investment and the main recipient of Tokyo’s economic assistance.⁵⁶ The Eastern European markets can be seen as an alternative to the Southeast Asian markets.

Japan defined herself as a “trading nation”⁵⁷ many times, and this seems to represent the essence, the top policy which is more important than others. According to this policy, good, primarily good trade relations, with any country in the World are essential. While Japan was cooperating with the free-world, at the same time she did its best to promote trade within East-West relations. The main reason is because Japan needs any chance for improving a foreign trade exchange she can get, in order to develop its economy.⁵⁸ The principle was to expand trade relations with any country, no matter the political system.

⁵⁶ MOFAJ, “Gaikō Seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1978,” 1978,
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1978/1978-contents.htm>.

⁵⁷ MOFAJ, “Gaikō seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957.”

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Saikin ni okeru tsūshō bōeki kōshō,/ tai Amerika bōeki oyobi tōzai bōeki no shomondai

Japan restored diplomatic relations with the communist countries by the end of the 1950s since the Soviet Union, and satellite countries did not sign Peace Treaty with Japan in San Francisco in 1951.⁵⁹ Japan and the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty by themselves, different from the group San Francisco Peace Treaty, originating in their common aspirations. The restoration of diplomatic relations and signing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union were considered very significant for Japan's diplomacy.⁶⁰ Two countries signed Protocol for developing MFN treatment agreement, Fishery Agreement and Joint Declaration of the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1956.⁶¹ The following year Japan signed Joint declarations for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland.⁶²

Regarding the Japan- People's Republic of China relations, though the official peace treaty was not signed until 1978, Japan cooperated on private sector levels, as well as conducted trade on a governmental level, based on Japanese *seikei bunri* policy and lower-level trade/cooperation agreements. Since the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, trade relations were conducted behind the scene and within the externally imposed restrictions. Japan regained its right to freely conduct trade before she regained its sovereignty, in 1949 and that is when the trade with the People's Republic of China started. However, due to the People's Republic of China participation in Korean War, and a subsequent international embargo on trade with the People's Republic of China, Japan-PRC trade also halted. After the war

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Wagakuni to kaku chiiki to no ma no shomondai/ Soren oyobi Tōō kankei

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Saikin ni okeru wagakuni gaikō no taiyō

⁶¹ *Ibid.* Shiryō/ Nipponkoku to sovu~ieto shakai shugi kyōwakoku renpō to no kyōdō sengen, bōeki no hatten oyobi saikeikoku taigū no sōgo kyoyo ni kansuru Nisso gitei-sho, hokuseitaiheiyō no kōkai ni okeru gyogyō ni kansuru Nisso jōyaku

⁶² *Ibid.*, Shiryō/ Nipponkoku to pōrando jinmin kyōwakoku to no ma no kokkō kaifuku ni kansuru kyōtei, Nipponkoku to chekkosurovu~akia kyōwakoku to no ma no kokkō kaifuku ni kansuru gitei-sho

was ended, the trade also gradually resumed. The trade exchange was being promoted through the conclusion of private trade agreements. The first such agreement was concluded on June 1, 1951, with the three members of Japanese Diet being the signatories to it.⁶³ Still, since the two governments did not have resumed diplomatic relations, the trade between the People's Republic of China and Japanese companies was going through the British Banks in Hong Kong and Shanghai.⁶⁴

Though in the recent years after the WWII and even after regaining the sovereignty Japan had its trade with China watched by the United States,⁶⁵ Japan had more contacts with China than any other non-communist country. Many prominent governing party politicians visited China many times and promoted stronger ties with China, economically and politically. Also, there were pressures for upgrading relations with China from the Japanese Socialist and Communist parties, businesses and private interest groups.⁶⁶ And all that was happening before the formal normalization of the relations in 1972, and signing the peace treaty in 1978.

In its diplomatic blue books, Japan was expressing to have “formal diplomatic and friendly relations with China.” Also, that is the reality that the CCP controls mainland China, and therefore it cannot be ignored. Furthermore, since Japan reestablished relations with the Soviet Union, which is also a communist country, establishing relations with China would be welcome in the same manner. That is, seeing from the historical, geographical, economic and cultural perspectives, Japan

⁶³ Leng, *Japan and Communist China*, 56–57.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶⁵ Yoko Yasuhara, “Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls in Asia, 1948-52,” *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 1 (January 1986): 75–89.

⁶⁶ J. V. d’Cruz, “Japanese Foreign Policy and the Cold War,” *The Australian Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1965): 39, doi:10.2307/20634066.

should establish and maintain close relations with “Mainland China.” In particular, trade relations are important for both sides and thus should be maintained.⁶⁷

Although the two countries had not established the diplomatic relations yet, they proceeded with semi-official trade relations. That apparently meant that officially Prime Minister Yoshida denounced the People’s Republic of China while in fact the first and second Sino-Japanese private-sector trade agreements were signed while he was the Japanese leader.⁶⁸

Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato⁶⁹ placed the highest priority on Japanese economic recovery and growth through the ambitious “income-doubling plans.” Along with this line, the Ikeda cabinet agreed to resume Sino-Japanese trade relations in 1960.” However, official Japanese (political) foreign policy toward China did not change until Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka⁷⁰ visited China in 1972, after Nixon’s visit to China.⁷¹

Going one step further in its ambiguity, Japan conducted trade during the Vietnam War with both North and South Vietnam, while did not recognize the North. Furthermore, during the Vietnam War Japan supplied the United States with military equipment, and publically showed support. On the other hand, PM Sato stated that Japan does not support bombings of North Vietnam since it is a “peace-loving nation.”⁷² Socialist Party criticized Japanese participation in the Vietnam War,

⁶⁷ MOFAJ, “Gaikō seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957.” Wagakuni to kaku chiiki to no ma no shomondai/ Ajia kankei; in the Diplomatic Bluebook Japanese Government refers to PRC as “Mainland China”

⁶⁸ Itoh, *The Origin of Ping-Pong Diplomacy*, 25–26.

⁶⁹ Hayato Ikeda (1899-1965) was Prime Minister of Japan from 1960 to 1964.

⁷⁰ Kakuei Tanaka (1918-1993) who served as Japanese Prime Minister from 1972 to 1974.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 28- 29

⁷² Mainichi Shinbun, 06/07/1965

underlining the importance of peace-loving nation concept.⁷³ Meanwhile, Japanese public and intellectuals organized anti-Vietnam War protests in downtown Tokyo in 1965.

By the beginning of the 1960s, Japan had signed Commerce and Navigation Agreements with all Eastern European countries, including Yugoslavia who did not belong to the COMECON. By the 1957 Japan had signed fifteen Commerce and Navigation Treaties. Six of those were a continuation, and seven were re-written from the pre-War period, and two are newly created. Though the Treaty with Yugoslavia was re-written based on the pre-War treaty,⁷⁴ it took effect only in 1959, after revision was done. Though Yugoslavia was the first communist country to originally have signed the treaty with Japan, by the time the Treaty took effect, Japan signed treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. To point out, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States was signed in 1953.

The first committee which was established was the Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee in 1965⁷⁵ Members of this committee were representatives from economic institutions and social organizations. As for the economic institutions which were dealing with trade with the Eastern Europe, they were: the Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations) and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Regarding the social organizations which were involved in trade with the Soviet Union, those were the Organization for the Promotion of International Trade of Japan (*Nippon Kokusai Boeki Sokushin-kai*), the Japan-Soviet Union Society (*NISSO*

⁷³ Mainichi Shinbun, 07/05/1965

⁷⁴ MOFAJ, "Gaikō seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957.", Saikin ni okeru tsūshō bōeki kōshō/ tsūshō kōkaijōyaku kankei

⁷⁵ Yataro Terada, "The System of Trade between Japan and the East European Countries, Including the Soviet Union," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, East-West Trade: Part 1, 37, no. 3 (1972): 440.

Kyokai), Organization for the Trade with the Soviet Union and East Europe (*Soren Too Boeki-kai*), and the Japanese-Soviet Trade Association (*NISSO Boeki Kyokai*).⁷⁶

Committees with different countries had a different member's structure. For Poland it was an intra-governmental committee with the advisors from the business sector; with East Germany, it was formed of government officers and business groups' leaders; with Hungary, it was in the form of a round-table with representatives from economic institutions, businesses, and social organizations, etc. The committees with other Eastern European countries were established in 1971 (East Germany, Hungary) and in 1972 (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland and Yugoslavia).⁷⁷

In Japan's relations with the Eastern European communist countries, during the Cold War period, due to the different political ideologies, the main dimension of the bilateral relations were economy and culture. But even regarding the economic dimension with the socialist countries Japan had a negative stand at first. The East-West framework made trade relations difficult. COCOM imposed many restrictions and also, from the socialist side, trade was made difficult due to the different (socialist) system of economy.

Political relations were under the shadow of adverse political ideologies. Also, the usual booster for trade relations upgrade is cultural relations. All Eastern European countries were organizing various cultural exchanges with Japan, with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as leading countries in this area.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 437.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 441.

⁷⁸ “ Dai 10-kai Tōō taishi kaigi (10th East Europe Ambassadorial Meeting in 1969), Saikin no Nisso oyobi Ni~Tsu Tōō shokoku kankei (Latest Status of Japanese-Soviet, and Japanese-Eastern Europe Relations),”, 19–25, MOFAJ DA.

The system of trade between Japan and Eastern European countries was based on the private initiative, that is, in Japan government did not interfere in trade based on the capitalist economic system they had. Therefore, with the trade with the socialist countries, Japan exercised this practice as well. On the other side, in the socialist state's trade was centrally planned and controlled by the governments. Thus, the systems of trade were somehow unbalanced; different institutions were in charge of the trade from both sides. Only in the case of the Soviet Union with whom Japan had signed a trade agreement and Poland with whom Japan had established a mixed committee, the Japanese Government was in charge of the trade relations.

Given the situation of the East-West confrontation and COCOM restrictions on trade between the blocs, it was beneficial for Japan that she had practiced *seikei bunryu* policy and system of the free market trade so that she did not have to implicate complicated political matters into the trade business.

Japan, as an American ally in East Asia, belonged to the free world and the Western bloc, the bloc which fought against the Communism. Therefore, Japan's relations with communist countries, especially at the beginning of the reestablishment in the 1950s, were hardened. However, Japan, in order to achieve its national interests, needed to cooperate with that part of the world as well. In that regard, Japan pursued development of relations with communist countries. While trade relations (mostly trade relations, less political relations) with two greatest communist countries, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, were developing at a good pace, relations with Eastern European communist countries were in general underdeveloped, due to distance and different socio-political-economic systems. As it will be shown in the following chapters, trade relations with Yugoslavia were also

underdeveloped. However, there were other motives behind Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations than economic ones.

Chapter 5: The Reestablishment of Diplomatic and Trade Relations

Japan and Yugoslavia reestablished their diplomatic relations through *notes verbales* exchanged in 1952, soon after Japan regained its sovereignty. By doing so, Yugoslavia became the first communist country that Japan had established diplomatic relations with. Moreover, it was the only one until 1956 when Japan signed a joint declaration with the Soviet Union.

As mentioned, Yugoslavia had not participated in the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951. Although it was invited, Yugoslavia at the moment was heavily preoccupied with serious existential problems, and had not sent the delegation to the Conference. As a consequence, Japan and Yugoslavia had to bilaterally pursue the reestablishment of their diplomatic relationship. Achieving a bilateral diplomatic agreement was not a particular problem, since the two countries, although formal enemies, never directly clashed in the World War II, and thus had not had any war reparations or other war-related issues between them. The two countries reestablished their diplomatic relations by exchanging the *Notes Verbales* between the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Koca Popovic on February 1952.

By the time their diplomatic relations were reestablished, Japan and Yugoslavia found themselves with different political and economic systems and contradictory ideological beliefs. Yugoslavia was a communist country, second only to the Soviet Union by the implementation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. It had a

centrally-planned economic system, which although different from those of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, had a state-controlled economy and was not working on the principles of the free market. Japan, on the other hand, was a democratic state with a free-market economy. The two countries belonged to the opposite sides of the Cold War confrontation — Japan belonged to the Western bloc, which fought to contain communism, and Yugoslavia was a communist country which, although defected from the Eastern bloc, was ideologically closer to the East rather than the West. Therefore, their bilateral relationship was influenced by the Cold War tensions and interests of the superpowers.

However, despite all the differences between them, Japan and Yugoslavia maintained friendly bilateral relations throughout the Cold War. Since the two countries had utterly different economic systems, trade was developing slowly. The diplomatic relations were not very developed throughout the first decade as well.

5.1 The Setting

Though their respective international positions and domestic conditions were not the same, in the aftermath of World War II Japan and Yugoslavia shared some similarities. They were both politically and economically small countries which needed restoration and development. Although they did not have same positions *vis-à-vis* Eastern and Western blocs or superpowers, both of them exerted themselves to understand the balance of power between the blocs in order to survive in a newly established World order. Japan was closer to the United States, but was also trying to improve relations with the Soviet Union, in order to gain relative power in international relations. Yugoslavia, contrarily, was ideologically closer to the Soviet

Union but had strained relations with it, while was maintaining cooperative relations with the United States.

One more similar characteristic between the two were their respective regional and international positions, as well as their own perceptions of these positions. That is to say, both had a perception of being a part of both sides – the East and the West. Indeed, in the aftermath of World War II, both Yugoslavia and Japan found themselves belonging to the Eastern regions (East Europe and East Asia, respectively), but cooperating with the West (the United States). While Japan understood its role as a bridge between the East and the West quite early (the roots of this idea trace back even before the World War II), Yugoslavia came to the understanding of this idea during the mid-1950s, when Tito saw an opportunity in connecting the two sides.

