Enduring Unipolarity:
Exploring U.S. Primacy After the Cold War

A Dissertation

Submitted to the University of Tsukuba
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International Political Economy

Takafumi OHTOMO

2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I thank my dissertation committee in the Doctoral Program in International Political Economy at the University of Tsukuba: Professors Tatsuo Akaneya, Yutaka Tsujinaka, and Motoko Shuto. Professor Akaneya's profound insights always helped me think more deeply about important questions and view issues from different angles. As chair of the committee, he patiently guided me through the process of completing the dissertation and helped me grow intellectually as a scholar. Professor Tsujinaka, while busy traveling worldwide as Vice President for International Affairs, asked many questions to improve my manuscript, encouraged me to work hard, and showed me how to remain optimistic by example. Professor Shuto is a model teacher always willing to help. One time she stopped eating lunch (at 15:30) to offer detailed comments on the draft and continued working with me until dinnertime. I am also grateful to Professor Emeritus Sumio Hatano for guiding me over the years and encouraging me to finish.

The University of Tsukuba offered an ideal environment for conducting research, first when I was a graduate student and later when I joined as junior faculty. Moreover, I was fortunate to receive research funds from the University of Tsukuba as well as the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) KAKENHI (10375389)) that partially supported the dissertation.

In my undergraduate study at Valparaiso University, Professors Albert Trost and Zhimin Lin introduced me to the world of international relations. My interest in the field was further expanded by professors at the University of Chicago's Committee on International Relations: Duncan Snidal, Lloyd Gruber, Charles Lipson,

John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and James Fearon. I am grateful for their help.

I was also fortunate to have many friends, colleagues, and senior professors who helped and encouraged me along the way. I thank Aya Adachi, Kaori Adachi, Futaro and Taro, Atsushi Ishida, Takuo Iwata, Choe JaeYoung, Yasuaki Kawanabe, Joji Kijima, Shozo Kitta, Sumiko Koyama, Miyoko Motozawa, Makoto Nakada, Toru Nakanome, Michiyo Obi, Shigeo Osonoi, Liang Pan, Robert Pekkanen, Saadia Pekkanen, Koetsu Sato, Kazuko Shiojiri, Mike Strausz, Miyuki Sugimura, Kiwako Tateno, Jacquelyn Thompson, Leslie Tkach-Kawasaki, and Toshinobu Usuyama.

This dissertation is dedicated to my father Kenji, my mother Noriko, my sister Eriko, and my brother Tetsuya, who supported me all these years. I could not have chosen this path if I had not been born into such a supportive family. I wish to be the kind of parent that they have been to me.

I am also grateful to my parents-in-law, Toshimitsu Ishigure and Yumiko Ishigure for trusting me (and for letting us live in their house while they were in Saudi Arabia and Slovenia). Many thanks also go to Ayako, my brother's wife, my niece Haruka, Ayako's father Shigeru Fujioka, Ayako's mother Chizuko Fujioka, my sister-in-law Mayumi, and my brother-in-law Robert for their kindness and constant support.

Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Hiromi, who was always there for me with enduring love (and patience!), and our beloved son, Yutaro, who brings enormous joy to our lives. I could not have finished without them.

ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I ask why the unipolar structure of international relations has endured long after the Cold War, despite predictions that the United States would have limited time as the most powerful country. I suggest two primary factors. First, the United States has maintained relations with key allies who know they can best ensure their security through cooperating rather than counterbalancing. In particular, Japan and Germany, often seen as potential threats because they have histories as former aggressors, chose to bandwagon with the United States to solve what I call their "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem, avoiding suspicions that would have deepened if both had pursued independent security policies after the Cold War. America's other major allies also remain because current arrangements satisfy their security needs. The U.S. unipolar position could have deteriorated much faster if an anti-U.S. coalition including major Western powers had dissolved the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

Second is America's extensive network of overseas military bases, essential for deterring potential enemies, fighting wars, conducting exercises, collecting intelligence, and providing logistics in case of actual war. Some states seek nuclear weapons to enhance their power, but having nuclear weapons provides less leverage than they might expect. In case of conflict, bases are the crucial element for launching soldiers using conventional weapons. America's access to worldwide bases, therefore, enhances its unmatched power projection, making it likely to maintain such superiority vis-à-vis others in the future. Thus, extensive overseas bases and the lack of serious counterbalancing against the United States contribute to prolonged U.S. unipolarity in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> We remain the largest economy in the world by a pretty significant margin. We remain the most powerful military on Earth. Our production of culture, our politics, our media still have….enormous influence. And so I do not buy into the notion that America can't lead in the world. I wouldn't be here if I didn't think that we had important things to contribute.[1]

President Barack Obama made that assertion in April 2009, after the G20 summit meeting in the United Kingdom. In the State of the Union address on January 24, 2012, he also said, "Anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about."[2]

Leaders of declining states tend to tell the public and the world, however, that their countries are not in decline when in fact they are. Moreover, many argue that other states are increasingly trying to balance against the United States to challenge U.S. primacy, and the power of the United States is quickly declining. But is this view correct?

