

A Functional Approach to English Constructions
Related to Evidentiality

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List of Abbreviations

ACC	accusative	MOD	modality
COMP	complimentizer	NOM	nominative
COP	copula	P.DEM	proximal demonstrative
DAT	dative	PF	perfective
PL	plural	POL	polite
EVID	evidential	Q	question
GEN	genitive	SFP	sentence-final particle
IMPF	imperfective	SG	singular
INFER	inferential	STAT	stative
LOC	locative	SUPER-POL	super-polite
M	masculine	TOP	topic
MIR	mirative		

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Evidentiality: Grammaticalized or Not Grammaticalized

Some languages develop grammatical items encoding the semantic category concerning the source of information. This category has traditionally been called *evidentiality*.¹ Evidential expressions “[cover] the way in which the information was acquired” (Aikhenvald (2004: 3)): they signal that the information in question was obtained via first-hand observation, inference, hearsay, and so on. With respect to information status, “[e]videntials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE” (Anderson (1986: 274)). Japanese is, for example, rich in evidential markers. Typical evidential expressions are as follows (the examples in (1)-(4) are cited from Aoki (1986: 230, 232)):

(1) Ame-ga hutteiru soo da.
rain-NOM be falling EVID COP
‘They say it is raining.’

(2) Ame-ga hutteiru tte.
rain-NOM be falling EVID
‘They say it is raining.’

(3) Konokusuri-wa yoku kiku yoo da.
this medicine-TOP well work EVID COP

¹ I use the term *evidentiality* in what Willett (1988) calls “the narrow sense”; namely, evidentiality in this thesis refers to a linguistic category “whose primary meaning is source of information” (Aikhenvald (2004: 3)). Unlike Chafe (1986) and Palmer (1987), I do not include in the scope of evidentiality the speaker’s epistemological attitude toward his knowledge like reliability, probability, and possibility. “Assessments of the truth or factuality of a proposition traditionally fall into the domain of modality” (Floyd (1999: 21)).

‘I infer from my own experience that this medicine works well.’

- (4) Konokusuri-wa yoku kiku rasii.

this medicine-TOP well work EVID

‘I infer from what I heard that this medicine works well.’

- (5) Ame-ga hutteiru.

rain-NOM be falling

‘It is raining.’

The nominalizer *soo* followed by the copula *da* in (1) and the quotation marker *tte* in (2) indicate hearsay; they differ in that the latter is used in casual speech (cf. Makino and Tsutsui (1986), Hasegawa (2015)). The nominalizer *yoo* followed by *da* in (3) and the auxiliary *rasii* in (4) denote inferential evidentiality; they are, however, distinguished, as the English translations suggest, in that the former “is used when the speaker has some visible, tangible, or audible evidence collected through his own senses” while the latter “is used when the evidence is circumstantial or gathered through sources other than one’s own senses” (Aoki (1986: 231)). Notice that no evidential marker is used, as in (5), when the speaker directly perceives the event in question (cf. Kamio (1990), Hirose (2013)); the zero-evidential also contributes to evidential interpretations.^{2, 3} A number of

² Direct perception is concerned with not only five senses but also emotion or thought (cf. Floyd (1999)). When we talk about, say, our own sadness, we normally say in Japanese:

- (i) (Watasi-wa) kanasii.
I-TOP sad
‘I am sad.’

In (i), because the speaker is expressing his own sadness, the sentence is marked by no evidential marker. It is strange in this situation to use evidential markers like *-rasii* and *-yoo da* (i.e. **(Watasi-wa) kanasii {rasii/yoo da}*). When we talk about others’ mental states, on the other hand, sentences should be marked with evidential markers, because the speaker cannot directly perceive others’ emotions or thoughts (cf. Aoki (1986), Kamio (1990)):

- (ii) {Kimi/Kare}-wa kanasii *(rasii / yoo da) ne.
{you/he}-TOP sad EVID EVID COP you know
‘You are sad/He is sad.’

studies have conducted investigations into grammatical evidential items of languages in the world and given highly detailed descriptions of them. Findings accumulated in these works are collected in Aikhenvald (2004), which organizes languages with grammatical evidential items in terms of evidential meanings they encode and in terms of the number of evidential items they have.

There are, on the other hand, languages which have no grammatical items specialized in expressing evidentiality. English is one of those languages (cf. Hill and Irvine (1993), Lazard (2001), Aikhenvald (2004)). Because of the absence of grammatical evidential markers, English often does not linguistically specify evidential meanings, leaving evidential interpretations open. This means that evidential interpretations of sentences should be inferred from contexts. The sentence *it's raining*, for instance, can appear without linguistically specifying evidential meaning, and have various evidential interpretations, as shown in the following examples (Shizawa (2015b: 162)):

- (6) (*The speaker is looking out the window.*) Oh, it's raining.
- (7) It's raining (, because they are walking under their umbrellas).
- (8) A: What did John say?
B: It's raining.

In (6), the speaker is describing the situation he sees in front of him; the sentence expresses the speaker's visual perception. In (7), on the other hand, the speaker does not visually perceive that it is raining, but infers this information from the fact that people are walking under their umbrellas; in this case, the sentence can be regarded as an inferential

³ The zero-evidential in Hixkaryana, for instance, also contributes to evidential interpretations (Derbyshire (1985)).

evidential. Lastly, in (8), speaker B is conveying to speaker A what John said; the sentence has a hearsay interpretation. The contrast between Japanese and English shows that languages can be dichotomously divided based on whether evidentiality is deeply rooted in their grammatical systems or not.

1.2. Evidentiality in English: Forms and Functions

The lack of grammatical evidential expressions in English, however, does not mean that English does not linguistically mark evidentiality. It has been pointed out that certain verbs, adverbs, and phrases can be exploited to express evidentiality (cf. Anderson (1986), Chafe (1986), Fox (2001), Aikhenvald (2004)). Although these items may not be inherently evidential markers, they are conventionally used as evidential expressions because of their semantic compatibility with evidential meanings. For instance:

- (9) I hear Mary won the prize. (Anderson (1986: 274))
- (10) She says they met the professor later. (Fox (2001: 171))
- (11) Well Schaeffer it seems had just found the latest article from the Smithsonian.
(Chafe (1986: 268))
- (12) There's over a hundred thousand according to this article. (Fox (2001: 172))
- (13) The band have reportedly decided to split up. (OALD⁷)
- (14) I guess I was thinking about it in a different way. (Chafe (1986: 266))
- (15) I see that you were sick last night. (Matlock (1989: 216))
- (16) John must have arrived (because I see his coat on the chair).
(Anderson (1986: 274))

All these underlined expressions are, more or less, related to evidential interpretations.

Roughly speaking, *I hear* in (9), *She says* in (10), *it seems* in (11), *according to this article* in (12), and *reportedly* in (13) indicate that the information was obtained from a third-person, and *I guess* in (14), *I see* in (15), and *must have* in (16) express inferential evidentials.^{4, 5} However, as noted above, they may not reside in the system as evidentials proper. Anderson (1986), for example, points out that the verb *hear* is interpreted not as an evidential but as a main predicate describing the subject's action when it is stressed, as illustrated in (17). In this case, the proposition in the *that*-clause can be replaced with the pronoun *that* as in *I already HEARD that, you don't need to tell me AGAIN* (Anderson (1986: 276)).

(17) I HEARD (that) Mary won the prize. (Anderson (1986: 276))

These examples suggest that English speakers know the way to linguistically mark the source of information by using expressions like those given in (9)-(16) which are not evidentials proper but whose semantic meanings are potentially compatible with evidential meanings.

Why, then, is evidentiality manifested in English as in (9)-(16), when its linguistic realization is not obligatory? A well-known view on the function of evidential expressions in English regards evidentials as “reflecting or conveying the *speaker's* degree of certainty” (Sidnell (2012: 297)); evidential sentences normally weaken the speaker's degree of certainty (cf. Willett (1988), Matlock (1989), Floyd (1999), Simons (2007)). According to Matlock (1989: 217), *I hear* in example (9), for instance, indicates that the speaker obtained the information via a third person; by making the information source

⁴ Following Kärkkäinen (2007), I regard *I guess* as an inferential expression.

⁵ The evidential use of *I see* as in (15) is not related to visual perception, but “code[s] the speaker's deduction based on the perception of the end results of an event” (Matlock (1989:216)). According to Matlock (1989: 216), the information in the *that*-clause in (15) can be interpreted to be a conclusion deduced from the observation of, say, an aspirin bottle, or vomit.

clear, he keeps his distance from the information; “[t]his increase in ‘distance’ results in greater uncertainty on the part of the speaker.”

Another long standing view (which is closely related to the above view) is concerned with the speaker’s authority, responsibility, and entitlement (cf. Aijmer (1980), Okada (1985), Shuman (1993), Ifantidou (1994), Fox (2001)).⁶ Aijmer (1980), for instance, notes that the sentence in (18) has at least two interpretations (see also Okada (1985) and Ifantidou (1994)).

(18) It is said that fear in human beings causes odour. (Aijmer (1980: 116)).

It is said in (18) indicates that the information in the *that*-clause is shared knowledge in the community. In some contexts, it can be used to authorize what the speaker is conveying by indicating that the information is shared in the community as general knowledge. In other contexts, it can also be used to avoid responsibility for the statement by attributing it to a third party. Furthermore, Fox (2001) proposes the functional difference between sentences with and without evidential expressions. She claims that “zero-evidential marking [i.e. sentences without evidential markers] represents a claim to greater authority, responsibility, and entitlement than does overt evidential marking” (Fox (2001: 170)); sentences like those in (9)-(16) express less authority, responsibility, and entitlement than those in (6)-(8).⁷

Notice that previous studies typically describe the function of evidential expressions in terms of the speaker, i.e. the *speaker*’s degree of certainty, or the *speaker*’s authority, responsibility, and entitlement (cf. Sidnell (2012), Mushin (2013)); they do not seriously

⁶ The term *entitlement* means ownership of experience and information (Shuman (1993)).

⁷ She argues that the speaker chooses either sentences with evidential expressions or those without evidential expressions, depending on the social relationship with the hearer; she regards evidential expressions as index of social reality. See Fox (2001) for more detailed discussion.

take into consideration the relationship between evidential expressions and the hearer. These speaker-oriented analyses of evidentiality, however, are not sufficient to fully generalize the function of English evidential expressions.

1.3. Aim

The analyses proposed in previous studies seem to work out well as far as the evidential expressions recognized in these studies are concerned. Notice here that English, unlike languages with grammatical evidential items such as Japanese, has not been seriously studied to descriptively clarify what evidential meanings are manifested by what evidential expressions. So it comes as no surprise that there exist evidential expressions which have not been recognized as such so far. A question arising here is: Can the speaker-oriented analyses in the previous studies be applied to those as-yet-unrecognized evidential expressions? I will point out that there do exist evidential expressions which lie beyond the scope of speaker-oriented analyses. The constructions I deal with in the thesis are given in (19)-(23). All the constructions have been, more or less, considered in previous studies repeatedly, but rarely dealt with in detail from the perspective of evidentiality.⁸

(19) *The it is that-construction:*

I cannot pay you back today. It's just that all the banks are closed.

(Koops (2007: 207))

(20) *The take it that-construction:*

I take it you won't be coming to the party? (OALD⁷)

(21) *The I tell you-construction:*

⁸ As for the deictic inversion construction, I largely draw on Shizawa (2015a), in which the construction is regarded as an evidential construction.

I tell you, I could fly around this room without my eyes closed! (Toy Story)

(22) *The subjectless construction:*

Wouldn't blame her if she did leave him. (Thrasher (1977: 28))

(23) *The deictic inversion construction:*

There's Harry with his red hat on. (Lakoff (1987: 469))

As will be demonstrated in Chapters 3-7, these constructions are used not to weaken the speaker's degree of certainty, or his authority, responsibility, and entitlement, but to achieve different communicative goals (the functions of these constructions are different from one another); their functions cannot be captured by merely focusing on the speaker, as in the previous studies, and cannot be generalized unless we introduce the perspective of the hearer.

Given the existence of these constructions, we must say that there has yet to be a full generalization about the function of English evidential expressions. In the first place, “[t]he communicative functions of evidentials in interaction are still poorly understood” (Nuckolls and Michael (2012: 181)) in not only English but also other languages. The functional aspect is thus still the frontier of research in evidentiality. Hoping to explore and develop this frontier, the thesis aims to give a generalization about the function of evidentiality to cover a full range of evidential expressions in English. In doing so, as just mentioned above, I will make a point of defining the function from the hearer's perspective.

The generalization I will propose can be extended to a linguistic category often discussed in relation to evidentiality, namely *mirativity*, which is occasionally subsumed under the category of evidentiality (cf. Lazard (1999, 2001); see also Guentchéva (1994)). Mirativity is a category “whose primary meaning is speaker's unprepared mind,

unexpected new information, and concomitant surprise” (Aikhenvald (2004: 209)). Evidentiality and mirativity are similar in that they “essentially delineate the speaker’s relationship, either physically or psychologically, to experienced events and states” (Dickinson (2000: 381)). As with languages with grammatical evidential items, languages with grammatical mirative items have attracted much attention since the seminal work of DeLancey (1997). English, on the other hand, has not become the focus of attention because of the lack of such grammatical mirative items. Notice that like evidentiality, mirativity can be linguistically manifested with the aid of certain constructions (cf. DeLancey (2012)). However, it remains unclear what constructions encode mirativity in English, let alone what functions those constructions have. I will attempt to illustrate that the following three constructions encode mirativity and pursue the applicability of the proposal I will give in the thesis to their functions:

(24) *The turns out-construction:*

Turns out the bowing wasn’t the cause of his problems.

(*House MD*; Season 1-2)

(25) *The Mad Magazine construction:*

What, me worry?

(Akmajian (1984: 2))

(26) *The what-a exclamative construction:*

What a day (I had).

(Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 376) with slight modifications)

At the end of the thesis, I will demonstrate that the analysis I will develop here is fully compatible with *the three-tier model of language use*, proposed by Hirose (2013, 2015). This model hypothesizes that language use consists of three tiers: the situation

construal tier, the situation report tier, and the interpersonal relationship tier. Hirose aims to deduce the main findings accumulated in previous contrastive studies of English and Japanese from combinations of those three independent tiers. The three-tier model has gradually been attracting attention, as can be seen from the publication of a series of articles on this specific topic in *English Linguistics* in 2015. The articles by Hirose and other authors on the three-tier model, however, mainly focus on phenomena concerning the situation construal tier and the situation report tier; the role which the interpersonal relationship tier plays in communication (particularly in English) has yet to be fully understood. Because evidential expressions in English are closely related to the interpersonal aspect, the analysis developed in the thesis will contribute significantly to a better understanding of the nature of the interpersonal relationship tier in the model.

Last but not least, the thesis limits its observations to cases in which evidential/mirative constructions appear in face-to-face daily conversations (although the data which I use come from several kinds of sources, such as constructed examples, movies, and novels). This is because, as mentioned above, I would like to propose a generalization including the perspective of the hearer; it would be relatively easy to observe the relationship between evidentials and the hearer in conversation. The applicability of the proposal of the thesis to evidentials in other registers is open for future research.

1.4. Organization

The organization of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 proposes a generalization about the function of English evidentiality which is supported by the discussions developed in Chapters 3-8. Chapter 3 deals with the *it is that*-construction. This construction encodes abduction, a kind of inference, giving rise to a contrastive

interpretation. Chapter 4 analyzes the *take it that*-construction, which encodes an unambiguous inference. Due to the nature of this inference, the construction is used to make the hearer check whether the information the speaker provides is in his knowledge. Chapter 5 demonstrates that the performative clause *I tell you*, which indicates that the information source is the speaker himself, expresses the speaker's informational superiority, imposing the information on the hearer. Chapter 6 illustrates that the subjectless construction lays bare the speaker's thought occurring at speech time. This evidential meaning gives rise to the speaker's informational superiority and urges the hearer to accept what the speaker is thinking about at speech time. In other words, the speaker directs the hearer to understand his thought at speech time. Chapter 7, drawing largely on Shizawa (2015a), shows that the deictic inversion construction expresses the speaker's direct perception at the time of utterance. This evidential meaning is tied to the function of making the hearer pay attention to the event or the thing that the speaker is perceiving. Chapter 8 explores the applicability of the proposal to mirativity. This chapter deals with three mirative constructions, i.e. the *turns out*-construction, the mad magazine construction and the *what-a* exclamative construction, and clarifies that their functions are deduced from their mirative meanings. Chapter 9 provides a theoretical support to the analysis developed in the thesis from the perspective of the three-tier model of language use, proposed by Hirose (2013, 2015). Chapter 10 offers concluding remarks.

Chapter 2

The Function of English Evidentials in Communication

2.1. Proposal

Some languages obligatorily mark evidentiality (cf. Guenchéva (1994), Aikhenvald (2004)). Among typical languages with obligatory evidential markers is Tuyuca, a Tucano Language spoken in Colombia and Brazil. Tuyuca has five evidential markers (i.e. visual, non-visual (any of the senses other than visual), inference (based on visible or tangible evidence, or result), assumption (based on evidence other than visible results, e.g. logical reasoning, assumption, or general knowledge), and reported (the terms are borrowed from Aikhevnald (2004))). These evidential markers grammatically appear as suffixes containing the information *person, number, gender, tense, and evidential* (Barnes (1984, 1999)), as illustrated in the following examples, cited from Barnes (1984: 257):

(1) díga apé-wi

soccer play-3.M.SG.PAST.EVID

‘He played soccer.’ (I saw him play.)

(2) díga apé-ti

soccer play-3.M.SG.PAST.EVID

‘He played soccer.’ (I heard the game and him, but I didn’t see it or him.)

(3) díga apé-yi

soccer play-3.M.SG.PAST.EVID

‘He played soccer.’ (I have seen evidence that he played: his distinctive shoe print on the playing field. But I did not see him play.)

- (4) *díga apé-hĩyi*
 soccer play-3.M.SG.PAST.EVID
 ‘He played soccer.’ (It is reasonable to assume that he did.)
- (5) *díga apé-yigi*
 soccer play-3.M.SG.PAST.EVID
 ‘He played soccer.’ (I obtained the information from someone else.)

In languages where evidential marking is obligatory, the speaker has no choice but to mark evidentiality, which means that the speaker basically uses evidential markers independently of his intention (Plungian (2010)); “the speaker needs no good reason for the use except that the grammar requires it” (Dahl (1990: 685)).

In languages with no obligatory evidential markers like English, on the other hand, evidential expressions “are used only in such cases in which the speaker explicitly wants to emphasize the respective [evidential] meaning” (Plungian (2010: 18-19)). What function, then, does the emphasis on evidential meanings give rise to in English? As noted in Chapter 1, the analysis focusing exclusively on the role of the speaker cannot successfully capture the function of a full range of evidential expressions in English. This does not mean, however, that we should give up the analysis including the speaker’s perspective. Rather, I would like to emphasize the necessity to introduce the hearer’s perspective into the analysis on the function of evidentiality (cf. Sidnell (2012)); to correctly understand the function of evidential expressions in communication, we should take into consideration the hearer’s perspective as well as the speaker’s. On the basis of this view, I propose the following generalization:

- (6) Evidential expressions in English serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting


their respective evidential meanings.

By the phrase *manipulate the hearer*, I mean that evidential expressions instruct the hearer to assimilate the information in question into his knowledge in one way or another, to pay attention to some event or thing, and so on. It should be noted here that the generalization is concerned with the speaker's intention to use evidential expressions and not directly concerned with the hearer's reaction to the speaker's evidential utterance. For example, the speaker uses a certain evidential expression with the intention to make the hearer pay attention to some object, but the hearer may or may not act as expected by the speaker. Even if the speaker fails to elicit the expected reaction from the hearer (i.e., the hearer does not look at the object), the evidential expression has been chosen depending on its function. In short, the hearer's reaction does not affect the function of each evidential expression.

The way of manipulating the hearer varies depending on the nature of each evidential meaning. Thus, we need, first of all, to clarify what expressions encode what evidential meanings; otherwise, we fail to understand the function of each evidential expression. Notice here that the interpersonal function of the evidential expression in question is assumed to be (more or less) fixed because such a function is deduced from its evidential meaning. It is thus reasonable to say that interpersonal functions of evidential constructions in English are conventionalized.¹ To sum up, English evidential expressions, in particular those used in conversations, consist of evidential meanings and conventionalized interpersonal functions determined by their evidential meanings, as schematized in (7) (the dotted arrow signals that the evidential meaning of the evidential expression *X* determines its interpersonal function).

¹ I use the word *conventionalize* in a general sense, and will not deal with the issue about how it is related to pragmatic notions proposed in previous studies, such as conventional implicature (Grice (1975)).

(7)



Evidential expressions with conventionalized interpersonal functions are exploited in actual context to fulfill various communicative purposes, e.g. to maintain the interpersonal relationship with the hearer, to keep the hearer at a distance, and to force the hearer to do something, and the way the conventionalized interpersonal function in question is exploited varies depending on the context.

2.2. Analysis

To make the generalization clearer, I will describe several simple examples by focusing on what effects evidential expressions have on the hearer.

2.2.1. Inferential Evidentials

Let us first consider the inferential evidential expression *I guess*:

(8) I guess it's time to leave. (Lakoff (1973: 300))

Lakoff (1973) points out that sentence (8) is ambiguous with respect to the degree of the speaker's certainty: *I guess*, on the one hand, can play a role in downgrading the speaker's certainty; it can be, on the other hand, used when the speaker has full confidence about the statement. In the latter interpretation, the speaker uses *I guess* for the purpose

of politeness: he “does not wish to assert himself at the risk of offending the addressee” (Lakoff (1973: 300)). I suppose, however, that independently of the degree of the speaker’s certainty, *I guess* functions to manipulate the hearer in a uniform fashion. *I guess* means that the information in the embedded clause is a conclusion of the speaker’s inference (cf. Kärkkäinen (2007)) and is not a fact. This aspect of *I guess* as an inferential evidential is foregrounded, and thus, the hearer is instructed to understand the information in question as undetermined or unreliable. In the actual context, since *I guess* indicates that the hearer is not imposed to accept the information in question as a fact, it can be used as a politeness strategy.

2.2.2. Hearsay Evidentials

Hearsay evidentials can also be captured by the proposal in (6). The following example includes the hearsay evidential expression *I hear*:²

- (9) Janice: So, I hear, you hate me!
Joey: I, ah, I never said hate, I was very careful about that.
Janice: A little birdie told me something about you wanting to rip your arm off and throw it at me.
Joey: And you got a ‘hate’ from that?! You’re taking a big leap there...

(*Friends*: Season 3-1)

The hearsay evidential expression *I hear* means that the information in question is

² I have cited the scripts of the dramas and the movies used in this thesis from the following websites:

Friends: <http://www.livesinabox.com/friends/scripts.shtml>

House MD: http://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/episode_scripts.php?tv-show=house-md

Amadeus and *Star Wars Episode VI*: <http://www.imsdb.com/>

Toy Story: <http://www.scifiscripts.com/cartoon/>

originated in a third party. By highlighting this meaning of *I hear*, the speaker forces the hearer not to regard him as an information source. In (9), *I hear* serves to instruct Joey to understand the information that Joey hates Janice not to be a judgment made by the speaker *Janice*, but to be a statement attributed to a third party. By forcing Joey to notice that this information came from someone else, Janice would try to make Joey remember that he said to someone that he hates Janice. In fact, Joey is replying in his first utterance that he did not say so.

2.2.3. Idiomatic Evidential Expressions

In addition to evidential expressions such as *I guess* and *I hear* which compositionally indicate the evidential meanings, the generalization in (6) can capture idiomatic evidential expressions, expressions specialized in encoding evidentiality, in a similar fashion. Let us consider the *have it that*-construction:

(10) Rumor has it that she is getting married. (Genius⁴)

As is obvious from the description of *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* where *Rumor has it* is paraphrased as *People say*, this construction is specialized in expressing an information source which appears in subject position (Ikarashi and Honda (2014)). As with hearsay evidentials like *I hear*, this construction functions to force the hearer not to regard the speaker as an information source, but to attribute the information in question to someone else. In (10), the hearer is instructed to understand that the information that the woman in question is getting married is attributed not to be the speaker's own judgment, but to be a rumor. Because rumor is an unreliable information source, the hearer is forced to evaluate the information in question as doubtful.

The example in (11), on the other hand, provides the hearer with an authoritative information source by which the speaker persuades the hearer to believe the information in question.³

(11) [A and B are talking about the documentary movie about Abraham Lincoln. B, however, has not seen that movie.]

A: I just watched a really interesting movie about the life of Abraham Lincoln.

B: Ahh, the poor guy was shot right in the middle of a restaurant.

A: Restaurant?! The movie has it that he was shot in a theatre.

By using the *have it that*-construction, speaker A directs speaker B, who believes that Lincoln was shot in the restaurant, to bring his attention to the information source *the documentary movie*, which was made on the basis of facts. Thus, speaker B is forced to evaluate as valid the information that Lincoln was shot in a theatre.

2.3. Conclusion

The examples given above may be dealt with without introducing the hearer's perspective. However, the necessity of the hearer's perspective will be shown by the evidential constructions I will discuss in the following chapters, where I will argue that their communicative functions can never be captured without taking the generalization in (6) into account; we cannot correctly understand the communicative nature of evidential expressions unless we introduce this perspective into the analysis. Through careful

³ Brugman (1988, 1996) points out that the subject position of the *have it that*-construction should be occupied by nouns which are fraught with unreliability, such as *story*, *rumor*, and *joke*. The sentence in (11), however, suggests that the restriction on the choice of subject NPs pointed out by Brugman should be abandoned, because speaker A puts the NP *movie* in the subject position to show that the information conveyed in the construction is reliable.

analysis of these constructions, I will demonstrate the validity and necessity of this generalization.

Chapter 3

The *It Is That*-Construction and Abduction

3.1. Introduction¹

This chapter deals with sentences containing *it is (that)*, as in (1) and (2). Henceforth, I call these sentences the *it is that*-construction.²

- (1) He was shot in his house. It is that he knew too much. (Declerck (1992: 219))
- (2) Monica: How's it going?
Phoebe: Oh, okay, except I broke up with Roger.
All: Awww.
Phoebe: Yeah, right.
All: Aaawwwwww!!
Rachel: What happened?
Phoebe: I don't know, I mean, he's a good person, and he can be really sweet, and in some ways I think he is so right for me, it's just... I hate that guy!³ (*Friends*: Season 1-13)

¹ This chapter is a revised and extended version of Ikarashi (2014a).

² The *it* of the *it is that*-construction is generally regarded as an expletive (cf. Delahunty (1990), Declerck (1992)). Thus, the *it is that*-construction should be distinguished from the expression in (i), in which *it* refers to the specific problem mentioned in the preceding sentence.

