

# A Proposal of Two Levels of the Public Self to Hirose's Three-Tier Model\*

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## 1. Introduction

This article proposes to divide the public self in the sense of Hirose's three-tier model into two levels, which agree with two modes of self-reference by *I* and that by *you* in English. It also clarifies why the indefinite *you* and Japanese *hito* denoting an ethically good person function like quantifiers in light of the speaker's replicable use of address terms. Specifically, I take up examples like (1):

- (1) When I went to work midnights a few months ago, it was discovered that I didn't have a nickname. You need one, to talk casually over the radio: "Stix, you getting coffee?" ... and I always thought that nicknaming yourself was like talking to yourself, something that made you look foolish if you were overheard.  
(Laffey (2000:141))

In (1), the author talks about himself, but from the second sentence on, he uses *you* and *yourself* for self-reference. He seems to have considered the kind of context in which he switches from *I* to *you*, or in which someone else may replace him as an author. Thus, unlike the first sentence whose content is available only to him, the contexts having *you* as parts contain information to which anyone has access.

In Japanese, *hito* 'person' can be similarly used in a similar context, as in (2):<sup>1</sup>

- (2) Min-na asobi tai ga, hito-wa hito-no  
All.people play want but person-TOP person-GEN  
sukina yooni iki rare nai.  
fond.of way live can NEG  
'Everyone wants to play, but a person cannot live in the way he likes.'

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\* This is part of my on-going research on Southeast Asian English with special reference to personal pronouns. Portions of this article were presented at a regular meeting of Fukuoka Linguistics Circle in April 20, 2013 in which I talked about third person singular pronouns standing for the reader's intimate partner. I am grateful to students of Shimonoseki City University, who taught me a title of Taylor Swift's song, which gave me the basic idea developed here. I benefited very much from discussions with Yukio Hirose, Toshiko Yamaguchi, Hiroshi Ohashi, Shigeki Seki, Hiroaki Konno, Hironobu Kasai and Akira Ito. I thank the anonymous *TES* reviewers for their helpful comments on the draft of this article. The remaining inadequacies are entirely my own.

<sup>1</sup> The following abbreviations are used in the glosses of examples in this article: ACC = accusative, COP = copula, GEN = genitive, IMP = imperative, LOC = locative, NEG = negative, NOM = nominative, QUOT = quotative, TOP = topic.

When used in dialogue, the two occurrences of *hito* in (2) are in an anaphoric relation with each other, and can refer either to the addressee or to the speaker.

These uses of *you* and *hito* have much to do with Hirose's three-tier model, especially with his division of the private and the public self. Focusing on the nature of the public self, I argue that it consists of two hierarchical levels: The lower level provides the contrast between speaker and addressee because they are two different individuals, but the higher level neutralizes the contrast, because at this level, anyone is a replicable instance of the normal, or ethically good, person.

This article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Hirose's three-tier model with special reference to the division of the private and the public self. Section 3 discusses the indefinite reference uses of *you* in English, pointing out how and why it has quantificational effects. Section 4 deals with Japanese *hito* standing for dialogue participants. Section 5 focuses on the two levels of the generalized and the particularized public self. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.

## 2. A Partial Review of Hirose's Three-Tier Model

Before starting our discussion, we first review the basic points of Hirose's three-tier model. I have to say that I discuss his model only partially in relation to the division of the speaker between the private and the public self, as reflected in grammatical differences between *zibun* 'self' and other self-referential terms like *watasi* 'I' in Japanese. According to Hirose (2000, 2013), the private self is an aspect of the speaker which is separated as the subject of thinking or consciousness and the public self is that of the speaker separated as the subject of communicating.

Given this definition, a question appears whether or not the public self is the speaker's possession in the way the private self is. I argue that it is the role given to him in dialogue rather than his possession, which is supported by the fact that *hito* in Japanese can be used both as self-reference and address terms only in dialogue.<sup>2</sup>

Hirose (2013:11) argues that *zibun* represents the speaker's private self, and that it can be equally anaphoric to any person-denoting antecedent, whether that antecedent refers to the speaker, or to the addressee, or to a third party, as in (3):

- (3)      Zibun-wa    zettaini    tadasii to    {boku/kimi/kare}-wa  
              self-TOP    absolutely right    QUOT {I/you/he}-TOP  
              omot-ta.  
              think-PAST  
              Literally, 'Self<sub>i</sub> be absolutely right, {I<sub>i</sub>/you<sub>i</sub>/he<sub>i</sub>} thought.'

