

Žaň Thaň sag pa on theses (*dam bca'*,
pratijñā) in Madhyamaka thought*

Chizuko Yoshimizu

Žaň Thaň sag pa 'Byuň gnas ye śes (*alias* Yes śes 'byuň gnas, active in the first half of the 12th century)¹ is reported to have been one of the chief disciples of Pa tshab Ńi ma grags (1055–ca. 1145), who translated Candrakīrti's main treatises into the Tibetan language.² One composition by Žaň Thaň sag pa is now available to us in the form of a handwritten manuscript: a complete commentary on Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (Pr) entitled *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi*

* My special thanks are due to Kevin Vose, who corrected the English of the present paper, and Pascale Hugon for their valuable suggestions and comments.

¹ Žaň Thaň sag pa is supposed to have belonged to the Žaň clan and resided in Thaň sag monastery, which he himself built in 'Phan yul, north of lHa sa, where Pa tshab was born and based after his return to Tibet. Presumably Žaň Thaň sag pa learned from Pa tshab after the latter had returned to Tibet from Kashmir around 1101 (cf. Yoshimizu 2005: 128 n. 2). According to Chos 'phel (2004: 166f.), the Thaň sag monastery was converted from bKa' gdams pa to dGe lugs pa at the time of the 5th Dalai Lama. It is therefore to be identified with the current dGe lugs temple dGa' ldan chos 'khor dgon, the foundation of which Śes gñen tshul khriims (2001: 203) ascribes to Žaň Ye śes 'byuň gnas in the 13th century. I am indebted to Maho Iuchi for the information about Thaň sag monastery. Iuchi (2007: 62) presents the list of the bKa' gdams pa temples surrounding lHa sa.

² Pa tshab translated into Tibetan the *Prasannapadā*, the *Madhyamā-kāvātāra* and its *Bhāṣya* as well as the *Catuhśatakaṭikā*. In some biographical literature, Pa tshab is also given the clan name Žaň. Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 45 n. 89.

ti ka. This manuscript is definitely a discovery of great importance for the study of Tibetan scholasticism in the 11–12th centuries.³

As I have previously discussed, *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa* held the Madhyamaka theory of “freedom from extremes” (*mtha’ bral dbu ma*) in terms of “neither existence nor non-existence” (*yod min med min*), which is the exact view that the later Sa skya scholar Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge (1429–1507) ascribed to him.⁴ With regard to Candrakīrti’s defense (in the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā*) of Buddhapālita’s statements, against Bhāviveka’s attacks on them,⁵ unlike later Tibetans *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa* never expresses the idea that the Madhyamaka school thereby divided into two branches, the Thal ’gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) and the Raṅ rgyud pa (*Svātantrika). He is rather of the opinion that a *raṅ rgyud pa*, such as Bhāviveka, who uses an autonomous inference (*raṅ rgyud rjes dpag, svatantrānumāna*) is unqualified to claim to be a *dbu ma pa*⁶ and that between a *raṅ rgyud pa* and a *dbu ma pa* there is no common establishment (*mthun snaṅ = ubhayasiddha*) of the subject of debate.⁷ Following Candrakīrti, *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa* does

³ For detailed features of the manuscript, the authorship, as well as the historical figure of *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa*, cf. Yoshimizu 2005 and 2006, which include an edition of the 18th chapter and of some parts of the first chapter. This manuscript is not included in the recently published *bKa’ gdams gsuṅ ’bum*.

⁴ *lTa ba’i śan ’byed* 8a4–8b1 and 17b3f.; cited in Yoshimizu 2005: 130 n. 10. For Go rams pa’s detailed discussion, cf. Matsumoto 1999: 205ff. and Cabezón and Dargyay 2007: 203ff.

⁵ For a detailed investigation of *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa*’s interpretation of Buddhapālita’s statements, Bhāviveka’s criticism thereof, as well as Candrakīrti’s rejoinder focusing on the reading of Pr 18,5–19,7, see Yoshimizu 2006: 87ff. (English summary on 114).

⁶ See *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 21b1–4 edited in Yoshimizu 2006: 102f. (Text 1) and translated in *ibid.*: 81. *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa* does not use the appellation Thal ’gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) as a branch name referring to the Buddhapālita-Candrakīrti lineage, although he calls them the advocates of *prasaṅga* reasoning (*thal ’gyur smra ba*) (cf., e.g., 6b5 cited below in n. 8).

⁷ Therefore, in *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa*’s view, *dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa* is not

not accept an autonomous inference as a means of establishing ultimate reality,⁸ since, as taught by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva,⁹ the Mādhyamika (*dbu ma pa*) disowns any doctrinal position (*phyogs*, *pakṣa*) or thesis (*dam bca'*, *pratijñā*) to be proven on his own account.

Thus, on one hand strictly rejecting formal probative reasoning, Žañ Thaṅ sag pa on the other hand adopts in his own discussion plenty of logical terms such as reason (*he du*, *hetu*), pervasion (*khyab pa*, *vyāpti*), argument (*'thad pa*, *upapatti*) and the like.¹⁰ The flourishing of *pramāṇa* studies in his time well accounts

established. See *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 21b1–4 edited in Yoshimizu 2006: 102 (Text 1) and translated in *ibid.*: 81.

⁸ Žañ Thaṅ sag pa states that the Mādhyamika may use an autonomous inference if not investigating ultimate reality. See *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 6b5 (cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2005: 132): *don dam spyod* (read: *dpyod*) *pa'i skabs min pas / (sic) rañ rgyud byas kyañ 'gal ba med // de phyir thal 'gyur smra ba la // 'gal ba'i ñes pa mi bsam mo //* Go rams pa quotes the first half of this verse in his *dBu ma'i spyi ston* (105a1f.) as a statement by Žañ Thaṅ sag pa without specifying the source (see Yoshimizu 2005: 132). For citations from the *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka*, I retain orthographic peculiarities of the manuscript, which I have listed in Yoshimizu 2005: 138.

⁹ Cf. *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV) 29–30 cited in Pr D6a3f., P6b5f.: *gal te ñas dam bcas 'ga' yod // des na ña la skyon de yod // ña la dam bca' med pas na // ña la skyon med kho na yin // gal te mñon sum la sogs pa'i // don gyis 'ga' žig dmigs na ni // sgrub pa 'am (D 'añ) bzlog par bya na de // med phyir ña la klan ka med //* = L. de La Vallée Poussin ed. (LVP) 16,7–10: *yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva* (VV Johnston & Kunst 1978 reads *eṣa*) *me bhaved doṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ // yadi kiñcid upalabheyam pravartayeyam nivartayeyam vā / pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ // *Lakṣaṇaṭīkā* (LṬ) edited by Yonezawa 2004: 132; *Catuhśataka* (CŚ) 6.25 cited in Pr D6a2f., P6b4f.: *yod dañ med dañ yod med ces // phyogs ni gañ la 'añ yod min pa // de la yun ni rin po na'añ // klan ka brjod par nus ma yin //* = LVP 16,4f.: *sadasatsadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate / upālambhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktum na śakyate //* Cf. further the investigation of these verses in Seyfort Rugg 2000: 115ff.

¹⁰ For instance, Žañ Thaṅ sag pa terms the three verses cited above (see

for his broad knowledge of the Buddhist logico-epistemological system.¹¹ To a certain extent, indeed, *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa* admits Mādhyamikas' commitments to logical argumentation. It is well-known that Candrakīrti has called “theses” (*pratijñā*) Nāgārjuna's negative statements in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) 1.1.¹² *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa* also calls “theses” (*dam bca'*) Buddhapālita's commentarial statements on MMK 1.1 as will be seen below, as well as several of Candrakīrti's statements including *Madhyamakāvātāra* (MA) 6.8cd, which is cited in the *Prasannapadā*.¹³ How should one

n. 9), viz., CS 6.25 and VV 29–30 “three arguments for the Mādhyamika's lacking probandum and argument” (*dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 15a3: *dbu ma pa la sgrub bya daṅ 'thad pa med pa'i 'thad pa gsum*). Rejecting the Mādhyamika's use of probandum and argument, he thus gives arguments for the rejection.