While they both attempted to balance the two worlds they were part of, Japan clearly belonged to the Western bloc, while Yugoslavia, being a communist country, did not belong to either of the blocs. In restoring the relations with the communist countries, as mentioned earlier, Japan encountered difficulties from the very beginning. The challenges were even harder to overcome given that they were coming from the outside. The Cold War circumstances and superpowers confrontation influenced which countries would be invited to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Cold War confrontation was the reason why Japan did not have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China until 1972 and with most of the countries of the Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia) until 1956. As shown in Chapter 5, Japan did not have so much of internal problems to establish diplomatic relations with communist countries, as it had problems came from the outside circumstances. If anything, influential factors within Japan's (business circles) always pushed towards

the improvement of relations with the communist countries, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in particular.

After the reestablishment of relations with the Soviet Union and satellite countries, Japan also changed its foreign trade policy towards the Eastern European countries. The first trade agreement Japan concluded with a communist country was that with the Soviet Union in 1957. Agreements with other countries from the bloc followed — with Poland in 1958, Czechoslovakia in 1959, Romania in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961. In 1959, Japan also concluded the Trade and Maritime Agreement with Yugoslavia.

All these agreements with communist countries were concluded based on the principles of the *seikei bunri* policy. In addition to that, in the mid-1950s, when Japan started negotiations regarding the agreements, the international environment was experiencing a relaxation of tensions. Namely, after Stalin's death in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev sought to ease the tensions with the United States. In that regard, favorable circumstances allowed for Japan to pursue the establishing of good and friendly diplomatic and economic relations.

By this time, Yugoslavia had already established a partnership with the United States. Yugoslavia and the United States were on good terms all through the 1950s, which made Yugoslavia a reliable partner for other countries from the Western bloc. Although Japan had always been cautious about Yugoslavia (especially in economic matters), having the American "seal of approval," Yugoslavia seemed more stable and reliable than other communist countries in the region.

Japan's actions towards the Eastern European countries (and well as Yugoslavia), also coincided with Japan's policy towards the improvement of relations with the communist countries in general. Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama (1954-

1956) was the one who neglected the American incentives regarding the foreign policy and took a new approach, attempting to improve relations with the communist countries. Though the aim was to improve relations with Japan's closest neighbors, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, development of relations with other communist countries was initiated as well.

These actions were well received on the Yugoslav side. Yugoslav officials, especially those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although seeking development of relations with Japan since the beginning, were suspicious regarding Japan's intentions. While officials at the state economic institutions were eagerly looking for possible economic cooperation, MOFA officials had suspicions over whether Japan regards Yugoslavia with respect, regardless of the political system. Therefore, Japan's showing of good will towards the communist countries was welcomed by the Yugoslav side.

Before Hatoyama, in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was believed that Japan, although having regained its independence and starting to restore the economy quite successfully, was still "more of an object than the subject in international affairs." The pressure on Japan was coming not only from the United States, its greatest ally, but also from the countries from the opposite bloc which were trying to expel the United States presence and influence from the region – the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union was putting pressure on Japan by using peace treaty negotiations and unresolved territorial disputes, and China by using the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations.¹

¹ AY KPR I-3-a, 47/13, Prijem Parlamentarne Delegacije (Reception of the Japanese Parliamentary Delegation)/ Dokumentacija O Pripremi Prijema (Documentation Regarding the Preparations for the Reception), 09.01.1959

As explained above, although Yugoslavia and the United States developed generally good relations and a mutual cooperative relations after 1948, these relations were for both earnest. They chose to cooperate for practical reasons, and neither side approved the others' foreign policy actions in the most occasions. Yugoslavia was firmly against the American foreign policy in Asia, particularly against its participation in Korean and Vietnam wars. Seeing how Japan was a close American ally in the fight against communism in Asia, in the beginning, Japan was perceived as the same as the United States. And while they had to turn a blind eye to the United States due to practical reasons, Yugoslav officials did not believe there was enough to be gained by doing the same for Japan.

Therefore, the bilateral relationship at the beginning in the 1950s was influenced by numerous suspicions on both sides. Hatoyama Cabinet with its foreign policy strategy obviously removed those suspicions for both Japan and Yugoslavia.

5.2 The Origins

Japanese efforts to cooperate with the Soviet Union and other communist countries were a clear sign for Yugoslavia that Japan was not the rigid, capitalist country which despises Communism as originally thought differing from previous reports, which all described Japan as a country which simply follows American instructions regarding foreign policy, in the annual report from the Yugoslav Embassy in Japan in 1956 showed Japan in a positive light for the first time. It was written that the positive changes could be seen soon after Hatoyama took the Office both Japan concluded the first (fishery) Agreement with the Soviet Union and initiated the reestablishment of their bilateral relations. Moreover, Japan was perceived as “the

first American ally which well understood the situation in Asia.”² Namely, although Japan was providing support to the United States Army in both the Korean and the Vietnam wars, Japan also followed a different approach to problems - by providing aid, donations and favorable bank loans to these countries. In addition, it was advocating a political solution. This was crucial for Yugoslavia since it was openly criticizing superpowers (and especially the United States), when they attempted to interfere in other countries’ relations, and especially if aggression was involved. Additionally, about that Time Tito became closer to the third world countries of the South East Asia, and was supporting their opinions on this matter.

One more aspect of Hatoyama’s actions was particularly appealing to the Yugoslav officials. That was the nature of Japan’s motives behind the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Japan pursued this policy not only for its own sake but also with the goal to use that bilateral relation as a bargaining power in its relations with the United States.³ This was an interesting point for Yugoslavia because of its policy of balancing between the Soviet Union and the United States and using the relations with one against the other as a bargaining power. Not many countries were in similar position during the Cold War, to be able to have both of the superpowers’ attention. In addition, their unique status could have been used as leverage. Both Japan and Yugoslavia had that particularity in their positioning *vis-à-vis* the super powers.

Japan monitored Yugoslavia and its balancing between the East and the West as well. MOFAJ representative in Belgrade, Hirose, noticed how Yugoslavia was in a rather peculiar position, attempting to be on good terms with the United States while

² MOFARS DA 1956 F[older] 41D02 S414654, Report on Japan by YMOFA, 1956.

³ AY PA KPR I-5-b - 46-1, Situacija u Japanu (Situation in Japan), report, 1955

avoiding to join NATO.⁴ At that point in time not only from the outside parties but the most of the Yugoslav officials as well.

Later the following year, when many other foreign officials expressed their doubts about it, President Tito tried to justify this situation in his expose regarding Yugoslav foreign relations. He stressed that Yugoslav foreign policy was based on the Charter of the United Nations, that Yugoslavia was aiming to preserve peace and peaceful international cooperation, as well as to resolve problems, based on equality among countries and non-interference in any country's internal affairs. What was more, Yugoslavia wished to cooperate with all the countries in the world which share the same goals. The main purpose of this statement was to express how Yugoslavia maintained equal relations with both the East and the West, especially since improving relations with the Soviet Union was seriously threatening to harm Yugoslavia's relations with the United States.⁵

During this occasion, Tito revealed that Yugoslavia was opening more to the West, by basing its foreign policy on the principles of "peaceful co-existence."⁶ These principles were first "invented" by the Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev in the light of his attempts to ease the tensions between the blocs. The principles were well received by the Japanese, who sought a way to resolve the issues between them and the Soviet Union.

⁴ MOFAJ DA, A'-0159 Yūgosurabia tai seisaku kankei zasshū — chīto shushō no enzetsu ni kansuru kudan, Hirose, Envoy to the Office in Belgrade, 1954.

⁵ MOFAJ DA A'-0159, Yūgosuravu-ia tai seisaku kankei zasshū — / Kyōsan shugi ni kanren suru taibei hihan no kiji, January 29, 1955

⁶ *Ibid*; MOFAJ DA A'-0159, Tito daitōryō no gikai gaikō oyobi Barukan dōmei,-koku kōshikan, 28.10.1954

Therefore, Tito's alignment with the Soviet coexistence policy and the general lifting of the Cold War tensions coincided with Japanese goals to diversify its relations with the countries other than the United States.

Developments that occurred in Japanese-Yugoslav relations in the mid-1950s fit into (all) these circumstances. Following a few years of inactivity, in 1955 Japan and Yugoslavia started to send economic and diplomatic delegations to each other's respective countries, and to explore the possibilities of strengthening of their bilateral relations.

From the Yugoslav perspective, steps taken for the improvement of the economic relations were especially welcomed. Japan, too, was looking to diversify its foreign markets, although Yugoslavia was not particularly strong partner in that regard. The trade never even came close to being balanced since Yugoslavia did not have much to offer in comparison to other communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. However, Japan saw an opportunity to export its industrial goods.

5.3 Developments in Economic Relations

Patterns in Japanese-Yugoslav relations that developed at this early stage remained the same for the rest of their relationship, throughout the Cold War. As it will be shown below, Yugoslavia was always dependent on Japanese bank loans to purchase high-quality modern Japanese industrial equipment and had very little to offer to Japan in the way of export. Japan, for its part, provided those loans and kept exporting goods to Yugoslavia without high expectations or need to increase the imports.

To start with, the system of economic exchange between Japan and Yugoslavia was the same as the system with any of the Eastern bloc countries,

including the poor, Soviet-controlled satellite states. It is clear that Japan had particular interests and special kind of economic relationship with the Soviet Union. However, the Satellites were very low on Japan's list of trade partners. Yugoslavia, in the economic regard, was in the same position. However, different from JMOFA, JETRO did not consider Yugoslavia a part of Eastern Europe, but rather treated it as a Western European country until the mid-1970s.

As it will be described in the following chapter, Yugoslavia was only politically different, meaning valued higher, than the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. However, as a trade partner, Yugoslavia was not highly regarded in Japanese economic institutions. Furthermore, Japanese Ministry of Finances (MOF) and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) were trying to deny loans to Yugoslavia most of the time due to pragmatic reasons (such as the bad state of Yugoslav economy and its foreign currencies). It was a joint effort of JMOFA officials and representatives from Japanese companies which had interests in Yugoslavia that always supported Yugoslav application for a loan, and were convincing MOF and MITI to approve it.

The system itself was based on a pattern that avoided direct government-to-government negotiations and agreements. Japanese trading companies cooperated with Yugoslav trading companies, providing the necessary information and supporting their applications for loans at the Japanese financial institutions (most of the times, the Japanese Export-Import Bank was a loan provider). In Japan, those Japanese trading companies cooperated with the Japanese financial institutions, from which they obtained money loans on behalf of the Yugoslav companies. That is to say, Japanese trading companies acted as a proxy between Yugoslav state-owned companies (which were all state owned) and Japanese financial institutions. Thus

Japanese governmental institutions and the Government itself was not directly providing finances to the Yugoslav Communist Government. Although Japanese trading companies with their representative offices in Yugoslavia were *de facto* conductors of businesses with the Yugoslav institutions, loans and investments were coming from the Japanese Export-Import Bank. This was a common way for Japan to provide loans to countries with which the Government did not have particularly good relations or was afraid to pursue the development of relations. In particular, this system enabled the Japanese Government to distance itself from the trading partner country in case of trading with communist countries. It was supposed to eliminate complications regarding opposed political systems or historical issues.

A Yugoslav diplomat working for the Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo had been advised on one occasion, by a consultant to Export-Import Bank of Japan, not to try change the established pattern of cooperation since it was functioning so well. Moreover, it was proved to be the most successful in obtaining loans from the Japanese Government. In a situation when the applicant is coming from a developing country and/or a country with a bad economy, Japanese Export-Import Bank would not usually approve a loan to such a company. However in case the Japanese companies supported this application by taking responsibility for an applicant, or providing evidence that the loan would benefit to the Japanese side the loan would be almost certainly approved.⁷

It was evident from the very beginning that problems in economic relations would occur since Yugoslavia was a socialist country with the socialist-type poorly shaped economy. As explained in Chapter 3, the Yugoslav economic system was a

⁷ MOFARS DA 1959 F56R41F430741, Note from the conversation between Soic (Yugoslav Embassy) and Kono (Manager, Business department of Export-Import Bank Japan), 22.10.1959

miscellaneous organization of planned socialist economy, and a socialist market economy at that, named the socialist self-management economy. Among other characteristics, Yugoslav economy dealt with foreign trade mostly based on the exchange of goods, or when it used currency for foreign trade, it used its own currency rather than the United States dollar. As it is known, in the free world, the United States dollar was the only currency used in pre-Oil Shock era (pre-1973), and Japan, as a member, used the dollar as well. Furthermore, because of the geographical distance, Japan and Yugoslavia had very little, if any, interest in each other's markets. First and foremost because it was not profitable, but also due to the lack of information available regarding their markets.

In 1953 Yugoslavia had sent the first economic mission to Japan in order to explore the Japanese market and obtain information. The following year Japan sent a mission to Yugoslavia with the same purpose. The director of Japanese Export-Import Bank, Matsudaira, was a member of the mission to Yugoslavia himself, which indicated a certain level of dedication on the Japanese side.⁸ Although these first exploratory visits to both countries brought very few results, they represented a step forward in their mutual economic endeavors. The truth is, Yugoslavia and Japan possessed very limited knowledge each other's markets, and in order to establish any economic relations, this gap had to be overcome.

The first Japanese trading company to establish a representative office in Belgrade was Marubeni Ida Company in 1953. The Marubeni Company was an international trading company acting on behalf of Hitachi Heavy Machinery, Yokohama Tires, Toshiba, etc. It was the biggest importer of textile materials to Japan

⁸ MOFAJ DA E'.2.2.9.1, Honpō tai yūgōsuravia keizai kankei, Note on Japanese trade mission visit, 02.09.1954.

and an exclusive exporter for Yokohama Tires in the 1950s. This company conducted import-export businesses in Yugoslavia for a long time, some of which were a trilateral trade among Japan-Yugoslavia-Soviet Union.⁹ Throughout the Cold War, there were more than fifteen Japanese companies' offices in Yugoslavia.