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<sup>2</sup> In what follows without any sexist connotations, I use a masculine pronoun like *he* to refer back to the speaker or the thinker, or simply to a person, and a feminine pronoun like *she* to refer back to the addressee where their actual sexes are irrelevant.

This is because, as Hirose argues, the concept of private self is equally distributed to anyone who takes himself to be the subject of thinking or consciousness, and *zibun* is specialized to represent it without having to do with the question of whose private self it represents. He also notes that English lacks a pronoun equivalent to *zibun*.

The difference between *zibun*, standing for the private self, and those terms standing for the public self is made obvious in (4), where the first conditional clause creates a hypothetical world in which the speaker turns into the addressee, and the subject of the second clause refers in fiction to her, or her image, as well as to him. To express the second subject, *watasi* and *otoosan* ‘father’ are fine, but *zibun* is not, and Hirose’s theory is able to account for the acceptability difference. As in (4b), the self-referential *otoosan* is used only by a father whose addressee is his child.

- (4) a.    *Watasi-ga omae-nara, watasi-wa sono-sigoto-o hikiuke-nai.*  
          I-NOM    you    COP.if    I-TOP       the job-ACC    accept-NEG  
          ‘If I were you, I would not accept the job.’
- b.    *Otoosan-ga omae-nara, otoosan-wa sono-sigoto-o*  
          Father-NOM    youCOP.if    father-TOP    the-job-ACC  
          *hikiuke-nai.*  
          accept-NEG  
          ‘If I were you, father (the speaker) would not accept the job.’
- c.    \* *Watasi-ga omae-nara, zibun-wa sono-sigoto-o hikiuke-nai*  
          I NOM       you    COP.if    self-TOP    the-job-ACC    accept-NEG  
          Literally, ‘If I were you, the self (the speaker) would not accept the  
          job.’

In colloquial Japanese, the most natural wording for the message made in (4) is a subject-less version of the second clause, as in *watasi ga omae-nara,  $\phi$  sono-sigoto o hikiuke-nai*: This indicates that like *watasi* and *otoosan*, the null subject stands for the public, rather than private, self, but this is not relevant to the present discussion.

This context of exchanging identities requires the second subject to stand for the speaker’s self that communicates with and, in a hypothetical world, is combined with part of the addressee’s self (cf. Pelletier (2004)); since this combination of the two selves is produced only in dialogue, it belongs to the public self, and is readily expressed by the terms for it. On the other hand, *zibun* specifically stands for the speaker’s private self, so it cannot stand for such a self that is specific to dialogue.

This contrast reveals the nature of the public self. As the speaker can enjoy it only in dialogue with his addressee, it is not a person’s property, but a speaker’s

role provided in turn by the rule of dialogue to which both participants agree.

Hirose (2013:15) says that in English, *you* is chosen to represent people in general, treating *you* in this use as the same in meaning as the generic *one*. This is true of the proverb in (5), which is paraphrased as “One cannot live by bread alone”:

- (5) You cannot live by bread alone.

Like *you* in (1), reference of the generic *one*, too, can be as narrow as the speaker’s self-reference. Despite the similarities, closer examination reveals differences in meaning between *you* and *one*. Moreover, he does not ask why *you* can assimilate to *one* typically in generic sentences—a question which needs to be answered.

Hirose (2013:15) also points out that like *you*, *hito* in Japanese is selected to represent people in general, as in (6), where *hito*<sub>1</sub> and *hito*<sub>2</sub> are disjoint in reference:

- (6) Hito<sub>1</sub>-wa tosi-o toru ni-ture, hito<sub>2</sub> kara  
 person-TOP age-ACC get as other.person from  
 manabu koto-ga ooku naru.  
 learn thing-NOM more become  
 ‘The older one gets, the more one learns from other people.’

He does not discuss why *hito*, denoting basically one person, is adopted to stand for people in general like *you*, but I argue that this is because both follow the same heuristic to be quantified by the speaker’s replicable act of addressing the addressee.

I use “replicability” in the technical sense of van Hoek (1997): According to van Hoek, replicability is a characteristic of quantified noun phrases like *every boy*, where the nominal denotes a representative instance, and the quantifier produces a set of replicas from that instance. In this way, what is grammatically a singular noun phrase can refer to a set of referents that are replicas of one representative.

The replicability is adapted to apply to replicable address terms like *you* in English and *hito* in Japanese; for example, the indefinite *you* semantically denotes a representative addressee, and the quantifier is replaced by a replicable act of addressing, thereby ensuring that in the context of replicable addressing, its reference replicates itself to cover a whole set of addressees, as we will see shortly.