¹¹ It is, however, unknown whether *Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa* received education at gSaṅ phu sNe'u thog monastery, which was the centre of *pramāṇa* studies at that time. We cannot exclude the possibility that he learned logic from Pa tshab and Kanakavarman, for both of them supposedly inherited the tradition of Buddhist logic that flourished in Kashmir. Moreover, Pa tshab's first collaborator Mahāsumati is described as a great logician in the colophon of the *Prasannapadā* (see Yoshimizu 2005: 133 n. 19).

¹² *Madhyamakāvātārabhāṣya* (MABh) 81,17ff.: *de bžin du dam bca' bag sum char la yaṅ sbyar bar bya'o // dam bca' ba bži po de rjes su brjod nas rigs pas sgrub pa'i phyir bśad pa / Pr LVP 13,2f.: tataś caivaṃ saṃbandhaḥ, naiva svata utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana / evaṃ pratijñātrayam api yojyaṃ // Cf. MMK 1.1 (cited in Pr LVP 12,13f.): na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana // Cf. also dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 10a1f.: de bži car las skye bar mi 'thad do sñam du ñes pa ni 'phags pa klu grub la mña' nas dam bca' mdzad do //*

¹³ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 11b5f.: *skye bar gyur pa slar yaṅ skye bar rigs pa 'aṅ ma yin ñid (= MA 6.8cd) ces pa ste dam bca' tsam mo // Cf. MA 6.8 (cited in Pr LVP 13,7–8): tasmād dhi tasya bhavane na guṇo 'sti kaścij / jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva yuktam // Cf. also dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 14a5, where Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa terms dam bca' Candrakīrti's refutation of Bhāviveka's assertion: tshig de dag gis ni ñes pa brjod par mi rigs ces dam bca' bstan te / = “[Candrakīrti] presents a thesis by saying ‘[it is] not proper’ [that Bhāviveka] has indicated failures by those words*

distinguish these “theses” which Indian Madhyamaka masters are supposed to have advocated from those theses which they all have rejected?

In the present paper, I would like to clarify how Žañ Thaṅ sag pa confronted this most controversial problem in the history of the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition, which his contemporary as well as later Tibetan scholars were also destined to encounter.¹⁴ I will first examine Žañ Thaṅ sag pa’s arguments for distinguishing between acceptable theses and unacceptable theses for Mādhyamikas. The focus will be on his interpretation of the kind of thesis that is grounded in the logical system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Then, I will analyze his ontology-based defense of the theory that for the Mādhyamika negation is not what is to be proven (*sgrub bya, sādhya*), confirming an essential link between this theory and the theory of neither existence nor non-existence (*yod min med min*), according to which the negation should eventually be negated as well. Our final aim is to gain a clearer perspective of the historical development of Tibetan Madhyamaka, which has proceeded in a close relation to the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition.

Žañ Thaṅ sag pa’s arguments for and against the Mādhyamika’s use of theses

Insofar as the statements of MMK 1.1 are concerned, the fact that Candrakīrti has referred to them as theses (*pratijñā*) requires an explanation from later interpreters, for it is obviously contradictory to his own statement that Mādhyamikas have no thesis of their own.¹⁵

[in Buddhapālita’s commentarial statements on MMK 1.1.]”

¹⁴ Seyfort Ruegg (2000: Section II, especially 115ff. and 219ff.) has provided a detailed investigation of this problem in the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition.

¹⁵ See Pr LVP 23,3: *nāsmākaṃ svapratijñāyā abhāvāt* / Accepting the ambiguity of Candrakīrti’s usage of the word *pratijñā*, Matsumoto (1997: 372f., 383) has inferred that Candrakīrti just followed Bhāviveka in calling MMK 1.1 theses while insisting that the Mādhyamika has no the-

Žañ Thaṅ sag pa solves this problem by explaining that Candrakīrti applies the word *pratijñā* or *dam bca'* in “mere transactional usage” (*tha sñad tsam*). Žañ Thaṅ sag pa also describes such a thesis as “mere thesis” (*dam bca' tsam*) or “mere name” (*min tsam*) and opposes it to a “genuine thesis” (*dam bca' rnal ma*),¹⁶ notably to the thesis or the position (*pakṣa*)¹⁷ defined by Dignāga. Žañ Thaṅ sag pa says as follows:

[1] [Each statement in MMK 1.1 is] thus called a root thesis (*rtsa ba'i dam bca'*) but [this is] mere transactional usage (*tha sñad tsam*), for [this thesis] is not a [thesis] like that which has five characteristics (*mtshan ñid lña*), namely: 1) [stated in its own] form (*[raṅ gi] ño bo*, [*sva*]rūpa), 2) alone (*kho na*, *eva*), 3) being intended (*'dod pa*, *iṣṭa*), 4) [by him]self (*bdag ñid*, *svayam*), 5) [and] unopposed (*ma bsal ba*, *anirākṛta*), [which are regarded as] the defining characteristics of the thesis (*dam bca'i mtshan ñid*).¹⁸

sis of his own (i.e., according to Matsumoto, *svatantrā pratijñā*). Seyfort Ruegg (2000: 129f.) has proposed to distinguish between a *pratijñā* as a philosophical statement or thesis by Mādhyamikas that does not posit any substantial self-existence and a thesis that posits a substantial self-existence, which Mādhyamikas reject.

¹⁶ Cf. *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 11b5f. cited above in n. 13, which comments on MA 6.8, and 10b1f. cited below in n. 34.

¹⁷ The words *pratijñā* (*dam bca'*), *pakṣa* (*phyogs*) and *sādhya* (*sgrub bya*) are generally used as equivalents in both Indian and Tibetan logical traditions. Dharmakīrti employs in his verse commentary on PS 3.2ab the word *sādhya* for *pakṣa*, which is to bear the fourfold characteristic of the thesis (PV 4.28, cited and translated in Tillemans 2000: 48: *gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asaṅmohāya lakṣaṇam / tac caturlakṣaṇam rūpanipāteṣṭasvayaṅpadaiḥ //*). Tillemans (2000: 4, n. 16) indicates that Dignāga uses the terms *anumeyanirdeśa*, *pakṣavacana* and *sādhyanirdeśa* as synonyms. Those equivalent terms, *pratijñā*, *pakṣa* and *sādhya*, are employed as such by Mādhyamikas too (cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 130f.). Žañ Thaṅ sag pa himself admits that they are equivalents (*dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 13a3f.: *dam bca' daṅ sgrub bya daṅ phyogs ni rnam graṅ so*).