(i) I've got a bit of a problem. It is that all the banks are closed. (Otake (2002: 142))

³ The adverb *just* is often used with the *it is that*-construction. There may be several reasons for their compatibility. For one thing, it is used for the purpose of politeness (cf. Otake (2009)). As discussed below, the construction serves to manipulate the hearer's knowledge in a certain way, which would potentially infringe his negative face. According to Quirk et al. (1985: 598), *just* is an attitude diminisher "which seek to imply that the force of the item concerned is limited." *Just* thus serves to limit, or diminish, the negative influence caused by the manipulation of the hearer's knowledge.

It has been pointed out that the *it is that*-construction has a wide range of interpretations, such as explanation, excuse, conclusion, and so forth, which I assume are illocutionary forces determined in actual contexts (cf. Declerck (1992), Otake (2002, 2009)).⁴ For example, the constructions give explanations for the shooting of the person in question in (1) and Phoebe's separation from Roger in (2). Leaving aside the illocutionary force the construction has, I will propose that the construction is specialized in encoding a certain inferential meaning. More specifically:

- (3) The *it is that*-construction encodes abductive inference.⁵

This means that the *it is that*-construction falls under the class of inferential evidential expressions.⁶

The notion of abduction is crucial to the proposal in (3). In abduction, we first observe a phenomenon, then make a list of possible explanations of the phenomenon under consideration, and finally, select an explanation from the list of possible

⁴ In fact, these interpretations have often been discussed in the study of speech acts and performative verbs (cf. Austin (1962), Fraser (1974)).

⁵ Previous studies also analyze the *it is that*-construction in terms of inference (cf. Delahunty (1990), Declerck (1992), Koops (2007)). However, they do not regard inference as part of the semantic content of the construction; rather, they focus on inference to describe the pragmatic aspect. For instance, Delahunty (1990), who calls the construction *the inferential construction*, defines the construction as follows:

[T]he form [i.e. the *it is that*-construction] can be viewed as a pragmatic instruction to its audience to infer a relationship between the construction and its context that goes beyond the mere addition of the information conventionally denoted by the clause (hence the label “inferential”).

(Delahunty (1990: 20))

On the other hand, the proposal in (3) deals with the inference encoded in the construction.

⁶ Delahunty (1990) also considers the *it is that*-construction to be an evidential expression. He does so by interpreting evidentiality in the broad sense (see footnote 1 of Chapter 1). He argues that the construction “locate[s] the warrant for the truth or falsity of the claim outside of the speaker” (Delahunty (1990: 25)), and thus it “expresses an attitude toward knowledge” (Delahunty 1990: 26). As I defined in Chapter 1 (footnote 1), however, this thesis uses the term *evidentiality* in the narrow sense: the speaker's epistemological attitude toward his knowledge falls outside the scope of evidentiality. Thus, if we follow Delahunty's analysis, the construction cannot be regarded as an evidential expression.

explanations (Delaney (1993: 15-16)).^{7, 8} A causal relationship is typically involved in abduction (cf. Hinkelman and Spackman (2000)). More specifically, a cause is inferred from an effect through abductive inference. Suppose, for example, that you observe that the ground is wet. You then come up with a set of propositions, such as *someone watered the ground, it rained, a water pipe ruptured*, and so forth, that could have caused the state of the ground. Finally, you select the most probable proposition, say, *it rained*, from the set. This inferential process is summarized in (4).

- (4) The ground is wet.
 If it had rained, the ground would be wet.

 It rained. (Conclusion)

As proposed in Chapter 2, evidential expressions in English manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective evidential meanings. In abduction, one explanation is selected from possible explanations. The statement in the *that*-clause is offered as a conclusion of abduction. In other words, the construction implies that statements other than those in the *that*-clause are not valid. The *it is that*-construction foregrounds this characteristic of abduction, giving rise to the following function:

- (5) The *it is that*-construction serves to instruct the hearer to replace the information expected to reside in the hearer's knowledge with the information provided in

⁷ Abduction is originated in the philosophical work of Charles Sanders Peirce. He formulates it as follows:

- (i) The surprising fact, C, is observed;
 But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
 Hence, there is a reason to suspect that A is true. (Peirce (1940: 151))

⁸ Note that the validity of the conclusion of abduction is not necessarily guaranteed, because there are other propositions that can explain the state of affairs in question. Thus, abduction is probable inference.

the *that*-clause.

In what follows, I will first bring forward evidence to show that the *it is that*-construction encodes abductive inference, and then illustrate the functional aspect of the construction.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 clarifies that the *it is that*-construction encodes abduction. Section 3.3 argues that the abductive meaning is closely associated with the function of the construction. Section 3.4 shows that in order to capture the function of the construction, we need to recognize its evidential meaning in the first place. I will illustrate that without understanding evidential meaning, it becomes difficult to give a comprehensive account of the relevant phenomena. Section 3.5 is a conclusion.

3.2. The *It Is That*-Construction as an Inferential Evidential Expression

This section provides evidence for the proposal in (3), repeated as (6).

- (6) The *it is that*-construction encodes abductive inference. (= (3))

To make the proposal clearer, let us first consider the following example:

- (7) Monica: How's it going?
Phoebe: Oh, okay, except I broke up with Roger.
All: Awww.
Phoebe: Yeah, right.
All: Aaawwwwww!!
Rachel: What happened?

Phoebe: I don't know, I mean, he's a good person, and he can be really sweet, and in some ways I think he is so right for me, it's just... I hate that guy! (= (2))

In Phoebe's first utterance, she is disclosing her separation from Roger to the others. In her second utterance, she is looking for the reason why she broke up with Roger. Among possible reasons, she finally selects the most probable explanation: She hates him. The statement *I hate that guy* is, thus, considered to be abductively related to the previous discourse. The *it is that*-construction encodes this abductive inferential process, which resides in the discourse. In the following subsections, I will provide evidence to demonstrate that the construction encodes an abductive inferential process.

3.2.1. Causal Interpretation

The *it is that*-construction basically serves to provide the cause of what is stated in the previous sentence (cf. Curme (1931), Bolinger (1972), Carlson (1983); *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*). Bolinger (1972) thus paraphrases it as the *it is because*-construction (see also Declerck (1992: 209)). The *it is that*-construction in (8), for instance, can be paraphrased as the *it is because*-construction shown in (9).

(8) I cannot pay you back today. It's just that all the banks are closed.
(Koops (2007: 207))

(9) I cannot pay you back today. It's because all the banks are closed.

This paraphrase suggests that the proposition *all the banks are closed* is the cause of what

is stated in the first sentence.⁹

This observation raises interesting questions. Note that the *it is that*-construction superficially has no expression indicating causality like *because* in the *it is because*-construction. How, then, does the causal interpretation of the *it is that*-construction arise? Previous studies do not address this question seriously.¹⁰ Given the proposal in (6), on the other hand, this question can be immediately answered as follows. A cause is inferred from an effect in abduction. Because the *it is that*-construction encodes abductive inference, causal interpretation is involved in the construction despite the absence of expressions that superficially ensure causality as *because* does.

3.2.2. Tense of the *Be*-Verb

As just mentioned, the *it is that*-construction and the *it is because*-construction are similar in that they express causal interpretations. These two constructions, however, show different behaviors with respect to the tense forms each can take. Compare the following examples:¹¹

(10) He was shot in his house. It is that he knew too much. (= (1))

(11) He was shot in his house. ??It is because he knew too much.

⁹ Otake (2009) points out that the *it is that*-construction does not necessarily express the cause; it can be used to express the effect. As Otake himself puts it, however, the construction rarely expresses an effect. Thus, it is highly likely that there is some special licensing condition on the *it is that*-construction expressing an effect. Although it is important to clarify such a licensing condition, this issue lies beyond the scope here. See Ikarashi (2013b) for discussion on the licensing condition.

¹⁰ Otake (2009), for example, claims that the *it is that*-construction provides an interpretation of the preceding context; in other words, it “offers an explanation of the previous information on the basis of information that the speaker already has (Otake (2002: 142)).” Based on this claim, he notes merely that the causal interpretation of the construction is derived from the speaker’s interpretation of the preceding context. He is not concerned with why the construction mainly provides a cause.

¹¹ Example (11) was pointed out to me by Kevin Moore (p. c.).

Here, the causal relationship between the past two events is at issue, and both constructions serve to associate these events. However, the *it is because*-construction in (11) is not as natural as the *it is that*-construction in (10); it is more natural for the *it is because*-construction to be in the past tense (i.e., *It was because he knew too much.*). On the other hand, the same restriction of the tense form is not imposed on the *it is that*-construction. Then, why is the *it is that*-construction allowed to be in the present tense in (10)?

Again, the proposal in (6) immediately gives an answer to this question. Aikhenvald (2004: 102) notes that the inference “can be made later, after the event had happened.” In other words, “[a]n evidential can even acquire its own time reference, distinct from that of the clause” (Aikhenvald (2004: 4)). Abduction, which the *it is that*-construction encodes in (10), is an inferential cognitive process and is itself irrelevant to the actual occurrence of a series of events; even if the causal relationship between past events is at issue, they can be abductively associated with one another at speech time. Thus, as illustrated in (10), the tense form of the construction is not required to correspond to that of the past events.¹²

3.2.3. The Absence of Inferential Processes

The proposal given above predicts that even if the proposition in the *that*-clause represents a cause, the *it is that*-construction should be unacceptable in a context in which abduction does not take place. This prediction is borne out by the following example:

¹² The *be*-verb of the construction can be in the past tense, as in (i).

- (i) He was shot in his house. It was that he knew too much.

As with the *it is that*-construction in (10), the one in (i) also encodes abductive inference, but they differ as to when the abductive relationship is established: the present tense form of the construction in (10), as noted above, shows that the abductive relationship between the two past events is established at speech time, while the past tense form of the construction in (i) signals that the abductive relationship was established prior to speech time.

- (12) A: The sun is rising.
B: *It's that the earth is turning.

Speaker A first describes the situation he sees in front of him, and then speaker B confirms the reason for the rising of the sun. The proposition *the earth is turning* is thus construed to be the cause of the fact stated in speaker A's utterance. Note that we know that the movement of the sun is caused by the earth's rotation; it is evident that there are no causes for the movement of the sun other than the earth's rotation. If there is only one possible cause in a given context, abductive inference will not take place, because the cause is not understood to be selected from possible candidates, and therefore, abduction is not involved in (12). As the proposal predicts, the *it is that*-construction is unacceptable in this context.

The proposal further predicts that if the conversation in (12) is embedded within a context in which abduction takes place, the construction should become acceptable. This prediction is borne out by the example in (13).

- (13) [B knows that A believes that the movement of the sun is caused by the sun's revolution around the earth.]
A: The sun is rising.
B: It's (just) that the earth is turning.

Under this circumstance, the *it is that*-construction in (12) becomes acceptable. In (13), because of speaker A's belief, two possible causes for the movement of the sun coexist here, namely, *the earth rotates* and *the sun orbits around the earth*. Thus, the proposition in the *that*-clause can be interpreted to be selected as the appropriate cause from the set of

two coexisting propositions; abductive inference can occur in this context. As predicted, the *it is that*-construction is acceptable in (13). The difference between (12) and (13) indicates that the acceptability of the *it is that*-construction is contingent on whether abductive inference occurs or not.

3.2.4. Abduction vs. Deduction

The proposal that the *it is that*-construction encodes abduction also makes the prediction that the construction is not permitted when inferences other than abduction are at issue. To confirm this prediction, I will here discuss the inference in which causality is involved in the same way as abduction, namely, deduction. Consider the following example:

- (14) A: Tom looked ill when I saw him at school yesterday.
B: What did he do then? Did he go to the hospital?
A: No. *It's that he left school early.

Speaker B infers from speaker A's first utterance that Tom went to the hospital, and then speaker A provides the correct information that Tom left school early. Speaker A is talking about an effect (*Tom left school early*) derived from a cause (*Tom was ill*). Unlike the examples provided so far, the *it is that*-construction in (14) represents an effect. It should be noted that, in this case, the cause is a sufficient condition for the effect, which is automatically derived from the cause on the basis of the general knowledge that if you are ill, you leave school early. This inferential process can be represented as in (15).

(15) Tom was ill.

If you are ill, you leave school early.

Tom left school early. (Conclusion)

Because the conclusion is logically valid, the inference involved in (14) is deduction, not abduction (for the logical validity of abduction, see footnote 8). The unacceptability of the *it is that*-construction shows that the construction encodes abductive inference, but not deductive inference.

3.2.5. The Main Point of Utterance

Anderson (1986: 274) points out that “[e]videntials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE” (see also Simons (2007)). In the *it is that*-construction, thus, the main point in communication should be the embedded clause, not the main clause *it is*. This is reflected in the omissibility of the complementizer *that*:¹³

(16) It’s just he can’t make up his mind.

(Bolinger (1972: 36))

Following Underhill (1988) and Thompson and Mulac (1991), when the complementizer *that* is deleted, the main clause subject and verb become secondary to the content of the lower sentence with respect to the topic of the discourse. The omission of *that* in (16) shows that more focus is put on the *that*-clause than the main clause in communication. In this respect, the *it is* of the *it is that*-construction is similar to what Hooper (1975) calls assertive predicates, whose complements are asserted to be the core meanings or main

¹³ However, the complementizer is not always allowed to be omitted (Bolinger (1972)). See Bolinger (1972) for details.

propositions.¹⁴ Assertive predicates undergo certain syntactic operations that show that their complements are asserted. It is predicted that the *it is* of the construction shows parallel syntactic behaviors with assertive predicates. I will confirm this prediction with two syntactic operations: Negative Constituent Preposing (henceforth NCP) and tag questions.

NCP fronts a negative constituent and triggers Subject Auxiliary Inversion (e.g., *Never have I had to borrow money.* (Hooper and Thompson (1973: 465))). According to Hooper and Thompson (1973), NCP is restricted to application in asserted clauses. NCP can take place in the complement of the assertive predicate *exclaim*, but not in the non-assertive predicate *be likely*, as illustrated in (17).¹⁵

- (17) a. I exclaimed that never in my life had I seen such a crowd.
(Hooper and Thomson (1973: 474))
- b. *It's likely that seldom did he drive that car.
(Hooper and Thomson (1973: 479))

With this in mind, let us examine the following examples, where NCP takes place in the *it is that*-construction:

- (18) A: Everyone here dislikes Tom.
 B: It's just that never in his life has he kept his word.
- (19) A thousand pardons, my dear. Forgive my oversight. It's just that never have I ever enjoyed such an exquisitely prepared steak. (T. McGuire, *Texas Pride*)

¹⁴ The idea that the proposition in the *that*-clause of the construction is asserted to be true is compatible with Otake's (2002, 2009) observation that the construction "is used to reveal the true state of affairs" (Otake (2002: 151)).

¹⁵ For detailed discussion on the classification of predicates, see Hooper and Thompson (1973) and Hooper (1975).

NCP can take place in the *that*-clause without rendering the sentences unacceptable as (17b) is. This fact suggests that the *it is* of the *it is that*-construction shares the same properties as assertive predicates.

Tag questions (e.g., *This car needs a tune-up, doesn't it?* (Hooper (1975: 102))) also serve to make clear the parallelism between the *it is* of the *it is that*-construction and assertive predicates. Tag questions can be formed from the complement clauses of certain types of assertive predicates such as *think*, but not from those of non-assertive predicates such as *be likely*.¹⁶ Compare:

- (20) a. I think this car needs a tune up, doesn't it?
b. *It's likely that they've left the phone off the hook, haven't they?

(Hooper (1975: 103))

As with NCP, it is possible to form a tag question from the *that*-clause of the *it is that*-construction, as shown in (21).

- (21) A: Will you go out with me?
B: Sorry. Uh...
A: It's just that you don't like me, do you?

¹⁶ Hooper (1975) divides assertive predicates into two types, namely, strong assertive predicates and weak assertive predicates. Tag questions can be formed from the complement clauses of the latter, but not of the former. Because the verb *think* is a weak assertive predicate, a tag question is allowed, as shown in (20a). By contrast, a tag question may not be formed from the complement clause of the strong assertive predicate *assert*, as illustrated below:

- (i) *I assert that inflation will continue, won't it? (Hooper (1975: 103))

Although tag questions are not necessarily formed from the complement clauses of all assertive predicates, the predicate in question is an assertive one if a tag question can be formed from the complement clause of that predicate.

(21) also shows that the *it is* of the *it is that*-expression is functionally equivalent to assertive predicates. Notice that the acceptability is degraded when the formation of tag questions is formed from the main clause, as illustrated in (22).¹⁷

- (22) A: Will you go out with me?
B: Sorry. Uh...
A: ?? It's just that you don't like me, isn't it?

This fact also suggests that the main point in communication is not the *it is*, but the embedded clause.

Note in passing that even questions can be formed in the embedded clause of the *it is that*-construction, as shown in (23) and (24).

- (23) [Scene: Museum of Prehistoric History, Ross and a co-worker (Marsha) are setting up an exhibit which includes some mannequins of cave people.]
Ross: No, it's good, it is good, it's just that –mm- doesn't she seem a little angry?
Marsha: Well, she has issues. (*Friends*: Season 1-2)
- (24) Ross: (looking at Monica's legs) WOW!
Chandler: Hey! Stop staring at my wife's legs! No no! Stop staring at your sister's legs!
Ross: I'm sorry, it's just... how did you get so tan?
Chandler: She went on one of those spray-on tan places.

¹⁷ One of my informants has pointed out to me that example (22) is not entirely unnatural; if the sentence were to be acceptable, speaker A would be asking speaker B about the situation (i.e. not going out with A). In this case, however, the proposition in the *that*-clause may be presupposed and thus *it is* of the sentence is no longer regarded as an evidential expression.

The *yes-no* question and the *wh*-question appear in the embedded clauses in (23) and (24), respectively. As has been discussed in this subsection, the embedded clause of the *it is that*-construction has a main clause status in that it is asserted as a main point in communication. That is why syntactic operations restricted to main clauses are allowed in the *that*-clause, as shown in (23) and (24).

3.2.6. Declerck's (1992) Analysis

Lastly I will support the proposal in (6) from a conceptual point of view by showing that Declerck's (1992) analysis can be subsumed under the proposal. Declerck (1992) characterizes the *it is that*-construction as specificational in that the proposition introduced by the *that*-clause is identified as a value for the variable contained in the preceding sentence. Consider (25) as an example.

(25) I cannot pay you back today. It's just that all the banks are closed. (= (8))

According to Declerck, the first sentence *I cannot pay you back today* contains an invisible variable *x*, as in *I cannot pay you back today for reason x*, and the proposition *all the banks are closed* is interpreted as a value of the variable *x*.

I would like to point out that the specificational property observed by Declerck immediately follows from the proposal in (6). The specificational process, in which the most appropriate value is selected from a set of possible values to specify the variable (cf. Declerck (1992: 214)), corresponds to the abductive inference process, according to which the most appropriate explanation is chosen from possible explanations to capture the

phenomenon in question; these two processes share the operation selecting an element from possible candidates. The specificational property of the construction thus comes from abductive inference and should be understood as an aspect of abduction.¹⁸

3.3. The Function of the *It Is That*-Construction

As proposed in Chapter 2, evidential expressions in English manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective evidential meanings. In this section, I will demonstrate that the nature of abduction, encoded by the *it is that*-construction, is closely related to the function of the construction. In abduction, the most plausible explanation is selected from possible explanations for the phenomenon under consideration. The *it is that*-construction provides a conclusion of abduction in the *that*-clause. This implies that statements other than those in the *that*-clause are rejected as being inappropriate in the sense that the speaker does not choose them. The *it is that*-construction foregrounds this nature of abduction, giving rise to the following function:

- (26) The *it is that*-construction serves to instruct the hearer to replace the information expected to reside in the hearer's knowledge with the information provided in the *that*-clause. (= (5))

Because the construction serves to force the hearer to register the information in the *that*-clause in place of the information already existing in his knowledge, the information the speaker provides is naturally associated with unexpectedness (Guentchéva (1994) in

¹⁸ Note that specification itself does not predict the fact that the *it is that*-construction exclusively represents a cause; the causal interpretation does not directly stem from the specificational process, in which the proposition in the *that*-clause is merely specified as a value of the variable contained in the preceding utterance (cf. Otake (2009: 97-98)). Given the analysis based on abductive inference, on the other hand, the causal interpretation of the *it is that*-construction naturally follows, since abductive inference intrinsically involves the causal interpretation. Thus, as discussed in this subsection, the specificational property of the construction should be subsumed under abductive inference.

fact points out that abduction can underlie surprise, emotion strongly related to unexpectedness).

The function in (26) leads us to consider that the construction is often used in a context in which the speaker tries to dispel the hearer's misunderstanding and provides the hearer with the correct information (cf. Otake (2009); see also Koops (2007)). Let us begin with Otake's (2009) observation about an attested example:

(27) [Lois Lane asks Superman what color underwear she is wearing. Then Superman falls silent for a moment.]

Lois Lane: Oh, gee, I embarrassed you, didn't I?

Superman: Oh, no, no, not at all, it's just that this planter must be made of lead.

(*Superman*, cited from Otake (2009: 77), with modifications)

Lois Lane infers from Superman's behavior that her question embarrassed him. Then, Superman is denying her expectation and explaining why he fell silent; he fell silent not because she embarrassed him, but because he was thinking that the planter is made of lead. According to the function proposed in (26), the *it is that*-construction is used to manipulate Lois Lane's knowledge. More specifically, the construction instructs her to replace her expectation that she embarrassed Superman with the information given in the *that*-clause, which is considered to be unexpected to her.

While the misunderstanding is verbalized by the hearer herself in (27), the speaker anticipates and verbalizes the hearer's misunderstanding in the following example:

(28) I can't eat the chicken. It's not that I can't eat it, it's just that I've got a piece of gum in my mouth and I don't know what to do with it.

(*The Guardian*, September 2, 2002, cited from Otake (2009: 66))

Here the speaker first rejects the expected misunderstanding by using the *it is that*-construction with the negative element *not*. In this case, the construction indicates that the statement in the *that*-clause (i.e., *I can't eat it*) is not a correct conclusion of abduction.¹⁹ He then provides the correct information about the reason for the impossibility of eating the chicken. The second *it is that*-construction functions to manipulate the hearer to replace the information expected to be in his mind with the correct information, which the speaker may consider to be unexpected to the hearer.

The information required to be replaced is not always linguistically manifested. Observe the following example:

- (29) Monica: How's it going?
Phoebe: Oh, okay, except I broke up with Roger.
All: Awww.
Phoebe: Yeah, right.
All: Aaawwwwww!!
Rachel: What happened?
Phoebe: I don't know, I mean, he's a good person, and he can be really sweet, and in some ways I think he is so right for me, it's just... I hate that guy! (= (2))

In Phoebe's first utterance, she is disclosing her separation from Roger to the others. In her second utterance, she is looking for the reason why she broke up with him. Even if

¹⁹ Evidential expressions themselves can fall under the scope of negation (cf. Aikhenvald (2004)).

there is no explicit information which is required to be replaced, the *it is that*-construction functions in a similar fashion to examples like (27) and (28). The *it is that*-construction here is considered to manipulate the hearers as follows: “Although there may be several reasons for the separation from Roger, you should abandon the reasons you have in mind and instead register into your knowledge the correct information that I hate Roger.” The information that she hates him will be unexpected to the hearers because she is enumerating positive impressions of him.

The examples given above show that the construction is employed to manipulate the hearer in a manner described in (26). We then predict that the construction should be unnatural in a context where there is no need to force the hearer to abandon the information expected to be in his knowledge and to register unexpected correct information. This prediction is supported by the example in (30).

(30) [Someone asks you why you always order the same thing at a restaurant, and you reply as follows:]

*It is that this is delicious.

Here, abductive inference is assumed to take place; we can easily come up with several possible reasons the speaker orders the same thing at the restaurant, and the answer the speaker provides can be interpreted to be selected from these possible reasons. However, unlike in the examples given above, there is no indication that the hearer has a misunderstanding or that the speaker is providing unexpected information to the hearer. The information that the thing is delicious does not need to be offered as unexpected correct information which should be replaced with the information already existing in the hearer’s knowledge. That is why the construction sounds unnatural in (30).

3.4. The Importance of Evidential Meaning

As discussed in section 3.3, the *it is that*-construction can be used when the speaker needs to dispel the hearer's misunderstanding. Notice, however, that the construction is not always licensed in such a situation. For example:

- (31) A: Tom looked ill when I saw him at school yesterday.
B: What did he do then? Did he go to the hospital?
A: No. *It's that he left school early. (= (14))

Speaker A is rejecting speaker B's assumption that Tom went to the hospital, and then is providing the correct information in the form of the *it is that*-construction. Nevertheless, the construction is unacceptable. This is because deduction, not abduction, is involved in this context (see section 3.2.4.). The unacceptability cannot be explained merely on the basis of the functional aspect of the construction; we should consider whether or not evidential meaning is involved in the first place. This example suggests that in order to capture the usage of evidential expressions, we should first identify and spell out their evidential meanings.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter first made it clear that the *it is that*-construction encodes abduction. As proposed in chapter 2, evidential expressions in English manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective evidential meanings. The *it is that*-construction thus manipulates the hearer by foregrounding the nature of abduction. In abduction, the most plausible explanation is selected from possible explanations for the phenomenon under consideration. Because the *it is that*-construction provides a conclusion of abduction in

the *that*-clause, statements other than those in the *that*-clause are implicitly rejected as inappropriate. Therefore, the construction functions to instruct the hearer to replace the information expected to reside in his knowledge with the information provided in the *that*-clause. Because the construction forces the hearer to register the information in the *that*-clause in place of the information already existing in his knowledge, that information is associated with unexpectedness.

Chapter 4

The *Take It That*-Construction and Unambiguous Inference

4.1. Introduction¹

The sentence in (1) and the underlined sentence in (2) include the expression *I take it (that)* (the prepositional phrase *from X* sometimes appears between *it* and *that*). In what follows, I will call those sentences the *take it that*-construction.² This chapter clarifies the evidential character of this construction.

(1) I take it you won't be coming to the party? (OALD⁷)

(2) "Janine, have you received your results from the bar exam yet?"

Janine's face fell, "Yes."

"I take it from your expression that you failed."

(S. Kohler, *The Paddle Club: A Fun, Romantic and Erotic Spanking Novel*)

It is pointed out that the *take it that*-construction introduces a conclusion of inference (cf. Nakau (1994), Otake (2004, 2009)). In (2), for example, the construction

¹ This chapter is a revised and extended version of Ikarashi (2013c).

² The *take it that*-construction is normally restricted to the first-person subject and present tense, as illustrated in (i) (Ross (1973)).