### 3. The Indefinite Reference Uses of *You* in English

We identify the nature of the speaker’s self represented by *you* and the constraints on this way of self-reference, first by examining the type of context where the self-referential *you* occurs, and second by reviewing the characteristics of

the indefinite reference uses of *you* so that they include the self-referential *you* as a subtype for referring specifically to what I call “the generalized public self.”

Hirose (2013) argues that *I* in English belongs to the same class of terms as *watasi* and *otoosan* in Japanese, standing basically for the speaker’s public self. I say “basically” because *I* can also be diverted into standing for the speaker’s private self in his account—a point which we do not discuss in the present article.

The main issue here is concerned with *you* rather than with *I*, however. It follows from Hirose’s definition that the self-referential *you* represents the speaker’s public self like *I* does, since it refers to an aspect of the speaker who communicates with the addressee. Now we should ask how the speaker’s self represented by *you* differs from the public self represented by *I*, for there should be a difference in level of generality between the public self represented by *I* and that represented by *you*.

Komori (1992:191) points out with the example in (7) that there are contextual constraints on the speaker, or actually the narrator, who uses *you* for self-reference:

- (7) I’m proud to tell people I’m a policeman. For other people, I don’t know if it’s a mixture of fear and respect or what, but you’re not just a regular Joe, you’re a policeman. I’m the first person in the family to be a policeman.

Komori accounts for the context for the self-referential *you* in terms of the empathy that the speaker wants the addressee to have with him, assuming that it is expressed in his reference to himself by the pronoun by which she refers to herself.

Makishita (1997:32) gives a similar account to the following confessional passages, where the speaker shifts from *I* to *you* for self-reference:

- (8) a. I mixed my drinks, that was my mistake. That’s what goes to your head. It hurts.  
b. I played billiards with a friend of mine and that very night he died. Something like that sticks in your mind.

In the second sentences of (8), *your* is close to *my*, which marks the context where the speaker wants to generalize his experience to what everyone will agree with.

The difference in level of self-reference between *I* and *you* leads me to argue that the public self consists of two levels; the particularized and the generalized. The particularized public self at the lower level shows itself in particular situations: This is clear in Japanese, where the speaker has to change his self-reference term depending on the addressee. The generalized public self at the higher level shows

itself in generalized situations where all speakers use the same term to address the addressee. Specifically, it exhibits the following three discourse functions:

- (9) i. It represents the speaker's constant right to engage in dialogue with any addressee,
- ii. it brings about quantificational effects,
- iii. it can be used as an indirect self-reference term.

In English, *you*, but not *I*, exhibits all the three functions, for *I* does not show quantificational effects. The speaker, or more precisely, his particularized public self, has identity in him, and so cannot be quantified. By contrast, the speaker as a communicator of the generalized public self may address a different addressee on a different occasion in replicable fashion, which allows addressees to be quantified. The three functions in (9) can be summarized as the following heuristic:

- (10) Addressees' heuristic for finding an implicit quantifier to make dialogue self-relevant: Derive a generic quantifier from reference to the speaker's generalized public self to put your own in its scope.

This heuristic applies to *you* in English and to *hito* in Japanese, and captures the fact that what are originally terms denoting individuals are adopted to express general statements. The addressee takes a speaker who performs replicable addressing not as an individual speaker, but rather as an instance of these addressees replicated, because when the generalized public self talks with a replicable addressee, what is true of one instance is also true of other instances, which neutralizes the distinction between speaker and addressee, or between speaker and any other third party.

One question arises as to the nature of the speaker's right in (9i). Since any addressee turns into a speaker in dialogue, this right is, by definition, given to any speaker. Also since it is a matter of convention of language use in a particular language, it is not a person's property or something that a person has as his possession, but rather is a general rule to be followed by any person who uses that language to participate properly in dialogue. In short, the generalized public self stands for a role that every dialogue participant assigns himself in the language.


An English speaker can, in fact must, always address the addressee by *you*, irrespectively of whether the person addressed is male or female, older or younger than the speaker, socially stronger or weaker than he, familiar or unfamiliar with him, and so forth. These differences in personal relation between speaker and

addressee can be encoded by modifying *you*, like *you honey* or *you bitch*. However, such modifiers are optional and do not affect the fact that *you* in English is a versatile address term which is free from the matters of social deixis. This means that he uses *you* to quantify the number of addressees when he repeatedly uses *you* to address an addressee on one occasion, address another addressee on another occasion, and address still another addressee on still another occasion, thus allowing that replicates of *you*'s addressee will cover a generic set of people. This is why the indefinite *you* assimilates in range of reference to the generic *one*, as in (5).