¹⁸ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 10b1: *de ltar na rtsa ba'i dam bca' zes pa yaṅ tha sñad tsam yin te // dam bca'i mtshan ñid ño bo kho na 'dod pa bdag ñid ma {bsal}* (Ms. *gsal*) *ba ces pa mtshan ñid lña ldan lta bu ma*

The five defining characteristics of the thesis enumerated here can be identified with those which Dignāga stated in *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (PS) 3.2 as *pakṣalakṣaṇa*. Dharmakīrti, let us note, only considered the first four as such.¹⁹ Let us see PS 3.2:

[PS 3.2] [A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated in its proper form alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e., as a *sādhyā*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject, it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly recognized.²⁰

Now it is clear that Žañ Thaṅ sag pa differentiates the “genuine thesis” fulfilling the Buddhist logicians’ definition from the set of theses acknowledged by Candrakīrti as “mere transactional usage.” Accordingly, one could offer as a hypothesis that the Mādhyamika may advocate a thesis if it is not intended as a

yin no //

¹⁹ See PV 4.28–29 (cited and translated in Ono 1986: 849 and Tillemans 2000: 48f.) and Tillemans *ibid.*: 49. The enumeration of these five characteristics appears in PV 4.85 (*ibid.*: 116: *svayamnipātarūpākhyā vyatirekasya bādhiḥ / sahnirākṛteneṣṭaśrutir avyāptibādhanī //*), where Dharmakīrti explains that Dignāga’s definition of the thesis serves to eliminate the faults of over- and non-pervasion (*ativyāpti, avyāpti*).

²⁰ PS 3.2: *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo ’nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi //* The English translation and the Sanskrit reconstruction follow Tillemans 2000: 47. The Tibetan version runs (Tillemans 2000: 47 n. 166, cf. Kitagawa 1973: 471f.): *rañ gi ño bo kho nar bstan // bdag ’dod rañ gi chos can la // mñon sum don dañ rjes dpag dañ // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba’o //* Cf. also *Nyāyabindu* (NB) 3.38: *svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo ’nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti //* NM 1: *svayam sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ / cited in Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (PVV) 320,16 [443,3ff.]; *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (PVBh) 510,23f.; and Tillemans 2000: 117f. Dignāga refutes in PS 3.3 and 3.5 respectively the *Nyāyasūtra*’s definition of the thesis as a presentation of the probandum (*sādhyanirdeśa*) and that in Vasubandhu’s *Vādaividhi* as a statement of the probandum (*sādhyābhidhāna*). See Tillemans *ibid.*: 39 n. 145.

probandum (*sādhya*) by the Mādhyamika himself.²¹ This distinction between the Mādhyamika's use of theses and that advocated by Buddhist logicians is supported by the thesis-definitions of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in *Nyāyamukha* (NM) 1 and *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) 4.86ab, which say respectively: “The thesis (or the position) is what is intended by [the proponent] himself as the probandum” (*svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo...*) and “What is accepted as the probandum is the defining characteristic of the thesis” (*sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣalakṣaṇam*).²² In light of those logicians' definitions, the Mādhyamika's principle, in turn, would clearly emerge in contrast, that the Mādhyamika or the follower of the middle way is one who neither intends to prove something nor accepts what is to be proven (*sādhya*) as his own.²³

The Mādhyamika's rejection of autonomous inference (*svatantrānumāna*) also results from his non-acceptance (*anabhyupagama*) of *sādhya*, as Candrakīrti explains in his *Prasannapadā*.²⁴ It

²¹ As for the fifth characteristic, “unopposed by perceptible objects, etc.,” it is unclear whether the Mādhyamika is totally free from this condition. However, the fact that Candrakīrti did not ultimately accept Dignāga's theory of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) (cf. Yoshimizu 1996) may allow us to conjecture that this condition is acceptable for Mādhyamikas only in the case of investigating common sense objects.

²² Cf. n. 20 above and Tillemans 2000: 117f.

²³ In this regard, Žaň Thaň sag pa expressly defines the Mādhyamika as the one who has no doctrinal position (*phyogs med pa*) of his own and hence excludes Bhāviveka, who sets forth a probandum or a doctrinal position (*sgrub bya 'am phyogs*), from the lineage of Nāgārjuna. Cf. *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 14b8: *dbu ma pa ces pa ni phyogs med pa la zer la legs ldan khyod rañ rgyud byed na ni dbu ma pa ma yin žiñ klu'i rjes su mi 'brañ pa žig ste | sgrub bya 'am phyogs 'dod pa'i phyir ro ||*

²⁴ Pr LVP 16,2: *na ca mādhyamikasya svataḥ svatantram anumānam kartuṃ yuktaṃ pakṣāntarābhyupagamābhāvāt |* (The Tibetan translation D6a2, P6b3f., omits *svataḥ*) = “For the Mādhyamika, it is not appropriate to formulate an autonomous inference on his own account, because [for him] there is no acceptance of the positions alternative [to the position that things arise from themselves, for instance, the position that they arise from an other].” Although Candrakīrti is here rejecting the four

would therefore be natural that whoever has no intention to prove something positively neither states a thesis on his own account nor formulates an inference independently of his opponent's assertion. "Autonomous" (*svatantra*) can be interpreted as synonymous with "intended by the proponent himself" (*svayam iṣṭa*) in terms of Dignāga, even if it is unclear whether Candrakīrti knew Dignāga's thesis-definition.

Žañ Thaṅ sag pa makes this point clear in his own definition of autonomous inference as well as in his commentary on Candrakīrti's refutation of autonomous inference:

[Definition:] Autonomous inference is the proof of a probandum (*sgrub bya, sādhya*) that has a [genuine] characteristic (*mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa, *lakṣaṇavat/lākṣaṇika*) by means of [a logical reason fulfilling] the three conditions (*tshul gsum, trirūpa[liṅga]*) that are established for both proponent and opponent by a valid means of cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*).²⁵

[2] The thought [expressed by Candrakīrti] here [in Pr LVP 16,2] is [the following]: The formulation of an autonomous logical reason (*raṅ rgyud kyi he tu*) [i.e., an autonomous reasoning or inference] entails (*khyab*) that the probandum (*sgrub bya, sādhya*) has a [genuine] characteristic (*mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa*). It is not appropriate for the Mādhyamika to state an autonomous logical reason [i.e., an autonomous reasoning] because for him there is no probandum, which would be entailed (*khyab byed du gyur pa*) [by an autonomous logical reason].²⁶

alternative positions of the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi, mu bži*) enumerated in MMK 1.1, he has undoubtedly extended the scope to all possible doctrinal positions. Pr LVP 18,5f. cited below in n. 27 is also often referred to as Candrakīrti's refutation of autonomous inference. For his criticism of autonomous inference, cf. further, e.g., Yotsuya 1999: 47ff., Seyfort Rungg 2000: 129ff. and Yoshimizu 2003: 269ff.

²⁵ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 14b8f. edited in Yoshimizu 2006: 104 (Text 2): *raṅ rgyud ni sgrub bya mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pa la tshul gsum rgol phyir rgol gñis ka'i tshad mas grub pa žig gis sgrub pa'o ||*

²⁶ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 15a1f.: *de'i bsam pa ni raṅ rgyud kyi he du byed pa la sgrub bya mtshan ñid daṅ ldan pas khyab la / dbu ma pa la khyab byed du gyur pa'i sgrub bya med pa'i phyir raṅ rgyud kyi he du*

While *Žaṅ* *Thaṅ* *sag pa* does not say what he has in mind by the expression “a probandum that has a characteristic” (*sgrub bya mtshan ṅid dan ldan pa*), the most plausible reading is to take it as a probandum that has the fivefold characteristic of a genuine thesis in accordance with the aforementioned logicians’ thesis-definitions. In short, it is a probandum “intended by the proponent himself” (i.e., *svayam iṣṭa*).