The first Japanese investment loan that was approved and provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan in 1955 was in the amount of 12 million USD. It was designated for buying industrial equipment for the viscose factory in Loznica from Mitsubishi. Japan was the first country to give a loan to Yugoslavia and moreover, throughout the 1950s, provided a multitude of investment loans for the construction and development of Yugoslav factories. The factory was launched on November 14th, 1957, with a large Japanese delegation in attendance, including the director of Japanese Export-Import Bank, Mr. Ishikasa Rokuro, Director of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding&Engineering (Hiroshima) and representatives from Mitsubishi's branch in Dusseldorf, West Germany.¹⁰

5.4 Trade and Maritime Transportation Agreement

For (the period of) the first few years since the initiation of economic relations between Japan and Yugoslavia, the exchange was on a low level. At that time Japan still had not changed its economic policy towards the Communist countries of the Eastern Europe and was very cautious when it came to Yugoslavia. In addition to that, the lack of knowledge about each other's markets also influenced the trade. In the MOFAY Economy Department's report regarding the trade with Japan, it had been

⁹ MOFARS DA 1956 F42R13F42782, Information note; 1958, F54D0S45424, Information note 9.1.1958.

¹⁰ MOFARS DA 1957 F46D19S422969, Note Verbale, 15.10.1957.

stated that in 1954 Yugoslavia had no exports to Japan, but imported goods worth 70,000 USD. The following year, Yugoslavia's export increased somewhat, while the import reached 11,7 million USD. Most of it was equipment for the Viscose factory in Loznica.¹¹ Before the Trade and Maritime Transport Agreement, which was concluded in 1959, trade exchange between the two countries was very low. For those few years before the Agreement, except for that loan for Loznica factory, almost nothing was happening on the economic level.

The first trade agreement Japan concluded with a communist country was with the Soviet Union and it was signed even before the Joint Declaration, in 1954. Only after the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration (19 October 1956) the two countries signed the Trade and Maritime Agreement, the first such agreement concluded with any communist country. Additionally, the 5-year trade treaty with the Soviet Union was signed on 6 December 1957. This treaty provided the MFN status to each other and defined volumes of trade, exchange regulations, and other particularities. However, it was slightly different from the treaties Japan concluded with other communist countries. The Agreement signed with Yugoslavia in 1959, although giving the MFN status to one another, was not followed by a trade treaty. Thus, it was mostly a symbol of good will between them. It did not define any quotas or goods to be sold.

Yugoslavia and Japan signed the Trade and Maritime Transport Agreement after almost six years of negotiations. Negotiations regarding the treaty started at the Yugo-Japan trade meeting in Tokyo in 1953 and continued in Belgrade until both sides finally signed it in 1959. Despite the long and what would be expected detailed negotiations, the agreement did not bring the expected difference in treatment to Yugoslavia in terms of trade with Japan, nor did it enable trade in free currencies.

¹¹ MOFARS DA 1956 F42D14S44520, Report, 08.02.1956.

For instance, trade agreements with the Soviet Union included fixed list of goods planned for the exchange.¹² Yugoslav representatives in Japan tried to push into concluding the real trade agreement, with 5-year plans and goods lists, but Japan never wavered.¹³

Table 1: Japan-Yugoslavia trade balance for the period 1958–1960.¹⁴

Japan's exports (in millions of USD)	1958	1959	1960
In total	2876.80	3456.50	4054.50
Eastern Europe*	22.96	28.94	/
Yugoslavia	1.18	9.92	5.84
Japan's imports (in millions of USD)	1958	1959	1960
In total	3033.40	3599.80	4491.50
Eastern Europe*	24.86	43.91	/
Yugoslavia	0.003	0.68	2.80

Data obtained from: White Paper on International Economy and Trade, Ministry of International Trade and Industry 1961, New International Division of Labor, Tables: 2-33 and 2-34, and Detailed Exposition, Tables: 3-176 and 3-177, 248.

*Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union.

If comparing the volume of the trade for 1959 with the first year of trade exchange (1954), the obvious growth of the volume can be noticed, with both export and import overpassing 3 million USD. Nevertheless, those numbers still represent a very small part of the overall Japan's and Yugoslavia's trade. For Japan, 0,1% of exports and 0,09% of imports, and for Yugoslavia 0,72% of exports and 0,52% of

¹² MOFARS DA 1961 F50R23F (none existing), Information, 17.01.1961

¹³ MOFARS DA 1962 F53R25F418266, Information note, by Vajs, 25.04.1962; 1962, F53R03F47538, Report by Ambassador F. Kos, 16.01.1962

¹⁴ Data were previously used in a research and published: Jelena Glisic, "East-West Trade and Japanese-Yugoslav Relations during the Cold War," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 37 (2015): 119–33.

imports. However, after signing the Trade and Maritime Transport Agreement, Japan-Yugoslavia trade was still at a low. Until the beginning of the 1970s, Japanese exports reached the amount of about 50 million USD, and exports averagely 15 million USD.¹⁵ Japan's trade surplus with Yugoslavia (3 million USD) was only 0,7% of total Japanese foreign trade surplus in 1960.¹⁶

Despite the Trade and Maritime Agreement, the trade exchange between Japan and Yugoslavia remained rather low. Apparently, this phenomenon happened in Japan's trade relations with other communist countries as well. Same problems occurred in Japanese-Soviet trade after the conclusion of the agreement. Part of the problem was (certainly) ignorance about each other's market systems, as well as a Soviet system of foreign trade which required reciprocity in trade exchange.¹⁷

The Trade and Maritime Agreement had only a light effect on improving the trade volume between Japan and Yugoslavia. Even before concluding it, Japan approved only a few investment credits to Yugoslav fabrics, and the Yugoslav side was mostly interested in the credits, since it desperately needed investment credits to initiate economic development. As for the trade volume, it did increase to some degree, but it did not significantly represent any of the countries' total trade volumes. The Agreement appeared to have more significance as a proof for developing friendly relations between the two distant countries. Both Japan and Yugoslavia needed trading and political partners in order to pursue more balanced policies *vis-à-vis* the superpowers upon which they were dependent. Though the bilateral trade volume was not significant for either side, foreign trade represented an important part of their

¹⁵ JETRO White Paper 1976, Table 4: Japan's trade balance according to region/country, 388.

¹⁶ JETRO White Paper 1976, Table 4: Japan's trade balance according to region/country, 388.

¹⁷ Rajendra Kumar Jain, *The USSR and Japan, 1945-1980* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981), 67–68.

respective foreign policies, since the ability to trade with various countries other than the superpowers represented a step forward in independence from their pressures. By signing the treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia, according to the official statement, Japan became fully fledged in cooperating in trade matters with these socialist countries and furthermore, committed to developing economic and friendly relations with them.¹⁸ This Agreement had political as well as economic impact on Japanese-Yugoslav bilateral relations. Though the economic impact was rather small, compared to their overall trade volumes, it certainly expanded foreign trade options for both countries, making space for further development. At the time both countries were still struggling with their economic development (Yugoslavia more than Japan) and were exploring markets. For Yugoslavia, this agreement was a part of the policy for the escape from the dependence on the Soviet Union and the United States. Yugoslavia already started to diversify in the mid-1950s in order to escape dependence and constant struggle and not to fall under the influence of any of the superpowers.

As for Japan, through the 1950s Japanese Prime Ministers focused on rebuilding relations with Asian countries and diversifying its diplomatic relations in general. Especially Prime Minister Hatoyama (1954-1956), who sought to restore Japan's national pride and gain some power in the international relations, both regionally and globally. As MOFA had noticed, Japan's greater appearance in the Southeast Asian Region was part of an effort to repair relations destroyed by the

¹⁸ Diplomatic Bluebook 1960, MOFAJ, Tsūshō kōkaijōyaku oyobi tsūshō ni kansuru jōyaku kankei, Nihon yūgō tsūshō kōkaijōyaku no teiketsu

Pacific War. Additionally, it was to impose an influence on the countries from the region.¹⁹

While trying to improve relations with East Asia, a priority area of its political and economic interest, Japan worked on reconnecting with the countries from other regions as well, with a goal of expanding its foreign trade into new markets. Therefore, the Eastern European markets as well as the Yugoslav market, although modest in size, fit into these foreign policy goals.

5.5 The Developments in Political Relations

Although the bilateral relations were developing in a friendly manner since 1952, it was only at the end of the 1950s that Yugoslavia started receiving greater initiatives for upgrading the relations. Yugoslavia and Japan exchanged a few business delegations, out of which the most important one was when the delegation led by the Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo visited Japan in 1957. The delegation was well received in media (newspapers and television) as well as in the governmental institutions. They had numerous meetings with JMOFA officials, representatives from Export-Import Bank and MITI.²⁰

The first exchange on a political level occurred in August/September 1959 when Japanese Parliamentary delegation visited Yugoslavia. The delegation was assembled by various members from both houses of the Parliament, with Yamamura Shiniro from the ruling LDP as chef. The delegation had an extended visit, traveling

¹⁹ AY PA ,KPR I-3-a, 47/13, “Prijem Parlamentarne Delegacije (Reception of the Japanese Parliamentary Delegation)/ Dokumentacija O Pripremi Prijema (Documentation Regarding the Preparations for the Reception)/ Informativna Beleska O Japanu (Informative Notes on Japan),” January 9, 1959.

²⁰ MOFAJ DA A'-0142, Yūgōsurabia yōjin honpō hōmon kankei vukumanovichi [Visits from Yugoslav officials – Vukmanovic]; YMOFA DA 1959 F56D37S418511, Report, by YMOFA, September 1959

around the country, meeting with local officials as well as with businessmen. They also had a meeting with President Tito (on September 1st), when they addressed several questions regarding the international situation: a future meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's position regarding China and the India-China border dispute, etc.²¹ Although the purpose of this delegation was to gather information about Yugoslavia and its political life, more often than not, on both official and unofficial occasions, the delegation members inquired about not only Yugoslavia's opinions regarding external actors (the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China), but also requested information on those actors. On the other hand, according to the YMOFA report, Japanese parliament members avoided expressing direct opinions about the Soviet Union or China.²² Moreover, Yugoslavia and Japan's mutual support within the framework of the United Nations was discussed, pointing out their joint efforts in finding a peaceful solution to Indochina problems.²³

In connection with the previously mentioned first positive reaction regarding the Japanese foreign politics (during the Nakasone Cabinet, when Yugoslavia saw Japan as a positive factor which contributes to the solution of the Southeast Asia problems), this shared approach regarding the Indochina issues was jointly promoted by the United Nations. The two countries, despite low level economic and fairly

²¹ "Prijem Parlamentarne Delegacije (Reception of the Japanese Parliamentary Delegation)/ Dokumentacija O Pripremi Prijema (Documentation Regarding the Preparations for the Reception)/ Informativna Beleska O Japanu (Informative Notes on Japan)."

²² MOFARS DA 1959 F56D37S418511

²³ AY PA, PR I-3-a, 47/13, I-K 140, J:2026/2, Prijem Parlamentarne Delegacije (Reception of the Japanese Parliamentary Delegation)/ Dokumentacija O Pripremi Prijema (Documentation Regarding the Preparations for the Reception)/ Zabeleske O Prijemu Parlamentarne Delegacije Japana Kod Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita, Na Celu Sa Clanom Donjeg Doma Simirom Jamamurom, 1.IX 1959. u Beogradu (Notes Regarding the Reception of the Japanese Parliamentary Delegation at the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito, Led by the Member of the Lower House Shimiro Yamamura, 1.IX 1959, in Belgrade)

underdeveloped diplomatic relations supported each other's efforts when it came to finding a solution to the Indochina problem.

In addition to the mutual support in the United Nations, one dimension of the relations that was quite developed from the very beginning. Even before the exchange of diplomatic or trade delegations, there was the exchange of information between Japanese and Yugoslav MOFA officials. Yugoslavia represented a valuable source of information regarding the Soviet Union, especially because it was not willing to cover up on behalf of the Soviet Union, as other Eastern European Countries. In many of the archival documents about both countries, there is evidence on the information exchange between Japanese and Yugoslav diplomats. On many occasions, the diplomatic staff from the Japanese Embassy in Belgrade would simply schedule a meeting at YMOFA with some of the Yugoslav officials, at which the two sides exchanged information. For the most part, the information revolved around the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. *Vice versa*, Yugoslav Ambassador going for a meeting in JOFAJ) happened only on rare occasions.

, ambassadors from the two countries also commonly met and shared information. For example, the Japanese Ambassador (Matsuhiro) and the Yugoslav Ambassador (name missing) to Canada in 1954, discussed the change in the Soviet leadership. The Yugoslav Ambassador mainly expressed the Yugoslav Government's views of the events, thus giving information about the Soviet Union leadership change from an angle of a communist country to the Japanese diplomat.²⁴ Also, meetings between Japanese and Yugoslav Ambassadors to France (Nishimura and Prica,

²⁴ MOFAJ DA A'-0159, Yūgosuravu ~i a taishi to no kaiken kansuru kudan, Matsudaira taishi (Information about the meeting with the Yugoslav Ambassador), by Ambassador Matsudaira (Canada), 04.08.1954; JMOFA DA A'-0159 yūgōsuravia no taigai seisaku kankei zasshū dai 1-kan (Foreign Policy Towards Yugoslavia, Vol.1)

respectively) were a common thing in the 1950s.²⁵ As it seems by looking into the volume regarding the policy towards Yugoslavia (from JFOFA), and as numerous reports from Nishimura state, Ambassadors Nishimura and Prica conducted regular meetings while holding posts in Paris., During these meetings they would exchange information about the two countries and about the Soviet Union

From the reports from the Ambassadors that had posts in Yugoslavia, it could be noted that this trend continued in well into the 1960s as well. In all these reports during the 1960s, it was stated that Yugoslavia had no burning issues, however it had a specific international position - good connections with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, as well as communist countries like China,. Therefore, it was able to obtain various information about them.²⁶

However, Yugoslav ambassadors to Japan, as well as other diplomatic staff, sought other ways for obtaining the information from Japanese officials. Different from the activities in Yugoslavia, in Japan, all encounters happened outside of the JMOFA, and commonly during some formal events, such as receptions at the other embassies.