This leads us to assume that the indefinite *you* has a quantifier in it, because, as a first approximation, it is paraphrased as 'each addressee,' and the understood quantifier is responsible for the generic sense it accompanies in its context.

Actually, *you* can function as a quantifier to bind a pronoun in a magazine article title like the one in (11), where *him* is taken to be a bound pronoun in such a way that for each addressee *x*, *x* is asked whether *x* lets *x*'s sweetheart pay for dates:

- (11) Should you still let him pay for dates?



ELLE, Singapore, February 2013, front cover

Third person singular pronouns used in this way are characteristically antecedentless, and are often found in the tense-less contexts of advertising phrases and article titles of Southeast Asian magazines for young people interested in or concerned with relationship with the opposite sex. Such pronouns typically stand for a sweetheart or someone intimate of each reader, more precisely, someone of the opposite sex with whom each reader takes herself to be intimate. Thus, the indefinite *you* as a quantifier may introduce a bound pronoun: It quantifies a set of readers, each of whom has someone intimate in mind, and within its scope, the reference of a third person pronoun for that someone covaries with the reference of the indefinite *you*.

Bolinger (1979:201) notes that the indefinite *you*, but not the generic *one*, is characteristically used in sentences whose generalization is believed to be normal by the speaker himself. As in (12b), generalizations introduced with *you* turn to be unnatural when they are forced to express what is considered out of the norm:

- (12) a. How does one get from London to Oxford? - Well, one way is by boat upstream from Westminster.  
 b. How do you get from London to Oxford? - ?Well, one way is by boat upstream from Westminster.

London and Oxford are connected with a canal, so the sentence in (13b) is true in a way, but the normal choice is the bus or train to move between the two places.

This suggests that the quantifier assumed to be involved in the indefinite *you* does not quantify addressees in general, but rather quantifies only a subset of them. This is supported by the following examples, taken from Bolinger (1979:202), who observes that *you* is different from other personal pronouns in generic use in that it is suited for expressing the normal and typical cause-and-effect relation in parataxis:

- (13) a. You try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits you.  
 b. \* One tries to tell him something, he hauls off and hits one.  
 c. ?? They try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits them.  
 d. ? We try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits us.

An addressee of the indefinite *you* takes a cause-and-effect relation as if she was responsible for it only when that relation is normal and typical, so she can find her own counterpart in it. Other pronouns lack such a personal simulation.

The quantifier assumed in *you* is in line with the following contrast, observed by Bolinger (1979:202), where the second sentence with *you* is outside the scope of the quantifier of the first sentence, but can inherit, or reproduce the quantification:

- (14) a. Everybody loses a loved one - but when it happens you realize it's not a cause for you or anybody to despair.  
 b. \* Everybody loses a loved one - but when it happens one realizes it's not a cause for one or anybody to despair.

This is because the indefinite *you* functions as an equivalent to *every*.<sup>3</sup> Since the

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<sup>3</sup> As Hironobu Kasai pointed out (personal communication), in (14a), the postulated quantifier may work well with the first occurrence of *you*, but not with its second occurrence, since the quantifier, if any, would force a wrong interpretation saying that ...every addressee realizes it's



generic *one* is unusable in the act of replicable addressing, it cannot (re)produce quantification by itself, but can only accept it. Thus, it is unacceptable here.

To combine these observations with Kaplan's (1977/1989) thesis that a deictic term has a character, or a constant linguistic meaning, the character of the indefinite *you* can be paraphrased as describing the addressee's self-consciousness about the membership to the set of people who are equal in the addressee's status, as in (15):

- (15) (each) addressee who takes herself to be one of the addressees

This means that the indefinite *you* covers only those who take themselves to be in the generalization expressed by the sentence involving *you*. Here the quantifier in parentheses is not a proper part of, but is constantly supplied to, the character of *you*.

The character proposed in (15) is supported by the contrasts in (16), taken from Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990:751), where the indefinite *you* welcomes only addressees each of whom assumes herself to be in a drama whose main character is in Egypt. Since such a specific assumption is unnatural in generic sentences, the terms that welcome everyone in generic sentences are unnatural in (16).

- (16) a. You are in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that you have really left your own world and time behind when suddenly you meet your next-door neighbor from home.  
 b. ? One is in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that he has really left his own world and time behind when suddenly he meets his next-door neighbor from home.  
 c. {?\*Everyone/\*Anyone} is in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that they have really left their own world and time behind when suddenly they meets their next-door neighbor from home.