In this manner, *Žaṅ* *Thaṅ* *sag pa* rules out both the genuine theses of the Buddhist logicians and autonomous inferences from the Mādhyamika’s logical scene. Consequently, whatever inferential statement Madhyamaka masters have properly made must be either a *prasaṅga* reasoning or an other-acknowledged inference (*para-prasiddhānumāna*, *gžan grags rjes dpag*), the probandum of which is not intended by the Mādhyamika himself. *Žaṅ* *Thaṅ* *sag pa* actually reads Buddhapālita’s commentarial statement on MMK 1.1 twofold as a *prasaṅga* as well as an other-acknowledged inference.²⁷ What is interesting for our discussion is that in both interpreta-

brjod par mi rigs so //

²⁷ In this respect, one should note that *Žaṅ* *Thaṅ* *sag pa* interprets Pr LVP 18,5–19,7, which has recently aroused discussion among modern scholars, to deal with the question of whether the Mādhyamika should state a logical reason and examples of an other-acknowledged inference. This interpretation consents with that proposed by MacDonald 2003: 167f. According to *Žaṅ* *Thaṅ* *sag pa*, Candrakīrti there eliminates the need for such an inference, but then in Pr LVP 19,8–21,7, Candrakīrti shows that Buddhapālita has presented an other-acknowledged inference. See *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 16b3–17b2 cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2006: 95ff., Text 7 [109–112] and 114 ad Pr LVP 18,5ff.: *athāpi syāt / mādhyamikānāṃ pakṣaheturṣṭāntānām asiddheḥ svatantrānumānānabhidhāyivāt svata utpattipratīṣedhapratijñārthasādhanam* (according to MacDonald 2003: 167; LVP: *-pratijñātārthasādhanam*) *mā bhūd ubhayaśiddhena vānumānena parapatijñānirākaraṇam... //* (= D6b1f., P7a3ff.) = “[It may be granted], since Mādhyamikas do not state an autonomous inference owing to the non-establishment of the position, the logical reason, and the example, that there should be neither a proof of the content of the thesis (*pratijñārthasādhana*) when negating the origination from self, nor a refutation of the opponent’s thesis by means of an inference established for both [parties]....”

tions he terms it a “thesis” (*dam bca'*). More precisely, he terms Buddhapālita’s statement, “Things do not arise from themselves (*na svata utpadyante bhāvās...*),” a “pseudo-thesis” (*ltar snañ dam bca'*, **pratijñābhāsa*) when he interprets it as a *prasaṅga* reasoning,²⁸ and when he interprets it as an other-acknowledged inference, he renders it as a thesis properly attended by a logical reason, examples and pervasion.²⁹ But yet, in his view, Buddhapālita’s statement,

²⁸ One should note that in the manuscript the expression “pseudo-thesis” (*ltar snañ dam bca'*) is a replacement for “negative thesis” (*bkaḡ pa'i dam bca'*). It is clear that the letters *bkaḡ pa'i* have been deleted and the letters *ltar snañ* have been inserted instead. Either Žañ Thaṅ sag pa himself or the scribe made this correction, which I think proper and necessary, because a *prasaṅga* reasoning is not a thesis that establishes negation. Moreover, as will be discussed, Žañ Thaṅ sag pa’s final position is that negation (*bkaḡ pa*) is also to be negated by the Mādhyamika. See *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 12a1f.: *'gal brjod kyi tshul bśad pa / dños po rnams bdag las skye ba med de / [~bkaḡ pa'i~ deleted] [ltar snañ inserted] dam bca' ste / dños po rnams bdag las skye ba bkaḡ pa tsam dam bca'i tha sñad du byed pa'o //* = “[The following is] the explanation of [Buddhapālita’s] way of indicating contradiction [in the Sāṃkhya theory of the origination from self]: [Buddhapālita says] ‘Things do not arise from themselves.’ [This is] a {pseudo} thesis. [Buddhapālita] made the mere negation of things’ origination from self in a transactional usage of thesis.”

²⁹ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 17b6f.: *skyañs kyi ñag gis yañ lag lña pa'i sbyor ba bstan lugs bśad pa dños po rnams bdag las skye ba med de ces pas dam bca' ste / dños po rnams ni chos can no // grañs can gyi lugs kyi chos can gñis te / bdag las gžan pa'i dños po rnams dañ / mñon par gsal ba'i bum pa las gžan pa'i dños po rnams chos can gyi don to // bar 'dir yod pa'i phyir ces pa'i he du kha bkañ ño // dpe' bstan pa de dag gi skye ba don med pa ñid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dañ ces pa'o // śin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir dañ žes pa yañ dper bya'o //* = “The explanation of the way in which a formal probative argument (*prayoga*) with five members is stated by Buddhapālita’s words is [as follows]: a thesis [is given] by saying ‘Things do not arise from themselves’; ‘Things’ are the subject (or “the property possessor”; *chos can, dharmin*). According to the Sāṃkhya tenet, the subject is twofold: ‘things other than self’ and ‘things other than a directly perceptible pot’ are the subject matter. Between these [thesis and examples], the reason (*hetu*), ‘because [they]

whether it is read as a *prasaṅga* or a *paraprasiddhānumāna*, is safe from being a genuine thesis in terms of Buddhist logicians, because it is not intended as what is to be proven by Buddhapālita himself. Moreover, all those Madhyamaka teachers, Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, have solely negated others' positions without intending to prove something positively as their own position.³⁰ Therefore, Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa maintains, their statements cannot be genuine theses but must be regarded as theses only in transactional usage.

To these arguments for sanctioning the Mādhyamikas' use of theses, however, the following objection may well arise: The negation itself can be construed as a probandum that the Madhyamaka masters have intended to prove. By negating the origination from self, for instance, they would intend to establish the non-origination from self as their own thesis, even though they insist that it is mere transactional usage.³¹ Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa indeed deals with this

exist,' is to be added. [Buddhapālita] shows an example (*dpe*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*) by saying 'because their origination would be pointless and....' [His subsequent statement] 'because [it] would be over-extended and' is also stated as an example." Also, *ibid.*: 18a3: *dños po rnams bdag las skye ba med de dam bca' / yod pa'i phyir he du / khyab pa ni dpe' daṅ gcig / dam bca' slar brjod 'jug sdud do /* "Thesis: Things do not arise from themselves. Reason: Because they exist. The pervasion is the same as the examples [show]. The conclusion is the restatement of the thesis." As for the details of Źaṅ Thaṅ sag pa's interpretation of the pointlessness and the over-extension of the origination from self, given in ablative forms (*tadutpādavaiyārthyāt atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca*) as the example or the proof of pervasion, see Yoshimizu 2006: 89–94 and Yoshimizu 2008.

³⁰ Cf. PrLVP34,5: *parapratijñāniṣedhaphalatvādsmanumānānām/*

³¹ The possibility should also be precluded that the negation here in question might be an implicative type of negation (i.e., *paryudāsa*, *ma yin dgag*) that affirms the contrary position, that things arise from others. Both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti take the negations in MMK 1.1 as non-implicative negations (i.e., *prasajyapratīṣedha*, *med dgag*). See *Prajñāpradīpa* (Prajñ) D48b6f., P58a6f.: *bdag las ma yin źes bya ba'i dgag pa 'di ni med par dgag pa'i don du lta bar bya ste / dgag pa gto che ba'i phyir daṅ / 'di lta rtogs pa (P rtog pa) ma lus pa'i draṅ dgag pas*

objection by introducing mainly ontology-based arguments. That will be our next subject of consideration.