U.S. power has not declined so dramatically nor has a coalition of major counterbalancing powers seriously threatened U.S. security. Although some dispute the U.S. economic outlook, the United States has been the most powerful country in the world since the end of the Cold War,[3] and its primacy has persisted much longer

---

[1] Barack Obama, "News Conference by President Obama," Excel Center, London, United Kingdom, April 2, 2009, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/News-Conference-by-President-Obama-4-02-09/ (accessed November 11, 2010).

[2] Remarks by President in State of the Union Address, The While House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 24, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address (accessed August 13, 2012).

[3] The post-Cold War could generally be divided into three phases: (1) the immediate

than many expected. The central question I seek to answer in this dissertation, therefore, is what factors contribute to America's sustained primacy, or the so-called unipolar structure of international politics after the Cold War?

It is no accident that we find many discussions of overwhelming U.S. power, because it certainly affects international politics. In the late 1990s, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine called the United States a "hyperpower . . . a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories."[4] In Vedrine's view, the word *superpower* is:

> . . . a Cold War word that reflected military capabilities of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But now, the breadth of American strength is unique, extending beyond economics, technology or military might to this domination of attitudes, concepts, language and modes of life.[5]

Although he did not use exact terms such as *U.S. primacy* or *unipolar world,* the basic idea is clear.

Obviously, the United States is also conscious of its position. When the Cold War ended, the United States was concerned about how to maximize and prolong its primacy well into the future. The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of the U.S. Department of Defense famously stated that the goal of the United States was to achieve primacy, and to refuse to tolerate the rise of other great powers.[6]

---

post-Cold War phase, 1989-2001; (2) the post-9/11 phase, 2001-late 2000s; and (3) the rise of China phase, late 2000s (2007) to the present.

[4] "To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower,'" *New York Times*, February 5, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/news/05iht-france.t_0.html (accessed August 22, 2012).

[5] Ibid.

[6] "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival,'" *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, A14.

Examples abound illustrating U.S. power, especially its long-distance force-projection capabilities. On September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11), the U.S.S. (United States Ship) Enterprise, an American aircraft carrier,[7] was returning to its homeport in Norfork, Virginia, from Operation Southern Watch where it had been monitoring the no-fly zone in Iraq. But after learning about the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., the ship took a 180-degree turn to waters off southwest Asia. Within three weeks, jet fighter aircrafts from the Enterprise had completed approximately 700 missions in Afghanistan to destroy al Qaeda training camps and Taliban military installations.[8] To participate in the military operations, U.S. aircrafts also launched from a base on Diego Garcia, an island approximately 1,790 kilometers south of India.[9] Countries in Central Asia such as Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan also provided military bases to the United States to assist the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan.[10] In the Iraq War of 2003 that followed, some U.S.

---

[7] As of April 2013, 22 aircraft carriers operate in the world. Although countries that possess aircraft carriers usually have only one (Russia, India, France, Brazil, Thai, and China) and those that have two are even limited (the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy), the United States alone possesses 10, ready to be deployed to different parts of the world. See "World Wide Aircraft Carriers," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/carriers.htm (accessed April 4, 2013). This site includes Enterprise, but it has been inactivated on December 1, 2012, and is in the process of decommissioning. See USS Enterprise (CVN 65), "Public Relations," http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/enterprise/Documents/Enterprise/public_relations.html#Deactivate (accessed March 4, 2013). According to the official website of the United States Navy, Nimitz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carl Vinson, Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, John C. Stennis, Harry S. Truman, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush are currently commissioned. See Navy.mil., "The Carriers: The List," http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-list.asp (accessed April 4, 2013).

[8] Navy.mil, "The Carriers—Why the Carriers?" http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-why.asp (accessed November 15, 2010).

[9] Adam Hebert, "Black September 11," *Air Force Magazine*, September 2002, 57, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2002/September%202002/0902black.pdf (accessed September 29, 2012).

[10] Alexander Cooley, "Base Politics: Redeploying U.S. Troops," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 79-92.

Marines stationed in Okinawa, Japan, were deployed to Iraq to fight and occupy the country.[11] These episodes show that the United States is able to project its massive military force swiftly to countries located even on the opposite side of the globe. No other country comes close in its scale in projecting power worldwide, surpassing the area that ancient Roman Empire controlled long ago.