- (i) a. I take it that you had sampled those brownies.
b. ?? I took it that you had sampled those brownies.
c. *I am taking it that you had sampled those brownies.
d. *Bill takes it that you had sampled those brownies.

(Ross (1973: 161))

Otake (2009), however, points out that the construction can take subjects other than the first-person and occur in forms other than present tense. Although it is important to clarify restrictions on person, aspect, and tense, this issue lies beyond of the scope of this chapter. I will restrict myself to the data which include the construction as used in the first-person present tense.

provides a conclusion inferred from Janine's behavior (the premise of the inference is expressed by the prepositional phrase *from your expression*). In this sense, the construction can be regarded as an inferential evidential expression. In fact, as with other evidential expressions, the embedded clause, not the main clause *I take it*, is the main point in communication. This is shown by the omissibility of the complementizer *that*, as shown in (1), and by the parenthetical use of *I take it*, as illustrated in (3).³

(3) You'll be staying the night, I take it.

(*Cambridge International Dictionary of English*)

Notice, however, that there are several subcategories of inference (cf. Willett (1988), Aikhenvald (2004)). It is thus not enough to merely define the construction as an inferential. Given the proposal in Chapter 2 that evidential expressions in English serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective evidential meanings, we cannot correctly associate the meaning of the construction with its function unless we specify what inference is involved in the construction. This chapter thus aims to make clear the inferential character of the construction. The proposal is as follows:

(4) The *take it that*-construction encodes an unambiguous inference.

To put it another way, the construction indicates that there is enough evidence in the

³ A parenthetical is allowed only when the embedded clause is the main point in communication. Assertive predicates such as *say* or *suppose*, thus, allow complement preposing, whereas nonassertive predicates such as *be likely* do not, as shown in (i) (cf. Hooper (1975)).

- (i) a. He wants to hire a woman, he says. [(strong) assertive]
b. Factivity is important in other constructions as well, they supposed. [(weak) assertive]
c. *Many of the applicants are women, it's likely. [nonassertive]

(Hooper (1975: 94))

context to unambiguously arrive at a conclusion.

Unambiguous inference implies that everyone draws the same conclusion because this inference proceeds in an unambiguous way; the hearer can come to the same conclusion as the speaker does. Foregrounding this character of unambiguous inference, the *take it that*-construction serves to manipulate the hearer in the following manner:

- (5) The *take it that*-construction serves to make the hearer check whether the information the speaker provides is in his knowledge.

The construction expresses the speaker's assumption that the hearer shares the information in the *that*-clause with speaker. The hearer is, thus, placed in a situation where the relevant information, if incompatible with his knowledge, should be rejected to be false; otherwise, the speaker has a wrong notion of the hearer's knowledge. By putting the hearer in such a situation, the construction serves to confirm the existence of the information in the hearer's knowledge.

Our discussion proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 briefly overviews previous studies and demonstrates that it is insufficient to merely define the *take it that*-construction as an inferential evidential. Section 4.3 clarifies that the construction encodes an unambiguous inference. Section 4.4 illustrates that the function of the construction arising from its evidential meaning plays an important role in achieving communicative goals in actual contexts. Section 4.5 is a conclusion.

4.2. Previous Studies

As noted in section 4.1, previous studies regard the *take it that*-construction as an inferential. Otake (2004, 2009), for instance, points out that the construction introduces a

conclusion inferred on the basis of evidence. In (2), repeated as (6), the speaker infers from Janine’s behavior and expression that she failed the bar examination.

- (6) “Janine, have you received your results from the bar exam yet?”
 Janine’s face fell, “Yes.”
“I take it from your expression that you failed.” (= (2))

Inference is, however, divided into subcategories. Ladakhi, a Sino-Tibetan language spoken in India, for example, makes a subtle distinction between inferential evidentials by using different suffixes, as summarized in (7) (Bhat (1999)).

- (7) a. *rək*: inferred from sounds or from habitual occurrences
 e.g. *dolmə yon̄-thig-rək*
 Dolma come-INFER-SOUND
 ‘Dolma is coming (a guess made by hearing footsteps, voice, etc.)’
- b. *yot*: inferred from observations not remembered correctly
 e.g. *khoe ŋe kəne pene khyer-thig-yot*
 he me from moneytake-INFER-OBSERVED
 ‘He might have taken money from me’
- c. *son̄*: inferred from unobserved partial or vague knowledge
 e.g. *kho i-khəŋpe nəŋŋə duk-thik-son*
 he this-house in lived-INFER-UNOBSERVED
 ‘He might have lived in this house’
- d. *duk*: guessed, as for example about events that occurred at a distance and hence cannot be seen clearly

e.g. ə-pumo rdemo yot-thig-duk
that-girl beautiful be-INFER-GUESSED
'That girl might be beautiful'

(Bhat (1999: 73))

Considering the semantic complexity of inference, it is insufficient to merely define the *take it that*-construction as an inferential. In fact, the unacceptability of the following example cannot be accounted for unless we specify the inferential nature involved in the construction in more detail:

(8) [A and B are talking on the phone. A lives in Japan and B abroad.]

A: It's too cold today.

B: *I take it that it's snowing?

Speaker B infers from the temperature in Japan that it is snowing there. Although the inference is made on the basis of the evidence, the construction sounds unnatural in this context.

Furthermore, recall that in chapter 3, I demonstrated that the *it is that*-construction encodes abduction. In this sense, it falls under the class of inferential evidential expressions. Therefore, the *it is that*-construction and the *take it that*-construction would be said to semantically amount to the same construction without specifying the inferential meanings they encode; if so, we would fail to attribute their functional difference to the difference of their evidential meanings. We thus need to provide a finer description of the inferential meaning of the *take it that*-construction.

4.3. The Evidential Meaning of the *Take It That*-Construction

4.3.1. Proposal

As illustrated in the previous section, it is necessary to clarify the type of inference involved in the *take it that*-construction. I will thus propose that the construction has the following evidential meaning:

- (9) The *take it that*-construction encodes an unambiguous inference.

Unambiguous inference means that a conclusion can be unambiguously gained from enough evidence in the context; in other words, the speaker thinks that there is no possibility to reach different conclusions from the one in question.

To make the proposal clearer, let us consider the following example:

- (10) “Janine, have you received your results from the bar exam yet?”

Janine’s face fell, “Yes.”

“I take it from your expression that you failed.” (= (2))

Generally, examinations have two possible results: pass and fail. As is clear from the depiction of Janine’s behavior (i.e., *Janine’s face fell*), the result of the examination is negative. We can thus infer from these contextual hints that she failed the examination in an unambiguous fashion. The *take it that*-construction encodes this unambiguous inference.

Note that unambiguous inference does not mean deduction. Given that the failure of the examination causes Janine’s behavior in (10), the speaker infers the cause from the result. This inferential process is not deduction, in which the result is inferred from the

cause (on the basis of the major premise). Crucial to the inferential meaning of the construction is that there is enough evidence in the context to unambiguously arrive at the conclusion in question.

Given the proposal in (9), the unacceptability of the example in (8), repeated as (11), can be accounted for.

(11) [A and B are talking on the phone. A lives in Japan and B abroad.]

A: It's too cold today.

B: *I take it that it's snowing? (= (8))

In our actual world, the coldness of the atmosphere does not necessarily mean that it is snowing; the atmosphere is also cooled by, say, nocturnal radiation. We cannot unambiguously infer that it is snowing only from the information given by speaker A. Hence, the *take it that*-construction is not appropriate in this context. In the following subsections, I will provide evidence to demonstrate that the construction encodes an unambiguous inference.

4.3.2. Evidence

4.3.2.1. The Relationship between Context and Unambiguous Inference

As discussed in the previous section, the *take it that*-construction in (11) is unacceptable because the information in the *that*-clause cannot be unambiguously inferred from the evidence in the context. We can then predict that the construction in (11) becomes acceptable if there is ample evidence to make it possible to arrive at the conclusion unambiguously. This prediction is borne out by the example in (12), where the italicized context is added to the example in (11).

(12) [A and B are talking on the phone. A lives in Japan and B abroad. *On the previous day, A said to B that it would snow the next day.*]

A: It's too cold today.

B: I take it that it's snowing? (cf. (11))

In addition to the information on the temperature given by speaker A in the immediate conversation, speaker B knows the possibility that it is snowing in Japan from the information given by speaker A on the previous day. These two pieces of evidence will make it possible to unambiguously infer that it is snowing in Japan. Hence, in this context, the *take it that*-construction is acceptable.

The contrast between the following two examples can also be accounted for in a similar fashion:

(13) [B enters a contest. Several days later, a package arrives in the mail.]

A: A package arrived for you.

B: Oh! *I take it that I won the contest?

A: Could be.

(14) [B enters a contest. *B gets a very good score, whereas the others get very poor scores, which makes B confident that he will win the contest.* Several days later, a package arrives in the mail.]

A: A package arrived for you.

B: Oh! I take it that I won the contest?

A: Could be.

In (13), speaker B only has the information that a package arrived for him. This does not

immediately mean that he wins the contest; we cannot unambiguously infer his win in this context. That is why the *take it that*-construction sounds unnatural. In (14), on the other hand, the construction becomes acceptable. The difference between (13) and (14) lies in the italicized context; participants in the contest other than speaker B got very poor scores, which makes him have full confidence to win the contest. We can thus easily interpret the arrival of the package as a notification of speaker B's win; his win can be unambiguously inferred in (14). Hence, the construction is natural.

Given the proposal in (9), we can explain the (un)acceptability of the examples in (15) and (16).

(15) I take it that you'll be staying tonight.

(*Cambridge International Dictionary of English*)

(16) *I take it that you'll be fine?

(Otake (2009: 162))

Otake (2009) observes that when the content of the *that*-clause describes a future event, this event should be construed at the time of utterance to be determined to happen. According to Otake, the future event described in (15) is considered to definitely happen. This is clear from the use of the expression *will be -ing*, which implies that the event in question happens "as a matter of course" (Leech (1987: 68)). On the other hand, he notes that the event described in (16) is an uncertain one; it is normally difficult to correctly predict someone's recovery from illness. The construction in (16) thus sounds unnatural. According to the proposal in (9), the acceptability of these examples depends on to what extent we can easily imagine evidence ensuring an unambiguous inference. In (15), because the future event described is expected to happen, we can easily imagine a context where the occurrence of this event is inferred unambiguously. In (16), on the

other hand, because we cannot assert with confidence that the future event described happens, it would be difficult to come up with a situation where the event in question is inferred in an unambiguous way. We can then predict that the sentence in (16) becomes acceptable if it is put in a context where the hearer's recovery is guaranteed. The following example lends support to this prediction:

- (17) A: A doctor said this medicine works perfectly for me.
B: I take it that you'll be fine?

Speaker A is providing the information that a doctor, a medical authority, ensures that the medicine in question works perfectly for speaker A. This immediately means that he recovers from a bad health condition; in other words, we can unambiguously infer speaker A's recovery on the basis of his utterance. Hence the acceptability of the *take it that*-construction.

4.3.2.2. The Absence of an Inferential Process

The proposal in (9) states that the content in the *that*-clause is a conclusion inferred unambiguously. It is thus predicted that the *take it that*-construction is unacceptable when the content is not inferentially acquired even if unambiguousness is involved. In fact, the following construction is not acceptable:

- (18) A: I'm hungry.
B: *I take it that you're hungry.

The statement *you're hungry* is unambiguously gained because speaker A has just said that

he feels hungry. It is, however, not gained via inference. The context is not compatible with the meaning of the construction; hence the unacceptability.

4.3.2.3. Comparison between the *Take It That*-Construction and *Assume/Suppose*

Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (7th edition) paraphrases the *take it that*-construction as *assume* or *suppose*, but their differences are not made clear. The proposal in (9), on the other hand, provides a perspective to differentiate between the construction and these two verbs. That is, they are different as to whether unambiguous inference is involved; it is involved in the *take it that*-construction, but not in *assume* and *suppose*. Let us consider the following example:

(19) [B enters a contest. Several days later, a package arrives in the mail.]

A: A package arrived for you.

B: Oh! {I assume / I suppose / *I take it} I won the contest?

A: Could be.

As explained above, speaker B only has the information that a package arrived for him. This information does not necessarily mean that he wins the contest; an unambiguous inference does not occur in this context. That is why the *take it that*-construction sounds unnatural. *Assume* and *suppose*, on the other hand, are acceptable in the same context. This means that these two verbs have nothing to do with whether the inference in question is unambiguous or not. The example in (19) suggests that the proposal in (9) makes it possible to distinguish the *take it that*-construction from semantically similar verbs like *assume* and *suppose*.

4.4. The Function of the *Take It That*-Construction

In the previous section, I have demonstrated that the *take it that*-construction encodes an unambiguous inference. As noted in section 4.3.1, unambiguous inference means that a conclusion can be unambiguously gained from enough evidence in the context. This implies that in unambiguous inference, everyone draws the same conclusion because this inference proceeds in an unambiguous way; the hearer can come to the same conclusion as the speaker does. Foregrounding this character of unambiguous inference, the *take it that*-construction serves to manipulate the hearer in the following manner:

- (20) The *take it that*-construction serves to make the hearer check whether the information the speaker provides is in his knowledge. (= (5))

The construction expresses the speaker's assumption that the hearer shares the information in the *that*-clause with speaker. The hearer is, thus, placed in a situation where the relevant information, if incompatible with his knowledge, should be rejected to be false; otherwise, the speaker has a wrong notion of the hearer's knowledge. By putting the hearer in such a situation, the construction serves to confirm the existence of the information in the hearer's knowledge. Due to this function, the *take it that*-construction is often accompanied with the illocutionary force of confirmation (cf. Otake (2004, 2009)).

Let us now consider several attested examples on the basis of which I will demonstrate that the function in (20) can capture actual uses of the construction. First, observe the following example:

(21) [Nakata is a character who can talk with cats.]

“Do you mind if I sit down here for a while? Nakata’s a little tired from walking.”

The black cat rose languidly to its feet, whiskers atwilt, and yawned so tremendously that its jaw looked almost unhinged. “I don’t mind. Or perhaps I should say it’s not up to me. You can sit anywhere you like. Nobody’s going to bother you for that.”

“Thank you kindly,” the man said, lowering himself down beside that cat.

“Boy oh boy, I’ve been on the move since six this morning.”

“Um... I take it, then, that you’re Mr. Nakata?”

“That’s right. Nakata’s the name. And you would be?”

(H. Murakami, *Umibe no Kahuka* [Kafka on the Shore], translated by P. Gabriel)

Nakata starts to express his tiredness without introducing himself, which leads the cat to confirm whether Nakata is the man’s name. The information that the man’s name is Nakata is unambiguously inferred from Nakata’s second utterance *Nakata’s a little tired from walking*. Since unambiguous inference implies that the hearer can come to the same conclusion as the speaker does, the *take it that*-construction here expresses the cat’s assumption that the information that Nakata is the hearer’s name exists in the hearer’s knowledge, which in turn makes the hearer check whether the conclusion the cat came to is actually in his knowledge. That is why the construction in (21) is interpreted to have the illocutionary force of confirmation.

The function in (20) can account for the acceptability of the *take it that*-construction in (22), which takes the form of an inverted *yes-no* question, i.e. one with *do*-support (see also Wierzbicka (2006)). In this example, the construction can be used because the witch

unambiguously infers from Jack's behaviors that mice are not for sale.

(22) [A witch is in a shop to buy mice. But Jack, an owner, refuses to sell mice.]

“I know you're there, my dears,” the witch said in a low, humming voice.

“Come out and say hello...”

Reluctantly, moving like puppets, the mice reappeared, but Uncle Jack snapped out his hand. “Not in my shop, if you please!” he said sharply, and the mice scuttled back to their hiding places, their spell-bonds broken.

The witch stared back to him. “How very unwise,” she commented, in a voice like ice. “Do I take it that your mice are not for sale?” (H. Webb, *Dogmagic*)

As noted in the previous section, the *take it that*-construction can be paraphrased as *assume* or *suppose* (OALD⁷). Notice here that when the subject is first person, *assume* and *suppose* are not allowed to be expressed in the form of inverted *yes-no* questions because it is nonsensical to ask others about the speaker's own mental state, to which they cannot access (cf. Lakoff (1969)):

(23) { * Do I assume / * Do I suppose } that your mice are not for sale?

As with *assume* and *suppose*, the *take it that*-construction expresses the speaker's mental state: that is, it describes the speaker's unambiguous inferential process. Nevertheless, the construction is acceptable even if it takes an inverted *yes-no* question form, as shown in (22). This acceptability can be accounted for on the basis of the function in (20). The construction implies that the information unambiguously inferred resides in the hearer's knowledge as well as the speaker's. This means that the information expressed

by the construction is accessible to both the speaker and the hearer:

(24) I take it that [your mice are not for sale]

accessible to both the speaker and the hearer

Thus, it is not nonsensical to ask the hearer in the form of an inverted *yes-no* question to confirm whether the information in the *that*-clause is compatible with his knowledge (cf. (20)). On the other hand, the information expressed by *I assume* and *I suppose* is accessible only to the speaker because these expressions have nothing to do with an unambiguous inferential process (see example (19)):

(25) I assume / I suppose that [your mice are not for sale]

accessible only to the speaker

Since the hearer cannot access to the information in the *that*-clause, it is absurd to ask him about its validity in the form of an inverted *yes-no* question.

Lastly, let us observe the *take it that*-construction as used sarcastically:

(26) [Scene: The Hospital, Joey is in the waiting room as Rachel comes back out with the doctor.]

Joey: Hey! So?

Dr. Long: She's fine. She's experiencing Braxton-Hicks contractions, mild discomfort caused by contractions in the uterine wall.

Rachel: Hmm, mild discomfort. So I take it you've had one of these Braxton thingies?

Joey: So but everything is normal.

Dr. Long: Absolutely. (*Friends*: Season 8-14)

Braxton-Hicks contractions are symptoms experienced by pregnant women. Dr. Long is describing Rachel's situation as mild discomfort. Rachel is totally disagreeing with such a description; she seems to think that if one has experienced Braxton-Hicks contractions, one cannot say that they are mild discomfort. The construction here serves to make Dr. Long check whether he has ever experienced Braxton-Hicks contractions. However, because the doctor is a man, he is assumed to deny that he has experienced them. So, the construction makes him notice that he described Braxton-Hicks contractions as mild discomfort in spite of the fact that he has not experienced them, giving rise to the sarcastic and critical interpretation.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the *take it that*-construction encodes an unambiguous inference; that is, the conclusion expressed in the *that*-clause is unambiguously inferred from the context. This, in turn, implies that the hearer can also arrive at the same conclusion through the same inferential process because he shares the same context with the speaker. Thus, the *take it that*-construction serves to make the hearer check whether the information the speaker provides is in his knowledge.

Chapter 5

The *I Tell You*-Construction and the Speaker as an Information Source

5.1. Introduction¹

The underlined sentence in (1) includes the expression *I tell you*. Henceforth, I will call it the *I tell you*-construction.^{2, 3}

- (1) Lightyear: They are a terilium-carbonic alloy, and I can fly.
Woody: No, you can't.
Lightyear: Yes, I can.
Woody: You can't.
Lightyear: Can.
Woody: Can't. Can't. Can't.
Lightyear: I tell you, I could fly around this room with my eyes closed!

¹ This chapter is a revised and extended version of Ikarashi (2013a).

² In order to discuss the central function of the *I tell you*-construction, this chapter will deal with sentences like (i) in which the illocutionary force indicator (*I tell you*) and the propositional content (*it's cold here*) in the sense of Searle (1969) are separable, but not with sentences like (ii) in which the illocutionary force indicator is a constitutive part of the propositional content.

- (i) I tell you that it's cold here.
(ii) I tell you to put your toys away.

³ In (1), the complementizer *that* is absent. One might thus assume that the *I tell you* in (1) is parenthetical. In fact, it can appear at the end or in the middle of the sentence as follows:

- (i) I tell you, this wedding (, I tell you,) is not going to happen (, I tell you).
(*Friends*: Season 4-23)

Whether *I tell you* is parenthetical or not, however, is irrelevant to the discussion here. This is because the parenthetical use of *I tell you* encodes the same kind of illocutionary force as that conveyed by its non-parenthetical use as seen in examples like (ii) (cf. Lyons (1977)).

- (ii) I hereby tell you that Lyndon Johnson is an imperialist butcher. (McCawley (1968: 157))

Woody: Okay, then, Mr. Light Beer, prove it.

(*Toy Story*)

The phrase *I tell you* in (1) is describing the speaker's act of conveying the information to the hearer at the time of utterance. Such a phrase has generally been considered to be a performative clause, a clause which typically consists of a first person subject, a second person indirect object, and a performative verb in the simple present tense. Comparing with other performative clauses like *I promise you* and *I order you*, *I tell you* seems pleonastic with respect to informativeness because it is evident from the declarative sentence form that the speaker is performing the act of conveying the information to the hearer.

This chapter aims to clarify the motivation of the use of the *I tell you*-construction in terms of evidentiality. Notice that the construction indicates that the information conveyed comes from the speaker; in other words, the speaker describes himself as an information source. *I tell you* thus falls under the class of evidentials (cf. Rooryck (2001)). The *I tell you*-construction expresses the situation where the speaker, an information source, believes that he has more access to the information in question than the hearer. In short, it signals the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer. Hence, the following function arises:

- (2) The *I tell you*-construction serves to force the hearer to incorporate the information in question into his knowledge.

Since the semantic nature of *I tell you* is clear as noted above, this chapter mainly focuses on the functional aspect of the construction.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 poses a problem

concerning the distribution of the *I tell you*-construction in discourse context. Section 5.3 puts forward a proposal on the function of the construction. In order to understand that function more clearly, this section further overviews the default informational relationship between speaker and hearer in English discussed by Hirose (2013, 2015). Section 5.4 demonstrates that the proposal correctly captures the distributional properties of the construction. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.

5.2. A Problem Concerning the Distribution of *I Tell You*

Although the *I tell you*-construction is fully acceptable in (1), it is, according to native speakers' intuition, rarely used in daily conversations. Consider, for example, a simple dialogue like (3).

- (3) [A and B are talking on the phone.]
 A: How's the weather in Tokyo?
 B: *I tell you, it's raining.

Here, speaker B, like Lightyear in (1), is performing the act of conveying the information to speaker A, but the use of *I tell you* makes the sentence conversationally unusual.

Comparison of example (4) with example (5), given below, also shows that the *I tell you*-construction is normally not used in English.

- (4) a. Honestly, I can't remember a thing about last night.
(OALD⁷, with slight modifications)
 b. Honestly [I TELL YOU [I can't remember a thing about last night]]
└──────────┬──────────┘
↑

According to the Performative Analysis (cf. Ross (1970)), the adverb *honestly* in (4a) modifies the implicit performative clause represented in capital letters as I TELL YOU in (4b) (cf. Schreiber (1972); see also Rutherford (1970)). One might expect that *I tell you* could be explicitly used in this example because it grammatically guarantees the relationship between the speech act of the sentence and the adverb *honestly*. The corresponding explicit performative clause, however, yields a conversationally unnatural sentence, as in (5), a fact which, as far as I know, was first pointed out by Shizawa (2011).

(5) ?? Honestly, I tell you I can't remember a thing about last night. (cf. (4a))

The above facts indicate that the explicit use of the *I tell you*-construction generally tends to be avoided in conversation.

What contextual factor, then, licenses the use of the construction? Previous studies have focused on syntactic aspects of performative clauses (e.g. the Performative Analysis (cf. Ross (1970), Sadock (1974))) and their semantic aspects (e.g. whether or not performative clauses contribute to truth conditions (cf. Austin (1962), Reçanati (1987))), but have not seriously investigated their distribution in contexts.⁴ Fraser (1980: 345), for instance, merely notes that explicit performative clauses make “unequivocal what speech

⁴ Lakoff (1973, 1977) discusses in what context performative clauses are licensed in terms of politeness. However, the examples that she provides are, strictly speaking, not performative sentences. For example, she gives the following examples:

- (i) a. I am telling you that Sweeny is a conscious dupe of the Communist conspiracy.
 b. I am asking you why you voted for that idiot Sweeny. (Lakoff (1977: 103))

It is generally accepted that performatives are first person indicative active sentences in the simple present tense. The verbs *tell* and *ask* in (i) take present progressive forms; thus, they are not used performatively. According to Mori (1980), the illocutionary force of sentences like those in (i) is ‘explanation’; these sentences are employed when the speaker explains what speech act he just performed in the previous utterance. Accordingly, what Lakoff discusses in (i) is the illocutionary force EXPLAIN, and not the illocutionary force TELL or ASK.

act the speaker intends to perform” (see also Leech (1980), Blakemore (1991), Collins (2006)). This function, however, is not a crucial factor which determines the acceptability of *I tell you*. In (1), for example, we can omit *I tell you* from Lightyear’s underlined utterance without rendering the sentence ambiguous about the illocutionary force. This means that the illocutionary force of this utterance is not equivocal; thus, the function of the *I tell you*-construction is not to disambiguate the illocutionary force of the sentence. There should be another reason for using it. In the next section, I will investigate what function the *I tell you*-construction has in terms of evidentiality.

5.3. The Function of the *I Tell You*-Construction

5.3.1. Proposal

As noted in section 5.1, *I tell you* indicates that the speaker describes himself as an information source. Thus, it expresses the situation where the speaker believes that he has more access to the information in question than the hearer. In short, the construction signals the speaker’s informational superiority over the hearer. Hence, the following function arises:

- (6) The *I tell you*-construction serves to force the hearer to incorporate the information in question into his knowledge.

In other words, the speaker expresses his authority on knowledge, urging the hearer to accept the information in question.

5.3.2. Reciprocal Information Sharing

To understand the function of the *I tell you*-construction in actual contexts more

clearly, I will turn to the informational relationship between speaker and hearer assumed in sentences without *I tell you*. For simplicity of exposition, I will call these sentences plain sentences. The interpersonal relationship assumed in plain sentences will be made clear by comparing English and Japanese. In Japanese, the difference in the speaker's and the hearer's state of knowledge at speech time is often expressed by certain sentence-final particles:

- (7) a. Hanako-wa byooki da yo. [known only to speaker]
 Hanako-TOP ill COP SFP
 'Hanako is ill.'
- b. Ii tenki da ne. [known to both speaker and hearer]
 good weather COP SFP
 'It's a beautiful day.'

In (7a), only the speaker knows that Hanako is ill; he has a fuller grasp of the information in question than the hearer. In this respect, he is informationally superior to the hearer, which is explicitly encoded by the sentence-final particle *yo* (cf. Masuoka (1991)). In (7b), on the other hand, both speaker and hearer know that it is a beautiful day. In this case, since the speaker and the hearer share the same information, they are informationally equal, which is expressed by the sentence-final particle *ne* (cf. Kamio (1990)).⁵

⁵ The sentence-final particle *ne* is obligatory when the information in question is known to both speaker and hearer, as in (7b), but it can be used optionally when the information is known only to the speaker, as illustrated in (i).