By the end of the 1950s there occurred a few initiatives for the upgrade of the bilateral relations on both the political and economic level. However, the trade was imbalanced despite the initiatives for improvement. Neither did the renewed Trade and Maritime agreement (1959) bring instant improvement. For economic relations,

²⁵ MOFAJ DA A'-0159, Prica, Yūgōsuravu~ia taishi-nai-wa no kudan, Nishimura taishi (Information about the meeting with Yugoslav Ambassador Prica), by Ambassador Nishimura (France), 07.05.1954; JMOFA DA A'-0159, Yūgosuravu~ia taishi to no kaiken kansuru kudan, Matsudaira taishi (Information about the meeting with the Yugoslav Ambassador), by Ambassador Matsudaira (Kanada), 04.08.1954.

²⁶ MOFAJ M'.3.1.1.32-4-7 Zaigai kōkan-chō ni taisuru kun-tachi kankei Ōshū chiiki no bu chū yūgōsuravu~ia taishi (Ambassadors Takahashi, Sono and Nakagawa)

some of the main difficulties were a lack of information on both sides and geographical distance, and thus unprofitability of trade. Of course, an important factor was also the poor state of Yugoslavia's developing economy.

It is clear that economic gain was not behind Japanese motives for nurturing relations with Yugoslavia in the 1950s. It cannot be said that Japan invested particular effort into this relationship. Moreover, it is curious why it invested any effort in it at all, considering that the trade was not very fruitful and that the two countries could never become true allies, at least not as long as they had opposing political systems and there was an ongoing Cold War confrontation between the East and the West.

CHAPTER 6: Tito's Visit to Japan

During the cherry blossom season of 1968, Yugoslav President Tito, accompanied by several state officials and his wife paid a visit to Japan. The communist leader has spent a whole week in an official state visit with the highest state honors. He and his entourage were welcomed at the Haneda airport by Japanese highest ranking officials, including the Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Japanese Emperor Hirohito.

Moreover, the Emperor Hirohito and Empress Koujun hosted a reception at the Imperial Palace for the Yugoslav guests. Therefore, a monarch from the world's longest monarchy hosted a reception in honor of one of the world's biggest anti-monarchist. This was not the first time for Tito to meet a monarch, as he was an often guest to the Western European royal courts, including the British. However, this was a rather unusual situation for the Japanese. This was the first time that one communist president was welcomed to Japan in an official capacity. Moreover, Tito became the first communist president to have been organized an imperial reception in Japan. So, what was behind all this?

6.1 The Setting

After the establishment of their bilateral relations in 1952, Japan and Yugoslavia continued slow but steady development in political and economic spheres. Since then, Japan and Yugoslavia have exchanged numerous political level visits as well as economic relations related visits, and additionally a few high-level visits

including a visit of Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeo Miki and Shojiro Kawashima in 1966 as a special representative on behalf of Prime Minister Sato to Yugoslavia.

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato also visited Yugoslavia in September 1963, before he became the Prime Minister. At the time of the visit, he was the Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency, and he went to Yugoslavia as a head of a business delegation. This visit had high expectation from the beginning. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs pressured Yugoslav officials (through the Embassy in Tokyo) to make sure that the visit is well organized and that the delegation was appropriately received in Yugoslavia.¹ The delegation was consistent of bank representatives and businessmen who, after series of meetings in Belgrade, separated and went in different cities around Yugoslavia for further visits to factories, etc. in order to investigate potential trade deals. The visit ended with signed a communiqué and concluded business deals.²

One of the important points regarding this visit was that it was the first time that Sato expressed interest in Yugoslavia and especially in meeting with President Tito. At that time Sato was not able to meet with President Tito due to his other obligations, regarding which he expressed regrets on several occasions, once formally, in the letter he sent to President Tito.³ Sato's expression of interest towards President Tito and his following letter were first steps in the invitation for President

¹ MOFARS DA 1963 F49 D20 S432956, Coded letter to Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo, by Zec, 10.11.1963; MOFARS DA 1963 F49D27S431864, Telegram, by ambassador Rolovic to YMOFA, 01.10.1963

² MOFARS DA 1963 F49D27S(unknown), Coded letter to Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo, by Zec), 16.10.1963

³ AY PA KPR I-1, 501 Letters, Letter from the President of Japanese Government Eisaku Sato to the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito regarding the visit to Yugoslavia from the vice-president of LDP Shojiro Kawashima, October 1966

Tito to visit Japan. During one meeting between the Yugoslav Ambassador to Japan Vladimir Rolovic and a deputy director for Eastern Europe and Socialist Countries where Prime Minister Sato was also present, the Prime Minister officially invited President Tito to visit Japan. This invitation, coming from Prime Minister Sato came as a surprise for Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some of his cabinet ministers.⁴ The formal invitation came later when Vice-President of the Federative Executive Council of Yugoslavia Humo Avdo visited Japan in 1966.⁵

Several Yugoslavia Federal Executive Council⁶ high-ranking officials visited Japan over the years (the Vice-president of Federal Executive Council – Svetozar Vukmanovic in 1957, a member of Federal Executive Council – Avdo Humo in 1965, Under Secretary of the State for Foreign Relations Pavicevic in 1965). Aside from regular parliamentary visits, trade delegations were the most numerous ones, which occurred 1953, 1960, 1965 and 1968 by Yugoslavia, in 1953, 1960 and 1963 by Japan (Prime Minister Sato, who was The Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency at the time was leading the delegation). Also, a delegation of SOHYO visited Yugoslavia in 1967.⁷

The upgrade of the relations in the 1960s, comparing to 1950s, came with the changes in the international environment, as well as with the changed circumstances and new national goals of both Japan and Yugoslavia. The beginning of the 1960s

⁴ AY DA KPR I-2/38-1, Talks regarding comrade president's visit to Japan by ambassador Rolovic/ J. B. Tito's trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968/ Documentation regarding the visit preparations/ Office of the President of the Republic, 02.12.1966

⁵ MOFAJ DRO A'-0404, Yūgōsuravu~ia yōjin honpō hōmon/ fūmo; AY PA KPR I-5-b - 46-3, Evaluation of a member of Executive Council Humo's visit to Japan

⁶ The Federal Executive Council was the executive body of Yugoslavia responsible for state affairs and for supervising the implementation of laws.

⁷ AY PA KPR I-3-a, KPR I-5-b - 46-3; MOFAJ DRO, A'-0186Yūgōsuravu~ia yōjin sho gaikoku hōmon dai 1 - 3-kan [Yugoslav foreign dignitaries visits, Volumes 1-3], Japanese; Yūgōsuravu~ia yōjin honpō hōmon [Yugoslav foreign dignitaries visits to Japan]; MOFAJ DRO A'-0404 Yūgōsuravu~ia yōjin honpō hōmon

experienced rough start with the Bay of Pigs incident, Cuban missile crisis, and the Berlin crisis (1961). All of that deteriorated the US-Soviet relations bringing them to the closest point to start a direct war.

The intra-bloc homogeneity began to show divisions in both blocs. Western European allies of the US showed disagreements and initiated more independent attitudes towards the specific issues. De Gaulle pursued a foreign policy independent from the US and the UK, reconnecting with the Soviet Union and developing French nuclear weapons. On the other side, in the Eastern bloc, in 1960 began the Sino-Soviet split which lasted until the end of the Cold War.

This unstable situation, in combination with issues, rose during the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, directed Japan in a direction slightly different than before. Although we could witness Japan's inclinations towards the foreign policy completely independent from, if not against, the American directions before, in the mid-1950s, in 1960s Japan started pursuing the achievement of its national goals regardless of the US's interests.

Contradictions in the international environment have created a maneuvering space for Japan to pursue its interests. As Yugoslav ambassador in Japan, Vladimir Rolovic observed, "contradictions in Japanese foreign policy are one of its key features. The main goal is to use those contradictions, each when it seems most suitable so that Japan obtain the best possible results."⁸ This principle guided Japan's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Even though Japan considered the Soviet Union as an enemy, the deterioration of relations between them would harm Japanese economic interests. That is, Japan liked economic benefits from the trade relations

⁸ MOFARS DA 1963 F49 D 12 S437717, Opinions regarding Japanese foreign politics, by ambassador V. Rolovic, 11/09/1963

with the Soviet Union and other communist countries and put those benefits before political views.⁹ Also, Japan finds certain actions of the Non-aligned Movement favorable (when the NAM resists pressure from the superpowers), but others not (when the NAM strengthens its position in the Southeast Asian Region).¹⁰ Moreover, even though Japan supports the policy of achieving détente, which helps its economic interests, in Ambassador Rolovic's opinion, this support is only to a certain degree, since Japan benefits from the Cold War framework. Japan always loudly stated its affiliation to the free world, but carefully avoided direct participation in any confrontations, or kept quiet where siding with the free world could bring harm to the economic interests.¹¹ Therefore, we can see Japan's bi-feelings towards Non-aligned Movement and Yugoslavia. While some aspects of Non-aligned Movement were useful for Japan's pursuit of its national interests, some were not. However, it may be, by the 1964 Japan has become the third world economy which mostly followed its economic interests. With the accordance of its economic power, Japan started taking more independent foreign policy actions. Economic power gained enough confidence to Japan to pursue political power in world politics as well. Aside from economic (domestic) factor, one external factor enabled this policy as well. In the light of weakening of American influence over its allies and the changing international situation, Japan gained more confidence to pursue its foreign policy goals which were not aligned with the US ones. Particularly during the term of Prime Minister Sato (1964-1972), Japan was pursuing more independent foreign policy. It was during his term that Japan got the Okinawa back from the US protectorate. Moreover, Sato was

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ MOFARS DA 1972 F60F11S414848, Report, Japan, Bilateral relations, by the Direction for Asia and Australia, MOFA, 15.04.1972

¹¹ *Ibid.*

the first Japanese Prime Minister to make a commitment to the cooperation in the Far East security and development issues of South East Asian countries. During this period, Japan increased its defense budget by 50% and attempted as well to change the Constitution in order to introduce full-fledged army forces.¹² Although this attempt failed and Japanese cooperation was limited to the economic and political support to the US in the region, it was a significant step forward in Japan's international commitments.

During this time, Japanese relations with the communist countries also made an improvement. In Japanese political and business circles, not only in the left-oriented ones but rather conservative ones as well, started a trend of working on improving trade relations with China.¹³ The advancements towards this goal could be clearly seen in US-Japan Joint Communiqué of 1965. As stated in the Communiqué, for the first time Japan publically announced its intention to develop trade relations with the People's Republic of China.¹⁴ Though the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Japan and China was still out of the question, this was the first time that the American government publically agreed with Japan over the China matter.

The Japanese efforts to improve relations with the People's Republic of China were also noted by Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As they noted – over the years many meetings on various levels occurred between Japan and People's Republic

¹² AY PA KPR I-2 60 J 1088-1093, Put Predsednika Tita u Japan, Informativno-politicki materijali, Elaborat: Savremena društveno-ekonomska i politicka kretanja i položaj Japana u međunarodnim odnosima (A trip of President Tito to Japan, Informative-political materials, Elaborate: Contemporary socio-economic situation and position of Japan in international relations)

¹³ See Sadako Ogata, "Japanese Attitude toward China," *Asian Survey* 5, no. 8 (August 1965): 389–98, doi:10.2307/2642411.

¹⁴ See Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister and U.S. President Johnson available on <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19650113.D1E.html> (last access 28/06/2015)

of China, which shows Japan's interest to improve relations with China. Their bilateral relations were certainly very complicated, but Japanese effort to improve them indicates that Japan is willing to cooperate with various countries in the world, and not only with the Western allies.¹⁵ For Yugoslavia, this Japanese policy was appealing. They respected Japan for it, and this probably was a core argument why to deepen the relations with Japan particularly. Among Western bloc or the countries of "the free world," not many of them showed interest to cooperate with the communist countries as Japan did. Japan showed will and capacity to cooperate with not only Western countries but also with the socialist Eastern and Asian communist countries.

Along with developing relations with China, Japan started improving relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries as well. Foreign Minister Takeo Miki went on an extensive trip to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in 1967, and Minister of Ministry of International Trade and Industry Kano went to Bulgaria and Rumania the same year. For Eastern European countries, these were first visits of high-ranking officials from Japan. Foremost, these visits had a purpose of improving trade relations.¹⁶ This effort by the Japanese Government was especially welcomed in Yugoslav diplomatic circles during the preparations for Tito's visit to Japan. It appeared positive that Japan is ready to oversight ideological differences in order to achieve mutually beneficial economic cooperation with socialist countries. In relations with the Soviet Union, high-level meetings started with Ministry of Foreign Affairs exchanged visits in 1966 (Gromiko and Shiina) when the annual consultations

¹⁵ MOFARS DA 1969 F75D14S439927, Information from the meeting with the LDP vice-president Kowashima with Ambassador K. Bulajic, 06.11.1969

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

on the ministerial level were established, which marked the improvement of bilateral relations.¹⁷

On the other side, at the beginning of the 1960s, Yugoslavia had an advantage of being on good terms with both blocs. Moreover, President Tito managed to gather leaders of the Third World countries in the (still informal) movement which was politically outside of the blocs, which improved Yugoslavia's position vis-à-vis the blocs. This was one of the best attributes that Yugoslavia had, looking from the point of view from the Japanese Government. In addition to need to have a stable ally in the Eastern Europe, Japan aimed at using some other benefits of Yugoslavia's membership in the Non-Aligned Movement.