Žañ Thaṅ sag pa's defense and his final position that the Mādhyamika does not even accept negation (*bkag pa*) as a probandum

A crucial point is how to interpret the value of the negation of origination, which brings a logical and doctrinal determination for the Mādhyamika himself. Žañ Thaṅ sag pa first discusses the issue just after the aforementioned statement [1].³² Let us see his argument, which is based on an ontological observation:

[3.1] [Objection:] Granted that [your] intended thesis (*'dod dam bca'*) is mere name (*min tsam*), it is established with regard to entities (*dños po*) as a genuine thesis (*dam bca' rnal ma*), for non-origination is established by [your] negating origination, because [these] two, i.e., origination and non-origination, are [respectively] positive determination (*yoñs gcod*) and negative determination (*rnam gcod*), and because according to the principle of direct contradiction (*dños 'gal*) the negation of one results in the establishment of the other.³³ Thus, the thesis (*dam bca'*) that there is no origination is indirectly established.

rnam par mi rtoḡ pa'i ye śes śes bya'i yul ma lus pa daṅ ldan pa 'grub par dgoṅs pa'i phyir ro // and Pr LVP 13,4ff.: nanu ca, naiva svata utpannā, ity avadhāryamāṇe parata utpannā ity aniṣṭaṃ prāpnoti / na prāpnoti, prasajyapraṭiṣedhasya vivakṣitatvāt parato 'py utpādasya praṭiṣetsya-mānatvāt /

³² See statement [1] cited above in n. 18 from *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 10b1. He further develops it after statement [2], cited above in n. 26 from *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 15a1f., as will be discussed below.

³³ The principle of direct contradiction conforms with the principle of the excluded middle, which holds in any logical discussion. The Madhyamaka masters, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, also apply it to their argument for negating self-nature. Cf., e.g., *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (MAIv) ad *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (MAI) 1 D56b7f. (Ichigo 1985: 22): *raṅ bžin yod par gyur na ni gcig pa'am cig śos las mi 'da'o // de dag ni phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid yin pas phuṅ po gžan sel bar byed do // Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ) D191a4f. (cited in Tsoṅ kha pa's *rTsa še Źik chen* 25b4f.): *phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyi chos dag ni cig*

[Reply:] The error that [you] have stated does not exist, for, if we negated the origination that is unexamined [by an analytical reasoning] (*ma brtags pa'i skye ba*), non-origination would be established, but we negate the origination postulated [by the Sāṃkhya] (*btags pa'i skye ba*), so that the non-origination that is unanalyzed [by a reasoning] (*ma dpyad pa'i skye med*) does not come to be established, since [these] two, viz., examined origination (*brtags pa'i skye ba*) and unexamined non-origination (*ma brtags pa'i skye med*), are not directly contradictory (*dños 'gal*).³⁴

Here *Ḍaṅ Thaṅ sag pa*'s wording is puzzling, but in effect, there is no substantial difference between the notions “unexamined” (*ma brtags pa*) and “unanalyzed” (*ma dpyad pa*), which both refer to the origination that is conventionally accepted by the world (i.e., *kun rdzob, saṃvṛti*), without being examined by a reasoning which analyzes ultimate existence (i.e., *don dam, paramārtha*).³⁵ Since the

śos dgag pa / gžan sgrub pa med na med pa yin pa'i phyir gñi ga ma yin pa'i phyogs su rtog pa yaṅ rigs pa daṅ ldan pa ma yin no //

³⁴ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 10b1ff.: gal te 'dod dam bca' ces pa miñ tsam du 'dod kyaṅ dños po la dam bca' rnal mar grub ste / skye ba bkag pas skye myed grub par 'gyur te / skye ba daṅ skye med gñis rnam gcod yoṅs gcod yin pa'i phyir daṅ / dños 'gal gyi lugs kyis cig bkag pa cig gi sgrub byed du 'oṅ pa'i phyir ro / de ltar na śugs la skye ba med pa zēs bya ba'i dam bca' grub po ce na // brjod pa skyon de ni med de // kho bo cag gis ma brtags pa'i skye ba bkag na / skye med de grub par thal ba bden mod kyi / kho bo cag ni btags pa'i skye ba 'gog pas ma dpyad pa'i skye myed grub par mi 'gyur te / brtags pa'i skye ba daṅ ma brtags pa'i skye med gñis dños 'gal ma yin pa'i phyir ro //*

³⁵ The establishment of things without examination or analysis could be adopted from the definition of the conventional (*kun rdzob*) by Śāntarakṣita in MAI 64–65 that the conventional is agreeable and acceptable only as long as it is not examined (see Ichigō 1985: CXXV, tr. CXLII): *ma brtags gcig pu ṅams dga' žiṅ // skye ba daṅ 'jig pa'i chos can pa // don byed pa dag nus rñams kyi // raṅ bžin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs // brtags pa ma byas ṅams dga' ba'aṅ // bdag rgyu sṅa ma sṅa ma la // brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yi // 'bras bu de 'dra 'byuṅ ba yin // Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge* also makes use of the notions “unexamined” and “unanalyzed” in his *Śar gsum ston thun*. See, e.g., his definition of the conventional as that which is true in the perspective of non-analytical thinking (16,4f.:

origination “postulated” (*btags pa*) by the Sāṃkhya opponent does not exist even conventionally, the negation of this kind of origination cannot result in establishing conventional non-origination from the Madhyamaka point of view. Then, Žañ continues his discussion as follows:

[3.2] [Objection:] Although that failure does not exist, it still follows that the non-origination that is examined [by an analytical reasoning] (*skye med brtags pa*) is established by [your] negating the origination that is examined [by an analytical reasoning] (*skye ba brtags pa*).

[Reply:] No, it doesn’t. The establishment of imagined non-origination (*skye med kun brtags*) does not result in establishing a thesis (*dam bca’*, *pratijñā*), for none [of] the characteristics of the thesis (*dam bca’i mtshan ñid*) are observed, because the origination postulated [by the Sāṃkhya] (*btags pa’i skye ba*) and the unexamined non-origination that is imagined (*ma brtags pa’i skye med kun brtags*) are nothing but names (*miñ ñid*). Or alternatively (*rnam pa gcig du na*),³⁶ [according to the principle of the excluded middle one could posit that] non-origination is established by virtue of negating origination. By this alone, however, no thesis comes to be established, for a thesis intends a state of affairs (*don*, *artha*) as something to be proven (*sgrub bya*, *sādhya*), and yet we do not even intend non-origination as something to be proven.³⁷

ma dpyad pa’i bsam ñor bden pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa’i mtshan ñid do). In the next passage cited in the body of the present paper, however, Žañ Thaṅ sag pa subsumes the unexamined conventional establishment of non-origination under the concept “imagined.” I am deeply indebted to Kevin Vose for both interpretation of the notions “unexamined” (*ma brtags pa*) and “unanalyzed” (*ma dpyad pa*) and information about Phya pa’s use thereof.

³⁶ The phrase *rnam pa gcig du na* can be identified with the phrase *rnam pa gcig tu na*, which is used in canonical texts as the translation of the Sanskrit phrase *atha vā*. In the manuscript of the *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka*, the letter *du* often appears in the place where according to Tibetan orthography the letter *tu* should appear.

³⁷ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 10b3f.: *gal te ñes pa de med mod kyi ’on kyañ skye ba brtags pa bkag pas skye med brtags pa grub par thal lo ce na | ma yin te skye med kun brtags grub pas dam bca’ grub par mi ’gyur te | btags pa’i skye ba dañ ma brtags pa’i skye med kun brtags ni miñ ñid*

On my reading, the opponent is presumably pointing out the possibility that the substantially real or ultimate non-origination that bears “examination” (*brtags pa*) might be established by negating the origination that is examined and purportedly established as real by the Sāṃkhya. In his reply, Zhañ Thañ sag pa rejects this objection by defining the Mādhyamika’s establishment of non-origination as “imagined” (*kun brtags, parikalpita*). Thus eliminating the establishment of ultimate non-origination, he likewise characterizes the conventional non-origination that is unexamined as “imagined” (*ma brtags pa’i skye med kun brtags*).³⁸ To sum up, Zhañ Thañ sag pa is arguing that the non-origination from self is, be it ultimate or conventional, merely imagined and constructed by name (*miñ*) or verbal transaction.³⁹ From the viewpoint of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka, the negation of origination from self gains neither ultimate nor conventional ontological establishment.