- (i) S: Kore, ikura desu ka?
 this how.much COP.POL Q
 'How much is this?'
 H: Gohyaku-en desu ne.
 500-yes COP.POL SFP
 Lit. '(It) is 500-yen' (Kamio (1994: 97), underline mine)

In English, by contrast, the interpersonal aspect related to the speaker's and the hearer's state of knowledge is not normally reflected in linguistic forms. Consider the following examples:

- (8) a. Hanako is ill. [known only to speaker] (cf. (7a))
b. It's a beautiful day. [known to both speaker and addressee] (cf. (7b))

(Hirose (2013: 26))

English can use the same assertive form of sentence either to convey information known only to the speaker, as in (8a), or to convey information known to both speaker and hearer, as in (8b) (cf. Kamio (1990)).⁶ In other words, English has the general pragmatic tendency not to need to linguistically encode information on the interpersonal relationship between speaker and hearer (Hirose (2013, 2015)). We can say, then, that in English the speaker and the hearer are assumed by default to be informationally equal in linguistic terms because no particular attention needs to be paid to the actual difference, if any, in their states of knowledge at speech time (cf. Hirose (2013, 2015)).⁷ This equal relationship observed in plain sentences implies that information giving “can be said to be


In (i), S does not know how much the thing in question is, and only H knows its price. Kamio (1990, 1994) calls this type of *ne* ‘optional *ne*.’ Because of *ne*, the information about the price is regarded as if it were shared between S and H. Optional *ne* thus serves to express a sense of solidarity between speaker and hearer. Unlike the *ne* in (7b), optional *ne* is strategically used for the purpose of politeness. I will not go further into optional *ne*, which is not directly relevant to the analysis developed below.

⁶ Statements are not always informative as in (8a). As Langacker (2008: 472) puts it, “[m]uch of our everyday talk consists in stating what is already plainly evident to the listener,” as illustrated in (8b). Although there is no element which linguistically distinguishes between the sentences in (8), these two types of sentences should be interpreted differently in terms of informativeness. In this respect, Sidnell’s (2012) characterization of declarative sentences (in the first position of turn organizations) is not correct. He suggests that “tellings (declaratives, assertions, etc.) [...] can be seen to index the differential knowledge of speaker and recipient” (Sidnell (2012: 299)); in declarative sentences, the speaker has more access to the information in question than the hearer. Declaratives, however, do not necessarily presuppose the speaker’s informational superiority, as illustrated in (8b).

⁷ This is also the reason why, as Lakoff (1990: 174) puts it, “English is capable of encoding interactive information, but often avoids it.”

about ‘reciprocal information sharing’” (Hirose 2013: 25).⁸ We can say, following Hirose (2013: 25-26), that when the speaker conveys information unknown to the hearer, as in (8a) above, he “achieves” reciprocal information sharing; on the other hand, when he conveys information known to the hearer, as in (8b), he “confirms” reciprocal information sharing.

On the other hand, when using the *I tell you*-construction, the speaker places himself in an informationally superior position to the hearer and thereby forces the hearer to incorporate the information in question into his knowledge (= (6)). Thus, the speaker’s informational superiority expressed by the construction implies that in this case, information giving means, as it were, “one-sided information giving.” The linguistic relationship between speaker and hearer and the manner of information giving discussed here can be diagrammed as in (9).



The vertical line indicates the degree of informational superiority, and the double arrow the manner of information giving. The double-headed double arrow in (9a) means that S(peaker) reciprocally shares information with H(earer), and the single-headed double

⁸ This implication is supported by the following example, in which the verb *share* can mean “to tell”:

- (i) I will share the news with you. (Hirose (2013: 25))

arrow in (9b) means that S one-sidedly gives information to H (i.e., the speaker forces the hearer to accept the information in question (= (6)).

The discussion so far suggests that the *I tell you*-construction can be used in a context in which the reciprocal information sharing, the unmarked manner of information giving, is not likely to be successful in making the hearer accept the information conveyed; in such a context, the speaker can choose to use the construction as a strategy of showing his informational superiority over the hearer and forcing the hearer to incorporate the information in question into the knowledge. In the next section, I will illustrate the validity of the proposal in (6) by investigating the distribution of the construction on the basis of the analysis developed here.

5.4. Distribution

The present proposal accounts for attested examples in which the use of the *I tell you*-construction is licensed. First, consider example (1), repeated as (10).

(10) Lightyear: They are a terilium-carbonic alloy, and I can fly.

Woody: No, you can't.

Lightyear: Yes, I can.

Woody: You can't.

Lightyear: Can.

Woody: Can't. Can't. Can't.

Lightyear: I tell you, I could fly around this room with my eyes closed!

Woody: Okay, then, Mr. Light Beer, prove it. (= (1))

Lightyear and Woody are characters in the movie *Toy Story*, in which toys move like

human beings. Lightyear has wings on his back. So, he is insisting that he can fly, but Woody is refusing to believe it. Obviously, Woody will not share the information that Lightyear can fly; in other words, reciprocal information sharing, the default manner of information giving, is unlikely to be achieved in this context. Lightyear seems thus to use the *I tell you*-construction, which forces Woody to incorporate the information in question into his knowledge.

The example in (11) also suggests the plausibility of my analysis. In the example, Barney is using the *I tell you*-construction so as to persuade Daniel to realize his misunderstanding of Percy.

(11) Daniel: [...] But now it's different. He[= Percy]'s realized that he must work, same as other folks, and he's doin' it. He works for some magazine or other, doin' what he calls literary work.

Barney: Humph! What magazine is it?

Daniel: I don't know. I never asked.

Barney: Well, all right. I tell you, honestly, Dan, there's a feeling that he is working you and the family for easy marks. [...]

(C. L. Joseph, *Cap'n Dan's Daughter*)

Judging from Daniel's first utterance, he strongly believes that Percy mended his ways; it is thus difficult for Barney to share with Daniel the information that Percy is deceiving Daniel and his family, which Barney believes to be true. The difficulty to achieve reciprocal information sharing is assumed to lead Barney to use the *I tell you*-construction.

Furthermore, if the pragmatic condition is met, the construction can be used in an utterance which lacks a subject and a finite verb, as exemplified in the following example:

(12) “I know what!” said Sally suddenly, “I’ll put my name on this!” She drew the little Christmas tree toward her over the table top.

“Jesus, that ain’t no kind of a present,” Fred said. “I still think you oughta put your name on the necktie.”

Sally fingered the little Christmas tree lovingly. “No, I tell you, Fred. I’d rather put my name on this. Honest, I’d rather put my name on this than on the necktie or any of the other stuff.” (M. Wolff, *Night Shift*)

In (12), *I tell you* simply modifies the phrase *No*, but it is fully acceptable. In this context, Sally is insisting that she will put her name on the little Christmas tree. Fred is then expressing his strong disagreement with Sally’s idea. They are disputing where Sally’s name should be put. This motivates Sally to use the *I tell you*-construction in order to make Fred accept that she has no intention to put her name on the necktie.

Interestingly, the following example, unlike the examples given above, is used as a politeness strategy:

(13) Salieri: I would never miss anything that you had written. You much know that.

Mozart: This is only a vaudeville.

Salieri: Oh no. It is a sublime piece. The grandest operone. I tell you, you are the greatest composer known to me.


Mozart: Do you mean that?

Salieri: I do. (Amadeus)

This seemingly peculiar use of the *I tell you*-construction can be accounted for by

assuming that it is exploited as a politeness strategy for just the same reason that the imperative is.

The imperative is intuitively considered to be impolite because it imposes an action on the hearer (cf. Lakoff (1972), Brown and Levinson (1987)); in terms of Brown and Levinson's (1987) analysis, it impinges on the hearer's negative face. Leech (1983), however, points out that the use of the imperative is construed as polite when the action that the speaker orders the hearer to perform is beneficial to the hearer (see Leech (1983: 107) for details; see also Lakoff (1972)). The cost-benefit scale in (14), proposed in Leech (1983), illustrates this point.



The value of the imperative in (14a) at the one end of the scale is 'cost to the hearer' because peeling potatoes absorbs the hearer's time and energy. Hence, this imperative is impolite. On the other hand, the value of the imperative in (14f) at the other end of the scale is 'benefit to the hearer' because eating sandwiches satisfies the hearer's appetite. Hence, this imperative is polite.

Keeping the observation about imperatives in mind, let us turn back to the example in (13). In the underlined sentence, by using the *I tell you*-construction, Salieri is attempting to force Mozart to accept the information that Mozart is the greatest composer. Notice that the acceptance of this information is beneficial to Mozart because Salieri extols him. Thus, the *I tell you*-construction here serves as a politeness strategy, strengthening the force of praise. Its function in (13) is correctly captured by the proposal in this chapter.

As might be expected, when there is no contextual reason to abandon reciprocal information sharing, *I tell you* yields an unnatural sentence. Let us first consider example (3), repeated as (15).

(15) [A and B are talking on the phone.]

A: How's the weather in Tokyo?

B: *I tell you, it's raining. (= (3))

Here speaker A is asking about the weather in Tokyo, and so he has the intention to share the information on it with speaker B. That is, there is no reason to assume that speaker A is likely to refuse to reciprocally share information with speaker B; hence, the default manner of information giving in English is required in (15). That is why speaker B is not permitted to use the *I tell you*-construction, the use of which would force speaker A to incorporate the information into his knowledge.

The following example, given in section 5.2, can be accounted for along the same lines:

(16)?? Honestly, I tell you I can't remember a thing about last night. (= (5))

Notice that the sentence is presented without any specific context. In this case, the information is expected to be conveyed in the default manner, i.e. in the manner of reciprocal information sharing. Hence, the use of the *I tell you*-construction sounds unnatural without context. It can be predicted, however, that sentence (16) becomes acceptable if it is put in an appropriate context where the speaker is permitted to impose the information in question on the hearer. This prediction is borne out by the following example:⁹

(17) [A and B had drinks at a bar last night. B drank too much and does not remember what happened there. However, A does not know this fact.]

A: Man, who were those girls you were talking to last night? They were
HOT!

B: Honestly, I tell you I can't remember a thing about last night.

Speaker A is speaking with the presupposition that speaker B remembers what happened the night before. The two speakers have different recognitions about B's memory of what happened at the bar. Speaker B thus has to do much more than simply provide new information: he needs to deny the presupposition and make speaker A recognize that he does not remember anything about the night before. To achieve this communicative

⁹ Uchida (2011) points out that performative adverbs are not compatible with performative verbs. He gives examples like (i).

(i) ? {Confidentially / Generally / Strictly}, I promise to be there at 10 tomorrow.
(Uchida (2011: 105))

In the framework of relevance theory, he accounts for this fact as follows: Performative adverbs contribute to helping the hearer to recover higher-level explicatures associated with speech acts; the use of such adverbs is thus redundant if performative verbs appear. However, the example in (17) (as well as the attested example in (11)) suggests that performative adverbs and performative verbs can co-occur in certain cases and such co-occurrence should be explained without recourse to the notion of higher-level explicatures.

purpose, speaker B is allowed to use the *I tell you*-construction, which serves to force speaker A to incorporate the information in question into his knowledge and to change his misconception.

Note in passing that the notion of informational superiority involved in the *I tell you*-construction is independent of social superiority. Let us first consider Japanese examples. The following example clearly illustrates the conceptual independency of informational superiority from social superiority (cf. Uyeno (1971)):

- (18) Sensee, ii tenki degozaimasu yo.
professor good weather COP.SUPER-POL SFP
'Professor, it's a beautiful day.'

In (18), where it is assumed that the speaker is a student of the hearer, the speaker uses the super-polite form of the copula, *degozaimasu*, because he is socially inferior to the hearer. Nevertheless, by using the sentence-final particle *yo*, he expresses his informational superiority over the hearer without having a negative effect on their relationship. This fact suggests that informational superiority can normally be expressed regardless of social relationship.

The same is true of the *I tell you*-construction; even when the speaker is socially inferior to the hearer, he can use the *I tell you*-construction as far as the pragmatic condition is met. For instance, the construction in the underlined sentence in (19) forces Vader to accept the information in question, which he would not accept in the previous conversation.

- (19) Commander: Lord Vader, this is an unexpected pleasure. We're honored by

your presence.

Vader: You may dispense with the pleasantries, Commander. I'm here to put you back on schedule.

[The commander turns ashen and begins to shake.]

Commander: I assure you, Lord Vader, my men are working as fast as they can.¹⁰

Vader: Perhaps I can find new ways to motivate them.

Commander: I tell you, this situation will be operational as planned.

Vader: The Emperor does not share your optimistic appraisal of the situation.

Commander: But he asks the impossible. I need more men.

(*Star Wars Episode VI: Return of the Jedi*)

The commander is socially in a much lower position than Vader, as indicated by the commander's first utterance. Despite his social inferiority to Vader, the commander is using the *I tell you*-construction in his underlined third utterance, insisting his informational superiority over Vader. In the movie, he utters this sentence in a trembling voice, watching out for Vader. This would mean that he utters the sentence in question while being extremely conscious of his social inferiority to Vader. Notice that Vader's

¹⁰ Some previous studies point out that performative verbs other than *tell* consist of the meaning "to tell" and other meanings specific to each of them (cf. Kasai (1977), Nakau (1980)). For instance, the verb *assure* used in (19) is defined in *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (7th edition) as "to tell somebody that something is definitely true or is definitely going to happen, especially when they have doubts about it (underlines mine)," *assure* has the meaning "to tell" and the underlined extra meanings. We can then predict that the performative clause *I assure you* will be used when the speaker needs to show his informational superiority over the hearer with the intention to remove the hearer's doubt. In fact, the context in (19) is constructed as predicted. Judging from his first and second utterances, Vader doubts that the commander's men are working as fast as they can; it is thus reasonable to say that the commander is using *I assure you* in order to force Vader to accept this information and remove his doubt. I believe that other performative clauses can be analyzed along the same lines, but I leave their analysis to future research.

response to the commander's utterance in question suggests that as with the Japanese example in (18), their social relationship is not negatively affected by the use of the construction. This example shows that the *I tell you*-construction is used independently of the social relationship between speaker and hearer.

5.5. Conclusion

The performative clause *I tell you* indicates that the information conveyed comes from the speaker; the speaker describes himself as an information source. It thus expresses the situation where the speaker believes that he has more access to the information in question than the hearer. In this respect, the construction signals the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer. Hence, the construction serves to force the hearer to incorporate the information in question into his knowledge.

Chapter 6

The Subjectless Construction and the Speaker's Thought at Speech Time

6.1. Introduction

English is a language which normally does not allow the omission of the subject. This grammatical restriction is illustrated in (1).

- (1) a. *Am here.
b. *Is a doctor.

(Schmerling (1973: 578))

The subject may not be omitted even when it can be predictable from the verbal form, as in (1a). It has been recognized, however, that subjectless sentences can be licensed in certain registers. One of those registers is a daily conversation (cf. Schmerling (1973), Thrasher (1977)). The subjectless sentences in (2) and (3), where the subject *I* is omitted, occur in this register. In what follows, I will call subjectless sentences appearing in conversations the subjectless construction.

- (2) Wouldn't blame her if she did leave him. (Thrasher (1977: 28))

- (3) Joey: You and Milton have to join us on the boat. Karen'll pack a lunch, you'll bring the kids, we'll make a day of it.

Jeannie: Oh, that sounds lovely. We're gonna have to set that up. Oh, I better get back. Hope the baby feels better.

Joey: Oh, thanks, thanks. Bye bye Jeannie.

Jeannie: Bye bye Joey.

(*Friends*: Season 2-23)

Previous studies have sporadically pointed out the meaning and the function of the subjectless construction (cf. Thrasher (1977), Mack et al. (2012)). However, there has yet, to my knowledge, to be a comprehensive study which successfully clarifies its semantic and pragmatic characters and their relationship. This chapter thus aims to first offer a proposal on the semantic aspect of the construction in terms of evidentiality. More specifically:

- (4) The subjectless construction lays bare the speaker's thought occurring at speech time.

In other words, the construction is expressive of the speaker's thought at speech time. The construction can be regarded as an evidential because it specifies the information source; it indicates that the information in question comes directly from the speaker's own thought.

Notice here that the speaker has more access to his thought than the hearer; the information conveyed by the construction falls within the speaker's informational territory, but not within the hearer's. The construction thus expresses the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer, requiring the hearer to incorporate into his knowledge what the speaker is thinking about at speech time (see the discussion on the *I tell you*-construction in Chapter 5). This means that the speaker directs the hearer to understand his thought at speech time. Hence, the following function arises:

- (5) The subjectless construction serves to force the hearer to have empathy for the speaker.¹

In other words, the construction requires the hearer to understand what the speaker is thinking about by taking the speaker's point-of-view, or by projecting himself onto the speaker.

Note that the subjectless construction is different from the evidential constructions dealt with in the previous chapters in that the former does not include any lexical items (more or less) associated with evidential meanings; the evidential meaning of the subjectless construction is expressed in a grammatical way, i.e. deletion. The subjectless construction is not the only grammatically expressed evidential. Shizawa (2015a, b) proposes that the locative inversion construction (e.g., *On the wall hangs a portrait of Mao*. (Hooper and Thompson (1973: 467))) is a construction dedicated to expressing the speaker's direct perception; as with the subjectless construction, the locative inversion construction indicates the evidential meaning in not a lexical but a grammatical manner, i.e. inversion. These two constructions suggest that English develops grammatical means to express evidentiality. To fully understand evidentiality in English, we should

¹ Subjects can also be omitted in diaries (cf. Haegeman (1990, 1997, 2013)), as illustrated in (i) (the underlines indicate that the subjects are omitted).

- (i) ___ Never saw such crowds-such enthusiasm. ___ Arrive at Embassy [,] ___ bid President goodbye. ___ Have dinner at Palace where I make a speech in reply to the [Truman writes "Tuesday night" above this part of the entry] Mexican President.
(*Diary of Virginia Woolf*, III, 29 December 1929; cited from Haegeman (2013: 89))

The subject omission in diaries, however, would differ from that in (informal) conversations in functional terms. Hirose (2006) argues that in diaries, subjects are omitted because of the speaker's high accessibility to them; the speaker does not need make subjects explicit if he knows what they are; to put it differently, what Horn (1984) calls the speaker-based principle is at work in diary subject omission. In conversation, on the other hand, subjects are omitted, as proposed in (5), for the purpose of the manipulation of the hearer. Thus, these two types of subject omission are triggered by different purposes. Further investigations would be required to differentiate them in more detail, but I will not go further into this issue here.

direct our attention to grammatically expressed evidentials as well as lexically expressed ones.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 briefly overviews previous studies and points out the inadequacy of the semantic and functional descriptions they provide. Section 6.3 clarifies the evidential meaning of the subjectless construction. Section 6.4 argues that this evidential meaning gives rise to a communicative function of the construction. Section 6.5 illustrates that not all subjectless sentences are employed for interpersonal strategies. Section 6.6 is a conclusion.

6.2. Previous Studies

This section briefly overviews previous studies closely related to the analysis I will provide below, and points out their problems. Thrasher (1977: 98) describes the omission of the subject as rapport deletion, which means that “the participants in a particular conversation [are] on a close personal relationship.” In example (3), for instance, repeated here as (6), the subjectless construction expresses Jeannie’s empathy for Joey, resulting in the indication of their closeness.

- (6) Joey: You and Milton have to join us on the boat. Karen’ll pack a lunch, you’ll bring the kids, we’ll make a day of it.
- Jeannie: Oh, that sounds lovely. We’re gonna have to set that up. Oh, I better get back. Hope the baby feels better.
- Joey: Oh, thanks, thanks. Bye bye Jeannie.
- Jeannie: Bye bye Joey. (= (3))

Comparison between the following examples clearly shows that the subjectless

construction is strategically used to confirm the solidarity between the interlocutors (Hirose (2013)):²

- (7) a. I hope you like it.
b. () Hope you like it.

(Hirose (2013: 24))

- (8) a. I hope you like it, {sir/Professor Brown}.
b. ?Hope you like it, {sir/Professor Brown}.

(Hirose (2013: 24))

The subjectless construction in (7b) “conveys a greater sense of closeness than [(7a)]” (Hirose (2013: 24)). So, as illustrated in (8a), the sentence with the explicit subject is compatible with formal address terms such as *sir* and *Professor Brown* which serve to keep a psychological distance from the hearer, but as shown in (8b), the subjectless construction is incompatible with these address terms.

Thrasher’s (1977) account can capture a wide range of examples, but the following example falls outside the scope of his analysis:

- (9) Kutner: You really lost all that money? I don’t care about the money.
Taub: I just feel bad for Rachel.
Kutner: She married a guy in one situation and ended up with another; that’s hard on anyone.

² Hirose (2013) considers the subjectless construction to be a subjective expression (see Hirose (2013: 24) for details); he explains that the omission of the subject creates the psychological closeness between speaker and hearer in the following manner. “When *I* is unexpressed, as in [(7b)], the speaker is describing the situation not from the perspective of an outside reporter, but from that of an inside participant, which he imposes on the addressee; this results in the speaker bringing the addressee closer to him” (Hirose (2013: 24)). I will give a full explanation of the closeness created by the subjectless construction in section 6.4 on the basis of its evidential meaning.

Taub: Thanks, Makes me feel much better, hearing my wife's a gold digger.

Kutner: No, I just meant she married this master of the universe, successful surgeon, and now he's basically, you know, a flunky for this mad scientist who saves lives, so that's good. (*House MD*: Season 5-18)

Kutner and Taub are talking about Taub's financial situation. Kutner is then describing Taub's wife's situation with sympathy, which seems to lead Taub to understand that Kutner is insulting his wife. The subjectless construction in this situation is thus sarcastically used to convey Taub's discomfort. This example shows that the omission of the subject cannot be merely defined as rapport deletion.

Another work closely related to the analysis I will develop below is Mack et al. (2012). They propose that the subjectless construction typically expresses "immediate judgments, [...] a judgment that the speaker formed just before the sentence was uttered" (Mack et al. (2012: 214)) (see also Schmerling (1973)). For instance:

(10) Sounds as if he had been involved with another woman before divorcing his wife. (Mack et al. (2012: 215))

Here, the speaker is indicating that he has just formed an opinion about the relevant person's behavior. Immediate judgments imply temporal immediacy; that is, "speakers should use zero sentences [i.e. the subjectless construction] relatively frequently when expressing recently-formed judgments, and less frequently to express judgments formed further in the past" (Mack et al. (2012: 214)). In fact, their corpus analysis shows that the subjectless construction in the present tense is more frequent than that in the past tense.

I agree with Mack et al. (2012) in that the construction is anchored to speech time.

Their analysis, however, is not sufficient to cover a range of subjectless examples. First, as they recognize, the construction can be used in the past tense, as shown in (11).

(11) [A patient [P] is lying on the bed and starts to talk with a doctor [D].]

P: Where are my parents?

D: They're probably dealing with committee issues or something.

P: They were arguing. I saw my mom crying. Looked like my dad was yelling at her.

D: They care about you a lot. *(House MD: Season 7-2)*

The underlined sentence seems to describe the judgment made in the past. In this case, the construction does not express the speaker's immediate judgment.

Second, the speaker's judgment is not necessarily involved when subjects other than explitives are omitted (their data are limited to sentences where explitives are omitted, as shown in (10)). In (6), for instance, Jeannie's utterance *Hope the baby feels better* expresses not her judgment about Joey's baby, but her mental state (i.e. hope). These facts suggest that the notion *immediate judgments* does not capture the subjectless construction comprehensively.

The previous studies we have seen capture some aspects of the subjectless construction, but there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis which enables us to understand its semantic and pragmatic characteristics.

6.3. The Subjectless Construction as an Evidential Expression

6.3.1. Proposal

I will first explore the meaning of the subjectless construction from the perspective

of evidentiality. The proposal is as follows:

- (12) The subjectless construction lays bare the speaker's thought occurring at speech time. (= (4))

In other words, the construction is expressive of the speaker's thought at speech time. Notice that the construction indicates that the information in question is originated in the speaker's thought. In this sense, the construction can be regarded as an evidential expression. Let us consider the following concrete example:

- (13) Joey: You and Milton have to join us on the boat. Karen'll pack a lunch, you'll bring the kids, we'll make a day of it.
Jeannie: Oh, that sounds lovely. We're gonna have to set that up. Oh, I better get back. Hope the baby feels better.
Joey: Oh, thanks, thanks. Bye bye Jeannie.
Jeannie: Bye bye Joey. (= (3))

In the underlined sentence, Jeannie is expressing her hope that Joey's baby feels better in the form of the subjectless construction. According to the proposal in (12), she is laying bare her hope just occurring to her at speech time; the construction is expressive of her hope occurring at speech time.

As noted in the previous section, the construction can also depict past events. In this case, it expresses what the speaker has just remembered at speech time, namely recollection. For example:

(14) [A patient [P] is lying on the bed and starts to talk with a doctor [D].]

P: Where are my parents?

D: They're probably dealing with committee issues or something.

P: They were arguing. I saw my mom crying. Looked like my dad was yelling at her.

D: They care about you a lot. (= (11))

Here, the patient is describing her past judgement concerning her parents' past interaction in the underlined sentence. Given the proposal in (12), the patient lays bare her thought occurring at speech time. The underlined subjectless construction thus indicates that the patient is devoting herself to the act of recalling to her mind her past judgment about her father's act; in other words, the construction signals that the patient's past judgement is verbalized just as she remembered it. In the following subsections, I will give several pieces of evidence for the proposal in (12).

6.3.2. Evidence

6.3.2.1. Interpretations of the Subjectless Construction

According to the proposal in (12), we can predict that the subjectless construction can be used when the speaker lets out his emotions evoked at speech time. Comparison between the construction and sentences with explicit subjects lends support to this prediction. Consider the following examples:

(15) a. Wouldn't blame her if she did leave him. (= (2))

b. I wouldn't blame her if she did leave him.

One of my informants has pointed out that in (15a), the speaker, without thinking, expresses a strong emotion like “Of course I will never blame her.” According to this informant, such an interpretation is not involved in (15b); the speaker in (15b) merely expresses his opinion without a strong emotion after a moment’s thought. In fact, the sentence in (15a) is licensed in an emotional situation, as in (16), but not in a non-emotional situation, as in (17).

(16) A: Oh my gosh! Did you hear Karen caught her husband with another woman? She is saying she’s going to leave him!

B: Wouldn’t blame her if she did leave him.

(17) A: Would you blame Karen for leaving her husband?

B: *Wouldn’t blame her if she did leave him.

(cf. I wouldn’t blame her if she did leave him.)

