Local Government Responsiveness in Indonesia after Decentralization: Examining Elite Initiatives and Citizen Participation

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ABSTRACT

In the evaluations of the quality of democracy in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, many studies have emphasized the unchanged composition of political power elites and those elites' persistent practice of exploiting the state resources. They argue democratic institutional changes have been superficial and only beneficial to the elites. Challenging these arguments, this thesis offers more nuanced picture of Indonesian democracy by indicating that Indonesian elites are increasingly accommodating the demands of non-elites. It studies the emergence of performance-oriented local leaders at the provincial level, examining two cases of such local leaders in West Sumatra and South Sumatra Province. While examining these elite initiatives, this thesis also studies the efforts of actors in civil society in bringing changes of local governance in order to develop an understanding of a whole picture of Indonesian democracy. It seeks to find the increasing influence of civil society groups by examining two reputed cases. One is a successful local anti-corruption movement. Another is reputed participatory budget planning at one district.

This research uses the framework which has been developed in clientelism studies of comparative politics. With narrow definition of patronage network, this dissertation argues, gubernatorial candidates have been becoming less dependent on patronage networks as far as vote mobilization is concerned. Competition among local elites has been intensified by the introduction of direct local government head election. In such situation, some local leaders adapt a new strategy to ally with non-elites for winning out. They have implemented the policies clearly targeted to non-elites such as providing free education and free healthcare program for all residents, and improving transparency and effectiveness of government administration.

However such signs of a shift have limitations. With many constraints on the citizens' options of collective actions beyond voting, the influence of actors in civil society has yet been weak. Informational asymmetries between local elites and citizens have been increasingly salient and constraint severely the public's ability to put pressure on local governments. Collusive relationships between elites and local media are being consolidated. In addition, local governments and parliaments have prevented any details of key discussions from leaking to the public, while ostensibly following the procedures of information disclosure.

The main conclusions drawn from this research are that while elites nurtured during the Suharto era remain in power, and civil society groups have not yet increased their influence, a departure from the entrenched political patterns still occurs in some regions. Such changes are not caused with the replacement of vested interests with new ones but by ambitious elites' new strategies to join hands with non-elites by promising and implementing the policies which accommodated the latter's interests.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

List of Abbreviations

APBD	*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* (Regional Government Budget)
APBD-P	*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah Perubahan* (Revised Regional Government Budget)
APPI	*Aliansi Pendorong Pakta Integritas* (Alliance for Supporting the Integrity Pact)
Askeskin	*Asuransi Kesehatan untuk Masyarakat Miskin* (Health Insurance for the Poor)
AUSAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BAPPEDA	*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (Regional Development Planning Board)
BKMT	*Badan Kontak Majelis Ta'lim* (Recitation Group Contact Board)
BOS	*Bantuan Operasional Sekolah* (School Operational Assistance Grant)
BOSDA	*Bantuan Operasional Sekolah Daerah* (Regional School Operational Assistance Grant)
BPS	*Badan Pusat Statistik* (Statics Indonesia)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAU	*Dana Alokasi Umum* (General Allocation Fund)
DPR	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (National Parliament)
DPRD	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* (Local Parliament)
FPSB	*Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat* (Concerned Forum of West Sumatra)
Gapensi	*Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi National Indonesia* (Indonesian National Contractors' Association)
GTZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (German Agency for Technical Co-operation)
Golkar	*Partai Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups Party)
GR	Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*)
HMI	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (Islamic University Students Association)
ICMI	*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Muslim ntellectuals)
ILGR	Initiative for Local Governance Reform (in Indonesian Language, *Program Prakarsa Pembaruan Tata Pemerintah Daerah* or P2TBD)
Jamkesda	*Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah* (Regional Health Insurance for the Community)
Jamkesmas	*Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat* (Health Insurance for the Community)
Jampidsus	*Jaksa Agung Muda Pidana Khusus* (Junior Attorney for Specific Crime)
KAMI	*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Indonesian Students Action Front)
KPK	*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* (Corruption Eradication Commission)
KPU	*Komisi Pemilih Umum* (General Election Commission)
KUA	Kebijakan Umum Anggaran (General Budget Policy)
LBH-Padang	*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Padang* (Padang's branch of the Legal Aid Foundation)
LKAAM	*Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau* (Body for Minangkabau Customary Law)

LPJ-AMJ	*Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban Akhir Masa Jabatan* (End-of-Term Accountability Report)
LPPI	*Lembaga Pengawas dan Pengaduan Independen* (Independent Observer and Advisory Board)
LSI	*Lembaga Survei Indonesia* (Indonesian Survey Agency)
MenPAN	*Kementrian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara* (State Ministry for State Apparatus Reform)
MMI	*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Warrior's Council)
MUBA	Musi Banyuasin District
MUI	*Majlis Ulama Indonesia* (Counsil of Indonesian Ulama)
Musrenbang	*Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan*（Development Planning Meeting）
OKU	Ogan Komering Ulu District
P5D	*Pedoman Penyusunan Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan di Daerah* (Guideline for the Preparation, Planning and Control of Development at the Regional Level)
PAD	*Pendapatan Asli Daerah* (Regional Own Revenue)
PAN	*Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party)
Partnership	Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia
PBB	*Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Monn and Star Party)
PBR	*Partai Bintang Reformasi* (Star Reformist Party)
PBET	Participatory Budgeting and Expenditure Tracking
Perda	*Peraturan Daerah* (Local Regulation)
PD	*Partai Demokrat* (Democratic Party)
PDIP	*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PKS	*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party)
PPAS	*Prioritas Plafon Anggaran Sementara* (Budget Ceilings of Work Units)
PPP	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party)
Puskesmas	*Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat* (Community Health Clinic)
R-APBD	Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Draft of Regional Government Budget)
Renja-SKPD	*Rencana Kerja Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah* (Annual Plan of Regional Sectoral Work Unitl)
RKA	*Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran* (Work Plan and Budget)
RKPD	*Rencana Kerja Pembangunan Daerah* (Annual Local Government Work Plan)
RSBI	*Rintisan Sekolah Bertaraf International* (Pioneering International Standard School)
Sespri	*Sekretaris privadi* (Personal Secretary)
SBI	*Sekolah Bertaraf International* (Iinternational Standard School)
SKPD	*Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah* (Regional Sectoral Work Unitl）

SPPD	*Surat Perintah Perjalanan Dina*s (Letter of Travel Requisition)
SSN	*Sekolah Standar Nasional* (National Standard School)
TII	*Transparansi Internasional Indonesia* (Transparency International Indonesia)
UMMY	*Universitas Mahaputra Muhammad Yamin* (University of Mahaputra Muhammad Yamin)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
YLBHI	*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia* (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)

Note on Indonesian Names

There are two elements for a non-specialist reader to get confused on the use of Indonesian names. First is regarding spelling. Indonesian spelling has undergone several reforms since independence, which have not entirely taken hold. As far as personal names are concerned, various spellings are still in common use. Therefore, Suharto and Soeharto refer to the same person, though Suharto is the post-reform spelling. This dissertation uses the contemporary spellings where possible. But if a person is consistently referred to by a name spelled in the older manner, this study also follows the use of the old spelling.

Second is regarding the custom of addressing names. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon custom, in Indonesia it is most usual to use title plus the name that comes first for formal address. For example, in case of Gamawan Fauzi, he is commonly addressed "*Pak* (Mr.) Gamawan," not "Pak (Mr.) Fauzi" on formal occasions. As with many academic studies, this dissertation also follows this custom.

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Aims and Objectives

This dissertation examines the responsiveness of local governments to citizens' demands in Indonesia after the end of the authoritarian rule of President Suharto in 1998. In this study, responsiveness is judged by whether local governments implement programs which the majority of residents would prefer. It investigates whether local governments have unequally and unfairly catered to the wishes of some vested interests as many studies indicate, or they have rather responded to the demands of a larger and more heterogeneous electorate. Assuming that citizens' participation is a crucial factor for increasing responsiveness of local government, this dissertation examines various modes of citizens' participation to articulate demands and put pressure on local governments. Among various citizens' political actions, this thesis studies three modes of participation. One is voting, the most conventional mode of participation. The other two are raising voices and engaging in budget planning, both of which are crucially important modes of citizens' political actions during the time between elections. In this way, this thesis examines whether Indonesian citizens, through various modes of participation, have increased influence over local governments and made them responsive to their demands after democratization and decentralization.

As a consequence of studying local governments, this thesis also discusses impacts of decentralization, which Indonesian government has pursued since 2001. In light of the presumable close connection between decentralization and participation, this thesis examines whether decentralization has increased effectiveness of three modes of citizen's participation (voting, raising voices, and engaging in budget planning) in articulating their demands and putting pressure on local governments. One of the key assumptions of the proponents of

decentralization is that citizens can get better information about local government performance than about central government performance. Therefore, as one of the key attention-focusing points, this thesis studies citizen's access to information of local government policies when they vote, raise their voices and engage in participatory budget planning.

Suharto's fall in May 1998 ushered in dramatic institutional changes in almost all areas. To name a few key changes, Indonesia held a fair election for the first time since 1955, reducing military role in administration and politics, and allowing press freedom. Besides these, importantly for this thesis, Indonesia embarked on a drastic decentralization program, which a World Bank report described as "Big Bang" (World Bank 2003). However, despite of these institutional changes, leading scholars in the field of Indonesian politics have indicated the continuing features from the authoritarian regime and emphasized the deficiencies of this newly-fledged democratic system. Particularly after the euphoria of democratization subsided in both the academic community and the local media, a significant number of studies have given gloomy evaluations in regards to the quality of democracy in Indonesia. Using various analytical concepts such as "oligarchy" (Richard and Hadiz 2004), "party cartel" (Slater 2004), "patrimonialism" (Webber 2006) and "shadow state" (Shulte-Nordholt 2003), "patronage democracy" (Klinken 2009), they especially emphasized the aspect of elite dominance in the Post-Suharto Indonesia

The major objective of this dissertation is to challenge these current prevailing arguments stressing persistent elite dominance and to offer a new perspective to prompt a rethink of the evaluation of Indonesian democracy by indicating the changing relationship between elites and citizens. What these elite-dominance arguments emphasized consisted mainly of three features: first, unchanged composition of elites, second, elites' practice of exploiting the state resources to deliver benefits to their cronies, and third, fragmented and

vulnerable civil society force.

Out of these three features emphasized by the previous literatures, this thesis reviews the last two aspects. First, through empirical studies of two provinces in Sumatra Island, Indonesia, this thesis argues that at least in the two regions concerned, local politicians (and governments) are increasingly responding to the needs of a larger and heterogeneous electorate, rather than just exploiting the state resources for their cronies and themselves. This thesis labels these local politicians as the performance-oriented type of local leaders, which should be distinguished from the conventional one.

Second, this thesis seeks to find out that civil society force has increased its influence through various actions beyond elections by examining two reputed cases which are likely to show such increase. It studies a well-known citizen movement against corruption in local Indonesia and the reputed participatory planning process in the district which many donor agency programs had assisted to improve its implementation. Actually this second goal is not achieved, since even in these two reputed cases civil society force have not yet increased its influence. Therefore, instead of refuting the arguments of vulnerable civil society, this thesis advances our understanding on what factors constraints citizens to put pressure on local governments.

1.2 Increasing Government Responsiveness

1.2.1 Definition of Responsiveness

Responsiveness of the government has been one of the key issues in the evaluation of the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005). As Robert Dahl claims, “continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens is a key characteristic of democracy” (Dahl 1971, 1). This thesis shows that this key aspect is gradually improving in Indonesia, though changes are yet sporadic

While there are various definitions on responsiveness, a leading scholar in the field of comparative politics, Susan Stokes's definition fits to this study. She defines as follows: Governments are considered to be responsive "when they take the same actions that a hypothetical assembly of citizens would take by majority vote if the assembly had the same information the government has" (Stokes 1997, 210). To make it simpler, in this study, responsiveness is judged by whether government takes actions which the majority of residents would prefer.

Meanwhile, Stokes characterizes "unresponsiveness" simply as actions to "pursue rents rather than public welfare" (Stokes 1997, 216). To put it another way, government take unresponsive actions at the cost of policies the residents want. Those include, e.g. skimming money for private use, enjoying the excessive perquisites of office, and shirking. In a typical scenario, "if the politician needs money to finance campaigns and private interests provide the money at the price of policy concessions that are costly to voters" (Stokes 1997, 216), politicians will act unresponsively. Thus, it goes without saying that the practice of exploiting the state resources for personal ends, which many studies of Indonesian politics indicate as a feature of Indonesian democracy, is considered as an unresponsive conduct.

1.2.2 Participation and Responsiveness

In political studies, few would disagree that participation is a crucial condition to increase government responsiveness. As Verba and Nie claim, "Responsiveness is what democracy is supposed to be about and, more specifically, is what participation is supposed to increase" (Verba and Nie 1972, 300). Among various modes of participation, scholarly attentions have been concentrated on voting (Powell 2000, Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). As one study describes, "researchers have tended to equate participation with voting" (Kuklinski and Stanga 1979, 1090).

However, elections are not the only instrument that most citizens have at their disposal. As Cleary argues, responsiveness also depends on "a citizenry's ability to articulate demands and pressure government through a wide range of political actions beyond voting" (Cleary 2007, 284), such as staging a demonstration, lobbying, and participating in public forum. While some scholars view these participatory strategies as just complementary to voting, others see them have much more influence. Kuklinski and Stanga argues that whereas elections only apply diffuse pressure "without specifying how leaders should respond", "citizen communication of preferences" through various modes of participation between elections provides 'relatively precise guidelines within which officials are to make policy decisions" (Kuklinski and Stanga 1979, 1090).

These discussions fall into line with Diamond and Morlino's standard argument. They indicate political competition and participation are two crucial conditions for increased responsiveness. Participation here means not just voting. While emphasizing on the importance of genuinely competitive elections, they argues that the underlying dynamics of increasing responsiveness is in the citizens' participation beyond elections. "A well-established, independent, informed and engaged civil society" is essential for articulating and aggregating citizen interests and demands (Diamond and Morlino 2005, 30).

Therefore this study assumes voting and other modes of participation are equally important mechanism to facilitate responsive governance. With the latter's modes of participation, this thesis identifies the two most crucial aspects which has attracted scholarly attentions. One is activities of raising their voices practiced by civil society organizations (hereafter referred to as CSO) on local governments, and the second is activities of engaging in budget planning.

In this way, this thesis accommodates three modes of participation into analysis. Chapters Four and Five examine whether election mechanism (citizens' voting) facilitate for

increased responsiveness, while Chapters Six and Seven examine citizen's ability to convey their preferences to local government through various actions beyond elections. Chapter Six studies citizen's political action of raising their voices, while Chapter Seven examines the participatory planning. The following part of this section discusses the mechanism of three modes of participation, one by one, to induce government responsiveness.

a. Debate on Citizens' Voting and Government Responsiveness

In theory, in elections, the performance of the incumbent is reviewed and evaluated, and the voters either reward the incumbents by voting for them or punish them by voting for opponents. Thereby, elections are supposed to induce elected officials to implement policies that the voters want. The anticipation of not being reelected in the future leads elected officials not to shirk their responsibilities to the electorates in the present (Diamond and Morlino 2005, Fearson 1999)

In this electoral mechanism, many scholars including Diamond and Morlino argue that, "competitiveness" is essential element to function as an incentive for politicians to be responsive (Diamond and Morlino 2005). In competitive elections, political rivals are supposed to offer programmatic alternatives to the voters and the incumbents face a credible threat of electoral punishment. Analyzing the members of the House of Representatives in the United States, Griffin argues that "elected officials who represent more competitive districts are more responsive to their constituents' preferences" (Griffin 2006, 911). It is also supposed to be applicable to the direct elections of the local government heads.

However, some argue that in many cases, elections do not function as a sanctioning device to induce politicians to be responsive (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). Voters put a diversity of opinions and evaluations into a single ballot; therefore it can signal only ambiguous preferences to individual office holders (Ackerman 2004). For Fearson, there are

two principal mechanisms in elections, which inevitably interact but should be considered as different. One is for sanctioning for the incumbents and the second is for selecting "good types" who are principled and competent. And he argues that in fact voters do not think retrospectively about the performance of the incumbent, but think about elections much more as "opportunities to select good types" than as "sanctions to deter shirking by future incumbents" (Fearson 1999, 82). He suggests using the vote for two purposes (of sanctioning a bad one and choosing a good type) weaken the power of incentives for the incumbent government to perform well.[1]

While confirming with such uncertain mechanism of elections, this study argues, though it will be unlikely to prevail over Indonesia, in some regions, competitive elections indeed induce politicians to respond to the demands of some majority. After the introduction of direct local government head elections, competition among local politicians has become increasingly intensive, thereby made a threat of electoral punishment more credible for the incumbents.

b. Debate on Citizens' Raising Voices and Government Responsiveness

According to Sammuel Paul's study, at least four barriers may exist in the mechanism of raising voices to induce local governments to be responsive. First, "its laws and legal and institutional systems" may constrain these actions. Second, "informational asymmetries" can be a severe constraint. Third, the officials may take a cooptation strategy by providing better quality services to some, while excluding others in the process. Fourth, "lack of income, education and related attributes of the public" may limit its interest in the CSOs' activities

[1] Though Fearson also posits that if voters determine to focus on one of the two purposes, selecting a good one or sanctioning a bad one, rather than use the vote for two purposes, it is likely to increased accountability (Fearson 1999: 83).

(Paul 1991, 80).

c. Debate on Participatory Planning and Government Responsiveness

As to participatory planning, many academics and practitioners in the field of international development claim that it is crucial for increasing the responsiveness of governments (Manor 1999, Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist 2004, Ackerman 2004). However, while many countries have implemented various measures to attribute an important role to citizen engagement in the decision-making processes of the state and local governments, meaningful participation is yet rarely found (Speer 2012). As Yan and Callahan describes, “many public officials are reluctant to include citizens in decision making, or if they do, they typically involve citizens after the issues have been framed and decisions have been made” (Yan and Callahan 2007, 249). Therefore, in many cases, efforts for participatory planning are just shallow.

Thus, there are many constraints and uncertainties on the effectiveness of all the three modes of participation (voting, raising voices, and engaging in budget planning) in inducing governments to be responsive. This thesis examines these three modes of participation at the local level. As Indonesia embarked on a drastic decentralization project in 2001, it is inevitable to discuss on decentralization. The following section discusses the impacts of decentralization on these three modes of participation.

1.3 Decentralization and Participation

Though there are a number of definitions and categories of decentralization, this dissertation primarily discusses political decentralization, following one of the standard classifications. Hence references in this dissertation to 'decentralization' should be understood

as referring to political decentralization unless otherwise specified. In the understanding of this key term, this thesis owes to Agrawal and Ribot's differentiation between political and administrative decentralization. According to them, administrative decentralization is to occur when powers are devolved to appointees of the central government, while 'political decentralization' is to occur when powers are devolved to those elected by residents directly or representatives of residents of that government's jurisdiction, independent of higher-level governments (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Definitely, Indonesia took large steps toward political decentralization in 2001, accompanied by devolution of financial resources.

In political studies, decentralization has been discussed in close association with participation, and hence with government responsiveness. In various ways, decentralization is expected to increase effectiveness of citizen's participation in influencing policies of local governments. One of the important expectations of political decentralization is that it will increase citizens' participation and cultivate democratic values at the local level. The argument has been common in political science since it comes from classical democratic political thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill (Treisman 2007, 156-163). In the recent studies, a leading scholar on democracy, Larry Diamond argues that "local governments are particularly suited for giving citizens the opportunity to internalize democratic norms and practices because of its lower barriers to participation than at the national level" (Diamond 1999, 124).

However, using public choice theory, some question these arguments. Among these, the most critical arguments are from "elite capture" theory. They argue that there are more opportunities for rent-seeking at the local level because local politicians and bureaucrats are likely to be more subject to the pressing demands of local interest groups. In developing countries, in which the mechanisms of monitoring of public bureaucrats are much weaker, there is a tendency for the local elites to "capture" local governments and direct resources to

meet its own narrow interests rather than those of the mass of the local populace (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000).

In the same vein, Daniel Triesman posits that whether citizens' participation in governments cultivates civic virtue or corruption depends on preexisting practice in that government. Then he argues:

> ---in settings in which most citizens are already virtuous, local government service may help train and indoctrinate new generations---at least a few members of them. In States where corruption is common and politics unruly, giving power to local governments will probably just spread these vices to other levels. Within limits and in particular countries, decentralization may cultivate desirable qualities. But we should not assume this will generally be true (Triesman 2007, 164).

These arguments are bolstered by some empirical studies. Using the firm-level surveys in 67 countries, Fan, Lin and Trisman argues decentralization actually facilitates the spread of corruption. They conclude that "in countries with a larger number of administrative or governmental tiers, reported bribery was both more frequent and more costly to firms" (Fan, Lin and Trisman 2009, 32). The spread of corruption after decentralization has been also confirmed by many researchers of area studies and local media in developing countries. In the context of Indonesia, local media and Indonesian researchers frequently laments that decentralization has just facilitated the emergence of local bosses (*raja-raja kecil*) to exploit state resources for their own personal ends, mostly without being charged for corruption.

Considering such situation, even a proponent of decentralization, Diamond wisely has some reservations and reminds us the similar arguments of Triesman. His reservations are as follows:

> The decentralization of political and economic authority may also exacerbate clientelism at the local level. Where hierarchical chains of particularistic, patron-client relations are already the dominant mode of politics, shifting discretionary financial authority from the central to the local level may simply shift the locus of clientelism and corruption from the central to the local arena,---(Diamond 1999, 133-134)

In this way, Diamond indicates the possibility that decentralization may exacerbate the preexisting "patron-client" relations. It is exactly in the same line with many literatures on Indonesian politics, which is discussed later in Chapter Two.

In short, the relationship between decentralization and government responsiveness is ambiguous in the theoretical literature as well as the empirical study. Importantly for this thesis, such differing views on the impacts of decentralization are particularly found in the theoretical and empirical study on the relationship between decentralization and participation, whether decentralization stimulates citizen's participation and, as a consequence, it increased influence of citizens vis-a-vis local governments. As discussed earlier, there are various modes of participation (e.g. voting, raising voices and engaging in budget planning) to increase responsiveness of local governments and each mode has different mechanism. Thus, the next section examines the correlations between decentralization and effectiveness of the three modes of participation, one by one.

1.3.1 Voting in Local Elections

Regarding participation as a mode of voting, there are primarily two reasons that holding elections at the local level might increase the responsiveness of government. First, voters might get better information about local than about central government performance.[2]

[2] Some empirical studies support this assertion. Using the opinion surveys in central and East European countries, Rose et al. indicate that respondents in smaller localities were more likely than

Second, smaller number of electorates might more easily coordinate their voting strategies to sanction the incumbent (Seabright 1996, Treisman 2007).

In the first assumption, it is only likely if the local unit is minuscule. But most real political units are large enough that voters might get confused on the various evaluations of local government performance. The local units this dissertation deals with are categorized in the latter group, and the size of localities requires systemic monitoring for gaining accurate information. Indeed, Chapters Four and Five in this dissertation illustrate that electorates do not seem to have accurate information about local government performance. Local media are not able to conduct systemic monitoring on it.

Besides, what makes information on local government performance more complicated is unclear division of responsibilities among several tiers of governments. Without doubt, it confuses voters on to which tier of government credits of good performance should be attributed. In many cases, local governments are assigned joint responsibility with the central government in many different policy areas. As Chapter Four exactly shows that each government at all the three administrative levels (the national, provincial and district) makes their own measures in policy areas of health care and education.[3] Given that all of the governments at different levels have some discretion to make their own measures in various policy areas (e.g. education and healthcare) and, as a consequence, each has incentive to claim their credits, it is not surprising that such situation muddles the attribution of credits or blames.

As to the coordination advantage of smaller size of electorate, the problem that voters

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respondents in large cities to be knowledgeable about local politics (Rose et al. 1996, quoted in Diamond 1999, 127).

[3] District governments' as the author uses that term here, refers to both governments of *kabupaten* (generally translated as district or regency) and governments of *kotamadya* (generally translated as city or municipality). Hence references in this dissertation to 'districts' should be understood as referring to both *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* unless otherwise specified.

must put a diversity of opinions into a single ballot, discussed in the previous section, still exists even in elections at the local level, and may undermine this advantage. Whether in elections at the local level or the national level, the voters face difficulty to coordinate over which issues they are focusing on. While governments make thousands of decisions that affect individual life, voters only have one vote to control these things (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999; Ackerman 2004).

Thus, in the theoretical literature, there is no consensus on whether decentralization will increase the effectiveness of voting in inducing government responsiveness. However, many empirical studies showed some positive aspects which electoral competition may facilitate. For Instance, analyzing the municipal elections in Mexico, Rodríguez indicates that these elections have "already begun to induce all parties in government to perform better" (Rodríguez 1998, 164). In the seminal literature on decentralization and local governance, Grindle posits that though increased political competition does not necessarily improve municipal performance, such competition is still an important condition that facilitates changes in how municipal business is done. Increased inter- and intra-party competition expands the possibilities for bringing alternative leadership to local government. Though this alternative leadership is not always better than the old one, opportunities are opened up for the public officials "committed to improving the performance of local government" (Grindle 2007, 170). Thus, it suggests that the impact of political competition on government responsiveness varies in countries and regions, but it at least opens up the possibilities to induce some local politicians to be responsive in some regions. In this sense, political competition is still key aspect to see change in government responsiveness.

Actually, there is another mechanism that local elections may facilitate for increased responsiveness of government. Local elections at several tiers of government may stimulate the ambition of local politicians to run for increasingly powerful positions. In many cases,

politicians use local government head position as a springboard to higher offices. Such career incentives may motivate them to behave responsively in order to acquire a good reputation, which becomes a precious asset to run for a different elective office in the future (Myerson 2006, Cleary 2007, Triesman 2007). It can be assumed that the incentives to build a reputation are much higher when local officeholders are given wide-ranging responsibilities in a decentralized system.

Obviously this mechanism also faces the similar constraints and problems which are discussed above. Unclear attribution of credits or blames among several tiers of government may undermine the incentives of local politicians to respond to the demands of residents. The problem of coordinating voting strategies also exists, therefore there is no guarantee that local politicians with a good reputation will always win. Besides there is also a possibility that such good reputation might be somewhat exaggerated and misleading.

Though there might be many constraints on this mechanism, this study still sees it as a key aspect to see a shift in government responsiveness in Indonesia. Indeed, these career incentives seem to start functioning. But this aspect has been rarely discussed in Indonesian studies. Chapters Four and Five in this dissertation will highlight this mechanism by examining the career trajectory of two local politicians. Both ascended from the position of the district head to higher powerful positions.

In short, there are mainly two key assumptions of local elections to induce elites to respond to citizen's votes. First, whether voters can get better information about local than about central government performance. Second, whether holding local elections increased career incentives for local politicians to achieve good performance.

1.3.2 Raising Voices at the Local Level

Regarding citizen participation as a mode of raising voices through actions and media,

many claims that decentralization has “great potential to stimulate the growth of civil society organizations and networks” (Manor 1999). It is the arena of local and community life that offers the greatest scope for independent organizations to form and influence policy’ (Diamond 1999, 124). As Putnam’s evidence suggests, these horizontal networks and active involvement in civil society organizations induce local government to perform well (Putnam 1993).

However, as Triesman argues, “because more is usually at stake at the central level”, “the media and watchdog groups are more active in monitoring the central than local governance” (Triesman 2007, 166). Issues of the central government have a larger readership and it helps to find financial resources for monitoring activities. For the researchers on politics in developing countries, Triesman’s argument makes more sense. In Indonesia, the members of CSOs in Jakarta are much more skilled and professional to monitor governments than those of CSOs at the local level. These Jakarta-based CSOs mostly monitor the central government, and some of them easily find various financial resources such as donor agencies and fees of TV appearance. On the other hand, most of the local CSOs face difficulty to find financial resources to continue their activities. Given the ambiguous attribution of credits among governments, gaining accurate information on local governance requires systemic monitoring. However, in many cases, local CSOs cannot fulfill that role.

In this dissertation, Chapter Six will see this aspect, whether decentralization has provided scope for CSOs to influence policies of local governments.

1.3.3. Engaging in Budget Planning at the Local Level

A number of advocates of decentralization actively promote various participatory governance mechanisms in which citizens interact with government officials and convey their

preferences on the programs of local governments.[4] Needless to say, for these advocators, it is primarily the local arena that participatory governance mechanisms work well (Blair 2000, Manor 1999).[5] For example, in their assumption, local governments are supposed to hold more public meetings than a central government. Thus, decentralization is assumed to draw increasing numbers of people and groups into active engagement with the local governments.

Among various participatory governance mechanisms, participatory budget planning has been always the center of the scholarly and practitioner's attention. The increased attention on this mechanism has made a moderate-scale city in Brazil, Porto Alegre become one of the famous cities in the world. The participatory budgeting of this city, which started in 1989, has been frequently lauded as a model that local governments in other developing countries should emulate (Santos 1998, Waglè and Shah 2003, Goldfrank 2007). The initiative of Kerala in India is also often heard as a good model (Evans 2004, Heller 2001).

In line with these proponents, several studies find positive findings to show that participatory budgeting at the local level induces increased government responsiveness. Using the database of Brazil's 220 largest cities, Boulding and Wampler find that municipalities that adopt participatory budgeting spend a significantly higher share of their budget on health and education, though this shift in budget priorities has not yet led to the points of showing 'dramatic improvements in social well-being (Boulding and Wampler 2009, 133).' Analyzing cases in rural Guatemala, Speer also showed that participatory planning has increased local government spending for the poor when it is combined with competitive

[4] For example, Manor promotes 'participatory rural appraisal techniques,' public meetings to hear the appraisals from dwellers on a project (Manor 1999, 78).

[5] But Andersson and Learhoven questions the assumptions that participatory governance would be an automatic consequence of decentralization policies. They argue that 'higher occurrence of civic engagement in municipal affairs in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico is not necessarily a result of the national decentralization policy (Andersson and Learhoven 2007, 1107).'

elections.

However, there are also many studies which arrive at an opposite conclusion to these studies above. Analyzing Ireland case, a better known case of direct participation, Bräutigam find that the consultations and negotiations in the process of budget planning are much more one-sided; and they have not yet brought benefits to the poor (Bräutigam 2004, 663).[6] Similarly, Francis and James found that rhetoric and procedures exist for the promotion and realization of participatory planning in Uganda, but the resources that the participatory process can actually control are minimal. Thus, they are "reduced to a ritualized performance with little meaningful citizen involvement" (Francis and James 2003, 326).

In the case of Indonesia, the central government also actively encouraged local governments to implement participatory budgeting with the changes of several institutional designs after the onset of decentralization in 2001. However, as Chapter Seven of this dissertation shows later, the process of participatory budgeting are full of rhetoric rather than meaningful citizen involvement. In this sense, the situation of participatory planning in Indonesia is similar to the Francis and James's (2003) Uganda case and Bräutigam's (2004) Ireland case.

Thus, even in a decentralized system, there are many constraints and uncertainties on the effectiveness of all the three modes of participation in inducing governments to be responsive. The causal association between decentralization and increased citizen participation is ambiguous in the theoretical literature as well as the empirical study. Taking that into consideration, this thesis sees whether decentralization has led to increased responsiveness of local governments in Indonesia.

[6] In the same article, Bräutigam analyzes also the case of Porto Alegre, Mauritius, Costa Rica and Chile.

1.4 Clarification of the Key Terms

Besides the term of 'responsiveness', there are two key terms which particularly need a clarification before going into following chapters. One is local elite and second is civil society. Following the Donald Emmerson's classic study on Indonesia's elite, this study defines the elite by institutional affiliation rather than by possession and exercise of power (Emmerson 1976, 24). Thus, the "local elite" is defined as the persons in public positions and in the higher bureaucratic positions at the local level. To put it simply, local government heads, local parliament members and senior officials at local governments are the primary members of local elites. Hence it excludes business owners or religious leaders who stay outside the government, though these may count behind the schemes in the government decisions.[7] Instead the focus is on interactions between the residents and local elites who are responsible in planning and implementing the government policies.

As to the term of "civil society", conceptual fluidity concerning the meaning of this term is a persistent issue and this dissertation does not spare space to discuss it. This study basically follows Alagappa who defines it as "a distinct public sphere of organization, communication and reflective discourse, and governance among individuals and groups that take collective action deploying civil means to influence the state [which means the local government in this study] and its politics but not capture state power, and whose activities are not motivated by profit" (Alapappa 2004, 9). Thus, civil society organizations, which deploy civil means to influence the state in civil society sphere, include a variety of organizations from non-government organizations (NGO) which have laudable agenda such as monitoring governance to the organizations which are essentially non-political in nature such as charity

[7] In many cases, most of those influential persons in regions (e.g. business owners and religious leaders) choose to become a parliament member or local government head, rather than stay outside the government.

associations and recreational clubs, as long as their activities are bounded by a legal order. Importantly for this study, not only collective actions mobilized by an organization but personal networks and communications among individuals are also important in influencing the state.

1.5 Selection of Localities

From 33 provinces in Indonesia**,** this study focuses on two regions in Sumatra Island: South Sumatra and West Sumatra province. But the analysis covers two administration levels: the provincial and district level. Chapter Four discuss on South Sumatra province and Musi Banyuasin district, Chapter Five on West Sumatra province and Solok district, Chapter Six on West Sumatra province, and Chapter Seven on Solok district in West Sumatra province.

The primary reason to select these regions is that, to the best of this author's knowledge, they are pioneering cases to show increased responsiveness of local governments. South Sumatra is one of the first provinces to promote free education and free health care service for all the residents. West Sumatra governor was known in reducing corrupt practices. In the analysis on the citizenry's influence between elections, the anti-corruption movement in West Sumatra is still referred to as one of the few laudable civic movements. In the analysis on participatory planning, Solok district has been one of the favorite places for donor agencies to facilitate citizen's increased participation in budget planning. Thus, this thesis considers that the changing aspects showed in these pioneering cases may not represent overall pattern of Indonesian Politics, but they depicts one of the key trends, which could not be deemed as a trivial anomaly case.

In addition, these two regions have attracted less scholarly attention than other regions. The studies on local politics in Indonesia after Suharto's fall tend to focus on regions in Java Island (primarily because of the proximity from Jakarta and Jogjakarta city), the

conflict-prone regions such as Aceh, Papua, Maluku and East and West Kalimantan, and the resource-rich regions such as Riau and East Kalimantan. The selected regions of this thesis conform to none of these features. Thus, this thesis aims to fill this paucity of scholarly analysis on these two regions.

1.6. Overview of the Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds with an examination on the influence of three modes of citizens' participation: voting, raising voices, and engaging in budgeting planning. By studying whether these three modes of citizen participation have put pressure on local elites, including local government heads, government officials and parliament members to serve their demands, it highlights the patterns of continuity and change in the relationship between elites and citizens. Thereby, this thesis identifies which modes of citizens' participation lead to the emergence of responsive local governments.

Chapter Two does literature reviews on Indonesian Politics, highlighting that many studies, using various analytical paradigms, stress elite dominance in the Post-Suharto politics. Then it reviews several attempts to challenge these elite-dominance arguments, including those conducted by leading scholars in this field. Then, it clarifies how this dissertation contributes to these arguments to challenge elite-dominance interpretation. After the literature review section, this chapter clarifies two key analytical concepts of this study: the performance-oriented type of local leaders and information asymmetry. In the final section, it explains how this dissertation offers a more nuanced picture of Indonesian democracy by showing a visualized figure.

Chapter Three examines the trajectory of decentralization policies in Indonesia, indicating the important institutional changes which are assumed to have affected local government responsiveness. Then, it analyzes one of the significant trends in decentralized

Indonesia, the trend that a small but not negligible number of local heads have become nationally known with a good reputation. Most of these represent the performance-oriented local leaders, which this dissertation offers as a new type. In the final section, it sees economic and political settings of South Sumatra and West Sumatra Province from which two performance-oriented local leaders, the focus of Chapters Four and Five, emerged. The information of these two regions also covers the fields in Chapters Six and Seven.

Chapters Four and Five examine citizen engagement with voting, analyzing the impacts of electoral mechanisms to induce increased responsiveness of local governments. Both of chapters indicate the emergence of a new type of local leaders, whose power more depends on their reputations and performance as a local government head. Chapter Four examines the case of the governor of South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin. Alex emerged as a distinguished local leader by implementing two high-profile 'generous' programs; free education until high school and free healthcare for all the residents. Chapter Five examines the case of the governor of West Sumatra, Gamawan Fauzi. Gamawan became well-known nationally as a reformer of anti-corruption. After assumed a governorship, Gamawan implemented several measures to improve transparency and efficiency of local administration. Thus, these two politicians implemented many programs targeting for the interests of the majority, rather than just allocating benefits to their cronies. These two chapters examine the mechanisms and processes to induce such increase of responsiveness of local government heads.

Chapter Six examines citizen engagement in raising voices on streets and media, orchestrated by CSOs. It examines the trajectory of a well-known non-partisan citizen movement against corruption in West Sumatra province. Mobilized in the spirit of citizenship and voluntarism, citizens with various backgrounds got together to organize a civil society group and start investigations and monitoring of the budget implementation of the provincial

government. Eventually they found misappropriation of the local parliament members. Their activities led to the indictments of almost all of the parliament members, making a national sensation. Thus, this chapter examines to what extent the pressures from civil society organizations have induced local governments to be responsive to their demands.

Chapter Seven examines citizen engagement in participatory planning. It analyzes the case of Solok district in West Sumatra province, seeing how citizens' voices are listened to and consulted by the local officials and parliament members in the process of budget planning. Thus, it examines to what extent Indonesia's bottom-up planning system induces local government to be responsive to the demands of the residents.

Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter summarizes the main arguments developed in this thesis and situates the preceding analysis of local government responsiveness within a broader context **of** post-Suharto politics. Besides, this final chapter points to the broader implications of this study in regards to the discussion of linking decentralization and government responsiveness.

Chapter Two

Literature Review and Analytical Framework

2.1 Literature Review of the Studies of Indonesian Democracy

2.1.1 Literatures Stressing Elite Dominance

Despite extensive and drastic institutional changes, many leading scholars in the field of Indonesian politics have indicated the continuing features from the authoritarian regime. They indicate the continuity of the Indonesian elite and the practice of elite politics, thereby casting doubt as to whether democratization has brought benefits for all societal interests. Elite dominance has been repeatedly highlighted in the studies of Post-Suharto politics.

a. Oligarchy

Among these stressing elite dominance, the most consistent and vivid interpretation was provided by Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz in their seminal work, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in An Age of Markets* published in 2004 (Robison and Hediz 2004). They argued that ascendant politico-business elites who were nurtured under the Suharto regime maintained their strategic administrative and political positions. These elites reconstituted themselves in the new democratic institutions and formed new "oligarchic coalitions" consisting of politicians, bureaucrats and business people (Robison and Hadiz 2004, 9). By exploiting state power and resources, these oligarchs have developed new networks of "patronage" and kept their power. For protecting their interests, these old "predatory" elites often utilized mass mobilization and political violence through paramilitary youth organizations, which are commonly recognized as "*preman* (thugs)" groups among the

observers of Indonesia.[1] Such pervasiveness of money-driven politics and political violence led them to conclude that Post-Suharto Indonesia fell into an "illiberal form of democracy" (Robison and Hadiz 2005, 231).[2]

As a consequence of such illiberal political milieu, Robison and Hadiz argues that no new political power, such as from civil society groups, has yet had any greater influence in the open democratic process. It was partly attributed to the legacy of the authoritarian regimes. For a long period of three decades, civil society groups had been systematically depoliticized, and the resistance of working class had been devastated violently (Robison and Hadiz 2004, 253). As a consequence, "a vigorous civil society" has yet emerged (Robison and Hadiz 2004, 31). In this way, they highlighted consistently weak civil society.

Using the same analytical concept, "oligarchy", Jeffrey Winters added new verve to these arguments in the recent studies of Indonesian Politics.[3] In his comparative research on oligarchs spanning a daringly wide range of historical and contemporary cases, including ancient Athens and Rome, and the medieval Italian city-states, as well as the contemporary United States, Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia, Winters presented basically the similar arguments of Robison and Hadiz as to Indonesian democracy.[4] Electoral democracy has been

[1] For them, a para-statal youth group, *Pemuda Pancasila* is typical example of gangster youth groups. They also cited political parties' youth organizations such as *Banser (Bantuan Serbaguna,* or assisting force of all purposes), the mobile force of National Awakening Party (PKB) or *Satgas* (*Satuan Tugas*, or Task Force) the mobile force of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) as a paramilitary organization (Richard and Hadiz 2005). Though they emphasized the element of militancy of these groups, they are basically just a loosely-associated group consisting mostly of the unemployed young people. While Robison and Hadiz and their followers called these groups as "*preman*" group, to my author's knowledge, many Indonesians hesitate to call them so.

[2] The term, "Illiberal Democracy" was first used by Fareed Zakaria in an article of *Foreign Affairs* (Zakaria 1997).

[3] Jeffrie Winters is mostly known for his previous writings on Indonesia's political economy during the Suharto era (Winters 1996).

[4] This book's primal intention is not to write on the Indonesian oligarchy in detail and the section of discussing oligarchs in contemporary Indonesia is considerably thin. However, this book's

thoroughly "captured" by oligarchs (Winters 2011, 180). These "untamed" oligarchs are using their wealth both to compete unfairly for office and to defeat the rule of law (Winters 2011, 192). However, importantly, Winters differs from Robison and Hadiz's views on the oligarch's frequent mobilization of violence. Winters argues that, Indonesian oligarchs, unlike those in Philippines, are "not yet armed." Thus, they rely almost exclusively on expending substantial sums of money to protect their interests (Winters 2011, 207). Indeed, the most questionable part in Robison and Hadiz's argument is their highly emphasis on the use of violence.