*yin pa’i phyir dam bca’i mtshan ñid mi dmyigs so // rnam pa gcig du na
skye ba bkag pas skye med grub kyañ de tsam gyis dam bca’ ’grub par mi
’gyur te // dam bca’ ni don sgrub byar ’dod pa yin la / kho bo cag ni skye
med sgrub byar yañ mi ’dod pa’i phyir ro //*

³⁸ I prefer leaving *ma brtags pa’i skye med kun brtags* as it appears in the manuscript and not emending it to *brtags pa’i skye med kun brtags*, since the latter sounds like a tautology. My solution, moreover, suggests that in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka system even conventional non-origination or the negation of origination is regarded as being imagined.

³⁹ The underlying idea is, in my view, that the imagined characteristic (*kun brtags pa’i mtshan ñid, parikalpita lakṣaṇa*) is non-substantial with regard to characteristics (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*) and therefore not substantially existent but merely postulated by names, as taught in *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (SNSū) chapter 7 (Lamotte 1935: 67f., tr. 194): *don dam yañ dag ’phags de la chos rnam kyī mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid gañ ze na / kun brtags pa’i mtshan ñid gañ yin pa’o / de ci’i phyir ze na / ’di ltar de ni miñ dañ brdas rnam par bžag pa’i mtshan ñid yin gyi / rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis rnam par gnas pa ni ma yin pas de’i phyir de ni mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid ces bya’o //* Tsoñ kha pa evidently shares this idea, for he forms the concept *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* to describe substantial existence on the basis of the three kinds of non-substantiality taught in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, as I have extensively discussed (cf., e.g., Yoshimizu 1993).

For the purpose of ruling out the possibility that the Mādhyamika could establish the non-origination from self as his own thesis, Žañ Thaṅ sag pa adverts in the last portion of his reply again to the logicians' thesis-definition and indicates that a genuine thesis establishes a probandum that has substantial reality, saying, "for a thesis intends a state of affairs (*don*, *artha*) as something to be proven." The condition that both the reason (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) in an inference must be a real state of affairs (*artha*), and not imagined, can be found in Dharmakīrti's PV 4.13 on Dignāga's PS 3.1ab (*parārthānumānaṃ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśanam*).⁴⁰ Žañ Thaṅ sag pa means that since non-origination is not such a real state of affairs nor is it substantially existent, it cannot be a genuine thesis. His argument ends with the emphasis that the Mādhyamika does not even intend the negation of origination as a probandum.

Interestingly, he confronts the same problem elsewhere, too, after the aforementioned statement [2].⁴¹ There he clarifies the value of the negation in Candrakīrti's system in contrast with that in the system of the three masters from the East (*śar gsum pa*). Replying to the objection that his statement [2] involves acceptance (*khas len*, *abhyupagama*) of reason, pervasion and the like,⁴² Žañ Thaṅ sag pa argues as follows:

⁴⁰ PS 3.1 (Tillemans 2000: 9): *parārthānumānaṃ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśanam / tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviśayo mataḥ ||* = (Tillemans tr.) "An inference-for-others, however, elucidates the state of affairs which [the proponent] has understood himself. There, the presentation of the inferendum is held to have the goal of the reason as its object." PV 4.13 (Tillemans 2000: 24f.): *tad arthagrahaṇaṃ śabdakalpanāropitātmanām / alīngatvaprāsiddhyartham arthād arthaprasiddhitaḥ ||* = (Tillemans tr.) "This word 'state of affairs' [in Dignāga's definition of an inference-for-others, i.e., *svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśana*] is designed to establish that things whose natures are verbally and conceptually superimposed are not [valid] reasons, for [one] state of affairs [viz., the *sādhya*] is established from [another] state of affairs [viz., the reason]." For further analysis of these verses, cf. Tillemans *ibid.*

⁴¹ See statement [2] cited above in n. 26 from *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 15a1f.

⁴² *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 15a2: *gal te dbu' ma pa khyed khas len*

[4] [Reply:] No, it doesn't. Whereas the three [texts of the masters from] the East [i.e., Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla] intend the negation (*bkag pa žig*) when they negate entities, having negated those entities which are [supposed to be] either one or many by [the argument] that they are neither one nor many (*gcig dañ du bral, ekānekaviyoga*), this Mādhyamika [i.e., Candrakīrti] does not intend even such a thing as the negation. Because [he] intends that it is nothing (*ci yañ ma yin*), he has no acceptance at all. Or alternatively [one could accept the negation but] by a mere acceptance [of the negation] there occurs no thesis. There would occur a thesis if one accepted [the negation] as what is to be proven (*sgrub bya, sādhyā*), but there is no [such] failure because the Mādhyamika does not accept [the negation] as what is to be proven.⁴³

Here Žañ Thañ sag pa draws the same conclusion as that in the aforementioned reply [3.2], that there is no thesis for the Mādhyamika because he does not accept any probandum, but from a slightly different observation. Describing Candrakīrti's intentions as "it is nothing" (*ci yañ ma yin*), Žañ Thañ sag pa seems to be resorting to the theory of "freedom from extremes" (*mtha' bral*) in terms of "neither existence nor non-existence" (*yod min med min*), ac-

med par 'dod kyañ khas len dañ bcas pa ñid de / rañ rgyud kyi he du brjod pa la rañ rgyud kyi sgrub bya mtshan ñid can yin pas khyab ces khyab bya khas blañs so // sgrub bya khas blañs pa med pa'i phyir ces he du khas blañs so // de'i phyir khas len can du 'gyur ro že na / = "[3] [Objection:] Although you Mādhyamikas assert to have no acceptance, [your statements] definitely involve an acceptance, for you accept the pervasion in saying, 'the formulation of an autonomous logical reason [i.e., an autonomous reasoning or inference] entails that the probandum of the autonomous inference has a [genuine] characteristic.' [And] you accept the reason in saying, 'because for him the asserted probandum does not exist.'"

⁴³ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 15a2f.: ma yin te śar gsum pa gcig dañ du bral gyis gcig dañ du ma'i dños po bkag nas dños po bkag pa'i bkag pa žig 'dod la / dbu ma pa 'di ni bkag pa de de lta bu yañ mi 'dod de / ci yañ ma yin par 'dod pas khas blañs gañ yañ med do // rnam pa gcig du na khas blañs pa tsam gyis dam bcar mi 'gyur te / sgrub byar khas blañs na dam bcar 'gro la / dbu' ma pas sgrub byar khas ma blañs pa'i phyir ñes pa med do //*

ording to which even the negation should be counted among what is to be abandoned.⁴⁴ And the non-acceptance of the negation as a probandum is Žañ Thaṅ sag pa's final argument to ensure the Mādhyamika's disowning of a thesis. He thereby completely differentiates Candrakīrti's system from that of those who intend a negative determination, such as the non-existence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), by means of an autonomous proof.⁴⁵

In this regard, it is significant that Žañ Thaṅ sag pa defines the nature of non-implicative negation (*med dgag, prasajyapraṭiṣedha*) specific to the Madhyamaka system and sets it apart from the traditional definition thereof, which both Buddhist logicians and their followers, viz., Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, are supposed to have acknowledged.⁴⁶ Žañ Thaṅ sag pa states as follows:

⁴⁴ As I have closely discussed, Žañ Thaṅ sag pa demonstrates this theory in his commentary on the 18th chapter of the *Prasannapadā* without mentioning the designations *mtha' bral* or *yod min med min*. See *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 74b6 (cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2005: 136): *theg pa gsum gyi rigs can ston' nīd kyi sa bon smin pa la bdag med pa dañ bdag bkag pa'i bkag pa yañ med ces so* // One should note that the logical rule of double negation, in the sense that the negation of the negation of a position affirms the position, is inapplicable to the theory of freedom from extremes. For the rule of double negation, cf., e.g., *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin) chapter 3 in the passage preceding the head of the Sanskrit fragment edited by Matsuda and Steinkellner (1991). See PVin chapter 3 D224b7, P323b4: *mthun pa'i phyogs ma yin pa nīd la med do zes bya bas ni 'di mthun pa'i phyogs la yod par brjod pa yin te / dgag pa gñis kyi* (emended : DP kyi) *rnal ma go ba'i phyr ro* / Manuscript A64a2: *asapakṣa eva nāstīti cāsyā sapakṣe 'stīto cyate, praṭiṣedhadvayena prakṛtagamanāt* / Cf. also *ibid.* D225a2, P323b6: *de dgag pa bkag pa'i ño bo ni sgrub pa'i rañ bzin yin pa'i phyr ro* // Manuscript A64a4, Matsuda and Steinkellner 1991: 142: *praṭiṣedhaniṣedhasya vidhānarūpatvāt* / I owe this information to Tom Tillemans and Pascale Hugon.

⁴⁵ The masters from the East maintain that the Mādhyamika establishes the negation of superimposed ultimate intrinsic natures. Cf., e.g., MĀ D179b5–180a2 cited and translated in Keira 2004: 31f.

⁴⁶ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 11a3: *sgra'i dbaṅ du byas na bya ba dañ 'brel ba don gyi dgag pa ston pa ste med dgag ste / dper na śid zan mi bza' ces pa ste bza' ces pa bya ba yin / de dañ dgag tshig mi gñis sbyar bas*

[5] The non-implicative negation (*med dgag*) by Buddhist logicians (*tshad ma pa*) is also regarded as implicative negation (*ma yin dgag*) from the Madhyamaka [viewpoint]. They implicitly intend the property of negation [or the property of being negated] (*dkag pa'i chos žig*) after negating the blue. Mādhyamikas do not even intend the negation, because [they] intend that it is nothing (*ci yañ ma yin*). [They] intend neither the collection of the property and the property-possessor (*chos dañ chos can gyi tshogs don*), nor the property-possessor, nor the single property to be proven (*sgrub bya'i chos*), [i.e.,] the non-existence of intrinsic nature (*rañ bžin med*).⁴⁷

In this way, Žañ Thañ sag pa throughout insists on negating the negation with regard to Mādhyamikas' negative statements.⁴⁸ Obviously, he opposes Candrakīrti's system to that of those adherents of logic who had been regarded as authentic Mādhyamikas in Tibet until Candrakīrti's works were introduced. In fact, Žañ

mi bza' ces so // des na śid zan za ba bkag pa tsam sgrub pas med dgag go / It also deserves attention that Žañ Thañ sag pa defines *med dgag* in general as the "establishment of mere negation [e.g.] of the eating of food offerings" (*śid zan za ba bkag pa tsam sgrub pa* 11a3). This interpretation is different from the well-known definition of *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* in *Tarkajvālā* (TJ) D59b5f.: *med par dgag pa ni dños po'i ño bo ñid tsam žig 'gog par zad kyī de dañ 'dra ba de ma yin pa gžan gyi dños pos grub par mi byed pa ste / dper na bram zas chañ btuñ bar mi bya'o žes bya ba de tsam žig 'gog par zad kyī de las gžan pa'i btuñ ba btuñ ño že'am mi btuñ ño žes mi brjod pa lta bu'o //* Cf. further Phya pa's definition cited below in n. 49. As for the two kinds of negations, viz., *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*, in the Indian Buddhist tradition, see, e.g., Kajiyama 1973.

⁴⁷ *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka* 11a4: *tshad ma pa'i med dgag kyañ dbu' ma pa la ltos nas ma yin dgag du 'gro ste / sñon po bkag nas bkag pa'i chos žig śul du 'dod pa'o // dbu' ma pa ni bkag pa yañ mi 'dod te / ci yañ ma yin par 'dod pa'i phyir ro // chos dañ chos can gyi tshogs don yañ mi 'dod [chos can yañ mi 'dod inserted] sgrub bya'i chos [rañ bžin med inserted] rkyañ pa yañ mi 'dod zer /*

⁴⁸ Cf. Nāgārjuna's statements in his VV 63 that he negates nothing and that there exists nothing to be negated. He also describes in VV 23 the nature of negative statements as an illusion which stops another illusion (cited and translated in Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 119f).

Thaṅ sag pa's contemporary Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) defines non-implicative negation (*med dgag*) in the system of the masters from the East as apprehending “sole negation” (i.e., *dgag pa 'ba' žig par blos žen par bya ba*).⁴⁹ It is further interesting to recall that Tsoṅ kha pa (1357–1419) expressly reiterates the view that non-implicative negation (*med dgag*) is an establishment of negation.⁵⁰ Now one can properly assume that Tsoṅ kha pa thereby tried to integrate the view of the masters from the East into Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka system. Go rams pa later made a sharp rejoinder to Tsoṅ kha pa, defending the theory of “neither existence nor non-existence.”⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Śar gsum stoṅ thun* 87,9f.: *sgrub pa 'ba' žig daṅ dgag sgrub tshogs pa ma yin dgag yin la dgag pa 'ba' žig pa myed dgag yin pas med dgag gi mtshan ṅid ni ldog pa de kha yar nes pa na dgag pa 'ba' žig par blos žen par bya ba yin la* / It is unclear whether Žañ Thaṅ sag pa and Phya pa actually knew each other.

⁵⁰ Cf., e.g., *rTsa še tik chen* 25a1ff.: *dam bca' bži med dgag tu bžed pa'i phyir raṅ bžin 'gog pa'i skabs thams cad du med dgag rtags kyi bsgrub byar bya'o // des na tshig gsal las / rjes su dpag pa dag ni gžan gyi dam bca' ba 'gog pa tsam gyi 'bras bu can yin pa'i phyir ro // zes gsuṅs pa yaṅ raṅ bžin yod pa rnam par bcad tsam žig sbyor ba rnam kyis sgrub kyi de las gžan pa'i chos gžan mi sgrub pa'i don yin pas raṅ bžin yod pa 'gog gi med pa mi sgrub ces pa min no* // Quoting this passage, Matsumoto (1997: 321f.) has described it as an “astonishing statement,” meaning that it is completely different from the thought of non-implicative negation introduced by Bhāviveka into the Madhyamaka tradition. The fact is, however, that Tsoṅ kha pa's statement shows full agreement with the interpretation which Žañ Thaṅ sag pa has ascribed to Buddhist logicians. Matsumoto has carefully compared Tsoṅ kha pa's view with Bhāviveka's concerning non-implicative negation and detailed the unique characteristics of Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka thought. It will become clear upon reading earlier Tibetan treatises to what extent Tsoṅ kha pa owes his thought to early masters.

⁵¹ Regarding the controversy between Tsoṅ kha pa and Go rams pa et al., cf., e.g., Matsumoto 1997: 288ff., Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 195–266, Cabezón 2003, Cabezón 2007, and Yoshimizu 2005: 137ff.

Concluding remarks

The problem of whether the Mādhyamika should propound theses of his own has developed in Tibet into the controversy as to whether the Mādhyamika should establish or adopt the negation of intrinsic nature as his own probandum. This controversy first took place between the followers of the Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśīla lineage of Madhyamaka and the followers of the newly introduced Madhyamaka of Candrakīrti (i.e., between the so-called Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika). Due to Tsoṅ kha pa's integration of the logical methods shared by the Buddhist logicians and Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśīla into Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka system, however, this debate shifted to a matter for dispute among the adherents of Candrakīrti in the dGe lugs and Sa skya schools. Considered from the historical perspective, one should review the value and the nature of the thesis for the Mādhyamika in wider scope, including the Buddhist logical tradition. The influence of the Madhyamaka thought of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, in particular, needs to be reexamined.