In (16), speaker A is reporting that Karen witnessed her husband’s affair. Reacting to Karen’s poor story, speaker B is expressing his strong will to take her side. In this situation, the subjectless construction sounds natural. In (17), on the other hand, the construction is degraded. Here, speaker B is merely answering speaker A’s question; there is no motivation to express speaker B’s emotion. In such a non-emotional situation, we are required to use the sentence with an explicit subject.

Next, let us consider the subjectless construction as used to describe a past event. Observe the following example, uttered to one of the speaker’s friends to report his experience:

(18) Went to the class and the teacher wasn’t there. So I got the day off.

The informant giving judgment on the examples in (15) has also pointed out that the subjectless construction in (18) is associated with the speaker's emotion; the construction indirectly expresses his frustration with the absence of the teacher. As with (15a), the construction describing the past event in (18) is used to express the speaker's emotion. It is noteworthy that the construction in (18) has a further interpretation; it provides a clue to the hearer that additional information is to follow. This second interpretation can be accounted for on the basis of the proposal in (12). As noted, in depicting a past event, the subjectless construction expresses what the speaker has just remembered at speech time. In other words, the construction in (18) indicates that the speaker is devoting himself to the act of recalling events to his mind. It is thus reasonable to say that the construction can imply that past events are chronologically uttered just as they come to the speaker's mind. That is why the construction in (18) serves as a hint that additional information is to follow. We can here predict that the subjectless construction in the past tense, like that in the present tense, becomes unnatural when there is no need to express the speaker's strong emotion and to provide a clue to the hearer that additional information appears immediately after the construction. This prediction is borne out by the following example:

(19) A: Where did you go today?

B: ?? Went to the church.

A: Was Tom also there?

B: Yes.

Here, speaker B is merely answering speaker A's question; he does not have intention of expressing his emotion or of telling events chronologically. Hence, the construction

sounds unnatural.

6.3.2.2. The Speaker's Thought

The subjectless construction is an evidential expression indicating that the information in question is originated in the speaker's thought at speech time. It is thus predicted that the construction cannot convey the information which is attributed to someone other than the speaker. This predication is supported by the following examples:

- (20) a. Looks like an accident to me.
b. *Looks like an accident to John.

(Schmerling (1973: 582))

Here, the origin of the information is expressed by the prepositional phrase *to X*. In (20a), the information is attributed to the speaker. Hence, the construction is acceptable. In (20b), on the other hand, the prepositional phrase *to John* suggests that the information comes from John. As predicted, this sentence sounds unnatural.

6.3.2.3. Immediacy

The subjectless construction is associated with the speaker's thought occurring at speech time. The content described by the construction should thus be limited to the speaker's immediate thought, a thought anchored to speech time. Let us first consider the following example:

- (21) W: How do you like it?

H: Tastes good.

W: Really?

H: Yeah. *Tastes good. (cf. It tastes good.)

The first subjectless construction is describing speaker H's immediate thought, which occurs as he eats the food speaker W served. In this case, the construction is acceptable. The second subjectless construction, on the other hand, is rejected as unnatural. The content of this sentence loses immediacy because of the separation in time from the point where speaker H ate the food. As predicted, immediacy is an important factor to determine the acceptability of the subjectless construction.

Given that the content of the subjectless construction is anchored to speech time, a certain widely-known fact can be naturally accounted for. Consider the following examples:

- (22) a. *I don't think e should go.
b. *e don't think e should go.

(Weir (2012: 108))

Whether or not the main clause subject occurs, the omission of the embedded subject results in an unnatural sentence (cf. Thrasher (1977), Weir (2012)). Notice that the unacceptability illustrated in (22) is parallel with that observed in performative sentences. Performative clauses are anchored to speech time. These clauses are not normally allowed to occur in embedded clauses, as illustrated in (23).

- (23) a. I (hereby) promise that I'll be late.

(Ross (1970: 251))

- b. I admit that I (*hereby) promise that I'll be late. (Ross (1970: 252))

In (23a), the phrase *I promise* is regarded as a performative clause, as is clear from the compatibility with the adverb *hereby*. When this clause is embedded as in (23b), the clause is no longer interpreted to be a performative clause. (23) indicates that the phrase anchored to speech time may not occur in the embedded environment. With this in mind, let us turn back to the examples in (22). As noted repeatedly, the subjectless construction is associated with the speaker's thought occurring at speech time. Hence, the construction will be unacceptable when it appears in an embedded environment.

6.3.2.4. Performative Adverbs

We have so far seen that the subjectless construction lays bare the speaker's thought occurring at speech time. This means that the construction is by nature expressive (in fact, Mack et al. (2012) consider the construction to be subjective (see also Zwicky (2005))); the construction is specialized in the thought-expressing function. Hirose (1995) calls linguistic forms with this function *private expressions*. Private expression is, as its name suggests, "the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language" (Hirose (1995: 226)).³ From a semantic point of view, the subjectless construction is a private expression and hence a non-communicative form (although it conventionalizes a certain interpersonal function (see section 6.4)).⁴ We can thus predict that the construction is semantically

³ Private expression is introduced together with *public expression*, which means "the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the communicative function of language" (Hirose (1995: 226)).

⁴ Just because expressions are private expressions does not mean that they are not used in communication. Private expressions appearing in communication are used strategically for certain communicative purposes (cf. Hasegawa (2006), Konno (2012, 2015)). Konno (2012, 2015), for example, proposes that the Japanese adjectival conjugational ending drop construction (the ACED construction), as in (i), expresses "the speaker's immediate reaction to a given situation in which (s)he is involved at the time of utterance, and is used exclusively as a private expression" (Konno (2015: 143)). As illustrated in (i), the

incompatible with performative adverbs, which by nature presuppose communication with the hearer (see section 5.2 of Chapter 5). In fact, the following sentence sounds unnatural:

(24) *Frankly, wouldn't blame her if she did leave him.

(cf. Frankly, I wouldn't blame her if she did leave him.)

The use of the performative adverb *frankly* makes the subjectless construction unacceptable. In this case, the subject is required to be explicit. Note that adverbs like *really* can be used with the subjectless construction, as shown in (25).

(25) Really wouldn't blame her if she did leave him.

Really is not a performative adverb, and hence, does not semantically presuppose the existence of the hearer. It is thus compatible with the construction.

6.4. The Function of the Subjectless Construction

The subjectless construction is an evidential expression which signals that the

construction includes an optional subject NP with no case marker and an adjectival stem followed by a glottal stop (as shown by “?”).

- (i) (Heya) kitana?
room dirty.?
'(This room is) dirty.'

(Konno (2015: 143))

According to Konno (2015: 145), “if you hear the ACED utterance *Kitana?*, you will inevitably understand that the speaker *truly* thinks that something is *very* dirty.” In other words, the construction reveals the speaker's private thought and hence is regarded as a sign of trust (see also Hasegawa (2006) for related discussion). The fact that the ACED construction and the subjectless construction are used in communication does not mean that these constructions are public expressions; they are semantically private expressions, but are pragmatically used for certain communicative purposes. To borrow Konno's (2015: 145, fn. 8) metaphor, “this is similar, for example, to the fact that just because forks can be used to hurt people, that does not alter their function per se.”

information in question is originated in the speaker's thought at speech time. This evidential character is foregrounded, and, as a result, contributes to the manipulation of the hearer. Notice first that the speaker has more access to his thought than the hearer; the information conveyed by the construction falls within the speaker's informational territory, but not within the hearer's. This means that the construction expresses the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer, urging the hearer to accept what the speaker is thinking about at speech time. In other words, the speaker directs the hearer to understand his thought at speech time. Hence, the following function arises:⁵

- (26) The subjectless construction serves to force the hearer to have empathy for the speaker. (= (5))

In other words, the construction requires the hearer to understand what the speaker is thinking about by taking the speaker's point-of-view, or by projecting himself onto the speaker.

Recall here that the *I tell you*-construction also forces the hearer to accept the information in question by expressing the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer (see Chapter 5). The subjectless construction and the *I tell you*-construction, however, differ in that while the latter one-sidedly imposes the information in question on the hearer, the former requires the hearer to understand what the speaker is thinking at

⁵ One might think that *I think* (e.g., *I think it tastes good.*), like the subjectless construction, expresses the speaker's thought and hence has a similar function to (26). This is, however, not the case. The subjectless construction expresses the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer, while *I think* does not. As Mack et al. (2012) and Hirose (2013) put it, the subjectless construction is a subjective expression; according to the proposal given above, the construction lays bare the speaker's thought occurring at speech time; hence the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer. *I think*, on the other hand, can be regarded as objective in that it linguistically describes the speaker's thought; the speaker sees his thought from the perspective of an outside reporter. In this sense, the speaker puts himself at an equal footing with the hearer; the speaker is informationally equal with the hearer. Thus, *I think* is normally used to avoid imposing the information in question on the hearer (cf. Ifantidou (1994)).

speech time.

Let us first consider the example in (27), which was given to exemplify Thrasher's (1977) rapport deletion.

(27) Joey: You and Milton have to join us on the boat. Karen'll pack a lunch, you'll bring the kids, we'll make a day of it.

Jeannie: Oh, that sounds lovely. We're gonna have to set that up. Oh, I better get back. Hope the baby feels better.

Joey: Oh, thanks, thanks. Bye bye Jeannie.

Jeannie: Bye bye Joey. (= (3))

According to the proposal in (26), the subjectless construction forces Joey to understand what Jeannie is thinking about at speech time (i.e. the hope that the baby feels better), or to have empathy for Jeannie. Note here that it is reasonable to say that Jeannie assumes that Joey has the same hope because it is beneficial to Joey. The construction is thus assumed to be used to force Joey to understand that Jeannie is sharing his hope; it indicates that Jeannie and Joey are reciprocally sharing the same hope (in fact, one of my informants has pointed out that reciprocity is involved in the subjectless construction in (27)). As a result, the omission of the subject in (27) is interpreted to be rapport deletion. If the subject occurs, the friendliness, or the psychological closeness, created by the omission of the subject decreases.

The following example can be captured in a similar fashion:

(28) A: Oh my gosh! Did you hear Karen caught her husband with another woman? She is saying she's going to leave him!

B: Wouldn't blame her if she did leave him. (= (16))

The subjectless sentence can be interpreted to express reciprocal agreement; speaker A and Speaker B reciprocally agree that they will not blame Karen if she divorces her husband. This interpretation can be explained as follows. The construction forces speaker A to empathically understand speaker B's thought in question. It is reasonable to say that speaker B assumes that speaker A has a similar opinion (i.e., *Speaker A will not blame Karen if she leaves her husband.*) because Karen's husband was involved in wrongdoing. Speaker B is thus using the subjectless construction with the intention to force speaker A to understand that they are reciprocally sharing the same opinion.

The subjectless construction as used in the past tense can be accounted for along the same lines:

(29) [A patient [P] is lying on the bed and starts to talk with a doctor [D].]

P: Where are my parents?

D: They're probably dealing with committee issues or something.

P: They were arguing. I saw my mom crying. Looked like my dad was yelling at her.

D: They care about you a lot. (= (11))

Here, the patient is talking about interaction between her parents in the past. The underlined subjectless sentence allows the patient to require the doctor to have empathy for her. In this case, the construction conveys undesirable information. So the patient is asking the doctor to feel sympathy for her.

As pointed out in section 6.2, the subjectless construction can be used dismissively.

For example, the following subjectless sentence serves to criticize the hearer:

(30) Wouldn't do that if I were you.

Suppose that the speaker and the hearer, who are not friends, are arguing about something. In this case, the subjectless construction serves to force the hearer to understand what the speaker is thinking about by taking the speaker's point-of-view, which makes the hearer aware that the speaker will never agree with him; the subjectless construction serves to make the hearer realize that there is a huge discrepancy in opinion between speaker and hearer.

The following attested example can be explained along the same lines:

(31) Kutner: You really lost all that money? I don't care about the money.

Taub: I just feel bad for Rachel.

Kutner: She married a guy in one situation and ended up with another; that's hard on anyone.

Taub: Thanks, Makes me feel much better, hearing my wife's a gold digger.

Kutner: No, I just meant she married this master of the universe, successful surgeon, and now he's basically, you know, a flunky for this mad scientist who saves lives, so that's good. (= (9))

Kutner and Taub are talking about Taub's financial situation. Kutner is then describing Taub's wife's situation with sympathy, which seems to lead Taub to interpret Kutner's utterance to insult his wife. The subjectless construction in this situation is sarcastically and critically used to convey his discomfort. (In this situation, the subjectless

construction is more natural than the sentence with the subject *it* in order to achieve the communicative goal here.) In the subjectless construction, Taub is sarcastically saying the opposite: Kutner's utterance actually makes Taub feel bad. This is clear from Taub's utterance just after the subjectless construction *hearing my wife's a gold digger*. The subjectless construction forces Kutner to have empathy for Taub, or to understand Taub's discomfort caused by Kutner's previous utterance. Thus, the subjectless construction in (31) serves to criticize the hearer, Kutner.

6.5. Subjectless Sentences Unrelated to the Manipulation of the Hearer

The examples provided so far are strategically used to manipulate the hearer. Not all subjectless sentences, however, are employed for such a strategy. Consider the following example:

- (32) This is the biggest shirt I could find. It's not mine, but don't worry about it.
It's just a souvenir from somebody. Might not be your style, but give it a try.

(H. Murakami, *Umibe no Kahuka* [Kafka on the Shore],
translated by P. Gabriel)

One of my informants has pointed out that unlike the examples provided so far, the underlined subjectless sentence does not imply any interpretation related to interpersonal aspects. Rather, the subject is omitted to avoid redundancy. The topic of this utterance is about a shirt; every sentence contains the pronouns referring to this shirt. So the subjectless construction can be paraphrased as *It's just a souvenir from somebody, and (it) might not be your style*. To avoid using such pronouns redundantly, the subject is

omitted in the underlined sentence.⁶ Example (32) shows that subjectless sentences are not necessarily concerned with the manipulation of the hearer; we should distinguish this type of subjectless sentences from the subjectless construction dealt with in this chapter.

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter has proposed that the subjectless construction lays bare the speaker's thought occurring at speech time. In other words, the construction indicates that the information in question is originated in the speaker's thought at speech time. In this sense, the construction can be regarded as an evidential expression. Because the speaker has more access to his thought than the hearer, the construction expresses the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer; the speaker expresses his authority on knowledge, urging the hearer to accept the information in question. This means that the speaker directs the hearer to understand what he is thinking at speech time. Hence, the subjectless construction forces the hearer to have empathy for the speaker.

⁶ Observing actual conversation data, Oh (2005) argues that a subject can be omitted to mark the sentence as "a resaying or a second saying." The cases Oh deals with would be different from those I have analyzed in this chapter in functional terms. They might be functionally similar to the example in (32). I will not go further into this issue here and will address it in future research.

Chapter 7

The Deictic Inversion Construction and the Speaker's Instantaneous Perceptual Experience

7.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with the Deictic Inversion Construction (abbreviated as the DIC), as illustrated in (1)-(3), where locative expressions come before verbs and logical subjects occur after the verbs.

(1) Here comes Harry. (Lakoff (1987: 471))

(2) There's Harry with his red hat on. (Lakoff (1987: 468))

(3) Assistant: We've got a couple changes in your schedule. Your 4:00 herbal massage has been pushed back to 4:30 and Miss Somerfield canceled her 5:30 shiatsu.

Phoebe: Ok, thanks. [assistant leaves, then walks back in]

Assistant: Oh, here comes your 3:00. I don't mean to sound unprofessional, but, yum (walks out, Paolo enters) (*Friends*: Season 1-12)

Previous studies point out that the DIC is used to manipulate the hearer's attention (cf. Lakoff (1987), Dorgeloh (1997), Webelhuth (2011)). More specifically:

(4) The DIC serves to direct the hearer's attention to the object in question.

In (1) and (2), for example, the speaker is trying to bring the hearer's attention to Harry.

In (3), the assistant is directing Phoebe's attention to a customer who is scheduled to come to her massage parlor at 3:00.

As for the semantic aspect of the DIC, Shizawa (2015a) proposes as follows:

- (5) The DIC encodes the speaker's instantaneous perceptual experience.

In other words, the DIC expresses the information which is acquired via the speaker's direct perception at speech time.¹ In this sense, the DIC encodes the source of information. Shizawa, thus, argues that the DIC falls under the class of evidential expressions. This means that as with the subjectless construction (see Chapter 6), the DIC expresses evidentiality in a grammatical, not a lexical, way, i.e. inversion.

How, then, are the evidential meaning in (5) and the interpersonal function in (4) associated with each other? This chapter aims to answer this question on the basis of the proposal in Chapter 2, i.e., evidential expressions in English serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective evidential meanings; I will clarify a mechanism by which the evidential meaning of the DIC creates its function.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 overviews Shizawa's (2015a) proposal and provides further evidence to support this proposal. Section 7.3 argues that the evidential meaning of the DIC underlies its function. Section 7.4 is a

¹ Noaki Wada (personal communication) has brought my attention to the following examples given by Hinds (1986: 32-33):

- (i) a. A mouse is in the kitchen.
b. Three mice are in the kitchen.

According to Hinds (1986), these examples express the existence of a mouse or mice like the existential *there*-construction (i.e., *There is a mouse in the kitchen.* / *There are three mice in the kitchen.* (Hinds (1986: 32)). It should be noted here that examples (ia) and (ib) "establish a visual set, and the listener expects that something is going to happen very soon" (Hinds (1986: 33)). This means that the direct perception (in particular, the visual perception) can be expressed by sentence forms other than the DIC. Further investigations are required to find out forms specialized in expressing the direct perception and to define the functions of these forms.

conclusion.

7.2. The Evidential Meaning of the DIC

7.2.1. The Speaker's Instantaneous Perceptual Experience

As noted, Shizawa (2015a) proposes that the DIC has the following evidential meaning:²

- (6) The DIC encodes the speaker's instantaneous perceptual experience. (= (5))

Note that the speaker's perception is not limited to visual sense; the DIC can express the information gained through, for example, auditory perception:

- (7) There goes the phone (= it's ringing). (OALD⁷)

In (7), as the paraphrase shows, the speaker hears the phone ringing (see Lakoff (1987) for related discussion). In the rest of this section, I will show the validity of the proposal in (6) by citing Shizawa's examples and providing further evidence.

7.2.2. Evidence

7.2.2.1. Restrictions on the Source of Information Expressed by the DIC

The proposal in (6) leads us to predict that the DIC cannot be used unless the speaker's direct experience is at issue. Shizawa (2015a: 53) provides the following examples:

² Shizawa (2015a) discusses the DIC to demonstrate that the locative inversion construction (e.g., *On the wall hangs a portrait of Mao*. (Hooper and Thompson (1973: 467)) is an extended construction of the DIC. See Shizawa (2015a; section 4) for more detailed discussion.

- (8) Inferential Information:
- a. *Here comes Harry (, because our dog is barking).
 - b. *There may go the bell.
- (9) Hearsay information:
- A: What did Mary say?
- B: *There's Harry with his red hat on.

In (8a), as is clear from the expression in the parentheses, the speaker infers that Harry arrives at the place where the speaker is. Similarly, in (8b), the speaker infers that the bell is ringing. The unacceptability of these examples shows that the DIC cannot express the information gained via inference. In (9), the DIC expresses hearsay information, which makes the sentence unnatural. These examples suggest that the DIC is specialized in expressing the speaker's direct experience.

Let us next consider the following examples, which Lakoff (1987: 469) provides to illustrate that a locative expression of the DIC is not a grammatical subject:

- (10) a. There is Harry with his red hat on.
- b. *There is believed to be Harry with his red hat on.
 - c. *There is likely to be Harry with his red hat on.

Raising-constructions such as *x is believed to* and *x is likely to* allow only subjects to occur in these constructions. Lakoff (1987), thus, concludes that the unacceptability of the examples in (10b) and (10c) is attributed to the grammatical status of the locative expression *there*; locative expressions of the DIC are not grammatically subjects. Given the proposal in (6), on the other hand, the unacceptability in (10b) and (10c) can be

explained as follows. Putting aside the grammatical status of the locative expression *there*, the raising-constructions in (10) are semantically incompatible with the DIC in the first place. The DIC expresses the speaker's perceptual experience, while the raising-constructions in (10) express belief or expectation. This semantic incompatibility, thus, causes the unacceptability in (10b) and (10c).

7.2.2.2. Yes-No Questions

Shizawa (2015a) points out that yes-no questions may not be formed from the DIC, as shown in (11).

- (11) a. *Does here come Harry?
b. *Is there Harry with his red hat on?

(Shizawa (2015a: 53))

According to Shizawa, the unacceptability is caused by the semantic incompatibility between the DIC and yes-no questions. Yes-no interrogative sentences are used to ask about the truth or falsity of the proposition in question, whereas the DIC expresses the speaker's direct perception. The speaker in (11) thus is asking about the truth of his own perception, which makes the sentences nonsensical.

7.2.2.3. Negation

Lakoff (1987) points out that the DIC may not be negated, as in (12).

- (12) *There isn't Harry with his red hat on.

(Lakoff (1987: 469))

This fact can be ascribed to the evidential meaning of the DIC. The DIC indicates that the speaker perceives an event at speech time. In (12), however, the speaker cannot perceive the event in question because the negative form implies that this event does not happen. That is why the DIC in (12) sounds unnatural.

7.2.2.4. Instantaneity

The DIC expresses the speaker's instantaneous perceptual experience. This means that this construction is anchored to speech time. Let us first consider the following example:

(13) Here comes Harry. (Lakoff (1987: 471))

According to Lakoff (1987: 471), "here is a true present tense, that is, *comes* makes reference to the time the sentence is uttered and it is instantaneous." This instantaneous character of the DIC can be demonstrated by the phrase *from time to time*, which "restricted to generic, not instantaneous, time reference" (Lakoff (1987: 471)); we can predict that the phrase *from time to time* should semantically be incompatible with the DIC. As predicted, the following sentence sounds unnatural:

(14) *Here comes Harry from time to time. (Lakoff (1987: 471))

Recall here that performative clauses, which are anchored to speech time, are not normally allowed to occur in embedded clauses (see section 6.3.2.3 of Chapter 6). It is thus predicted that the DIC, which, like performative clauses, is anchored to speech time, may not occur in the embedded environment. This prediction is supported by the

following example:

(15) *I doubt that there's Harry in the kitchen. (Lakoff (1987: 469))

Here, the DIC is embedded in the complement clause of the verb *doubt*, resulting in the unacceptable sentence. The parallelism between performative clauses and the DIC shows that the latter, like the former, is an instantaneous expression.

7.3. The Function of the DIC

As noted in section 7.1, it is generally said that the DIC has the following interpersonal function:

(16) The DIC serves to direct the hearer's attention to the object in question. (= (4))

According to Webelhuth (2011), the DIC is used in a situation where the speaker assumes that the hearer does not pay attention to the object in question, and he needs to direct the hearer's attention to that object. For example:

(17) Assistant: We've got a couple changes in your schedule. Your 4:00 herbal massage has been pushed back to 4:30 and Miss Somerfield canceled her 5:30 shiatsu.

Phoebe: Ok, thanks. [assistant leaves, then walks back in]

Assistant: Oh, here comes your 3:00. I don't mean to sound unprofessional, but, yum (walks out, Paolo enters) (= (3))

In this scene, a customer is scheduled to come to Phoebe's massage parlor at 3:00, and he appears there, but Phoebe does not notice it. In the underlined sentence, the assistant seems to try to direct Phoebe's attention to the customer.

How, then, does the interpersonal function in (16) derive from the evidential meaning of the DIC? The DIC is an evidential expression conveying the information which the speaker acquires at speech time. Notice that the hearer is assumed to be able to perceive the same object or event as the speaker perceives because he shares time and space with the speaker. Foregrounding this character, the DIC serves to invite the hearer to jointly pay attention to the object or the event in question.³ Hence the function in (16).

7.4. Conclusion

Functionally, the DIC serves to direct the hearer's attention to the object in question. Semantically, the DIC can be regarded as an evidential expression encoding the speaker's instantaneous perceptual experience. This chapter has explained how the function of the DIC derives from its evidential meaning. Given the proposal in Chapter 2, the DIC highlights the hearer's ability to perceive the same object or event as the speaker perceives. Thus, the DIC serves to invite the hearer to jointly pay attention to the object or the event in question.

³ Shizawa (2015a) also attempts to account for the mechanism by which the interpersonal function in (16) derives from the evidential meaning of the DIC; he focuses on a psychological phenomenon known as *joint attention*, which means "a simultaneous engagement of two or more individuals in mental focus on one and the same external thing" (Shizawa (2015a: 54)). He explains as follows:

First, by using a locative phrase [...], the speaker directs the hearer's attention to the perceptual field or space in which an entity exists. At this step, the speaker has succeeded in sharing and coordinating attention with the hearer; that is, joint attention is established between them. Second, by introducing the entity, the speaker directs the hearer's focus from the space or region to the entity itself.

(Shizawa (2015a: 54))

My analysis and Shizawa's do not exclude each other; rather, these explain the same phenomena from different perspectives.

Chapter 8

Mirativity in English: Forms and Functions

8.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to extend the generalization proposed in Chapter 2 to a linguistic category often discussed in relation to evidentiality, namely *mirativity*. Mirativity is a category “whose primary meaning is speaker’s unprepared mind, unexpected new information, and concomitant surprise” (Aikhenvald (2004: 209)). For example, in Magar, a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in Nepal, mirativity is expressed by “the verb stem plus nominaliser *o*, followed by *le*, [i.e.] a grammaticalised copula, functioning as an auxiliary and marker of imperfective aspect: Σ -*o le* [STEM-NOM IMPF]” (Grunow-Hårsta (2007: 175)). Let us compare the following sentences:

- (1) a. thapa i-laŋ le
Thapa P.DEM-LOC COP
‘Thapa is here’ (non-mirative)
- b. thapa i-laŋ le-o le
Thapa P.DEM-LOC COP-NOM IMPF
(I realize to my surprise that) ‘Thapa is here’

(Grunow-Hårsta (2007: 175))

According to Grunow-Hårsta (2007: 175), the non-mirative sentence in (1a) “simply conveys information, making no claims as to its novelty or the speaker’s psychological reaction to it”; on the other hand, the mirative sentence in (1b) “conveys that the

information is new and unexpected and is as much about this surprising newness as it is about the information itself.”

Evidentiality and mirativity are similar in that they “essentially delineate the speaker’s relationship, either physically or psychologically, to experienced events and states” (Dickinson (2000: 381)); they mark the status of the information in question in the speaker’s overall knowledge. As with languages with grammatical evidential items, languages with grammatical mirative items have attracted a great deal of attention since the seminal work of DeLancey (1997). English, on the other hand, has not become the focus of attention because of the lack of such grammatical mirative items. Notice, however, that like evidentiality, mirativity can be linguistically manifested with the aid of certain constructions (cf. DeLancey (2012)). I hypothesize, therefore, that mirative constructions, like evidential ones, serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective mirative meanings. I will verify this hypothesis by analyzing the following three expressions assumed to encode mirative meanings:

- (2) *The turns out-construction:*

Turns out the bowing wasn’t the cause of his problems.