On many occasions, Japanese expressed their positive opinions regarding Yugoslav non-aligned orientated foreign policy. It is interesting that those opinions did not come only from SPJ members or members from Japan-Yugoslavia friendship organizations, but also from LDP members and officials working for various departments in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, Kanazawa, a chief of the analytic department in the Ministry, during his visit to Yugoslavia in 1971, noted the positive impact Yugoslav membership to the Non-aligned Movement had to Yugoslav foreign policy balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Also, Kanazawa expressed how in Japan the Non-aligned Movement countries are considered not only as good trading partners but also as an influential political factor in the international relations.¹⁸ Japanese interest in developing closer relations with Yugoslavia was closely connected to this opinion regarding the Non-aligned Movement.

¹⁷ AY PA KPR I-2 60 J 1088-1093, A trip of President Tito to Japan, Informative-political materials, Elaborate: Contemporary socio-economic situation and position of Japan in international relations

¹⁸ MOFARS DA 1971 F67 D08 S412182, Note regarding meeting between SDS B. Loncar (YMOFA) and Kanazawa Masao (a head of the analytical department in MOFAJ), 19.06.1971

The decade of the 1960s was a significant turning point for Yugoslavia. On the domestic level, Yugoslavia undertook extensive system liberalization changes in 1963. On the international level, Yugoslavia finally escaped from insecurities for its faith and pulled away from the failure. It did not have to rely on either superpower to survive, but it rather developed cooperation with the US and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's love-hate relationship with the Soviet Union was over, and the current status was that they were in mutually respected diplomatic relations (since 1961). In the 1960s it finally found its place in the international system becoming a member of the third (non)bloc. This provided it with powerful position vis-à-vis superpowers and enabled its independence. The belonging to the alliance of the non-aligned countries had straightened up Yugoslavia-People's Republic of China relations as well.¹⁹

During this decade, both countries achieved a certain status and certain amount of power. Their bilateral relations were also blooming, with high-level state meetings and various other meetings on parliamentary and business levels. After a few years' contemplation, Tito's visit to Japan was realized when both Japan and Yugoslavia achieved certain amounts of influence in international relations. At the time, Tito was at the peak of his power and Yugoslavia was one of the leading countries of the Third World. During the 1960's, Japan was rising as well, having developed into an economic giant and becoming the world's third-largest economy.

¹⁹ MOFAJ A'-403 Oshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon kankei zakken chitō yūgōsuravu~ia daitōryō kankei/ Kokkō-kai kankei/ junbi zairyō

6.2 Yugoslav State Visit to Japan in April 1968

In the mutual relations, the two countries marked a relatively low trade exchange. According to the preliminary report for Tito's visit by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan had no particular interest in deepening the economic cooperation with Yugoslavia. This was because Yugoslav economy was not significant on the international level, its market represented only a small share of all Japanese export markets with no potential to expand considerably. Moreover, Yugoslavia had very low reserves of natural resources. Thus those could not get a bigger share in the trade exchange.²⁰

However, Yugoslavia, different from Japan, was not satisfied with the level of their economic relations. Yugoslavia, although politically improved its international status, did not manage to improve the condition of its economy. As Japanese officials expected, Yugoslav visitors would try to change the current status of trade deficit and improve economic relations during Tito's visit to Japan. Accordingly, the most of the organized meetings for a visit were the ones with Japanese economic institutions and private companies.²¹

From Yugoslav viewpoint, the visit was considered to have many benefits. The persistent deficit in trade exchange was something that bothered Yugoslav diplomats, and this visit was an opportunity to negotiate more trade deals in order to fix this problem. A scientific-technological cooperation was already developing, during which process Yugoslavia realized that could learn much from Japan and

²⁰ MOFAJ A'-403 Oshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon kankei zakken chitō yūgōsuravu~ia daitōryō kankei/ Kokkō-kai kankei/ junbi zairyō

²¹ MOFAJ A'-403 Oshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon kankei zakken chitō yūgōsuravu~ia daitōryō kankei/ Kokkō-kai kankei/ junbi zairyō; M'.3.1.1.32-4-7 Zaigai kōkan-chō ni taisuru kun-tachi kankei Ōshū chiiki no bu chū yūgōsuravu~ia taishi/ Takahashi chū yūgosurabia taishi

wanted to create more opportunities to do so. On a political level, this was a chance to develop bilateral relations more than before, for which many previous high-level visits paved the way. Moreover, under the framework of Tito's promotion of himself as a leader on the NAM, this visit would bring strengthening ties with the rising power and the greatest economy in the region where NAM had many members.²²

Moreover, as Tito has told to the Asahi during the interview, his visit was scheduled as a part of Yugoslav NAM activities, with a goal to expand relations with all peaceful nations. Also, he believed that Japan and Yugoslavia shared common values and opinions, such as the ones regarding the war in Vietnam. They both invested an effort to find a peaceful solution to this war.²³

Japanese interest in this visit was, foremost, to affirm herself in the international community as a rising political power, in particular among the third world countries of the Southeast Asian region.²⁴ Within the framework of increasing its international presence and improving diplomatic relations with socialist and third world countries of SEA, welcoming the leader of the NAM was a good step forward towards that goal.

Since Japan has been already practicing *seikei bunri* policy for years, Yugoslav ideology did not represent a significant problem for Japan. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's specific political Cold War orientation makes it different from other socialist countries. Therefore, under the framework of improving relations with socialist countries in general, improving relations with Yugoslavia with whom Japan

²² AY KPR I-2 60 J 1088-1093, Informative-political materials, State Secretariat for Foreign Relations/ J. B. Tito's trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968, 20.03.1968

²³ MOFAJ A'- 0435 Ōshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon kankei zakken/ chitō yūgōsuravu~ia daitōryō kankei/ setsugu kankei

²⁴ *Ibid.*

already had better relations than with other Eastern European socialist countries, seemed like a natural move. At the time, though Yugoslavia was not under the Soviet umbrella, their bilateral relations were rather improving, due to the Yugoslav more balanced foreign policy and increased power vis-à-vis the superpowers. Thus, even though welcoming Tito in Japan could not significantly help Japan to score points with the Soviet Union, it showed Japan's intentions to cooperate with socialist countries in general.

On domestic politics level, LDP presented to the opposition parties and groups that are willing to improve relations with the socialist countries and not only cooperating with the capitalistic world. This especially was significant for the SPJ which maintained friendly relations with the CPY for decades.

For the Japan visit, Yugoslavia had sent quite a big delegation, led by the President Josip Broz Tito. Jovanka Broz, his wife accompanied him, as well as Ivan Macek -Member of the Council of Federation, Vladimir Popovic - Member of the Council of Federation and Secretary General to the President of the Republic, Rudi Kolak - Vice President of the Federal Executive Council, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar - President of the Executive Council of Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, Marko Nikezic - Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Krsto Bulajic - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the SFRY to Japan, Nikola Milicevic - Director of Department of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs.²⁵

Within the one week (April 8-15), President Tito and his associates in an attempt to deepen their knowledge of Japan visited places of economic interest, as well as cultural and historic locations in the cities of Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto.” The

²⁵ AY PA, KPR I-2 60 J 1088-1093, J. B. Tito's trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968; MOFAJ DRO A'-403, Ōshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon kankei zakken chitō yūgōsuravu~ia daitōryō-seki [Visits from the European countries, Yugoslav President Tito's visit]

President and his associates had numerous meetings with the Japanese Government officials as well with the business community leaders. In both Tokyo and Osaka, they have met with the representatives from Keidanren, Chamber of Commerce and Industry and visited many private companies and factories (such as the Ishikawajima Harima Corporation which cooperated with Yugoslav companies).²⁶

Tito was also meeting with the diplomatic officials, including Prime Minister Sato. The two of them have met for several times during the visit – during the three receptions (one at the welcome event upon the arrival, one at the Sato’s residence and one organized by President Tito) and during the official meeting.²⁷ President Tito and Prime Minister Sato had an official meeting on April 9th to exchange views regarding the world’s most significant problems. In this meeting, they expressed their countries’ respective foreign policy goals. They found their common basis to endeavor towards the world’s peace and related cooperation with the United Nations. The two leaders paid particular attention to the problem of Vietnam, the crisis in the Middle East, disarmament and economic situation of the developing countries. They also talked about the way that UN and UNSC function. The two leaders agreed to cooperate in strengthening the efficiency of the UN.²⁸ Finally, President Tito and Prime Minister Sato decided to continue to join efforts to promote world’s peace, international cooperation, economic stability and progress of the developing countries, nuclear non-proliferation.²⁹

²⁶ AY DA KPR I-2/38-1, Joint Communique, J. B. Tito’s Trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968, 15.04.1968; MOFAJ DRO A'-403, Ōshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon kankei zakken chitō yūgosuravu~ia daitōryō-seki [Visits from the European countries, Yugoslav President Tito’s visit]

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ AY DA, KPR I-2/38-1, Joint Communique, J. B. Tito’s Trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968

²⁹ *Ibid.*; *Gaikō seisho* 1969 (Diplomatic Bluebook 1969) - Yūgosurabia no chitō daitōryō (Yugoslav President Tito Kakusetsu/ wagakuni to kakkoku to no shomondai/ Soren Tōō chiiki/

As for the protocol events, Yugoslav visitors have hosted two receptions, one in Tokyo, one in Osaka, where they welcomed numerous high-ranking officials from the Japanese Governmental offices, as well as influential people in business. Also, Japanese side hosted a reception; that is Emperor Hirohito, and Empress hosted a reception dinner at the Imperial Palace on April 8th.³⁰ Tito was the first communist president to have a reception in his honor organized by Japanese Emperor and Empress.

6.3 The Effects of the Visit on Japan and Yugoslavia

Despite the lack of interest on the Japanese side, this visit created prospects for expanding trade cooperation. Needless to say, for a small-size economy as Yugoslavia's, even a small improvement in the economic relations was significant.

Japan's concessions towards Yugoslavia's wishes to increase the level of trade exchange between the two countries despite the low profitability for Japan, coincided with some other areas of the Japanese foreign policy at the time. Namely, at the end of the 1960s, Japan was investigating possibilities for expanding trade with the Eastern European Socialist countries, foremost the Soviet Union and to diversify economic and diplomatic partners.

According to Japanese 1969 Diplomatic Bluebook, Japan, and the Soviet Union have strengthened their relations based on cultural, people-to-people exchange and trade relations.³¹ Though the territorial dispute was still unresolved, Japan

yōjin oyobi shisetsu-dan no rainichi (Various matters/ Matters between our country and other countries/ Dignitaries and delegation from Soviet Union-Eastern Europe)

³⁰ *Gaikō seisho* 1968 (Diplomatic Bluebook); MOFAJ DRO, A'-0435, Ōshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon-nai kankei, chītoyūgosurabia daitōryō kankei setsugu (State visits from Europe, Yugoslav President Tito's visit, Reception)

³¹ Diplomatic Bluebook (*Gaikō seisho*) 1969, *Waga gaikō no ayumi/ waga gaikō no kihon hōshin/ heiwa e notataikai* (Our diplomacy/ Basic policies in our diplomacy/ Fight for peace)

pursues friendly politics towards all the nations of the world and wishes to contribute to the world peace. The reason for this was maintaining peace in the region and the World, and not provoking unnecessary conflicts. Japan quite successfully pursued a foreign policy of expanding good relations with many countries despite their ideological or diplomatic disagreements. The bottom line is, this way the economy and foreign trade could prosper better, which was to the mutual interests.

Furthermore, it was in Japan's best interest if the World trade was developing well, and since this was possible only in the peaceful environment, Japan put an effort to promote friendly relations and cooperation among all the countries in the World.³² Particularly, Japan was seeking to increase import of raw materials, as "Japan has interests to increase import of raw materials from any country," and Eastern European countries they have natural resources, especially Soviet's Siberia area.³³

During the period of mid-1960s relations on an economic level between Japan and Yugoslavia were generally improving. Trade visits on both sides were organized and also various study groups visits. Representatives from Yugoslav companies were going to Japan quite often to learn about Japanese industry and business practice. The balance of trade was on the Japanese side, and the main goal for Yugoslavia was to see what it can do to upgrade trade exchange to its benefit. Yugoslav side was aware that they are not competitive enough for the market as big and as advanced as Japanese.³⁴ In fact, these problems kept occurring throughout the whole period in question. Yugoslav Embassy staff and various experts that had been sent to the visits

³² *Ibid.*/ Wagakuni no han'ei to kokumin no fukushi kōjō (Our prosperity and of our welfare improvement)

³³ MOFAJ DRO M' 3.1.7.8-5-9, 9th Eastern Europe Ambassadorial Meeting 1968, Wagakuni no tai Soren Tōō bōeki keizai kankei (Japan vs. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe trade and economic relations), 17.05.1968

³⁴ MOFARS DA1968 F69D19F424499 and F42881, Information from the Yugoslav Embassy in Japan, 26.06.1968

and missions to Japan were aware of the fact, but very few changes were actually made. Yugoslav political system was firmly controlled from the top, and like in other communist systems, the changes were slow and difficult if they did not come from the top. Moreover, the trade expansion with Japan, though the trade expansion per se was necessary for Yugoslavia, was not a high priority for Yugoslav Government who had many other problems to deal with.

Japanese were interested mostly in the import of raw materials, as it was a top priority for the Japanese trade strategy, but due to the bad organization of Yugoslav state in this matter, Japan had no means to pursue its interests. Additionally, the distance between the two countries was creating a cost problem, and therefore Yugoslav raw materials were not competitive on the Japanese market.