Instead of universal quantification, the referential range of the indefinite *you* is a limited set of people who are relevant to the locally-understood normal cases.

In sum, the indefinite *you* involves a sense of norm because it refers to an addressee who takes herself to be a member of a larger set; such an addressee has the self-consciousness of having equal membership with others who are equally addressed by *you*, i.e. normal people in general. This means that an addressee with

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not a cause for every addressee or anybody ..., where the two occurrences of *every addressee* have to talk about two different people (cf. Buring (2005:82)). Structural details need to be studied, but this means that *you* may accompany a quantifier only when it is a topic which has scope over the rest of the sentence, and otherwise, it is free from it. This agrees with my claim that the quantifier, or a quantificational function, is not in *you* as such, but rather in the addressing act expressed by *you*.

that self-consciousness is to follow what is normally accepted and replicated among normal people, and this is the source of the norm expressed by the indefinite *you*.

It is not that *you* has a quantifier in it, but that the replicable addressing by *you* brings about quantificational effects. The quantificational effects associated with *you* do not belong to its properties, but to the context in which it is used. As we see in the next section, the same point can be made in relation to *hito* in Japanese.

#### 4. The Modal *Hito* in Japanese Standing for Dialogue Participants

As mentioned in section 2, it is characteristic of Japanese to linguistically divide the particularized public self into particularized public selves in such a way that the speaker has to change his self-reference term depending on the addressee, especially the child addressee; for example, the speaker who talks to his son calls himself *otoosan*, one who talks to his pupils calls himself *sensee* ‘teacher’, and a police officer calls himself *omawarisan* ‘police officer’ when he talks to a child who comes to ask him for help because he is a police officer. Each of these terms serves as a mirror for the speaker to define his role for the addressee, and this applies not only to these role descriptions, but also to lexical self-reference terms like *watasi*.

To call himself *watasi*, the speaker has to agree with the addressee in using the self-reference term as a polite adult, for it is in a social deictic contrast with other self-reference terms like *boku* (used by a male in humble style), *ore* (used by an arrogant male), and *atasi* (used by a female when talking with her friend). Choice of one of these terms reflects the personal relation between dialogue participants.

In parallel with a collection of self-reference terms, Japanese has a collection of address terms each of which encodes a unique personal relation between speaker and addressee; for example, a speaker who addresses by *kimi* is superior to the male addressee, one who does by *kisama* is hostile to him, one who does by *anata* takes a polite attitude toward the addressee, and one who does by *omae* is superior to her in a commanding way. Japanese does not have a versatile address term like *you*, and replicates of the addressee of a given address in Japanese term are limited in number and type, and such terms are unqualified to stand for a generic set of people.

Exceptionally, *hito* is a term which can be addressed to anybody in Japanese; as in (17), it is suited for a speaker who needs to address the addressee indirectly:

- (17)        Hito-ga        suru koto ni-wa        sippai mo aru.  
               person-NOM do    thing LOC-TOP mistake also exist  
               ‘There are also mistakes in things that a person does.’

When read out of context, this *hito* may be a generic term, but in dialogue, it is well

used to stand for either speaker or addressee. The speaker can use *hito* to indirectly address anyone, irrespectively of whether the addressee is younger or older than he is, higher or lower in status than he is, or friendly or unfriendly with him. Thus, like *you*, replicas of the addressee for *hito* can extend to a generic set of people.

To discuss the *hito* as an indirect address term, we first need to distinguish at least three uses of *hito*, as in (18). The referential use in (18i) is free from modal restrictions and occurs in contexts that describe specific situations about someone other than those present in dialogue. The generic use in (18ii) occurs only in the context of generalization, but such generalizations need not be about ethical or moral values. The *hito* in (18iii) is most limited in use, for it occurs only in modal generalizations in which all dialogue participants talk about what people should do.

- (18) i. Hito-ga mi-eru.  
           person-NOM see-can  
           ‘A person is visible.’ (referential to a third-person individual)
- ii. Hito-wa nisoku-hokoo-suru.  
       person-TOP biped.walk-do  
       ‘A person walks on two feet.’ (denoting a generic set of people)
- iii. Hito-ga suru koto ni-wa sippai mo aru. (= (17))

In fact, *hito* in (18iii) differs in meaning from *hito* in (18i) and (18ii); it means not just ‘person,’ but ‘ethically good person,’ thanks to which it occurs only in contexts that have to do with the contrast between ethically-good and ethically-bad people.