Following these major scholars, a more junior analyst, Fukuoka reproduced the same argument of oligarchy. Using the term of "clientelist" instead of "patronage", Fukuoka underscored the key points of Robison and Hadiz. He even followed the most questionable part of their arguments, oligarch's mobilization of violence, and concludes that Indonesia developed into an illiberal type of democracy (Fukuoka 2012, 62). The oligarchy paradigm also inspired Indonesian scholars in Jakarta (Noor 2001). A leading political analyst at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Syamsuddin Haris started to use a new variation, "oligarchic political party (*oligarki partai*)" (Harris 2005).[5] With this term, Haris highlighted

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contributions to the debate on Indonesian Democracy are not negligible. The book now became one of the favorite reference literatures especially for Indonesian researchers whose comments are frequently cited in local media.

[5] Haris does not clarify whether he coined this term by himself, or adapted from other literatures. In the studies of comparative politics, the term of "oligarchic party" is rarely used. But some used this term in discussing political parties in Laten America (Roberts and Wibbles 1999). In their articles, "oligarchic parties" are vertically organized, patronage-based parties which have roots in nineteenth-century, predated the onset of mass political mobilization. Such political parties are found in Latin American countries such as Uruguay, Colombia, and Honduras. Meanwhile, Shamsuddin Haris's definition is not clear. But this term, "oligarchic political party (*partai oligarki*)" became widely used by academics, politicians and CSO activists. When you find the word, oligarchy in Indonesian newspapers, most of the cases mean *oligarki partai*, the oligarchs in political parties, not those in the business world. Hence, the Chinese-descent owners of a business conglomerate, which usually refrains from engaging directly in political activities, is rarely discussed as an oligarch in local news media, though they clearly consists of the main parts of oligarchs in Winters or Robison and Hadiz's arguments (Winters 2011, Robison and Hadiz 2004).

the dominance of top down decisions in all Indonesian political parties. Though his paradigm is blunt and quite ambiguous because it does not discuss well enough to what extent decision making power of political parties should devolve from the leadership of a few persons to more representative procedures, the term itself caught the hearts of Indonesian people concerned about elite dominance. Other than Syamsudddin Haris, many leading and famous Indonesian political analysts such as Sukardi Rinakit, Arbi Sanit, J. Kristiadi and Yudi Latif are fond of using this term.[6] With the frequent use of these scholars, in the last decade, "oligarchy," a jargon of political studies, became widely used in Indonesia, even among journalists, CSO activists, and politicians. With the simple search in the website of the major Indonesian newspaper, *Kompas.com,* the term of *oligarki* (oligarchy) get 102 hits in the news of Indonesian Politics from January 2008 to August 2013.[7]

b. Other Variations of Stressing Elite Dominance in Indonesian Politics as a Whole

Other than these oligarchy frameworks, the pundits of Indonesian politics---mostly foreign scholars---have offered many variations on the theme of elite dominance in Post-Suharto era. Using the well-used framework in Indonesian Studies, patrimonialism, Douglas Webber argues that Indonesian government has not yet separated the private from the official sphere like patrimonial government in Max Weber's analytical concept.[8]

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[6] Sukardi Rinakit is a researcher at the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate, the think tank founded by Soegeng Sarjadi. Arbi Sanit is a senior professor at the University of Indonesia. J Kristiadi is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic of International Studies (CSIS). Yudi Latif is a political analyst with a doctoral degree at the Australian National University. All of them frequently appear on TV and newspapers.

[7] The word, oligarchy gets 115 hits at the site of Kompas.com. Out of them, 13 hits were not related to Indonesian politics. Mostly was international affairs news. Information available at <http://www.kompas.com/ > (accessed September 18, 2013). When other terms related to elite dominance such as "elite politics" are included in the search, you will find such words in newspapers almost every day.

[8] As to the studies using Patrimonialism paradigm, see, for example, Crouch (1979).

Therefore the office holders exploit their positions primarily for "their personal rather than universalistic ends" (Webber 2006, 397). Such entrenched tradition of patrimonialism has been buttressed by the survival of powerful interests rooted during the Suharto era (Webber 2006, 415). Not just Webber but many emphasize such patrimonial characters of Indonesian democracy (Bünte and Ufen 2009)

A leading anthropologist in Netherlands, Henk Schulte Nordholt also stresses the patrimonialistic feature of Indonesian governments, offering another variation, the notion of a "shadow state" (Schulte Nordholt 2003). This notion was originally used in studies in African and Indian political economy (Harriss-White 2003). As with the argument of patrimonialism, Schulte Nordholt's shadow state paradigm indicates the ambiguous boundaries between the private and the official in the government, especially emphasizing the dominance of (semi-)criminal and informal arrangements such as corruption, tax evasion and misuse of public policies. He argues that in Indonesia, the "real state" consisting of a formal set of bureaucratic institutions co-exists with a "shadow state" in which "bureaucrats, businessman, politicians and criminals interact on a regular basis" (Schulte Nordholt 2004, 33). Using this notion, his followers, Syarif Hidayat and Erwiza Erman described how local businessmen (the owners of local tin company in Bangka Beliteng province) and leaders of gangsters (the leaders of the experts in traditional self-defense known as *jawara* in Banten province) gained their economic interests in various unfair ways such as arranging corruption scheme (Hidayat 2007, Erman 2007).[9] However, what is the most problematic in patrimonialism as well as shadow state paradigms is that they overemphasize the influence of "informal" arrangements such as corruption scheme. This point is discussed later in this section.

In a more refined way, Dan Slater also indicated elite dominance. Employing Richard

[9] *Jawara* are men of prowess in traditional self-defense (*silat*) and wear black uniforms and carry machetes (Okamoto and Hamid 2008)

Katz and Peter Mair's party cartel model (Katz and Mair 1995), Slater argues that "with a little prospect for a near-term escape," Indonesian politics remains mired in a condition of "collusive democracy", in which all major political parties enter into a vast national alliance (Slater 2004, 91). In such situation, the distinction between parties in office and those out of office becomes blurred, and as a consequence, elections do not fully function as a device to sanction the parties of unsatisfactory performance. These colluding parties "become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state to ensure their own collective survival" (Slater 2004, 65). Thus, Slater explained the survival of elites and the practices of those in exploiting state resources in a different way from what he calls "culturalist, often essentialist, arguments that Indonesia's exceptional recent levels of elite collaboration are deeply rooted in national political character" (Slater 2004, 66).[10] A leading scholar in German, Andreas Ufen thoroughly agrees with Dan Slater's party cartel paradigm and indicates that "cartels are in some measure a result of a fragmented party system with unclear majorities" (Ufen 2009, 166).[11]

c. Local Boss Paradigm: Stressing Elite Dominance in Local Politics

Olle Törnquist is also a foremost scholar stressing elite dominance. Especially he contributed to this debate by shedding light on elites' control in "local" Indonesia. Just two years after the Suharto's fall, Törnquist already indicated the emergence of "local bosses", who "enjoy a monopolistic position over coercive and economic resources within their bailiwicks" (Törnquist 2000, 388). The concept of local boss was adapted from John Sidel's

[10] Though he did not cite any literatures of what he means as a culturalist and essentialist argument, this criticism is probably directed to most of the literatures discussed above, including oligarchy, patrimonialism, shadow state, and local boss paradigm.

[11] In the same article to indicate party cartel in Indonesia, Ufen also argues the upsurge of local bosses (Ufen 2009).

bossism framework in the study of Philippine politics (Sidel 1999).[12] Though Törnquist took ambiguous position on whether Indonesia's local bosses were the same kind of the Philippine's, he basically agrees that what Sidel had seen in local Philippines started to occur in Indonesia. In this way, regarding the impacts of decentralization, Törnquist concludes that it has just reorganized privileged access to resources among the members of elites (Törnquist 2004, 218).

After Törnquist introduced the analytical concept of local boss in the study of Indonesian politics, a number of scholars follows him (Hadiz 2003, Schulte Nordholt 2007), though many shows a differing opinion on the similarity between Philippine and Indonesia. On this point, John Sidel, who first advocated local boss paradigm, clearly indicate the difference between two countries, arguing that the power of these new local bosses in Indonesia has not yet gained the similar power of Philippine's (Ufen 2009, Sidel 2004).[13]

d. Other Variations of Stressing Elite Dominance in Local Indonesia

In the same vain, analyzing local politics in three provinces in Java Island, a leading scholar in Japan, Jun Honna also indicated that decentralization primarily benefited the (political, bureaucratic, business and military) elites. Apparently inspired by Robison and Hadiz, in an article of a leading journal in Japan, Honna argued that these elites "shrewdly *hijacked* the new democratic spaces in more sophisticated ways than those during the Suharto

[12] Törnquist is one the earliest scholars to introduce local boss paradigm in the studies of Indonesian politics. A year later, Vedi Hadiz also indicated the emergence of local bosses. In Törnquist's argument, local bosses in Indonesia were "pettier" than Philippine's in terms of less private wealth and more dependency on public resources but at the same time both have "basic similarities". On the other hand, Hadiz's position was clear. Local bosses in Indonesia were basically the same with Philippine's. (Hadiz 2003)

[13] For Ufen, the empowerment of new local bosses has not yet reached Philippine proportions. Unlike those in Philippine, local elites in Indonesia do not have a decisive impact on national politics in the national parliament, or in the central executives of political parties.

era" (Honna 2005, 57), [14] though he refrained from using such a rather blunt expression as *hijacking* in the English version of this article published a year later (Honna 2006). Like Robison and Hadiz, Honnna also referred to elites' reliance on *preman* (thugs) brokers to mobilize mass support and limited influence of civil society groups (Honna 2006, 95)

Even after the introduction of the direct local government head elections, which changed political milieu in a major way in local Indonesia as is discussed later in the next chapter, many scholars retained the same arguments with those above.[15] Nankyung Choi argued that this institutional reform just transferred some of the money politics occurring in the local parliaments to political party branches by indicating the fact that most of the candidates have been forced to buy an expensive ticket to run for office from political parties (Choi 2009). Based on rich case studies, Choi reaches a conclusion that because of the weakening of parties, the resilience of local elites and the reassertion of patrimonialism, direct local elections have just "allowed entrenched local elites---to enhance their power" (Choi 2011, 102). Vedi Hadiz, a foremost proponent of oligarchy and local boss paradigm, also indicates the similar points---especially the dominance of money politics--- in local direct elections. Though admitting that violence is less a feature of local elections than it had been in the earlier part of the post-Suharto period, Hadiz still argues that the introduction of local direct elections should be viewed just as a part of "the broader process of development of a distinctly *illiberal* form of democracy" (Hadiz 2010:166).[16]

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[14] My translation. Emphasis added. See Honna (2005).

[15] As to the studies of this line conducted by Indonesian scholars, see, for example, several articles in the book edited by Syarif Hidayat (Hidayat 2006).

[16] As discussed above, in Robison and Hadiz's argument, pervasiveness of money-driven politics and political violence are two essential features in the illiberal form of democracy (Robison and Hadiz 2004). Given the fact that one of them (violence) is less likely to be dominant, as Hadiz admits, it clearly lacks firm evidence in sticking to the idea of illiberal democracy.

2.1.2 Main Three Points of Elite-Dominance Argument

Thus, elite dominance is now one of the dominant interpretations of Indonesian democracy. Though these interpretations seen above indicate the important aspects of the post-Suharto politics and offered a meaningful caution against the euphoria of democratization, their rather simplified characterization of Indonesian Politics as being captured by the entrenched elites need to be reconsidered. This thesis indicates that what the elite-dominance interpretation emphasized consisted mainly of three aspects: First, the unchanged composition of politico-economic elites after democratization, second, the persistent practices of those elites in exploiting the state resources to deliver benefits to their cronies, and third, the consistently weak and fragmented civil society groups.

However, as to the first point, though no one disagrees that the political elites were not replaced, but the range of political elite has been "broadening" (Crouch 2010, 6). Consequently, the boundaries between old entrenched elites and newly ascendant elites are increasingly becoming blurred. As Hadiz admits, the range of interests contesting power at the local level are now much more varied than under the New Order (Hadiz 2005). In local politics, various actors such as entrepreneurs, state bureaucrats, religious leaders, leaders of civilian militia, traditional aristocrats of ethnic groups, and , though to a lesser extent, CSO activists, entered into the political arena. These varied elites do not just build collusive relationships among them for their own collective survival, as argued by Slater, but they are competing at least as much as collaborating[17] Intra-elite competition is undoubtedly becoming keen. This thesis assumes such increased competition among elites is a key point to explain the changing aspects in the politics of the Post-Suharto era, which is discussed below.

Regarding the second point, rampant government corruption is not the unique character of Indonesian political economy but rather should be seen as a generic trait of

[17] The similar point is indicated by Aspinall (2013)

human society, especially in developing countries. Therefore, simply indicating the practice of corruption does not get us very far analytically. Besides that, they put too much emphasis on the dominance of corrupted practices. Though it cannot be denied that corruption is rampant in the post-Suharto era, the public office holders, in many cases, do not freely indulge in corruption. Not surprisingly, the concerns for the next election---to a moderate degree---may constraint those politicians to indulge in such conducts. As Marcus Mietzner indicates, not a few corrupted politicians have been ousted in the direct local elections (Mietzner 2009). Again, increased (intra-elite) electoral competition should be examined carefully to see a shift in the post-Suharto politics.

As to the third point, though Indonesia's civil society groups are certainly not united to mount coherent challenges up to the point of seriously threatening the interests of the entrenched elites, their sporadic and dispersed civic social movements and street protests have often exercised unignorable influence on the government policies. To name a few, for stopping the original proposal of building a new splendid building for the national parliament, or defending the Corruption Eradication Commission from the parliament's attempt to constrain its ability, with backing from the media coverage, they were influential enough to persuade the government and the parliament to reconsider the original plan. Though these popular protests remain issue-based, ad hoc movements, hence civil society groups have failed to exercise consistent influence on the government, their influence could not be dismissed as merely being no significance.

2.1.3 Critiques to the Elite-Dominance Interpretations

Some scholars challenged those rather simplified views stressing elite dominance. A major experienced scholar in the field of Indonesian Politics, Harold Crouch offers a different

picture on the continuity from the authoritarian regime.[18] With rich information on the reforms in various areas in the Post-Suharto era, Crouch argues that Indonesia in fact underwent "a partial transformation of some key aspects of the political system which, if by no means total, was in many ways quite fundamental" in a decade after democratization (Crouch 2010, 7). Importantly, these significant reforms were adopted by institutions that were thoroughly penetrated by vested interests which had been closely tied to the Suharto regime (Crouch 2010, 11). While oligarchy and the similar arguments stress that the process of designing institutional changes were totally under control of the vested interests and, as a consequence, these changes were only to be beneficial to those elites, Crouch argues that even in such situation, reforms were carried out even in a way that possibly threatens the positions of the beneficiaries of the status quo. Furthermore, even in "politics-as-usual circumstances" (during the term of President Aabdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), where change was not considered urgently-needed, and hence concern about bureaucratic and narrow clientelistic relationship could gain importance, many important reforms were actually pressed forward (Crouch 2010, 339).[19] Though Crouch does not provide us a clear answer why reforms proceeded even in such situation except just mentioning that they were "the product of protracted bargaining between largely

[18] One of the objectives of Crouch's book is clearly to question and challenge Robison and Hadiz's oligarchy interpretation (Crouch 2010).

[19] Crouch divides reform into two categories; crisis-ridden reform and politics-as-usual reform. Crisis-ridden reforms are carried out in a circumstance "where policy elites believe that a crisis exists and they must do something about the situation or they will face grave consequences" (Crouch 2010, 7) Therefore in this type of reform, "concern about national welfare, political stability, and broad coalitions of political support tends to dominate their deliberations" (Crouch 2010, 7). According to Crouch, most of the reforms conducted during the term of President Habibie are categorized into crisis-ridden crisis. For example, the decision to embark on decentralization in 1999 is clearly categorized as a crisis-ridden reform. On the other hand, politics-as-usual reforms are carried out in a circumstance where "change is considered desirable but the consequences of not acting are not considered threatening to the decision makers or the regime (Crouch 2010, 7)." For example, the introduction of direct presidential election and local government head election was decided in such situation.

self-serving parties" (Crouch 2010, 339), Crouch convincingly reminds us the importance of turning attention to the changing aspect again. According to him, the most extensive reforms were carried out in areas concerning governing institutions; the constitution, legislatures, elections and, importantly for this thesis, regional government. On the other hand, the reforms proceeded less smoothly in the area of military and judiciary.

A Crouch's pupil, Edward Aspinall also takes a different position from the prevailing arguments of elite dominance. While the emphasis of elite-dominance literature has been on identifying modes of the "concentration" of material and political power by the oligarchs or the entrenched elites, Aspinall stresses the feature of "fragmentation," its lack of powerful and permanent pillars to organize political forces and structure the flow of patronage (Aspinall 2013, 49). According to him, internal fracturing and dispersing dynamics is visible in virtually all kinds of political and social activities, including those of political parties, NGOs and Islamic organizations. Then Aspinall argues that such fragmentation definitely shows "discontinuities with the past and features that are characteristic of the current age" (Aspinall 2013, 36). However, he takes ambiguous position on whether this fragmentation feature has brought about changes in elite politics. He even suggests the possibility that "fragmentation enables oligarchy" (Aspinall 2013, 51).

Also in the studies on local politics, many indicate the changing political environment after the introduction of direct local government heads election. Marcus Mietzner indicates that Indonesian voters show a certain level of reasonable judgment in selecting candidates in local direct elections (Mietzner 2009). The electorate is inclined to sanction incumbents who are deemed excessively corrupt and choose more competent figures in their stead. According to his data, 40 percent of incumbent candidates running for reelection lost their jobs in the direct polls (Mietzner 2009, 141). This data suggests that local direct elections provide a highly-competitive environment among candidates. In such situation, Michael Buehler

argued that political elites are now changing strategies to grab offices. In the new system, they have relied more on personal networks at the local level and less on party machines; and have gradually recognized that ample campaign cash does not guarantee winning (Buehler 2009). By the same token, and most importantly for this dissertation, Harold Crouch indicates that direct elections provided some avenues for the emergence of "new types of local leader". Those are "reform-minded or performance-oriented" local leaders "whose success depended, to some extent at least, on meeting public expectations", though discussed only briefly in his book (Crouch 2010:115-117).

However, Mietzner does not discuss whether "more competent figures" elected by reasonable voters have brought about changes in governance. In the same vain, Buehler has yet to provide insight on the consequences of the changing strategies of elites during the election. It requires an examination of whether such a reshuffle of strategies has led to the changes of governance as tangible policy outputs. As to Crouch's argument, he left a difficult task in determining who is reform-minded or performance-oriented as he avoided mentioning any specific names or cases. It makes his argument unclear in regard to what respects those local leaders are new and how they emerged. By examining a case which is considered to have a new type of local leader, this thesis will show clearly the features of this type. The case also indicates the changes of strategies of local elites that indeed led to the changes of policy outputs.

Following Mietzner, Buehler and Crouch, this thesis will modify the view emphasizing the entrenched power elites and the unchanged mode of ruling of these elites, arguing that the latter aspect is actually changing. While agreeing that the composition of politico-economic elites is largely unchanged (Mietzner 2010, Buehler 2010), this thesis argues that the political rivalries among these elites should not be downplayed. Dissimilar to a unified class, these elites have not always been cohesive to ensure their collective interests.

In post-Suharto Indonesia, a wider range of varied interests have been contesting power, making the intra-elite competition keener. Competition especially became tougher after the introduction of the direct local-head elections.[20] Such heated competition, at least in several regions, has prompted a few elites to adopt a new strategy to join hands with non-elites by promising and implementing the policies which accommodated the latter's interests in order to defeat their rivals.[21] Having such a distinct strategy to deliver programs targeted for non-elites is the key feature of a new type of local leader.

This thesis argue that a narrow focus on the unchanged practices of corruption overlooks much that shows the changing mode of ruling of local elites. It is hard to deny that most of the regional heads require a considerable amount of money to ascend to the head positions as discussed by Choi and Hadiz, however, they do not entirely resort to accumulated properties to grab the public offices. Some depend more on their reputation and popularity rather than financial resources. These elites may experiment with a drastic approach to respond to the demands of constituents, rather than just exploit the state resources. Examining such a case, Chapter Three and Four will advance our understanding of some new aspects of local elites.

2.2 Analytical Concepts

This dissertation examines three modes of citizen participation, and these three modes are totally different political interaction between elites and citizens. Therefore, there is no common analytically framework to be applied throughout this dissertation. Instead, this thesis

[20] Since the introduction of direct local-head elections, 40 percent of incumbents were thrown out. (Mietzner 2010)

[21] Harold Crouch (2010) mentioned such a perspective very briefly in his book but has not yet delved into it. This paper will expand his idea by analyzing a case.

uses a common analytical concept in the analysis of the cases in Chapters Four and Five, the categorized types of local leaders to differentiate the performance-oriented type from the boss type. Meanwhile Chapters Six and Seven have each analytical concept, but deal with the common constraint on citizen participation, the asymmetries of information between elites and citizens.

In order to analyze local leaders in Indonesia, this thesis develops its own categorization of local leaders. In this categorization, this thesis proposes the performance-oriented local leaders as a new type which should be distinguished from the conventional type. As seen above, many studies labels local elites in Indonesia as "local boss" and as those developing new clientelistic network. To differentiate this conventional clientelistic type of local elites from the new type, several concepts of the clientelism studies are very useful. The following sees the arguments of the clientelism studies which recently flourished in comparative politics.

2.2.1 Clientelism

With some simplification, using the paradigm of patron-client relations has long been standard analytical tactic in the studies of Indonesian politics. Whatever they call a "patronage" (Liddle 1995, Hadiz 2003), or "patron-client linkage" (Jackson 1978), or "clientelism" (Tomsa and Ufen 2013) or, the Max Weber's similar concept, "patrimonialism" (Crouch 1979),[22] they emphasized the dominant influence of many kinds of these patronage networks. The fact of finding rampant corruptions was always indicated as a clear indication of such networks. Going back to the analyses of politics during the Suharto era, for example,

[22] Compared to clientelism, the paradigm of patrimonialism emphasizes more on emotional and traditional linkages rather than material linkages. But still clientelism and patrimonialism are proximate paradigms and some uses them almost interchangeably.

Harold Crouch argued that the stability of Suharto regime in the early stage attributed to the Suharto and his close army generals' exclusive control of "the means of coercion and the distribution of *patronage*"(Crouch 1978, 351. Emphasis added by the author). In the recent studies, Edward Aspinall followed previous literatures to emphasize "the continuing importance of *patronage* distribution for organizing political life and mediating class relations," though indicating new aspect of Post-Suharto politics, fragmentation of political powers and "decentered clientelism"(Aspinall 2013, 28).

However the studies of comparative politics on clientelism convincingly indicate that the mode of exchange through patronage networks thrives in both autocracies and democracies, in both Western and non-Western countries and it endures in the face of economic development (Hicken 2011, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).[23] As Lemarchand and Legg put it, this type of relationship must be regarded as "a generic trait of political systems" (Lemchand and Legg 1972, 149). Therefore the existence of resilient patronage networks is not a unique feature of Indonesian democracy. Even in an old consolidated democracy, the persistent problems stemming from patron-client linkages are often founded. These facts blunt the analytical edge of the paradigm of patron-client relations on which the literature of Indonesian studies conventionally has relied. This dissertation stresses the studies of Indonesian politics need to move beyond just indicating the entrenched patronage networks.

For that purpose, following the recent studies of clientelism in the comparative politics, the definition of clientelism should be narrowly defined. While many Indonesian studies have used the analytical tool of patronage to explain various political affairs, the

[23] Following Kitschelt and Wilkinson, this thesis uses the terms patronage and clientelism interchangeably, though some authors use patronage in a narrower sense (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Stokes 2007). Different authors draw distinction between patronage and clientelism in various ways, but as Hicken argues, most of them agrees that "clientelism is a much broader phenomenon than patronage, with patronage simply one specific type of clientelist exchange" (Hicken 2011, 295).

cross-national comparison-oriented scholars confined their scope of analysis to election-related affairs. Most of them have examined the impacts of clientelistic exchange on the outcome of elections, and consistently dealt with clientelism 'as a method of electoral mobilization (Stokes 2007, 604)'.[24] In this way, they clearly differentiate clientelistic exchange for elections from that for other purposes beyond elections.

According to Hicken, the clientelism studies have highlighted four key elements of patron-client relationships: dyadic relationships, hierarchy, iteration and contingency (Hicken 2011). The "dyadic" element underscores the personal, face-to-face quality of clientelistic relationships, while the "hierarchy" element underscores asymmetry relationships between two persons of unequal status, power or resources.[25] The "iteration" element underlines the ongoing nature of the relationships, "with each side anticipating future interactions as they make decisions about their behavior today" (Hicken 2011, 292). The "contingency" element underscores the reciprocal, quid pro quo nature of the patron-client exchange. In a clientelistic relationship, "the politician's delivery of a good is *contingent upon* the actions of specific members of the electorate (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007)." Thereby, benefits are "particularly targeted."

Among these four elements, the last element, contingency-based exchange is particularly important feature to differentiate from other modes of exchange (Hiken 2011, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).[26] For example, delivering material goods through policies

[24] For example, a leading scholar in the studies of Indonesian politics, Edward Aspinall defined patronage "as a material resource disbursed for particularistic purposes and for political benefit, typically distributed via clientelist networks, where clientelism is defined as personalistic relationship of power" (Aspinall 2013, 28).

[25] The scholars of the first-generation of the clientelism study such as Landè and James Scott took particular note of the hierarchy element (Landè 1977, Scott 1972).

[26] A leading scholar, Susan Stokes define clientelism as 'the proffering material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses simply: Did you (will you) support me?" (Stokes 2007:604-605). Thus, contingency is the key element for her, while she does not

targeted for certain groups such as healthcare schemes for the poor and a debt moratorium for farmers are not categorized as clientelistic exchange because the benefits of the policies are not directly "contingent" on a vote for a politician, and voters that supported the opposition still have access to the benefits of promised programs.

With a narrowly defined clientelism, Kitschelt and Wilkinson developed simply conceptualized two models of politician-electorate exchange. One is the clientelistic exchange, which is contingency-based and particularly targeting. The other one is a mode of programmatic (program-based) exchange. Programmatic exchange is a non-contingent, indirect political exchange through which 'politicians announce and implement policies that create beneficiaries and losers without verifying that the beneficiaries will actually deliver their votes" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:10).

Based on this Kitschelt and Wilkinson's dichotomous distinction, Magaloni et al. developed a useful analytical framework to examine yields and risks of incumbents' electoral strategies. To make their framework simpler, they narrowed down the scope of politicians' policy packages in programmatic exchanges, from those including ones targeted for a certain groups, such as, farmers, to those providing public goods, from whose enjoyment no one can be excluded. In other words, in their model, an incumbent politician has only two choices: relying on clientelistic exchange or providing public goods. According to them, relying on clientelistic exchange minimizes electoral risk because politicians can employ preexisting networks to target transfers to core supporters "whose electoral support is certain." However, transaction costs are expensive, thus "fewer voters can normally be targeted." On the other hand, public good provision has "the advantage of lowering transaction costs and benefiting a larger and more heterogeneous electorate." Thus, the expected electoral return is higher than with clientelistic exchange, yet it has "the disadvantage of greater risk precisely because all

attach weight to the hierarchy nor iteration element.

voter groups can consume them regardless of their expected voting behavior." (Magaloni et al. 2007: 203)

In reality, all of the incumbent politicians use a mix of those two strategies. The key question is which strategy has been increasing in significance. This thesis argues that in the gubernatorial elections in Indonesia, candidates have been gradually giving weight to the strategy of providing public goods rather than just relying on clientelistic networks because electorates of gubernatorial elections are considerably larger than those of district head elections, with a consequence, in theory, that the gubernatorial candidates need to rely less on clientelistic networks and more upon a strategy (promise) of providing public goods.

This dissertation argues that the case of Chapters Four and Five represent those gradual shifts of local politicians' choices toward an electoral strategy of providing public goods. As to the Alex Noerdin's free education and healthcare programs, no one was excluded from the benefits of these programs. By the same token, Gamawan Fauzi's measures to improve transparency and efficiency of the provincial administration is also categorized as a program of providing public goods in the sense that every one can enjoy the benefits of these measures, though less clearly fitting to Magaloni et al.'s analytical model than Alex Noerdin (because Gamawan's measures were not a kind of directly providing goods to the electorates but indirectly bringing benefits by cutting waste budget and allocating the saved money to the other programs.)

Although the framework of Magaloni et al. seeks to analyze the incumbents' strategies, this thesis assumes it is also applicable to analyze the strategies of non-incumbent candidates who attempts to ascend from the position of the district head to the governorship such as the case of Alex Noerdin in the South Sumatra gubernatorial election in 2008 and the case of Gamawan Fauzi in the West Sumatra gubernatorial election in 2005. Both of the candidates campaigned hard on their promises of providing public goods. And, importantly, in both of

the cases, their campaign promises were accompanied by the practical accomplishments of implementing those programs during their term of a district head.

2.2.2 Performance-Oriented Local Leaders as a New Type

Incorporating these arguments of the clientelism study into analytical framework, this thesis advances further Harold Crouch's idea of a new type of local leaders. Clear differentiation between clientelistic exchange and program-based exchange discussed above is useful to highlight the features of a new type of local leaders. As discussed above, Crouch's argument is unclear in regard to what respects a new type of local leader is different from conventional one. He even avoided mentioning any specific names which are considered to be categorized as a new type. He only describe briefly that they are "reform-minded or performance-oriented" local leaders "whose success depended, to some extent at least, on meeting public expectations" (Crouch 2010:115-117). Instead of using Crouch's description with no change, this thesis offers a renewed picture of a new type of local leader by indicating three features as showed in Table 2.1. This model does not adopt the feature of reform-mindedness from Crouch's description because it is really a difficult task to determine whether they are reform-minded or not, but follows the Crouch's idea in regard to the point of being performance-oriented. Local leaders in this type attempt to improve their performance as a local government head in order to gain a good reputation which can be useful for further political career goals. Thus, this dissertation labels the new type of local leaders as "performance-oriented" type

Table 2.1 Features of Performance-Oriented Type and Boss Type of Local Leaders

	Description
"Performance-Oriented" Type of Local Leaders	① Mainly take the strategy to conduct program-based exchanges with voters by providing non-excludable public goods that can be consumed by almost all the electorate. ② During the election campaign period, they largely rely on appealing their reputation of good performance, and do not highly rely on clientelistic networks including those of political parties. ③ Have the desire to run for higher positions. Typically they use the job of district head as a springboard to a governorship and more powerful positions.
"Boss"Type of Local Leaders	① Mainly take the strategy to conduct clientelistic exchanges with voters by delivering benefits disproportionately to their cronies and core supporters. ② During the election campaign period, they largely rely on the mobilization of core supporters who expect rewards in return after election. Consequently they require more money for winning than the performance-oriented type of local leaders ③ Have a strong desire to establish and maintain a stronghold as their "bailiwick".

Source: Made by This Author

This thesis characterizes the performance-oriented of local leaders with three features. First, they take the strategy to conduct program-based exchanges with voters as a method of vote mobilization. Since the expected electoral return is high, local leaders in this type try to transfer benefits to a larger and more heterogeneous electorate by providing public goods that can be consumed by all the electorate, though whose electoral support is uncertain. Second, during the election campaign period, they largely rely on appealing their reputation of good performance, and do not highly rely on clientelistic networks including those of political

parties. Third, they have the desire to run for higher positions. Typically they use the job of district head as a springboard to a governorship and more powerful positions. In this way, the first two features are adopted from Kitschelt and Wilkinson's models of politician-electorate exchange and the framework of Magalon and others of the incumbents' strategies. The last feature is added in order to accommodate the significant trend in local Indonesia.

As defined above, this new type of local leaders gains a good reputation by providing public goods which can be enjoyed by all the electorate including non-elites. In this sense, they clearly join hands with non-elites for winning over other elites, rather than build collusive relationship among elites for their collective survival. It is not only for increasing the probability of their reelection, but, in many cases, for ascending to more powerful political position.

In many respects, this new type of local leaders contrasts to the conventional type of local leaders, which is labeled as "local boss" by many Indonesianists such as Hadiz and Törnquist. Local leaders in this "boss" type can be also characterized with three features. First, they mainly take the strategy to conduct clientelistic exchanges with voters by allocating benefits to themselves or to their cronies and core supporters. Second, during the election campaign period, they largely rely on the mobilization of core supporters who expect rewards in return after election. Consequently they require more money for winning than the performance-oriented type of local leaders. Third, they typically have a strong desire to establish and maintain their stronghold, rather than aspire for increasingly powerful positions.

This dissertation points to Alex Noerdin, the governor of South Sumatra, and Gamawan Fauzi, the former governor of West Sumatra as an example of the performance-oriented type of local leaders. As discussed above, one of the features of this new type is to have the desire to run for higher position, and typically use the job of district head as a springboard to a governorship and a more powerful position. This phenomenon is

one of the outstanding trends in Post Suharto local politics.

2.2.3 Information Asymmetries

While Chapters Four and Five use two types of local leaders as a common analytical framework, this framework is not continuously used in Chapters Six and Seven. Even these latter two chapters do not have a common framework between the two since citizen's raising voices and participatory planning are totally different political affairs. However, as discussed in Chapter One, these two modes of citizens' participation are crucially important in examining the relationship between elites and citizens in a comprehensive way. Instead of having a common framework, these two chapters illustrate the common problem which citizens face in their efforts to put pressure on local governments. That is informational asymmetries between local elites and citizens.

In various ways, local governments restrict the public's access to information or limit the scope for the media to publicize the poor quality and other attributes of local government services. Dissemination of information is also limited by local governments' media capture. Chapters Six and Seven check these points as a severe constraint on the citizens' participation.

2.3 Nuanced Picture of Indonesian Democracy

This dissertation challenges the elite-dominance interpretation of Indonesian democracy. As seen above, in order to accentuate the unique features of Indonesian democracy, the elite-dominance arguments have tended to overemphasize various deficiencies such as the ambiguous boundaries between the private and the official sphere (Webber 2006, Schulte Nordholt 2004) and collusive relationship among political parties (Slater 2004). As a consequence, intentionally or unintentionally, they have a tendency to

contrast Indonesian democracy with a more consolidated and mature democracy. In contrast with an idealized model of democracy or the Western model, some lament the existence of rampant corruption (Webber 2006), while others lament weak position of Indonesia's civil society groups (Robison and Hadiz 2004, Winters 2011, Törnquist 2000). In the same vain, one study argues that Indonesia remained only "procedural" democracy, in the sense that it only meets the minimal conditions such as holding free elections, but has not yet become "substantial" democracy (Abdulbaki 2008). To put it another way, these arguments tend to become mired in an analysis of somewhat simplified dichotomy; whether it is consolidated or defective, efficient or ineficient, superficial/procedural or substantial.

As a consequence of such simplified assessments, there is a wide gap between what elite dominant arguments describe and an idealized model of democracy or those in Western countries. As to the responsiveness of politicians to the demands of citizens, this dissertation argues that, elite-dominance arguments overemphasize their practice of exploiting the state resources to deliver benefits to their cronies. The figure below (Figure 2.1) is the visualized picture of the wide gap which such exaggeration causes in the analysis of politicians' responsiveness to the demands of citizens. It defines politicians' responsiveness to votes as the ordinate and politicians' responsiveness to citizens' political actions between elections on the abscissa. When it comes to the three modes of citizens' participation, voting, raising voices, participatory planning, which this dissertation examines, the first is plotted on the ordinate, while the last two is plotted on the abscissa.

Figure 2.1 Visualized Picture of the Wide Gap between Indonesian Democracy Described by Elite-Dominance Literatures and Mature Democracy



Source: Made by This Author

In order to complement these simplified assessments of elite-dominance arguments, this dissertation offers more nuanced pictures of Indonesian democracy by showing the changing elites' responsiveness to the demands of citizens in two ways. First, it indicates Indonesian elites are increasingly becoming responsive to votes. This increase of responsiveness has been induced by the introduction of direct elections of local government head. Second, it seeks to find out that ordinary citizens including civil society groups slightly increased influence vis-a-vis elites through various political actions beyond voting, though this attempt does not produce apparent success. In this way, this dissertation attempts to rectify the imbalance caused by the overemphasis of the elite-dominance arguments on elites' practice of exploiting state resources for their personal ends. To put it another way with the

use of Figure 2.1, the objective of this thesis is to situate Indonesian democracy somewhere in the wide gap between what elite-dominance arguments describe and an ideal model of democracy.

Chapter Three

Changing Political Milieu in Local Indonesia

First, this chapter sees the trajectory of central-local relationship in Indonesia, especially focusing on the process after Indonesia embarked on a drastic decentralization project in 2001. Among a number of institutional changes in the process of pursuing decentralization, the introduction of direct local government-head election in 2005 is important for this dissertation.

Then, it analyzes one of the significant trends in local politics since 2001, the trend that a growing number of local heads have become nationally known with a good reputation. Typically, they had gained a good track record as a district local government head, which became a good asset to ascend to more powerful positions. Analyzing these local government heads, this chapter shows three remarkable strategies to establish a good reputation. Most of them analyzed in that section are categorized as a performance-oriented local leader, which this dissertation pose as a distinguished type from the conventional, and features of which is showed in Table 2.1 in Chapter Two. Almost all of the cases have two out of three features since they capitalize on their good reputation of better performance (the feature two in Table 2.1) and have the desire to run for higher positions (the feature three in Table 2.1). However, a few cases do not have the feature one (showed in Table 2.1); primarily take the strategy to conduct program-based exchanges with voters. Despite of these exceptions, analyzing strategies of local leaders to establish a good reputation advance our understanding of a performance-oriented type of local leaders.

Then, in the final section, this chapter sees economic and political background from which two performance-oriented local leaders, Alex Noerdin in Chapter Four and Gamawan Fauzi in Chapter Five, came. At the same time, the information of these regions also covers

the fields in Chapters Six and Seven.

3.1 Changing Central-Local Relationship in Indonesia

3.1.1 Embarking on Decentralization

The 32 years of Suharto's regime during 1966 to 1998, which is commonly called "New Order (*Orde Baru*)" in Indonesia, was largely an era of political stability, though it had started from a tremendous political turmoil with the physical elimination of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and its supporters.[1] As Aspinall and Greg put it, the pace of political change was "glacial" throughout the Suharto era, despite rapid economic growth and modernization (Aspinall and Greg 2003, 1). By the middle of the 1970s, a political format of the New Order regime was largely set (Crouch 1979). Particularly a key political mechanism was settled in 1973, when the political parties were forced to fuse into two parties. Four Islamic political parties were amalgamated into the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembanguna*, PPP), while five secular parties including major nationalistic ones into the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, PDI). Since then, the authority had debilitated both parties in various ways such as interfering with the process of screening parliament members. Both parties were prohibited from engaging in activities below the district level, while the government's electoral machine, Golkar (the Functional Group), which was not conceived as a political party,[2] freely engaged in vote gathering activities even at the village level. Civil servants, including local government officials, were obliged to support Golkar. With these institutional arrangements, Suharto had held the

[1] There are various views on the estimated number of victims in this physical elimination, but many agree that at least approximately 500,000 persons were massacred and another 600,000 was detained without trial from 1965 to 66 (Aspinall and Greg 2010).

[2] As the name, the Functional Group, suggests, Golkar was conceived as an assemblage of functional groups, not as a political party.

national parliament in his grip throughout the New Order era.

By the same token, the structures of center-local relations had been stable during the Suharto era. The New Order authority had complete control of the local governments to ensure that central government policies of all kinds were enforced right down to the village level. Uniform administrative structures and procedures were imposed across nation with Law No.5 of 1974 on local governance and Law No.5 of 1979 on village governance. Same as the national parliament, Golkar controlled comfortable majorities in local parliaments. Besides all that, local government heads were practically determined by the central government.[3] Therefore local governments seldom dared to voice concern at national decisions even when they viewed them as inimical to their interests.

By contrast, Suharto's fall in May 1998 ushered in a dramatic transformation in almost all areas. Suharto's successor, President B.J. Habibie (May 1998 - October 1999) introduced a series of political reforms, including holding fair and free elections, lifting a ban on organizing political parties, adopting human rights principles, allowing press freedom, and reducing military role in administration and politics. Importantly, reforming relations between central and local governments was not an exception but rather one of the major political agenda for the Habibie government (Habibie 2006). Put in a precarious position facing with the internally divided military and Golkar along with being besieged by violent street demonstrations against him, Habibie, Suharto's hand-picked successor, sought to gain some reformist credentials ahead of the legislative election by offering decentralization (Smith 2008, Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005).

[3] Under the Law No.5 of 1974, local parliaments were entitled to draft a short-list of candidates for the positions of governor, district head and mayor, which was subsequently handed over to the next higher government. But, after all, the central government did not need to confirm the highest vote-getter in that selection process, and reserved the authority to install a different nominee for the position. In this way, the local government heads were practically determined by the central government.

Habibie government enacted a drastic decentralization program, which a World Bank report referred to as the "Big Bang" approach (World Bank 2003), turning one of the most centralized systems in the world to one of the most decentralized ones (Hofman and Kaiser 2005, 15). Habibie first instructed the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Home Affairs to draft laws of decentralization, then this drafting team was joined by a small group of political scientists known as the Team of Seven (*Tim Tujuh*), headed by Ryaas Rasyid, a strong proponent for decentralization (Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005, Hofman and Kaiser 2005, Smith 2008).[4] Having been involved in designing systems for the elections, at that time, Team of Seven garnered much public exposure on TV and newspapers in steering public attentions to the need of decentralization reform. Within an extraordinarily short period time, this team (consisting of not just the members of the Team of Seven but the bureaucrats of the central government) designed laws and persuaded Habibie and the National Parliament (DPR) to pass laws on decentralization in May 1999, with little feedback from the politicians and even less consultations with the regions (Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005). According to Ryaas Rasyid, President Habibie fully endorsed their draft laws with almost no changes and threw his weight behind them in parliament. At that time, the members of the draft team repeatedly emphasized the benefits of promoting decentralization to President Habibie in order to signal to the Indonesian electorate that he was more than Suharto's lackey (Smith 2008, 223).