Though the initial reports from Japanese Embassy to Yugoslavia in the mid-1960s when the liberalization started were positive, at the end of the 1960s, according to the Japanese Ambassador to Yugoslavia Akira Sono, the situation in Yugoslavia was rather difficult. It was difficult not only due to the bad economic situation but also due to the domestic political issues, such as protests against the government.³⁵ The bad economic situation caused Yugoslav people to protest against the government, which slowed down a progress of liberalization.

Regarding the liberal reforms in domestic politics and system of government in Yugoslavia, Sono's opinion is that the government did not conduct real reforms, that all remained as it was and that all was just a show since the will of the people was rather weak.³⁶

³⁵ MOFAJ DRO M'.3.1.7.8-5-9, 9th Eastern Europe Ambassadorial Meeting 1968, Gijiroku (Proceedings)

³⁶ *Ibid.*

The biggest problem with the protests against the government appeared to be potential hunger due to the lack of wheat, which meant potential starvation of the population. In ambassador Sono's view, the possible solutions for this would be rather tough, since Yugoslavia must either bend to the United States or the Soviet Union in order to get their aid for the wheat supply.³⁷

In Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs opinion, Japanese relations with the Eastern European countries were in general friendly throughout the 1960s. The core part of the relations was traded. Due to the geographical distance, there was a lack of interests on both sides for deepening political relations. That is why Japan had no signed political agreements with the Eastern European countries.³⁸

Japan in the 1960s grew economically stronger and started promoting friendly relations with all the countries of the World who shared similar perceptions and goals. That meant with the socialist countries as well, since "they live in the same international society although their political, economic and social systems are different."³⁹ The goal of this policy was to "make it possible for Japan to have more options and to act more flexibly to promote its national interests."⁴⁰ Japan discovered the inhomogeneous structure of the blocs and decided to use it in its favor. Deepening relations on various levels with the Eastern European communist countries continued in the decade of 1970 with this goal.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ MOFAJ DRO M'.3.1.7.8-5-10, 10th East Europe Ambassadorial Meeting in 1969, Saikin no Nisso oyobi Ni~Tsu Tōō shokoku kankei (Latest Status of Japanese-Soviet, and Japanese-Eastern Europe Relations), 17.09.1969

³⁹ Gaikō seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1972, Waga gaikō no kichō/ sho gaikoku to no kankei no zōshin (Keynotes on our diplomacy/ The promotion of relations with foreign countries)

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Good organization of the visit and great media coverage indicated the significant interests of Japanese Government regarding this visit. The Japanese Government had many interests to carry out this visit well. Foremost to show the independent foreign policy, to strengthen its position within the third world countries (especially in the Southeast Asian region), and additionally to get greater support from its opposition parties (SPJ and SOHIO) which favored more independent foreign policy from the US.⁴¹

This visit aligned with Tito's general foreign policy as well. He was in the pursuit of power, for building good relations with as many countries as possible in order to strengthen his position and Non-aligned Movement position vis-à-vis the blocs. The visit had left Tito happy about the effects it had on his image. Japanese Embassy in Belgrade reported on satisfying media coverage and positive public opinion in Yugoslavia regarding Japan and the visits itself.⁴² It seems that set goal which preceded this visit were achieved. This visit aligned with Tito's foreign policy goals. At the time he was traveling around the world in a pursuit for building friendly relations with as many countries as possible in order to strengthen his position within the Non-Aligned Movement, so as to strengthen Non-aligned Movement's position vis-à-vis the blocs. As Tito told Nasser on his way back from the big Asian tour, he left Japan in good impression about the Japanese people — “We were also impressed

⁴¹ AY, CK SKJ, IX-51/VII-19, J.B. Tito's Visits to Japan, Mongolia, Iran and Talks in Moscow, Commission for the International Relations, May 1968

⁴² MOFAJ DA, A'-403, Chitō daitō kikoku (Information regarding Tito's return to Yugoslavia), Ōshū shokoku daitōryō honpō hōmon kankei zakken/ chitō yūgōsuravu~ia daitōryō kankei/ kokkō-kai kankei/ ippan (State visits from European countries/ Yugoslav President Tito's visit/ Diplomatic relations/ General matters) 01/05/1968

by the exceptional work discipline that even Germans have never had. They are all disciplined, in companies and any other place.”⁴³

Looking from Yugoslav side, developing relations with Japan was a part of broader foreign policy strategy to acquire allies and, accordingly, more support and influence in international relations. Having already been an ally of the most of South East Asian countries within the Non-Aligned Movement framework, it was beneficial for Yugoslavia to acquire Japan’s support in the region. Japan was an economically most developed country in the region and was showing interest to develop regional relations further.

The Japanese government had many interests to carry out this visit well, foremost to show the independent foreign policy. Furthermore, to improve its image within the Third World countries (especially in the Southeast Asian region) in order to better pursue the role of a bridge between Asia and the West. By improving relations with the countries from the region, Japan would gain more power vis-à-vis the US. An additional advantage of the visit was to obtain points from opposition parties and NGOs (Socialist Party of Japan and SOHYO). Both SPJ and the SOHYO cooperated with their respective counterparts in Yugoslavia.

Moreover, according to Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs report, this visit confirmed mutual interest in the development of the bilateral cooperation and the cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, with the goal of preserving and establishing peace in the World.⁴⁴ This visit was an expression of the mutual

⁴³ AY PA KPR I-3-a UAR, Minutes of Conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Brijuni, Croatia, 11.07.1968

⁴⁴ MOFARS DA 1972 F60F11S414848, Report, Japan, Bilateral relations, by the Direction for Asia and Australia, YMOFA, April 15, 1972

interest in the development of the bilateral cooperation and the cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.

Furthermore, due to Sato's Government's continued support for the American involvement in the Vietnam War, as well as due to disagreements over domestic economic development, increase of the defense budget (for 50% in 1967-1972 comparing to the previous one), etc., his cabinet was rather unpopular among the Japanese public and in particular among the opposition parties.⁴⁵ Tito's visit to Japan thus helped Japanese Government to gain some positive points among these groups.

Tito was convinced that the biggest motive for inviting him in an official state visit was his position within the Non-Aligned Movement, as he told Nasser on his way back from Japan — "In our opinion, the reason behind that insistence was the fact that Yugoslavia is a non-aligned country."⁴⁶ He generally left Japan in a very good impression, being mostly impressed by the work discipline "that even Germans have never had."⁴⁷

Deepening relations with Yugoslavia in the 1960s, which culminated in Tito's visit to Japan, was part of Japan's pursuit of political power in international relations within the Cold War structure. Japanese Government in the 1960s, and especially Prime Minister Sato who governed for the most of this decade (1964-1972) indeed showed a degree of independence in foreign policy comparing to the previous Japanese governments. Prime Minister Sato continued a line of Japanese foreign policy and security tied down to the US, which was confirmed during his visit to the

⁴⁵ AY PA, KPR I-2 60 J 1088-1093, A trip of President Tito to Japan, Informative-political materials, Elaborate: Contemporary socio-economic situation and position of Japan in international relations

⁴⁶ AY PA KPR I-3-a UAR , Minutes of Conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Brijuni, Croatia, 11.07.1968

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

US in 1965 and 1967. Moreover, during Sato's administration, Japan and US deepened their cooperation on the international security level, committing to cooperation in the Far East. Sato also improved Japan's relations with the countries in the region during his trip around the region in 1967.⁴⁸ It is possible that PM Sato, having strengthening regional ties and cooperation in mind, reached out to the leader of the Non-aligned Movement, President Tito. Tito had naturally good relations with the Southeast Asian countries which belonged to the movement and therefore could help Japan in developing better relations with those countries. According to the LDP vice-president Kowashima, it was in Japan's interests to improve relations with the Non-aligned Movement member countries as well. In that regard, the relations with Yugoslavia were very important as well.⁴⁹

During the decade of the 1960s, bilateral relations between Japan and Yugoslavia saw an improvement. This was possible due to the state of the international environment and their respective positions and according to foreign policies at the time. Both Japan and Yugoslavia gained a better position in the World, which they were working on since the end of World War II. Yugoslavia found its place as the member of the Non-aligned Movement and established herself as an influential country within it. This membership helped it to decrease the pressures from the superpowers and to pursue more independent foreign policy. Japan became an economic power, surpassing the countries of the Western Europe and becoming

⁴⁸ AY PA Put Predsednika Tita u Japan, Informativno-politicki materijali, Elaborat - Savremena drustveno-ekonomska i politicka kretanja i položaj Japana u međunarodnim odnosima

⁴⁹ MOFARS DA 1969 F75D14S439927, Information from the meeting with the LDP vice-president Kowashima with Ambassador K. Bulajic, 06.11.1969

number three in the World. Along with the economic power, Japan intensified its efforts for getting the political power as well.

However it may be, Japan and Yugoslavia still did have differences between their political and economic systems, between their ideologies. In the view of the Japanese Government, Tito's NAM politics was "one man show" with clearly selfish goals behind it. Tito, while acted in order to strengthen NAM position in the world, he actually worked on confirming his own power within the NAM, as well as among the NAM countries' leaders.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, welcoming Tito would bring some benefits to acquiring Japanese foreign policy goals, and they did.

Also, Japan and Yugoslavia had some shared, some conflicting interests in the Southeast Asian Region. Japan was not supportive of all Yugoslav actions related to the Non-aligned countries issues, like the fight of newly independent countries against their previous imperialistic governments.⁵¹

Therefore, improving mutual relations was a part of a bigger picture to both countries. Japan pursued improvement of relations with Asian countries and communist countries. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was aiming at increasing its international position and its position within the Non-aligned Movement.

As the official statement in the Joint Communique says: "the visit of President Tito, his wife, and his associates contributed to the better understanding between the two countries and for the advancement of the future cooperation in politics, economy, and culture."⁵² Yugoslavia certainly did get a better insight into Japanese politics and

⁵⁰ MOFAJ DRO M' 3.1.7.8-5-9, Dai 9-kai Tōō taishi kaigi [9th Eastern Europe Ambassadorial Meeting 1968], Saikin no kokusaikyōsanshugi undō [Recent developments in the international socialism], 25.05.1968.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² AY DA, KPR I-2/38-1, Joint Communique, J. B. Tito's Trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968

industry, its officials enjoyed a warm hospitality and had been treated with the highest respect. It got new business deals and increased its international profile. President Tito appeared to the world as a high-ranked leader, rather than a leader of a country with a failing economy.

Chapter 7: Further Developments - Japanese-Yugoslav Relations in the 1970s

7.1 The International Setting

At the very beginning of the decade, American foreign policy decisions affected the entire world and initiated the changes. The Cold War was not the same since the President Richard Nixon had decided to cancel the convertibility of the US dollar to gold in 1971 and reconcile with the Communist China the following year. Moreover, while both actions had a reason behind it and the US benefited from them, they influenced many countries. However, as much effect this event had on the rest of the world, the effect on Japan was the biggest by far. Abruptly changed America's China policy left Japanese Government shocked and betrayed.

It took a couple of years for Japanese to create a new, adjusted foreign policy. Foreign Minister Ohira for the first time showed intentions towards the greater changes, saying that the Japanese foreign policy was expanding, that it was limited by the San Francisco Peace treaty for years, and that now the circumstances allowed Japan to expand.¹

Although it had already initiated more proactive foreign policy in the mid-1960s, the events in 1970s instigated Japan to put more effort to it. Japan, like the US, tried to play the USSR and PRC against each other in order to gain leverage in the bilateral relations with these countries. Japan was aware that the Soviet Union was left

¹ MOFARS DA, 1973, F52D18S44209, Report from Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo, by Ambassador J. Smole, 18.01.1973.

out alone against the two great powers teamed up in the region and tried to improve relations with Japan.

The Japanese Government even changed its policy of *seikei bunri* towards the communist countries. Japanese government's bank – Export-Import Bank of Japan for the first time got involved in the economic negotiations with the USSR, regarding the Siberia projects. Before, it was a business-level initiative from the Japanese side, hosted by the Keidanren, where the Export-Import Bank was working from behind. In 1973, during the three days projects negotiations in Tokyo, Japan Export-Import Bank became a major negotiating party, next to the Keidanren.² Accordingly, the Japanese business circles started to show more interest towards the Eastern European markets as well.³

Japan initiated the establishment of mixed trade committees in charge of handling trade relations between Japan and Eastern European communist countries and the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s. According to the Diplomatic Bluebook, the purpose was for Japan to create more opportunities for the development of its economy.⁴ A Japan-USSR trade committee was established in 1966, a Japan-Poland trade committee in 1967, Japan-Hungary and Japan-East Germany committees in 1971. The following year, Japan created a committee for trade with Yugoslavia, and also Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania. These committees were a framework for trade between private companies and economic institutions on the Japanese side and governmental institutions on the Eastern European side. On the Japanese side

² MOFARS DA, 1973, F52D20S437601, Report from the Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo, by Ambassador Joze Smole, 30.08.1973.

³ MOFARS DA, 1973, Report about Japan's economic tendencies by the Yugoslav Embassy, by Ambassador Joze Smole, 22.12.1972.

⁴ Gaikō seisho [Diplomatic Bluebook] 1972, *Waga gaikō no kichō/ sho gaikoku to no kankei no zōshin* [The basics of our diplomacy/ Promotion of relations with foreign countries]. (Tokyo. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

committee members usually were people from the Keidanren, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and various civil organizations.⁵ As a result, trade between Japan and Eastern European countries had been increasing year after year, with a growth of 85% between 1973 and 1974, a growth rate much higher than that of Japan's global trade. Japan's trade surplus also grew, causing a considerable imbalance in trade with some Eastern European countries.⁶

7.2 Japan-Yugoslavia Trade Committee

Japan-Yugoslavia Trade Committee for the promotion of trade was established on Jun 21st, 1972 in Tokyo. On the Japanese side, the members came from various companies, the Keidanren, Chamber of Commerce and Japanese Association for improvement of trade with socialist countries. The first President was Shigeo Horie—already a president of Japan-Yugoslavia Friendship Association, and also a President of Japanese Association for improvement of trade with socialist countries. The first joint meeting of this committee was held in Tokyo in 1974.⁷ After this, trade exchange between the two countries increased. As part of the efforts, Japan had been dispatching various economic delegations to the Eastern Europe, while as well receiving the delegations from the region. Yugoslavia welcomed this Japan's efforts,⁸ since, during Tito's visit to Japan in 1968, one of Yugoslavia's goals were boosting

⁵ Yataro Terada, "The System of Trade between Japan and the East European Countries, Including the Soviet Union," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, East-West Trade: Part 1, 37, no. 3 (1972): 437–40.