As shown in (19), the *hito* in (18i) and (18ii) can be restrictively modified by an adjective, but the *hito* in (18iii) (henceforth, the modal *hito*) cannot:

- (19) a. Wakai hito-ga mi-eru.  
           young person-NOM see-can  
           ‘A young person is visible.’
- b. Wakai hito-wa tairyoku-ga aru.  
       young person-TOP physical.strength-NOM exist  
       ‘A young person has physical strength.’
- c. (\*)Wakai hito-wa wakai hito-no sukina yooni iki  
       young person-TOP young person-GEN fond.of way live  
       rare nai.  
       can NEG  
       ‘A young person cannot live in the way a young person is fond of.’

The example in (19c) is acceptable only in the reading in which *wakai hito* refers to a generic set of young people excluding speaker and addressee, and is unacceptable in the reading in which it is intended as an indirect address term. This is because the modal *hito* is different in meaning from the *hito* in (18i) and (18ii). It has the sense of ‘an ethically good person whom everyone can and should mimic as a model’ and this sense defies restrictive modification, which would contradict its sense of denoting a model whom anyone or all kinds of people can and should mimic.

The modal *hito* is used for an indirect reference to the addressee typically when the speaker talks about a moral with her. In such contexts, it is taken to be an indirect address term as well as an indirect self-reference term, because it refers to a model person with whom both speaker and addressee can equally identify themselves. Thus, the speaker can express an aspect of his public self with *hito*, but that is not what he has in his possession; it is a role given to him in dialogue.

Suzuki (1996:132-150) and Miki (1998) point out that *hito* is used as a self-reference term only when the speaker is angry at the addressee, as in (20):

- (20)      Hito-no        hanasi-o        kike.  
              person-GEN story-ACC    listen.to.IMP  
              ‘Listen to what I say.’

In this case, the *hito* is clearly self-referential, and does not refer to the addressee. However, the previous studies did not discuss how the self-referential *hito* is related to the modal *hito*, nor the fact that the modal *hito* is partly self-referential and partly addressee-oriented. In the present account, this self-referential use is derived from the modal *hito* denoting a discourse participant. In other words, it is a by-product of the fact that the speaker does not regard the addressee as a proper addressee, because he is angry at her, and does not regard her as an ethically good person.

Here is how the self-referential use is derived. Semantically, the modal *hito* denotes a dialogue participant, but, due to the current addressee’s failure to make a cooperative relation with the speaker, the dialogue participants in question do not include her, because she does not qualify as an ethically good person. Thus, the modal *hito* referring to the dialogue participants excluding the current addressee ends up in referring only to the current speaker. Thus, there is no need for *hito* to have a separate sense of self-reference, because it is contextually derived from its sense of denoting the generalized public self as an ethically good person.

## 5. Contrasts between the Generalized and the Particularized Public Self

Both in English and Japanese, the unmarked choice of self-reference is in

terms of the particularized public self, and self-reference in terms of the generalized public self is the marked choice. Japanese has a number of different terms for standing for the former self, but in English, there is virtually one word for the particularized public self, i.e. *I*, which denotes a basic role of the speaker addressing the addressee. In other words, *I* denotes the speaker's basic role defined on the addressee's part. This does not mean that English speakers cannot divide the particularized public self into public selves in the way Japanese speakers can. It is only that *I* can cover different aspects of the particularized public self, as in (21):

(21) I'm only me when I'm with you.

This is a title of Taylor Swift's song, where *I* and *me* stand for two different aspects of the singer's public self, with the former standing for her self communicating with anyone, and the latter for her self communicating with someone she loves.

English can express different aspects of the particularized public self, too, but in a different way from Japanese. This applies to pronouns used for what Haiman (1995:229) calls cases of the most extreme self-alienation, as in (22):


(22) I'm in charge of me.

According to Haiman, this example "occurs in copy for a body-building advertisement" that offers a good context where "the subject/speaker *I* is treating the object *me* as an entirely separate entity." This effect comes from the *me* that occurs in the context where a reflexive is grammatically expected to occur in its place.

Since the speaker maintains his physical identity when he refers to himself as *me* in the same clause in which *I* is the subject, it is not exact to say that he treats a part of himself as "an entirely separate entity," as Haiman says. It is more exact to say that he treats a part of himself as having an occasionally different role in (22), where *I* refers to a role of the particularized public self who communicates with others in one occasion and *me* to another role of the self communicating with still others in another occasion. Thus, two different roles of the particularized public self can be expressed in terms of the apparent violation of the Binding Condition A in the sense of Chomsky (1981), which, in our terms, are responsible for formulation of clauses as expressing two instances of the self to be in the same occasion.