With these two laws, Law 22 of 1999 on regional autonomy and 25 of 1999 on intergovernmental fiscal relations, Indonesia embarked on decentralization, and its implementation started in January 2001. The central government devolved fiscal and

[4] The Team of Seven was in charge with reforming electoral system in preparation for the elections held in June 1999. After completing that task, they turned to decentralization program. The members of the Team of Seven were Ryaas Rasyid, Affan Gaffar, Andi Mallarangeng, Djohermansyah Djohan, Luthfi Mutty, Ramlan Surbakti and Anas Urbaningrum.

administrative authorities to lower levels of governments, provinces and districts.[5] In order to reduce the risk of secession, this devolution deliberately bypassed the provinces and strengthened the district governments. The role of the provinces was confined to such areas as facilitating cross-district development and representing the central government within the region. The central government ceded authority to local governments in all fields except foreign policy, defense, security, monetary policy, the legal system and religious affairs. Thus, district governments were to take on much responsibility for such important areas as education, health and public works (Aspinall and Greg 2003, Bünte 2009,)

In addition to the devolution of these administrative authorities, the selection of local government heads became independent from the intervention of the central government. Under Law 22 of 1999, both legally and practically, local parliaments were given the power to elect and dismiss local government head. Since the election of 1999, the configuration of political parties in local parliaments has varied across nation, and Golkar is no longer the national government's singular electoral machine. These new arrangements brought uncertainty in competition to gain the position of local government heads. In such situation, some local leaders started to emerge on national media with a good reputation of their performance, and such trend would be further strengthened with the introduction of direct local government head elections in 2005, as is discussed later. On the other hand, in almost all of the regions, the process of electing the local government head was tainted by the bribery of the candidates to the parliament members (Rasyid 2003, 66).

Along with much of administrative authorities and the power to determine its government head accompanied the financial resources. Law 25 of 1999 mandates that a minimum of 25 percent of domestic revenues be transferred to local governments through a

[5] As stated in Note 6 in Chapter One, 'districts' in this dissertation should be understood as referring to both districts (*kabupaten*) and cities (*kotamadya*) unless otherwise specified.

budget grant mechanism called General Allocation Fund (*Dana Alokasi Umum*, DAU).[6] In addition, the producing localities, their host provincial governments along with district governments within the province receive 15 percent of oil, 30 percent of natural gas and 80 percent of mining, fishing and forestry revenues. In the first year of decentralization, the regional share in government spending jumped from the average 15 during 1990s to 30 percent (Hofman and Kaiser 2005, 15). Accompanying with the financial resources, over two million civil servants, or almost two-thirds of the central government workforce, were transferred to the regions in 2001. As a consequence, in the same year, some 2.8 million out of total 3.9 million were classified as regional employees (Hofman and Kaiser 2005, 15).

In this way, Indonesia embarked on a drastic decentralization project in 2001 with devolution of much of administrative and political authorities to local governments, and with transfer of considerable financial resources.

3.1.2 Introduction of Direct Local Government-Heads Elections

But after only three and half years of implementation of these two laws, the decentralization framework was revised with Law 32 of 2004 on regional autonomy and 33 of 2004 on intergovernmental fiscal relations at the very end of Megawati Soekarnoputri's presidency. With these new laws, Indonesia clearly turned in the direction of "recentralization" in some governance areas (Bünte 2009, Okamoto 2012), however, the basic framework of local autonomy was largely maintained (Harold 2010). In fact, in terms of financial resources, the regional share in government spending rather increased to 36 percent in 2005 (World

[6] Central transfers, including DAU, are the most important source of revenues for local governments in Indonesia. In 2010, Regional Own Revenue (PAD) accounted only 10 percent of total local government expenditures. On the other hand, central transfers financed 90 percent of total local government expenditures, 54 percent of provincial, 86 percent of cities, and 93 percent of districts expenditures. Among items of central transfers, the General Allocation Fund (DAU) is the largest, accounting for 56 percent of total central transfers and financed 46 percent of total local government expenditures (Shah, Qibthiyyah and Dita 2012).

Bank 2008).

Significantly, the new framework strengthened the role of the governor in guidance and supervision of district governments, making the districts answerable to the province for the conduct of some assistance tasks from the stipulated 31 shared areas of responsibilities such as education, healthcare and public works (UNDP Indonesia 2009). The concept of the non-existence of hierarchy between provincial and district governments, which had been clearly stated in Law 22 of 1999, was abandoned in favor of a more explicit measure of hierarchy. However, provinces have not yet had sufficient authority to force districts to obey their instructions, and the division of responsibilities between provinces and districts still remains unclear even after the relevant government regulation was issued in 2007.[7]

The main innovation of the newly revised laws of 2004 was the introduction of direct elections for the heads of local governments. The new system was introduced with the aim of making local governments more accountable and responsive to the local residents by letting them directly choose (Ramses and Barkry 2009). In this new arrangement, local parliaments significantly reduced its power since they no longer had absolute authority to elect and remove local government heads.[8] Meanwhile the central government can unilaterally suspend local government heads for corruption or if they threaten public safety (Bünte 2009, 111).

Despite of such significant changes, there are many constraints in this new system in inducing local governments to be responsive to the demands of the electorate (Choi 2011, Hadiz 2010). The most notable one is that political parties control the power to nominate

[7] Government Regulation No. 38 of 2007 stipulated the assignment of functions in the shared areas of responsibilities. But as a UNDP Indonesia report argues, overlaps still occur (UNDP Indonesia 2009, 11)

[8] Under the new system, local parliaments have to seek a judicial ruling when they want to remove the government head.

candidates for local government heads and their deputies. It required candidates to gain endorsement from a party or coalition of parties that had earned at least 15 percent of the vote in the local parliament election, or that controlled 15 per cent or more of seats in the local parliament. Though, in 2008, a new rule was introduced to open the way for independent candidates (*calon perseorangan*) to run for the office, most of the candidates still usually take the usual course, to gain the endorsement of political parties since the requirement to run as an independent candidate is highly demanding.[9] In this way, under the system of direct elections, the executive bodies of political parties play a key role as a strategic gatekeeper to power. As a result of it, many observed the practice of "buying the ticket" from political parties to run for the office, which makes the costs of running much higher (Choi 2011, Hadiz 2010).

However, as shortly discussed in Chapter Two, this dissertation argues that the introduction of direct local government head elections has significantly changed the political milieu of local Indonesia. First, ample cash does no longer guarantee winning. Second, it has changed how local elites advance their political career. It clearly increased incentives for local government heads to improve the performance of their government. They try to establish a good reputation not only for being reelected but also for seeking more powerful political positions. Having desire to run for higher positions is one of the features of the performance-oriented local leaders, which this dissertation offers as a new type of local leader.

[9] The judgment of the Constitutional Court on July 23 in 2007 (the case of No.5/PUU-Ⅴ/2007) urged the central government to allow independent candidates to run for local government head elections. After its subsequent revisions of the relevant law in 2008 Law 12 of 2008 on the revision of Law 32 of 2004), candidates without the endorsement of political parties are allowed to participate in the election with the requirement of collecting signatures from 3 to 6.5 percentage of the entire electorate. (The figure of percentage varies according to population size of the region.) Besides this requirement itself is highly demanding, the uncertain process of checking the signatures by the Local Election Commission has urged most of the major candidates to seek the endorsement of political parties. Thus, political parties' power as a strategic gatekeeper to the local government head position remained largely intact.

The next section sees the major patterns of these elites to establish a good reputation.

3.2 Career Incentives for Local Leaders

One of the significant trends after Indonesia embarked on decentralization in 2001 is that a small but not negligible number of local government heads have become well-known nationally and locally with a reputation of good performance. The introduction of direct local government head elections strengthened this trend. In many cases, these local leaders had established a good reputation when they were in the district head office. Capitalizing on these achievements, they ran for a governorship as a promising candidate. According to the Michael Buehler's gathered data, 33 out of 132 candidates for governorship from 2005 to 2008 were incumbent or former district heads (Buehler 2010).

There are at least two advantages for the district government heads to compete in direct gubernatorial elections. First, district heads are likely to amass a significant lead in their district since they can mobilize their subordinate bureaucrats and other networks they have already built. Second and most importantly for this thesis, they may establish a good reputation when they are in the district head office, which would become a good asset for election campaigns.

This section seeks to find the patterns of such district heads to establish a good reputation, though it is a nearly impossible task to comprehensively classify a wide variety of these patterns. Therefore, this thesis indicates three of the most outstanding patterns (see Table 3.1). The first is the type to achieve a reputation as a "clean" district head. A famous example is the former West Sumatra Governor (2005-2009) Gamawan Fauzi, which is discussed in Chapter Five. This type does not just confines to Gamawan. The former East

Belitung district head and a Chinese descendant politician,[10] Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, can be also categorized according to this type. He had established a reputation of cleanness during less than 3 years in the district head office. As if emulating Gamawan's successful track of becoming famous with winning a prestigious anti-corruption award,[11] Baski obtained the award of "the Person of Anti-Corruption (*Tokoh Anti-Korupsi*)" from a civil society organization, *Tiga Pilar Kemitraan* (the Partnership of Three Pillars).[12] In the same year of winning that award, Indonesia's leading magazine, Tempo Magazine (*Majarah Tempo*), in the year's end special issue, selected Baski as one of the ten persons who had made a change in Indonesia during the year of 2006.[13] Gained confidence with these prestigious honors, Baski ran for the Bangka Belitung gubernatorial election as a governor candidate with the backing of only minor political parties in 2007.[14] Although he failed to be elected, given that he is from a minority ethnic group in the province, long-time politically alienated Chinese descendant group, the election result of Baski's losing only with a narrow margin was really surprising.[15] After this failure,[16] Baski ran for the Jakarta gubernatorial election as a deputy

[10] East Belitung (*Belitung Timur*) district is in Bangka Belitung Province.

[11] See Chapter Five.

[12] The form of this organization was coordinated by "three pillars"; the State Ministry for State Apparatus Reforms (Men PAN), KADIN (the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and several CSOs tackling with corruption issue. This organization has worked mainly in facilitating donor projects for combatting the corruption problem.

[13] Among the ten selected persons, Baski was the only person from regional head. See *Majarah Tempo*, December 25-31, 2006.

[14] Baski gained the supports of 16 minor political parties such as the New Indonesia Party (*Partai Indonesia Baru*).

[15] The election day was in February 22, 2007. Three pairs ran for this gubernatorial election. The pair of Eko Maulana Ali, the former Bangka district head (1997-2007) and Syamsuddin Basari, the former chair of the local parliament in Belitung district won this election. They were backed by major political parties (Demokrat, PKS, PBB and PAN). Eko and Samsuddin garnered around 35 percent with 180,641 votes, while Baski and his partner, Eko Cahyono won around 33 percent with 166,561 votes. The difference of garnered votes between these two pairs was only 14,080, which accounted 2.7 percent of total votes. The number of total vote was 510,854. See *Kompas*, March 7, 2007.

governor candidate with Joko Widodo in 2013.[17] Getting through the run-off election, the pair of Joko Widodo and Baski eventually won the governorship.[18]

Table 3.1 District Heads' Major Strategies to Establish a Good Reputation for Next Political Career

Category of Reputation	Sub-Catefory by Program	Succeeded to Become a Governor (Place and Year of the Gubernatorial Election)	Failed to Become a Governor (Place and Year of the Gubernatorial Election)
"Clean" by Improving Transparency		Gamawan Fauzi (West Sumatra Province, 2005)	Basuki Tjahaja Purnama * (Bangka Belitung Province, 2007)
"Generous" with Fee-Free Public Service Programs	Free Education and Free Health Care	Alex Noerdin (South Sumatra Province, 2008)	Gede Winasa (Bali Province, 2008)
	Free Education Providing Free Land for the Poor	Awang Faroek Ishak (East Kalimantan Province, 2008)	
"Close" by Maintaining Good Communications with the Residents		Joko Widodo (DKI Jakarta Province, 2012)	
		Rustriningsih** (Central Java Province, 2008)	

* Baski became the deputy governor of Jakarta in 2012
** Rustriningsh won as a deputy governor

Source: Made by This Author Based on the Information form Various Sources of Mass Media.

[16] After the failure in the Bangka Belitung gubernatorial election, Baski ran for a national parliament seat from the Golkar Party and was successfully elected in April 2009.

[17] The first gubernatorial election was held in July 11, 2012. Since all of the pairs did not meet the requirement of gaining more than 50 percent of total votes, the top two pairs, the pair of Fauzi Bowo, the incumbent governor (2007-2012) and Nachrowi Ramli, a retired military general and the pair of Joko Widodo, the former mayor of Solo (2005-2012) in Central Java province and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama proceeded to the run-off election.

[18] In this run-off election, which was held in 20 September, the pair of Joko and Baski garnered around 54 percent of total with 2,472,130 votes to defeat the incumbent candidate who gained 46 percent of total with 2,120,815. See *Koran Tempo*, September 29, 2012.

The second noticeable way to gain a reputation is to implement "generous" public services especially for the poor. The most notable in this type is to implement free education and free health care programs for all residents. A well-known case of this type is the former district head of Jembrana, Gede Winasa, who initiated several innovative programs to provide fee-free services.[19] His programs had been frequently lauded by the local media, the central government, donor agencies, and their collaborating CSOs. Then, with a built-up reputation, Gede Winasa ran for the Bali gubernatorial election.[20] Although he lost that election, Winasa's reputation appeared to stimulate his political rival, the elected Bali governor, Made Mangku Pastika to start the province's own free health care program (Rosser and Willson 2012). As another case, the former East Kutai district head (1999-2003, 2006-2008), Awang Faroek Ishak is categorized in this type (see Table 3.1).[21] With considerably abundant revenue of this resource rich district, Awang Faroek gained popularity by providing free education until senior high school.[22] Awang's East Kutai government also prepared a number

[19] See *Gatra*, "*Berhemat Untuk Sekolah Gratis*.[Cut Waste for Free Education.]" March 5, 2008. *Gatra*, "*Bebas Ongkos Untuk Sehat* [Fee Free for Health.]" March 19, 2008.

[20] The Bali gubernatorial election was held on July 9 in 2008. Three pairs competed in this election. The pair of Made Mangku Pastika, the former Bali's Police Chief and Puspayoga, the former mayor of Denpasar won an outright victory with 1,087,910 votes which accounted about 55 percent of valid total votes. On the other hand, Gede Winasa, a nationally known as a pioneer of implementing free health care and free education program, who paired with Alit Putra, the former Badung district head (1990-1999) gained only third position with 360,724 votes which accounted around 18 percent. The number of total valid votes is 1,976,495.

[21] Awang Faroek was born to an aristocratic family in the locality of Kutai. During Suharto era, he became a national parliament member from 1987 to 1997, provincial secretary of Golkar from 1983 to 1988 (Morishita 2008).

[22] Though, outside the province, many recognized Awang as one of the notorious regional government heads because he was allegedly involved in a corruption case surrounding the divestment of PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC) shares in 2008 when Awang was the district head of East Kutai district. East Kutai district and East Kalimantan province sold off their right to buy the shares of KPC to the Bakrie Group, led by the influential politician of the Golkar Party, Abrizal Bakrie. In this corruption case, Awang was named a suspect in 2010 but the investigation officially stopped with the letter of the attorney general (known as *Surat Perintah Penghentian Penyidikan*, or SP3) on June 7, 2013 because the prosecutors did not find enough evident to indicate Awang's involvement in this corruption.

of scholarships for students and teachers to study in higher education institutions.[23] Besides these, his famous program was to provide free land of two to five hectare with a certification to the poor families with only condition of utilizing as farmland.[24] Capitalizing on these achievements, he ran for East Kalimantan gubernatorial election and won in 2008.[25] In addition to them, the focus of Chapter Four of this dissertation, the governor of South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin was also a famous example of this type.

When we expand the scope of search beyond strategies of district heads, this pattern of being 'generous' is also seen in governor's re-election strategies. South Sulawesi governor (2008-2013), Syahrul Yasin Limpo provides a case of gaining popularity by implementing free healthcare and free education programs. He implemented these programs during the first term, which became the cornerstones of his election campaigns for a second term in 2013.[26] The former governor of Aceh province (2007-2012), Irwandi Yusuf also campaigned hard on his government's performance in the education and health care sector in his running for the second term in 2012.[27] Actually Irwandi failed to be reelected in the 2012 gubernatorial

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[23] *SWA Sembada* "*Inilah Para Penguasa Daerah Probisnis* [They are the Regional Heads to Facilitate]." April 15, 2004.

[24] This program is known as "Redistributing Productive Land to Famers [*Redistribusi Lahan Produktif untuk Petani*]". This was lauded as one of the best practices at the official site of a research institution, Towards Innovative Local Governance (*Yayasan Inovasi Pemerintah Daerah,* YIPD*).* As to the report of YIPD, in the first phase, farmer lands of two to three hectare were already distributed to at least 11,000 poor families. This information is available at <http://www.yipd.or.id> (accessed on September 16, 2013).

[25] East Kalimantan gubernatorial election was held on May 26, 2008. Since none of the candidates had won more than 30 percent of the votes, the run-off election was held on September 10, 2008. In this final round, Awang Faroek, paired with Farid Wadjdy, defeated the pair of Ahmand Amins, then the mayor of Samarinda and Hadi Mulyadi. (Morishita 2008). Awang was reelected in the gubernatorial election held on September 15, 2013.

[26] The South Sulawesi gubernatorial election was held on January 22, 2013. Syahrul Yasin Limpo, paired with Agus Arifin Nu'mang, garnered around 52 percent of total with 2,251,407 votes. The total valid votes were 4,294,960.

[27] As with the healthcare program of the Alex Noerdin (South Sumatra) and Syahrul Yasin Limpo

election mainly because he parted with the Aceh Party (*Partai Aceh*), and the influence of this dominant party in the province was powerful enough to have its endorsed candidate to beat him. Nevertheless, Irwandi still represents distinctly the generous type to establish a good reputation.[28]

The third noticeable way to gain a good reputation is to be "close" to the residents by maintaining good communications, though this type is less clear-cut than the other two previous types above (see Table 3.1). The former district head of Kebumen, Rustriningsih can be categorized to this type. With the launch of a TV program, "*Selamat Pagi Bupati* (Good Morning District Head)" at the local government TV (*Ratih TV),* Rustriningsih appeared almost every day on TV to promote her government programs (Ratnawati 2009). Such efforts to improve information flow from the government to the residents contributed much to the establishment of her popularity as being close to the residents, which would become a precious asset for her to run for the Central Java gubernatorial election as a deputy governor candidate. Though Rustrininsih yielded the governor candidacy to a retired military general, Bibit Walyo, the pair of Bibit and Rustriningsih was successfully elected in June 2008.

While Rustrininsih represents a case to improve one-way communications with the residents, the mayor of Solo, Joko Widodo, who is commonly called "Jokowi", represents a case to improve two-way dialogues with the residents. Actually Jokowi can be categorized into all the three types described above: clean, generous and close. However, he primarily

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(South Sulawesi) governments, the Irwandi government's free health care program offered universal coverage for all residents (Aspinall and Warburton 2013)

[28] The Aceh Party gained 33 out of 69 seats (around 47 percent) in the provincial parliament during the term from 2009 to 2013. In the gubernatorial election on April 9 in 2012, the pair endorsed by this party, Zaini Abdullah and Muzakir Manaf won with 1327695 votes (around 56 % of total valid votes. Meanwhile, the pair of Irwandi Yusuf and Muhyan Yunan gained 29 percent of total with 694,515 votes. The total valid votes were 2,380,386. See the official site of the Independent Election Commission of Aceh (*Komisi Independen Pemilihan Aceh*, KIP Aceh). Available at <http://kip-acehprov.go.id/> (accessed on September 15, 2013).

represents the third type since he first emerged as a distinguished local leader on national media by successfully relocating around 900 street vendors (commonly called in Indonesia as *Pedagang Kali Lima*) to a newly prepared place with persuasion in 2007. While many other local government heads solved the similar problem by forcibly removing them with the local police unit (*Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja*, Satpol PP), Jokowi chose to patiently persuade them with some financial incentives.[29] In this way, he gained popularity as being close by showing a willingness to maintain good communications with the residents.

But as mentioned above, he also represents the other two types. In 2010, Jokowi was lauded as "clean" local leader with winning a prestigious award, the Bung-Hatta Anti-Corruption Award.[30] The Jokowi's Solo city government also sought to establish a reputation to implement "generous" free health care programs for the poor. With such good reputations, Jokowi ran for the Jakarta gubernatorial election with the partner, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in July 2012. In this election, he promised several specific and well-explained electoral pledges clearly targeting the interests of the poor. Among these, Jokowi promised to introduce a new health care program, named as the Healthy Jakarta Card, to cover additional 4.7 million residents in the first phase (Aspinall and Warburton 2013). In this way, Jokowi used all of the three strategies to emerge as a distinguished local leader. At the time of writing this dissertation, Jokowi is recognized as a new rising star in Indonesian Politics and has been the front runner in almost all of the opinion surveys on who would be the most suitable for the next president.

In this way, a small but not negligible number of local politicians have advanced their political career by establishing a good reputation. Here it should be noted that not all of the

[29] *Gatra*, January 5, 2011.

[30] Gamawan Fauzi emerged as a distinguished local leader with winning this award in 2005. On this award, see Chapter Four.

local leaders who gained a good reputation with three strategies analyzed above are categorized as a performance-oriented type of local leaders. Some are excluded from this category. Being distinguished from the conventional “boss” type, this new type of local leaders is defined in a narrower way than just defined as those who seek a good reputation for winning elections. As showed in Chapter Two, this thesis poses three features of this new type; first, primarily take the strategy to conduct program-based exchanges with voters by providing non-excludable public goods which can be consumed by almost all the electorate; second, during the election campaign period, they largely rely on appealing their reputation of good performance; third, have the desire to run for higher positions.

Going back to the analysis conducted above in this section, this thesis finds that most of the cases analyzed above can be categorized as a performance-oriented type of local leaders. These cases almost automatically have two out of three features since they usually rely on their good reputation during the campaign period (the second feature) and have the desire to run for a more powerful position, the governorship (the third feature). However, some cases may not meet the first condition since the benefits of the policies with which they gained a good reputation are possibly delivered to the specific targets, thereby not enjoyed by almost all the electorate (the first feature). To put it another way, it should be careful examined whether the delivery of a good of the attention-grabbing program is directly contingent on a vote for a politician. Deduced from the nature of the program, the most likely exception which does not meet the first condition is Awang Faroek Ishak, who gained a reputation of being “generous” by distributing free land to the poor. It can be presumed that the chances of delivering of these lands to his core supporters are high, though it requires further specific investigation on this point.

Though there are some exceptions, most of the cases analyzed above, including Alex Noerdin, Gamawan Fauzi, Joko Widodo, Irwandi Yusuf, Gede Winasa, Baski Tjahaja

Purnama and Syahrul Yasin Limpo,[31] are categorized to be a performance-oriented local leader. Capitalizing on their good reputation, some successfully advance their political career (such as the case of Joko Widodo, Syahrul Yasin Limpo, Gamawan Fauzi, and Alex Noerdin), while others failed to be elected or reelected (such as the case of Irwandi Yusuf and Gede Winasa). As identified above, there are three noticeable types to establish a good reputation: being "clean", "generous", and "close". Out of these three types, the next chapter, Chapter Four examines a popular example of the "generous" type, Alex Noerdin, while Chapter Five examines a well-known example of the "clean" type, Gamawan Fauzi. As this section shows that similar patterns are found in the other regions, these two cases represent one of the significant trends in local Indonesia.

It is also important to consider what economic and political conditions enable or limit local leaders' choices of strategies to attain a good reputation. One of the key conditions is apparently the size of the fiscal budget of local governments. Many of local government heads who employed a strategy to attain a reputation of being "generous" (the second type in Table 3.1) are those in resource-rich regions with abundant revenue such as Awang Faroek Ishak in East Kutai district or Irwandi Yusuf in Aceh Province, though there are some exceptions such as Gede Winasa in Jemberana district. Implementing fee-free public service such as free land for the poor and free healthcare requires a large budget, which discourages those in the regions of a small budget to adopt such programs. Instead, they seek to take other strategies such as achieving remarkable performance of improving transparency (the first type in Table 3.1) and showing positive attitudes toward communications with the residents (the third type in Table 3.1). Joko Widodo and Rustriningsih are such cases, who were the

[31] For some observers of Indonesian politics, Syahrul Yasin Limpo is known as a notorious local government head. However, given that his reelection strategy to appeal his achievements such as implementing free health care program, this thesis argues, he should be considered as a performance-oriented local leader, though it requires further investigation on his strategies in the gubernatorial election of 2013.

government head of the regions with small budget size (Solo city and Kebumen district).

In order to analyze such conditions, the next section sees economic and political background of West Sumatra and South Sumatra province, as a platform that facilitates the emergence of Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi as a local leader with a good reputation. Since both of them ascended to the governorship after they had achieved good performance as a district head. The section also sees economic and political background of Musi Banyuasin district (for Alex Noerdin) and Solok district (for Gamawan Fauzi). Besides for Chapters Four and Five, these regions information also covers the fields in Chapters Six and Seven. In Chapter Six, the stage is West Sumatra Province, where citizens have engaged in raising voices against West Sumatra provincial government, while in Chapter Seven, the stage is Solok district, where participatory planning has been promoted with the assistance of donor agencies.

3.3 Profiles of the Selected Sites

3.3.1 Economic and Social Background

South Sumatra Province and Musi Banyuasin District

South Sumatra province is home to a large river port city, Palembang with a population of more than 1.3 million (see Map 1 and Map 2 in Appendix 1). The province is known as the place where the Srivijaya Kingdom centered in ancient times. Although the province is blessed with natural resources such as oil, gas and coal, the provincial revenue is relatively low, compared to the other resource rich provinces such as East Kalimantan, Aceh and Papua. South Sumatra provincial government's 2010 per capita expenditures numbered Rp. 0.43 million, slightly higher than the national average, ranking only 20th among the 33 provinces (World Bank 2011, see also Table 3.2).

The district of Musi Banyuasin, known as its abbreviation, MUBA, is situated in the

northern part of South Sumatra province (see Map 3 in Appendix 1). The district covers 14,265 square kilometers, about 15% of South Sumatra's total area with a population of around 561,000 in 2010 (see Table 3.2).[32] It is rich in oil and natural gas, with each of which accounting for around half of South Sumatra's total output (in 2008).[33] Of significant note, the production of natural gas remarkably increased to be double the amount of 2003 levels in 2006 when the pipeline leading to Singapore went into full-scale operation.[34] Accordingly, MUBA's annual revenue tripled in 2007, compared to that of 2005. Since the onset of decentralization in 2001, MUBA has been among the most significant beneficiaries in the province. MUBA's annual revenue was almost twice that of the second highest district (Musi Rawas) in the province (in 2007).

Thus, MUBA is a resource-rich region with abundant revenue, which enables Alex Noerdin to implement the large-budget, attention-grabbing programs such as free education and free healthcare program. In contrast, he must have faced much more difficulty with budget constraints after he became the governor, since the budget of South Sumatra province is just the average size. Despite of such budget limitations, Alex managed to implement free education and free healthcare program on a province-wide scale.

[32] Musi Banyuasin district should not be confused with Banyuasin district, which splintered from MUBA in 2002. The area of MUBA was reduced by half after the division.

[33] According to the data of 2005 at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, each of the oil and natural gas reserves in South Sumatra Province constitute around 10% of Indonesia's total reserves.

[34] In 2010, the production of natural gas tripled from 2003 levels.

Table 3.2 Scale of Economy and Government Finance of the Provinces and Districts Selected for This Study (in 2010)

Region	Population	Area (Km^2)	Total Budgeted Expenditure (million IDR)	Expenditure per capita (million IDR)	Local Own Revenue As % of Total Revenue	General Allocation Fund As % of Total Revenue
South Sumatra Province	7,450,394	86,431	3,225,412	0.43	47.8	16.2
Musi Banyuasin District	561,458	14,265	1,412,881	2.52	2.9	5.9
West Sumatra Province	4,846,909	42,297	1,817,068	0.37	50.1	40.8
Solok District	348,566	3,738	527,011	1.51	4.2	79.5

Source: Statistics Indonesia (BPS) and Data from each region's Development Planning Board.

West Sumatra Province and Solok District

West Sumatra province lies on the coast of Indian Ocean in the center of Sumatra Island (see Map 1 and 2 in Appendix 1) The capital city of the province, Padang, has a population of more than 800,000, becoming one of the major cities in Sumatra Island .Though it has coal mining industry around the city of Sawahlunto and produces cement in Padang city, the province is recognized as a resource-scarce province in comparison to neighbor provinces in Sumatra. Therefore many people has gone away to work in Jakarta or resource-rich neighbor provinces such as Riau. The dominant ethnic group in the province, Minangkabau is known for the unique pattern of male out-migration. West Sumatra provincial government's 2010 per capita expenditures numbered Rp. 0.37 million, ranking 23rd among the 33 provinces (see Table 3.2).

Solok district is located just inland of Padang.[35] It is a one-hour bus trip from the center of Padang, mostly on a mountain road (see Map 4 in Appendix 1). The district extends over an area of 3,738 square kilometers and is home to roughly 350,000 people. Its economy

[35] Solok district (*kabupaten*) should not be confused with the municipality (*kotamadya*) of the same name, which it surrounds.

highly depends on the agricultural sector, given its scarce mineral resources. As other resource-scarce districts and cities in Indonesia, Solok generates little of its own revenue (*Pendapatan Asli Daerah* or PAD), covering about 4 percent of total budget (in 2010). Therefore it depends heavily on the central government's General Allocation Fund (*Dana Alokasi Umum* or DAU), accounting for almost 80 percent of total revenue every year (see Table 3.2). The budget size of Solok is average in the province, ranking 8th out of 12 districts.

Thus, compared to resource-rich regions such as MUBA, the fiscal budget of Solok is far smaller. The budget of West Sumatra province is also not large. In such economic situations, Gamawan Fauzi, seeking to gain a good reputation, needed to conceive a program which would get attentions but not require a large budget. It led him to take the strategy of gaining a reputation of “clean”, which required little budget. He implemented various measures of improving transparency with the assistance of donor agencies.

3.3.2 Political Background

South Sumatra Province and Musi Banyuasin District

In South Sumatra province, Islamic parties had been strong in past decades. In 1955 election, the first democratic election in Indonesia, a major Islam party at that time, the Masyumi Party won around 45 percent of total votes (see Table 3.3). Even during the Suharto era, the only admitted Islam party, the United Development Party or PPP had gained higher percentage of seats in the parliament than that of national average. However, since around the election of 1992, PPP had gradually lost its popularity (see Table 3.4)

After the end of the Suharto regime, instead of Islam parties, politics in South Sumatra have been led by the two major secular parties: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle or PDI-P, led nationally by Megawati Sukarnoputeri, and the Functional Groups

Party or Golkar, Suharto's dominant political vehicle. In the first elections after Suharto's fall in 1999, as in the rest of Indonesia, PDI-P was the clear victor in South Sumatra. It won 26 out of 75 provincial parliamentary seats, while in second place came Golkar with 15 seats. In 2004 Golkar became the top party in the provincial parliament, winning 16 out of 65 seats, while PDI-P had lost more than half of their seats, falling to second place. In 2009, the PDI-P recaptured the top, but won only 8 out of 44 while Golkar captured 7 seats.

The dominant figure of PDIP in the province was Taufik Kiemas, the husband of Megawati and a native of the province. His brother, Nazaruddin Kimas, a national parliament member (2004-2014), has led the provincial branch of the party. Meanwhile, since 2004, the provincial branch head of Golkar has been assumed by Alex Noerdin.

Table 3.3 Parliamentary Votes in 1955 Election in Central Sumatra and South Sumatra

South Sumatra			Central Sumatra		
	Votes	%		Votes	%
Masyumi	628,386	44.7	Masyumi	797,692	52.5
PNI	213,766	15.2	Perti	351,768	23.2
PKI	176,900	12.6	PKI	90,513	6.0
P.S.I.I	149,239	10.6	NU	71,959	4.7
NU	115,938	8.2	PNI	42,558	2.8
Others	121,149	8.6	Others	164,600	10.8
Total	1,405,378		Total	1,519,090	

Source: Feith (1957, 68)

Table 3.4 Seats in Local Parliament in West Sumatra and South Sumatra during Suharto Era

West Sumatra Province

Political Parties	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
Golkar	21	19	28	30	33
PPP	11	13	7	5	3
PDI	-	-	1	1	-
Appinted Representative	8	8	9	9	9
Total	40	40	45	45	45

South Sumatra Province

Political Parties	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
Golkar	18	18	25	26	30
PPP	14	12	7	4	4
PDI	2	2	4	6	2
Appinted Representative	6	8	9	9	9
Total	40	40	45	45	45

Source: Statics Indonesia (BPS)

Table 3.5 Seats in Local Parliament of South Sumatera Province (1999-2014)

	Seats		
Political Parties	1999-2004	2004-2009	2009-2014
Golkar	15	16	16
Demokrat (PD)	-	9	13
PDIP	26	12	11
PKS*	1	4	7
Gerindra	-	-	6
PAN	5	7	5
PPP	6	6	5
Hanura	-	-	4
PKB	3	4	3
PBR	-	5	2
PBB	2	1	1
TNI/Polri	8	-	-
Others**	9	1	2
Total	75	65	75

* From 1999-2004, the name was Partai Keadilan (PK). It changed name to PKS in 2004

** From 1999 to 2004, PKP, PDI, PPII, PNU, PSSI 1905, PP, PBI, PUI, PDR had one seat each.
From 2004 to 2009, PNUI had one seat. From 2009 to 2014, PKPB and PPRN has one seat each.

Source: Election Commission of South Sumatra Province

The party politics of Musi Banyuasin district basically follows the same pattern of South Sumatra province. In the election of 1999, PDIP became a leading party, winning 16 out of 45 seats. Five years later, PDI-P had its seats reduced by half and Golkar got back to the top position. In 2009 election, PDIP got a narrow victory with 8 seats over Golkar and the National Mandate Party or PAN, each of which gained 7 seats. Even though led by the former MUBA district head and the incumbent governor at that time, Alex Noerdin, Golkar slid to the second position (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 Seats in Local Parliament of Musi Banyuasin district (1999-2014)

	Seats		
Political Parties	1999-2004	2004-2009	2009-2014
PDIP	16	8	8
Golkar	10	11	7
PAN	2	5	7
Demokrat (PD)	-	1	4
Gerindra	-	-	4
PPP	4	3	2
PKS*	1	1	2
PKB	3	1	-
PBB	1	2	-
TNI/POLRI	5	-	-
Others**	3	8	10
Total	45	40	44

* From 1999-2004, the name was Partai Keadilan (PK). It changed name to PKS in 2004

** From 1999 to 2004, PKBP, PDLB, PSⅡ had one seat each.
From 2004 to 2009, PKPI had three seats. PPDI, PPDK, PBR, PPIB, PP had one seat.
From 2009 tp 2010, PPDI had three seats. PHNR and PBR had two seats. PPRN, PKPB, PBN had one seat.

Source: Election Commission of South Sumatra Province

In this way, though Islamic parties were strong in the 1955 election, the two big secular political parties, PDIP and Golkar, have always been rivals in South Sumatra province as well as MUBA in the Post-Suharto era.

West Sumatra Province and Solok District

West Sumatra province has been a strong power base for Islam parties. In the election of 1955, the Masyumi Party won more than half of total votes in the Central Sumatra province, a split of which would become West Sumatra province (see Table 3.3). During the Suharto era, the percentage of PPP seat in the province had exceeded national average until the election of 1992 (see Table 3.4).

One key feature of West Sumatra politics is the weakness of the parties upholding *Sukarno-ism*. In 1955 election, a nationally leading party, the Indonesian National Party or PNI only gained less than three percent of total votes (see Table 3.3). In the elections during the Suharto era, the Indonesian Democratic Party or PDI had gained no seat or only one (see Table 3.4). Such feature continues after the authoritarian regime ended, PDIP has been a small minority in the last three elections. .

After democratization, Golkar kept the leading position, competing heavily with major Islam parties. In the election of 1999, Golkar won by a narrow margin with 12 seats, followed by two Islam parties, PAN with 11 seats and PPP with 10 seats. In the next election, Golkar increased its presence with 16 seats while PAN and PPP lost a few seats. However, in 2009 election, as everywhere in the country, the Democratic Party or *Partai Demokrat* (PD) made remarkable gains to capture the top position with 14 seats in West Sumatra.[36] Meanwhile Golkar slid to the second position with 9 seats (see Table 3.7).

[36] The Democratic Party was led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,

Table 3.7 Seats in Local Parliament of West Sumatera Province (1999-2014)

	Seats		
Political Parties	1999-2004	2004-2009	2009-2014
Demokrat (PD)	-	6	14
Golkar	12	16	9
PAN	11	10	6
PKS	2*	7	5
Hanura	-	-	5
Gerindra	-	-	4
PPP	10	7	4
PBB	3	5	3
PDIP	5	4	3
PBR	-	-	2
TNI/Polri	6	-	-
Others	6**	-	-
Total	55	55	55

* From 1999-2004, the name was Partai Keadilan (PK). It changed name to PKS in 2004

** Others are from small parties (KAMI 1, PUI 1, PP 1, PKB 1, PIIM 1, PKP 1)

Source: Election Commission of West Sumatra Province

The party politics of Solok district showed a similar pattern to that of the province. In the elections of 1999 and 2004, Golkar remained in the top position, followed by PPP and PAN. In the election of 2009, even though the number of seats gained by Golkar in the parliament got the same with that of PD and PAN, Golkar retained the leading position. (see Table 3.8)

Table 3.8 Seats in Local Parliament of Solok District (1999-2014)

	Seats		
Political Parties	1999-2004	2004-2009	2009-2014
Golkar	12	12	6
Demokrat (PD)	-	1	6
PAN	6	6	6
PPP	8	5	5
PKS*	1	4	4
PBB	2	5	3
PKPB	-	2	0
PDIP	2	0	0
TNI/POLRI	4	-	-
Others	5**	-	5***
Total	40	35	35

* From 1999-2004, the name was Partai Keadilan (PK). It changed name to PKS in 2004

** PKP, P.Persatuan, PKB, PUI, P.Masyumi Baru gat one seat each

*** Gerindra, Hanura, PPI, PPRN, PDK got one seat each.

Source: Election Commission of West Sumatra Province

In this way, the significant feature of politics in West Sumatra is that Golkar has kept its influence in the Post-Suharto era. Islamic political parties, particularly PAN, also have commanded a certain level of influence. However, there are no bitter and long rivalries among political parties which match to South Sumatra's rivalries between Golkar and PDIP.

3.3.3 Background for the Emergence of Performance-Oriented Local Leaders

The key economic background for the emergence of Alex Noerdin as a "generous" type of local leader (the second type in Table 3.1) was undoubtedly the abundant fiscal budget of the MUBA district. In such favorable situation, Alex had implemented various large-budget, attention-getting policies when he was the MUBA district head from 2001 to 2008. As to the political situation, the key feature of South Sumatra is that two major secular political parties, Golkar and PDIP, have always fiercely competed in the Post-Suharto era. Since 2004, Golkar has been led by Alex Noerdin. Meanwhile his main political rival always

came from or with the support of PDIP. In South Sumatra provincial parliament, PDIP has played as an influential critic against Alex. Such heated competition between two major political parties is one of the key backgrounds to lead Alex to take the strategy to join hands with non-elites.

Meanwhile, the modest budget of Solok district is the key economic backgrounds for the emergence of Gamawan Fauzi as a “clean” local leader (the first type in Table 3.1). Facing with the budget limits, Gamawan could not implement big-budget programs for attracting the attentions of constituents as Alex did. Instead, this Solok district head found an innovative way to become a nationally well-known local leader. He had built close relationship with international donor agencies by committedly implementing their programs. Besides these donor programs required little budget from Solok government, these donor agencies vigorously promoted him as a good local leader. As to the political background, there have been no dominant political parties in West Sumatra. In this fragmented political map, Gamawan joined hands with small parties, PDIP, the seventh largest party and the Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB), the sixth largest party in the 2005 West Sumatra gubernatorial election. Resulting from avoiding of depending on major political parties in the province, which were considered to represent vested interests, his clean image was significantly strengthened.

Chapter Four

Politics of Promising Free Health Care and Free Education: The Case of South Sumatra

This chapter examines a case of the new type of local leader, Alex Noerdin. Alex became known as a distinguished local leader by implementing various 'generous' programs clearly targeted to non-elite interest during his tenure as the district head of Musi Banyuasin. Among these, the most high-profile programs were to provide free health care for all the residents and free education up to the high school level. Capitalizing on such lauded performance as a district head, he ran for a governorship. During the election campaign period, Alex laid out the attention-getting pledges to implement free healthcare and education programs, and eventually defeated an odds-on favorite candidate. Importantly, he implemented his promised programs after elected.

This chapter however, has no intention to paint him as a reformer or a successful governor. Especially outside South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin has been known as a controversial figure since he was allegedly involved in the corruption scandal (known as the case of the athlete's dormitory for Southeast Asia Games [commonly referred to as its abbreviation, SEA GAMES]) which gained public attention resulting in the indictment of the Treasury of Indonesia's leading party, the Democratic Party in 2011.[1] Aside from that, his overconfident move to run for the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election, which ended up in a crushing defeat, battered his reputation.