Nonetheless, it is often said that China, India, and Brazil are shifting the balance of power, and the relative power of the United States is in decline. According to the Pew Global Attitude Project, "[i]n 15 of 22 nations, majorities or pluralities say China either will replace or already has replaced the United States as the world's leading superpower."[12] This view is strongly shared even among traditional U.S. allies in Europe. Moreover, the *Economist* predicts China to overtake the United States by 2018.[13] Similarly, according to the International Monetary Fund's *World Economic Outlook*, the Chinese economy is likely to surpass that of the United States a bit earlier by year 2016.[14]

Much of these claims about the inevitable decline of the United States, however, are largely based on perceptions and predictions. As such, it is even more

---

[11] "Okinawa to beikoku kaihei tai (3) [Okinawa and U.S. Marines (3)], Jiji Tsushinsha, Jiji.Com, n.d., http://www.jiji.com/jc/v2?id=20100424us_marine_corps_in_okinawa_03 (accessed September 27, 2012).

[12] Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitude Project, "China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower," July 13, 2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/13/chapter-1-the-global-balance-of-power/, (accessed August 28, 2012).

[13] *The Economist*, "The Dating Game," December 27, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/save_date (accessed September 22, 2012).

[14] International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook: Tensions from the Two-Speed Recovery* (Unemployment, Commodities, and Capital Flows), April 2011, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf (accessed September 22, 2012).

essential to explore the factors that differentiate the United States from other major powers, which in turn helps us understand the enduring U.S. position in the world.

The remainder of the introduction is divided into five parts. First, I discuss the puzzles surrounding the issue of U.S. unipolarity. Second, I present research questions to be explored in this dissertation. Third, I provide a brief answer to the central research question. Fourth, I discuss contributions of this dissertation. Fifth and finally, I provide a road map of the rest of the dissertation.

1.1. The Puzzles

Many welcomed the Cold War's end because it diminished greatly the prospects for superpower confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of a unipolar world in which the United States is the most powerful.

At the same time, some were wary of the Cold War ending because bipolarity, which characterized the Cold War, also ended.[15] Bipolarity is considered to be one if not the most stable form of international structure.[16] To be sure, despite fierce rivalry, the United States and the Soviet Union did not directly go to war with each other.

Some argue that the disappearance of the stable bipolar structure might even bring Western states back into power politics.[17] Furthermore, others argue that it is

---

[15] Because the resurgence of the Soviet Union was a possibility, one could argue that the United States needed time to truly recognize the end of the Cold War bipolarity.

[16] For the argument that bipolarity is the most stable, see Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93, no. 3 (Summer 1964): 881-909. For arguments that attribute Cold War stability to bipolarity and nuclear weapons, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of The Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[17] John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 5-56. For an argument predicting a new direction of international politics in the post-Cold War, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

inevitable for the United States to face a serious balancing coalition.[18] But despite the existence of possible contenders, both Cold War friends and foes, U.S. primacy has not yet been seriously challenged.

To be sure, many democratic allies with wealth and advanced military capabilities have instead remained in the alliance with the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, survived the end of the Cold War. Without a strong external threat, the ties that bind the members may be weaker than they were during the Cold War, but NATO still unites more states in Europe with the United States. In the Pacific, the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to exist by expanding its roles and missions even after the disappearance of the Soviet Union to meet new challenges. In addition, non-democracies such as Russia, China, and Iran are not banding together to seriously challenge the United States.[19] Why?

1.2. Research Questions

In this dissertation, I ask the following questions: Why does U.S. primacy continue after the Cold War, while some argue that America's unipolar moment would end quickly? Why do member states remain in the alliances created during the Cold War rather than forming new coalitions to counter U.S. power? How does U.S. global military presence contribute to its power? In short, what factors contribute to the American unipolarity?

---

[18] Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5-51.

[19] Shanghai Cooperation Organization could be one of such examples of anti-U.S. alliance. But it does not constitute a strong counter alliance against the United States or NATO.

1.2.1. Why the Question is Important for the United States

The question of whether the United States can maintain its superior position well into the future has been one of the central issues for U.S. policymakers and scholars of international relations.[20] They care about America's position in the world, perhaps because the decline of a great power and the rise of a challenger often lead to major conflicts between the two.[21] When the Cold War was drawing to a close, some in the United States called for the "containment" of Japan, because they feared that Japan's economic strengths could challenge U.S. preponderance in the future.[22] Moreover, neighbors of a unified Germany feared the new Germany's economic size and potential military capabilities.[23] And most recently, discussions have grown about China's rise and how that might challenge U.S. hegemony.[24] Because the United States as a superpower is concerned about maintaining its position in the world,

[20] Samuel P. Huntington argues, "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world." See his "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 83. On the contrary, Stanley Hoffmann suggests that the United States pursued creating world order rather than primacy. See his *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).