⁶ "Diplomatic Bluebook for 1974." Public Information Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, accessed December 2, 2014. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1974/1974-contents.htm>.

⁷ YDA, Y1973, F63R02F421771, Information by Smole, 26.04.1974.

⁸ MOFAJ DA 1972 F60F06S419673 "Pismo iz Jugoslovenske Ambasade u Tokju SIP-u, J. Smole (A letter from the Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo, by J. Smole)," May 23, 1972.

trade with Japan. Furthermore, the establishment of the Mixed-Trade Committee for Yugoslavia was an opportunity to fix misbalance in a trade with Japan.⁹

Then followed Japanese delegation's extended visit to Yugoslavia in March 1973, where they carefully investigated the status of Yugoslav economy, looking for the potential improvement points in the bilateral trade. The annual committee meetings were established in 1974.¹⁰ Japanese exports to Yugoslavia more than doubled from 43.5 million USD in 1972, when the committee was created, to 111.9 million USD in 1974 when the first joint meeting occurred. Yugoslav exports to Japan increased six times, from 9.8 million USD in 1972 to 62.7 million USD in 1978. Japan's exports to Eastern Europe also doubled between 1972 and 1974.¹¹

Accordant to the Diplomatic Bluebook, in the light of the Cold War détente, Japan started pursuing improvement of relations with the Eastern bloc member countries.¹² Détente coincided with already undertaken actions by the Japanese Government towards the boost of trade with the communist countries of Eastern Europe.

However it may have looked to the Yugoslav officials, Japan's motives behind this particular trade committee were slightly different from the ones towards the trade committee with the Soviet Union. The first trade committee that was established was the one with the Soviets for the purpose of obtaining better deals for resource imports. The Soviet Union was a significant trading partner with Japan, and its resources had the largest share of Japanese imports from it. On the other side, Yugoslavia did not

⁹ "Pismo iz Jugoslovenske Ambasade u Tokju SIP-u (A letter from the Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo to the MOFARS)," June 22, 1972, 1972 F61F02S424493, MOFARS DA.

¹⁰ MOFARS DA, 1973, F53D02S415761, Notes and Protocol regarding the visit of Japanese economic delegation by Branko Jovicic, Adviser Privredna Komora Jugoslavije, 11.04.1973.

¹¹ Nihon bōekishinkō-kai. Tsūshōhakusho (White paper on international trade), Japan. Tokyo. Japan External Trade Organization. 1975, 324.

¹² "Diplomatic Bluebook (Gaikō seisho) 1972," July 1972, Sekainougoki/ Ōshū no jōsei/ Tōō

have much to offer in that regard. Throughout the whole period of the bilateral relations after the World War II, Yugoslav side was finding ways to promote and expand trade with Japan, but without much success.

Although it was the first investor to Yugoslavia after the split from the Soviet Union, Japan never actually aimed at expanding the trade relations. Japan did negotiate and participate in various trade arrangements with Yugoslav counterparts, but the whole thing never went any further than that. It is even funny how Yugoslav official never saw through the Japanese economic policy towards Yugoslavia, even after decades of trying to expand the economic side of the relations without success. It is the impression that Yugoslav officials were seeing all the smallest efforts from the Japanese side as hopeful that one day something big might happen. However, it never has. Japanese were applying the same policy that they were applying to the Soviet Union (such as the Trade and Maritime Agreement in 1959, the formation of Trade Committee in 1972), only on a smaller scale. Moreover, while after concluding the Trade and Maritime Agreement the USSR got separate agreements on trade quotas and trade plans renewed every five years, Yugoslavia (as well as other poor Eastern European countries) never moved from the first, basic agreement.

The same thing was happening in the 1970s, with the Trade Committee. While Yugoslavia was happy about its establishment and was getting happier and happier with every committee meeting, trade volume has not advanced. Moreover, due to the Yugoslav economy failing more evidently than before (the money reserves at this point were drained out almost entirely), Japan Export-Import Bank rejected to finance many trade deals during this decade. While, on the other side, Siberia, and the Russian Far East projects were advancing.

In 1972 Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry denied a loan for export of the textile factory equipment to Yugoslavia from Kanematsu Goshō because of the bad state of Yugoslav monetary reserves. Although some loans were approved, not all of them did. Loan for export by Itoh to Jadranbrod (Shipbuilding Company) was adopted.¹³ This proves that despite Japan's open trade policy towards the communist countries of Eastern Europe, realistic thinking prevented them from making mistakes.

Although not advancing on the bilateral level, Yugoslavia's rising popularity among the Non-aligned Movement countries caught a Japanese eye. According to the Ambassador Kuroda's report, Japanese were closely following Yugoslavia's role in the East-West relations and its growing influence in the world.¹⁴

Main developments in the bilateral relations were, however, in the sphere of economy, due to the annual trade committee meetings and constant business proposals and negotiations. On the other side, on a political level the Japan-Yugoslavia relations were on the same level as before - regular parliamentary visits on both sides. During this decade occurred two high-profile visits, both from the Japanese side – a visit from the Japanese Crown Prince and Princess to Yugoslavia in 1976 and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan Masayoshi Ohira visited Yugoslavia in May 1973. Ohira's visit was partially organized as a return visit to President Tito's five years before.

7.3 Crown Prince Akihito's Visit to Yugoslavia

Crown Prince Akihito's visit to Yugoslavia was organized as a return visit to the previous Tito's visit to Japan in 1968. Japanese Crown Prince Akihito and Princess

¹³ MOFARS DA, 1972, F61D02S435335, Report from Yugoslav Embassy in Tokyo, by Ambassador Joze Smole, 04.10.1972.

¹⁴ MOFAJ M'3.1.1.32-4-7 Zaigai kōkan-chō ni taisuru kun-tachi kankei Ōshū chiiki no bu chū yūgōsuravu-ia taishi/ Kuroda chū yūgosurabia taishi

Michiko came to Yugoslavia in 1976. Yugoslavia was the first communist country to be visited by the members of the Japanese Royal family. A few years later, in 1979, the Crown Prince and Princess visited Romania and Bulgaria.¹⁵

Although Prince Akihito's visit was not a political visit, he was still accompanied by the advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Yoshihiro Nakajima and a team from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁶ Also, Tito stated that the relations between Japan and Yugoslavia were developing well. Yugoslav economy was supported by many loans and investments from Japan.¹⁷

As already said, Crown Prince and Princess did not visit Yugoslavia as political representatives of Japan and their visit was organized in a sightseeing manner. However, since they were a royal couple, they were welcomed with highest honors. Additionally, even though the Crown Prince was not a political figure, he was accompanied by Japanese high-ranking officials who were political figures and who met with their counterparts in Yugoslavia. However, relations between Japan and Yugoslavia in the 1970s were in a stalemate with only Mixed Trade Committees active, and this visit did not express anything more than a good friendly relations.

In the events of Tito's death in 1980, although a sentiment of good friendly relations remained, relationship between Japan and Yugoslavia changed. Yugoslavia became politically and economically unstable country and Japan simply halted most of the ongoing cooperation out of precautions. This turned out to be smart decision since Yugoslavia after Tito was torn among nationally based conflicts and soon vanished in civil war.

¹⁵ "List of Abroad Visits of the Royal Family (1953 - 1988)." The Imperial Household Agency. <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/about/gokomu/shinzen/gaikoku/gaikoku-s.html>. Accessed April 20, 2015.

¹⁶ Politika [Politic; Yugoslav newspapers], Borba [The Fight; Yugoslav newspapers], 13.07.1976

¹⁷ Borba, 15.06.1976.

Conclusion

Through analysis of Japanese and Serbian diplomatic archival documents, as well additional materials, such as published documents from the MOFAJ, this dissertation has contributed to our understanding of the relationship between Japan and Yugoslavia during the Cold War. As two countries with opposing ideologies, Japan and Yugoslavia found themselves on the opposite sides of the Cold War confrontation. Nevertheless, throughout the years they have been working on the development of their bilateral relationship. Moreover, the two countries have found interests in pursuing the development in order to achieve their respective national interests. The perspective taken within this dissertation is that, although Japan was often considered to be passive and reactive in international relations, it actively pursued its national interests by taking initiatives and developing relations with ideologically opposed countries and countries with different socio-political-economic systems. Through an analysis of particular events in Japanese-Yugoslav shared history, it is shown that both countries contributed to the development of their bilateral relationship as part of a strategy to achieve their respective national goals.

The study, its purpose, and background were introduced in the introduction where also the research questions were posed. To recall, the research questions are as follows:

- 1) How the diplomatic relations between Japan and Yugoslavia have been developing since 1952 when they were established?

2) What kind of motives had two unrelated (even ideologically contradictory) regimes have to pursue the development of diplomatic relations and what did these two geographically, historically, politically and socially distant countries find in common under the Cold War (1952-1980)?

From the Japanese side, all Eastern European Communist countries were treated as part of the group since they all had similar socio-politico-economic systems. In that regard, Yugoslavia as well was considered to be one of the Eastern European Communist countries. More often than not, Japan developed and pursued same foreign policies towards the group of those countries, i.e. if a trade agreement was signed with one of them, it was also signed with the others. However, despite geographical proximity and same ideology, there are in fact major differences between Eastern European Communist countries and Yugoslavia. Although it was a Communist country which geographically belonged to the Eastern European Region, Yugoslavia, different from the satellites, distanced itself from the Soviet Union. Moreover, Yugoslavia developed relatively good relations with the United States and the Western bloc. It cooperated with the both superpowers, although sometimes had strained relations with one or another. Moreover, because of its close relations and connections with both the Eastern and Western blocs, Yugoslavia was a valuable source of information about the blocs for Japanese officials. Therefore, although was a Communist country, Yugoslavia was a useful Communist country to Japan.

Yugoslavia was the first Communist country to establish diplomatic relations with Japan after World War II (in 1952) and started relations four years before the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries (in 1956). Over the years the two countries exchanged numerous high-level visits, among which President Josip Broz Tito's visit to Japan in April 1968 which was the most important event in their

bilateral relations. President Tito thus became the first Communist leader from Eastern Europe to visit Japan. By the time of Tito's visit to Japan in April 1968 Yugoslav President has already become well-known to the world at the beginning of the 1960s for his travels around the world and meetings with numerous world leaders. As one of the leaders of the Non-aligned Movement and influential figure in East-West relations at the time, Tito has visited many countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union. He was focused on increasing his political power within the NAM as well as on international level. On the other hand, Japan has achieved enviable economic growth and has become not only the influential actor in the East Asian Region but also in the world.

The second chapter overviewed methodology and previous research regarding Japan and Yugoslavia during the Cold War. Furthermore, it outlined the analytical framework. The analysis of Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations in this dissertation is based on the combined analysis of the two sets of archival materials, newly declassified materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Diplomatic Archives and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia Diplomatic Archives. In addition to that, this dissertation employs additional materials, such are the documents from the Archives of Yugoslavia the Foreign Relations of the United States Series and materials published by Japanese state institutions. It also includes articles from Japanese and Yugoslav newspapers.

A literature overview showed that Japan's relations with the United States had provided an analytical framework where Japan was almost exclusively analyzed through its alliance with the United States and in that regard perceived as a minor ally,

a dependent party in that relationship,¹ or as a reactive or defensive state.² However, in some recent studies, it was found that Japan implemented a sort of double standards when it comes to its diplomatic relations, creating different foreign policy strategies for different countries. In that regard, Japan created a two-track foreign policy: one for the West and one for Asia. Moreover, in East and Southeast Asia, Japan at times undertook actions on the foreign policy level that the United States did not approve and therefore they had problems with them.³ This showed us that, although an indisputable American ally, Japan sometimes, in order to pursue its own national interests, cooperated with countries which were not approved by the United States or with Communist countries, which had utterly opposing ideologies and political systems. Moreover, there are plenty of studies considering Japan's relations with the two most influential Cold War Communist countries – the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.⁴

¹ Makoto Iokibe and Robert D. Eldridge, eds., *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011); Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The United States-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, A Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival, 1950-1960*, Luther Hartwell Hodges Series on Business, Society, and the State (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Glenn D. Hook, ed., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies / Routledge Series (New York: Routledge, 2012); Yoshihide Soeya, *Nihon No "midoru Pawā" gaikō: Sengo Nihon No Sentaku to Kōsō*, Chikuma Shinsho 535 (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 2005).

² Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," *World Politics* 40, no. 4 (July 1988): 517–41, doi:10.2307/2010317; Kenneth B. Pyle, "In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 243, doi:10.2307/132470; Gerald L. Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change*, Studies of the East Asian Institute (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993).

³ Ming Wan, *Japan between Asia and the West: Economic Power and Strategic Balance* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

⁴ Toshio Oshikawa, *Sengo Nitchū Bōeki to Sono Shūhen: Taikenteki Nitchū Kōryū: Dokyumento (Postwar Japan-China Trade and Its Surroundings: Experiential Intercultural Exchange: Document)* (Tōkyō: Tosho Shuppan : Gogatsu Shobō, 1997); Christopher Howe, ed., *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*, Studies on Contemporary China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); George P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China," *Asian Survey* 9, no. 12 (December 1969): 900–918, doi:10.2307/2642558; Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian*

The second chapter introduced a background setting of the international environment during the Cold War, explaining the relations between the superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union, ideological confrontation and basic events in the East-West relations during that period. The Cold War divided the world into two major spheres of interest – the American sphere, representing the democracy and the free world, and the Soviet sphere which represented the Communism. The superpower ideological confrontation heavily influenced the rest of the world, making an impact on both Japan, which belonged to the democratic world, and Yugoslavia, which belonged to the Communist world.