The chapter examines the trajectory of the political career of Alex Noerdin, from his background, achievements as a district head and electoral strategies at the gubernatorial

[1] South Sumatra province co-hosted SEA GAMES with Jakarta from November 11 to 21 in 2011. As to the corruption, this chapter will discuss it later.

election to the fulfillment of electoral pledges. In the end, it concludes with the implications of this case study on the local leaders' initiatives to respond to the demands from non-elites.

4.1. Central Government's Programs

Before going into the discuss on the education and health programs in Musi Banyuasin district and South Sumatra province, it is better to refer to the central government programs, which are closely interrelated with the regional government programs. In the education sector, the most significant program is the School Operational Assistance (BOS) program. Launched in 2005, the program disburses funds to all primary and junior secondary schools, both public and private, on a per–pupil allocation mechanism. The use of the funds is confined to the guidelines, but the schools still have a fair amount of discretion over how the funds are spent (Ministry of National Education 2009). Those funds are to cover operational costs such as those related to utility charges, stationery, school examinations, remuneration for part-time teachers and remedial teaching programs. Yudhoyono government increased significantly the BOS funding allocations in 2009, the election year, when the government instructed all public primary and junior secondary schools to exempt students from the operational costs of schooling, with the exception of the schools accredited by the central government as 'international standard schools (SBI)' or 'pioneering international schools (RSBI)' (Ministry of National Education 2009). With this program, in the election campaigns of 2009, the President Susilo Banbang Yudhoyono claimed the provision of free basic education as one of his achievements.

In the health sector, the most significant program is the Health Insurance for the Community (*Jamkesmas*) program. It started in 2005 with the name of Health Insurance for the Poor (*Askeskin*) program and changed its name to *Jamkesmas* in 2008 with some changes to the management of the funds. Targeting the poor and the near-poor, the program is a

revenue-financed fee waiver entitling members to free in-or out-patient care at hospitals and primary health centers (*puskesmas*). Although hospital stays are only admitted in a third-class ward, a person with a *Jamkesmas* member card can receive virtually all primary, secondary and tertiary care procedures for free, along with medications, lab tests, radiology, and other expensive diagnostic procedures. Hospitals are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis, while *puskesma*s are provided the operational funds in the form of capitation payments. In the *Jamkesmas* program, the Ministry of Health takes on the management of payments to hospitals, while in the *Askeskin*, the state-owned insurance company, PT.Askes was entrusted to that role.[2] In this manner, *Jamkesmas* covered 76.4 million people or about a third of the population (from 2007 to 2010) (World Bank 2012, Ministry of Health 2009).

Nevertheless, the central government has still counted hugely on local governments, both at the provincial and district level, to make up the shortfall for these programs. In many cases, the BOS program has not covered all operational costs, with the consequence that many local governments have provided their own school operational assistance grants to top up BOS, generally known as BOSDA or regional BOS (Rosser and Joshi 2012; Rosser and Willson 2012). As to *Jamkesmas,* approximately 60 percent of all Indonesians are still without any formal health insurance (in 2010) (World Bank 2012).[3] To cover these uninsured people, a significant number of local governments have set up their own insurance schemes, generally called *Jamkesda.* The number of district-level *Jamkesda* has been on the rise from around 60 in 2008 to over 300 (out of 498) in 2010 (World Bank 2012:34). However, the content of the benefit packages and the number of beneficiaries varies among regions; and the

[2] Interview with Ismiyanto Cahyono, Head of the Service Center and Health Insurance, Ministry of Health, February 1, 2011.

[3] Other insurance programs such as those for government officials, military officials, and private company employees cover approximately 10 percent.

number of those local governments having implemented a free-healthcare-for-all scheme, as Alex Noerdin promised to constituents, is much less.

Importantly, those local governments have been given significant discretion to respond to such shortfalls left by the central government (Rosser and Willson 2012). This also means that local heads of governments have many opportunities to establish their reputations if they tackle these challenges.

4.2. Road to Musi Banyuasin District Head

Alex Noerdin was born to a relatively wealthy family in Palembang city, the capital of South Sumatra Province in 1950. His father, Noerdin Pandji (1926-1998), was a military officer who retired early when he was in his mid-thirties with the rank of Army Major.[4] He was known in the province as a veteran who contributed to the struggle for independence against the Netherlands. After retiring, he was active in the political arena to the extent that he became the chairman of South Sumatra provincial parliament for a short period (1966-1967).[5] Taking advantage of his extensive network, Noerdin Pandji got involved in a variety of businesses, one of which was the operation of a petrol station located near the city hall of Palembang, as is well-known in the locality.

Growing up in such a distinguished family, Alex received a high-level education.

[4] Noerdin Pandji---from a privileged segment of society---was educated at the Dutch Middle School (MULO: *Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs*) during the colonial period. After completing the school, he underwent Japanese military education (*Giyugun)*. Joining in the fighting against the Dutch military, he was engaged in the battle near his hometown, the southern part of the Sumatra islands (largely at *Lampung* section*)*.

[5] Noerdin Pandji served in the military until 1961. A year earlier, he became a provincial parliament member of South Sumatra. In 1968, as a South Sumatra representative, he participated in the Special Session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) which officially appointed Suharto to the Presidency. In addition, Noerdin Pandji was also actively engaged in the management of several veterans' organizations such as the Veterans Legion of the Republic of Indonesia (*Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia*).

After spending his days in Palembang city until high school, he went to Jakarta to study industrial engineering at Trisakti University while simultaneously to learning law at Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia, both of which are top-ranked private universities in Indonesia. When he turned thirty, he finally managed to complete a bachelor's degree and was awarded a second one in the following year.

After graduating, Alex became a local government official at South Sumatra Province and successfully advanced his career while at this work place in the government office. He gained experience primarily at the Provincial Regional Development Planning Agency, then, proceeded to take on the role as head of several government offices at Palembang city and the province.[6] Besides that, as a competent bureaucrat, he was given many opportunities to participate in overseas training. What marked a turning point in his career was the assignment as regional secretary (*Sekretaris Daerah*, commonly referred to as its abbreviation, *Sekda)*, a top position of district administrative posts, at the most resource-rich district in the province, Musi Banyuasin, in 1999.[7] This happened just when the central government decided to devolve authorities into local governments with accompanying financial resources. [8] Working under Nazom Nurhawi, a typical Suharto-era local government head who was a retired army officer and less familiar with administrative duties, Alex presided over most of the projects in the district.

After two years in that pivotal post, Alex ran for the district head (*bupati)*, and was

[6] Alex assumed the head of the Palembang city Tourism Office, the head of Palembang city Regional Development Planning Agency and the head of South Sumatra Provincial Tourism office until he was assigned to the Musi Banyuasin district.

[7] See the profiles of localities in Chapter One.

[8] Alex Noerdin had been familiar with the Musi Banyuasin area because the district was his mother's hometown.

successfully elected on 10 December in 2001 by the local parliament (DPRD).[9] This replacement was often described as Alex's 'coup' by several local journalists.[10] It has been rumored that Alex schemed to create an atmosphere such that his predecessor, Nazom Nurhawi, would abandon his bid for a second term. Up to that time, Nazom had mishandled student demonstrations which had been held frequently in the period of transition to democracy and incurred harsh criticism from the media on his dispatching a state-sponsored vigilante group to disperse the protests which had been a usual measure during the Suharto era.[11] Besides that, Nazom had troubles in maintaining a favorable relationship with the DPRD members who were democratically elected for the first time after Suharto's fall and had a long list of demands including public cars and mobile phones for personal use. What determinably thwarted Nazom's bid for re-election was the parliament's rejection of his end-of-term accountability report (*Laporan Pertanggung jawaban Akhir Masa Jabatan*, LPJ-AMJ).[12] At the very least, Alex allegedly worked behind the scenes to orchestrate this rejection.[13]

Alex's winning majority vote at the parliament was not free from suspicion of bribery, as with the other local-head elections at that time. Nominated by the faction of small Islamic-oriented parties, he won 25 of the 45 votes to defeat his rivals, each of which was

[9] The election was postponed several times because of the disagreement over election procedures. This benefited Alex Noerdin, who had been appointed interim district head by the governor to replace Nazom Nurhawi six months before the election. *Sumatera Express*, June 11, 2001.

[10] Personal interviews by this author with several newspaper journalists stationed in Musi Banyuasin whose names are withheld by request, in Musi Banyuasin, April 27, 2011.

[11] *Sumatera Express*, July 17, 2000.

[12] The accountability report was denied by all major parties in the DPRD. *Sumatera Express*, May 1, 2000.

[13] A local parliament member from the Golkar Party at that time who worked as Alex's right-hand man for his victory with the district head position acknowledged, with less hesitation, Alex's involvement of this parliament's rejection of the accountability report. Interview with Sulgani Paku Ali, in Palembang, April 28, 2011.

nominated by the leading party (PDI-P) and the second majority party (Golkar)[14]. Alex used what is known in Indonesia as a 'quarantine' strategy, isolating the DPRD members of his group from lobbying by other candidates.[15] The 25 legislators who voted for Alex Noerdin spent three days outside the district, moving from hotel to hotel in Jakarta, Bandung and the southern part of South Sumatra Province, returning to MUBA only several hours before voting began. He even prepared a tailored formal dress for each of them to wear on the day of voting.[16]

In addition, up until the voting day, he allegedly exploited the district budget to win the legislators over to his side.[17] Seven official cars for legislators budgeted in the district revenue of that year were provided far ahead of schedule even without the acceptance of the district head, allegedly with Alex's personal guarantee to pay them.[18] Seven days before the voting, a representative of the rival group, a deputy chair of the DPRD officially reported Alex to the police concerning his alleged role in corrupt practices in a few projects.[19]

As just described, Alex Noerdin is from a privileged family and can be clearly

[14] The research on this election is owed to Elizabeth Fuller Collins's research (Collins 2007, 135-6). However some detailed accounts are, as a matter of course, added to hers.

[15] Half of the members of the PDI-P and the Golkar Party shifted in favor of Alex, although each of the parties officially nominated the other candidate. The group with Alex consists of legislators from all major parties in the district.

[16] The 25 members were measured for those clothes in advance of the voting. Interview with Sulgani Paku Ali, the chairman of the DPRD from 2004 to 2009, in Palembang, April 28, 2011.

[17] Alex was in a position to control government projects in the district as a regional secretary and later an interim district head.

[18] Seven *Mitsubishi* cars were provided to the legislators close to Alex Noerdin in May 2001. Although 17 units of public cars for legislators were budgeted in that year, enough fiscal funds were not yet transferred from the central government for buying them at that time. Those seven units of cars were allegedly procured without public tender. *Sumatera Express,* May 14, 16 and 25, 2001.

[19] In addition to the case of official cars for legislators, a deputy chair reported the corruption in the project of fortifying the *Musi* river bank in which Alex was allegedly involved. *Sumatera Express*, December 4 and 5, 2001.

categorized as an old elite nurtured by the Suharto regime. The ways to ascend to the district head were not unrelated to bribery allegations as other regions across Indonesia. But after becoming a district head, he had assumed prominence by implementing a series of attention-getting programs.

4.3. Achievements of the Musi Banyuasin District

Alex Noerdin had been in the MUBA district head office for seven years until he resigned to run for a governorship during his second term in August 2008. It is not surprising that he had the intention to run for the gubernatorial position for a long time while in the district head post. Rumors circulated in regards to Alex's intention at least in the end of 2004 when he became the provincial chair of the Golkar Party, which many assumed to be a stepping stone to his bid for the governorship.[20]

While in the office, trying to establish a good reputation, Alex implemented a series of programs in the health and education sector. Obviously inspired by the programs of the Jembrana district in Bali Province, which was, at that time, one of the most lauded districts as a model for good government, Alex started almost the same programs in MUBA.[21] Those were two high-profile programs: the program to give grants to schools on a per-student basis for operational costs, and the program to set up a local health insurance scheme for poor people.

The education program to disburse school operation grants started in 2003, which was two years after the Jembrana district started such a program. Although many regional governments have also implemented similar programs after the national program, such as the

[20] *Sumatera Express*, Jan 1, 2004

[21] Regarding the healthcare program at Jembrana district, one middle-ranking CSO in Jakarta and World Bank made several good reports (Yayasan TIFA 2005, World Bank 2006).

BOS, started in 2005, only a small number of regions implemented such programs at that time. Trying to have a lead over the Jembrana district's program which targeted schools from the primary level up to the senior high level, MUBA expanded its target down further to kindergartens.

However, during the initial four years, the amount of grants remained relatively small. It was obviously not enough to cover all of the operational school costs. Just in 2007, a year before the gubernatorial election, MUBA drastically increased the amount of grants, making it double or threefold at each level.[22] With this increase, Alex could appeal to show that MUBA had achieved the provision of free education from kindergarten up to senior high school.

The MUBA insurance scheme started in 2003. As with the Jembrana district's program and the central government scheme at that time,[23] cooperating with the state-owned insurance company, PT Askes, MUBA allocated health cards to poor households entitling them to free care at public health facilities. It started tentatively with only 20,000 beneficiaries. Then, in the next year, the number of the targets increased to around 160,000 persons, which accounted for about 30 percent of residents.[24] However the scheme was still mainly for the poor in the initial four years.

The noteworthy fact was that, just like the school operation grant program, the budget

[22] From 2003 to 2004, MUBA disbursed Rp. 5,000 (US$0.6) per pupil to kindergartens, Rp. 5,000 to primary schools, Rp. 15,000 (US$ 1.7) to junior secondary schools, Rp. 17,500 (US$ 1.8) to senior high schools, Rp. 22,500 (US$ 2.3$) to vocational schools. In 2007 it drastically increased to Rp. 10,000 (US$ 1.1) per pupil to kindergartens, Rp. 19,000 (US$ 2.0) to primary schools, Rp. 22,000 (US$ 2.3) to junior secondary schools, Rp. 80,500 (US$ 8.1) to senior high schools, Rp. 85,500 (US$8.7) to vocational schools.

[23] In 2003 Megawati Soekarrnoputri's government introduced the Health Service Insurance for Poor Families, or JPK-Gakin, and encouraged district governments to implement their own health insurance schemes modeled on the national program. (Aspinall and Warburton 2013)

[24] Interviews with several senior officials at Musi Banyuasin Health Office, in Musi Banyuasin, April 28, 2011.

of the health insurance program was increased considerably only in 2007. With this bigger budget, the target expanded to cover all the residents in the district and people could receive free medical care service by only showing a MUBA identity card instead of the health card which the program up to that year had provided to the beneficiaries. Again with the considerable changes in the previous year of the gubernatorial election, Alex claimed to have established a universal health care system in the district during the campaign.

While implementing those high-profile programs, Alex poured his energy into developing infrastructure to show tangible accomplishments. In the education sector, notable projects included the construction of a nursing school and a polytechnic school. Both of the schools have provided services to the students without charge and all of the students can enjoy free school dormitories and get a monthly allowance.[25] In the health sector, MUBA built the first district-owned general hospital at the center of the district, which started to operate in 2007. It considerably increased the residents' access to advanced medical care.

With these programs, Alex had gained a reputation for prioritizing the areas of education and health. During the gubernatorial election, he capitalized on this reputation and campaigned as a candidate who had already proven to effect changes.

4.4 South Sumatra Gubernatorial Election 2008

The South Sumatra gubernatorial election, held in early September 2008, became a straight fight between Alex Noerdin and the incumbent governor, Syahrial Oesman. For many local intellectuals, Syahrial, a former bureaucrat at the Department for Public Works for the better part of his professional career,[26] and the former district head of Ogan Komering

[25] Polytechnic schools teach accounting, computer skills and repairing electric appliances. With 2010 data, the number of students is 24 persons per year in the nursing school and 72 in the polytechnic school. The facility was built in 2006 and started operations the next year.

[26] For most of his career, he worked at the district level in the South Sumatra province. Most importantly,

Ulu (hereafter referred to as OKU) from 2000 to 2003, was seen as likely to be returned for a second term.[27] Although facing corruption allegations at the time of the election,[28] he still retained a good reputation, especially in agricultural policies since assuming the governorship in 2003.[29] While in office, Syahrial energetically visited many places even in remote areas to the extent that he was considered to have stepped in all of the sub-districts in South Sumatra Province.[30] While the name recognition of Alex Noerdin was still mostly confined to the MUBA district before the election campaigns started, Syahrial, as an incumbent, had advantages over Alex in many respects.

Their running mates and supporting political parties were almost equal in vote-gathering power. Syahrial was nominated by PDI-P, the second leading party at the provincial parliament at the time. He partnered with Helmi Yahya, known as a TV talent and a successful businessman, as a running mate.[31] Alex was nominated by the leading party, Golkar. He teamed up with Syahrial's former partner, Edy Yusuf, the district head of OKU at the time, with the intention of splitting the rival's support base.[32]

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he assumed the head of the Public Works Office at the Bangka district, which, at that time, belonged to South Sumatra Province, when he was just 38 years old. After five years in that position, he moved to the OKU district to assume the same position. Two years later, he became the district head of OKU.

[27] Interview with Mahmud, the managing editor of *Sumatera Express*, Palembang, Feb 14, 2011

[28] Syahrial allegedly bribed several national parliament members to arrange the big infrastructure project in the national budget to build a port at the northern part of the province and several paved roads to the port (known as the *Tanjung Api-Api* project). Eventually, in April 2010, the Supreme Court gave Syahrial a three-year prison sentence. *Koran Tempo*, April 22, 2010.

[29] Syahrial won a narrow victory against the incumbent governor at the time, Rosian Arsyad, in an indirect election in South Sumatra's regional parliament. Even though the dominant party during this period, PDI-P, backed Rosian, half of the members of the party went to Syahrial. *Sumatera Express*, August 5, 2003

[30] Interview with Aliandra Pati Kandata, the South Sumatra provincial chair of PDI-P, the deputy chair of the provincial parliament (2009-2014), Palembang, April 24, 2011

[31] Helmi Yahya is also a teacher at a professional training college for accountants.

[32] Edy Yusuf is a former bureaucrat. He had been the vice district head during Syahrial's term of office. Edy took over the district head position when Syahrial left in order to ascend to governorship.

In the survey conducted by Alex's election team six months before the polling day, Alex's popularity was far behind Syahrial's.[33] Having recognized his position in lagging behind Syahrial, Alex Noerdin asked for advice from a newly established political consultant agency, Fox Indonesia, on his election campaigns.[34] Since it was the first job for this agency, which would later become one of the leading political consultant agencies in Indonesia to preside over Yudhoyono's presidential campaigns in 2009, the agency launched full-scale efforts to achieve Alex's election win in order to build its own reputation.

With this agency's assistance, Alex developed an election strategy to campaign hard on his performance in the education and health care sector of the MUBA district. His campaign team coined a catchword to boast himself as "a pioneer to achieve the provision of free education service up to the high school level and universal free health insurance service (*Sang Pelopor Berobat Gratis dan Sekolah Gratis*)". He promised the provision of those services, which he had implemented in the MUBA district, in all the areas of South Sumatra Province. In every campaign speech, he emphasized that what the province needed to implement those kinds of services was only the willingness of the governor, and South Sumatra could become the first province to provide such services.

Most remarkably, at the final phase of the election race, Alex and his running mate pledged clearly in their campaign ads and the TV debate shows that they would resign if they could not fulfill their commitments to provide the services of free education and free health

[33] The survey was conducted by a well-established survey agency, LSI (Indonesian Survey Agency). In that survey, 55 percent of the interviewees supported Syahrial, while 32 percent supported Alex.

[34] LSI recommended Fox Indonesia to Alex. This consultant agency was established in February 2008 by Rizal Mallarangeng and Andi Zulkarnain Mallarangeng (generally known as Choel Mallarangeng), both of whom are brother of Andi Mallarangeng, the spokesman of the Yudhoyono government at the time. Up to that point, Rizal had been a personal political consultant to Abrizal Bakrie. A month after the establishment, the agency received a contract from Alex as a first job. During four months up to the polling day, the chair himself visited South Sumatra at least once in a fortnight. Interview with Rizal Mallarangeng, Jakarta, July 21, 2011

insurance within a year.[35] Along with making such a clear commitment, he even presented a detailed estimated budget amount with regard to the program of free education [36]

To reinforce those pledges, he launched massive election campaigns not only in the media but in the field as well. Alex and his consultancy operation organized several medical teams for providing free health care service, moving from place to place in the province. Renting out a hotel banquet room in Palembang city for a month, the team held briefings on his pledges along with a lunch or dinner four times in a day, each of which hosted around 60 to 100 persons. Participants of those seminars were given a 'free health card' entitling cardholders to free medical care at hospitals so that they could experience such service before Alex was to fulfill his commitment.

Responding to Alex's campaigns to promote his candidacy with clear election pledges, interestingly, even his opponent got dragged into the competition to show such pledges. At the early stage of the election race, Syahrial's team emphasized his stance not to make any irresponsible promises, criticizing Alex's promises as being unfeasible. However, when approaching the end of the campaign period, his team also presented several campaign pledges such as allocation of at least 15 percent of the revenue in the agricultural sector and implementation of a microcredit program.

Such competition to show clear electoral pledges is an outstanding part of this election. However, as was common across Indonesia, both candidates spent lavishly with a huge amount of funds allocated for their electoral campaigns. Both teams had aired TV commercials on nationwide networks beginning six months prior to the polling day, and invited famous singers from Jakarta for their campaign rallies. They even chartered a

[35] *Sumatera Express*, August 19, 2008

[36] *Sumatera Express*, August 28, 2008

helicopter to move around the province.[37] Alex Noerdin officially reported the election expense of Rp. 15 billion (about US $ 1,500,000) to the South Sumatra Election Commission, which many considered to not represent the actual figures.[38] Alex's political consultant, Rizal Mallarangeng, admitted that his client spent at least more than Rp. 50 billion (about US $ 5,000,000).

[37] *Sumatra Express*, August 20, 2008.

[38] The South Sumatra provincial chair of PDI-P even estimated that Alex spent more than Rp.100 billion (US $ 10,000,000). Interview with Aliandra Pati Kandata, April 24, 2011.

Table 4.1 Voting Outcome of South Sumatra Gubernatorial Election 2008 by Pairs of Candidates and Districts and Cites

	Alex Noerdin and Eddy Yusuf	Syahrial Oesman and Helmy Yahya
Ogan Komering Ulu District	73,141	84,053
OKU Timur District	111,114	223,954
OKU Selatan District	84,295	79,124
Ogan Komering Ilir District	172,106	188,058
Ogan Ilir District	92,815	95,719
Muara Enim District	181,902	153,587
Lahat District	105,231	81,143
Empat Lawang District	78,865	23,536
Musi Rawas District	127,803	117,825
Musi Banyuasin District	207,142	54,261
Banyuasin District	188,638	179,846
Palembang City	331,929	368,164
Pagar Alam City	41,859	24,303
Lubuk Linggau City	42,121	43,410
Prabumulih City	27,429	47,390
Totals	1,866,390	1,764,373
Percentage	51.4	48.6
Total Valid Votes	3,630,763	

Source: South Sumatra Election Commission, *Summary Perolehan Suara Dan Rincian Surat Suara Pilkada Provinsi Sumatera Selatan Tahun 2008* [Summary of Voting Outcome of South Sumatra Gubernatorial Election 2008], Palembang: South Sumatra Election Commission, 2008.

With those various campaign strategies, eventually, Alex managed to garner 51.4 percent of the valid votes to defeat Syahrial by only a margin of about 120,000 votes (See Table 4.1). His victory can be attributed to his clear electoral pledges. The benefits of his promised programs were not directly contingent on a vote for Alex, and would be provided on a non-exclusive basis. In this sense, as a method of vote mobilization, Alex Noerdin depended less on clientelism, or a mode of exchange though patronage networks, but more on public goods provision strategy.

Such shifts of electoral strategies with local elites were not often seen across Indonesia. In most of the regional elections, the candidates showed only vague electoral pledges without any specific programs. However, the electoral success of Alex seemingly affected one another with several regional heads such as the South Sulawesi governor. Also, in the Jakarta gubernatorial election of 2012, the mayor of Solo city, Joko Widodo, won by promising several specific electoral pledges, in particular by accommodating interests of the poor, in an impressive way. It is now becoming a model for future candidates. Thus such changes of electoral strategies towards less dependence on clientelistic networks should not be overlooked. The next section will show how such changes indeed resulted in terms of policy outputs.

4.5 Fulfillment of the Campaign Promises

Only a year after assuming the governorship, Alex Noerdin managed to fulfill his two high-profile election pledges. There were two noteworthy points in this implementation phase. First, the provincial public spending on education and health remarkably increased after Alex assumed the governorship. This increase resulted mainly from the allocated budgets for the two programs he promised to the constituents: the school operation grant program and the universal health care program.

The second point is that Alex succeeded in persuading the lower government units to cooperate in implementing his programs. Under the regulations of local governance in Indonesia, many of the authorities, including in the sector of education and health, are devolved to the districts, not to the provinces. Therefore one of the most difficult challenges that provinces face in implementing their original programs is to secure the cooperation of districts. Alex maintained vigorous leadership to overcome this challenge.

Inaugurated in the beginning of November, Alex had to prepare the budget bill for the

fiscal year of 2009 in a short amount of time, which was supposed to be approved in the provincial parliament in December.[39] In order to immediately launch his promised programs, Alex needed to secure budgets for those in this budget bill. In only two months, he had to negotiate not only with the parliament but also with the district governments. In the end, he managed to secure the budgets for the two programs.

Notably, the districts agreed not only to implement those programs but to share the financial burden. As shown in Table 4.2, on aggregate, the districts bore about 30 to 40 percent of the costs, reducing the provincial burden to about 60 to 70 percent. Although some districts such as Palembang and Banyuasin, where Alex's political rival took the top position, bore only less than 20 percent, the lower government units were, by and large, cooperative. As Alex himself boasted, he took a firm attitude in the negotiations with those units, showing his intention that he would not hesitate to accuse them publicly of being a hostile element to the growing people's demands for his programs if they rejected to cooperate with him.[40] With such leadership, the province secured the cooperation of the districts.

[39] Alex was inaugurated on November 8, 2008.

[40] See the news of November 11, 2009 on Alex's official site. http://www.alexnoerdin.info (accessed in January 28, 2011)

Table 4.2. Financial Burden Rate of Districts and Cities for the Provincial Health Insurance Scheme and the Provincial School Operational Assistance from 2009 to 2010

Districts/ Cities	Burden rate for the health insurance scheme (%)		Burden rate for the school operational assistance program (%)	
	2009	*2010*	*2009*	*2010*
Palembang	3	11	8	16
Banyuasin	8	19	9	30
OKU Selatan	20	20	13	40
Ogan Ilir	30	30	32	30
Muara Enim	30	30	55	56
Empat Lawang	30	30	25	30
OKU Timur	31	40	39	40
Musi Rawas	43	50	50	50
Ogan Komering Ulu	50	50	0	40
Ogan Komering Ilir	50	50	27	27
Prabumulih	60	50	33	50
Pagar Alam	60	60	41	50
Lubuk Linggau	60	60	43	43
Lahat	60	60	16	60
Musi Banyuasin	100	100	40	60
Total	34	37	26	37

Source: Based on the Data Provided at South Sumatra Health Office and Education Office to the Author in April 2010 in Palembang.

The school operation grant program started in July 2009 with the start of a new school year.[41] Just a few regions implemented such programs on a province-wide scale, while many have done so at the district level. Complementing the national program (the BOS), the school operation grant program disbursed block grants on a per–pupil basis to all schools at the primary level up to the senior high level.[42] The provincial regulation (*perda*) on this program

[41] The local regulation No.32/2009 on the school operation grant program was approved at the provincial parliament in March 2009.

[42] In 2009 and 2010, the program disbursed Rp. 10,000 (US$ 1.1) per pupil per month to primary schools, Rp. 15,000 (US$ 1.7) to junior secondary schools, Rp. 80,000 (US$ 9.0) to senior high schools, and Rp. 90,000 (US$ 10.0) to vocational schools.

prohibited all of the schools except those categorized as international standard schools (SBI or RSBI) and national standard schools (SSN) to charge any fees of operation to its students and their parents,[43] with the reason that the program, in the estimation of the provincial education office, provided enough grants to the schools to cover all of the operational costs.[44] With this program, the province claimed to have achieved the provision of free education, and proceeded to advertise this fact on the billboards across the province.

The main difficulty with the implementation of this program is that the province does not have enough authority to supervise schools. While the province provided legal foundation for this program with a provincial regulation and its relevant guidelines, the district education offices mainly assumed the supervising task. Without the permission of the districts, the province cannot even check the accounting reports which the school heads submitted to the districts. Even though they may receive the reports of some disobedient schools, the province has no authority to directly punish those schools.[45]

The provincial health insurance program started in January 2009.[46] The program was basically designed on the model of the national insurance program, the *Jamkesmas*. Extending to those not covered by the *Jamkesmas* and other insurance programs such as those for civil servants, the program entitles anyone possessing a South Sumatra identity card to

[43] As to the abbreviation of RSBI, SBI, SSN in Indonesian language, see the list of abbreviation of this dissertation.

[44] In 2011, SBI (or RSBI) accounted 0.3 percent of all the elementary and junior secondary schools, while SSN accounted 2.8 percent. Of all the senior high schools, SBI (or RSBI) accounted for 1.9 percent, while SSN accounted for 23.9 percent.

[45] Interview with Ade Karyana, the head of the South Sumatra education office, Palembang, February 9, 2011.

[46] It started when the provincial parliament passed Local Regulation No.2 of 2009 on the implementation of the provincial health insurance program. The program was named *Jamsoskes Sumsel Semesta* (Universal Health Insurance in South Sumatra).

free health care at local hospitals and primary health centers.[47] Setting the same scope of coverage as the Jamkesmas, it even covers relatively expensive medical treatments such as radiation treatment for cancer.[48] Even it employs the software used for *Jamkesmas* with which the hospitals compile the claims of the health services they provided to the members of the provincial health insurance for reimbursement.[49]

Over the four years it has been operating, the budget allocations to this program have remained stable at around Rp. 240 billion (US$ 27 million).[50] With those relatively large budgets, as shown in Table 4.2, the provincial program covered 55 percent of the total number of residents, around 7.3 million, in South Sumatra Province, while the Jamkesmas covered 38 percent.[51] Together with other insurance programs, South Sumatra achieved universal coverage of health insurance to all the people of South Sumatra. According to the data of 2011 (Table 4.2), such provinces numbered only four: Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Bali, South Sulawesi and South Sumatra. Even among the four, South Sumatra was one of the

[47] You can receive free in- or out-patient care at public local hospitals and participating private facilities with an appropriate referral from *puskesmas*; a South Sumatra identity card; and a letter issued at the village to declare you are not covered by any health insurance scheme. The Jamkesmas program admits in-patient care only in the third-class room, which prevents rich people from utilizing this scheme. If you need an advanced medical treatment at the hospitals in Palembang city, you are allowed to receive free treatment there with an appropriate referral from the hospitals and a letter of approval from the district health office. If the hospitals in Palembang judge that you need more advanced treatment, with an approval letter from the provincial health office, you are allowed to move to the hospitals in Jakarta, such as the Cipto Mangunkusmo hospital.

[48] See the Guideline for the Implementation of this Program, *Pedoman Pelaksanaan Program Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan Sumatera Selatan Semesta Tahun 2009*, issued in 2009 by the South Sumatra Provincial Health Department.

[49] With the assistance of the Australian Agency for International Development, the central government developed a software for reimbursement arrangement, which is generally called Indonesia-specific Diagnostic Related Group (Ina-DRG)

[50] The annual budget for this program was calculated with the estimated cost of Rp. 5000 (US$ 0.6) per person per month to cover around four million people while the estimation of the Jamkesmas was set at Rp. 6250 (US$ 0.7) per person per month (in 2011).

[51] See the report of this program for the year of 2010, *Laporan Program Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan (JAMSOSKES) SUMSEL SEMESTA Tahun 2010*, made by the South Sumatra Provincial Health Department.

pioneers to implement such a program. Moreover, in terms of the number of the beneficiaries, South Sumatra's program covered the third largest amount, following South Sulawesi and East Java.

Table 4.3. Beneficiaries of Health Insurance Schemes in 2011 by Province

Province	Jamkesda		Jamkesmas		Subscribers of the other insurance programs (%)*	Total (%)
	Number of beneficiaries	% of the provincial population	Number of beneficiaries	% of the provincial population		
South Sumatra	4,016,349	55.0	2,793,317	38.3	6.7	100.0
Bali	2,535,886	71.8	548,617	15.5	12.6	100.0
Bangka Belitung	739,027	65.1	116,726	10.3	15.0	90.3
South Sulawesi	4,721,946	58.5	2,449,737	30.3	11.2	100.0
Riau Archipelago	967,059	54.8	277,589	15.7	13.0	83.5
East Kalimantan	1,342,361	39.9	910,925	27.1	21.2	88.2
Riau	2,042,651	37.7	1,230,911	22.7	6.3	66.7
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	1,731,925	35.0	2,682,285	54.2	10.7	100.0
Maluku	436,574	28.5	840,680	54.9	11.3	94.7
South Kalimantan	980,848	27.3	843,837	23.5	10.9	61.7
Gorontalo	202,374	19.5	431,299	41.5	9.8	70.9
Central Kalimantan	421,962	18.9	763,556	34.1	19.5	72.5
Nusa Tenggara Timur	725,824	17.1	2,798,871	65.8	5.2	88.0
Maluku Utara	170,151	16.4	302,436	29.2	18.0	63.7
North Sulawesi	339,323	15.2	485,084	21.8	14.9	51.8
West Kalimantan	585,157	13.5	1,584,451	36.7	18.3	68.5
Nusa Tenggara Barat	572,976	12.9	2,028,491	45.7	6.9	65.6
Central Sulawesi	336,601	12.8	851,027	32.3	10.3	55.4
West Java	5,002,792	11.7	10,700,175	25.1	6.5	43.3
North Sumatra	1,051,403	8.1	4,124,247	31.9	12.4	52.4
Jambi	200,779	6.5	784,842	25.4	6.3	42.1
West Sumatra	279,272	5.9	1,361,281	29.0	13.5	48.4
DI Yogyakarta	204,157	5.9	942,129	27.4	23.6	57.0
Bengkulu	80,500	4.7	632,098	36.9	12.6	54.2
Southeast Sulawesi	89,643	4.6	1,144,447	58.6	14.4	77.6
Lampung	339,594	4.2	3,146,184	38.7	7.6	50.5
DKI Jakarta	341,000	3.7	675,718	7.4	26.4	37.5
Central Java	1,172,875	3.6	11,715,881	35.8	7.3	46.6
East Java	1,291,881	3.5	10,710,051	28.6	12.0	44.0
West Sulawesi	14,500	1.2	473,817	40.7	7.6	49.6
Banten	37,978	0.4	2,910,506	27.5	9.3	37.2
Papua	7,950	0.3	1,943,517	72.5	7.5	80.3
West Papua	0	0	521,558	71.5	11.1	82.5

* It includes health insurance programs for government officials, military officials and employees at private companies.

Source: Calculated by This Author Based on the Data from the Document of Ministry of Health, *Profil Data Kesehatan Indonesia Tahun 2011*, published in 2012. See page 198.

The main issue with the implementation of this program is the scarcity of third class rooms (*Kelas III*) at local hospitals into which the benefit package of the program (and the *Jamkesmas*) allows members to be admitted. Those rooms in the South Sumatra public hospitals have been packed all the time, resulting in patients needing to wait one to two weeks on average while asking for a vacant bed at the reception desk every day from morning to evening.[52] Another issue is that the doctors give priority to customers who pay out-of pocket because of an incentive they can get for serving them, as is also found in the Jamkesmas program (Rosser 2012: 266). Although having such problems, the program, as a whole, has provided a minimum social security to the South Sumatra people. Few people could undergo relatively expensive medical treatments such as a radiation treatment for cancer without the aid of the program.[53]

In this way, these two fee-free programs have been targeting a vast majority of residents. Residents in the province could enjoy benefits from these programs without being verified that they would actually deliver their votes to Alex. Using the analytical concepts of Magaloni and others, Alex Noerdin gave significant weight to providing public goods rather than utilizing clientelistic networks as a method of vote mobilization. It is worth noting that these two programs were relatively free from corruption allegations, since much of the implementation tasks were entrusted to the district and city governments as discussed above. South Sumatra government undertook the role of designing the programs, overseeing the budget use of district and city governments, and bearing more than 60 percent of financial burden (see again Table 4.2).

[52] Confidential interviews with 14 cancer patients, the beneficiaries of the provincial health insurance program, at the Mohammad Hussein hospital, Palembang, April 20, 2011.

[53] In 2010, through the provincial health insurance program, around 70,000 patients received in-patient care and around 140,000 received out-patient care at the local hospitals in the province.

The fact that Alex's South Sumatra government gave weight to delivering benefits to a vast majority of residents was also showed in the budget allocation. Those two fee-free programs entailed a considerably large budget, although part of it was shouldered by the districts. Accordingly, the province's budget allocations to the education and health sector significantly increased. In 2010, the budget for the school operation grant program accounted for more than half of the total budget allocations to the education sector, while the budget for the health insurance program accounted for nearly 40 percent of the total budget in the health sector. Compared to the 2008 budget, the last budget during Syahrial Oesman's term, public spending on education nearly doubled in 2009, both as a nominal value and percentage of the total budget, while the public spending on health more than tripled (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 South Sumatra's Public Spending on Education, Health and Public Works

Year	Spending on Education as % of Total Budget	Spending on Health as % of Total Budget	Spending on Public Works as % of Total Budget
2008	8.4	4.8	30.4
2009	16.1	14.8	16.1
2010	17.4	13.0	23.1

Source: Calculated based on the Annual Reports of South Sumatra Budget (APBD) from 2008 to 2010. Documents provided at West Sumatra Financial Bureau in April 2010 in Palembang.

Even compared to the other provinces in Indonesia, Alex's South Sumatra government allocated a good proportion of the total budget to education and health sectors. As shown in Figure 4.1, South Sumatra's public spending on health in 2010 was the third largest as a percentage of the total budget after East Java and Central Java. In the public spending on education, South Sumatra ranked 7th out of 33 provinces. As just described, it is undeniable

that South Sumatra Province focused its efforts on education and health.

Figure 4.1. Each Province's Public Spending on Education and Health in 2010



Source: Calculated from the Data Provided by an Official from the Ministry of Home Affairs to This Author in April 2010 in Jakarta.

4.6. Corruption Allegation and Solid Inner Circle

Besides the programs discussed above, two other points should be noted concerning the administration of Alex Noerdin. Firstly, he blatantly appointed his solid inner circle members to strategic positions in the South Sumatra government. The most noticeable case

was the appointment of his blood brother as head of the Health Office. In addition, he brought dozens of his close aides from the MUBA district to the provincial government.[54] Those trusted staff took the same positions that they assumed at MUBA. Many strategic positions such as the head of the Public Works Office, the head of the Education Office, the head of the Mines Office and the head of the Agriculture Office were assigned in such a way.[55] Aside from these appointments, he also tended to prefer the people from his father's hometown, the Lahat district.[56]

Another point is Alex's alleged involvement in the corruption cases. The well-known allegation involves the case of building projects related to the large-scale international sports event, the SEA GAMES, for which Alex Noerdin successfully led South Sumatra to become one of the host regions. Two years after the investigation started, at the time of writing this paper, the prosecutors had just acquired Alex as a witness, not as a suspect, although in the trials for the alleged mastermind, one of the witnesses testified that a few percent of the project expenses went to Alex Noerdin. Aside from this allegation, his rival political rival accused Alex of being involved in several corruption cases when he was the MUBA district head.[57]

In this way, Alex Noerdin has been, with no doubt, a controversial figure. But he concurrently represents a new aspect of the local elite. The achievements as discussed above should not be overlooked. The case suggests local elites are becoming more responsive to

[54] At the time as MUBA district head, Alex Noerdin preferred to appoint the bureaucrats who had built their career at the provincial government rather than the bureaucrats who had spent most of the time at the MUBA district. Thus those close aides are not necessarily from the MUBA district.

[55] Aside from those mentioned, the head of the Citizen Empowerment Bureau and the head of the Regional Civil Service Agency were such cases.

[56] For example, one of the specialist staff members (*staf alih*), the head of the Tourism Office was from the Lahat district.

[57] Interview with Ahmad Yani, a national parliament member (2009-2014) from PPP, on April 26, 2010 in Palembang.

non-elite interests in some regions.

4.7 Summary

An analysis of the trajectory of Alex Noerdin up to the accession to the MUBA district head unmistakably shows that he was typical of the old elites who were nurtured during the Suharto era. His corruption allegations indicate the continuity of local elites' practices in exploiting state resources. However, the other side of his governance still should not be overlooked. His clear strategy to accommodate non-elite interests indicates that the mode of ruling of local elites is partly changing. Here, it should be noted that South Sumatra's budget allocations for the health and education sector have been considerably increased since Alex assumed the governorship.

The case indicates two points to challenge the Indonesian studies stressing continuity. First, without replacement of vested politico-economic interests, some change could still occur. The persons within those interests may initiate such changes. Importantly, those individuals are not necessarily clean and reformist leaders but rather ambitious and shrewd ones. Ironically, often times they do not escape from corruption allegations.

Second, the introduction of direct local-head elections has changed the political milieu in which local elites engage in fierce competition. Induced by such competition, at least in electoral mobilization, gubernatorial candidates are becoming less dependent on patronage networks. As showed in South Sumatra, such shifts of strategies of local elites started to be reflected on the policy outputs.