(*House MD*; Season 1-2)

- (3) *The Mad Magazine construction:*

What, me worry?

(Akmajian (1984: 2))

- (4) *The what-a exclamative construction:*

What a day (I had).

(Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 376) with slight modifications)

As noted in Chapter 1, evidentiality can be divided into subcategories, such as

visual perception, inference, and hearsay, on the basis of the way the information in question was acquired. Subcategories of mirativity, on the other hand, have yet to be fully understood because of the immaturity of this field. To clearly understand functions of mirative constructions in English, however, we need to specify mirative meanings of respective mirative constructions because, according to the proposal in Chapter 2, these meanings underlie their functions. Aikhenvald (2012) also points out the necessity of clarifying the subcategories of mirativity:

- (5) When we describe linguistic categories — such as aspect, or tense, or gender, or evidentiality — we do not just say that a language has “tense”: we specify that it has present, past, and remote past; or past versus non-past. Along similar lines, it is not enough to say that a language has “mirativity”: one needs to specify the subset of the range of mirative meanings grammaticalized in the language. (Aikhenvald (2012: 437))

Thus, I will first specify the mirative meanings of the English mirative constructions given above, and then discuss their functions in communication.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 illustrates that several mirative meanings can be distinguished by different mirative markers in a language, more specifically in Japanese. Unlike in Japanese, it remains unclear what constructions encode mirativity in English, let alone what functions those constructions have. In order to pursue the applicability of the proposal given in Chapter 2 to mirative expressions, I will first clarify the mirative meanings of the constructions I will deal with, and then discuss the functions created by their mirative meanings. More specifically, section 8.3 deals with the *turns out*-construction, section 8.4 the Mad Magazine construction, and

section 5.5 the *what-a* exclamative construction. Section 8.6 is a conclusion.

8.2. Subcategories of Mirativity

As noted in the previous section, there are very few studies which attempt to divide mirativity into subcategories. Therefore in this section, before discussing English mirative constructions, I will illustrate that several mirative meanings can be distinguished by different mirative markers in a language like Japanese. Although Japanese has not been seriously investigated in terms of mirativity, the following discussion will show that this language develops a mirative system consisting of several mirative markers encoding different mirative meanings.

8.2.1. The Sentence-Final Particle *No*

Japanese develops nominalizers. Among them, much attention has been paid to the sentence-final particle *no* (cf. Mikami (1953), Yamaguchi (1975), Tanomura (1990), to name a few). As I will propose in Appendix, it falls under the category of mirative markers; more specifically, it expresses the speaker's unexpectedness and does not specify further meanings — an unmarked mirative marker (see Appendix for more detailed discussion on the mirative marker *no*). Let us consider the example in (6) (*n* is a phonological variant of *no*).

- (6) Koko-ni ita n da.
here-DAT be MIR COP
'That is where you are.'

The sentence in (6) can be uttered in a context in which the speaker found the hearer in an

unexpected place, and hence implies his surprise. Without *no* (and the following copula verb *da*, which cannot immediately follow verbs), the sentence (i.e., *Koko-ni ita.*) no longer indicates the speaker's unexpectedness.

The mirative marker *no* is not licensed when the sentence in question describes the event expected by the speaker. Let us consider the sentence in (7), which we assume has been uttered in the situation where the speaker just put on a heater.

- (7) *Korede atatakaku naru n daroo.
 that warm become MIR MOD
 'The room will warm up.'

The speaker put on the heater with the intention of warming up the room; thus, he has expected that the event in question will happen after he puts on the heater. In this situation, the use of *no* degrades the acceptability of the sentence; we should omit *no* from the sentence (i.e., *Korede atatakaku naru daroo.*). Notice that the sentence in (7) becomes acceptable if the modality marker *ka* is attached at the end of the sentence:¹

¹ I assume that as opposed to the traditional view, *ka* is not a question marker (cf. Takiura (2008)). For one thing, *ka* can appear in a sentence which is not related to the illocutionary force of question:

- (i) Nani-o tabe yoo ka.
 what-ACC eat will MOD
 'What do I eat?'

Suppose that the sentence is uttered in a monologue with a non-rising intonation. In this case, the speaker is merely thinking about what he will eat, and thus does not intend to ask someone to specify the value of the *wh*-phrase. This example permits us to state that *ka* itself is not a question particle. Rather, I assume that *ka* serves as an illocutionary force indicator of question; it indirectly contributes to the interrogative interpretation by semantically indicating what Searle (1969) calls the preparatory condition. As Searle (1969: 66) argues, the illocutionary act of question presupposes, as a preparatory condition, that "S[peaker] does not know 'the answer', i.e., does not know if the proposition is true, or, in the case of the propositional function, does not know the information needed to complete the proposition truly." *Ka* shows speaker's uncertainty (cf. Moriyama (1989), Hirose (1995), Takiura (2008)), so its use linguistically expresses this preparatory condition, which in turn makes the hearer to infer that the expression is a question. See Ikarashi (2014b) for detailed discussion on the semantic and pragmatic aspects of *ka*. For the syntactic property of *ka* see Sakamoto and Ikarashi (2014).

- (8) Korede atatakaku naru n daroo ka.
 that warm become MIR MOD MOD
 ‘I wonder whether the room will warm up.’

Ka signals the speaker’s uncertainty (cf. Moriyama (1989)). Thus in (8), the speaker is uncertain about whether the room will warm up or not; in other words, the speaker does not expect that the heater will warm up the room. In this situation, the use of *no* allows the speaker to express the unexpectedness of the event in question.

8.2.2. The Quotative Particle *Datte*

Suzuki (1999) mentions that the Japanese quotative particle *datte* serves as a mirative marker (see also Suzuki (2006)); more specifically, *datte* expresses the unexpectedness of the statement by the third person.² For example:

- (9) [The speaker and the hearer are talking about a woman.]
 “Watasi, kekkonn suru wa” datte!
 I marriage do Feminine-marker MIR
 (Sinji-rare-nai yo.)
 believe-be able to-not I tell you
 ‘[A woman said] “I am getting married.” (I can’t believe it.)’

Datte in (9) is used to quote the statement made by a woman, signaling that the speaker finds the woman’s marriage unexpected. *Datte* cannot be used to express the

² It is generally pointed out that mirativity “makes no claims about the source of information, [and] can occur with first-hand observation, inference, or hearsay” (Watters (2002: 300)). However, we must admit that some mirative markers like *datte* are limited to particular information sources.

unexpectedness of the information gained via, say, visual perception, as illustrated in (10).

(10) **Koko-ni ita datte.*

here-DAT be MIR

‘That is where you are.’

In (10), *datte* quotes the information gained via the speaker’s visual perception, so the sentence results in an unacceptable sentence. This example shows that *datte* is a mirative marker specialized in the speaker’s expression of the unexpectedness of what someone said.

8.2.3. The Sentence-Final Particle *Koto*

Honda (2015, personal communication) proposes that the sentence-final particle *koto* behaves as a mirative marker conveying scalar implicature;³ more precisely, the particle *koto* indicates that the value of a certain property is higher than what the speaker expected it to be. Let us consider the following example:

(11) *Ookiku natta koto.*

tall became MIR

‘How tall you got!’

³ *Koto* can also be used to create noun clauses (cf. Kuno (1973)). For example:

- (i) *Kanozyo-wa Taro-ga sinda koto-o sinzi nai.*
she-TOP Taro-NOM died COMP-ACC believe not
‘She doesn’t believe that Taro died.’

Here, *koto* makes the clause *Taro-ga sinda* a noun clause, which makes it possible that this clause is used as an object of the main verb. Notice that Taro’s death is not related to the scalar property (see Kuno (1973) for semantic description of *koto*). So, *koto* in (i) should be differentiated from the sentence-final particle *koto*. I will not, however, investigate the difference between these two types of *koto* here.

The particle *koto* in (11) functions as expressing the speaker's sense of unexpectedness; *koto* implies that the degree of the hearer's tallness exceeds what the speaker has expected.

The oddity of the following example suggests that the speaker's sense of unexpectedness must be involved in *koto*:

(12)?? Omottatoori, kirei da koto.

as is expected beautiful COP MIR

'As is expected, how beautiful you are!'

The expression *omottatoori* 'as is expected' makes the sentence containing *koto* sound unnatural; the unnaturalness in (12) is caused by the semantic conflict between *koto* and *omottatoori*. Notice that the sentence becomes natural when *koto* is omitted (i.e., *Omottatoori, kirei da.*).

Comparison between the following two examples shows that *koto* is related to a gradable property:

(13) a. *Otoko-no hito da koto.

man-GEN person COP MIR

Lit. 'How man you are!'

b. Otoko-rasii hito da koto.

man-like person COP MIR

'How masculine you are!'

(13a) shows that the non-gradable predicate NP does not co-occur with *koto*. As shown in (13b), the sentence in (13a) becomes acceptable if the genitive marker *no* is replaced by

the adjective suffix *rasii*, which makes the predicate NP denote a gradable property (i.e. manliness). The contrast in (13) shows that *koto* expresses unexpectedness related to a gradable property.

8.2.4. Interim Summary

As shown so far, Japanese has at least three morphological mirative markers (i.e. *no*, *datte*, and *koto*). These mirative markers specify different mirative meanings. This is summarized in the following table:

Mirative marker	Mirative meaning
<i>no</i>	unmarked (unexpectedness in general (without further specification))
<i>datte</i>	unexpectedness of what someone said
<i>koto</i>	unexpectedness related to a gradable property

TABLE 1

The discussion in this section shows that mirativity has semantic subcategories which can be manifested in different linguistic forms. It is thus reasonable to say that several mirative meanings are linguistically distinguished in English. In what follows, I will specify the mirative meanings of the English mirative constructions given in section 8.1, and discuss their functions in communication.

8.3. The *Turns Out*-Construction and an Unmarked Mirative Meaning

8.3.1. Basic Features

This section deals with sentences containing the phrase *turns out*, as in (14). Henceforth, I call these sentences the *turns out*-construction.

- (14) Cameron: There's a problem.
 House: Complications in surgery?
 Foreman: Surgery went fine. He's in recovery. But we took a vial of C.S.F. and tested it.
 House: Really?
 Foreman: Turns out the bowing wasn't the cause of his problems. It was a symptom.
 Chase: Oligoclonal bands and increased intrathecal IgG.
 House: Which means multiple sclerosis. (*House MD*: Season 1-2)

Notice that the expression *turns out* is in the present tense even if the information in question is assumed to be gained in the past (see also Otake (2013) for related discussion). This means that *turns out* does not describe the discovery of the information in question in the past; rather, it is anchored to speech time, expressing the speaker's mental state, namely unexpectedness (see the discussion below). The phrase *turns out*, furthermore, could be considered to be a grammaticalized expression which derived from the phrase *it turns out that* through the omission of the expletive *it* and the complementizer *that*.⁴

⁴ The *turns out*-construction should be distinguished from the subjectless construction (see Chapter 6). For example, the latter is restricted to the sentence initial position (cf. Weir (2012)), whereas the former is not subject to such a restriction. Consider the following examples:

- (i) a. *e* won't be in the office tomorrow.
 b. *Tomorrow, *e* won't be in the office. (Weir (2012: 108))
- (ii) But after he asked Joseph about it, turns out it was you. (*Friends*: Season 2-23)

In (ib), the adverb *tomorrow* is put in the sentence initial position, which makes the subjectless construction unnatural. In (ii), on the other hand, the *turns out*-construction occurs after the adverbial clause. The contrast between (i) and (ii) suggests that the *turns out*-construction is not a type of the subjectless construction, but rather a grammaticalized expression encoding mirativity.

8.3.2. The Mirative Meaning of the *Turns Out*-Construction

DeLancey (2012) notes that the *turns out*-construction expresses a mirative meaning (see also Otake (2015)). More specifically, I assume that the construction has the following meaning:

- (15) The *turns out*-construction expresses an unmarked mirative meaning.

In other words, the construction expresses unexpectedness in general without further specification. Let us first consider the example in (14). Here, Cameron opens a conversation by saying that there is a problem concerning a patient. House expects that the problem is related to the surgery the patient had. Foreman, however, turns down this expectation, and then, informs the patient's medical condition in the form of the *turns out*-construction; the information that the bowing was not the cause of the patient's problems are presented as unexpected. The construction merely conveys that the information in question is unexpected to the speaker (and to the other participants in this case), and specifies no additional meanings. Unlike the Japanese sentence-final particle *koto*, for example, the *turns out*-construction is not related to a degree value, as is clear from the information of the underlined sentence in (14). Furthermore, unlike the Japanese quotative particle *datte*, the construction is indifferent about the source of information; in (14), for example, the construction conveys the information assumed to be inferred from the test result. In the following example, on the other hand, the construction expresses the speaker's impression of Sebastian:

- (16) Sebastian: Actually, I uh, I gotta get going. (To Rachel) Give me a call sometime.

Rachel: Oh, but y'know, no, you didn't give me your phone number.

Sebastian: Okay! See you later! (Exits.)

Chandler: (To Monica) Turns out he is kinda funny.

(*Friends*: Season 6-19)

Here, Chandler observes the conversation between Sebastian and Rachel, and gets the impression that Sebastian is a funny man. The *turns out*-construction serves to present Chandler's thought.

8.3.3. The Function of the *Turns Out*-Construction

The *turns out*-construction indicates that the information in question is unexpected for the speaker; to put it differently, this information has not existed in the speaker's knowledge, which means that it falls outside the speaker's territory of information and he has no authority on knowledge. By highlighting this character, the construction gives rise to the following function:

- (17) The *turns out*-construction serves to avoid imposing the information in question on the hearer.

Because of the function in (17), the *turns out*-construction can be used as a strategy of what Brown and Levinson (1987) calls negative politeness. For example:

- (18) A: The weather in Tokyo is fine, right?
B: Turns out it's snowing.

According to one of my informants, speaker B's utterance becomes rude if the phrase *turns out* is omitted (i.e., *It's snowing.*). In other words, the *turns out*-construction plays a role in maintaining the interpersonal relationship between speaker A and speaker B. This fact naturally follows from the function in (17). In (18), speaker A expects that it is fine in Tokyo, but contrary to his expectation, it is in fact snowing. Using the *turns out*-construction, speaker B avoids imposing this correct information (i.e., *It is snowing in Tokyo.*) on speaker A; the construction serves to avoid impinging on speaker A's negative face. Hence, the construction in (18) is interpreted to be more polite than the sentence without the expression *turns out*.

The attested example in (14), repeated as (19), can also be accounted for along the same lines.

(19) Cameron: There's a problem.

House: Complications in surgery?

Foreman: Surgery went fine. He's in recovery. But we took a vial of C.S.F. and tested it.

House: Really?

Foreman: Turns out the bowing wasn't the cause of his problems. It was a symptom.

Chase: Oligoclonal bands and increased intrathecal IgG.

House: Which means multiple sclerosis. (= (14))

The participants have thought that the bowing was the cause of the patient's problems, but the test result shows that their expectation was wrong. The *turns out*-construction is assumed to be used to avoid imposing on House the information which indicates their

diagnostic error.

Lastly, I would like to deal with the example in (16), repeated as (20).

(20) Sebastian: Actually, I uh, I gotta get going. (To Rachel) Give me a call sometime.

Rachel: Oh, but y'know, no, you didn't give me your phone number.

Sebastian: Okay! See you later! (Exits.)

Chandler: (To Monica) Turns out he is kinda funny. (= (16))

Prior to this scene, Rachel's friends Chandler, Monica (and Phoebe) asked Sebastian, a man who Rachel got acquainted with just before this scene, malicious questions about his personality, which leads Sebastian to run away from the others. Here, Sebastian is telling Rachel to call him later, but he did not give his phone number to her (so she cannot give him a call). Chandler observes their conversation, and gets the impression that Sebastian is a funny man. Chandler's opinion, however, would be offensive to Rachel, so he is presumably using the hedging expression *kinda* to soften what he is saying. Together with *kinda*, *turns out* is assumed to be used as a hedging expression. That is, it serves to avoid imposing his opinion on the others, and thus this opinion can be interpreted to be Chandler's personal one.

8.4. The Mad Magazine Construction and the Unexpectedness of What Someone has Just Said

8.4.1. Basic Features

This section explores the following sentences, which Akmajian (1984) calls Mad Magazine sentences, named after a famous American magazine. Henceforth, I call these

sentences the Mad Magazine construction (abbreviated as the MM construction).

- (21) a. What, me worry?
b. What! John get a job! (Fat chance)
c. My boss give me a rise?! (Ha.)
d. Him wear a tuxedo?! (Sure.)

(Akmajian (1984: 2))

Syntactically, the MM construction lacks tense, which forces the case of the subject to be marked as an unmarked accusative form (Akmajian (1984)). The following sentences, thus, are ungrammatical:

- (22) a. What! *She call me up?! Never.
b. *Him gets a job?!
c. *Her {might/will/ etc.} call me up?!

(Akmajian (1984: 3))

Phonologically, the subject NP and verb phrase are pronounced as two phonological phrases, both of which have a rising intonation (Akmajian (1984), Taylor (1998, 2002)). If these phonological conditions are not satisfied, sentences like (21) are no longer interpreted as MM constructions (Taylor (2002: 569)).

8.4.2. The Mirative Meaning of the MM Construction

The MM construction is generally considered to express the speaker's surprise (cf. Akmajian (1984), Taylor (1998, 2002); see also Konno (2012, 2015) for discussion on the

expressive function of this construction). In this sense, the construction falls under the class of mirative expressions (recall the definition of mirativity given in section 8.1, where *surprise* is a constitutive part of this notion). Furthermore, “[a] speaker, in using the construction, takes up a proposition already introduced into the discourse” (Taylor (1998: 187)) by a hearer (see also Fillmore et al. (1988)). These observations lead us to conclude that the MM construction has the following mirative meaning:

- (23) The MM construction expresses the unexpectedness of what someone has just said.

To get a clear idea of the mirative meaning given in (23), let us consider the following example:

(24) A: I hear that John may wear a tuxedo to the ball...

B: Him wear a tuxedo?! He doesn't even own a clean shirt.

(Akmajian (1984: 3))

Speaker A first informs speaker B of the possibility that John will wear a tuxedo. Reacting to what speaker A has just said, speaker B uses the MM construction to express the unexpectedness of John's behavior.

As stated in (23), the MM construction is specialized in expressing the unexpectedness of a statement by the hearer, which means that the construction cannot be used merely to convey information. In fact, the following sentence sounds unnatural:

- (25) *Honey, him wear a tuxedo.

Here, the speaker does not react to what the hearer said in the previous discourse; rather, he is merely conveying the information that the person in question wears a tuxedo. The unnaturalness of (25) shows that the construction is restricted to a situation where the speaker reacts to the statement made by the hearer.

8.4.3. The Function of the MM Construction

Generally, the MM construction is employed “to challenge or question a proposition just posed by an interlocutor” (Fillmore et al. (1988: 511)). To put it another way:

(26) The MM construction serves to dismiss what the hearer has just said.

As Taylor (1998: 187) puts it, the MM construction “presupposes a preceding discourse context and even sets up expectations about what is going to follow. (Typically follow-up remarks might be *Ridiculous!*, *You have to be joking!*, and the like.)” In (24), for example, by saying that John does not have a clean shirt, speaker A is explicitly showing his disbelief about what speaker A has just said.

Why, then, does the construction have the function given in (26) in the first place? Previous studies do not address this question, and merely consider this function to be inherent in the MM construction (cf. Fillmore et al. (1988), Taylor (1998, 2002)). On the other hand, the hypothesis given in section 8.1. (i.e., Mirative constructions serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective mirative meanings.) can explain the mechanism which gives rise to the function in (26). The construction indicates that the statement made by the hearer is unexpected to the speaker; what the hearer has just said has not existed in the speaker’s knowledge. Given the hypothesis in section 8.1, the construction foregrounds the situation where the information conveyed by the hearer

conflicts with the speaker's knowledge, thereby serving to dismiss that information as not being registered in the speaker's knowledge.

8.5. The *What-a* Exclamative Construction and the Unexpectedness of the Referent

8.5.1. Basic Features

This section deals with a type of exclamative sentences, as illustrated in (27) and (28), which, according to Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996), I will call the *what-a* exclamative construction.

- (27) a. What a question!
b. Jesus, what an idiot (I am).

(Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 385) with slight modifications)

- (28) I have acrophobia, which gives me vertigo. And I get dizzy. What a moment to find out I had it. (House MD: Season 2-16)

Structurally, this construction takes the schematic form *what a NP*, where the semantic content of the NP can be further specified by clauses like *I am* in (27b), or *to*-infinitive clauses like *to find out I had it* in (28).

Another noteworthy feature is the identifiability of described referent (Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996), Michaelis (2001)); the speaker and the hearer are supposed to be able to identify what entity is at issue. In (27a), for example, the speaker and the hearer can identify which question is under consideration. On the other hand, consider the following example:

- (29) *What a nice guy someone is. (Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 379))

As is clear from the pronoun *someone*, the expression *a nice guy* is not used here as a description of a specific person. The unacceptability in (29) shows that the construction cannot be used unless the NP in question describes a characteristic of a specific referent.

8.5.2. The Mirative Meaning of the *What-a* Exclamative Construction

Exclamative sentences are considered to express “expectation contravention” (Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996)), namely, unexpectedness. In this sense, they can be regarded as a manifestation of the mirative category. As for the *what-a* exclamative construction, most attention is directed towards the particular referent described by the NP because the construction is not necessarily used in the form of a full sentence (see the examples in (27) and (28)). So, it is reasonable to say that (unlike the *turns-out* construction,) this construction expresses the unexpectedness related to this referent, not to events, actions, or states. More specifically, I propose that the construction has the following meaning:

- (30) The *what-a* exclamative construction signals that the referent described by the NP deviates from what is expected.⁵

Let us first consider the following example:

- (31) What a question! (= (27a))

⁵ Exclamative sentences are often thought to be associated with the scalar property (cf. Zanuttini and Portner (2003), Collins (2006)); “the degree in question is higher than the speaker had expected” (Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 379)). On the other hand, I do not include the scalar property in the semantic description of the construction. This is because the construction does not necessarily include NPs related to scalar interpretations, as can be seen from examples like *What a day.* and *What a question.* So, I will focus here on the unexpectedness involved in the construction and leave it open whether the scalar property is constitutive part of the semantic content of the construction.

According to the proposal in (30), the question under consideration is interpreted to be an unordinary one; “[a] priori, we don’t know whether the question at issue was particularly incisive, inappropriate or obtuse” (Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 385)). In cases like (31), the context determines in what respect the question is unexpected to the speaker. On the other hand, the following example includes the modifier providing a criterion on the basis of which the referent in question is evaluated as unexpected:

(32) What a good time we had. (Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 385))

The adjective *good* modifies the noun *time*, and thus, the time the speaker and the others had is interpreted to be of higher quality than expected. Furthermore, the NP itself in the following example semantically contains the criterion by which the referent is considered to be unexpected:

(33) Jesus, what an idiot (I am). (= (27b))

The noun *idiot* describes the referent’s (i.e. the speaker’s) characteristic; the sentence expresses that the speaker is unexpectedly stupid.

8.5.3. The Function of the *What-a* Exclamative Construction

As discussed in the previous subsection, the *what-a* exclamative construction signals that the referent in question deviates from an ordinary state. The construction informs the hearer that the referent described by the NP is unusual; it plays a role in highlighting the unusualness of that referent. Given that the mirative constructions serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective mirative meanings, I propose that

the *what-a* exclamative construction has the following function:

- (34) The *what-a* exclamative construction serves to force the hearer not to consider the referent described by the NP in an ordinary way.

In other words, the hearer is instructed to regard the referent in question as unusual. The function in (34) can capture actual uses of the construction in contexts. In what follows, I will analyze two attested data. Let us first consider example (35).

- (35) [Context: An old woman ghost has haunted Phoebe. Phoebe believes that if she succeeds in showing the ghost everything in the world, it disappears.]

Phoebe: [enters] Hey. What a day. I took her everywhere. The Museum of Modern Art, Rockefeller Center, Statue of Liberty.

Rachel: She's still with you?

Phoebe: Yes. I guess she hasn't seen everything yet.

(*Friends*: Season 2-11)

Phoebe is using the *what-a* exclamative construction to open a conversation. What should be noticed here is that immediately after the construction, she starts to describe what she did that day. In other words, the construction serves as an opening sentence. This fact naturally follows from the function stated in (34). The construction serves to force the hearers not to consider the day in question to be usual; it makes them imagine that unexpected things happened. Then, Phoebe starts to talk about what happened that day.

In the following example, the *what-a* exclamative construction is assumed to

contribute to making the interpersonal relationship between the interlocutors:

(36) Monica: I am so glad you guys got together, Chandler and I are always looking for a couple to go out with and now we have one!

Chandler: Look at us, we're a couple of couples!

Janine: I had so much fun tonight, and what a great restaurant.

Monica: Yeah. (*Friends*: Season 6-11)

Here, Janine is using the construction *what a great restaurant*, which conveys that contrary to her expectation, the restaurant where they went for dinner was extremely good in quality. The function stated in (34) thus predicts that the hearers are directed to regard the restaurant as unexpectedly good. This means that the construction in (36) serves to linguistically create the situation where Janine and the hearers share the same great experience at the restaurant. As a result, the construction serves to contribute to a sense of solidarity among the interlocutors.

8.6. Conclusion

Mirativity is a linguistic category closely related to evidentiality in that both mark the status of the information in question in the speaker's overall knowledge. I hypothesized, therefore, that mirative constructions, like evidential constructions, serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective mirative meanings. I verified this hypothesis by analyzing the three mirative constructions: the *turns out*-construction, the Mad Magazine construction, and the *what-a* exclamative construction. These three constructions encode different mirative meanings, and thus function differently. Their mirative meanings and functions are summarized in the following table:

	mirative meaning	function
	unmarked (unexpectedness in general (without further specification))	to avoid imposing the information in question on the hearer
<i>the turns out</i> -construction		
the Mad Magazine construction	unexpectedness of what someone has just said	to dismiss what the hearer has just said
<i>the what-a</i> exclamative construction	unexpectedness of the state of the referent described by the NP	to force the hearer not to consider the referent described by the NP in an ordinary way

TABLE 2

The analysis developed in this chapter was limited to these three constructions, but in English, there should exist mirative expressions which have not been recognized as such. Further investigations are thus required to verify the applicability of the generalization proposed in Chapter 2 to the other, if any, mirative constructions in English.