The arguments so far presented result in the following conceptual person hierarchy in the form of a tree diagram, where the two triangles stand for dialogue:

(23)



In (23), “ge. pu. self,” “pa. pu. self” and “pr. self” mean “generalized public self,” “particularized public self” and “private self,” respectively. The hierarchy shows that self-reference makes, to cite Hirose’s words, a “three-tier model” in that it has one tier for the private self and two tiers for the public self: the first tier, represented by *zibun*, does not constitute dialogue, but the tiers for the particularized and the generalized public self do, accompanying second person addressees. The third person is located where neither dialogue participant can talk with that person.

The hierarchy implies that the first, second and third person distinctions come from the presence of an addressee: the speaker addresses her to express himself in the first person, and need to have a third person term to refer to someone other than her. Thus, the private self without coming into dialogue is conceptually a third person, because it refers to an inner person with whom the addressee cannot talk.

Among the terms for self-reference, only those for the particularized public self are strictly first-person singulars; they alone are used by speakers who face identifiable addressees in the canonical situation of utterance (cf. Lyons (1977:637)), and are exchanged with the second person singular in turn. Besides, the other two levels of a speaker’s self can be referred to with non-first person forms, too. This means that the first person is a subpart of self-reference specialized for dialogue.

In support of the hierarchy, I now show that the generic *one* in English is located at the branching node A in (23), a position for expressing both the addressee and the generalized public self, and the generic *one* is ambiguous between the two.

Moltmann (2006) notes that generic sentences starting with *one* like (24a) are oriented to the first person in expressing generalizations from the speaker’s own experience, and so they express a generalization from the experience of the higher clause subject when embedded under an epistemic predicate, as in (24b):

- (24) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.  
       b. John found out that one can see the picture from the entrance.  
 (25) One should not lie.

Moltmann says that the generic *one* in deontic sentences like (25), however, applies primarily to the addressee's experience and only secondarily to the speaker's.

Moltmann does not answer why the generic *one* is oriented to the local first person in (24), and to the second person in (25), but the present account can derive it from the position given to the generic *one* in (23A): it denotes an aspect of the speaker's generalized public self in the context where he takes the role of what Sells (1987:455) calls "source," which refers to "the one who makes the report."

In a context expressing what originates from a person's internal factors like ability, as in (24a), the speaker takes his generalized public self as an instance of the typical, for he is ready to take the source role, and be the one who makes the report about his ability. By contrast, in a context expressing what originates from social agreements like duty, as in (25), the speaker regards any of his addressees as such an instance: he cannot take the source role here, for he alone is not sufficient to be the one who makes the report about a social agreement, but an addressee in dialogue with him is, which brings about the second person orientation of the generic *one*.

Like the indefinite *you* in English, the modal *hito* in Japanese follows the heuristic in (10) to likewise function like a quantifier in contexts like those in (26):

- (26) a. Hito ni-wa hito-no ikikata-ga aru.  
           person LOC-TOP person-GEN life.style-NOM exist  
           'There is a person's life for each person.'  
       b. Hito-ga hito-no zenryoku-o dasu to-iu  
           person-NOM person-GEN full.power-ACC exert QUOT-say  
           ziki-ga omae-ni atte mo yoi.  
           period.in.life-NOM you-LOC exist also good  
           'It is also good for you to have a period in life when a person (the  
           addressee) exert his full power.'

In (26), the reference of the second occurrence of *hito* (*hito*<sub>2</sub>) covaries with that of its first occurrence (*hito*<sub>1</sub>), for the modal *hito* can cover two levels of reference involved in representing the generalized public self; *hito*<sub>1</sub> functions as a quantifier, and *hito*<sub>2</sub> denotes an instance of the quantified referents. Thus, (26a) is interpreted as follows: for every person x, including the addressee, there is a lifestyle that x adopts. Although being referential to an exchangeable role in dialogue, the modal

*hito* resembles *zibun* in (4) in being anaphoric to the topic, since it likewise denotes what is common to all the instances referred to, including the dialogue participants.

The example in (27) is acceptable only in the reading in which *hito* refers to a separate species of human beings, in contrast to a species of apes, for example, but not, in the reading in which it is intended to refer to a dialogue participant:

- (27) (\*)Hito-ni-wa hito-no ikikata-ga a-tta.  
           person-LOC-TOP person-GEN life.style-NOM exist-PAST  
           ‘There was a person’s life for a person.’