Such changes are facilitated by the emergence of local leaders who envision their career path from a district head to a governor. In the gubernatorial elections, they can resort to their achievements during the term as the district head. It makes their political pledges more specific than other candidates. It also encourages district heads to be responsive to the

demands of constituents in order to establish a good reputation

However the case also suggests the limitations of these changes. It is an open question whether Noerdin's achievements as Musi Banyuasin district head were somewhat exaggerated. Although his two high-profile programs were implemented over a period of five years, he drastically boosted the budget allocations for these programs only a year before the election. Without this increase, he could not have claimed to achieve the provision of free education and health. In many situations, politically-motivated programs have been implemented for only a short period of time. The continuity of the provincial programs of two fee-free public services also remains to be seen. If the governor is replaced, those programs representing Alex's term could also be replaced.

Chapter Five

The Politics of Promising Clean Government:

The Case of West Sumatra

This chapter examines another case of the new type of local leader, Gamawan Fauzi, the former Solok district head, who turned to the governor of West Sumatra. As Alex Noerdin represents a typical way to emerge to be recognized nationally as a laudable local leader by implementing generous fee-free education and healthcare programs, Gamawan represents another typical way of local leaders, emerging as a 'clean' local leader. While the former type consolidates its reputation often by using its own abundant revenue, this case study argues that, the 'clean' type of local leader often times comes from not-abundant-revenue regions therefore they need to find another financial resources. In the case of Gamawan, his success in emerging as a laudable local leader mostly attributed to the assistance of international donor agencies.

Gamawan Fauzi became widely known for implementing good practices, especially in terms of tackling corruption when he held the district head position from 1995 to 2005. Having gained a reputation as a successful district head, he won the gubernatorial election in 2005. Subsequently, he advanced his career further to be appointed as Minister of Home Affairs in October 2009 in the second cabinet of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Gamawan was quite active in appealing not only to the central government but also to international donor agencies, displaying a strong commitment to implement their programs. As a result of his lobbying, Solok became one of the favorite places of these aid agencies, and numerous programs kept coming to this district. With the assistance of these programs, as this chapter will show later, Gamawan organized several civil society organizations (CSOs) and facilitated their activities. His most prominent program was the Integrity Pact, with financial

assistance coming from the German aid agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). In this program, Solok created a CSO for public procurement monitoring. In another GTZ program, it formed another CSO for monitoring government services. While maintaining effective control of these CSOs, he consolidated the reputation of facilitating the activities of CSOs in tackling with corruption.

Another important feature of Gamawan Fauzi is his political shrewdness. It was clearly manifested during the presidential election in 2009 when Gamawan committedly supported to the incumbent President Yudhoyono. Though holding a governor position, he became the vice chair of the advisory board (*Dewan Pakar*) of Yudhoyono's provincial election campaign team. Following Gamawan, all but three of the district heads and mayors in the province placed their name on the list of the advisory board. Moreover, in the grand event of Yudhoyono and his pair, Budiono, to announce their candidacy for the presidential election in Bandung, Gamawan, on behalf of all supporters, expressed support for them. In the end, Yudhoyono secured around 80 % of votes in West Sumatra, despite the fact that his rival, Yusuf Kalla's wife was from West Sumatera province. Soon after the election, Gamawan was appointed as the Minister of Home Affairs. In addition to this episode, his relationship with West Sumatran political figures in Jakarta is not negligible. Gamawan especially maintained good connections with a former governor and a cabinet minister from the Suharto era, Hasan Basri Durin and Azwar Anas. He gained their trust when he served at the provincial government, and fostered these connections up to the present. When he ran for West Sumatra gubernatorial election in 2005, these two former governors publicly endorsed him. Though both of them were no longer influential and powerful at that time, their endorsement still served to raise Gamawan's reputation as a credible local leader.

This chapter analyzes how Gamawan got its reputation as a good local leader. It reveals a mutually beneficial relationship between the ambitious local government head and

donor agencies. Then this chapter examines how Gamawan competed and eventually won in the gubernatorial election, and how he attempted to fulfill his campaign promises to achieve clean and effective government after election. The case shows another case of increasingly responsive local government to the demands of majority of the constituents, initiated by the leadership of a local government head.

5.1 Competition to Gain Donor Agency Sponsored Programs

This chapter sheds light on a new competition in which local governments have engaged after decentralization, the competition revolves around international donor agencies. One of the key concepts of decentralization is that competition among local governments brings advantages. The classic and prominent argument on competition at a sub-national level is Tiebout's theory in which citizens are seen as 'voting with their feet'. Rational citizens will compare different packages of public goods and services of surrounding localities and move for the best available services within reach, thus inducing local policy improvements (Tiebuot 1956).

However, in developing countries, such competition is likely to be less intensive. Residents have limited access to information on the public services of other localities. This study indicates another type of competition, the competition for donor-agency-sponsored programs, is also a significant aspect. Such competition has been often observed but rarely evaluated in other researches.

The case of Gamawan shows that there are many advantages to winning this competition. These advantages could be categorized the following three advantages. The first is the positive economic effect. Donor agency programs not only bring new jobs into the locality but also often provide financial incentives to local governments with conditions to committedly follow their instructions. However, in most of these programs, the budget is not

abundant; hence the direct economic benefits are limited. The second advantage comes in the hints and ideas for reforming governance that they provide. Last but not least, there is an advantage in the publicity that the recipient government may enjoy. Donor agencies vigorously encourage advertisement of their achievements and contributions.

Regarding the propensity of donor agencies to vigorously promote their achievements, it partly results from their recognition of one key proposition of decentralization, that local governments can try experiments which could not safely be tried at the national level and eventually come up with innovative policies. Decentralization 'increases the chances of more effective development strategies being generated and subsequently diffused' (Turner and Hulme 1997:157). Recognizing these benefits, donor agencies, cooperating with the central government and local media, have collected the information of innovative practices and disseminated them as good practices.[1] Oftentimes initiatives for implementing good practices come from aid agencies. They implement pilot projects in some localities, and then praise their promoted measures by themselves in order that other local governments emulate them.[2]

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[1] In Indonesia, mainly, the State Ministry of Administrative Reforms has role to disseminate innovative practices. Every journal of its magazine, *Layanan Publik*, has reference to good practices of local governments. It gives periodically awards for institutions which provide good public services (*Citra Pelayanan Prima and Citra Bakti Abdi Negara*). As to media, weekly magazine *TEMPO* annually selected 8 to 10 good local governments. A major local news paper, *Jawa Pos* also annually evaluates good practices in East Jawa Province. Donor agencies and its associates closely cooperated with these institutions to collect and share good practices data. Notably GTZ had the program to collect the information of good practices with cooperation with the State Ministry of Administrative Reform. Often donor agencies promote the achievements of their pilot projects to these institutions.

[2] In often cases, the programs experimented in the pilot projects become an officially recommended measure by the central government. In Indonesia, for example, AusAID implemented its pilot program called PATEN (*Pelayanan Administrasi Terpadu kecamatan*, or Sub-district Integrated Administration Services) for improving permission management at sub-district offices (*kantor camat*) in five regencies/cities in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province in 2008. It delegates authority of giving several kinds of permissions to sub-district office so that the residents do not have to visit district office or city hall. Finally it became a measure recommended by the Ministry of Home Affairs to other local governments. (*Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 4 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pedoman Pelayanan*

Gamawan Fauzi committedly implemented such pilot projects of donor agencies, and his measures were lauded as innovative by donor agencies and their collaborative national government institutions, and as a consequence, he consolidated a good reputation. The case indicates that receiving donor agency programs is one of the most efficient means for gaining nation-wide reputation especially for the local government heads of resource-limited locality.

5.2 Track to Solok District Head

Gamawan Fauzi was born to the eighth of fifteen children in 1957, growing up at a farming village in Solok district in West Sumatra province. His father was a public officer at the Department of Education and Culture. Educated at the district until high school, Gamawan moved to Padang city and entered the Faculty of Law in the University of Andalas, the best university in West Sumatra province. After the graduation, Gamawan became a local government official at West Sumatra Province and successfully advanced his career in the provincial government office.

Since the early stage of his career as a bureaucrat, Gamawan had stand out from all the others and been recognized as an 'up-and-comer'. Soon after starting to work at the province, he was assigned to the Office of Social-Political Affairs (*Kantor Direktrat Sosial Politik*), one of the most important offices during the Suharto era, the head of which was usually assumed by a military man. One key task of this office was to mobilize votes for the Suharto's former electoral machine, Golkar.

Having gained experience at this strategic office, he reached the first turning point of his career, becoming the private secretary (*Sekretaris privadi,* or *Sespri*) of the governor, Hasan Basri Durin (1987-97). While still serving as the private secretary, Gamawan was promoted further to become the head of the public relations department (1993-95). This

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Administrasi Terpadu Kecamatan).

three-year experience of working as a spokesman of the governor provided good learning opportunities to Gamawan on how to communicate and build good relationship with local media.[3] Many indicate this experience made Gamawan prominently adept at managing the image and making use of local media, and it will serve him well later in the gubernatorial election.[4]

Then, the trust of the governor he had gained in these positions led to another turning point of his career. At the age of only 38, he was appointed as the district head of Solok in 1995. He was one of the youngest district heads in Indonesia at that time.[5] Even though it was still during the Suharto era and district heads were not given broad discretion, the young district head started to stand out among the others by responding quickly to the government instruction on One Stop Services (hereafter referred to as OSS, and in Indonesian language, it is called as *Unit Pelayanan Terpadu*).[6] Solok was one of the earliest districts to implement this concept around 1997.[7] In 2000, Gamawan gave this service a new twist, making it available for residents to apply for official licenses through the postal service.

Additionally, he made several administrative reforms. The most prominent reform was to abolish project honoraria, instead a local benefits package was provided to all local

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[3] One of the tasks of a private secretary is to act as a liaison between the governor and local media. It partly overlaps the task of the head of the public relations department. Thus altogether Gamawan worked as a spokesman of the governor for three years.

[4] Interview with Edi Indrizal, a professor at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Andalas, Padang, April 10, 2010.

[5] *Surya Karya*, July 7, 2005.

[6] Gianyar district introduced innovative One Stop Service (OSS) in 1994. In 1996 Ministry of Home Affairs gave instructions to all of districts and cities to implement OSS. This information was gathered at Ministry of Home Affairs, Jakarta, January 30, 2010. See also the report of Ministry of Home Affairs on One Stop Service, *Pengembangan Perijinan Satu Atap di Daerah. Laporan Akhir*.

[7] The first wave of six districts and cities to establish OSS were Solok, Gianyar, Sidoarjo and Bandung districts, and Tangerang and Bitung cities.

bureaucrats, starting in 2002.[8] Honoraria tended to be enjoyed by only a few officials, such as the district head, deputy district head and heads of departments. Through this reform, all bureaucrats— including teachers and clinic center officials— could receive the benefits package.

As described in the introduction of this chapter, these programs of Solok government are frequently praised by the central government, local media and international donor agencies. One academic, von Luebke argues Solok's good governance attributes primarily to Gamawan's leadership (von Luebke 2009). Actually such argument of emphasizing the role of local government head is often found in the comparative study of local governance. For example, examining the case of Mexico, a leading researcher in this field, Grindle emphasizes the significance of mayor's leadership in leading to a good performance of local government. Meanwhile, according to his study, active civic engagement does not necessary induce good performance (Grindle 2007). Therefore, rather than just emphasizing the role of local government heads' leadership, it is important to analyze the ways in which local government heads demonstrate leadership. As the part of demonstrating such leadership, Gamawan cooperated closely with donor agencies by incorporating their ideas into his program and implementing them to improve governance. The next section examines how these donor agencies contributed to the emergence of Gamawan as an icon of anti-corruption.

5.3 Role of Donor Agencies to Consolidate Gamawan's Reputation

5.3.1 Implementing Donor Agency Programs

This study identified three major donor agency programs which contributed to the reputation of Gamawan as a reformer of tackling corruption. Two of them were sponsored by

[8] Gorontalo province and Solok district have both claimed to be first to implement this change. This information was gathered at Ministry of Home Affairs, Jakarta, January 29, 2010.

GTZ and the last one by the World Bank.

a. GTZ Program for Supporting Civil Society Organization

One typical program drawn to Solok by Gamawan's energetic appeal was GTZ's program for organizing a CSO for monitoring public services. At first, Solok district was not selected when GTZ announced the locations of its program in 2001. They had chosen Salatiga city and Bima district. However, Gamawan did not want to give up and visited the GTZ office in Jakarta, asking them directly why his district was not selected. He showed his enthusiasm and readiness to implement this program. His appeal was eventually answered when the GTZ program did not work well in Salatiga city and GTZ decided to change the location to Solok district.[9]

In the middle of 2002, Solok and GTZ agreed to bear the costs of organizing a CSO on a fifty-fifty basis. Gamawan assembled academics, journalists and representatives of local communities, explaining the plan to form a CSO. This new organization was named LPPI (Independent Observer and Advisory Board).[10] They elected a person with significant experience leading a religious educational organization, BKMT (Recitation Group Contact Board), as the chairman.[11] This individual has been the provincial branch head of BKMT in West Sumatra since 1998. He himself claimed to be quite close to Gamawan because they had the same vision of developing the district based on Islamic ethics.[12] The secretary of LPPI was recruited from academics. He was Vice Rector of UMMY (University of

9 Interview with Tumpal Simanjuntak, senior advisor at GTZ SfGG (Support for Good Governance), Jakarta, August 25, 2009.

10 LPPI stands for in Indonesian language *Lembaga Pengawas dan Pengaduan Independen*.

11 BKMT stands for *Badan Kontak Majelis Ta'lim*.

12 Interview with Nafrul, the chairman of LPPI, Solok, March 10, 2009.

Mahaputra Muhammad Yamin)[13] in Solok district and became acquainted with Gamawan through monitoring activities in a donor agency program for alleviating the impact of the economic crisis in 1998.[14] Before LPPI was launched, this academic, with the recommendation of Gamawan, was appointed as the head of Education Committee (*Kepala Dewan Pendidikan*) of Solok district in 2002.[15] With exclusion of some founding board members achieved through the rules of the organization, soon only these close to Gamawan led this organization.

LPPI started off at the beginning of 2003 on schedule, although the district failed to prepare the promised funds for it.[16] It received complaints from residents and investigated them. When they found alleged mismanagement of the government, they reported their findings directly to the district head. Once or twice in a month, they met with Gamawan to share information on mismanagement and corruption. For the first two years, LPPI was quite active to supervise and condemn alleged corruption of bureaucrats, although they were relatively minor cases. Thanks to their reports, for example, the portion of a part-time teacher's salary that had been illegally skimmed off by an administrator was returned (case 4 Table 5.1). GTZ praised LPPI's activities and tried to disseminate their achievements as an example of good practices.[17] Having established their reputation, LPPI and Gamawan were

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[13] UMMY stands for *Universitas Mahaputra Muhammad Yamin.*

[14] This was thee Social Safety Net Program (*Jaring Pengaman Sosial*), funded by World Bank and ADB and other bilateral donors.

[15] The head of Education Committee was supposed to be elected at the meeting of all of the school committees at the district. However, in 2002, time prohibited sending representative to a national meeting, thus Muharizal was appointed without the normal process on the recommendation of Gamawan. Interview with Muharizal, secretary of LPPI, Solok, November 11, 2009.

[16] GTZ and Solok district were each supposed to provide Rp. 50 million. However, Solok prepared only Rp. 15 million, while GTZ fulfilled its commitment.

[17] See the GTZ report on the good practice of civil society organization (GTZ 2006).

invited to the awards ceremony of *Citra Pelayanan Prima* (good public service award) held by the State Ministry for Administrative Reform in 2004, although not as nominees or winners.

Table 5.1. Major Findings of LPPI Reported to the District Head (2003-2004)

Reported Case	Responsible Person
① Selling subsidized rice (intended for the poor) in the open market	Subdistrict Head (Camat)
② Selling subsidized fertilizer at market rates	Head of Subdistrict Office of Agriculture Department
③ Falsifying reports in a tree planting program (GNRHR)	Head of Subdistrict Office of Forestry Department
④ Skimming off a portion of a part-time teacher's salary	Head of Subdistrict Office of Education Department
⑤ Instituting a compulsory fee on parents in the name of a school uniform fee	School Head
⑥ Selling a cow provided to a farmers' group by a national program	Farmers' Group Leader

Source: Collected through personal interviews with the members of LPPI in March 2009 in Solok.

However LPPI's activities were strictly under the control of Gamawan. LPPI was careful not to put much pressure on the local government. It was quite rare to report to police officers or state prosecutors. The persons accused reached only as high as officials at the sub-district (*kecamatan*) level. After reporting to the district head, they did not question whether the persons responsible for the mismanagement were punished or not. According to the Head of Solok Personnel Affairs Bureau at that time, no one was given any heavy punishment in cases related with LPPI reports. Usually cases were dealt with by the relevant head of department with the letter of caution. At best the persons involved in cases were

moved to another place with the same position.[18] For example, in the case of one to four in the Table 5.1, all of the responsible persons of the alleged misappropriation (one head of sub-district office and three department heads at the sub-district office) were just moved to the other sub-district office without any sanction on career advancement or salary.

b. Integrity Pact

Gaining the trust of GTZ led to another significant program, the Integrity Pact. This policy became the symbol of his achievement to reduce corruption and led him to receive the Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award. The program was funded by GTZ and its associate, Transparency International Indonesia (TII), designed and implemented the program with cooperation of International Procurement Watch. With strong recommendation of GTZ, Solok was selected as a location. It became the first place to implement the Integrity Pact.[19]

The Integrity Pact is a public pledge not to engage in corrupt practices. Recently, it has become a common term used throughout administrative offices in Indonesia. Every minister of President Yudhoyono's cabinet signed the Integrity Pact when they assumed their posts. The practice of a written integrity pledge has been already implemented at five national ministries.[20] What differentiates the concept of the Integrity Pact of TII program from the others is that it emphasizes the importance of an independent monitoring organization. Moreover, the program focused on the public procurement process which they believe to be

[18] Interview with the former Head of Personnel Affairs Bureau of Solok District (2003-2004), Bukittinggi, November 25, 2009. SK Bupati (letters of decision by the district head) related with punishment to bureaucrats were also consulted.

[19] As of August 2009, Integrity Pact Program of TII has been implemented in twenty districts/cities. Interview with Heny Yulianto, project officer of TII, Jakarta, August 21, 2009.

[20] They are the State Ministry of Administrative Reform, the Ministry of Communication and Information, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Religion, and the Ministry of Forestry.

the most susceptible to corrupt practices.[21]

The preparation process started in the middle of 2003. At the end of that year, the Integrity Pact policy officially started with a ceremony in which the district head, deputy district head, and all department heads signed a piece of cloth which would be put in a frame and displayed on the wall. Alongside the pomp and circumstance of the launch, the program supported the creation of a monitoring association, APPI (*Aliansi Pendorong Pakta Integritas*, Alliance for Supporting the Integrity Pact). Its main work is to supervise whether the quality of project matches the promises in the bidding documents. In the middle of 2004, it started with 27 members from 18 local CSOs, most of which were quite new and small. Many were organized just one or two years before the launching of APPI, and their activities depended heavily on just a few individuals.[22] Many of them were not even registered at the district office.[23] The members of LPPI also joined in this organization at the time of launching, but were soon alienated.[24] APPI coordinates the activities of each CSO to work in line with program demands. The chief of APPI is an individual who had just finished the technical school in Bandung to become a notary and established a small CSO for monitoring local governance after he came back to Solok. He is known in the district as a journalist.

In 2004 APPI checked nine of the largest procurement projects in Solok. Three out of nine projects received special attention and were finally declared "problematic" in local

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21 Interview with Jonny Oeyoen, project officer of TII, Jakarta, August 17, 2009.

22 Active members are mainly from small and new CSOs such as LAPAU, SURAU, PETIR, PERMATA, PKSM-PERAK, PADAT and WIDYASWARA. Out of 27 members, two are students and two are professors at the University of Mahaputra Muhammad Yamin. Interview with Ilyasmadi, the secretary of APPI, Solok, 10 August 2009.

23 30 NGOs (LSM) were registered at the Solok District at the time of December 2008. Most of the NGOs which joined in APPI were not registered at the district office except three NGOs, LAPAU, PETIR and PKSM-PERAK.

24 Interview with Muharizal, secretary of LPPI, Solok, November 11, 2009

newspapers.[25] The relationship between APPI members and Gamawan was deemed to be not close. According to the members, Gamawan responded to their findings by just advising them to report directly to the Department of Public Works by themselves. Not long before they reported these cases, Gamawan left the position for the gubernatorial election.[26]

c. Initiative for Local Governance Reform and Local Regulation No.5 of 2004

In terms of economic benefits, the World Bank Program, Initiative for Local Governance Reform (ILGR, known as P2TPD in Indonesian language)[27] was significant for Solok. It allocated relatively large amount of incentive funds for local governments, though Gamawan just successfully led the government to receive this program during preparation phase and actually his successors' government benefited from its incentive funds. However, in the course of implementing several measures instructed and promoted by this donor agency program, Gamawan, again, gained nation-wide reputation.

In the preparation phase, the program set several conditions for local governments to join. One of the main conditions was to make a regulation stipulating the mechanism for receiving complaints from residents. To meet this condition, Solok district made Local Regulation No.5 of 2004 on transparent governance and citizen participation, referring to the regulation at Gorontalo city as an example.[28] It stipulated the organization of a Committee of Transparency and Participation to function as ombudsman. Because it fitted the concept of

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[25] Three projects were the Convention Hall project, the Pipe Water Channel project, and the Bridge project.

[26] Interview with Elyunus, the chairman of APPI, Solok, August 10, 2009.

[27] *Prakarsa Pembaharuan Tata Pemerintahan Daerah* (P2TPD)

[28] Gorontalo City did not receive support from the ILGR program but had already formed its mechanism for receiving complaints from residents. Interview with Elyunus, Solok, August 10, 2009.

the Integrity Pact, TII vigorously encouraged Gamawan to form such a committee. The chief of APPI was involved in drafting the regulation.

Solok became one of the first to make such regulation among candidate local governments to pass the preparation phase. Therefore it consolidated Gamawan's reputation further as a local leader of increasing transparency. The regulation was frequently applauded in Jakarta, although it had not yet been implemented at that time. (Legowo and Djadijono 2007)

Having met the other conditions, Solok district was selected to receive support from the ILGR program.[29] Only 14 out of 40 candidates passed through the preparation phase. In West Sumatra, Pesisir Selatan district failed to meet the conditions, while Solok and Tanah Datar successfully passed to the next phase. Solok received Rp. 26 billion in total during the term of Gamawan's successor (see Table 5.2). For a district with scant natural resources, these funds were no small sum. The district government used the entirety of the funds for improving infrastructure, such as paving of roads and reconstruction of bridges.[30]

[29] Those conditions included publishing the annual budget on posters put up in every sub-district and allocating block grant to villages.

[30] Interview with Elza, program officer of ILGR at Solok, Padang, November 10, 2009.

Table 5.2 Incentive Fund of ILGR Program to Solok District

Year	Incentive Fund (Billion Rp.)
2007	5.5
2009	5.5
2010	5.5
	9.5*
Total	16.5

* In the final year, an additional Rp. 9.5 billion was provided as a reward to meet the ILGR's conditions.
Source: Provided at Regional Development Planning Body of Solok District to the Author in October 2010 in Solok.

5.3.2 Contribution of Donor Agency programs to the Prominence of Gamawan

In addition to these three programs, Solok government under the leadership of Gamawan received several programs for improving governance from other donor agencies such as US-AID and Asia Foundation. Gaining trust from one institution led successively to the next program. For example, in 2004, a program of supporting schools for early education of the Kartika Sukarno Foundation, the Sukarno's daughter-affiliated philanthropic foundation, came to Solok because TII recommended this locality to the foundation when asked advice on the location of this program.[31] Donor agency programs tended to concentrate on places with good credit. The agencies are closely connected, and the information on their partners is shared among them. They try to avoid corrupt and inactive partners for achieving their targets. Thus, once a district builds a reputation for its commitment, programs will keep coming.

From the perspective of economic effects, most of these projects were less significant. The more significant merit of these programs was their ability to disseminate information nationwide. International donor agencies frequently share information with the central

[31] Interview with Jonny Oeyoen, Jakarta, August 17, 2009. The program of the Kartika Sukarno Foundation was to support schools for early education.

government, CSOs in Jakarta, and academics. They often publish books that applaud their own achievements.

Importantly, Gamawan was quite aware of their ability to publicize programs. According to the project officer of TII, Gamawan had already discussed with CSOs about the 2005 gubernatorial election when they were preparing for the Integrity Pact in 2003. TII promised him to advertise his achievements nationwide.[32] TII itself also had a clear motivation to disseminate the achievements of their core program.

Then, in September 2004, Gamawan received the Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award which made him well-known nationally. This award would serve him well as evidence of his success during the subsequent election campaign. The award was established mainly by CSO activists tackling corruption issues with the financial assistance of business entrepreneurs. The chief of TII (as of 2009), Teten Masduki, is one of the founders of the award, although he was not directly related with TII in 2004 when Gamawan won.[33] Winners were selected by independent intellectuals. However much of recommendations and information provided to the judges were from CSOs and donor agencies. Thus it is undeniable that TII's intention to disseminate its program and the trust of CSOs which Gamawan gained through the Integrity

[32] Interview with Jonny Oeyoen, Jakarta, August 17, 2009.

[33] Interview with Teten Masduki, Jakarta, August 21, 2009. Teten Masduki is one of the most famous civil society activists in Indonesia. Shortly after the Suharto's fall, Teten and partners established a civil society organization, Indonesia Corruption Watch (known as its abbreviation, ICW), which would become a leading organization in the field of anti-corruption activities in Indonesia. Under the leadership of Teten from 1998 to 2008, ICW consolidate an excellent reputation. At that time of being the chair of ICW, in 2003, he and other activists in this field initiated to found an award of anti-corruption, the Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award, which would become a prestigious award. In 2008, he left from ICW and moved to head other CSO of tackling corruption, Transparency International Indonesia. Recently, in March 2013, he ran for the West Java gubernatorial election as a deputy governor candidate partnering with a national parliament member from PDIP, Rieke Diah Pitaloka, as a governor candidate. Eventually in this election, Teten and his partner lost with a small margin. In addition, when declaring to run for the election, he resigned the position of the secretary-general of Transparency International Indonesia. Despite of this failure in the political sphere, he remains influential as a reputed activist.

Pact Program contributed much to his winning.

Thus, donor agencies and its affiliated CSOs played a true role in Gamawan's emerging as good district head. The Integrity Pact and the Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation were frequently pointed out as best practices even long after he resigned from his position as district head. But, in many cases, and specifically for these two policies, much of the task of implementation was left for his successor, Gusmal.

Actually, some lamented the lack of continuity of good practices and criticized his successor's failure to continue Gamawan's good programs (Zuhro 2009). Gamawan himself condemned his successor whenever the occasion presented itself. He often said, usually at public seminars, 'many policies of Solok district were applauded in the past, but I do not know whether it [the district] follows these policies now'.[34] However, his successor's failure can be partly attributed to the fact that much of the task of implementation was left for him.[35] Donor agencies and their associates tend to applaud good practices in a relatively short time. As to the Regulation No.5 of 2004, even when Gamawan had merely enacted and not yet implemented it, they lauded it as good practice.

Whether Gamawan's achievements were too hastily evaluated or not, the reputation as a winner of the Bung-Hatta Anti-Corruption Award would become a precious asset when he campaigned for a governorship. The next section sees what how Gamawan competed in the election.

5.4 West Sumatra Gubernatorial Election

5.4.1 Securing a Nomination

After the introduction of direct local-heads elections, West Sumatra's first direct

[34] Interview with officials at Ministry of Hone Affairs on 27 August 2009 in Jakarta.

[35] Interview with Gusmal, Solok district head (2005-2010), November 23, 2010.

gubernatorial election was held on 27 June 2005. Capitalizing on the good reputation as a successful district head, Gamawan became the eventual winner of this election. With much confidence in his popularity and achievements, Gamawan Fauzi's biggest concern in the earlier stage was to secure a ticket for running for the office; in other words, to gain the nomination by a party or a coalition of parties that had earned at least 15 percent of the votes in the latest regional legislative election.

At the 2005 West Sumatra gubernatorial election, there were two political parties which could independently nominate a pair of candidates: the Golkar Party and the National Mandate Party (PAN).[36] But Gamawan gave up the possibility of nomination of these major parties in the early stages of the process, and approached small parties. First he quickly secured the support of the Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB), the sixth largest party with 5 out of 55 seats in the provincial parliament at this time (see Table 3.6 in Chapter One). Then, he finalized a deal with PDIP, the seventh largest party with four seats (See Table 3.6 in Chapter One). Though these two parties have totally different political ideology, one is a staunch Islamism party and another is a nationalist and pluralist party, they formed a coalition for nominating him as a gubernatorial candidate. It is difficult to unravel what he exactly promised to these two parties, but these deals were considered to be "not unreasonably high price".[37]

In hindsight, this snap judgment not to seek major parties' nomination was, excellent in his winning the election. If he had sought a nomination from Golkar or PAN, he might have been forced to compromise various things such as the selection of his partner.[38] The

[36] See Table 3.6 in Chapter One. Golkar had 16 out of 55 seats (29 percent) during the period of 2004 to 2009, while PAN had 10 seats (18 percent).

[37] Interview with Erial Syah, a provincial parliament member from PDIP, Padang, 23 April 2010.

financial payments to political parties for a nomination ticket were also presumed to be high. With smooth negotiations with the two small parties, Gamawan gained full discretion in selecting a deputy governor candidate.

He chose Marlis Rahman, who has been rector of the province's best university, Andalas University since 1997. Marlis was an enthusiastic campus activist during his undergraduate days at Andalas University. Besides being a core member of the University's student council, he joined the anti-communist student movement, KAMI (Indonesian Students Action Front) and organized street demonstrations to demand for ousting Sukarno during the time of turmoil from October in 1965 to 1967. He was also an active member of the influential student Islamic association, HMI (Islamic University Students Association). After gained a bachelor degree, however, he focused on academic activities. Having a master and doctoral degrees in biology at the Ohio University in the United States, Marlis steadily developed his academic carrier. After having established a good reputation as an academician, he became active again in social activities around 1990s and has assumed the provincial head coordinator of the ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), one of the influential Islamic associations in 1995. His social networks developed through these various academic and social activities were helpful to garner votes.

But what Marlis contributed most to this pair's winning was arguably his image of being relatively distant from vested politico-business interests in the province. The pair of an experienced district head with an established academician turned out to have remarkable appealing power to the constituents. Both had a reputation of superior intelligence and of living modestly. These points were repeatedly highlighted throughout election campaign period.

Meanwhile, the leading party, Golkar decided to nominate a local cadre of its own, the West Sumatra provincial chair of the party, Leonardy Harmainy. At the time of the election,

he was the chairman of the provincial parliament. He was known as an influential local businessman in construction industry, and had assumed the provincial chair of the Indonesian National Contractors' Association (Gapensi) since 2003. He paired with an experienced bureaucrat, Rusdy Lubis, former West Sumatra regional secretary (2002-2005).

The second leading party in West Sumatra provincial parliament, PAN' process of nomination was full of internal rifts, and eventually failed to get at a decision to nominate its own candidate. The primary victim of this chaos was Jeffrie Geovanie, a successful business entrepreneur in the hotel and real estate industry, mostly in Bali province. Even the central board of PAN in Jakarta approved Jeffrie's nomination, the provincial chair of the party unyieldingly denied to write a sign of approval until the deadline passed.[39] In dismay at PAN's long and indecisive nomination process, at the very last minute, Jeffrie was forced to switch abruptly to another option, a nomination from the coalition of 16 small parties. With abundant financial resources, Jeffrie, born and raised in Jakarta and married to a daughter of the former Attorney General,[40] squeezed a nomination a day before the deadline. He paired with Dasman Lanin, a professor of education at the State University of Padang.

The United Development Party (PPP), with a coalition of the Democratic Party (PD), nominated a 39-year-old advocate, Kapitra Ampera, who maintained a law firm in the oil-rich neighbor province---Riau. In the beginning, PPP had been seen to endorse the incumbent governor, Zainal Bakar (1999-2004). But after the consideration of Zainal's lack of popularity

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[39] The name of Jeffrie was not familiar to the provincial member of PAN. He was rather close to the central board of the party, especially to Amin Rais, the party head at the time since he helped Amin's presidential election campaigns in 2004 as a director of his think tank, the Amin Rais center. Resisting against the top-down decision of the central board to nominate Jeffrie and his pair, Dasman, the West Sumatra provincial chair, Ki Jal Atri Tanjung, did not agree over the Jeffrie's selected pair. He was said to demand Jeffrie to choose him as his deputy gubernatorial candidate until the end.

[40] Jeffrie Geovanie is married to a daughter of the former Attorney General during the Suharto era (1990-1998), Singgih.

and poor odds for the second term,[41] PPP preferred to this rich young lawyer, though he had no background of the party's activities in the province. Kapitra, being conscious of his lack of broad social networks in the province, paired with a longtime local resident, Dalmi Abdullah, the West Sumatra office head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (2000-2005). [42]

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) was quick to determine to nominate its own senior party member, Irwan Prayitno, the second-term national parliament member since 1999.[43] Like other many core members of the PKS, [44] Irwan was a former leading figure in the *dakwah* movements in campuses, organizing various Islamic study groups during his undergraduate days at the University of Indonesia.[45] He frequently went back to West Sumatra and led the *dakwah* movements as a mentor, especially at the campuses of the major secular universities such as Andalas University. Irwan was also known as a joint manager of the well-regarded educational cooperation, the Adzkia group, running a variety of schools from kindergarten to senior high school. Forming a coalition with the Star Reformist Party (PBR) for a nomination, he paired with the provincial chair of this party, Ikasuma Hamid. At that time, Ikasuma, the former military officer and the district head of Tanah Datar for ten

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41 Zainal's government had received a long list of criticism. Not least amongst these was over his giving consent to the unbridled increase of the provincial parliament budget including the increase in salaries, allowances and other perquisite year by year (which will be discussed in Chapter Six).

42 Dalmi Abdullah is also known as a former parliament member of the Padang city from 1982 until 1987.

43 Irwan was one of the seven newly-elected national parliament members from the Justice Party (PK), the forerunner of the PKS, in 1999.

44 To name a few, for example, Zulkifliemansyah, Rama Pratama and Andi Rahmat were known as a former activist of *dakwah* movement in campuses.

45 "*Dakwah*" (*da'wah* in Arabic) literally means as predication of the faith among believers in order to strengthen their ties to Islam.

years (1985-95), was a provincial parliament member.[46]

In this way, five pairs of candidates ran for the West Sumatra gubernatorial election.[47] Among these, Gamawan and Irwan secured their nomination quite smoothly, which enabled them to declare their running a week ahead of the other candidates. While others were struggling to secure a nomination, Gamawan could promote his profile and achievements through local media.

In addition to this advantage, Gamawan obviously surpassed the other all candidates by the name recognition. Two gubernatorial candidates, Jeffrie and Kapitra, whose business and social activities were operated primarily outside the province, were totally unknown to the constituents before the election campaigns started. The other two candidates, Leonardy and Irwan were known to the supporters of their party, but their name was not well-known to the public outside these supporters.[48]

These advantages gave Gamawan a decisive edge in the electoral competition. Importantly, he received only the small political parties' backing and eventually won the election.

5.4.2 Campaign Strategies of Gamawan

During the campaign period, local and national media always introduced Gamawan as a reformer of anti-corruption. The Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption award was always referred to as a clear evidence of his achievements. While the image of Gamawan disseminated to the

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46 Tanah Datar district is one of the 19 districts and cities in the West Sumatra province, bordering with Solok district.

47 All of the candidates are from Minangkabau ethnic group, the dominant ethnic group in the province.

48 Interview with Hendra Irwan Rahim, head of Golkar West Sumatra branch (2009-2014), Padang, December 6, 2010.

public was quite clear, his campaign promises was much less specific.

It was manifested in the statement of the 'vision, mission and program (*visi, misi dan program)'* which he presented at the provincial parliament.[49] Instead of clearly articulating policies he would implement, Gamawan emphasized the need of governance reform and the importance of strong leadership of a governor. From the first paragraph of the statements, he indicated the people's longing for the emergence of a responsive (*responsif*), clean (*bersih*) and responsible (*bertanggung jawab*) government: and argued it was only realized by a leader of being high-principled and brave to effect changes. Then he promised to implement innovative measures to change the attitude of the government officials who had been often arrogant (*arogan*), inflexible (*kaku*) and feudalistic (*feodalistik*). As such, where he put emphasis was quite clear. In the meantime, the programs he pledged to implement in the last part of this statement were very general and lack substance. Thus this statement clearly showed that Gamawan's election campaigns relied on his image as a clean and reformist local leader rather than specific campaign promises.

In the campaign rallies, Gamawan appealed his modest and frugal living style. He stressed that he had only one car and one modest house in the collective housing area for the government officials, though already having assumed the district head for ten years. For appealing integrity, he claimed that he did not spend any money in the course of pursuing a bureaucratic and political career. It is noteworthy that he repeatedly stressed on his 'meager' resources; and therefore he could not spend much money for this gubernatorial election. Almost every rally, he claimed: 'If we need a banner and poster for the election, [ordinary] people will bear the cost. A local leader and people are supposed to reinforce each other.'[50]

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[49] The candidates of the West Sumatra gubernatorial election presented their 'vision, mission, and program' at the provincial parliament on April 20 in 2005.

[50] '*Bupati antikorupsi jadi calon gubernur Sumbar*. [The anti-corruption district head become West Sumatra gubernatorial candidate.]' *Media Indonesia*, 18 March 2005. Based on this

Indeed, he spent less money compared to other candidates in this election, and in the other regions' gubernatorial elections.[51] Gamawan did not hold a huge election rally which invites national political figures and famous singers form Jakarta. While such election campaigns are commonly seen in Indonesia, Gamawan chose not to do and could save costs.[52] Instead he preferred to hold a small-scale election rally, attracting people with using local music entertainers such as a performer of the traditional recorder known as *saluang*. These campaigns were in stark contrast to those of Jeffrie, who spent lavishly with a huge amount of funds. Jeffrie even had aired TV commercials on nationwide networks for numerous times, though the electorates were only in the province.

Importantly, Gamawan avoided of relying on the networks of the political parties.[53] After PDIP and PBB nominated Gamawan as a gubernatorial candidate, these two parties were placed on the sidelines in his election campaign team.[54] Instead, the personal networks Gamawan had built when serving at the provincial administration played a crucial role. Though not publicly, many bureaucrats were involved in his election campaigns. These networks of bureaucrats were coordinated by Yohannes Dahlan, the regional secretary of

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strategy and logic, Gamawan would later claim that he did not pay any money from his pocket for his gubernatorial campaigns. Such claim was frequently heard especially after he became the Ministry of Home Affairs.

[51] Interview with Asrul Syukul, regional secretary of West Sumatra Province (2008-2010), July 26, 2010. Asrul Syukul is from Solok district. At the time of the 2005 West Sumatra gubernatorial election, he was preoccupied with preparing for running for the position of South Solok district head. Eventually, he failed to win that election. However, as the fact that he became West Sumatra regional secretary in 2008 suggests, he was a close aide to Gamawan. He knows well on the Gamawan's gubernatorial campaigns in 2005.

[52] In West Sumatra province, it is common for politicians to hold an election rally at Imam Bonjol Square in Padang city and to gather at least more than 20,000 to 30,000 persons.

[53] Interview with Aristo Munandar, Agam district head (2000-2010). Padang, December 11, 2010. Aristo has a family relationship with Gamawan Fauzi.

[54] Interview with Ardiansyah, a provincial parliament member from PDIP, Padang, 23 April, 2010.

Solok city at that time and would later become the regional secretary of the province.[55] Gamawan's former bosses from 1977 to 1997, the former West Sumatra governor Azwar Anas (1977-1987) and Hasan Basri Durin (1987-1997) publicly endorsed him.[56]

With these electoral strategies, the pair of Gamawan Fauzi and Marlis Rahman eventually won an outright victory in the West Sumatra Gubernatorial Election, obtaining 41.5 percent of the valid votes. As Table 5.3 shows, the pair of Irwan and Ikasuma won only at Tanah Datar district, where Ikasuma assumed the district head for 10 years, Jeffri and Dasman won at Lima Puluh Kota district and Payakumbuh city, Leonardy and Rusdi won at Pasaman Barat district. On the other hand, the pair of Gamawan and Marlis topped the other four candidates at 15 out of 19 districts and cities. Especially, at his home district, Solok, Gamawan garnered over 80 percent of total votes.

[55] Interview with Yohannes Dahlan, Padang, December 6, 2010. Yohannes took the position of the head of the public relations department in the provincial government right after Gamawan left from this position for assuming the district head of Solok.

[56] Interview with Muslim Kasim, deputy governor of West Sumatra (2010-2015) and former Padang Pariaman district head (2000-2010), Padang, December 11, 2010. He has a good relationship with Azwar Anas.

Table 5.3 Voting Outcome of West Sumatra Gubernatorial Election 2005 by Pairs of Candidates and Districts and Cities

	Gamawan Fauzi and Marlis Rahman	Irwan Prayitno and Ikasuma Hamid	Jeffrie Geovanie and Dasman Lanin	Leonardy Harmainy and Rusdi Lubis	Kapitra Ampera and Dalimi Abdullah
Padang City	144,931	87,066	33,893	11,978	6,633
Kepulauan Mentawai Distric	14,390	3,750	4,222	3,000	2,649
Pesisir Selatan District	71,948	36,120	16,867	14,855	10,092
Solok District	114,398	10,090	7,491	4,691	4,154
Solok Selatan District	18,974	16,341	8,720	8,198	4,836
Kota Solok	16,936	2,311	1,296	977	1,158
Padang Pariaman District	55,119	26,624	12,116	26,718	21,770
Pariaman City	12,085	7,732	2,288	3,045	4,544
Pasaman District	30,031	23,997	18,663	17,630	13,258
Pasaman Barat District	24,083	25,698	36,271	36,431	15,038
Lima Puluh Kota District	45,796	28,437	59,127	11,703	13,374
Payakumbuh City	17,070	7,355	14,564	2,517	1,748
Agam District	51,138	42,690	30,792	18,509	23,040
Bukittinggi City	19,211	8,901	6,041	2,202	1,441
Tanah Datar District	37,986	75,043	11,614	7,729	4,262
Padang Panjang City	7,490	3,964	2,261	1,090	459
Sijunjung District	36,277	13,273	11,761	5,969	3,963
Sawalunto City	11,517	5,059	3,242	2,083	1,000
Dharasraya District	27,916	22,545	11,782	8,132	6,435
Totals	757,296	446,996	293,011	187,457	139,854
Percentage	41.5	24.5	16.1	10	7.7
Total valid votes	1,824,614				

Source: West Sumatra Election Commission, *Summary Perolehan Suara Dan Rincian Surat Suara Pilkada Provinsi Sumatera Barat Tahun 2005*[Summary of Voting Outcome of West Sumatra Gubernatorial Election in 2005], Padang: West Sumatra Election Commission, 2005.