Lastly, I will point out the necessity to distinguish between mirative meanings and mirative interpretations. The *turns out*-construction, the MM construction, and the *what-a* exclamative construction are assumed to encode mirative meanings; they are by nature mirative expressions. Recall here that the *it is that*-construction is associated with unexpectedness because the construction serves to force the hearer to register the information in the *that*-clause in place of the information already existing in his knowledge (see Chapter 3). That is, the *it is that*-construction is more or less related to mirativity. This construction is, however, an evidential expression encoding abductive inference, not a mirative one. So the construction merely pragmatically gives rise to a mirative interpretation; mirativity is a secondary interpretation. We should strictly distinguish between mirative meanings encoded in constructions and mirative interpretations secondarily arising from the functions of constructions

Chapter 9

Evidentiality/Mirativity as Seen from the Three-Tier Model of Language Use

9.1. Introduction

The previous chapters have been dedicated to illustrating that English evidential/mirative constructions serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective meanings. However, some fundamental questions have remained untouched.

First:

- (1) Why does English have no grammatical evidential/mirative markers in the first place?

As noted in Chapters 1 and 8, languages like Japanese develop grammatical evidential and mirative markers, whereas English does not. Why are languages divided into these two types? Second:

- (2) Why are English evidential/mirative constructions always related to interpersonal functions?

As is clear from the discussion so far, the constructions I have dealt with are specialized in manipulating the hearer. We can, however, imagine that interpersonal functions would not be involved in English evidential/mirative constructions; these constructions would serve to merely define how the speaker acquired the information in question.

Nevertheless, why do these constructions always have interpersonal functions?

I will answer these two fundamental questions from the perspective of the *three-tier model of language use*, proposed by Hirose (2013, 2015). Hirose aims to provide a principled and comprehensive explanation for the main findings accumulated in a number of contrastive studies of English and Japanese (cf. Ikegami (1981), Ide (1989, 2006), Kamio (1990, 1994), to name a few). The three-tier model hypothesizes that language use consists of three tiers: the situation construal tier, the situation report tier, and the interpersonal relationship tier. Hirose demonstrates that a number of linguistic phenomena can be deduced from combinations of those three independent tiers.

The three-tier model has gradually been attracting attention, as can be seen from the publication of a series of articles on this specific topic in *English Linguistics* (the journal of the English Linguistic Society of Japan) in 2015. The articles by Hirose and other authors on the three-tier model, however, mainly focus on phenomena concerning the situation construal tier and the situation report tier; the role which the interpersonal relationship tier plays in communication (particularly in English) has yet to be fully understood. Answering the above two questions, this chapter aims to promote a better understanding of the interpersonal relationship tier as well as the other two tiers.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 9.2 provides a brief overview of the three-tier model. Based on this model, section 9.3 answers the first question given in (1). Section 9.4 addresses the second question in (2). Section 9.5 is a conclusion.

9.2. An Overview of the Three-Tier Model of Language Use

This section briefly overviews the three-tier model. I will first introduce two essential notions from which this model has developed: private self and public self. I

will then go into the central part of the model.

9.2.1. Private Self and Public Self

In a series of studies, Hirose has maintained that there are two aspects to the notion of speaker: the ‘public self’ and the ‘private self’ (Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000, 2002); Hirose and Hasegawa (2010)). The public self is the subject of communicating and the private self the subject of thinking or consciousness.

Based on this dichotomy of speaker, Hirose characterizes English and Japanese as follows: English is a public-self-centered language and Japanese a private-self-centered language. In a public-self-centered language, the language system, by default, is constructed for communication. In such a language, there is no need to use special devices to signal the speaker’s communicative intention in a dialogue. On the other hand, in a private-self-centered language, the language system, by default, is constructed for expression of thoughts. In communication of this type of language, one normally needs to use special devices to indicate one’s communicative intention. Hirose calls these devices *addressee-oriented expressions*. Let us illustrate by comparing English and Japanese:

(3) Today is Saturday.

(4) a. Kyoo-wa doyoo da.
today-TOP Saturday COP
‘Today is Saturday.’

b. Kyoo-wa doyoo da yo.
today-TOP Saturday COP SFP
‘Today is Saturday.’


- c. Kyoo-wa doyoo desu.
 today-TOP Saturday COP.POL
 ‘Today is Saturday.’

In English, the sentence *Today is Saturday* in (3) can be used in both a monologue and a dialogue. There is no need to add an addressee-oriented expression to this sentence to express the speaker’s communicative intention. This means that in English, forms like (3) are unmarked in communication. In Japanese, on the other hand, expressions in a monologue and those in a dialogue are normally different. The sentence *kyoo-wa doyoo da* in (4a) is normally used in a monologue to express the speaker’s thought. We need to add addressee-oriented expressions if we want to indicate our communicative intention, as in (4b) and (4c). The sentence final particle *yo* in (4b) and the polite form of the copula, *desu*, in (4c) correspond to addressee-oriented expressions. In this way, Japanese linguistically distinguishes between expressions used in a monologue and those used in a dialogue.

9.2.2. The Three-Tier Model of Language Use

Hirose (2013, 2015) attempts to develop and elaborate the theory that we have just overviewed, and proposes *the three-tier model of language use*. What is remarkable in this new model is that a public self is further divided into two aspects, as depicted in (5): one is the public self who exclusively communicates his construed situation to the addressee, and the other is the public self who considers his interpersonal relationship with the addressee.

(5)



Based on this trichotomy of speaker, Hirose argues that language use consists of three tiers, as shown in (6).

(6) a. The situation construal tier:

The speaker as private self construes a situation, forming a thought about it.

b. The situation report tier:

The speaker as public self reports or communicates his construed situation to the addressee.

c. The interpersonal relationship tier:

The speaker as public self construes or considers his interpersonal relationship with the addressee.

Hirose (2013: 5) argues that “[l]anguages differ as to how the three tiers are combined, according to whether their basic ‘egocentricity’ lies in the public self or the

private self.” English and Japanese are defined, respectively, as follows (the sentences and figures are cited from Hirose (2015: 123-125)):

- (7) In English, a public-self-centered language, the situation construal tier is normally unified with the situation report tier, to which is added the interpersonal relationship tier; see Figure 1 below.¹ The unification of situation construal and situation report means that one gives priority to the outside perspective from which to report a situation and linguistically encodes as much as is necessary to do so. Thus, even when the speaker himself is involved in a situation as a participant, the reporter’s perspective places his self as a participant on a par with the other participants; hence comes objective construal. On the other hand, the fact that the situation report tier is not unified with the interpersonal relationship tier means that one can assume an unmarked (or neutral) level of communication which does not depend on any particular relationship between speaker and addressee, a level where the speaker and the addressee are assumed to be linguistically equal, being in a symmetrical relationship. This default level of communication can be modified, though, by taking into account additional factors concerning the interpersonal relationship between speaker and addressee, such as politeness, deference, and intimacy.

¹ In Figure 1, the vertical arrow from the S of the situation report tier to the S of the situation construal tier is meant to indicate that the private self construing the situation is encoded from the perspective of the speaker as public self.




FIGURE 1. English as a public-self-centered language

S : speaker or self, O : situation as object of construal, H : hearer or addressee, the single arrow (\longrightarrow): the process of “construing”, the double arrow (\Longrightarrow): the process of “reporting or communicating (to someone)”, the circle (○): where the unmarked deictic center is located

- (8) In Japanese, a private-self-centered language, the situation construal tier is normally independent of the situation report tier and the interpersonal relationship tier; see Figure 2 below.² Thus, in construing a situation, the speaker can freely place himself in the situation and view it from the inside; also, he does not need to linguistically encode what is already given in his consciousness; hence comes subjective construal. On the other hand, the situation report tier is unified with the interpersonal relationship tier, which

² In Figure 2, the vertical arrow from the S of the situation report tier to the S of the interpersonal relationship tier is meant to indicate that in reporting a situation to the addressee, the speaker as public self encodes (in one way or another) his construal of his interpersonal relationship with the addressee.

means that in reporting a situation to someone, the speaker must always construe and consider his interpersonal relationship with the addressee, defining himself and the addressee in terms of that relationship. Thus, in situation report, interpersonal relationship is linguistically encoded as much as possible, and there is no unmarked level of communication neutral to interpersonal relationship.




FIGURE 2. Japanese as a private-self-centered language

In the rest of this section, I will provide some examples to show how the three-tier model captures certain differences between English and Japanese.

9.2.3. The Situation Construal Tier and the Situation Report Tier

Let us first consider several examples which make clear the relationship between the situation construal and situation report tiers in English and Japanese. According to the Performative Analysis (cf. Ross (1970)), every sentence has a performative clause in its underlying structure (see also Chapter 5). For example:

- (9) a. Today is Saturday.
 b. I SAY TO YOU Today is Saturday.

(Hirose (2013: 11))

In (9a), the sentence is assumed to have an underlying structure with a performative clause like I SAY TO YOU, as shown in (9b), which guarantees that the speaker is talking to the hearer. Apart from its validity as a syntactic theory, the Performative Analysis reflects English native speakers' intuition; sentences are normally directed at the hearer. In terms of the three-tier model, this intuition can be straightforwardly captured by the combination of the situation construal and situation report tiers. As noted above, these two tiers are unified in English, which means that in uttering sentences, the speaker by default takes into consideration the existence of the hearer. Hence, English sentences normally convey the speaker's communicative intention.

It is not possible, by contrast, to assume that a Japanese sentence like (10a) corresponding to English (9a) has a similar implicit performative clause:

- (10) a. Kyoo-wa doyoobi da.
 today-TOP Saturday COP
 'Today is Saturday.'
 b. #I SAY TO YOU Kyoo-wa doyoobi da.

In (10a), the sentence is normally interpreted to be expressive rather than reportive; the speaker is merely uttering his thought (see Hirose (2013, 2015) for detailed arguments). So we cannot assume the implicit performative clause I SAY TO YOU, as illustrated in (10b). In order to provide sentences like (10a) with the speaker's communicative

intention, we usually add addressee-oriented expressions (see section 9.2.1), as shown in (11).

- (11) a. Kyoo-wa doyoobi da yo. (= (4b))
 today-TOP Saturday COP SFP
 ‘Today is Saturday.’
- b. Kyoo-wa doyoobi desu. (= (4c))
 today-TOP Saturday COP.POL
 ‘Today is Saturday.’

The linguistic distinction in Japanese between sentences with and without the speaker’s communicative intention can be ascribed to the separation of the situation construal and situation report tiers, which requires us to use linguistic expressions corresponding to each tier.

The possibility of omission of arguments also enables us to understand the relationship between the two tiers in question in English and Japanese. First, observe the following examples, cited from Hirose (2013: 15):

- (12) (Kare-wa) kanemoti de, (boku-wa) (kare-ga) urayamasii.
 he-TOP rich and I-TOP he-NOM envy
 ‘(He) is rich, and (I) envy (him).’
- (13) He is rich, and I envy him.

In Japanese, the situation construal tier is independent of the situation report tier. This means that in situation construal, the speaker is dominant and thus employs what Horn

(1984) calls the “speaker-based principle,” which says, “Say no more than you must.” That is why, as is well known, Japanese speakers can freely omit grammatical arguments like subjects and objects whose referents are established in their consciousness, as illustrated in (12), where the parenthesized arguments can be omitted.

In English, on the other hand, the situation construal tier and the situation report tier are unified. This means that the speaker always keeps the hearer in mind and hence “says as much as possible” to make himself understood by the hearer. To borrow Horn’s (1984) words, the “hear-based principle” is operative in English. That is why in English, the speaker is required to express the arguments of a predicate as explicitly as possible, as illustrated in (13).

9.2.4. The Situation Report Tier and the Interpersonal Relationship Tier

I will next provide examples which make clear the relationship between the situation report and interpersonal relationship tiers in English and Japanese. Matsumoto (1988: 415) points out that the English sentence *Today is Saturday* corresponds to several types of expressions in Japanese, as illustrated in (14).

- (14) a. Kyoo-wa doyoobi da.
Today-TOP Saturday COP
- b. Kyoo-wa doyoobi desu.
Today-TOP Saturday COP.POL
- c. Kyoo-wa doyoobi degozaimasu.
Today-TOP Saturday COP.SUPER-POL

In Japanese, the speaker needs to choose an appropriate expression in accordance with the

social or socio-psychological relationship with the hearer; in communication, he always takes such a relationship into consideration. This means that the interpersonal relationship tier is combined with the situation report tier. In English, by contrast, the fact that *Today is Saturday* corresponds to all the three Japanese expressions in (14) indicates that the speaker can convey factual or propositional information without encoding his socio-psychological relationship with the hearer. This fact clearly suggests the separation of the interpersonal relationship tier from the situation report tier.

Let us turn to another case involving the relationship between the situation report tier and the interpersonal relationship tier. In English, it is possible, by default, to convey information without contrasting the speaker's and the hearer's state of knowledge at the speech time (cf. Kamio (1990)). Consider the following examples:

- (15) a. Hanako is ill. [known only to speaker]
 b. It's a beautiful day. [known to both speaker and addressee]

(Hirose (2013: 26))

English can use the assertive form of sentences either to convey information known only to the speaker, as in (15a), or to convey information known to both speaker and hearer, as in (15b); English expressions can be insusceptible to the information on the difference in the state of knowledge between speaker and hearer, which means the separation of the interpersonal relationship tier from the situation report tier. In Japanese, by contrast, such a difference is usually expressed by certain sentence-final particles:

- (16) a. Hanako-wa byooki da yo [known only to speaker]
 Hanako-TOP ill COP SFP

‘Hanako is ill.’

b. Ii tenki da #(ne). [known to both speaker and addressee]

good weather COP SFP

‘It’s a beautiful day.’

In (16a), only the speaker knows that Hanako is ill; he has a fuller grasp of the information in question than the hearer. In this respect, he is “informationally superior” to the hearer, which is explicitly encoded by the sentence-final particle *yo* (cf. Masuoka (1991)). In (16b), on the other hand, both speaker and hearer know that it is a beautiful day. In this case, since the speaker and the hearer share the same information, they are “informationally equal,” which is expressed by the sentence-final particle *ne* (cf. Kamio (1990)). These examples suggest that unlike English, Japanese is sensitive to the information on the speaker’s and the hearer’s state of knowledge at speech time, which means that the interpersonal relationship tier and the situation report tier are unified.

9.3. The Situation Construal Tier and Evidentiality/Mirativity

Based on the three-tier model overviewed above, this section answers the question in (1), repeated as (17).

(17) Why does English have no grammatical evidential/mirative items in the first place? (= (1))

Comparison between Japanese and English evidentials/miratives helps to solve this question. Let us first consider Japanese evidential/mirative markers. In Japanese, the situation construal tier is independent of the other two tiers, as shown in the following

figure (for the sake of convenience, I simplify the original one given by Hirose (2013, 2015)).




FIGURE 3. Japanese

The independence of the situation construal tier is due to the characteristics of Japanese as a private-self-centered language. This means that this tier is given a special status in Japanese. It is thus reasonable to say that Japanese develops grammatical expressions which precisely describe how the speaker construes a situation. Grammatical evidential/mirative items are a case in point. Evidential and mirative items, roughly speaking, serve to distinguish between the speaker's direct and indirect knowledge. Plain forms (i.e. sentences with no evidential/mirative markers) are chosen when the speaker construes the information in question as direct knowledge, e.g. the information gained through the speaker's own perception, the information originated in his own thought, and so on. In (18), for example, the sentence expresses the information acquired via the speaker's visual perception, and in (19), the information conveyed is interpreted to be originated in the speaker's thought.

- (18) Ame-ga hutteiru.
rain-NOM be falling

‘It is raining.’

(19) Kanasii.

sad

‘I am sad.’

In other words, the unmarked mode of expression in Japanese is private expression encoding direct knowledge (see Hirose (2013, 2015) for more detailed arguments). If so, we can say that evidential/mirative items are used when the speaker construes the information in question as indirect knowledge, e.g. the information gained via hearsay (= (20), (21)), or via inference (= (22), (23)), and the information which has not existed in and hence falls outside the speaker’s knowledge (= (24)).

(20) Ame-ga hutteiru soo da.
rain-NOM be falling EVID COP

‘They say it is raining.’

(21) Ame-ga hutteiru tte.
rain-NOM be falling EVID

‘They say it is raining.’

(22) Konokusuri-wa yoku kiku yoo da.
this medicine-TOP well work EVID COP

‘I infer from my own experience that this medicine works well.’

(23) Konokusuri-wa yoku kiku rasii.
this medicine-TOP well work EVID

‘I infer from what I heard that this medicine works well.’

(The examples in (20)-(23) are cited from Aoki (1986: 230, 232))

- (24) Koko-ni ita n da.
 here-DAT be MIR COP
 ‘There you are.’

The observation so far enables us to conclude that the situation construal tier in Japanese is not unidimensional, but bidimensional, as shown in the following figure:




FIGURE 4. Japanese (revised version)

The dotted line in the situation construal tier denotes that this tier consists of two parts: direct knowledge and indirect knowledge. This bidimensionality is reflected in the development of a wide range of grammatical evidential and mirative markers.

Note in passing that grammatical items expressing indirect knowledge are divided into two types: private expressions and public expressions. These two types of expressions are defined in Hirose (1995: 226) as follows:

- (25) By the concepts ‘public expression’ and ‘private expression,’ I mean two different levels of linguistic expression which correspond to two different functions of language. Public expression is the level of linguistic expression

corresponding to the communicative function of language, whereas private expression is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language.

Grammatical evidential/mirative items as private expressions include the mirative marker *no*, and those as public expressions include the evidential expressions given in (20)-(23) (Hirose and Hasegawa (2010)). Suppose that someone says the following sentence to you:

- (26) Tookyoo-wa ame da yo.
Tokyo-TOP rain COP SFP
'It's raining in Tokyo.'

In this situation, you can react to this utterance by using the mirative marker *no*, as shown in (27), but cannot use the hearsay evidential markers *soo da* and *tte*, as shown in (28).

- (27) Ame na n da.
rain COP MIR COP
'It's raining.'
- (28) *Ame da {soo da/tte}.³
rain COP EVID
'You say that it is raining.'

Here, you are expressing what you have just learned from the interlocutor (i.e. the

³ *Tte* is licensed if the sentence is interpreted to be an echo-question, but here, I do not take such an interpretation into consideration.

information on the weather in Tokyo), and do not intend to convey this information to him (it is nonsense in (27) and (28) to interpret that you convey the information in question to the interlocutor as an information source). This means that the mirative marker *no* can be used as a private expression, whereas the evidential markers *soo da* and *tte* cannot. Suppose furthermore that you convey the information gained in (26) to a third person. In this case, the use of *soo da* and *tte* is fully acceptable as follows:

- (29) [You are speaking to a third person.]
 (Tookyoo-wa) ame da {soo da/tte}.
 Tokyo-TOP rain COP EVID
 ‘Someone said that it is raining in Tokyo.’

This example shows that the speaker’s communicative intention is involved in evidential markers like *soo da* and *tte*.⁴ In fact, as illustrated in (30), these evidential markers cannot appear in complement clauses of verbs of thinking such as *omou* ‘think’ followed by the stative aspectual verb *te-iru*, environments which allow only a private expression to appear (Hirose (1995), Hirose and Hasegawa (2010)); on the other hand, the mirative marker *no*, a private expression, can occur in the complement clause of *omotte-iru*, as shown in (31).

- (30) a. *Akio-wa Tookyoo-wa ame da tte to omotte-iru.
 Akio-TOP Tokyo-TOP rain COP EVID COMP think-STAT
 ‘Akio thinks “I hear it is raining in Tokyo.”’
 b. *Akio-wa Tookyoo-wa ame da soo da to omotte-iru.

⁴ The mirative marker *no* can be also used in communication to express unexpectedness to the hearer. See Appendix for detailed discussion.

‘Akio thinks “I hear it is raining in Tokyo.”’

c. *Akio-wa Tookyoo-wa ame rasij to omotte-iru.

‘Akio thinks it seems to be raining in Tokyo.’

d. ?? Akio-wa Tookyoo-wa ame no yoo da to omotte-iru.

‘Akio thinks it seems to be raining in Tokyo.’

(31) Akio-wa Tookyoo-wa ame na n da to omotte-iru.

Akio-TOP Tokyo-TOP rain COP MIR COP COMP think-STAT

‘Akio thinks it is raining in Tokyo.’

The above discussion leads us to conclude that Japanese grammatical items expressing indirect knowledge consist of private and public expressions.

On the other hand, in English, a public-self-centered language, the situation construal tier is normally unified with the situation report tier, which in turn is independent of the interpersonal relationship tier, as shown in Figure 5




FIGURE 5. English

This means that the unmarked mode of expression in English is public expression in which the speaker is assumed to be informationally equal to the hearer (see Hirose (2013, 2015) and Ikarashi (2013a, 2014c) for more detailed arguments). If so, what is important

in the unmarked mode of expression in English is reciprocal information sharing between speaker and hearer (cf. Chapter 5), rather than the speaker's source of information. In other words, in English, as long as the information in question is reciprocally shared between speaker and hearer in situation report, there is no need to make relevant how the speaker has obtained it in situation construal. That is why English has not generally developed grammatical evidential/mirative markers.

9.4. The Interpersonal Relationship Tier and Evidentiality/Mirativity

Next, I will address the following second question:

- (32) Why are English evidential/mirative constructions always related to interpersonal functions? (= (2))

In considering this question, we should first notice that the informational equality between speaker and hearer assumed in the unmarked mode of expression in English is overridden by the evidential/mirative constructions dealt with in this thesis, which in one way or another make the speaker informationally superior to the hearer. As noted in Chapters 1 and 8, evidential/mirative expressions delineate the status of the information in question in the light of the *speaker's* overall knowledge. The use of evidential/mirative expressions thus highlights the speaker as an information giver, which would be backgrounded without these expressions because of the separation of the interpersonal relationship tier and the other two tiers (see section 9.3); at the same time, highlighting the speaker as an information giver also makes salient the hearer as an information receiver. That is, the evidential/mirative meanings of the constructions I dealt with in this thesis foreground the

speaker's informational superiority.⁵ Thus by using these constructions to the hearer, the speaker can manipulate the hearer on the basis of his informational superiority, thereby adjusting their default equality relationship.

It should be noted, however, that the evidential/mirative constructions are divided into two types—called here Type-1 and Type-2—depending on where the speaker's informational superiority comes from. Type-1 constructions consist of the *it is that*-construction, the *take it that*-construction, the *I tell you*-construction, and the *turns out*-construction. These constructions are all public expressions in that they show performativity; their main clauses are anchored to speech time even if the propositions in the embedded clauses describe events, thoughts, etc. in the past, as shown in the following examples (I will not give examples of the *I tell you*-construction because *I tell you* is generally regarded as a performative clause):

(33) He was shot in his house. It is that he knew too much. (Declerck (1992: 219))

(34) I take it that you had sampled those brownies. (Ross (1973: 161))

(35) Turns out the bowing wasn't the cause of his problems.

(*House MD*: Season 1-2)

⁵ It should be noted that the expression *informational superiority* used in the three-tier model differs from that used in the discussion on evidential/mirative constructions in the previous chapters. Let us, for instance, consider the *turns out*-construction. As discussed in Chapter 8, this construction signals that the speaker does not place himself in an informationally superior position to the hearer because it indicates that the information in question is unexpected to the speaker, i.e., it falls outside the speaker's territory of information (for details see section 8.3.3). On the other hand, according to the three-tier model, the *turns out*-construction expresses the speaker's informational superiority; whether or not the construction in question semantically expresses the speaker's informational superiority, the use of evidential/mirative constructions is necessarily associated with the speaker's informational superiority because these constructions delineate the status of the information in question in the light of the speaker's overall knowledge; only the speaker can describe his own knowledge, and thus evidential/mirative constructions serve as markers which signal the speaker's privilege of the information conveyed. In the case of the *turns out*-construction, though actually being informationally superior to the hearer, the speaker chooses to make the hearer aware that he does not place himself in such a superior position because he himself finds the information in question unexpected.

This means that these constructions by nature (directly or indirectly) indicate the speaker as an information giver and the hearer as an information receiver; in this sense, they incorporate as part of their inherent meaning the speaker’s informationally superior relationship over the hearer. In terms of Konno’s (2015) notion of default preference override, Type-1 constructions override the default preference in English for the separation of the interpersonal relationship tier from the situation report and situation construal tiers, thereby unifying these tiers, as shown in Figure 6.




FIGURE 6. *Type-1 Default Preference Override in English*

Type-2 constructions, on the other hand, consist of the subjectless construction, the deictic inversion construction, the Mad Magazine construction, and the *what-a* exclamative construction.⁶ These constructions are all private expressions that represent the speaker’s consciousness, including thought, perception, and unexpectedness; in this sense, they only involve the situation construal tier, and not the situation report tier. That is to say, Type-2 constructions override the default preference in English for the unification of the situation construal and situation report tiers, thereby highlighting the

⁶ Sadock and Zwicky (1985) point out that the *what-a* exclamative construction is expressive.

speaker's situation construal (see Shizawa (2015b) for related discussion). Since only the speaker can have direct access to his own consciousness, this always guarantees the speaker's informational superiority in Type-2 constructions. Thus, if Type-2 constructions are used in conversation, the speaker's informational superiority is pragmatically presented to the hearer, thereby attracting the hearer's attention to the speaker's situation construal (see also Shizawa (2015b)). To recapitulate, Type-2 constructions are marked constructions in English that exclusively highlight the speaker's situation construal, but whose use in the presence of a hearer makes the hearer aware of the speaker's informational superiority, thereby affecting their interpersonal relationship (see also Hirose (2013)). The default preference override involved in Type-2 constructions is thus schematically represented as in Figure 7 (The thick rectangle of the situation construal tier signals that this tier is foregrounded).




FIGURE 7. *Type-2 Default Preference Override in English*

9.5. Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the following two fundamental questions concerning evidentiality and mirativity in terms of the three-tier model of language use, proposed by Hirose (2013, 2015):

- (36) Why does English have no grammatical evidential/mirative markers in the first place?
- (37) Why are English evidential/mirative constructions always related to

interpersonal functions?

The three-tier model has gradually been attracting attention. Hirose and other researchers have demonstrated that a number of linguistic phenomena can be deduced from combinations of the three tiers assumed in this model. However, phenomena concerning the interpersonal relationship tier have not been discussed seriously and hence have yet to be fully understood. By answering these two questions, this chapter has attempted to promote a better understanding of the interpersonal relationship tier as well as the other two tiers.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

English, unlike languages such as Japanese, does not have grammatical evidential markers. Because of the absence of grammatical evidential markers, English often does not linguistically specify evidential meanings, leaving evidential interpretations open. The lack of grammatical evidential expressions in English, however, does not mean that English does not linguistically mark evidentiality; evidentiality can be expressed with the aid of certain verbs, adverbs and phrases whose meanings are compatible with evidential meanings. The question I addressed is why evidentiality is manifested in English when its linguistic realization is not obligatory; in other words, for what purpose are evidential expressions used in English?