Bibliography

Primary literature

dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka: Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa 'Byuṅ gnas ye śes, dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka. Manuscript.

dBu ma'i spyi ston: Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ṅid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa ñes don rab gsal. In *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism*, 12, edited by bSod nams rgya mtsho, 348–451 (Ca 1–208a). Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1969.

CŚ: Āryadeva, *Catuhśataka*. V. Bhattacharya, editor. *The Catuhśataka of Āryadeva*. Calcutta: Viśva Bhāratī, 1931.

D: *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan 'gyur – preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima, editors. Tokyo, 1981–1984.

*LT: Dharma grags (Dharmakīrti), **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*. See Yonezawa 2004.

MA: Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvātāra*. See MABh.

- MABh: Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*. L. de La Vallée Poussin, editor. *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti: Traduction tibétaine*. St. Petersburg: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1907–1912.
- Mal: Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. D3884, P5284, Ichigō 1985.
- MAIv: Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*. D3885, P5285, Ichigō 1985.
- MĀ: Kamalaśīla, *Madhyamakāloka*. D3887, P5287.
- MMK: Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. J.W. de Jong, editor. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Center, 1977.
- NB: Dharmakīrti, *Nyāyabindu*. Paṇḍita Dalsukhbhai Malvania, editor. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa, Being a Sub-Commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971.
- NM: Dignāga, *Nyāyamukha*. Taishō 1628.
- P: *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition*. D.T. Suzuki, editor. Tokyo-Kyoto, 1955–1961.
- Pr LVP: Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*. L. de La Vallée Poussin, editor. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā*. St. Petersburg: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1903–1913; D4860, P5260.
- Prajp: Bhāviveka, *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. D3853, P5253.
- PS 3: Dignāga, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, chapter 3. See Kitagawa 1973.
- PV 4: Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, chapter 4. See Tillemans 2000.
- PVBh: Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*. R. Sāṅkrṭyāyana, editor. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya or Vārttikālaṃkāra of Prajñākaragupta*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
- PVin 3: Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, chapter 3. D4211, P5710.
- PVV: Manorathanandin. S.D. Shastri, editor. *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti. Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin*. Vanarasi: Bauddha Barati, 1968.
- Śar gsum stoñ thun: H. Tauscher, editor. *Phya pa Chos kyi señ ge, dBu ma śar gsum gyi stoñ thun*. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999.
- SNSū: *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. See Lamotte 1935.
- TJ: Bhāviveka, *Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti Tarkajvālā*. D3856, P5256.
- lTa ba'i śan 'byed*: Go rams pa bSod nams señ ge, *lTa ba'i śen 'byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer*. In *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism*, 13, edited by bSod nams rgya mtsho, 1–24 (Ca 1–47b). Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1969.
- rTsa še ũik chen*: Tsoñ kha pa Blo bzañ grags pa'i dpal, *rTsa še ũik chen. dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa ces bya ba'i rnam bśad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*. In *The Collected Works of Tsoñ kha pa Blo bzañ grags pa'i dpal*,

23 (bKra śis lhun po blocks), 1–566 (Ba 1–283b). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975.

VV: Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. E.H. Johnston & A. Kunst, editors. *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna. Vigrahavyāvartanī*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.

Secondary literature

Cabezón, José Ignacio, 2003. “Two Views on the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction in Fourteenth-Century Tibet.” In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction – What Difference Does a Difference Make?* edited by G.B.J. Dreyfus & S.L. McClintock, 289–315. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Cabezón, José Ignacio and Geshe Lobsang Dargyay, 2007. *Freedom from Extremes – Gorampa’s “Distinguishing the Views” and the Polemics of Emptiness*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Chos ’phel, 2004. *lHa sa sa khul gyi gnas yig. Gañs can bod kyi gnas bśad lam yig gsar ma 2*. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khañ.

Ichigō, Masamichi, 1985. *Madhyamakālamkāra of Śāntarakṣita – With His Own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*. Kyoto: Buneido.

Iuchi, Maho, 2007. *Kōdenki no Tibet Bukkyō Sekai – bKa’ gdams pa wo chūshin to shite (Tibetan Buddhist Universe in the phyi dar Period, Centering on bKa’ gdams pa)*. Dissertation, Otani University.

Kajiyama, Yūichi, 1973. “Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy.” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie* 17: 161–175.

Keira, Ryūsei, 2004. *Mādhyamika and Epistemology. A Study of Kamalaśīla’s Method for Proving the Voidness of All Dharmas*. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.

Kitagawa, Hidenori, 1973. *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū, Jinna (Dignāga) no taikai (Study of Indian Classical Logic, System of Dignāga)*. Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan.

Lamotte, Étienne, ed., 1935. *L’Explication des Mystères*. Louvain: Université de Louvain.

MacDonald, Anne, 2003. “Interpreting *Prasannapadā* 19.3–7 in Context – A Response to Claus Oetke.” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für die Indische Philosophie* 47: 143–195.

Matsuda, Kazunobu, and Steinkellner, Ernst, 1991. “The Sanskrit Manuscript of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für die Indische Philosophie* 35: 139–149.

- Matsumoto, Shirō, 1999. *Tibet bukkyō tetsugaku (Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy)*. Tokyo: Daizō-shuppan.
- Ono, Motoi, 1986. “Dharmakīrti ni okeru shuchōmeidai no teigi ni tsuite” (“On the Definition of *Pakṣa* as Amended by Dharmakīrti”). *Indogaku-Bukkyōgaku-Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies)* 34/2: (109)–(112).
- Śes gñen skhurim, 2001. *IHa sa'i dgon tho*. Lhasa: Bod ljoñs mi dmañ dpe skrun khañ.
- Seyfort Ruegg, David, 2000. *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part 1*. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
- Tillemans, Tom J.F., 2000. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (parārthānumāna). Vol. 1 (k. 1–148)*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Yonezawa, Yoshiyasu, 2004. “**Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*, Sanskrit Notes on the *Prasannapadā* (1).” *Naritasan bukkyō kenkyūsho kiyō (Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies)* 27: 115–154.
- Yoshimizu, Chizuko, 1993. “On *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa III* – Introduction and Section I.” *Naritasan bukkyō kenkyūsho kiyō (Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies)* 16: 91–147.
- 1996. *Die Erkenntnislehre des Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka*. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
- 2003. “Tsong kha pa’s Reevaluation of Candrakīrti’s Criticism of Autonomous Inference.” In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction – What Difference Does a Difference Make?* edited by G.B.J. Dreyfus & S.L. McClintock, 257–288. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- 2005. “A Tibetan Text from the Twelfth Century Unknown to Later Tibetans.” *Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie* 15: 125–163.
- 2006. “Indo-Tibet Chūgan-shisō-shi no saikouchiku ni mukete” (“Toward Reconstructing the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought – The Launch of the Study of *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka I*”). *Tetsugaku-shisō ronshū (Studies in Philosophy)* 32 (Tsukuba University): 73–114.
- 2008. “Zhang Thang sag pa’s Reevaluation of Buddhapālita’s Statement of Consequence (*prasaṅga*).” *Tetsugaku-shisō ronshū (Studies in Philosophy)* 34 (Tsukuba University): 81–99.
- Yotsuya, Kodō, 1999. *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong kha pa*. Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 8. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