In this way, Gamawan developed an election strategy to campaign hard on his frugal living, thereby accentuating his clean image and the reputation as a reformer of anti-corruption. By employing such strategy, he could cut spending on election campaigns and as a consequence, was less dependent on private interests who provided the money at the price of policy concessions. Gamawan also avoided relying on the networks of political parties. Though he did not lay out any specific programs as a campaign pledge, he repeatedly emphasized his commitment to tackle with the corruption issue.

The electorates enthusiastically voted for Gamawan though he did not hold a massive electoral rally. West Sumatran people clearly built up expectations for him to implement measures of improving transparency as he did when he was the district head. In the following section, how Gamawan responded to such high expectations is discussed

5.5 Improving Efficiency and Transparency of Public Administration

Though Gamawan's campaign promises were not as concrete and specific as Alex Noerdin's, Gamawan also fulfilled his commitment to improve governance. During his four years in the governor's seat, Gamawan had tackled with the problem of inefficient and prone-to-corruption bureaucracy.

Actually, Gamawan's reputation as a governor did not grow to be equivalent to the reputation he had acquired when he was Solok district head. It is a common criticism to him, especially among intellectuals in West Sumatra, that Gamawan did not implement any notable programs as he did in Solok district.[57] Considering that Gamawan's nationally-recognized reputation as a district head owed much to the donor agency programs as discussed earlier in this chapter, this study argues that one of the reasons of this inconspicuous performance as a governor is that he did not receive assistance from donor agencies as easily as he did during his 10 years in the district head position. Usually donor agency programs in assisting improvement of governance are provided to the district and city governments, not to the provincial governments.[58] Besides, several new rules and regulations he implemented for improving the transparency and efficiency of the provincial

[57] Interview with Edi Indrizal, a senior professor at the faculty of politics and social sciences at Andalas University, in Padang, 7 January 2010.

[58] As discussed in Chapter Three, much of the authorities are devolved to district and city governments, not to provincial governments.

administration, as discussed below, were so technical and small arrangements that the ordinary citizens would face difficulty to grasp them.

Although many of his attempts were not well-known to the public, Gamawan implemented at least four noticeable measures for improving governance of the province. According to the officials in the provincial government, Gamawan 'committedly' supervised the implementation of these measures.[59] Among the four, the most well-known measure was to restrict the off-duty usage of public vehicles for provincial officials.[60] In the practice of local governments in Indonesia, one of the major perquisites for senior officials in responsible positions is to use a public vehicle freely with subsidized gasoline without strictly distinguishing private use from public use. It is commonly seen that local officials treat them like a private vehicle after returning to home from work on their public car. Gamawan tried to change such practice and made a strict rule that all of about 600 public vehicles of the provincial government were to be returned back to the parking facility in the premises of the provincial office every day after work.[61] Once in three months, the government checked, without advance notice, whether the public vehicles were parked in the prescribed space after work. Though the government increased the transportation allowance for the senior officials as a compensation of restricting the usage of public vehicles, it was the painful change for them. With this measure, the government estimated to make the spending cut of about Rp. 4.7 billion (about US$ 470,000 dollars).

When this regulation started to be implemented in the beginning of 2009, it became

[59] Interviews with officials at the provincial regulation bureau, in Padang, September 27, 2009.

[60] West Sumatra Gubernatorial Decree No. 112 of 2008 stipulated this restriction.

[61] Only the governor, the deputy governor, the regional secretary, and the chairman and the deputy chairmen of the provincial parliament were exempted from this rule.

the national news. Major newspapers such as *Kompas*, major magazines such as *Tempo* and national TV news programs lauded this measure as a good practice that other local governments should emulate.[62] Although it should be noted that Gamawan supervised the implementation of this measure for only 10 months, and then he left the governorship for assuming the position of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 22 October 2009,[63] the measure itself was an innovative initiative to improve transparency and efficiency.

Secondly, as he did in Solok district, Gamawan reduced project honoraria, most of which had been enjoyed by a few high officials, and to provide local benefit packages to all provincial bureaucrats instead. Such measures had been implemented in many localities since Solok district and other areas had taken initiatives to implement them around 2002, and thus were not so special at the time of 2007 when this program started,[64] but it undeniably contributed to improve transparency in the West Sumatra government.

Third, the Gamawan government strictly withheld to extend the retirement age of the officials in the high management positions from 58 to 60.[65] It is a common practice in local governments in Indonesia that the officials in the positions such as regional secretaries and heads of departments and agencies, which are recognized as the positions above the echelon two level (*eselon II*) in the official administrative terms, are automatically allowed to work up until the age of 60 years.[66] But even his right-hand man, the regional secretary

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[62] See, for example, "Mobil Dinas Tak Pulang ke Rumah[Public Vehicles Are Not Used at the Officials' Home]", *Tempo*, 18 January 2009.

[63] Though not officially rescinded, this measure had not been fully implemented after Gamawan left.

[64] It started with the West Sumatra gubernatorial decree no. 14 of 2007 on local benefit packages.

[65] The retirement age of ordinary officials not in management positions is 56.

[66] Indonesian public service is organized in both echelons and grades. While the basic pay and rank of an official are determined by their grade or *golongan*, a person's management

(2005-2008) at that time, was not regarded as an exception and obliged to retire at the age of 58.[67] This strict retirement rule had been set in 2007 and held until his successor reinstated the previous practice in 2011.[68] Though it is not clear whether this rule had improved the efficiency of governance, it was at least a laudable attempt, given that only officials in high management positions, who usually should have close relationship with the governor, can enjoy the extension of retirement age, and therefore for some critics, it had been seen as a form of nepotism.

Gamawan's last but not least attempt to improve the quality of government was to put more rigorous rules on the official travel expenses (*perjalanan dinas*) for provincial government employees.[69] During his administration, the period of business trip was, in principle, limited to within three days. If the period of planned trip exceeds that, officials are obliged to show the grounds for the need for it in writing. Since it had been quite common that five-to-six-day business trip were easily allowed without adequate scrutiny on the appropriateness of the period of business trip, this rule cut waste spending. With this gubernatorial decree, Gamawan also set up a rule to pay a plane ticket cost for officials based on the actual costs incurred. Officials became obliged to return the difference between the expected costs provided to officials in advance and the actual costs if any. The government also made it obligatory to submit receipts of plane tickets along with ticket stubs. Given that

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position within the bureaucratic hierarchy is indicated by their echelon or *eselon*, with echelon 1 indicating the highest, and echelon 5 the lowest management positions. The highest position in provincial governments is Regional Secretary as echelon 1. As to echelon Ⅱ, for example, the head and the secretary of each service unit (such as the head of Education office) are categorized as echelon Ⅱ position.

[67] With the revise of national government regulation on the retirement age of public officials in 2008 (with the Government Regulation No. 65 of 2008), the retirement age of officials in the position of echelon 1 such as provincial regional secretaries could be even extended to 62.

[68] It started with the gubernatorial decree No. 28 of 2007.

[69] See the gubernatorial decree No. 6 of 2009.

the common practice of local governments in Indonesia that it pays a plane ticket cost based on the annually-stipulated standard cost and rarely demand the return of the difference between that and actual cost, these new rules merits attention. According to the officials in the provincial government, Gamawan closely 'supervised' the application of these rules.[70] In this way, Gamawan increased transparency of the travel expenses which have been considered as one of the main venues of misappropriation of government funds.

As shown above, Gamawan sought to fulfill the expectations of constituents by implementing several notable measures fitting to his public image as an icon of anti-corruption. Gamawan pursued these administration reforms in face of the expected intensive resistance from the bureaucrats, since these measures undoubtedly would reduce their interests. However, contrary to the expectations, there was no noticeable defiance on the part of the bureaucrats. It is presumably because it was too risky for them to stand against this nationally-reputed "clean" local leader. As is discussed above, Gamawan is prominently adept at making use of local media with the experience of working as the private secretary of the governor, and is known as an outspoken person in the local as well as national media. While managing the complaints of the bureaucrats under control, Gamawan's government cut waste spending and allocated more amount of budget to important policy areas.

These four measures discussed above were to respond to the demands of the majority of the constituents (which are mostly non-elites), who had long been disgusted at the corrupted and inefficient bureaucracy. They apparently reflected his election campaign of capitalizing on his popularity and reputation. In this way, the case of Gamawan also shows that the shifts of strategies of local elites led to several policy outputs which reflected more interests of non-elites.

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[70] Interviews with officials at the provincial regulation bureau, in Padang, September 27, 2009.

5.6 Summary

Since the inception of decentralization, local governments have been trying to adapt to new demands and expectations to introduce changes. One way to accomplish these tasks is to cooperate with international donor agencies and implement their programs. These agencies not only propose ideas of programs to local governments, but also vigorously disseminate their achievements if they committedly implement programs suggested by these agencies. As discussed in this chapter, donor agencies played a truly significant role in Gamawan's emerging as good district head. Gamawan successfully obtained their trust by facilitating the CSOs to achieve satisfactory results for donor agencies, while keeping the CSOs under his control by putting his loyal allies in the strategic positions of these organizations.

The partnership with donor agencies brought about good reputation, and its repercussions created advantages for him in the gubernatorial election. It is worth noting that Gamawan himself had clearly recognized such benefits of reputation when implementing donor agency programs. With the recommendations of the Jakarta-based CSOs with which he had established a good relationship through the donor programs, he won the Bung-Hatta Anti-Corruption award, which would become a symbolic evidence of his achievements.

The Solok case is often described as one in which a 10-year reform initiative crumbled shortly after the popular and reformist district head left office. Gamawan himself frequently tried to promote such a description. However, given the tendency of donor agencies to hastily evaluate and disseminate the achievements of their programs, it is an open question whether Gamawan's achievements were somewhat exaggerated or not.

Nonetheless, the reputation and popularity itself has consistently become a precious asset for his political carrier. By capitalizing on a good reputation as a reformer of anti-corruption, Gamawan could avoid of depending on the clientelistic networks. At relatively small campaign expenses and with the backup of only small political parties,

Gamawan scored an overwhelming victory in the election. On these points, Gamawan's election strategies were clearly different from those of the conventional type of local elites.

Such changing the way to compete in the election has led to the changes of policy outputs. Gamawan implemented several noticeable measures to improve transparency and efficiency of the provincial administration in order to meet the high expectations that the voters signaled to this reformer of anti-corruption. Though these measures were technical and small changes in the administrative procedures thus not well-known to the public in the province, Gamawan implemented these measures despite the expected intensive resistance from the bureaucrats. Thereby he set an example for other local governments to emulate, as he did when he was a district head. In this way, the case shows electoral incentives have somehow induced local elites to respond to the demands of the majority of residents.

Chapter Six

Regional Civic Movement of Anti-Corruption Campaigns: The Case of West Sumatra

This chapter examines citizens' ability to articulate their demands and put pressure on local governments through a wide range of actions beyond voting. While the previous two chapters discussed the initiatives from local governments, this chapter discusses the demand side to seek responses from local governments. It analyzes the case of West Sumatra anti-corruption movement, which is, as of writing this thesis, still often referred to as one of the few success civic movements to stand against corruption.[1]

The case highlights the increased tension between civil society organizations and local elites, revolving around the transparency and good governance issue. An apparent non-partisan movement, mobilized in the spirit of citizenship and voluntarism, confronted the corruption problem. The activists examined carefully the annual budget of the provincial government and indicated the parliament members' alleged disregard to the regulations. Urged by this civic movement, the prosecution finally decided to indict almost all of the parliament members in 2003.

However, in the end, after long, opaque proceedings of the trials, all of 43 accused members were acquitted at the Supreme Court in February 2008. At that moment, the civil society organization which initiated to accuse the misappropriation of the parliament members practically existed only in name. Long before the Supreme Court decision of acquittal, this once-influential civic anti-corruption movement had lost the appeal power

[1] See e.g. Danang (2009). Danang writes about the experience of a governance-watch CSO in Garut District in West Java, Garut Governance Watch (known as G2W). This organization accused the corruption of Garut district head. As a good precedent of the successful CSO to accuse corruption, Danang referred to FPSB (2009, 750).

and the members rarely gathered. Moreover, around the middle of 2005, the public opinion in the province gradually turned to be in favor of the accused DPRD members. Local newspapers, which had been the crucial allies of the FPSB, turned around and started to spare more space for the assertions of supporting the DPRD members.

A series of events attracted much attention of scholars (Davidson 2007, Crouch 2010, 223-7; Schütte 2009; Chaniago 2003) and donor agencies (Rinaldi et al., 2007). However, all of them mainly focused on the 'successful' aspects of this movement. Against these analyses, this chapter rather focuses on the aspects of 'failure' by accommodating the development since 2005 into analysis. It examines how and why FPSB failed to keep vigorous actions, and how the ex-DPRD members successfully gained supports not only from the influential citizens in the province but of the national parliament. Then the analysis extends to other anti-corruption movements which followed FPSB in the province. In summary, it argues to what extent civil society organizations are influential to put pressure on local governments to respond to their demands after the collapse of Suharto regime.

6.1 Overview of the Disputes of the Corruption

6.1.1 Definition of Corruption

Before discussing the trajectory of this anti-corruption movement, it is worth noting that the alleged corruption conducted by the West Sumatra DPRD members is not a frequently seen corrupt practice in recent years in Indonesia. It is not the corruption to receive a bribe from companies that win public works contracts, which, according to the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*, KPK), consists of

about 60 percent of the all corruption cases.[2] It is also not the conventional misuse of public funds, which usually conducted by the local government heads and senior bureaucrats.

The DPRD members allegedly appropriated an undue share of the benefits by making their own budget as they please through formal procedures. They intentionally disobeyed a government regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) which set guideline on the local parliament budgetary expenditures (the Government Regulation No.110 of 2000, hereafter referred to as GR110 of 2000). The provincial regulation (*perda*) on the annual budget itself, which the DPRD and the governor made together, became the major evidence to violate the law. [3]

With this problematic budget, the DPRD members awarded themselves salaries and other benefits far higher than what was stipulated by the Government Regulation. They invented many new items of the allowance for themselves such as the 'dignity allowance' and the 'visiting constituency allowance' which were not allowed by the Government Regulation. The most conspicuous misuse of the government funds for their personal benefits was to sign up the health insurance with paying high monthly premium so that they could receive a large sum of maturity return when the five-year term of the insurance ended (Isra 2006).

Though, in the end, such pursuit of their personal benefits was judged as a not-guilty act in the judicial court, the study still calls their conducts as corruption since it adopts the definition of corruption based on the public interest or public opinions, not

[2] "Inilah Lima Type Korupsi di Indonesia [Here are Five Types of Corruption in Indonesia], *Kompas*, September 15, 2012.

[3] Technically, the DPRD members were indicted on charges of violating the Law No.31 of 1999 on the eradication of corruption. But the major ground on the violation of this law was the allegation to violate the GR 110 of 2000.

based on the legality.[4] Their acts of unfairly appropriating undue share of benefits clearly were contrary to the public interests. Besides, the local mass media, as a representative of public opinions, accused their acts as corruption during the height of the anti-corruption movement.

The West Sumatra anti-corruption movement at least succeeded in restraining the DPRD's unbridled pursuit of their benefits with sharp criticism and by prompting the prosecution to investigate on the alleged violation. At least during the period of 2003 to 2005, DPRD members could not made their own budget as they pleased, and were forced to pay attention to the critics of FPSB.[5]

6.1.2 Success of the Anti-Corruption Movement in West Sumatra

In May 2003, the indictment against 43 out of 55 West Sumatra provincial parliament (DPRD) members on corruption charges attracted nation-wide attention in Indonesia.[6] A year later, it attracted much more attention when the district court announced the guilty verdict on them.[7] It galvanized local politicians across the country and brought a fleeting gratification to the populace who had been disgusted at the continuity of corruption after the collapse of Suharto regime. Inspired by the West Sumatra

[4] This classification follows James Scott (1972) which classified political corruption according to three criteria: the definitions based on legality, definitions based on the public interest, and the definitions based on public opinions. (quoted in Peters and Welch 1978)

[5] The budget for the year of 2002 became problematic, accused of not obeying with the guideline for DPRD expenditure, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Since then the DPRD members were forced to pay attention to the guideline for DPRD expenditure and the critics of FPSB. The budget for the year of 2005 was the last budget the DPRD members of this term (1999 to 2004) made.

[6] 43 out of 55 parliament members were indicted. Among the not-accused, six members were from the fraction of military and police who needed to be adjudicated in a military court. Two were dead before the indictment. One did not receive the allowances for the DPRD members, which became problematic. Three returned these allowances to the provincial government.

[7] See Padang District Court Decision No. 129/PID.B/2003/PN.PDG

case, the prosecutors in other areas also started to investigate the corruption offences of the local legislative bodies in their jurisdiction for the same charge. Thus it spread over anywhere in the country like domino, which one academic described as spreading 'Padang Virus'.[8] On a national scale, 67 cases in total were investigated, while in West Sumatra province, the DPRD members in three regencies and two cities were placed under investigation.[9]

In addition to such influence in the other regions, what made this event remarkable was that it was triggered by the campaigns of a group of civil society activists. The group was led by around 8 to 10 persons with various backgrounds such as academic, lawyer, business owner and activist of civil society organizations (CSOs). It was named *Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat* (FPSB, or the Concerned Forum of West Sumatera). According to the members, the term *forum* in the name means its meetings were basically open to anyone. Together with the main members, usually some journalists and students also attended the meetings at the peak of the movement. Its home base was placed at Padang's branch of Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI, *Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*).

It was the FPSB which found the budgetary improprieties against the government regulations and reported to the provincial prosecutor's office in February 2002 (See Table 6.1).[10] Although the prosecutors paid no attention to this report at first, with the street

[8] Satjipto Rahardjo, Emeritus Professor of Law Faculty at Diponegoro University described it in the article of the national newspaper. *Kompas,* June 12, 2004. The other article described it as "*Pesta Anggaran* (Revenue Party)". *Kompas* , September 18, 2004.

[9] Out of 67 cases, notably those of West Kalimantan Province, Cirebon City, Ciamis Regency, and Garut Regency were put on trial. See *Media Indonesia.*, Agustus 13, 2004. See also the memoir of Abudul Rahman Saleh (2008: 305). The report of the DPR commission is also informative (DPR 2006).

[10] They submitted a report on 9 February 2002 with the signatures of eight members of FPSB.

protests and the backing of the influential CSOs in Jakarta, FPSB finally succeeded in persuading them to investigate on it two months later.

Among the scholarly analyses on why and how this movement succeeded in accusing corruption, Davidson's paper offered a comprehensive one. Comparing with the other two failed anti-corruption movements in West Kalimantan province, he indicated several advantages of FPSB's movement as follows:

> FPSB developed a multi-dimensional strategy: exacting academic study of the budget pursuant to relevant national legislation, a legal approach pursued in the courts and at the prosecutor's office, a concerted press campaign (which featured the scripting of authoritative commentaries), and persuasive lobbying among government officials, local religious figures and university rectors and mass organizations. Amidst this productive balance of institutional and non-institutional means, FPSB's ability to guard against partisan politics in the defense of its independence and moral authority position was exceptionally expedient. (Davidson 2007: 90-1)

This study identifies five advantages of FPSB which led to a success to have an influence over the provincial government and the prosecution. The first is, as indicated in the quote above, their ability to maintain 'its independence and moral authority position'. Since it challenged almost all of the political interests in the province, FPSB movement was relatively free from the speculation that there was someone with a hidden political agenda behind its campaigns.[11] Secondly FPSB members had built the wide networks, especially with influential CSOs in Jakarta. They often visited to and consulted with the CSOs such as the International Corruption Watch. Through these networks, FPSB even

[11] One of the members, Rusmazar Rizuar was the competitor to Zainal Bakar, the governor of West Sumatra at the gubernatorial election of 2000 as the candidate of vice governor. However, he was not the main driving force of FPSB. Besides, as his following political career suggests, he is not so terribly ambitious person to utilize FPSB activity for his own political interest.

cooperated with the National Ombudsman Commission to file a complaint to the Supreme Prosecutor's Office (Isra 2006). The third reason is FPSB's ability to mobilize students. Driven by a sense of justice, usually the students voluntarily participated in a street demonstration without any financial help.[12] The participants were mainly from the faculty of law at the University of Andalas. At the peak, around a thousand students gathered at the DPRD building to criticize the legislative members. While the district court held the trial, almost every week, 300 to 500 students gathered and held a street demonstration in front of the court. The Forth is the quick response from the Ministry of Home Affairs to give permission to the prosecutor to investigate the DPRD members. Davidson indicates the President Megawati government saw this scandal as an opportunity to hit rival parties in a decidedly bailiwick of non-PDIP, the party led by Megawati (Davidson 2007).

The last but not least is the close relationship with newspapers. FPSB had enjoyed national and local news coverage. Even before the commencement of corruption trial which caused a national sensation, the activities of FPSB were reported several times by the national major newspapers. At the peak of the anti-corruption campaigns, major local newspapers featured this topic almost everyday. The FPSB members even had an easy and direct access to the chief editors and always worked with them. When wanting their assertions and findings heard, they just needed to call them.

Importantly, the mood right after the Suharto's fall apparently contributed to the highly critical attitude of the local newspapers to the DPRD's blatant abuses of power. Compared to those in the present day, the journalists at that time were obviously more active to fight for the realization of social justice. In addition to such euphoric mood which accompanied democratization, as Davison indicates, their critical attitudes were also encouraged by the intensified competition in the media business. After the authoritarian

[12] Interview with Roni Saputra, a student participant in FPSB movement, Padang, April 12, 2010.

regime's regulations on media had been lifted, many newspapers were newly launched in the province. In such situation, the topic of the DPRD's corruption was appealing for the editors of newspapers in order to gain new readers (Davidson 2007). The journalists were aggressive to get the information on the government budgets for cooperating with FPSB. At one occasion, they even 'stole' the thick official documents on the draft annual budget of the provincial government from a room in the DPRD building.[13]

However, along with the long process of fighting, FPSB had lost most of these five advantages. Especially the loss of close contact with local newspapers became apparent around 2005. Since then not only FPSB but the following anti-corruption movements have faced difficulty to build a close relationship with local newspapers.

6.1.3 Legal Disputes of the Case

This corruption dispute stemmed from the uncertainness of legal interpretation on the DPRD's authorities in the newly decentralized arrangements. The law on local government (No.22 of 1999) stipulated that DPRDs had the authority to determine their own budgets (Article 19, 21).[14] On the ground of this, DPRDs began to increase their salaries, allowances and other perquisites for themselves.[15] In some localities, DPRD's salaries and other benefits were far higher than those enjoyed even by the national congress (DPR) members in Jakarta (Crouch 2010, 224). Trying to control this unbridled increasing budgets, in November 2000, the Presidential Office issued a government

[13] Interview with Israr Iskandar, a lecture at Andalas University who was a journalist at this time, Padang, January 8, 2010.

[14] The law on guidelines and position of legislatures (No.4 of 1999) also stipulated that DPRD had the authority to determine their own budgets (Article 34).

[15] In West Sumatera Province, DPRD awarded itself four-time salary increase in 2000.

regulation which set guidelines for DPRD expenditure (GR110 of 2000).[16] However, like almost everywhere in the country, the West Sumatra DPRD totally ignored this guidance.

Despite of the repeated warnings to indicate the possibility of legal violations from the FPSB and the local media, DPRD never compromised to change their already decided budgets. When the budget drafting team of the provincial government refused to agree on this budget for the DPRD, they even gave a written statement to the governor that they would take full responsibility if the problem would occur.[17] Such uncompromising attitude of DPRD led FPSB to take another step. It filed a report of DPRD members' alleged violation of the law to the provincial prosecutor's office and urged it to investigate on that.

Facing such sharp criticism from FPSB, the West Sumatra DPRD took the initiative to challenge the legality of GR110 of 2000. Ahead of the other DPRDs in Indonesia, West Sumatra DPRD submitted a legal complaint on the regulation to the Supreme Court. They claimed that this government regulation contravened with the preceding laws, which have higher order of legal standing. In their view, especially it conflicted with the stipulation of the law on regional government (the Law No.22 of 1999) to grant the authority to local parliaments to determine their own budgets. A year later, in September 2002, the judicial judgment of the Supreme Court totally agreed with DPRD's claims and declared it invalid.[18]

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[16] The law 22 of 1999 clearly stated that the rules for drafting, amending and calculation of local budgets shall be stipulated by Government Regulations which was to be issued later (Article 86)

[17] Interview with Alizar, the head of financial bureau (*Kepala biro keuangan*) at that time, Padang, April 22, 2010

[18] For some, this Supreme Court decision was controversial. According to Saldi Isra's legal opinion, even though the DPRDs were given the authority to determine their own budget, it does not mean they can make their budgets as they please. It is natural to interpret that they still need to obey the government regulations, as local governments which are also given the authority to determine their budgets obeys many guidelines stipulated by the government regulations (Isra

What made this issue more complicated was that the Supreme Court did not repeal it retroactively. To be technically accurate in Indonesian legal terms, the court decision did not use the term, *tolak demi hukum*, which means repeal is applied retroactively, but used just *tolak*, which means repeal starts to be effective after the time of the court decision.[19] On the ground of this legal interpretation, the Supreme Court decision to repeal GR110 of 2000 did not stop the prosecutors to investigate and interrogate the legislative members. They considered that GR110 of 2000 could still be applied to the cases in which the offence occurred before the Supreme Court declared it invalid.

While the pressing from anti-corruption campaigns were increasingly mounting, the provincial prosecutors determined to indict DPRD members, and the trial at the District Court of Padang started in May 2003. A year later, the court gave sentences ranging from two years to two years and three months to forty-three members of the DPRD. Seven months later, at the Provincial High Court, their appeals were turned down and the verdict even toughened the sentences to between four and five years in jail.

Finally, at the Supreme Court, the sentences were confirmed. However, the judgment was odd and controversial. With no cogent reason, the court divided defendants into two batches which were handled by two separate judicial panels although they had been handled together in the previous courts. Only the first batch, consisting of 33 members, had their sentences confirmed in August 2005. This separation of legal cases benefitted to all the defendants. Although the final decision was already delivered by the Supreme Court, 33 members were not imprisoned immediately. The provincial prosecutor's office stated that they would wait to imprison them until the sentence of the

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2006).

[19] The former General Prosecutor, Abdul Rahman Saleh, explained this legal interpretation in simpler terms in his memoir (Saleh 2008).

other ten members was decided. In the result of this prosecutor's refrainment, all of the DPRD members saved themselves from execution of imprisonment.

After two-year obscure status of judicial proceedings for the second batch of ten, in October 2007, the Supreme Court, with the different composition of judicial panel members from that for the first batch, pronounced the completely opposite judgment. The verdict of acquittal was sentenced to them. It was just three days before the Eid al-Fitr festival, long and the most cheerful holidays in a year in Indonesia. The court judged that the repeal of GR110 of 2000 should be interpreted to be applicable retroactively. Therefore the sentence stated that the defendants were confirmed to have done what the prosecutors claimed, but they were not the criminal acts. Five months later, the first batch of 33 members were retried and finally acquitted.

Table 6.1 Chronology of the Main Events of the Anti-Corruption Campaigns of FPSB

Date	Event
Nov 2000	Government Regulation No. 110 of 2000 was issued.
Jan 2001	FPSB brought up an issue of the provincial parliament (DPRD)'s appropriation of undue benefits in the annual budget of 2001.
Sep 2001	West Sumatera DPRD submit a legal complaint to challenge the legality of GR 110 of 2000 to the Supreme Court.
Jan 2002	The DPRD and provincial government finalized the annual budget for the year of 2002, which would be accused by the prosecution of violating GR 110 of 2000.
Feb 2002	FPSB reported to the provincial prosecutor's office about the DPRD's alleged intentional disregard to GR110 of 2000.
Sep 2002	The Suprime Court repealed the legality of GR 110 of 2000 and asked the central government to revise it.
May 2003	The prosectution issued an indictment against the DPRD members.
May 2004	The District Court handed down a guilty verdict to the DPRD members.
Dec 2004	The Provincial High Court upholded the conviction of the DPRD members
Aug 2005	The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of 33 out of 43 DPRD members. Here with this verdict, the conviction of these members was finalized.
Sep 2005	White FPSB started to act against FPSB. Local newspapers started to show sympathetic view against the accused DPRD members.
Jan 2005	The DPRD members made a pleading to the Comittee Ⅲ of the national parliament (DPR) for postponing the prosecution of imprisonment against them.
Mar 2006	The Sepecial Joint Committee of DPR raised the issue of GR 110 of 2000 and accused the prosecution's mishandling of GR110 pf 2000 for personal benefits. .
Oct 2007	10 legislative members was aqquitted at the Supreme Court.
Feb 2008	The rest of the 33 members, who had received the conviction verdict in 2005, were also acquitted at a retrial.

Source: Made by the Author from the Information from Several Local Newspaper Articles

Thus the case which had galvanized the nation at one time ended up a same old story. Importantly, around the time of the first judgment of the Supreme Court for the first group of 33 members in 2005, the influence of FPSB considerably weakened. Even though the prosecutor's decision to withhold from executing the penalty of imprisonment for the 33 parliament members was quite controversial in terms of legal procedural mechanism, FPSB failed to mobilize sufficient enough supports to pressure on the provincial prosecutor. The following sections will see how and why once influential civic movements gradually lost its influence.

6.2 En Route to the Acquittals of the Accused

6.2.1 Turning the Tide of Public Opinion

The influence of FPSB took a downturn around the time of the Supreme Court judgment delivered in 2005. Facing the possibility of imprisonment, DPRD members desperately tried to gain the sympathy of public. At the peak of the anti-corruption campaigns, almost every opinion leaders such as academics, religious leaders and veteran newspaper journalists criticized the self-centered decision of DPRD members. However, after the guilty verdict at the Supreme Court, the situation started to change in favor of ex-legislative members. Especially the local newspapers turned to support them. This turning tide was typically represented by the column on the front page of *Singgalang*, one of the three dominant local newspapers in September 2005. A veteran journalist, Khairul Jasmi, who was to become chief editor of that newspaper a year later, asserted;

> [After the Supreme Court sentence delivered,] I gave long thought to the hardships they [the legislative members] would undergo, then, suddenly the humane sympathy came across my mind…. many people probably would share the same opinion with me that those 43 persons have already psychologically received a penalty since the case was brought to the prosecution…I am concerned with the impact it might make on the pride of Minang [the abbreviation of Minangkabau] if 43 legislative members, in other words, the representatives [of Minang] were imprisoned. (*Singgalang*, 13 September 2005).[20]

As stated in the last sentence of this quote, this column even suggested that the arrest of legislative members would devastate the ethnic pride of Minangkabau, dominant ethnic group in West Sumatra. After this column was written, such provocative expression to arouse the ethnic sentiment was frequently used by the local newspapers.

In parallel with this gradually changing public opinion towards DPRD members, a small civic group for saving the dignity of DPRD members was organized on the request of the DPRD members in the middle of 2005. It consisted of seven religious leaders,[21] led by a person who was known as a member of a radical Islam group, the Indonesian Islamic Warriors' Council, or *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI).[22] This individual was also known for his ardent campaigns to supervise immoral acts (amar ma'ruf nahi munkar)

[20] My translation. The original is in Indonesian language.

[21] Though this group was led by a radical religious leader, not all of the White FPSB members have such background. For example, one of the members, Mas'ud Abidin is not recognized as a radical Muslim figure.

[22] The chair, Irfianda Abidin was to become the national board member of MMI in 2008. He organized the anti-Ahmadiyah sect campaigns in the province, which often triggered violent acts. The MMI is known as radical Islam group, whose spiritual head had been assumed, until 2008, by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who was found guilty of conspiracy over various terror attacks including the 2002 Bali bombing attacks.

during the fasting month.[23] Stating its position as an adversary group to FPSB, this group blatantly named itself 'White FPSB' (FPSB *Putih*).

The members of this group attempted to mobilize public opinions in favor for the DPRD members by various acts such as staging a demonstration march. They visited to the governor's office, the provincial prosecutor's office and the police headquarter in order for calling their attention to the problem of GR110 of 2000. They claimed vociferously on local media that the legislative members were 'entrapped' by a scheme, using a word with a religious connotation, *penzaliman*, which literally means treating unfairly. They argued that there must had been a plot designed by unknown political and economic interests to destroy the prestige of Minangkabau and weaken the influence of the DPRD members. It was primarily because, according to their arguments, the DPRD members persistently opposed to the takeover of the Padang Cement Company, a state owned company based in West Sumatra, by a Mexican company, the Mexico CEMEX in order to protect the interests of Minangkabau people.[24] Though these assertions largely lacked credible evidence and rather impaired objectivity, White FPSB strongly disseminated such stories. In this way, frequently presenting emotional arguments, they attempted to stir the public opinion.

Alongside of arguments in defense of the DPRD members, White FPSB also

[23] Abidin became known as a religious activist for the first time around 2000 by operating such Islam-inspired activities to supervise immoral persons. Before that time, he was totally not involved in religious activities. He had run petty businesses such as selling computers. At the time of the interview in 2010, he owned two petty hotels in Padang and ran a company in the construction industry.

[24] Interview with Irfianda Abidin, the chairman of White FBSB, 12 April 2010. These assertions apparently reflected on the views of DPRD members. The accused DPRD member, the deputy chair of the provincial parliament, Titi Nazief Lubuk stated the similar story of the conspiracy. Interview with Titi Nazief Lubuk , Padang, October 21, 2010. See also *Singgalang*, 16 September 2005.

sought to damage the credibility of FPSB. It even labeled FPSB as a puppet of the foreign capitals (which especially implied the Mexico CEMEX and its associates). They also attempted to tap into the religious feeling, arguing that FPSB intentionally destroyed the image of Islam by discrediting many religious-leader-turned-politicians. They also criticized some FPSB members' political and religious opinions which were expressed outside the activities of FPSB.[25] On the grounds of a few members' individual views, it labeled FPSB as an anti-Islam organization. Moreover, their criticism also turned to some FPSB members' running for the seat of the provincial parliament in 2004.[26] They strongly criticized their political agenda of using the achievement of FPSB in their election campaigns.[27]

In this way, White FPSB tried to damage the credibility of FPSB by associating the ethnic sentiment and religious issue with the GR110 of 2000 case. Though most of the FPSB members insisted that the impact of White FPSB was small, the emergence of this organization demonstrated the undeniable turning of public opinion in favor of the DPRD members.

6.2.2 Intervention of the National Parliament over Legal Procedures

While gradually having the local newspapers and the influential religious figures to

[25] Around 2001, A few FPSB members expressed their individual views on local media to dissent from the enactment of the local regulation of preventing immoral acts (*pencegahan dan pemberantasan maksiat)*, which some DPRD members (which almost were the accused) initiated to draft. The local regulation was finally enacted as No. 11 of 2001 in the provincial parliament. For some religious leaders such as Irfianda Abidin, the opponents of this regulation were anti-Islamic persons.

[26] Though all failed to be elected, three FPSB members ran for the West Sumatra parliament in 2004: Abel Tasman, Oktavianus Rizwa and Rusmazar Rizuar. Only Abel Tasman ran again and was elected in 2009.

[27] Interview with Irfianda Abidin, Padang, April 12, 2010

their side in the province, the West Sumatra DPRD members were actively lobbying to President and the national parliament (DPR) in their quest for their acquittal. They made a desperate plea for support especially to the DPR's Commission Ⅱ, which deals with public administration affairs, and the DPR's Commission Ⅲ, which deals with judicial affairs. In March 2005, five months before the Supreme Court sentence delivered to the DPRD members,[28] these two commissions agreed to set up a special joint committee mainly discussing the problem of the GR110 of 2000.[29] Although the national parliament members had sporadically taken up this issue at the parliament before the establishment of this committee,[30] they intensified their criticism to the prosecution and the judicial institutions by way of this official committee.

The joint committee repeatedly held public hearings, inviting the concerned persons in the prosecution, the police, the judicial courts and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The General Prosecutor at that time, Abdul Rahman Saleh recounted in his memoir that he was invited constantly to the public hearings of this joint committee, and was asked similar questions again and again (Saleh 2008:309).

The activity of the joint committee culminated in March 2006. In this month, the members of the DPR's Commission Ⅲ packed into the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Bagir Manan, directly appealing him the injustice in charging the local parliament

[28] After the Supreme Court decision in 2005, the commission significantly intensified their concerns over this issue.

[29] The official name of this joint committee is *Panitia Kerja Penegakan Hukum dan Pemerintahan Daerah Gabungan Komisi Ⅱ dan Komisi Ⅲ* (The Joint Standing Committee of the Commission Ⅱ and Ⅲ on the Law Enforcement for the Local Governments).

[30] To cite an example, four months after the court decision at the Padang District Court in May 2004, the members of the DPR's commission Ⅱ strongly criticized the prosecution's selective indictment. They questioned why the prosecution did not indict local government heads though they clearly held half of the responsibility to make a budget violating GR 110 of 2000. *Kompas*, September 2, 2004.

members on the ground of GR 110 of 2000. They strongly requested him to immediately reverse the guilty verdicts in relation to this issue. Besides that, the joint committee invited to a hearing the Junior Attorney for Specific Crime (*Jampidsus*), the head of the corruption division at the Prosecutor's Office. In this hearing, they severely criticized the prosecution again with the extremely bitter terms. According to their assertions, a true motive to indict the local parliament members on the ground of GR110 of 2000 was to take money from them by threatening. In this sense, the prosecutors treated them as an 'ATM machine'. Furthermore, in the same month, the joint committee invited the West Sumatra DPRD members to its public hearing. Almost all of the accused DPRD members flocked to Jakarta, appealing the injustice in the verdicts delivered to them.[31]

In October in the same year, the joint committee compiled and submitted a final report to the President Yudhoyono. The report recommended the president to issue a warning letter to the Prosecutor's Office over the issue of GR110 of 2000 because the prosecution did not properly handle with it. It also recommended that the president should rehabilitate the reputations of the local parliament members who were wrongly accused on the ground of the nullified regulation. In this way, the West Sumatra DPRD members got the full supports from the national parliament. Just a year after the submission of this final report, the Supreme Court handed down the acquittals to the DPRD members.

Furthermore, the DPRD members succeeded in presenting a petition to President Yudhoyono. In January 2006, Bukittinggi city in the province hosted the summit meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and President of Indonesia.[32] Taking this opportunity, the DPRD members organized a delegation to meet with President Yudhoyono. The delegation consisted of the representatives from the influential civic

[31] Interview with Titi Nazief Lubuk , Padang, October 21, 2010.

[32] The summit meeting was held for two days from 12 to 13 January in 2006.

groups in the province. It included the provincial chair of the customary law leaders (known with acronym, LKAAAM or the Body for Minangkabau Customary Law), the provincial chair of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI), and the provincial secretary of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). The delegation successfully met with President and conveyed the DPRD's side of a story over the issue of GR110 of 2000. According to the deputy chair of the DPRD, at this time, President passed the message to the delegation that he recognized the possibility of the error (*kealpaan*) in the prosecution's handling of this issue.

6.2.3 Internal Disunity of FPSB

Around 2005, FBSB itself started to lose its energy and faced internal disunity. The source of disunity can go back to the year of 2004 when the prestigious award, the Bung-Hatta Anti-Corruption Award was given only to one of the members, Saldi Isra, not to the organization itself.[33] The award enhanced the visibility of Saldi, providing an excellent entrée for him to become a national figure as an academic and TV commentator in the field of anti-corruption. Some members complained that Saldi dominantly enjoyed the achievements of FPSB, although, according to their stories, Saldi was just one of the members and even frequently absent from the FPSB's meetings.[34] Although it is fair to say that Saldi's ability to eloquently explain FPSB's assertions as a spokesman and his network with CSOs in Jakarta contributed much to the achievements of FPSB, it is understandable that Saldi's prominence diminished the enthusiasm of other leading figures of FPSB, especially those affiliated with LBH of Padang, the main pillar organization of

[33] This year's Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award was given to two persons: Gamawan Fauzi, whom this study discussed in Chapter Five, and Saldi Isra.

[34] Interview with Oktavianus Rizwa, the chairman of LBH of Padang from 2002 to 2003, Padang, 22 April 2010. Interview with Ardisal, an activist of LBH-Padang, Padang, 21 April 2010.

FPSB.