This sentence in past tense describes a particular situation in the past, and cannot be equally relevant to any person, so either speaker or addressee cannot apply the heuristic in (10), failing to let the reference of the *hito* be replicated to him or to her.

The modal *hito* shares the replicability of addressing with the indefinite *you*, and likewise functions like a generic quantifier which ranges over dialogues in which the speaker uses it to address the addressee. Compared with *you*, it has a narrower sense to be replicated over the sentence meaning and the quality of its user, and thus it occurs only in the sentence which, as a whole, expresses what it expresses, i.e. in the sentence expressing what an ethically good person does, and only in the dialogue whose participants are supposed to be ethically good people.

The contexts for the self-referential *hito* are more limited than those for the self-referential *you*. An English speaker may use *you* for self-reference only with his own assumption that what he talks about himself is a normal case with which the addressee finds empathy, i.e. a generalized case about which she is supposed to do the same as he does. By contrast, a Japanese speaker can use *hito* for self-reference only when his addressee does not qualify as an ethically good person for him, and thus only in the utterance with which he tells her that he is angry at her.

This difference in self-referential use between *you* and *hito* offers evidence for Hirose’s hypothesis that Japanese is a private self-centered language, and English is a public self-centered, more precisely, a generalized public self-centered, language.

Assuming that English is a generalized public self-centered language, an English speaker can use *you* for self-reference in his own right. Since he can use *you* to refer to anyone as an instance of the generalized public self, the easiest way for him to offer such an instance is to make one out of himself. Without bothering to check whether someone other than himself is a normal speaker or not, he has only to assume himself to be one who talks about what he takes to be a normal thing.

On the other hand, assuming that Japanese is a private self-centered language, a Japanese speaker who refers with *hito* to a generalized public self has to put



priority on reference to someone other than himself or indirectly to the addressee and puts a low priority on his self-reference, because it is by far easier for him to find an instance of an ethically good person in someone else than to disqualify others from the status of an ethically good person in order to find it only in himself. He is allowed to make the latter choice by way of an utterance audible to his addressee only when he has enough reason to disqualify her from that status. This is the case where she is excluded from the proper dialogue participants because he is angry at her, which justifies him to use *hito* for self-reference in front of her.

Thus, Hirose's hypothesis is able to account for the difference in priority for self-reference between the self-referential *you* and the self-referential *hito* in terms of the difference of the central self a speaker can have in English or in Japanese.

I have argued that the public self has the two levels of the particularized and the generalized public self. We are now in a position to answer why there are such two levels. The two levels are in line with the difference between the speaker's self-reference in face of an identifiable addressee and his self-reference in face of an indefinite addressee, i.e. anyone who can be an addressee, and reflect the following correlation between speaker's identity and addressee's identity. The higher the level of identity the addressee has, the more personal the speaker becomes to choose the particularized public self, and the lower the level of identity she has, the more generalized and the less personal he becomes to choose the generalized public self.

## 6. Conclusion

Hirose's account is clear where there is a clear contrast between the speaker's self-reference and his addressing the addressee, but, as we have seen, there are cases where the contrast is unclear and the latter also serves as the former. To deal with such cases, I introduced and defended the concept of the generalized public self, which is assigned to the speaker as a normal or ethically good dialogue participant.

Hirose's argument is inner-oriented; he claims that *zibun* represents an inner constant part of every speaker which is responsible for his thinking in words, which is called the private self. My argument is outer-oriented in that I focus on what is constant between every pair of speaker and addressee in dialogue. This is realized as the generalized public self, by the speaker who addresses the addressee by the indefinite *you* in English, and the one who does indirectly by *hito* in Japanese.

Because *zibun* represents an internal aspect common to any speaker's mind, it is accordingly quantified when a set of speakers is quantified. By contrast, *you* and *hito* quantify their referents as they are used for addressing, for, like quantified noun phrases like *every boy*, their reference may replicate itself with the speaker's replicable act of addressing by them. Since interrelations of quantifiers and bound

pronouns belong to semantics rather than pragmatics, this is a case of pragmatic reduction of semantic concepts expressed by quantifiers (cf. Levinson (2000)).

The referential properties of terms standing for the public self will be more clearly understood in the three-tier model if it incorporates the role of dialogue to consider not only terms standing for the speaker, but also those standing for the addressee. This article is intended to be a proposal for this research orientation.

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