[21] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Dale Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

[22] James Fallows, "Containing Japan," *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1989, 40-54.

[23] Phillip D. Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 96-98.

[24] Aaron Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); John Mearheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); John Mearheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, no. 3 (2010): 381-396. For a contrasting view, see Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

and the end of unipolarity could put it in an insecure environment, understanding the factors that help America sustain its primacy is greatly important to many policymakers and scholars.

1.2.2. Why the Question is Important for Other States

Whether the United States can maintain its dominant position in the world is also important for other countries. The current balance of power would be greatly affected if major alliances today were dissolved and counter coalitions were formed against the United States. That could bring unexpected changes to the regional political, economic, and security environments for vulnerable states.

Moreover, a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from particular regions would create power vacuums that could ignite security competition among states in affected regions. For example, South Korea wants U.S. forces to remain on its territory to check North Korea. Also, South Korea cannot completely eliminate the fear of Japan's possible re-emergence as a regional military threat. Many Southeast Asian countries believe that Chinese assertiveness in the region must be checked with U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Japan, too, benefits from having U.S. forces on its territory to counter the North Korean threat as well as China's rise.[25] Because continued U.S. presence is likely to tame regional security competition, regional powers must understand the conditions under which the United States stays or leaves.

1.3. Definitions

Several key terms must be defined. *Unipolarity* refers to an international

[25] The United States also benefits from its presence in Asia, for example, by being able to watch China and North Korea closely.

system in which only one country is the great power,[26] in contrast to *bipolarity* in which two great powers are present, and *multipolarity* where three or more great powers exist in the system. *Alliance* is defined as "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states."[27]

Overseas presence, as defined here, refers to any military assets, including soldiers, weapons, and necessary supplies, located or engaged abroad in peacetime that can be used to achieve national security goals.[28]

A *sending nation* refers to a country that sends its troops to other countries. A *host country* or *receiving country* allows troops from other countries to be stationed on their soil.

1.4. The Argument

Two primary factors explain continued U.S. primacy: U.S. relations with key allies and its extensive network of overseas military presence. Contrary to the expectations of balance of power theory, the Cold War alliances continued in a unipolar world. Consequently, the United States did not have to face a formidable counter-U.S. alliance, and did not have to waste its economic and military resources.

To understand why alliances endure in the post-Cold War era, it is also important to understand the behavior of Japan and Germany.[29] Because of their

---

[26] According to Mearsheimer, "Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative limitary capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world." See his *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 5.

[27] Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 1.

[28] D. Sean Barnett and James S. Thomason also provide similar definition. See their "Flexible Presence in the 21st Century," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 20 (Autumn/Winter, 1998/99), 8.

[29] The assumption is that former Axis countries such as Germany and Japan may be

history as former aggressors, Japan and Germany still evoke suspicions even though they are Western allies. I argue that Japan and Germany suffer from what I call the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem. They consider themselves status-quo seekers, but must nevertheless work hard to signal their benign intentions. Their ultimate aim was to prevent a coalition from forming against them. Realizing such a risk, they refrained from pursuing independent security policies after the Cold War because that could have deepened distrust toward them. Instead, they continue to act through alliances, or bandwagoned with the United States, to dampen such suspicions.

Alliances endure for additional reasons. For instance, European allies sought to strengthen an exclusive European security institution in case the United States retreated from the region after the Cold War. However, because the United States wished to continue wielding influence, it maintained the trans-Atlantic alliance, which in turn resulted in alliance endurance. In Asia, China's rapid economic growth and its assertiveness since the late 2000s contributed to keeping American alliances together. Altogether, advanced industrialized states remained in U.S. alliance after the Cold War.[30] The current balance of world power, therefore, provides a clear advantage for U.S. primacy.

The second factor, overseas military presence, gives the United States additional advantages in wielding worldwide power and influence. Bases can be used for purposes such as deterring potential enemies, providing logistics in case war

---

dissatisfied with the international order shaped by the victors of World War II. The question of how these countries would behave in a changing security environment has been an important factor for the prospects of stable international environment in the postwar years.

[30] Rising China has no such powerful allies. Although it has been investing heavily in Southeast Asia, many see China as a threat. China also invests heavily in Africa, but even if African states ally with China, such a coalition would not constitute a powerful counter-weight to the United States. North Korea also would add little to China's power and influence.

breaks out, training soldiers, collecting intelligence, and showing political resolve by functioning as tripwires. In the post-Cold War era, no other country but the United States has such an extensive network of bases around the world that allow it to perform these functions. This starkly contrasts with the Soviet Union, which lost most of its bases overseas after the Cold War and with China, which has no such base network.