A changing international environment in the aftermath of World War II was additionally disrupted by the confrontation between the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The confrontation, although had started over Europe, spread over Asia and other continents.

The Soviet Union put countries of central-east Europe under its strict control, with the exception of Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union also had a powerful ally in Asia – the People’s Republic of China, until the beginning of the 1960s, when the alliance broke down. The Western bloc, on the other hand, was gathered around the other superpower – the United States. This bloc was formed predominantly by the countries in west Europe, but was also aligned with Japan through the United States – Japan alliance.

However, the ideological confrontations may have been a complicated and important factor for the international environment, the intensity of confrontation

Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace (London; New York: Routledge, 2003); Gordon Smith, “Resent Trends in Japanese-Soviet Trade,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 5 (1987): 111–23; Weibin Wang, “1950-Nendai nitchū ryōkoku gaikō seisaku no keisei to tenkai - `seikei bunri’ to `seikei fukabun’ ni kansuru kenkyū (Japan-China Relations in 1950s and Foreign Policy Formation and Development - Study on ‘separating politics from the economy’ and ‘Political and Social Inefficiency’” (PhD dissertation, University of Kyoto, 2000).

varied through time. The world experienced many crises, such as the Berlin Crisis (1961) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and Korean (1950-1953) and Vietnam War (1955-1975). However, the world also experienced a decrease of tensions in the mid-1950s and at the beginning of the 1970s.

Chapters three and four further explained Japan and Yugoslavia's respective positions within that international environment. Yugoslavia, although a Communist country, did not belong to the Soviet bloc. Its relations with the Soviet bloc were rather complicated at times. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was on good terms with the Western democracies and the United States in particular. The alliance was far from honest and solid, but the United States and Yugoslavia maintained good relations throughout the Cold War. Yugoslavia had a peculiar position having been a Communist country which cooperated with the West. However its relationships with democratic countries were solid, Yugoslavia was a strong advocate of Communism in the world. Yugoslavia, which was the greatest Soviet ally in the aftermath of World War II, soon became the only communist country in Eastern Europe to be outside of the Eastern bloc. Since the first half of the 1950s, Yugoslavia maintained good relations with the Western bloc and the United States in particular. However, while Yugoslavia became a Western ally, its political system and ideology remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism.

After Stalin's death, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union reconciled, although Yugoslavia remained to be outside of the Soviet influence. Starting from 1961, Yugoslavia became co-founder and Tito a leader of the Non-aligned Movement, the third group (but not bloc) in the Cold War environment. Through the NAM, Yugoslavia gained more relative power in the international relations vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union.

Japan, as an American ally in East Asia, belonged to the free world and the Western bloc, the bloc which fought against the Communism. Therefore, Japan's relations with communist countries, particularly in the beginning of the reestablishment in the 1950s, were hardened. However, Japan, in order to achieve its national interests, needed to cooperate with that part of the world as well. In that regard, Japan pursued development of relations with communist countries. In spite of People's Republic of China's ideology and disapproval from the United States, Japan, in a degree which was possible, worked on improving this relationship. The similar could be said for the relations with the Soviet Union. If Japan was strict with its political beliefs, it would never benefited from the resources rich Soviet Siberian area. Japan chose to subordinate its political beliefs to the economic interest. This was the essence of the Japanese foreign policy throughout the whole Cold War, illuminated the best in *seikei bunri* policy. In the beginning, in the 1950s, *seikei bunri* policy was applied on relations with Yugoslavia as well. For sure, Yugoslavia's unstable foreign policy must not have been easy for Japan to deal with. But Yugoslavia's balancing between the blocs and later on joining the third (non)bloc were things that drawn Japan closer to Yugoslavia than to other Eastern European countries. This made Yugoslavia attractive to the Japanese bigger opposition party - Japanese Socialist Party, which had people who openly praised Tito's politics and Yugoslavia's non-aligned position. On the other hand, Tito's good relations with the United States made Yugoslavia attractive to the Japanese ruling (pro-American) party – Liberal Democratic Party.

After providing a bigger picture to the story, chapters five, six and seven addressed the research questions. Chapter five primarily addressed the first research question regarding how bilateral relations between Japan and Yugoslavia were

developing since the reestablishment in 1952. Japan had not reestablished diplomatic relations with any of Communist countries during the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951, and Yugoslavia has become the first Communist countries Japan established diplomatic relations with in February 1952. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was among the first Communist countries to sign a trade and maritime agreement with Japan. On the other hand, Japan was among the first countries to provide assistance to Yugoslavia during the most difficult years of its isolation from the Eastern bloc countries.

By the time they reestablished their diplomatic relations, Japan and Yugoslavia found themselves with different political and economic systems and contradictory ideological beliefs. Yugoslavia was a communist country, second only to the Soviet Union by the implementation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. It had a centrally-planned economic system, which although different from those of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, had a state-controlled economy and was not working on the principles of the free market. Japan, on the other hand, was a democratic state with a free-market economy. The two countries belonged to the opposite sides of the Cold War confrontation — Japan belonged to the Western block, which fought to contain communism, and Yugoslavia was a communist country which, although defected from the Eastern bloc, was ideologically closer to the East rather than the West. Therefore, their bilateral relationship was influenced by the Cold War tensions and interests of the superpowers.

In the 1950s both countries were preoccupied with other more pressing issues, Japan with re-establishing relations with neighboring East Asian countries, and Yugoslavia with keeping its independence from the Soviet bloc and balancing between the blocs in order to survive. Thus, initial years of developing the relations

during the 1950s were slow, but at this period was set up a base for further, more frequent diplomatic and economic delegations' exchange visits in the 1960s. A conclusion of Trade and Maritime Agreement in 1959 proved to be beneficial less on economic and more on the political level. It was a part of Japanese policy for cooperation with communist countries in Europe. It appeared to have significance as a tool for developing friendly relations between the two distant countries. Although the agreement did not bring significant earnings to either, at the time it was significant in a way that both countries needed to expand their networks of trade and political partners in order to pursue more balanced politics vis-à-vis the superpowers, upon which they were dependent. For both Japan and Yugoslavia, the ability to trade with various countries other than the superpowers represented a step forward towards independence from superpowers' pressures.

Chapter six addressed both research questions analyzing how the Japanese-Yugoslav relationship was developing in the decade of the 1960s and what were their respective motives behind it. During the decade of the 1960s, bilateral relations between Japan and Yugoslavia saw an improvement. This was possible due to the state of the international environment and their respective positions and according to foreign policies at the time. Both Japan and Yugoslavia gained a better position in the world, which they were working on since the end of the World War II. Yugoslavia found its place as the member of the Non-aligned Movement and established herself as an influential country within it. This membership helped it to decrease the pressures from the superpowers and to pursue more independent foreign policy. Japan became an economic power, surpassing the countries of the Western Europe and becoming number three in the World. Along with the economic power, Japan intensified its efforts for getting the political power as well.

President Tito's visit to Japan at the end of the 1960s contributed to the improvement of Japanese image among the Southeast Asian countries. It also helped the Government to gain some support from various socialist groups within the country, the largest opposition parties among the others. On the other hand, President Tito achieved his goals as well. He presented himself as a world-class statesman, capable of working closely with both East and West. His influence within the Non-aligned movement was on the ascending path.

For Yugoslavia, relations with Japan had always been a part of a general foreign policy to develop good relations with as many countries as possible, in order to balance among the superpowers and shake off their influence over Yugoslav foreign policy. Moreover, Japan, having been an economically strong country even throughout the 1950s, and especially in the 1960s, was an important ally for pursuing Yugoslav foreign policy goals. However, despite all Yugoslav efforts, the bilateral relations have never developed in a more meaningful partnership. For rational Japanese policy makers, Yugoslavia was as valuable as the information regarding the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China it possessed. Trade relations with Yugoslavia could never offer a significant boost to the Japanese economy. Therefore, Japanese have maintained trade with Yugoslavia on a minimal level, not wanting to get too deep into economic or political problems of a communist country.

Chapter seven dealt with the aftermath of the biggest event in Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic history. The bilateral relations continued developing with the same pace after this visit. With economic cooperation still on the same level, Japan and Yugoslavia formed a joint mixed trade committee in 1974. Two years later Japanese Crown Prince paid a visit to Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia and Japan did not have same position vis-à-vis Eastern and Western blocs. But both of them had to fight for their independence in foreign policy making and worked very hard to balance their position in the Cold War structure. Both Japan and Yugoslavia pursued their own respective interests within the Cold War framework. The balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union was not in equilibrium, thus creating an instable environment to pursue foreign policy within. On the other hand, this instability left maneuvering space and enabled them to pursue their foreign policy interests.

Relations between Japan and Yugoslavia during the Cold War were based on their respective national interests. Economically, Yugoslavia needed Japan's technology and capital in its efforts to modernize the economy. On the other hand, Japan needed to diversify its export markets and Yugoslav raw materials to some extent were useful for raw materials deficit Japan. Politically, Yugoslavia needed Japan, which was an industrialized country, and a member of the Western club, to boost the support for the NAM, as well as to diversify its allies in order to assume more power vis-à-vis the superpowers. In contrast, Yugoslavia was a regional and political power among the third world with global importance. Japan needed Yugoslavia's support in its drive for a major political role in global and regional politics.

Under these circumstances, Japan and Yugoslavia expanded their cooperation, intensified official state visits, which culminated with the visit of President Tito to Japan in 1968. He was the first socialist president of the Eastern Europe to visit Japan, and moreover, to be received by the Emperor. This visit was an expression of the mutual interest in the development of the bilateral cooperation and the cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.

Their actual goals which lied at the very bottom of their foreign policies were: development and expanding economy and pursuit of power (economic and political). They developed good, friendly relations with any country remotely politically acceptable in order to achieve these goals. It was not that Japan and Yugoslavia developed their bilateral relations due to the common ideology or greater trade benefit. It was their broader foreign policy goals that set up the road for the relationship. Both countries needed any ally they could possibly get in order to strengthen their bargaining positions vis-à-vis the superpowers. And their bilateral relationship helped them towards their respective goals.

The pursuit of national goals was a prime motivation for Japan to ignore ideological differences with Yugoslavia and that as a part of pursuit for the achievement of their respective national interests they cooperated and worked on the development of their bilateral relationship. Although Japan and Yugoslavia were ideologically opposed countries during the Cold War, ideological differences were not a decisive factor in the development of Japanese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations.

This research entered into an area of an uncharted territory in the scholarship on Diplomatic History. While Japan's relationship with other Communist countries such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been widely documented, there is a lacuna in the literature on interactions with other Communist countries. In the case of Japan and other Eastern European Communist country relations, there have been few studies to date; whereas Japan's relationship with Yugoslavia, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, has thus far been undocumented. Thus, this dissertation creates a new page in the diplomatic history of

Japanese-Yugoslav relations since it represents the first analytical account of their bilateral relations.

Moreover, often times studies are done on Japan's relations with countries from the Eastern Europe. However, Yugoslavia is either just a passing mention or none at all. In addition to contributing to the academic work on Japan's relations with Yugoslavia, this research will also add to the existing body of work on Yugoslav diplomatic history.

Since it is based on unpublished (and for the most part unused) materials from Japanese and Serbian diplomatic archives, this dissertation reveals new evidence to the Cold War historiographies of Japan and Yugoslavia. In particular, it presents new information and perspective on Japan's relations with Communist countries from Eastern Europe during the Cold War, shedding light on Japanese Cold War diplomatic relations.

This dissertation also contributes to our understanding of East-West relations during the Cold War. As both Japan and Yugoslavia were very much influenced by the superpowers, their relations with the superpowers represented the biggest part in their diplomacies. Moreover, Japanese-Yugoslav relations and its development were also considered from the perspective of their relations with the superpowers. Yugoslavia usually sought the development of relations with Japan when it was trying to prove to the United States or the Soviet Union how it is capable of having another outstanding (and economically prominent) partner or when it was attempting to increase its political power and become a factor of influence between the blocs. On the other side, Japan as well was seeking strengthening ties with Yugoslavia mostly because of interest to balance its foreign relations between the blocs. The case of Japanese-Yugoslav relations also shows that the blocs were not monolithic and

unified in their fight against each other, and moreover, that the Cold War was not the war of ideologies, but in fact, a war where ideological differences were often eclipsed by national interests.

One of the main arguments of this research is that smaller states within the Cold War had to choose rationality over ideology in order to survive and develop further. This thesis showed how smaller states were pursuing their foreign policy interests while balancing between the blocs during the Cold War, based on the example of Japanese-Yugoslav bilateral relations. Furthermore, it showed how the smaller states with the different political systems and with different positions pursued their respective interests. Moreover, it showed how the countries with different political systems, which imposed them restraints in the international relations, still pursued basically the same thing – establishment of their places in the international system and pursued power.

Finally, this thesis showed how a political system of one country and its ideology did not make it blind for pursuing its interests to the best of its ability. Yugoslav socialist/communist ideologies always drew it towards the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union, but reality was directing it in the opposite direction. This was first showed in Tito's attempt to reconcile with the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Though Yugoslavia was a recipient of the Marshall Plan Aid at the time, and even had military consultations and cooperation with the United States, in the events of Stalin's death, Tito let his ideology and sentiments to raise his hopes for the coming back to the bloc. Within the span of only three years, he was proved wrong. Around that time he started to utilize the superpowers' confrontation develop to Yugoslav benefit.

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