Some LBH-Padang members felt that the LBH's contribution was unfairly less appreciated. Even though no one can deny that LBH-Padang was the main driving force of the FPSB, even providing some campaign funds for the first two years, the LBH's name was rarely mentioned whenever the FPSB's achievements were talked about. [35] In addition, the key person of LBH of Padang, who reinvigorated the activities of this organization around the end of Suharto era, was sidelined around 2004 after the disagreement in opinion on whether the accusation of the corruption in relation to the GR110 of 2000 should extend to the governor as a collusive partner of DPRD.[36] These accumulated frustration led the LBH-Padang break off from the FPSB around 2005, triggered by the fight over a trifle thing. When Saldi and his associates put force a proposal to get FPSB notarized in order for receiving supports from a local implementing agency of international donor projects, the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (hereafter referred to as the Partnership),[37] the LBH-Padang members opposed to this idea. In the LBH-Padang's view, as the main pillar of FPSB, LBH-Padang, which already had a legal entity status, was

[35] Interview with Ardisal, Padang, 21 April 2010

[36] Interview with Rahmat Wartira, the former chairman of LBH of Padang from 1994 to 2004, Padang, 6 May 2010. In order to enliven LBH of Padang in 1994, Rahmat even took the risk of letting his wife, a civil servant get a bank loan for it. In the early days of FPSB, Rahmat was a central figure of FPSB. He was one of the eight members who signed their names on the petition of accusing DPRD members submitted to the provincial prosecutor's office in 2003. Around 2005, Rahmat started to focus on running his own legal office. Since then, he has just acted as an advisor to LBH of Padang, not involved directly in the activities of it.

[37] The Partnership for Governance Reforms in Indonesia is an association to implement donor agency projects, originally established as a facilitator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project in 2000. The association name came from this UNDP project. It became an independent legal entity in 2003. Even after the UNDP program ended in 2007, it continued to work as an 'implementing agency' to manage projects primarily from various donor agencies such as US Aid and JICA. It has implemented over 300 projects since 2000 with a total budget of approximately 80 million US $. See the official site of the Partnership. http://www.kemitraan.or.id (Accessed on 25 July 2013)

appropriate to receive that support of the program, thus there was no need that FPSB dared to get notarized. For them, FPSB was an ad hoc aggregate of various organizations and individuals to function as a forum where anyone can participate in and go out, and therefore defining its composition of members (which implies a 'hierarchized network') in the process of notarization did not fit to that flexible feature.[38] After this breakaway of the LBH-Padang, only several persons engaged in the activities of FPSB.

Making such costly sacrifices, the FPSB got notarized and received supports from the project of the Partnership in 2006. Since then FPSB's activities were almost confined to this program. The project was initially to assist CSOs to make an agreement with DPRD members to realize the transparent government together. However facing with plenty of resistance from DPRD members, the project turned out just to hold several seminars on how to improve transparency and reduce corruption, inviting 20 to 30 DPRD members from districts and cities in West Sumatera province. The seminars were held at relatively luxurious hotels. Even though the seminar was on transparency, ironically, FPSB could not prevent the participants to fully receive the travel expenses (known as *Surat Perintah Perjalanan Dinas*, SPPD) from their each district and city government budgets, even though the seminar itself provided the transportation fees to the participants.[39] The project ended up in two years with elusive results and left almost half amount of the budget not used. It demonstratively indicated FPSB had already lost its energy and drive. After the program was over, the activity of FPSB practically stopped and the members rarely got together.

[38] Interview with Ardisal, Padang, 21 April 2010.

[39] Interview with Abel Tasman, a member of FPSB to implement this project, Padang, 23 April 2010. Later, he would become a provincial parliament member of West Sumatra in 2009.

6.3 Major Local Newspapers Co-opted

6.3.1 Anti-Corruption Movements Following FPSB

Though having saw the ways and means of FPSB to make a sensation and exercise influence on the provincial government and parliament, the following other anti-corruption movements in the province have not demonstrated the influence comparable to that of FPSB. Importantly, CSOs have faced difficulties to get their activities covered by media including local newspapers, which had been close allies to FPSB (until around 2005). Three major newspapers in the province have rarely given positive responses to the requests of the other CSOs.

After the FPSB failed to keep its momentum, the activities to accuse corruption in the province have centered on LBH of Padang. Withdrawing from the activities of FPSB, LBH of Padang has kept its efforts to raise the issue of corruption, cooperating with other CSOs and academics[40].

After the sensation of the crackdown on the local parliament members on the ground of the violation of GR110 of 2000 settled, it has been local government heads to be involved in the corruption allegation, rather than local parliament members. From 2005 to 2010, the alleged corruption case which LBH of Padang and its collaborators spent the most time and energy on accusing was the corruption of the mayor of Bukittinggi city (1999-2009). The mayor, Jufri, was involved in the alleged markup in the price of the land for the city parliament building.

[40] The activists, with whom LBH of Padang has worked together for accusing corruption, include young lectures in the faculty of Law at Andalas University, junior fellows of Saldi Isra, who is now a professor of that university.

In the anticipation of the anti-corruption activists, this would be the most likely case to draw the attention of the local community and media. Jufri had been the provincial chair of PD, the President Yudhoyono's party, and had prepared to run for a national parliament seat in the 2009 Election. On another front, the provincial prosecution had already investigated him as a suspect (*tersangka*) of the corruption and requested the permission of questioning him from the president. However this request to the president had been pending for a long period without clear explanation.[41] In such situation, LBH-Padang and its collaborators initiated their own investigation on this case, while putting pressure on the prosecutors to get the permission of questioning from the president immediately. This movement reached a peak before the 2009 election, holding street demonstrations in several cities such as Padang and Bukittinggi.[42]

However, even in this relatively appealing corruption case, the CSO activists could not receive enough attention from the public. To their dismay, their activities rarely were reported by major local newspapers.[43] An activist of LBH-Padang suspected that this was because of the close ties between local government heads and major local newspapers, in which the former becomes one of the important advertisement clients for the latter.[44] In this way, the CSO activists have felt much more difficulties to accuse the corruption of local government heads than to accuse those of local parliament members. Successfully containing the growing attention on the corruption allegation, Jufri was elected to the

[41] As of 2009, Jufri was still the mayor of Bukittinggi city. The prosecution needs a permission from the president to interrogate local government heads.

[42] Interview with Vino, the chair of LBH of Padang, Padang, 22 April 2010.

[43] Interview with Charures Simabura, a lecture in the faculty of Law at Andalas University, Padang, 9 April 2010.

[44] Interview with Ardisal, Padang, 21 April 2010.

national parliament in 2009.[45]

6.3.2 Close Ties between Local Government Heads and Newspapers

As Jufri case indicates, the relationship between local media and local elites has been increasingly close after the euphoria of democracy undoubtedly ended. It was in sharp contrast to the time of FPSB movement in its prime. At that time, the competition among local newspapers was intense and it encouraged local newspapers to take a severely critical position even to the governor, labeling him as the partner of the corruption. However, more than a decade after the democratization, the competition among local newspapers seems to be already settled.

For the stable management of local newspapers, the advertisement of local government heads is apparently one of the important financial resources. Moreover, in the common practice of Indonesia, local governments cover the transportation fees for the accompanying journalists to the local government heads or senior bureaucrats, therefore usually journalists receive honorarium for writing an article about the government programs from the public relations department of local governments. While denying such relationship would break the force of an objection, the editor-in-chief of the major local newspaper, *Singgalang*, admitted the honoraria from local governments were the non-negligible source of 'pocket money' for the low-paid journalists.[46]

What vividly shows this increasingly close relationship between local government heads and local media is the policy of West Sumatra government to appoint the chief editors of the local newspapers to a member of the board of commissioners at the province-owned companies (see Table 6.2). While usually these positions are allocated to

[45] After a long period of pending, Jufri was finally arrested and sentenced four-year imprisonment at Padang District Court in January 2012, more than two years after the election.

[46] Interview with Khairul Jasmin, the editor-in-chief of Singgalang, Padang, 13 October 2010

the retiring senior bureaucrats of the provincial government as a 'plum job', the governor at the time, Gamawan Fauzi decided to allocate such positions of three major province-owned companies to the newspaper writers in 2008.[47] All the three major local newspapers' chief editors were evenly appointed to these positions. By giving advice on the management of the company at the board meetings one or two times in a month, they could gain about 40 percent of the salary of the chief-executive-officer. Though their salaries are not considerably high because the companies are deficit-ridden, these positions provided extra pay for the chief editors. From the point of the ensuring the objectivity of reporting, such appointment is clearly problematic but it did not become widely known to the public.

Table 6.2 Appointments of Chief Editors of Local Newspapers to the Commissioners of the Province-Owned Companies (2008-2011)

Province-Owned Company (Description of Business)	Member in the Board of Commissioners (Proffessional affiliation)
Andalas Tua Sakato (trade business)	Asril Kasman (Editor-in Chief of *Haluan*)
Dinamika (running gas stations・automobil repair service)	Khairul Jasmin (Editor-in-Chief of *Singgalang*)
Grafika (printing business)	Stan Zaili Asril (Editor-in-Chief of *Padang Express*)

Source: Provided at the West Sumatra Province's Economic Bureau to the Author in April 2010 in Padang.

Though such personnel policy reflects the idea of the governor, Gamawan Fauzi, rather than the institutionalized practice,[48] it demonstratively shows a collusive

[47] Other than these three province-owned companies, there is only a province-partially-owned company, Bank *Nagari*, a regional development bank. Its positions in the board of commissioners are usually assumed by the retiring senior bureaucrats of the West Sumatra government.

[48] The information about whether such personnel policy has been carried out after the replacement

relationship between local elites and media. In such situation, the CSO activists have been increasingly frustrating at their limited access to the local media. LBH of Padang has been even seriously considering the idea of launching its own newspaper.[49] In this way, the relationship between the CSO activists and local media has significantly changed from the heyday of FBSB movement.

6.4 Summary

As per usual in Indonesia, FPSB's anti-corruption movement, which had once put considerable pressure on the local government and legislature to work for the benefit of the public, eventually failed to keep the appeal power. One cynic may say that all efforts of this movement against corruption have failed except that it facilitated the emergence of a popular national figure, Saldi Isra, as an academic, activist and TV commentator in the field of anti-corruption.

The fading energy of FPSB movement bolsters the argument of many previous literatures to emphasize on the consistently weak clout of civil society group and its fragmentation. When FPSB movement started to lose its vigor, the provincial parliament members asked cooperation from vocal activists to organize an adversary civic group against FPSB, showing differing opinions in local society. Besides, the FPSB itself fell into internal disunity.

The case also shows that the opaque and often puzzling judicial proceedings of a trial have constrained on civil society organizations to pressure on local governments. Even the national parliament members put pressure on the judicial institution over the court decision. Even though it must be recognized as an apparent political interference in

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of the governor is not yet available to the author.

[49] Interview with Vino, Padang, 22 April 2010

the judiciary from the standpoint of a mature democratic country, and was criticized as such by some CSOs in Jakarta, such action was publicly justified by the national parliament. In this way, one of the key political options that civil society organizations have at their disposal, to employ legal means, is severely constrained.

The study highlights the importance of the cooperation of local media. With their backup and initiatives to gain the information on the budget, FPSB succeeded in restraining the DPRD's unbridled pursuit of their benefits. Faced with sharp criticism from FPSB and local media; and with the indictment from the prosecution, the DPRD members relinquished many measures to benefit themselves.

However, the relationship between CSOs and local media has been deteriorating. The appointment of the chief editors of major local newspapers to the commissioners of the province-owned companies demonstratively illustrates the increasingly close relationship between local governments and media. Such collusive relationship between elites and media put CSOs in a difficult position to appeal to the public through the media. In this way, another key political option of civic movements, to appeal through media, is also gradually constrained.

Thus, with many constraints on the options of collective actions beyond voting, the influence of civil society organizations in increasing responsiveness of local government has yet been elusive.

Chapter Seven

Participatory Planning of the Annual Budget at the District Level: The Case of Solok

This chapter examines the annual budget making process at the district level, the lowest government authorized to make their own budgets. While more space is supposed to be made available for civic engagement after decentralization and democratization, this chapter sees how citizens have been involved in budget-making process by examining the case of Solok district in West Sumatra province.

The central government's embarking on decentralization brought new hope and inflated expectations to practice participatory planning. In the current budget process, citizen participation has been greatly encouraged in a public consultation forum, known as the Development Planning Meeting or *Musrenbang*, which starts from the village level. However, as this chapter will clearly illustrate, the sessions after *Musrenbang*, the meetings between the local parliament and the budgeting team of bureaucrats are usually much more important. In the case of Solok, citizens are completely excluded in these sessions and no local newspaper gains information on the detailed contents discussed in the sessions.

Many literatures indicate that though new institutional arrangements such as *Musrenbang* are introduced, tangible change remains elusive (Widianingsih and Morrell 2007). New procedures for participatory planning are merely becoming a formality (Sopanah 2012, Sarosa et al. 2008, and Purba 2010). While agreeing on these points, this study will further advance the research by shedding new light on the process of negotiations between local parliament and the executive budgeting team.

Since these negotiations are conducted behind closed doors, few studies researched on these processes. Building a trusted relationship with the parliament and the district head in

Solok district, the author gained an opportunity to observe key meetings between legislative and executive part to finalize the budget. In these meetings, except the members of the government's budgeting team and the parliament members, only the author was allowed to attend.

Based on this observation, this chapter will reveal how reluctant local elites are to disclose enough information to the public, while conforming to minimum required procedures for public participation and information disclosure. At the same time, the chapter argues that civic engagement is yet to increase and, as a consequence, it has failed to facilitate the emergence of responsive government.

7.1 Participatory Planning in Indonesia

7.1.1 Changes in Bottom-up Planning System from the Suharto Era

Before discussing the current annual budget making process, it is worth referring to the legacies of the Suharto era. During this period, while maintaining a highly centralized authoritarian regime, the government dared to embark on facilitating the bottom-up participatory planning around the early 1980s. The increased financial and technical assistance from donor agencies for regional and national development planning marked this decade (Ferrazzi et al. 1993, 171). The most important measure in terms of bottom-up planning was enacted in 1982 by the Department of Home Affairs.[1] The established system was commonly known as P5D (Guideline for the Preparation, Planning and Control of Development at the Regional Level).[2] Importantly, the system involved a number of

[1] See the Decree of the Ministry of Home Affairs No. 9 of 1982

[2] The official name in Indonesian language is *Pedoman Penyusunan Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan di Daerah*.

consultations, starting from the village level up to the district level.[3] At these meetings, the participants discussed their development needs and priorities, and a list of proposals as an outcome of the meeting was put forward to the upper level.

However, in the first place, local governments under the Suharto regime were not empowered to act as 'a revenue and expenditure centre' (Ferrazzi el al.1993, 174). In addition, in reality, a lack of human resources and authoritarian control of information and dissidents inhibited widespread participation. Often times, the participation became forced mobilization under the pretext of mutual assistance for community (*gotong royong*). Thereby, though the officials had described the P5D planning system as participatory, this was yet 'rhetorical rather than real' (Ida and Morrell 2007, 5).

The collapse of the Suharto regime and its subsequent decentralization reforms raised expectations of removing the obstacles to realize 'real' participatory planning. The decentralization laws designed in 1999 delegated sufficient authority to the district and city governments to determine and implement their development policies. In regard to the budget planning system, the most significant change was introduced with the enactment of the Law No.25 of 2004 on the National Development Planning System.

This law provided a firmer legal foundation to the public consultation process which had been only stipulated by the guideline in the Suharto era.[4] In the district budget preparation process, the public consultation forum, named as *Musrenbang* in the new law, is conducted at three administration levels: the village, the sub-district and the district level.[5]

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[3] In the guidelines of 1982, the village development consultations were named *Musyawarah Pembangunan Desa*, abbreviated as *Musbangdes*. The meeting at the district level was named *Rapat Koordinasi Pembangunan Tingkat II*, or the District Development Coordination Meeting, abbreviated as *Rakorbang II*.

[4] Besides the Law No.25 of 2004, later in 2008, the Law No.8 of 2008 on Regional Development Planning consolidated the legal foundation of *Murenbang* process.

[5] Sub-districts are part of district governments and heads of sub-districts are appointed by the district

Considering a *Musrenbang* as an important 'entry point' for citizens to get involved in local governance, donor agencies has conducted a number of programs for increasing the effectiveness of this forum.[6] With direct or indirect technical assistance of the donor agencies, a conductive environment for increased public involvement in *Musrenbang* has been motivated by several directives *(Surat Edaran)* and Ministerial Decrees (*Keputusan Menteri*) by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Development Planning Agency.[7]

7.1.2 *Musrenbang*: the Legislated Bottom-up Planning System

In the *Musrenbang* at the village level, community residents, led by the village head, discuss desired projects and make a prioritized list of those, which is forwarded to the sub-district level. In the *Musrenbang* at the sub-district level, delegations from each village discuss needs and priorities of their proposals and make a sub-district's prioritized list of projects, which is passed to the next level (see Figure 7.1). At the last step of *Musrenbang* process, the district head presides over the *Musrenbang* at the district level, where delegations from each sub-district and representatives from each sectoral work unit (SKPD) discuss the priority of the project requests. At this step, local aspirations are integrated and reconciled

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head. Village, a smaller administrative unit than sub-districts, is, on the other hand, a semi-autonomous entity, whose head is elected by the villagers.

[6] Even before the enactment of the Law No.25 of 2004, a number of local governments such as Solo City and Bandung district initiated some measures to facilitate participatory planning by passing local regulations (*perda*).In many cases, they got technical assistance from donor agencies. See Ito (2006) and Ida and Morrell (2007).

[7] The directive for the guidance of implementing *Musrenbang* was issued in 2005. See the Joint Ministerial Directive of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Head of the National Development Planning Agency No.0259/M.PPN/I/2005 /050/166/SJ. Since then, the Joint Ministerial Directive on *Musrenbang* has been revised almost every year. As to the Ministerial Decrees, in 2007, The Ministry of Home Affairs issued a decree on how to evaluate on the procedures of *Musrenbang.* See the Home Affairs Ministerial Decree No.050-187/Kep/Bangda/2007.

with sectoral initiatives.[8] As the outcome of this meeting, the government prepares the district annual work plan (RKPD), which forms the basis of annual budget preparation (See Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2).[9]

Figure 7.1 Bottom-up Mechanism of *Musrenbang*



Source: Made by This Author.

The district's strategic office in charge of coordinating government projects, the BAPPEDA (Regional Development Planning Board) is in charge of managing these meetings at all levels. As to the approximate implementation timing, the village consultations are held in January, the sub-district consultations in February, and the district meeting in March. Thus

[8] The laws and ministerial directives states the reconciliation and integration process between sectoral initiatives and local aspirations already starts when each work unit (SKPD) prepares its annual plan (*Renja* SKPD). At this stage, each SKPD is supposed to consider local aspirations conveyed via *Musrenbang* at the sub-district level. The public session to coordinate annual plans of SKPD (known as *forum* SKPD, or SKPD forum) is held especially for considering local aspirations. But, in practice, in many cases, SKPD forum is semi-closed to public, thus the integration between sectoral initiatives and local aspirations only starts in the *Musrenbang* at the district level. (Widiyanto and Kariadi 2011)

[9] As to the not-abbreviated names of SKPD, RKPD and *Renja* in Indonesian language, see the list of abbreviation of this dissertation.

these meetings are conducted in the early phase of the budget process, far away from the final approval of the annual budget, which is usually in November or December (see Table 7.1).

Though such institutional change and the directives from Jakarta has increased familiarity with inclusiveness and equity among government officials and citizens (Widianingsih and Morrell 2007), many studies indicated the limitations of the *Musrenbang* system to channel public demands into the annual budget. Poor quality of proposal preparation is a common problem at the village and sub-district level (Solthan 2009). Lack of capacity to plan on the community side and unwillingness to provide sufficient information about the planned programs on the government side often leads to unrealistic and excessive demands from villages (Purba 2010). Trimming proposals for fitting to financial realities is rarely seen. As a consequence, few of their proposals are accommodated in the budget, leading to village communities' loss of interest in this process. It is not uncommon to find villages not making new proposals and forwarding the same list every year (Widiyanto and Kariadi 2011, 123). Thus, one study described the process a forum just to make a 'wish list' (Sarosa et al. 2008).

Importantly, annual planning continues to be dominated by top-down sectoral initiatives. Through the course of budget process, many bottom-up proposals are dropped and many are added by sectoral agencies with little lower level participation. The excellent research by an Indonesian research institute, DEMOS cited the statement of a head of BAPPEDA at one district that more than 80 % of total programs are from sectoral initiatives (Widianto and Kariadi 2011:125).[10] Though it is not clear how he distinguished local aspirations from sectoral initiatives, this statement, which was supposedly based on the head of BAPPEDA's empirical supposition, is highly suggestive on the dominance of sectoral

[10] To be accurate to cite this statement, at Serang district in Banten province, the head of BAPPEDA explained that 'about Rp. 154 billion of proposals are from local aspirations and Rp. 670 billion of proposals are from sectoral initiatives'(Widiyanto and Kariadi 2011:125).

proposals. Thus many indicates that local governments see the *Musrenbang* processes as merely a matter of obligation to get the legitimacy of the budget. Where procedures for increased public participation are followed, it is done in a superficial manner (Sopanah 2012, Sarosa et al. 2008, and Purba 2010).

Table 7.1 Schedule of Annual Budget Preparation at the District Level

Timing *	Formulating an annual budget (APBD) (for the next fiscal year)	Formulating a revised budget (APBD-P) (for the current fiscal year)
Jan	・Fiscal year begins. ・*Mesrenbang* at the village level begins.	
Feb	・*Mesrenbang* at the subdistrict level begins. ・The public session to coordinate annual plans of service units (*Forum* SKPD) is held. ・Each servicel unit (SKPD) formulates its annual plan (Renja-SKPD).	
Mar	・*Musrenbang* at the district level.	
Apr-May	・The government budgetary team formulates the district annual work plan (RKPD).	
Jun-Aug	・The government start to prepare a draft of the general budgeting policies (KUA) and the provisional priorities and budget ceilings of each work unit (PPAS).	・The executive and the local parliament (DPRD) formulate the consent document on the KUA-PPAS for the budget revision. ・The executive and the DPRD finalize the revised budget (APBD-P). ・The lcoal regulation of the revised budget (*Perda* APBD-P) is submitted to and checked by the province.
Sep-Oct	・The government budgetary team and DPRD formulate the consent document on the KUA-PPAS. ・Each work unit prepares its budget estimates for their work programs (RKA-SKPD).	
Nov-Dec	・The government budgeray team prepare the draft local regulation on the budget (R-APBD) to seek approval from DPRD. ・Executives and DPRD finalize the next year's annual budget(APBD) ・The local regulation of APBD (*Perda* APBD) is submitted to and checked by the province.	

* For matching to the actual implementation, this approximative timing is modified from the schedule stipulated by the relevant laws.

Sources: Made by the Author Based on the Law No. 17 of 2003, Laws No. 25, No. 32 and No. 33 of 2004.

Figure 7.2 General Flowchart of Budget Formulation Process of the District Governments



* The notes of the Behid the Scenes are based on the author's observation at Solok district

Source: Made by the Author Based on the Relevant Laws.

7.1.3 Processes after *Musrenbang*

After the *Musrenbang* process, there is still a long way up to the approval of the annual budget. The government goes through a two-staged process to reach an agreement on the budget with the local parliament (see Figure 7.2). The first step is to gain an agreement on the general budgeting policies (KUA) and the provisional priorities and budget ceilings (PPAS). The annual works plan (RKPD) produced through the *Musrenbang* process becomes one of the bases in preparing the draft of KUA and PPAS.[11] At this stage, the key agreement is on the temporary budget ceilings for work units, within which each work unit prepares its detailed budget request (RKA-SKPD).[12] Thus, after this stage, in principle, the government and the parliament are not allowed to change the budget proposal in a large way. Then the second step is to gain a final approval from the parliament to enact local regulation (*Perda*) on the District Budget of Expenditures and Purchases (*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah*, hereafter referred to as APBD).

In these two sessions (or four sessions if you add those for the budget revision), the local parliament members collectively bargain with the executive to dispense favors to their constituency, though individual negotiations are conducted, in formal and informal sessions, through the whole budget-making process. Using various negotiating tactics such as boycotting deliberations, the local parliament usually extracts non-negligible concessions from the executive.

[11] Usually the KUA and the PPAS are discussed together.

[12] As to the not-abbreviated names of RKPD, KUA, PPAS, RKA-SKPD, see the list of abbreviation of this dissertation.

7.2 Participatory Planning Process in Solok District

7.2.1 Feature of the Solok District Case

Solok district has been one of the favorite places of donor agencies, and numerous programs for the improvement of governance have kept coming to this district (as discussed in Chapter Five), even after the popular district head, Gamawan Fauzi left in 2005. Among these were to facilitate increased citizen involvement in *Musrenbang* and provide useful knowledge to CSO activists and citizens. Just to name a few, the Participatory Budgeting and Expenditure Tracking (PBET) program,[13] a World Bank program, and the Local Governance Support Program, a US aid program (See Table 7.2).[14] Importantly, at the time of this study, a World Bank program, the Initiative for Local Governance Reform (ILGR) was still in operation. In order to meet the conditions to receive the incentives of totally Rp. 26 billion,[15] Solok government has made several arrangements for improving transparency of its annual budget such as announcing the information of the government projects sorted out by sub-district to the public.[16]

[13] PBET program was a World Bank program, implemented by the National Democrat Institute for International Affairs (NDI) for 4 years from 2005. The objective of the program was to promote citizen participation in the budget planning process. The program was designed to be complementary with another World Bank program, the Initiative for Local Governance Reform (ILGR) Program (which was discussed in Chapter Five). Thus the implementation sites of the PBET program were the same with the ILGR program. While the ILGR program works with the government officials, the PBET program works with CSO activists. In the case of Solok district, the program supported a CSO based in Jakarta, CIBA (Civic Education and Budget Transparency Advocacy) to organize a local CSO (CIBA Solok).

[14] Local Governance Support Program was a US Aid program, implemented in 72 districts and cities from 2005 to 2009. The program was to assist local governments to improve governance in various ways such as holding workshops for government officials, parliament members and CSO activists. For improving governance, one of the key points to which the program gave high value was public participation. In Solok district, the program was implemented for two years from 2005.

[15] See Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[16] In many cases, even such basic information is not easily accessed. It remains unclear that Solok District would keep this arrangement beyond the implementation period of the World Bank program.

Table 7.2 Major Programs of Donor Agencies for Improving Local Governance at Solok district (2001-2010)

Program (Supplementary Information)	Main Donor Agency	Year
Initiative for Local Governance Reform	World Bank	2003-2010
PBET(Supporting Citizen Participation in *Musrenbang*)	World Bank	2005-2008
Local Governance Support Program (Supporting Citizen Participation)	US Aid	2005-2007
Supporting a CSO for Monitoring Public Services	GTZ	2003-2004
Improving One Stop Service	Asia Foundation	2004-2006
Supporting to Start One Stop Service	Ford Foundation	2001-2003
Regulatory Impact Assessment (Supporting Citizen Involvement in Drafting and Assessing Local Regulation)	Asia Foundation	2007-2009
Integrity Pact	GTZ	2003-2006

Source: Regional Development Planning Board of Solok District

It is worth noting that these measures to facilitate citizens' participation in the budget planning were not only initiated by the nationally well-known local government head with a reputation of good governance, Gamawan Fauzi, but also by his successor, Gusmal, who had held the position of Solok district head from 2005 to 2010. As discussed in Chapter Four, some laments most of the measures initiated by Gamawan were not continued by Gusmal, however, actually some measures, such as holding an open SKPD forum well-attended by the public, were initiated and strongly promoted by the Gusmal government. Thus, Solok district, even during the period of the Gusmal government, is supposed to be more committed to citizen involvement than other average regions.

However, this chapter shows that even in such a district, citizen participation in budget-making process is encouraged only half-heartedly. My field study, conducted in Solok

district for two years from 2009 to 2010 when Gusmal was in the office, demonstratively reveals that the executive and the parliament members still remains quite hesitant to disclose information on the draft budget.

7.2.2 *Musrenbang* Process in Solok District

Musrenbang process in Solok district is also the case which bolsters the previous literatures' arguments on the limitations of this participatory planning system. The most noticeable problem is the inability or unwillingness of the officials at the sub-district office to make a prioritized list of the desired proposals. *Musrenbang* at the sub-district level only functions to compile the proposals from villages and pass them to the government. Screening and modification of proposals is rarely conducted. The officials even intentionally shirk the task of setting the priorities of these proposals.[17] Though, on the document forwarded to the upper level, priorities are specified among proposals, but in reality, it is just the inventory to mechanically record proposals one by one from each village in turns in decreasing order of the priorities set by each village. A sub-district official admits that it is for not causing unnecessary frictions among villages. Because many proposals which are low in the priority list or even not listed in the *Musrenbang* process will be included in the budget, they even explain to the participants that the priorities of proposals determined in the meeting have little meaning.[18]

Musrenbang at the district level is also reduced to be a formality. In the meeting, one-way communication from the government to the participants is dominant. In this sense, it is rather a 'briefing session' than a 'forum for discussion'. At 2009 Solok district *Musrenbang*,

[17] Interviews with several officials at two sub-district offices, Kubung and Danau Kembar, Solok, November 8 and 13, 2010.

[18] Interview with an official at the Danau Kembar sub-district office, Solok, November 13, 2010.

in the session that each delegation reported on the result of the *Musrenbang* at the sub-district level, all of the presenters was the head of sub-district office (*Camat*).[19] They rarely mentioned to the specific desired proposals, but mostly just showed basic figures such as the number of students in schools, patients who had visited health clinics and so on. Needless to add, the evaluations on the projects in the previous year were rarely made.

Besides, the representatives from civil society groups were selectively invited with transportation fees covered by the government. Though the government invites representatives from most of the district's major civil society groups such as LKAAM (the Body for Minangkabau Customary Law) and its affiliate women's group (*Bundo Kanduang*), usually most of them are close to the district head. As to NGO activists, invitation is more selective. For example, the chair of APPI was invited because he came from the same village with the district head and was recognized as a loyal supporter to him, while on the other hand, the chair and the secretary of LPPI were not invited although they have much experience of monitoring local government programs.[20] As a consequence, most of them were not actively involved in the discussion.

Furthermore, what was decided was not announced in front of the participants at the end of the meeting. In fact this meeting was full of briefing presentations by the government officials (heads of sub-district office and representatives of government service units), and nothing was decided in this meeting. Then the result of the meeting just will be finalized later by the BAPPEDA as the document of RKPD, which would not be made available to the public. It might to be considered as a deviation from the directives of the central

[19] *Murenbang* at the district level in Solok was held on April 16 in 2009, which the author attended. The author also attended it in the next year, which was held on April 13 to 14 in 2010.

[20] The activities of these two CSOs, APPI and LPPI, see Chapter Five of this dissertation.

government.[21] But such deviation is seen in most of the districts and cities.[22]

Only one remarkable attempt of Solok district for increased civic involvement has been to hold the well-attended public forum to coordinate the annual plans of SKPD, which is known as SKPD forum or *forum* SKPD in Indonesia, and held one or two weeks before the *Musrenbang* at the district level. This attempt is partly because of the encouragement from the World Bank's Initiative for Local Government Reform (ILGR) program.[23] Solok gave this SKPD forum a new name, the forum of 'the Synergy Team' (*Tim Sinergi*), which means the forum to create a new synergy among the government, DPRD, and civil society. This Solok government's experiment is often lauded by the central government, CSOs in Jakarta and international donor agencies (Widiyanto 2006). However, based on this author's observation, this forum is rather a 'briefing session' with one-way communication from the government, as with the *Musrenbang* at the district level.[24] In the case of 2009, though the forum was crowded with the participants from the government, the DPRD, sub-districts and civil society groups, there was seemingly no meaningful discussion, other than the briefings of each SKPD.[25]

In such situation, most of the village heads whom I interviewed claimed that the procedures of *Musrenbang* are merely a formality ('*hanya formalitas'*).[26] A village head,

[21] If you normally interpret the directives from the central government, it is clearly a deviation. See, e.g., the Joint Ministerial Directive of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Head of the National Development Planning Agency No.0008/M.PPN/01/2007/050/264A/SJ.

[22] Online Interview with the head of BAPPEDA at Empat Lawang District, August 20, 2013.

[23] Regarding the ILGR program, this dissertation already discussed in Chapter Five. See Table 7.2.

[24] In 2009, the author attended this forum, which was held on April 2 to 3.

[25] The invited representatives of civil society group in the SKPD forum is almost the same with those in the *Musrenban*g at the district level.

[26] I conducted interviews with six village heads in six sub-districts in Solok district from November 8 to 20 in 2010. On November 8, I interviewed with the village head of Koto Baru, Bukik Kanduang and Gantuang Ciri, on November 9, the village head of Sibarambang, on November 20, the village

who had successfully brought many projects to his locality, hinted that the key for their proposals being budgeted was to build close relationship with, and directly lobby to the district head or his close aides such as the head of BAPPEDA.[27] On another front, many of them remarked that the village which succeeded in sending their villagers to the local parliament as an elected member could easily get projects.

The DPRD members frequently show lack of enthusiasm to be involved in the *Musrenbang* process. Facing with the severe criticism from local newspapers on not attending the *Musrenbang* in the previous year, 20 out of 33 members attended the district-level *Musrenbang* in 2009.[28] However, most of them just merely made a token appearance and left quite early from the meeting. Such lack of enthusiasm is also demonstratively illustrated by the DPRD members from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Only one out of four was assigned by the party to attend *Musrenbang* process, while others focused on other ways to push their proposals being budgeted. These three PKS members did not just attend the district-level *Musrenbang*, but neither the sub-district-level nor the village-level. One member openly admits that the sessions after *Musrenbang* are much more important.[29] The head of BAPPEDA let out his complaints that most of the DPRD members entirely ignore the lists of proposals discussed in the *Murenbang* process. The proposals they push forward to the BAPPEDA are very often from outside of these lists.[30]

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head of Koto Laweh, on November 24, the village head of Cupak.

[27] Interview with the village head of Gantuang Ciri, Solok, November 8, 2010.

[28] In 2008 only a few members attended the district-level *Musrenbang*. See 'Anggota DPRD Banyak Mangkir [Many DPRD Members Skipped (*Musrenbang*)]', *Singgalang*, 31 March 2008. In 2009, the number of attendance considerably increased. According to the author's questionnaire survey to all of the Solok DPRD members conducted in July 2009, 25 out of 33 members attended at least one sub-district-level *Musrenbang*, 26 members attended at least one village-level *Musrenbang*.

[29] Interview with Alizar Ama, a DPRD member from PKS, Solok, August 4, 2009.

[30] Interview with Dusral, the head of BAPPEDA, Solok, November 19, 2009.

7.3. Executive-Legislative Meetings in Solok District

7.3.1 Acting Differently in Open Session and in Closed Session

After the *Musernbang* process, the government proceeds with key sessions with the DPRD. As showed in Table 7.2, while preparing the regular budget (APBD), the government starts negotiations for making revisions of the ongoing budget during the fiscal year.[31] For revising the budget, like the regular budget process, the government needs to go through a two-staged process to reach an agreement with the DPRD, the KUA-PPAS and the final approval stage. Thus there are four key executive-legislative sessions in a year.

As the case of Solok illustrates, the executive and legislative have almost no intension to release the content of their discussions in these sessions. Actually part of these sessions is open for the public to sit in the gallery seats, but almost all of the substantive deliberations are made only in the tightly closed sessions. The open sessions are held in the DPRD building and the members of the Local Coordinating Board, or *Muspida* (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah*), which consists of local representatives from key security institutions such as police, military and prosecutor's office, are invited to attend. On the other hand, the closed sessions are held in a place far away from the citizens, a hotel outside the district (See Table 7.3). In this way, only is available in the meetings at the DPRD building is pro forma discussions.

[31] In Indonesia, every year, the national government and almost all of the local governments make revisions of the budget during the fiscal year.

Table 7.3 Usual Time Schedule of the Key Legislative-Executive meetings on the KUA-PPAS or APBD in Solok District

	Schedule	Openness to the Public	Location
Day 1	The district head submits a draft of KUA-PPAS or APBD to the DPRD	Open to the public	DPRD building in Solok
Day 2	Each faction of the DPRD delivers remarks and questions on the draft	Open to the public	DPRD building in Solok
Day 3	The district head answers to the questions and remarks delivered from the DPRD in the previous day.	Open to the public	DPRD building in Solok
Day 4 | Day 6	Intensive discussion on the KUA-PPAS or APBD.	Closed-door session	A hotel (outside the district)
Day 7	The DPRD gives final approval on the KUA-PPAS or APBD.	Open to the public	DPRD building in Solok

Source: Made by the Author Based on the Observation in Solok District in 2009

Each session is usually a one-week long. As showed in Table 7.3, the first three days and the last are open to the public. It begins with the speech on the intent and purpose of a submitted draft by the district head, which is simply read from the prepared text in a monotone manner. The content of the speech is vague and very general, and soon after this speech, the meeting on the day ends. On the second day, each faction of the DPRD delivers remarks and questions on the draft, and on the next day, the district head answers to these questions and remarks. In this way, the question-and-answer session is held over two days, instead of one, thereby they avoid of prompting responses from the both parts in the open

sessions. In addition, the questions and remarks of the DPRD are short of specifics.

Then the place of the meeting moves from the DPRD building to a pricy hotel in Padang or Bukittinggi city, about one-to-two-hour drive from the center of the district. It is usually a three-day intensive meeting, and the location and date is not announced to the public. Even at the site of the hotel, there is no poster to show who are using the meeting rooms. In such tightly closed sessions, the DPRD members and the executive eventually begin to frankly exchange of questions and answers, discussing on the specific programs. Often times in these meetings, the DPRD members make straight-out requests for dispensing favors to their constituents or increasing the budget for their activities.

The primal reason of holding the key meetings outside the district is obviously that they can easily prevent the information from leaking to the outside. In these closed sessions, in many cases, the government officials hand some cash directly to the DPRD members for smoothly moving a meeting forward. From what I had seen of the envelope containing money, in the case of Solok district, the amount of money handed to the DPRD members were not so large, presumably less than Rp. 3 million (around US$ 300) for each member per session. Thus the DPRD members not only enjoy food and accommodation, but also get some money under the table. Furthermore, they would receive the officially admitted compensation of three-day travel expenses (*Perjalanan Dinas*).[32]

The meeting at a hotel is also advantageous for the executive part. In many cases, they overstate the number of the officials staying the hotel in order for padding the hotel bills and the travel expenses.[33] Though it is commonly seen in Indonesian local governments, most of

[32] In Solok, in cases of the activities in the province, the DPRD members are given Rp. 300,000 (US $ 30) per day as the travel expenses. Considering that what they actually pay from these expenses is only for the gasoline cost to come to the hotel, this compensation for travel becomes good pocket money for DPRD members.

[33] The officials who stay at a hotel are those at the BAPPEDA, the Financial Body (DPPKA), and the DPRD Office. Often some members come to a hotel even one week before the session and prepares

the budgetary team members were supposed to stay in a hotel on documents, but in reality, many of them only 'gave their signatures'. A BAPPEDA official admits that part of these pooled fund they gained thereby are used for the DPRD members for a swift approval.[34]

After reaching an agreement at the hotel meeting, the DPRD and the executive come back to the district and hold the final session to officially approve it. In this meeting, each faction delivers the final remarks. However these remarks rarely reflect on the discussions in the previous days. Therefore their remark is again perfunctory one rather than studied.

Only in this last session, journalists are invited to attend, usually with travel fees covered by the government. However, the information made available to the public in this meeting is only the general information and overall figures of the budget such as the number of total revenue, expenditure and deficit. In this way, citizens are totally excluded from these legislative-executive meetings and deprived of the opportunity to monitor most of the budget-making process.

As seen above, the DPRD and the executive act differently in open sessions and closed sessions. While ostensibly following the procedures for releasing the information to the public, they closed the lid tightly on the details of their discussions. The next section will slide this lid slightly and reveal what was actually discussed in these closed sessions.

7.3.2 Decisions in the Key Legislative-Executive Meetings on the Budget

a. The Case of the Revised Budget for the Fiscal Year of 2009

In the process of making revisions on the budget during the year of 2009, the

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for it. They are really busy in these sessions. But still too many persons are listed to stay in a hotel only on documents.

[34] Interview with an official at BAPPEDA, Padang, August 8, 2009.

legislative-executive sessions on the KUA-PPAS were held on the fourth week of July.[35] The sessions for the final approval for the revised APBD began 10 days later. In both of the sessions, the closed door meetings were held at a hotel in Padang city.[36] For the DPRD members, it was the last session to determine a budget before the end of the five-year term of 2004 to 2009.[37]

In these sessions, the major concern of the DPRD members was to increase the budget for their own activities. As a result of these sessions, the DPRD and the executive eventually agreed to add an additional Rp. 1.5 billion (about US$ 138,000) to the budget for local parliament activities.[38] Meanwhile the amount of the newly added budget to the other sectors in this closed session only ranged from Rp. 50 to 300 million, and the total amount of the newly-decided additional budget in this meeting to the other sectors other than DPRD Office was only around Rp. 760 million. Compared to them, the additional budget for the DPRD was noticeable.[39] For compensating this additional budget, Solok government increased borrowing from the local bank. As showed in Table 7.4, eventually Solok borrowed Rp. 5.5 billion in this year.

Part of this added budget bought three new cars for the incoming chair; an additional two went to the vice chair of the local parliament. Behind this request, there was the expectation of the chair and the vice chair that the public cars which they had used for five

[35] The district head at this time was Gusmal, who was elected in 2005.

[36] They discussed at the Rocky Hotel, near the central market in Padang. The meeting on the KUA-PPAS was held from July 24 to 26 in 2009, and that on the APBD was from August 6 to 8.

[37] The elections for the national and regional parliament members were held on April 9, 2009.

[38] Interview with Hilda Osmiati Ubani, the chair of Solok DPRD (2004-2009), August 8, 2009.

[39] The highest amount of additional budget, an additional Rp. 300 million was added to the Education Office.

years would be disposed and sold to them with low price. Though agreeing to buy new cars, the government gave only an ambiguous answer on the disposition of these public cars at this time.[40] Subsequently, it would become a trouble when the chair, who had led the meeting to add the budget for new cars, rejected a call from the government to return the car.