Over the past decades, the number of U.S. military personnel has fluctuated. During the war, U.S. military personnel abroad increased dramatically, but as the war ended, the number decreased. Although many expected the United States to demobilize its forces after the Soviet Union collapsed, it did not totally withdraw its military personnel. Instead, it maintained soldiers at various levels and in some regions even expanded its overseas military presence.

The U.S. Department of Defense reports 611 worldwide U.S. bases.[31] Major bases are located in advanced industrialized countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, but the United States maintains bases even in hostile countries such as Cuba.

Understanding main factors that explain how bases are established, end, and endure explains why the United States has maintained overseas military bases after the Cold War. International and domestic interests of the United States and host nations are explored in this regard. Important factors include the strategic environment surrounding the United States and host nations, security dependence between the United States and host nations, domestic politics of host nations, U.S.

---

[31] U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline* (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory), 25, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/bsr2011baseline.pdf (accessed September 27, 2012).

strategy, bargaining between the United States and host countries with regard to compensation, inertia, nationalism, budget, and hedge against uncertainties in the future. Although some countries drive hard bargains to get favorable deals in exchange for granting permission, most important bases are located in the territories of close allies. And since the United States has many bases around the world, losing one should not completely halt U.S. operations. Of course, retaining overseas bases is difficult, and the United States must strive to maintain them even in friendly states, but no other country besides the United States enjoys such an extensive network of overseas military bases.

In sum, in this dissertation I argue that continued alliance relationship and the extensive military base network are the keys to continued U.S. primacy after the Cold War. Without many powerful allies and friends, the United States would need to expend its resources to counter potential anti-U.S. coalitions, and without extensive overseas military bases, the United States would lose its influence. Although alliances and bases are examined separately, they are in fact closely linked. Powerful aircraft carriers, for example, cannot be dispatched to different parts of the world without the existence of both allies and bases.

1.5. Contributions

I make three contributions with this dissertation. First, I provide a new answer to the question of why alliances endure. I compare alliances in two different regions by exploring the utility of various theoretical arguments. In delineating the endurance of Cold War alliances, explanations often focus, for example, on their level of institutionalization,[32] or the degree to which allies share a certain collective

[32] Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International*

identity.[33] I critically evaluate such arguments in a first comparative theoretical analysis of NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and introduce an under-discussed function that helps explain alliance endurance: bandwagoning to dampen suspicion. Germany and Japan, both considered potentially threatening because of their past history, remain in the alliance to demonstrate that they have no desire to break away, no desire to pursue independent security policies, and no malign intentions. That is, they bandwagon to solve what I call the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem.

Second, this dissertation brings attention to the positive effects of U.S. overseas military presence. Some have emphasized that U.S. overseas military presence negatively affects U.S. power because bases in other countries create backlashes around the world.[34] In this dissertation, however, I take the opposing view and argue that such U.S. military presence contributes to U.S. primacy.

Third, I delineate the reasons for continued U.S. primacy. Previous works have failed to thoroughly explain why the United States has been able to maintain its unipolar position. In other words, studies largely fail to discuss the *sources* of America's unipolarity.

The question much debated today is whether a "unipolar" structure of international politics in which only one great power exists in the world would be durable. Some believe that America's unipolarity will last only for a short period, and

---

Organization 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 445-75; Celeste Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 705-735.

[33] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[34] Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000).

soon will be met by a coalition of countries that try to usurp its top position.[35] Others argue that states, including industrialized advanced economies, have been unable to challenge U.S. primacy/unipolarity in any significant way simply because it is too powerful to counterbalance.[36]

I argue that both arguments are wrong. Counterbalancing against the United States is not necessarily inevitable, and major world powers do not refrain from counterbalancing against the United States simply because it is impossible. By looking at international and domestic factors affecting the interests of both the United States and its allies/host countries, I provide in this dissertation a comprehensive understanding of U.S. primacy.

1.6. Roadmap

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I conduct a literature review. In Chapter 3, I provide a conceptual framework that helps explain U.S. primacy. Chapter 4 examines why Cold War alliances endure by giving examples from NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Chapter 5 turns to the issue of U.S. global military presence and illustrates the dominance of U.S. global military presence. Chapter 6 seeks to show how U.S. presence starts, ends and endures. Chapter 7 examines how general U.S. military presence and the force realignment

---

[35] Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 1 (1990/91): 23-33. For an argument suggesting that a unipolar world is not necessarily peaceful, see Nuno P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful," *International Security* 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 9-40.