Previous studies typically describe the function of evidential expressions in terms of the speaker, e.g. the *speaker's* degree of certainty, or the *speaker's* authority, responsibility, and entitlement (cf. Aijmer (1980), Okada (1985), Shuman (1993), Ifantidou (1994), Fox (2001)). They, on the other hand, do not take into consideration the relationship between evidential expressions and the hearer. This speaker-oriented analyses seem to work out well as far as the evidential expressions recognized in these studies are concerned. However, I pointed out that there do exist evidential expressions which lie beyond the scope of the speaker-oriented analyses; they are not sufficient to fully generalize the function of English evidential expressions. This thesis, therefore, attempted to give a generalization about the function of evidentiality to cover a full range of evidential expressions in English. More specifically, I made a point of defining the function of evidential expressions from the hearer's perspective, proposing the following

generalization:¹

- (1) Evidential expressions in English serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective evidential meanings.

The validity of this generalization has been confirmed by the following evidential constructions:

- (2) *The it is that-construction* (Chapter 3):
I cannot pay you back today. It's just that all the banks are closed.
- (3) *The take it that-construction* (Chapter 4):
I take it you won't be coming to the party?
- (4) *The I tell you-construction* (Chapter 5):
I tell you, I could fly around this room without my eyes closed!
- (5) *The subjectless construction* (Chapter 6):
Wouldn't blame her if she did leave him.
- (6) *The deictic inversion construction* (Chapter 7):
There's Harry with his red hat on.

The way of manipulating the hearer varies, depending on the nature of each evidential meaning. Thus, I first clarified the evidential meanings encoded by these constructions, and then discussed their functions in detail. I summarize their evidential meanings and functions in the following table:

¹ Expressions referring to the speaker's attention to the hearer can also be captured in terms of intersubjectivity (cf. Traugott (2010), Facchinetti (2009)). This means that the findings in this thesis can contribute to the study of intersubjectivity. I will address this issue in future research.

evidential construction	evidential meaning	function
the <i>it is that</i> -construction	The <i>it is that</i> -construction encodes abductive inference.	The <i>it is that</i> -construction serves to instruct the hearer to replace the information expected to reside in the hearer's knowledge with the information provided in the <i>that</i> -clause.
the <i>take it that</i> -construction	The <i>take it that</i> -construction encodes an unambiguous inference.	The <i>take it that</i> -construction serves to make the hearer check whether the information the speaker provides is in his knowledge.
the <i>I tell you</i> -construction	(The <i>I tell you</i> -construction indicates that the information conveyed comes from the speaker.)	The <i>I tell you</i> -construction serves to force the hearer to incorporate the information in question into his knowledge.
the subjectless construction	The subjectless construction lays bare the speaker's thought occurring at speech time.	The subjectless construction serves to force the hearer to have empathy for the speaker.
the deictic inversion construction	The DIC encodes the speaker's instantaneous perceptual experience (Shizawa (2015a)).	The DIC serves to direct the hearer's attention to the object in question (cf. Lakoff (1987), Dorgeloh (1997), Webelhuth (2011)).

TABLE 1

As is clear from Table 1, the hearer's perspective is deeply rooted in the functions of these constructions, and thus, it would be difficult to account for these functions if we did not take into consideration the hearer's perspective. These constructions, which had not been recognized as evidential expressions, emphasize the necessity to introduce the hearer's perspective into the analysis on the function of evidentiality; to fully understand the functions of English evidential expressions, we should take into consideration the hearer's perspective as well as the speaker's.

This thesis also sought to extend the generalization in (1) to mirativity, a linguistic category "whose primary meaning is speaker's unprepared mind, unexpected new information, and concomitant surprise" (Aikhenvald (2004: 209)). Mirativity is often discussed in relation to evidentiality (cf. DeLancey (1997)) because both are similar in that they mark the status of the information in question in the speaker's overall knowledge. I hypothesized, therefore, that English mirative constructions, like evidential ones, serve to manipulate the hearer by highlighting their respective mirative meanings. I verified this hypothesis by analyzing the following three mirative constructions:

(7) *The turns out-construction:*

Turns out the bowling wasn't the cause of his problems.

(8) *The Mad Magazine construction:*

What, me worry?

(9) *The what-a exclamative construction:*

What a day (I had).

To fully understand the functions of the mirative constructions in English, we need to specify their mirative meanings because these meanings underlie their functions.

However, subcategories of mirativity, unlike evidentiality, have yet to be fully understood because of the immaturity of this field (cf. Aikhenvald (2012)). So I first clarified the mirative meanings encoded by these constructions, and then discussed their functions in detail. I summarize their mirative meanings and functions in the following table:

mirative construction	mirative meaning	function
the <i>turns out</i> -construction	The <i>turns out</i> -construction expresses an unmarked mirative meaning (unexpectedness in general (without further specification)).	The <i>turns out</i> -construction serves to avoid imposing the information in question on the hearer.
the Mad Magazine construction	The Mad Magazine construction expresses the unexpectedness of what someone has just said.	The Mad Magazine construction serves to dismiss what the hearer has just said (cf. Fillmore et al. (1988), Taylor (1998)).
the <i>what-a</i> exclamative construction	The <i>what-a</i> exclamative construction signals that the referent described by the NP deviates from what is expected.	The <i>what-a</i> exclamative construction serves to force the hearer not to consider the referent described by the NP in an ordinary way.

TABLE 2

As with the functions of the evidential constructions, those of the mirative constructions can be defined from the hearer's perspective. Thus, these mirative constructions also suggest that the hearer's perspective is as important as the speaker's. However, in English, there should exist mirative expressions which have not been recognized as such. Further investigations are thus required to verify the applicability of the generalization proposed in (1) to the other, if any, mirative constructions in English.

Lastly, I addressed the following two basic questions concerning evidentiality and mirativity in English:

- (10) Why does English have no grammatical evidential/mirative markers in the first place?
- (11) Why are English evidential/mirative constructions always related to interpersonal functions?

I answered these questions in terms of the three-tier model of language use, proposed by Hirose (2013, 2015). According to this model, language use consists of three tiers: the situation construal tier, the situation report tier, and the interpersonal relationship tier. The three-tier model hypothesizes that, in English, the situation construal tier is unified with the situation report tier. This means that the unmarked mode of expression in English is reciprocal information sharing between speaker and hearer. In other words, in English, as long as the information in question is reciprocally shared between speaker and hearer in situation report, there is no need to make relevant how the speaker has obtained it in situation construal. That is why English has not generally developed grammatical evidential/mirative markers.

However, the informational equality between speaker and hearer assumed in the unmarked mode of expression in English is overridden by the evidential/mirative constructions dealt with in this thesis, which in one way or another make the speaker informationally superior to the hearer. Evidential/Mirative expressions delineate the status of the information in question in the light of the *speaker's* overall knowledge. The use of evidential/mirative expressions thus highlights the speaker as an information giver, which in turn makes salient the hearer as an information receiver. That is, the evidential/mirative meanings of these constructions foreground the speaker's informational superiority. Thus by using these constructions to the hearer, the speaker can manipulate the hearer on the basis of his informational superiority, thereby adjusting their default equality relationship.

Furthermore, the evidential/mirative constructions are divided into Type-1 and Type-2, depending on where the speaker's informational superiority comes from. Type-1 constructions consist of the *it is that*-construction, the *take it that*-construction, the *I tell you*-construction, and the *turns out*-construction. These constructions are all public expressions in that they show performativity, which means that these constructions by nature (directly or indirectly) indicate the speaker as an information giver and the hearer as an information receiver. In this sense, they incorporate as part of their inherent meaning the speaker's informationally superior relationship over the hearer. Type 1 constructions thus override the default preference in English for the separation of the interpersonal relationship tier from the situation report and situation construal tiers, thereby unifying these tiers. Type-2 constructions, on the other hand, consist of the subjectless construction, the deictic inversion construction, the Mad Magazine construction, and the *what-a* exclamative construction. These constructions are all private expressions that represent the speaker's consciousness, including thought, perception, and unexpectedness;

in this sense, they only involve the situation construal tier, and not the situation report tier. Since only the speaker can have direct access to his own consciousness, this always guarantees the speaker's informational superiority in Type-2 constructions. Thus, if Type-2 constructions are used in conversation, the speaker's informational superiority is pragmatically presented to the hearer, thereby attracting the hearer's attention to the speaker's situation construal. That is to say, Type-2 constructions override the default preference in English for the unification of the situation construal and situation report tiers, thereby highlighting the speaker's situation construal.

Appendix

The Japanese Sentence-Final Particle *No* as a Mirative Marker

1. Introduction

As noted in Chapter 1, Japanese is rich in grammatical evidential markers. Languages with these markers often develop grammatical mirative markers (cf. Aikhenvald (2012)), so it would be natural to suppose that Japanese has mirative markers. Nevertheless, there are very few studies which systematically and comprehensively investigate Japanese in terms of mirativity. In this sense, the study on mirativity in Japanese is in an early phase of development, and thus further investigations are required to fully understand the Japanese mirative system. Hoping to explore and develop this immature field, I will demonstrate that the sentence-final particle *no* falls under the category of mirativity.¹ More specifically, *no* has the following mirative meaning:

- (1) The sentence-final particle *no* expresses unexpectedness in general.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 8, the sentence-final particle *koto* and the quotative particle *datte* have specific mirative meanings: *koto* expresses unexpectedness related to a gradable property (Honda (2015, personal communication)) and *datte* unexpectedness of what someone said (Suzuki (1999, 2006)). On the other hand, the sentence-final particle

¹ Aoki (1986) regards the sentence-final particle *no* as an evidential marker (see also Simpson (2003)). He claims that “[a]n evidential *no*, or more informal *n*, may be used to state that the speaker is convinced that for some reason what is ordinarily directly unknowable is nevertheless true” (Aoki (1986: 228)). However, if we adopt Aoki’s semantic description, *no* cannot be considered to be an evidential because “[t]his morpheme can be interpreted as referring to validation of information rather than the way it was obtained” (Aikhenvald (2004: 81)). It should be noted that Aoki considers the information conveyed by the sentence with *no* to be “ordinarily directly unknowable” (see also Kamio (1997: 65)). His description implies that *no* falls under the class of mirativity.

no has an unmarked mirative meaning, namely unexpectedness in general without further specification. I will provide supporting evidence for the proposal in (1) in section 2.

The sentence-final particle *no* is noteworthy in that it expresses unexpectedness to not only the speaker, but also the hearer. Mirativity is generally defined in terms of the speaker's unexpectedness (cf. DeLancey (1997), Aikhenvald (2004)). However, Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012) proposes that it is also related to the unexpectedness to the hearer. The following example lends support to their proposal (*n* and *na* are phonological variants of the sentence-final particle *no* and the copula *da*, respectively):

- (2) Boku ne, konban deeto na n desu.
I you know this evening date COP MIR COP.POL
'I'm going on a date this evening.'

(Kikuchi (2000: 37), with slight modifications)

Here, the speaker is revealing to the hearer that he is going on a date; the speaker is assumed to intend to convey unexpected information to the hearer. *No* in (2) expresses the hearer's unexpectedness. I will go further into this characteristic of *no* later.

2. Evidence

This section provides supporting evidence for the proposal that the sentence-final particle *no* expresses an unmarked mirative meaning.

2.1. Incompatibility with *Omottatoori* 'as is expected'

The oddity of the following example suggests that the speaker's sense of unexpectedness must be involved in *no*:

- (3) *Omottatoori, ippai iru n da.
 as is expected many be MIR COP

‘As is expected, there are many people here.’

(Noda (1997: 87), with modifications)

The expression *omottatoori* ‘as is expected’ indicates that the event in question is expected to happen. As shown in (3), *omottatoori* is incompatible with *no*. In fact, the sentence becomes acceptable (i) if *no* and the following copula *da* are omitted, or (ii) if *omottatoori* is omitted, as in the following examples:

- (4) Omottatoori, ippai iru.

- (5) Ippai iru n da.

The incompatibility of *no* with *omottatoori* suggests that it is associated with unexpectedness.

2.2. Information Known to the Speaker

Tanomura (1990) points out that the following sentence containing *no* sounds unnatural:

- (6) [The speaker failed to make a contract. She speculates on the reason for this failure.]

*Kitto watasi-ga miseenen na n da.
 surely I-NOM under age COP MIR COP

‘I must be under age.’

(Tanomura (1990: 39))

Here, the speaker concludes that she could not make a contract because she is under age. Notice that the information that the speaker is under age is assumed to be evident to the speaker; this information is not unexpected to her. In this case, the sentence containing *no* sounds unnatural. In (6), we must not choose *no*, but must choose the sentence-final particle *kara* ‘because,’ which is not associated with mirativity, as shown in (7).

- (7) [The speaker failed to make a contract. She speculates on the reason for this failure.]

Kitto watasi-ga miseenen da kara da.
 surely I-NOM under age COP because COP

‘It is because I am under age.’ (Tanomura (1990: 39))

Even in the same context as in (6), however, the sentence is acceptable if the information inferred has not been established to the speaker prior to speech time. Let us consider the following example:

- (8) [The speaker failed to make a contract. She speculates on the reason for this failure.]

Kitto, watasi-ga situreina koto-o itta n da.
 surly I-NOM rude thing-ACC say.PAST MIR COP

‘I must have been rude.’

In (8), the speaker is assumed to realize at speech time that she was rude when talking about a contract, and to conclude that her rudeness resulted in the failure of the contract. Thus, the information that the speaker was rude can be regarded as unexpected. In this

case, the use of *no* is fully acceptable. The examples given above show that *no* introduces unexpected information.

2.3. The Speaker's Uncertainty

As discussed above, the mirative marker *no* is not licensed when the sentence in question describes the event expected by the speaker. Let us first consider the sentence in (9), which we assume has been uttered in the situation where the speaker just put on a heater.

- (9) *Korede atatakaku naru n daroo.
that warm become MIR MOD
'The room will warm up.'

The speaker put on the heater with the intention of warming up the room; thus, he has expected that the event in question will happen after he puts on the heater. In this situation, the use of *no* degrades the acceptability of the sentence; we should omit *no* from the sentence, as follows:

- (10) Korede attatakaku naru daroo. (cf. (9))

Notice that the sentence in (9) becomes acceptable if the modality marker *ka* is attached at the end of the sentence:

- (11) Korede atatakaku naru n daroo ka.
that warm become MIR MOD MOD

‘I wonder whether the room will warm up.’

Ka signals the speaker’s uncertainty (cf. Moriyama (1989)). Thus in (11), the speaker is uncertain about whether the room will warm up or not; in other words, the speaker does not expect that the heater will warm up the room. In this situation, the use of *no* allows the speaker to express the unexpectedness of the event in question.

2.4. Yes-No Questions

The sentence-final particle *no* can appear in yes-no questions, as exemplified in the following example:

(12) A: Kyoo-wa yasumimasu.

today-TOP absent from.POL

‘I will be absent (from school) today.’

B: Karada-no guai demo warui n desu ka?

body-GEN feel or something bad MIR COP.POL MOD

‘Are you sick or something?’ (Tanomura (1990: 63))

Here, speaker B infers that speaker A is sick. Speaker B is assumed not to know speaker A’s illness, so he is using *no* to express unexpectedness. As with declarative sentences with *no* like (6) and (9), yes-no questions with *no* sound unnatural if the information conveyed has already been established to the speaker, as shown in the following example:

(13) A: Kyoo-wa yasumimasu.

today-TOP absent from.POL

‘I will be absent (from school) today.’

B: *Tenki-ga warui n desu ka?
weather-NOM bad MIR COP.POL MOD

‘Is the weather bad?’

(Tanomura (1990: 63))

Suppose that speakers A and B live in the same town and both know the weather there. In this case, the information on the weather is not unexpected to speaker B, which makes the use of *no* unacceptable.

2.5. *Wh*-Questions

The sentence-final particle *no* can also be used in *wh*-questions. McGloin (1980) observes the difference between *wh*-questions with and without *no*. For example:

- (14) a. Kyoo(-wa) doko-e iku?
today(-TOP) where-to go
‘Where shall we go today?’
- b. Kyoo(-wa) doko-e iku no?
today(-TOP) where-to go MIR
‘Where are we going today?’

(McGloin (1980: 128))

Suppose that the speaker and the hearer are ready to go out for lunch together. According to McGloin (1980), the *wh*-question in (14a) indicates that the speaker tries to decide where they are going by discussing with the hearer, while that in (14b) indicates that the speaker is not involved in the decision as to where they are going and merely asks

the hearer to provide the answer. The difference between (14a) and (14b) observed by McGloin (1980) naturally comes from the mirative meaning of *no*. In *wh*-questions, the information conveyed by elements other than the *wh*-word is normally presupposed. In (14), for instance, the speaker has already known that he and the hearer will go to somewhere. Thus, when *no* appears in *wh*-questions, the unexpected information is the value of the *wh*-word; the speaker uses *no* to express his inability to specify this value. That is why *wh*-questions with *no* like (14b) indicate that the speaker cannot specify the value of the *wh*-word because of his inability to expect it and thus wants the hearer to provide it; on the other hand, *wh*-questions without *no* like (14a) signal that the speaker can expect and specify the value of the *wh*-word and thus is involved in its specification.

2.6. Comparison with *Koto* and *Datte*

Lastly, I would like to demonstrate that *no* has an unmarked mirative meaning. Comparison between *no* and *koto/datte* enables us to find that *no* is used in a general situation. First, let us consider the following examples:

(15) Koko-ni ita n da.
 here-DAT be MIR COP
 ‘There you are.’

(16) Kore-wa sugoku tumetai n da ne.
 this-TOP very cold MIR COP SFP
 ‘This is very cold.’

The sentence in (15) can be uttered in a context in which the speaker found the hearer in an unexpected place, and hence implies his surprise. In (16), the sentence indicates that

the speaker finds the object in question colder than he expected. Notice that a degree property is involved in (16), but not in (15). These two examples thus show that unlike *koto*, *no* is not sensitive to whether or not a gradable property is related to unexpectedness.

The following examples also show that *no* can be used in a general situation:

(17) [The speaker came back to his house, and found the rooms ransacked.]

Doroboo-ga haitta n da.

theft-NOM enter.PAST MIR COP

‘Someone must have broken into my house.’

(18) A: Watasi, kekkon simasu.

I marriage do.POL

‘I’m getting married.’

B: E!? Kekkō suru no?

what marriage do MIR

‘What!? Are you getting married?’

In (17), the speaker infers from the situation he sees in front of him that someone broke into his house. *No* indicates that the information inferred is unexpected to the speaker. In (18), speaker B expresses his surprise at what speaker A has just said. Recall here that in (15) and (16), the speaker expresses the unexpectedness of what he directly perceives: the information in (15) and that in (16) are acquired through the visual and tactile senses, respectively. Therefore, unlike *datte*, *no* does not express unexpectedness related to specific information sources.² These observations suggest that *no* expresses an

² The mirative “makes no claims about the source of information, [and] can occur with first-hand observation, inference, or hearsay” (Watters (2002: 300)). In this sense, *no* shows the general tendency of mirative items.

unmarked mirative meaning.

3. Unexpectedness to the hearer

So far, I have argued that the sentence-final particle *no* expresses unexpected information to the speaker. This semantic property of *no* is in conformity with a typological tendency of mirative markers; a number of mirative markers found in other languages are associated with unexpectedness to the speaker. In fact, when it comes to definitions of mirativity, the word *speaker* often appears in such definitions. According to DeLancey (1997: 33), for example, “the function of [mirativity] is to mark sentences which report information which is new or surprising to the speaker”, or Aikhenvald (2004: 209) says that mirativity is a linguistic category “whose primary meaning is speaker’s unprepared mind, unexpected new information, and concomitant surprise” (the underlines are mine). Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012: 488), however, points out that mirativity “will often be used in circumstances in which the proposition is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the speaker, but may also be used when it is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the addressee.” For example:

- (19) Amerika’ bo hu’tala dur kai sí’-an hu’la.
America very high house make PAST.PF.3PL become.PAST.INFER.3
‘In America there are very tall buildings.’ (DeLancey (1997: 47))

The example in (19) “could be said by someone who is returning from the wide world with stories for his fellow villagers” (DeLancey (1997: 47)). So, “in this context the proposition is not one for which the speaker does not have a psychological preparation, but rather one that is new for the addressee” (Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012: 488)). This

example shows that mirativity can also be captured from the hearer's perspective.

The sentence-final particle *no* is noteworthy in typological terms because it expresses unexpectedness to not only the speaker but also the hearer. Let us consider the following example:

- (20) Boku ne, konban deeto na n desu.
I you know this evening date COP MIR COP.POL
'I'm going on a date this evening.' (= (2))

Here, the speaker is revealing to the hearer that he is going on a date. The information conveyed is assumed to have already established to the speaker and thus it is not unexpected information to him. Rather, in (20), the speaker is assumed to intend to convey unexpected information to the hearer. *No* in (20) thus expresses the hearer's unexpectedness.³

This point can be confirmed by the following example:

- (21) A: Ano mise-ni hai-re-nakatta.
that shop-DAT enter-be able to-not.PAST
'I was turned away from that shop.'
- B:(*) Kimi-wa miseenen na n da yo.
you-TOP under age COP MIR COP SFP
'You are under age.'

³ *No* has been traditionally regarded as an explanation marker (cf. Alfonso (1966), Kuno (1973)). In (20), for example, the speaker is explaining his schedule to the hearer. This intuition also shows that *no* can be used to convey the information unexpected to the hearer.

Speaker B's utterance can be interpreted to be either acceptable or unacceptable depending on the context. Let us first consider the context where this sentence is unacceptable. The information that speaker A is under age is assumed to be evident to him because age is part of one's personal information. In other words, this information is not unexpected to speaker A. *No* in (21) thus introduces expected information, yielding an unnatural sentence. Speaker B's utterance, however, becomes natural in a context where he tries to make speaker A remember his age; considering the fact that speaker A tried to enter a shop for adults, speaker B treats speaker A as if A forgot his own age. In this case, the information that speaker A is under age is interpreted as if it were unexpected information to him. In this context, the use of *no* is fully acceptable.

The question arising here is why *no* expresses unexpectedness to the hearer as well as the speaker. I would like here to provide a tentative answer to this question. Japanese is a language which develops grammatical items encoding certain information on the hearer (cf. Kamio (1990), Hill et al. (1986), Ide (1989, 2006), Hirose (2013, 2015)). For example, honorifics, such as *desu* and *masu*, encode the socio-psychological relationship between speaker and hearer, and the sentence-final particles *yo* and *ne* encode the speaker's informational superiority over the hearer and the informational equality between speaker and hearer, respectively (see Chapter 9). It is thus not unreasonable to say that the mirative marker *no* can also be used to express the information on the hearer's state of knowledge at speech time. This answer is of course a mere speculation, and hence further investigations are required to provide a satisfactory answer to the above question.

4. Mirativity and the Categorical Judgment

Lastly, I will deal with examples which might appear to be counterexamples to the

analysis developed so far. Let us consider the following example:

(22) [The speaker hangs the laundry outside at night before going to bed. The next morning, he realizes that it is raining.]

*Ame na n da!
rain COP MIR COP
'It's raining!'

In (22), the speaker suddenly realizes that it is raining. Judging from the context, the speaker does not expect that it is raining in the morning. We can thus predict that *no* can be used in this context, but the sentence in (22) in fact sounds unnatural; here, *no* (and *da*) must be omitted, i.e., *Ame da!* (the copula *na* in (22) becomes *da* here).

However, the unacceptability in (22) reflects a certain property of mirativity. As Dickinson (2000: 381) puts it, mirativity “essentially delineate[s] the speaker’s relationship, either physically or psychologically, to experienced events and states.” In other words, the speaker must evaluate, in the light of his overall knowledge, whether or not the information in question is unexpected (cf. Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012)); more specifically, the speaker first recognizes an event, an object, etc., and then makes a judgment on whether this recognized event, object, etc. is unexpected information (see Guentchéva (1994) for related discussion). This judgment involved in mirativity can be considered to be what Kuroda (1972) calls the *categorical judgment*. Given that *no* is a mirative marker, it must be used in a situation where a categorical judgment is at issue.⁴ Notice here that in (22), the speaker is assumed to be merely expressing what he has just

⁴ Kuroda (1973: 380) in fact notes that the sentence-final particle *no* “serves as a marker to indicate that some ‘second order’ assertion, so to speak, is made with respect to the proposition expressed by the sentence to which [*no*] is attached.” That is to say, *no* indicates that the speaker first recognizes an event, an object, etc., and then makes a certain judgment on that recognized event, object, etc. (see also Hayashi (1964)).

recognized. To borrow Kuroda's (1972) words, the *thetic judgment* is at issue in (22). In fact, it is impossible to supply the sentence in (22), with or without *no*, with the topic phrase *X-wa*, such as *Kyoo-wa* 'today,' which Kuroda (1972) assumes signals that the categorical judgment takes place (i.e., *Kyoo-wa ame da!/ *Kyoo-wa ame na n da!) (see Kuroda (1972) for detailed discussion on the distinction between the categorical and thetic judgments). The unacceptability in (22) can thus be attributed to the absence of a categorical judgment. We can here predict that the sentence in (22) becomes acceptable if it is put in a context where a certain topic phrase can be linguistically manifested. This prediction is borne out by the following example:

(23) [The speaker looks out of a window and realizes that it is raining.]

(Kyoo-wa) ame na n da.

While in (22), the speaker has a sense of urgency because the laundry gets wet, in (23), the speaker does not have such a sense; here, he is merely describing the situation he sees in front of him. In this case, we can supply the topic phrase *kyoo-wa*, as shown in the parentheses, which means that the categorical judgment takes place; the speaker first observes the event and then makes a judgement that this event is unexpected to him. Hence the acceptability of the sentence in (23). The discussion developed here lends support to the claim that *no* falls under the class of mirative markers.

5. Conclusion

It is widely known that Japanese is rich in grammatical evidential markers. On the other hand, there are very few studies which investigate Japanese grammatical mirative markers. Hoping to promote the study of mirativity in Japanese, I attempted to clarify

that the sentence-final particle *no* is a grammatical mirative marker. More specifically, I proposed that *no* expresses an unmarked mirative meaning, i.e. unexpectedness in general without further specification. I also argued that the mirative marker *no* has a noteworthy function in typological terms; it expresses unexpectedness to not only the speaker but also the hearer. Furthermore, I demonstrated that the use of *no* is limited to a situation where the categorical judgment takes place.

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