The additional budget was also used for holding a nice ceremony to celebrate the end of the term of the DPRD members. Besides, the budget for the study tour of the local parliament members was also added. Using part of this added budget, the DPRD members went on the final three-day study tour to Java or Bali islands just two weeks before the end of the term.[41] Given that more than half of them would not continue in the DPRD for the next term, these tours were clearly without appropriate purpose.[42]

Furthermore, in these sessions, the DPRD members strongly push for buying a laptop computer for each member. Though it was not accommodated in the revised budget in 2009, it would be budgeted smoothly in the budget of the next year. In this author's observation, no DPRD members were seen to use this computer in a meeting during 2009 to 2010. In addition, oddly enough, when receiving their computer, even DPRD members strongly complained to the officials against the note, 'the asset of Solok Government', printed on it.

In this revision, the total increase of its expenditure was around Rp. 20 billion. Compared to this amount, an additional Rp. 1.5 billion budget for the DPRD was arguably just usual one. However, the most crucial point the case illustrates is the inaccessibility of citizens to the information on what was decided in the legislative-executive closed-door

[40] Interview with Dusral, the head of BAPPEDA, Solok, November 19, 2009.

[41] It was between the session on the KUA-PPAS and the session on the final approval of the revised APBD. The newly elected parliament members were sworn in on August 13 in 2009.

[42] Only 14 out of 35 were reelected in the 2009 election. They went on this study tour from July 28 to 30 in 2009.

sessions. To the author's knowledge, these described above were never known to the public. Even the plan to purchase a laptop for each DPRD member, which could become a controversial issue, was not leaked to the public. Such points are also seen in the following next case.

Table 7.4 Solok District's Financial Balance from 2009 to 2010

	2009		2010	
	APBD	Revised APBD	APBD	Revised APBD
				(billion Rp.)
Total Revenue	466.2	478.2	491.1	546.7
Total Expenditure	493.4	512.2	527.0	592.2
Deficit	27.2	34.0	35.9	45.5
Carry Over From Previous Year	27.8	29.1	35.9	33.3
Borrowing From Local Bank	-	5.5	-	12.2

Source: Provided at Solok District Asset and Finance Management Agency to this Author during the Period of 2009 to 2010 at Solok.

b. The Case of the Regular Budget for the Fiscal Year of 2010

In the budget-making process of the 2010 budget, the meetings discussing on the KUA-PPAS were held in the first week of November in 2009, and those for finalizing the APBD a week later. It was the first budget-planning for newly elected parliament members after the new five-year term of the DPRD just started in August. Both of the closed meetings for determining KUA-PPAS and finalizing APBD were held in a hotel in Bukittingi city.[43]

[43] The meeting on the KUA-PPAS was held at Hills Bukittinggi Hotel from November 8 to 11, while that on the final approval was held at Pusako Hotel from November 15 to 18.

In these closed meetings, each DPRD member explicitly called for adding a few public works projects in their constituency, especially their home village. DPRD members repeatedly asked the executive to understand their position which was under pressure from their electorates to fulfill part of their campaign promises in the recent election in April of that year. Since they focused solely on this point, the discussions on the budget of each work unit (SKPD) were conducted in a blatantly perfunctory manner in the first closed meeting in Bukittingi city. Many of DPRD members intentionally skipped most of the sessions in the hotel, even though still staying around there. Nothing important was decided on the KUA-PPAS and many decisions were postponed to the final approval session. Even in the last process, the second closed meeting in Bukittinggi city for the final approval of APBD, all of the DPRD members eventually decided to boycott the discussion in the last two days. By delaying the progress of the meetings in such a way, they threatened the government not to give their approval.

In these tough negotiations, as a concrete figure, the DPRD persistently demanded around Rp. 8 billion (US$ 720,000) budget for the projects which they can decide on their own.[44] Considering the limited budget of Solok district (see Table 7.4 regarding the total revenue of 2010), this requested amount was not acceptable for the executive. Since the talks in Bukittingi city broke down, the negotiation between the DPRD and the delegated executive team stretched out after they came back to the district, and the final negotiations were conducted in the form of direct talks between the chair of the DPRD and the district head.[45] In this way, both sides finally reached an agreement, and Rp. 1.7 billion (US$ 153,000) budget in the Public Works Office (*Dinas PU*) was left to the discretion of the DPRD

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[44] Interview with Edi Sumanto, a Solok DPRD member from PAN, Bukittinggi, November 18, 2009.

[45] Based on this author's observation. Interview with Syafri,the chair of Solok DPRD, April 13, 2010.

members.[46] It accounted for almost 10 % of the total capital expenditure (*Belanja Lansung*) in the Public Works Office.[47] This budget was equally shared by all of the members in the budgetary committee of the DPRD, thereby each member made a discretionary decision on the budget of Rp. 75 million (US$ 6750).[48]

Based on this author's observation and interviews with several DPRD members, most of this added budget was used for paving roads in each member's home village. Among these, there was a project to pave the road exactly in front of the home of a DPRD member.[49] Importantly for this study, in many cases, the DPRD members did not refer to the prioritized lists of desired projects which were decided in each *Musrenbang* at the village and the sub-district level. An official at the Public Works Office admitted that most of the projects proposed by the DPRD were those not listed or given lower priority in *Murenbang* process.[50]

This case confirms many of the village heads' claims that the DPRD's home village gains more projects than others. In such situation, village leaders increasingly recognize the lobbying to the DPRD members as an effective way for their proposals to be accommodated in the budget, while *Musrenbang* process is disregarded by them.

7.3.3 Individual Negotiations with the Executive

The process examined in the two cases above illustrates how the DPRD members

[46] Interview with Saiful, the secretary of Solok BAPPEDA, April 14, 2010.

[47] Total expenditure of the Public Works Office in the 2010 budget was Rp. 26 billion. In this expenditure, the apparatus expenditure (*Belanja Tidak Lansung*) was Rp. 8 billion and the capital expenditure (*Belanja Lansung*) was Rp. 18 billion.

[48] The budgetary committee of Solok DPRD in 2009 consisted of 23 members.

[49] Interview with Firmansyah, a DPRD member from Hanura, Solok, November 27, 2010

[50] Interview with the secretary of the Public Works Office, November 25, 2010

collectively bargains with the executive. Not surprisingly, along with such bargaining, DPRD members individually negotiate with the executive for their proposals accommodated in the budget. An experienced DPRD member in Solok revealed: “Though few DPRD members may know, actually individual negotiations are much more important to bring projects to their home village. In the meetings at the hotel, I just followed the colleagues for gaining additional projects for my village.”[51]

According to him, one of the keys to success is to belong to the DPRD committee dealing with infrastructure.[52] The discussions in that committee increase the knowledge on the government’s overall plan of this affair. When the government prepares the draft of KUA-PPAS around August to October, it is better to start negotiations with two institutions: BAPPEDA and the Public Work Office. In such a way, he constantly had brought the projects ranging from Rp. 100 million to Rp. 500 million to his village.[53]

His account suggests that the leverage on the budget differs substantially among DPRD members. A handful of experienced legislative members get more involved in the budget planning. Including such backroom dealings, available information on the budget-planning process has been yet quite limited to the public.

7.4 Summary

Solok district has implemented several measures to facilitate participatory planning with technical and financial assistance from donor agencies. However, even in such

[51] Interview with Afrizal Harun, a Solok DPRD member from Golkar since 1999, Bukittinggi, November 26, 2010.

[52] In the case of Solok, there are three DPRD committees. Among these, the committee C deals with infrastructure. At the time of the interview, 11 members belonged to this committee.

[53] Interview with Afrizal Harun, Bukittinggi, November 26, 2010. Afrizal Harun’s home village is Cupak, one of the biggest villages in Solok district.

advantaged situation, *Musrenbang* process has yet fallen short of its promise and potential. As with the participatory planning during the Suharto era, *Musrenbang* process still produces only the 'wish lists', to which the bureaucrats and legislative members rarely take heed . Though there is no clear deviation from the directives of the central government in terms of the procedural requirements, in practice, this participatory planning process is undermined in various ways by local governments and parliaments.

Such half-hearted attitude of local elites to citizen involvement is also reflected in different acts of the DPRD in open and closed-door sessions. While discussions are conducted in a blatantly perfunctory manner in the meetings in which citizens are allowed to sit in gallery seats, key decisions are made in the exclusively closed sessions. Such closed session is held in a hotel outside the district, and only bureaucrats and local parliament members know when and where it will be held. Thereby they ostensibly follow the procedures for releasing the information to the public, while preventing any details of discussions from leaking to the public.

In this way, public's access to information on local government budget is quite limited. Usually local newspapers only cover the general information and overall figures on the budget. Such informational asymmetries between local elites and citizens become severe constraint on the public's ability to pressure government by means other than voting. Therefore pressures from civil society have yet failed to improve responsiveness of local government.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

8.1 Local Elites' Response to the Three Modes of Citizen Participation

This dissertation has examined the effectiveness of three modes of citizen participation, which are voting, raising voices, engaging in budget planning, in prompting local governments to be responsive to the demands of the majority of the residents. As shown in Chapters Four and Five, the electoral mechanism, in which citizens exercise influence by voting, has prompted some local government heads to put priority on implementing programs which benefits the vast majority of the electorate. As this thesis argued, such a shift in local governance resulted from the change of local government heads' electoral strategies of vote mobilization. To put it another way, local government responsiveness has increased, to a certain degree, in some regions, as a consequence of elite initiatives——a shift in local government heads' approach to the citizens' votes.

In contrast to this positive improvement of government responsiveness, which is initiated by elites who respond to voting——the most conventional mode of citizen participation, the other two modes of citizen participation, raising voices and engaging in budget planning, have not yet brought about solid changes in local governance. In the case concerned in Chapter Six, the influence of citizens' raising voices remains small in the long term, though their voices occasionally exert significant influence over government policies for a short term. In the same vein, as shown in Chapter Seven, in the process of participatory budget planning, citizens' influence has been considerably limited, while local government officials and parliament members ostensibly promote citizens' increased participation. Thus, the expansion of spaces for citizen participation has not yet been fully developed in Indonesia.

8.1.1 Local Elites' Response to Citizens' Voting

As the case of Alex Noerdin in Chapter Four and Gamawan Fauzi in Chapter Five showed, some local politicians have had a clear-cut strategy to cater to the demands of the vast majority of the residents. Both of them placed much more emphasis on delivering benefits to a large number of residents, rather than transferring benefits to their core supporters. Or, at least, they managed to be seen as such in the public's eye. Alex Noerdin's South Sumatra government has implemented two "generous" programs for the majority of the residents. It provided free healthcare for all the residents and free education up to the high school level. Particularly as to the healthcare program, South Sumatra became one of the first provinces to implement such a program on a province-wide scale. Gamawan Fauzi's West Sumatra government implemented several measures to improve transparency and efficiency of provincial administration. Among these, the most well-known measure was to restrict the off-duty usage of public vehicles for provincial officials, resulting in a significant cost saving. His government also introduced highly rigorous rules to the official travel expenses (*perjalanan dinas*) for provincial government employees, which have been considered as one of the main venues of misappropriation of government funds. These measures were to bring a gratification to the majority of the residents who had been disgusted at the corruption of elites in senior positions of local governments. In this way, in the two regions concerned, local governments have become increasingly responsive to the expectations of the majority.

These measures discernibly indicate a shift of local governance. As to South Sumatra case, since the two fee-free programs entailed a considerably large budget, the province's budget allocations to the education and health sector significantly increased. Compared to the last annual budget of the predecessor's term, the public spending on education nearly doubled and that on healthcare more than tripled in the first year of the Alex government' budget, both in terms of nominal value and percentage of the total budget. Compared to the other 32

provinces in Indonesia, Alex's South Sumatra government allocated the third largest amount of budget to health sector and the seventh largest amount to education sector in terms of percentage of total budget. It is worth noting that these two fee-free programs were relatively free from corruption allegations, since much of the implementation tasks were entrusted to the district and city governments. South Sumatra government undertook the role of designing the programs, overseeing the budget use of district and city governments, and bearing more than 60 percent of financial burden. As to the West Sumatra case, Gamawan pursued several administration reforms in face of the expected intensive resistance from the bureaucrats. Contrary to the expectations, there was no noticeable defiance on the part of bureaucrats, mainly because it was too risky for them to stand against this nationally-reputed "clean" local leader. Gamawan was also known as an outspoken person in the local as well as national media. With these reforms to cut waste spending, Gamawan's government could allocate more amount of budget to important policy areas. In this way, in a visible manner, some local governments are shifting from catering to the demands of the vested interests towards serving the demands of the majority. Considering that most of the residents are non-elites, it can be said that they adopt a new strategy to join hands with non-elites.

Such a shift of local governance was undoubtedly initiated by local government heads. More importantly for this thesis, this shift clearly resulted from the change of electoral strategies of local elites competing in the direct local government head elections. In the case of South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin's winning was due largely to the two elaborately-explained attention-getting campaign pledges to implement free healthcare and education program. He even promised publicly in their campaign ads that he would resign if he could not fulfill his campaign pledges within a year. After defeating an odds-on favorite incumbent governor, he implemented his promised programs. In the same vein, Gamawan used the election strategy to campaign hard on his reputation as a clean figure with living a frugal life and a reformer of

anti-corruption. Though Gamawan's campaign promises were not as elaborate as Alex Noerdin's, he publicly promised in his campaign rallies to build a more responsive (*responsif*), clean (*bersih*) and responsible (*bertanggung jawab*) government as he did when he was the district head of Solok. After winning an overwhelming victory in the gubernatorial election, he needed to meet with high expectations of the constituents to improve transparency and effectiveness of administration. In this way, their main electoral strategy was to appeal their reputation of good performance and offer elaborate campaign promises. Such choices of electoral strategies led to the change of local governance towards more accommodating the demands of the majority of the residents after they were elected.

Using the analytical concepts of the clientelism studies advanced by Kitschelt and Wilkinson, and their followers as is discussed in Chapter Two (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Magaloni et al. 2007), both of the local leaders preferred to hold the indirect, implicit exchange of votes with their policies, which is called programmatic [program-based] exchange, rather than direct, contingent exchange of votes, which is called clientelistic exchange. They tried to garner votes with their promised programs which would benefit a vast majority of the electorate. More technically phrased, they gave weight to providing public goods from whose enjoyment no one can be excluded. Alex's two free programs and Gamawan's programs of improving transparency were undoubtedly such kind of programs. Delivery of a good is not contingent upon votes, and the beneficiaries of the programs are not verified whether they would actually deliver their votes to the policymakers.

As the flip side of building such a linkage with the electorate, they did not need to highly depend on clientelistic networks, as far as vote mobilization is concerned. As a consequence of less depending on clientelistic networks, they are likely to have two features. First, they were expected to require much less amount of personal funds for winning than those depending on clientelistic networks. Second, they were also expected not to primarily

utilize the networks of political parties, which are, in the case of Indonesia, one of the main venues of facilitating clientelistic connections between local leaders and supporters. These two points particularly fits to the features of Gamawan Fauzi. For gaining the nomination, Gamawan got the support of only small political parties in the province. During the campaign period, these political parties were placed on the sidelines. Gamawan did not use election campaigns requiring a large amount of money such as holding a huge election rally which invites national political figures and famous singers form Jakarta. He rather repeatedly appealed his meager personal funds in his campaigns. Indeed, he spent less money than other candidates in the election. In contrast, some may argue that these two points do not fit well with Alex Noerdin. It is true that he was backed by the leading party in the province, Golkar. He spent lavishly a huge amount of funds for electoral campaigns such as airing TV commercials on nationwide networks and chartering a helicopter to move around the province. However, it is undeniable that Alex did not highly depend on the networks of political parties. He rather preferentially treated the political consultant agency, Fox Indonesia, in orchestrating his election campaigns. With the assistance of this political agency, he decided to primarily use an electoral strategy of appealing his reputation of good performance and offering elaborate campaign promises. Thus, at least as a method of vote mobilization, both of them did not depend on clientelistic networks.

In addition to these points, it is worth noting that both of them had already established a good reputation at the time of running for the gubernatorial elections. In the case of Alex Noerdin, he had already built a solid track record in implementing free education and free healthcare program at a district-wide scale during his term of the head of Musi Banyuasin district. In the same vein, Gamawan became nationally known as an anti-corruption reformist when he was the head of Solok district. These achievements clearly enhanced the credibility of their campaign pledges in the election.

In this way, a shift of local governance, or more specifically, increased responsiveness of local governments to the demands of the majority of the residents was initiated by local leaders who adopted a distinct electoral strategy of vote mobilization. This dissertation described these local elites as a new type, which should be distinguished from the conventional ones, and labeled them as the performance-oriented local leaders. To summarize the features of Gamawan and Alex discussed above, there are three points, which were showed in Table 2.1 in Chapter Two. First, they attempted to garner votes primarily by promising programs of providing public goods which can be enjoyed by the vast majority of the electorate; second, during the election campaign period, they largely rely on appealing their reputation of good performance; third, they had the desire to run for higher positions as they jumped up from the district head position to the governorship. Thus, to put it another way, increased responsiveness of local governments resulted from the emergence of the performance-oriented local leaders who have three distinguished features indicated above.

8.1.2 Local Elites' Response to Citizen's Raising Voices

In contrast, citizens' raising voices have yet brought about increased responsiveness of local governance. As Chapter Six showed, even in the case of the reputedly successful civic movements such as the FPSB's anti-corruption movement, citizens' actions of raising their voices could not exert continuous pressure on the local governments for a long term. Actually, for the first three to four years since this anti-corruption movement started in 2001, FPSB had been highly influential to the extent that West Sumatra parliament (DPRD) members reluctantly relinquished some perquisites with which they gained an undue share of the benefits. However, this once-influential civic movement had gradually lost its appeal power, and its members rarely gathered. Meanwhile, local elites, particularly DPRD members in this case, attempted to reduce the influence of this movement in all kinds of ways such as

co-opting local newspapers and some elements in civil society. In this way, FPSB movement exerted significant influence over government policies for a short period of time, but failed to keep its influence in face of stiff resistance from local elites.

As the cases of FPSB and other CSOs following it in Chapter Six illustrated, there are at least two formidable barriers for citizens to make their voices heard by local governments. The first barrier is Indonesia's shaky judicial system. The opaque and often puzzling judicial proceedings of trials make it a tough choice for citizens to pursue legal channels. Even apparent political interference in the judiciary has been often seen. The second high barrier is information asymmetries between citizens and local elites. Actually, as the close coordination between local newspapers and FPSB illustrates, the journalists had been highly critical to the local governments and aggressive to gather information on government policies during the period right after the Suharto's fall. However, after the euphoria of democratization subsided, around 2005 in the case of West Sumatra province, local media have become increasingly close to local elites. The appointment of the chief editors of major local newspapers to the commissioners of the province-owned companies demonstratively illustrates this increasingly close relationship between local elites and media. Such collusive alliance put civil society activists in a difficult position to appeal to the public through the media. It constrains citizens' access to what they need to know.

With these constraints, citizens' raising voices have not yet led to increased responsiveness of local governments. In the long run, most of the accomplishments of civic movements remain elusive. Given the close ties between local media and elites, the environment for citizens to raise their voices has been rather deteriorating more than a decade after the democratization. The Information asymmetries between citizens and local elites have been becoming fixed rather than going away.

8.1.3. Local Elites' Response to Citizen's Requests in the Budget Process.

In the same vein, citizens have not yet increased influence over local government policies in the process of bottom-up budget planning. As Chapter Six illustrated, in this process, local governments have given their prior attentions to the demands of a handful of local elites which are expressed by DPRD members, rather than to meet the compiled requests of the vast number of the residents. Though the central government has actively encouraged citizen engagement in the process of budget planning by institutionalizing the system of *musrenbang* after decentralization, these public consultation fora have yet remains only the process of producing the wish lists. Importantly, the bureaucrats and DPRD members rarely take heed to these lists in the following key stages of compiling a budget draft.

Even in the budget-making process, as with the situation surrounding citizen's raising voices, information asymmetries between citizens and local elites have been increasingly obvious. Such situation resulted primarily from the deeply ingrained distaste of the government officials and parliament members for disclosing information to the public. Their attitude to information disclosure is demonstratively manifested in the executive and legislative's different acts in open and closed-door sessions. In the open sessions to the public, discussions are conducted in a blatantly perfunctory manner. In contrast, key decisions are made in the exclusively closed sessions held in a hotel outside the district. In this way, local elites prevent any details of key decisions on the budget from leaking to the public, while still putting up a mask of positive attitude to information disclosure. In this way, public's access to information on the local government budget remains severely limited.

Solok district, which Chapter Six examined, is the region where much technical and financial assistance of international donor agencies has come to facilitate citizen engagement in the budget planning. Even in such advantaged environment, the process of participatory

planning reduced to be a formality. Therefore, the situations described above are likely to be seen in most of the regions in Indonesia. Thus, citizen engagement in the budget-making process has yet brought about changes in government responsiveness. The influence of citizens' political actions during the period between elections remains significantly small.

8.2 Venues and Limitations of the Changes Initiated by the Performance-Oriented Local Leaders

8.2.1 Sustainability of the Policy Changes Initiated by the Elites

As discussed above, increased government responsiveness to the demands of the majority is primarily caused by local elites' changing approach to citizens' votes. The emergence of the performance-oriented local leaders epitomizes such changes. However, there is at least one key issue in regard to limitations on the changes initiated by this new type of local leaders. It is a problem of sustainability.

As discussed throughout this dissertation, these elite-led changes are not accompanied by increased influences of citizens during the time between elections. Citizens' political actions other than voting, whether raising voices or engaging in budget planning, have not yet exerted influence over government policies. Such weak influences of citizens' voices unquestionably limit the magnitude of the elite-led changes in various ways. The problem of the unsustainable reforms is one of the most crucial limitations.

Given the fact that the changes primarily depend on the initiatives and the leadership of local government heads, it could be anticipated that there would be instability in the focus of policy agendas as those in positions of local chief executives come and go. In fact, as discussed in Chapter Five, Gamawan Fauzi frequently lamented in public that many reputed measures initiated by him in Solok district were not continued by his successor. Thus, it is highly likely that each change does not last long.

However, it should be noted that a small but not negligible number of local leaders are emerging to attempt to initiate the changes of local governance in a roughly similar fashion with Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi. In particular, those promising free healthcare and education in direct local government elections are no longer a rarity, though these promises are not implemented fully or even not at all in some regions. Similarly, those promising to build a clean and efficient administration are seen in almost all elections. Among them, a small number of local leaders have established a good reputation as a reformer of anti-corruption. Thus, though each change may not last long, the changes in totality across Indonesia should not be deemed as trivial.

8.2.2 Changes at the Province and District Levels

This thesis mainly discussed the changes of local governance at the provincial level. The cases of Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi indicated that some local elites are changing their electoral strategies in the gubernatorial elections. As discussed briefly in Chapter Two, the number of electorates in the provinces is much larger than that in the district. Therefore it could be assumed that the cost of relying on clientelistic networks——garnering enough votes to win by delivering directly a good to core supporters——is much higher in the gubernatorial elections than in the district head elections. Meanwhile the strategy of providing public goods is much more effective in the gubernatorial elections. Thus, this thesis assumes that those using the same manner of Gamawan and Alex are more likely to be found at the provincial level.

However, the changes initiated by local elites are not confined to the provincial level. Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi started their political career as a district head and established a good reputation at that time. After decentralization, and particularly after the introduction of direct local government elections, a small but not negligible number of district

heads have initiated a shift of local governance towards accommodating the demands of the vast majority of residents in order to establish a reputation of good performance. Their motivations are not just for increasing the probability of their reelection as a district head, but also for seeking more powerful positions such as governorship. Following the successful seniors such as Alex and Gamawan, many local elites use the job of district head as a springboard to higher positions. Such career incentives motivate local elites to initiate the changes of local governance and increase responsiveness to the demands of the majority at the district level.

8.3 Challenging Elite-Dominance Interpretation

This dissertation intended to challenge the current prevailing arguments in the study of Indonesian democracy stressing persistent elite dominance in the Post-Suharto era. As discussed in Chapter Two, what these elite-dominance arguments emphasized consisted mainly of three points: first, unchanged composition of elites, second, elites' practice of exploiting the state resources to deliver benefits to themselves and their cronies, and third, fragmented and vulnerable civil society force.

As to the first point, this thesis did not challenge but agreed with this point. The composition of elites in West Sumatra and South Sumatra has not yet significantly changed. Regarding the background of local government heads, Alex Noerdin and Gawaman Fauzi are former local government officials, which were one of the key elements of local elites in the Suharto era. Both of them are from a relatively wealthy family. Alex's father was one of the influential military veterans in the province, while Gamawan's father was a public officer at the district branch of the Department of Education and Culture. Besides, it should be particularly noted that Alex Noerdin was a conventional kind of local elite at the time of assuming the post of MUBA district head in 2001. He gained that position by blatantly

buying votes of the parliament members, which was commonly seen in almost every process of determining a local government head at that time. Thus, while the changes they initiated as a local government head indicated a new aspect of local leaders, their personal backgrounds are not different from other conventional ones.

Similarly, this thesis agreed on the third point regarding civil society force. This thesis attempted to challenge this point by examining two reputed cases of citizen engagement which are likely to show increased influence of civil society force. However, the case of FPSB movement and the practice of participatory planning in Solok district indicated that civil society force remains fragmented and vulnerable in the Post-Suharto politics. In the case of FPSB, this once-influential CSO fell into internal disunity. Moreover, the reputation of FPSB was exposed to intensive verbal attacks orchestrated by a civic group in coordination with local parliament members. In the case of the budget planning in Solok, the wish lists of the residents, which are made through bottom-up planning process, are rarely heeded by the government officials and parliament members.

While agreeing on these two points, however, this dissertation contested the second point regarding elites' practice by indicating the emergence of a new type of local leaders. The performance-oriented local leaders such as Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi obviously deviated from the portrait of local elites drew by elite-dominance arguments. They are clearly oriented for serving the expectations of the vast majority of the residents, rather than just focusing on delivering benefits to themselves and their cronies. They initiated a shift of local governance from catering to the vested interests to increasingly accommodating the interests of non-elites. Though some of these performance-oriented local leaders, including Alex Noerdin, are not entirely free from corruption allegations, their basic orientation toward non-elite interests should not be denied. A narrow focus of elite-dominance arguments on the unchanged practice of corruption overlooks much that shows the changing mode of ruling of

local elites.

The emergence of this type of local leaders indicated that local elites are not always united to seek their "collective survival" by building collusive networks among them, as argued by elite-dominance arguments such as oligarchy and party cartel paradigm (Slater 2004, Robison and Hadiz 2004). As is the case with civil society force, local elites are also fragmented and competing each other. In such situations, come out some from the group of local elites to ally with non-elites.

It is worth noting that a new type of local leaders is not necessarily "virtuous", "clean", "reform-minded", or even free from predatory interests. They are rather ambitious local politicians who seek to rise up the political career ladder by building a good reputation. What distinguishes them from the conventional boss-type of local leaders is their electoral strategy to rely primarily on their good reputation and not to highly rely on clientelistic networks during the campaign period.

Elite-dominance arguments frequently laments that the entrenched political pattern from the Suharto era continued in the Post-Suharto politics with the reasons that the composition of elites remained unchanged and civil society force have not yet increased its influence. However, even in such situations, as this dissertation indicated, a shift of local governance or a departure from the entrenched political patterns, to put it another way, still occurs. Such a shift is not caused with the replacement of vested interests with new ones but by ambitious elites' new strategies to join hands with non-elites by promising and implementing the policies which accommodates the latter's interests.

8.4 Impacts of Decentralization

Elite-dominance arguments, particularly local boss paradigm, maintain that decentralization just reorganized privileged access to resources among the members of elite

and thus allowed these elites to enhance their power. For them, even the introduction of local government head elections just strengthened this pattern (Törnquist 2004, Choi 2011, Hadiz 2010). Challenging these arguments, this thesis indicated that decentralization is actually changing the relationship between elites and citizens. As this dissertation examined three modes of citizen participation, this section clarifies the impacts of decentralization on the effectiveness of these three modes.

As to the impacts of decentralization on the effectiveness of voting, as discussed in Chapter One, there are two key assumptions. First, voters can get better information about the performance of local governments than that of central government performance. Second, voters can more easily coordinate their voting strategies to sanction the incumbent in local elections. However, the cases in Chapters Four and Five indicated that the two assumptions, particularly the first one, have not yet been verified. Voters apparently got confused facing a welter of information on local government performance. It is partly as a result of local government heads' intensive promotion of their achievements. Often times they exaggerate their accomplishments. In the case of Alex Noerdin, most of the residents did not seem to know the fact that the allocation of the budget for the free healthcare program was increased considerably only a year before the gubernatorial election. With this increase, MUBA established universal health coverage for the first time, though having implemented free health program for some portion of the poor for a long time. However, in his election campaigns, Alex boasted himself as a pioneer of "universal" free healthcare program and claimed to have implemented it for more than "seven" years, despite that fact that he actually implemented such a program only for a year. In the same vein, Gamawan's achievements were also somewhat exaggerated. In many cases, Gamawan had merely crafted and enacted regulations, but much of the task of implementation was left to his successor. Nonetheless, with hasty evaluations of donor agencies, he was lauded nationally to have "achieved"

various administration reforms. In this way, it is highly questionable that voters can get accurate information on local government performance.

In addition to the difficulty to choose accurate one from a welter of information, unclear division of responsibilities among several tiers of governments always confuses votes. In the case of the South Sumatra free healthcare program, the province implemented it by coordinating and sharing financial burden with district governments. Therefore, it can be anticipated that each would claim their credits to this program. In this way, unclear division of responsibilities muddles the attribution of credits. Thus, the impacts of decentralization on the effectiveness of citizens' voting have remained elusive.

The impacts of decentralization on the effectiveness of raising voices are also questionable. As Chapter Six showed, local CSOs, the main actors to coordinate the political actions of raising voices, faced difficulty to keep their activities. It suggested that elites can co-opt media and some elements in civil society at the local level much more easily than the national level. Activists of local CSOs find it difficult to raise voices in local media, since media are becoming less active in covering negative information of local governments. Similarly, the impacts of decentralization on the effectiveness of citizens' engagement in the budget planning are elusive. The limited access of the public to the local government programs severely constraints these impacts. Thus, decentralization has not yet impacted positively on the effectiveness of political actions of citizens.

In contrast, decentralization has impacted positively on the motivation of local elites to be responsive to the demands of the majority. Decentralization has given local officeholders a motive to build a good reputation. The introduction of direct local government-heads elections undoubtedly enhanced such motive. As the trajectory of political career advancement of Alex and Gamawan illustrated, good reputations become a precious asset to run for higher political positions. Both of them are a kind of the pioneers to rise up

the political career ladder by establishing a good reputation, and they provided a helpful example for other ambitious local politicians to emulate. In this way, career incentives for local elites became much stronger after decentralization.

In addition, the introduction of direct local government head elections intensified competition among elites. Heated competition has prompted some elites to adopt a new strategy to join hands with non-elites, or the vast majority of the electorate, in order to defeat their rivals. It should be noted that Alex Noerdin's popularity was far behind his rival's at the time of six months before the polling day. In this situation, Alex proposed the elaborate campaign pledges which were clearly to accommodate the interests of non-elites. In this way, the introduction of direct elections offered a new motivation to local elites to be responsive to the demands of the majority.

8. 5 Implications to the Analyses of the Current Indonesian Politics

This dissertation highlighted two significant trends, which are closely interrelated, in the Post-Suharto Indonesian politics. One noticeable trend after the introduction of direct local government head elections is that an increasing number of former or incumbent district government heads and mayors are running for the positions of the governorship and more powerful positions. They use the job of district head and mayor as a springboard for rising up their political career ladder. The second important trend is that a small but not negligible number of local government heads come to place more importance on accommodating the demands of the vast majority of the residents. In the confluence of these significant trends, emerge a new type of local leaders who try to establish a reputation of good performance.

As discussed in Chapter Three, there are two most outstanding ways of building a good reputation. The first way is to implement "generous" public services especially for the poor. The most notable in this type is to implement free education and free health care

program for all the residents. The second way is to achieve a reputation of being “clean” by tackling with the issues of corruption and inefficient administration. Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi represent a kind of pioneers for each type, who successfully ascended to the governorship.

In recent local government head elections, an increasing number of candidates have promised to implement free healthcare and free education programs. Actually many of these promises are not implemented fully after they face the limits of the budget of each region. However, a small but not negligible number of candidates had already built a solid track record to implement such programs and enhanced credibility of their campaign pledges. It is more likely that such candidates implement these programs after they are elected. It is worth noting that the number of district-level free healthcare scheme has been on the rise from around 60 in 2008 to over 300 (out of 498) in 2010 (World Bank 2012:34), though most of them are not universal free healthcare program but covering a portion of the residents. In the same vein, an increasing number of district governments have provided their own school operational assistance grants (BOSDA) for achieving free education (Rosser and Willson 2012). Thus, the breeding ground is being built for local leaders to rise up the political career ladder in the similar fashion with Alex Noerdin.

Importantly, at the provincial level, the electoral success of Alex Noerdin in 2008 seemingly affected one another with several governors such as Syahrul Yasin Limpo, the South Sulawesi governor and Irwandi Yusuf, the Aceh Governor. In the roughly same fashion with Alex Noerdin’s electoral strategy, both of them campaigned hard on their achievements to implement free healthcare and free education program for seeking re-election

Regarding the pattern of achieving a reputation of being clean, candidates promising to build a clean and efficient administration are also commonly seen in local government head elections. It is true that most of these promises are not more than just a rhetorical

commitment. However, even though it is a much lesser degree than the case of promising free public services, a small number of candidates have built a solid track record to improve transparency and efficiency of administration. Typically, they enhance their reputation by winning prestigious awards such as the Bung-Hatta Anti-Corruption Award, which are organized by the consortium of the private companies and Jakarta-based CSOs in coordination with the central government. Following Gamawan Fauzi, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, the would-be deputy governor of Jakarta and Joko Widodo, the would-be governor of Jakarta won such prestigious anti-corruption awards. It is also important to note that international donor agencies have strenuously assisted local governments to tackle with the corruption issue and disseminate the achievements of their programs as a good practice.

Thus, the emergence of performance-oriented local leaders is not confined to the cases of West Sumatra and South Sumatra. Though it does not represent overall pattern of Indonesian Politics, a small but not negligible number of such local leaders are emerging. They should not be deemed as a trivial anomaly case.

Some may questions the effectiveness of their programs such as free healthcare program in terms of developing regional economy as a whole. It can be anticipated that many criticize these programs as too populistic. Agreeing with such concerns, this thesis still argues that what is important is not the effectiveness of these programs in contributing to regional economy but their policy-orientation towards the interests of non-elites. As long as local government heads fully implement these programs, it shows a significant shift of local governance. The significant fact is that local governance in some regions is shifting to a certain degree from catering to the vested interests to increasingly accommodating the interests of non-elites. It also should be noted that local governments have implemented these programs without shifting of burdens to future generations, given that local governments are practically prohibited from issuing local bond in Indonesia.

Besides these, this dissertation also offers some implications to the analysis of the emergence of Joko Widodo or Jokowi, one of the most important issues in the politics after the Yudhoyono government would end in 2014. As discussed in Chapter Three, Jokowi is the current Jakarta governor and a new rising star in Indonesian politics. After elected in the gubernatorial election in 2012, Jokowi has been the front runner in almost all of the opinion surveys on who would be the most suitable for the next president. It is definitely unprecedented political situation that a former mayor of a medium-sized city may ascend to the top position of Indonesia through the position of the governorship of Jakarta province. This dissertation suggests that Jokowi did not emerge all of a sudden in Indonesian politics.

His emergence should be interpreted as being on the cutting edge of the two closely-interrelated significant trends, which the beginning of this section indicated. Therefore the case of Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi offer good comparison with Jokowi. It may be unreasonable for some, particularly Indonesians, to put Jokowi in the same category with them ——particularly Alex Noerdin who is notoriously involved in some corruption allegations ——as the performance-oriented type of local leaders. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, in establishing a good reputation, Jokowi used a strategy that combines the same elements of these two local leaders, that of the generous and the clean type. Jokowi and Gamawan received exactly the same award of anti-corruption. As one of the campaign pledges, Jokowi promised to introduce a new free health care program for the poor based on the elaborate plan showing the number of targets for each phase.

The arguments of this dissertation suggest a requirement to study Jokowi's electoral strategy in the gubernatorial election, the key feature of the performance-oriented local leaders. The findings of this dissertation also suggest a need of close examination on the achievements of Jokowi as the mayor of Solo city. As seen in the case of Gamawan, international donor agencies may have played a key role for him to establish a good

reputation. As seen in the case of Alex Noerdin, Jokowi may have boosted the program of free healthcare scheme with the intention of running for the gubernatorial election.

It can be anticipated that Jokowi would stimulate more profoundly other local government heads as a successful case to be emulated than Alex Noerdin and Gamawan Fauzi did. Thus, it becomes increasingly important to study local elites who rise up the political career by establishing a reputation of good performance.

8.6 Offering a More Nuanced Picture of Indonesian Democracy

This dissertation indicated the emergence of performance-oriented local leaders. Admittedly these local leaders may not represent the overall pattern of Indonesian politics. The number of these still remains small, compared to that of the conventional type. Therefore the findings of this thesis do not entirely refute the arguments stressing elite dominance.

Instead of not offering an entirely alternative interpretation of Indonesian politics, this thesis identified the areas which appropriate modifications should be added in the arguments of evaluating Indonesian democracy. This thesis provided a more nuanced view on the ways of ruling of elites by highlighting variations among regions in Indonesia. The electoral mechanism to induce local elites to serve the expectation of the majority of the electorate is partly functioning, at least in some regions.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the arguments stressing elite dominance tend to overemphasize the deficiencies of Indonesian democracy, partly in order to dramatically highlight the uniqueness of Indonesian case. Many of these fell into an analysis of somewhat simplified dichotomy of mature and immature democracy. They present us with only polarized choices: whether Indonesian democracy is liberal or illiberal (Robison and Hadiz 2004), substantial or procedual (Abdulbaki 2008), consolidated or defective (Croissant 2004). Then, they argue that Indonesia is categorized into the latter one by pointing out the

continuing features from the authoritarian regime. Since these arguments are one of the currently dominant ones, there is a clear need to show a more nuanced picture of Indonesian democracy by detecting and highlighting the changing aspects. This need is expected to persist for many years to come. As this dissertation suggested, to study the changes initiated by elites is likely to be more promising, than to study the changes initiated by civil society actors.

Appendix Ⅰ Map of the Selected Localities

Map1. Map of 33 Provinces in Indonesia

*The province of number 05 is West Sumatra Province and Number 08 is South Sumatra Province.

Source: Retrieved from the Official Website of Ministry of Laws and Human Rights <http://www.kemenkumham.go.id/kinerja-anggaran/penetapan-kinerja/11-profil/sejarah/155-kantor-wilayah-kementerian-hukum-dan-ham-republik-indonesia> (accessed on Novemver 15, 2013)

Map 2 Map of Sumatra Island



Source: Made by This Author.

Map 3 Map of South Sumatra Province

Source: Retrieved from the Official Website of Ministry of Environment in Indonesia, Section of Indonesians Clearing House Mechanism for Biodiviersity (*Balai Kliring Keanekaragaman Hayati Nasional*), Text added by This Author. < http://bk.menlh.go.id/> (accessed on Novemver 15, 2013)

Map 4 Map of West Sumatra Province

Source: Retrieved from the Official Website of Ministry of Environment in Indonesia, Section of Indonesians Clearing House Mechanism for Biodiviersity (*Balai Kliring Keanekaragaman Hayati Nasional*), Text Added by This Author. < http://bk.menlh.go.id/> (accessed on Novemver 15, 2013)

Appendix Ⅱ　List of Interviewees

Gusmal, Head of Solok District (2005-2010).Solok, November 23, 2010.

Ade Karyana, Head of South Sumatra Education Office. Palembang, February 9, 2011.

Ahmad Yani, Member of DPR (2009-2014). Palembang, April 26, 2010.

Aliandra Pati Kandata, Head of PDIP South Sumatra Provincial branch. Palembang, April 24, 2011.

Aristo Munandar, Head of Agam District (2000-2010). Padang, December 11, 2010.

Asrul Syukul, Regional Secretary of West Sumatra Province, Padang, July 26, 2010.

Dusral, Head of Solok district BAPPEDA. Solok, November 19, 2009.

Fauzi Bahar, Mayor of Padang city (2003-), Padang, December 14, 2010.

Hendra Irwan Rahim, Head of Golkar West Sumatra branch. Padang, December 6, 2010.

Hilda Osmiati Ubani, Chair of Solok DPRD (2004-2009). Padang, August 8, 2009.

Khairul Jasmin, Editor-in-Chief of *Singgalang.* Padang, 13 October 2010.

Muslim Kasim, Deputy Governor of West Sumatra (2010-). Padang, December 11, 2010.

Nazal Bakrie, Head of PKS Solok district branch. Bukittinggi. November 27, 2010.

Rizal Mallarangeng, Co-Director of Fox Indonesia. Jakarta, July 21, 2011.

Suharman, Regional Secretary of Solok district. Agam, December 10, 2010.

Sulgani Paku Ali, Chair of Musi Banyuasin DPRD (2004-2009). Palembang, April 28, 2011.

Syafri, Chair of Solok DPRD (2009-2014). Solok, April 13, 2010.

Syamsu Rahim, Head of Solok District (2010-2015). Solok, November 25, 2010.

Teten Masduki, General Secretary of Transparency International Indonesia. Jakarta, August 21, 2009.

Titi Nazief Lubuk, Deputy Chair of West Sumatra DPRD. Padang, October 21, 2010.

Yohanes Dahlan, Regional Secretary of West Sumatra government. Padang, December 6, 2010.

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