[36] William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 20-33; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

plan affect Japan. I contrast Germany's case to show the differences. Finally, in Chapter 8, I summarize the argument and discuss policy relevance. I also touch on and respond to some counter arguments and discuss future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review the state-of-the-art literature regarding three issues: primacy/unipolarity, alliance endurance, and U.S. overseas military presence. These three issues constitute the core of this dissertation, which mainly focuses on exploring why U.S. primacy or the international structure of unipolarity is enduring much longer than some predicted. However, the literature regarding unipolarity does not explicitly focus on the importance of the enduring alliances of the Cold War or the roles of U.S. overseas military presence. Likewise, the literature on alliance endurance does not refer to its relevance to U.S. unipolarity and overseas military presence. The situation is the same for the literature on U.S. overseas military presence. That gap in the literature is unfortunate because the three are closely related. In the following pages, I review the three issues.

2.1. U.S. Unipolarity

Two main arguments exist in the debate surrounding U.S. unipolarity/primacy. Some suggest that U.S. primacy is bound to end soon,[1] while

[1] Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5–51; "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 86–124; *Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); and "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41. Christopher A. Preble, *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). For the basic argument that powerful states will be balanced by other powers, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). For a general realist analysis of unipolarity, see Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). For a different perspective about U.S. unipolarity, see Nuno Montiero, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful," *International Security* 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 9-40.

others argue that the United States cannot be counterbalanced because of its overwhelming power.[2]

The first argument posits that heavy concentration of power in one country invites balancing by others, and that America's position in the world will not last for many years. Instead, it will simply be remembered as a "unipolar moment."[3] This argument rests on the basic realist premise that powerful states will quickly be checked by other powers.

Generally, countries hostile to the United States tend to engage in balancing. However, some argue that not only anti-U.S. countries but also traditional allies appear to be engaged in a particular type of balancing. The so-called "soft" balancing is about opposing U.S. primacy through diplomatic means.[4] Although soft balancing does not involve "hard" military balancing, growing cases of soft balancing seems to suggest that even advanced industrialized countries are becoming seriously discontented about U.S. actions. This was particularly the case when Germany and France opposed the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Turkey also refused to let

---

[2] William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008). For an argument that America is not in decline, see Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International Security* 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 41-78; Robert Lieber, *Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States is Not Destined to Decline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert Kagan, *The World America Made* (New York: Knopf, 2012).

[3] Charles Krauthammer popularized the term *unipolar moment*. See "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (Winter 1990/91): 23-33.

[4] For soft balancing, see Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7-45; T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46-71; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72-108; Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander argue that the concept of soft balancing and normal diplomatic disputes are indistinguishable. See their "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 109-139.

American troops cross their borders to enter Iraq.

Moreover, particularly since the late 2000s, many point to China's rise as a key challenge to U.S. primacy. Susan Shirk is less optimistic about China's future because of its internal instability.[5] But China's increased defense budget and military modernization, including the commissioning of an aircraft carrier, show China's willingness to challenge U.S. primacy in East Asia. Structural realists such as John Mearsheimer consider this type of behavior a natural consequence of international politics as states tend to maximize power to dominate the system, or to achieve hegemony.[6] Moreover, Aaron Friedberg expects tensions between the United States and China to become more competitive because of clashing interests and fundamental ideological differences.[7] In contrast, Martin Jacques emphasizes China's growing economy and argues that China will seek to establish a new order completely different than the one created by the West.[8]

In sum, according to the first view, the so-called soft balancing by U.S. allies and friends and the rise of China threatens U.S. primacy and limits America's days as the most powerful country.

The second view holds that the current unipolar structure is more durable than expected because the United States is too powerful to challenge. For instance, in terms of military spending and the types of military equipment, no other country

---

[5] Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[6] While achieving global hegemon is difficult, powerful states can at least aim for regional hegemony. John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001): 40-42.

[7] Aaron Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).

[8] Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).

matches the U.S. arsenal. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth are the primary proponents of the view that the power gap between the United States and others is simply too large to close.[9] They point to the simple fact that no meaningful counterbalancing measures challenged U.S. primacy after the Cold War. Moreover, international institutions and norms have failed to constrain U.S. actions. Furthermore, unlike the times of bipolar Cold War or multipolar Europe, the United States as a unipole does not have to worry about how other powers will react to its own actions and is, therefore, less constrained.

Although scholars differ in their views toward the prospects for U.S. unipolarity, many agree that to avoid balancing, the United States should refrain from wielding its maximum power. For instance, when dealing with international issues, they suggest that the United States should pursue a multilateral, not unilateral,

[9] Brooks and Wohlforth's, *World Out of Balance* led to publications of special issues in academic journals and books. *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009) features the following articles: G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," 1-27; William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," 28-57; Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be," 58-85; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," 86-120; Michael Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy," 121-154; Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home," 155-187; Robert Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 188-213. Additional discussion of the special issue of *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (Jan 2009) can be found in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William Wohlforth, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For added chapters, see G. John Ikenberry, "The Liberal Sources of American Unipolarity," 216-251; Daniel Deudney, "Unipolarity and Nuclear Weapons," 282-316; Barry R. Posen, "From Unipolarity to Multipolarity: Transition in Sight?" 317-341; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Sell Unipolarity? The Future of an Overvalued Concept," 342-366. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011) features: Brendan Simms, "Introduction: World Out of Balance," 119-120; Erik Voten, "Unipolar Politics as Usual," 121-128; Simon Bromley, "The Limits to Balancing," 129-134; Charles L. Glaser, "Why Unipolarity Doesn't Matter (Much)," 135-147; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Exit: Beyond the *Pax Americana*," 149-164; Charles A. Kupchan, "The False Promise of Unipolarity: Constraints on the Exercise of American Power," 165-173; Randall L. Schweller, "The Future is Uncertain and the End is Always Near," 175-184; Jeffrey W. Legro, "The Mix that Makes Unipolarity: Hegemonic Purpose and International Constraints," 185-199; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Assessing the Balance," 201-219.

approach to minimize unnecessary backlashes.[10] Scholars share beliefs about the underlying assumption for choosing this solution: that America's actions will largely influence the future of international order. In other words, they believe the prospects for continuing primacy depend on how the United States uses its power.

Understanding whether the United States uses its power unilaterally or comparing its overwhelming material capabilities with others, however, are insufficient to explain U.S. unipolarity. It is not enough to simply say that balancing is impossible.[11] We must understand why other major countries do not seriously challenge U.S. primacy, and why traditional allies do not go beyond soft balancing. Moreover, the U.S. military ability to project forces well beyond its borders seems relevant to the question of U.S. unipolarity—a point not fully developed in the literature.

The following sections, therefore, look at the works pertinent to (1) alliance endurance explaining why major U.S. Cold War allies remain united, and (2) U.S. overseas military presence. As I will clarify, the literature is helpful, but does not adequately address the issue of U.S. unipolarity.

2.2. Alliance Endurance

Rather than balancing against the United States, major countries continue to

---

[10] Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World"; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response To U.S. Primacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005). Brooks and Wohlforth also call for structuring international institutions in ways that shape international politics that advantages the United States.

[11] In fact, Brooks and Wohlforth do not necessarily provide convincing reasons for the lack of counterbalancing. I seek to investigate that area in this dissertation.

remain in alliances that were created to fight the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Chapter 4 will provide a more detailed account, but scholars suggest several reasons. Some argue that Cold War alliances endure because their roles are expanding to include more nontraditional functions, thereby discovering new rationales for continued existence.[12] Others argue that a common identity, or the so-called "collective identity" shared among allies as advanced industrialized countries has been the primary reason.[13] The more recent work tackling the question of why NATO endures suggests the importance of members being mostly democratic countries.[14]

While institutional features help transform existing alliances to deal with new security challenges,[15] and collective identity may help members see similar threats even after the Cold War, neither the level of alliance institutionalization nor the identity shared among alliance members alone persuasively explain alliance endurance, especially when these two factors are considered comparatively and cross-regionally.

The unstable post-Cold War security environment unites Western states, but the Cold War legacy also cements U.S. unipolarity. Japan and Germany have long been considered potential contenders for U.S. primacy, but their reliance on the United States for security prevents their rise as superpowers. For a better

---

[12] Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 445–75; Celeste Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 705–735.

[13] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357–399.

[14] Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[15] Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability."

understanding of U.S. unipolarity, we must consider that factor, along with the China's rise and European will to keep the United States engaged in Europe.

2.3. Overseas Military Presence

The United States has a robust worldwide military presence that prevents potential contenders from challenging U.S. primacy. The current literature on unipolarity mentions that point briefly[16] and does not develop it at all.

Three types of literature regard overseas military presence. First are heavily empirical works[17] that focus on details about U.S. military presence abroad, sometimes including how many troops, nuclear missiles, and tanks are stationed at particular bases. They are important for providing vital information for understanding U.S. military presence overseas, although some fail to ask theoretically informed questions.

The second type is written by peace activists.[18] The works are similar to the

---

[16] One example is Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 34.

[17] Coletta, Paolo E., ed., *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985); James Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma* (New York: Praeger, 1990); Robert Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[18] Hiromichi Umebayashi, *Zainichi beigun* [U.S. forces in Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002); *Jyouhou koukai hou de toraeta zainichi beigun* [Understanding U.S. forces in Japan through U.S. Freedom of Information Act] (Tokyo: Koubunken, 1992); Hiromichi Umebayashi, *Jyouhou koukai hou de toraeta Okinawa no beigun* [Understanding U.S. forces in Okinawa through U.S. Freedom of Information Act] (Tokyo: Koubunken, 1994); Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard, eds., *The Sun Never Sets…:Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991); Tsutomu Arakaki, Daisuke Ebihara, and Akiyoshi Murakami, *Nichibei chii kyoutei: Kichi higaisha kara no kokuhatsu* [Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement: Accusation from the victims of military bases], Iwanami Booklet, no. 554 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001). Peace activists and scholars collaborate on some works. For example, Catherine Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts* (London: Pluto Press, 2009). Lutz is a professor of anthropology at Brown University. Several contributors to this volume are antiwar, antimilitary activists.

first type, but differ in their strong antimilitary, anti-American agendas. They focus on various damages caused by U.S. military presence: unsafe neighborhoods, murders, rapes, and environmental deterioration caused by military exercises and dumping of unsafe waste. As such, they often recommend total withdrawal of U.S. troops. Although the studies provide important facts, their main purpose is advancing their political agenda, not necessarily making scholarly contributions.

The third type approaches the issue of overseas military presence from a political science perspective. Three works deserve mention. In the order of publication, first is Christopher Sandars's *America's Overseas Garrisons*.[19] Sandars, a former British diplomat, covers almost the entire globe, from Europe to Asia to Middle East to South America and provides one of the most comprehensive treatments of U.S. overseas military presence.[20] The book captures the characteristics of U.S. overseas presence around the globe as the "lease-hold empire," since the United States negotiates basing rights with various countries.

Kent Calder and Alexander Cooley offer other major works on U.S. military presence.[21] Calder's *Embattled Garrisons* not only deals with a historical and statistical overview of American overseas military presence, but also provides some useful typologies of base politics between sending and receiving nations. Cooley's *Base Politics* examines the interaction between the host countries and the United

[19] Christopher Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[20] Harkavy's work is comprehensive in terms of geographical coverage and time span. It differs from Sanders's book in that it is more detailed in explaining the logistical aspects of overseas military presence, while Sandars's work focuses on diplomacy and how overseas military presence played a role. In this sense, Sanders's work has a more political science aspect.

[21] Kent Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and The U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

States, focusing on how democratic transition of host countries affect the prospects for U.S. military presence.

Calder's book deserves closer exploration as it is closely related to this dissertation.[22] The issue of overseas military presence is crucially important for the United States. Yet although American military strategy depends heavily on U.S. global posture, this topic has received rather limited scholarly attention. In *Embattled Garrisons*, Calder offers an important first step in analyzing the different politics that involve host and base nations, and countries that deploy forces overseas.

Calder aims to explore why host nations react differently to the military presence of other countries. In other words, he tries to explain why some nations provide stable bases while others do not. He also aims to show how best to manage host-nation politics and maintain overseas bases once they have been established by major powers.

After discussing the historical development of overseas bases, Calder delineates five hypotheses explaining the positive and negative factors affecting the prospects for successful base management: contact, colonization, occupation, regime shift, and dictatorship.

The contact hypothesis states that a contentious base politics pattern is likely to emerge in densely populated countries or communities where chances are high for interaction between base inhabitants and the general community. The colonization hypothesis posits that the basing nation's history of colonizing the host nation will adversely affect the likelihood of maintaining bases in that country. The occupation hypothesis asserts that stable base politics is likely when a non-colonial power, as a

[22] The following is from Takafumi Ohtomo, review of *Embattles Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* by Kent Calder, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9, no. 1 (2009): 197-200.

liberator, displace a totalitarian or illegitimate regime. The regime-shift hypothesis says that the political regime shift of a host nation, especially those in the process of democratization, could lead to the withdrawal of foreign forces. Finally, the dictatorship hypothesis suggests that a basing nation will tend to support dictators when its base facilities are considered valuable. Drawing on various historical examples, he maintains that, in general, the hypotheses are strongly supported. Some are useful in understanding how bases begin and endure, which I will discuss later.

Calder also introduces various paradigms concerning base politics. First, he asserts that when dealing with base issues, leaders of a host nation often use a mixture of coercion and material compensation as policy tools. He then shows four possible patterns of base politics: (1) compensation politics, (2) bazaar politics, (3) fiat politics, and (4) affective politics.

Japan practices compensation politics heavily, where significant material payments flow from the host nation government to various interests that are adversely affected by foreign military presence. Coercion is not involved since mediating institutions such as the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA or *Boei shisetsu cho*) function to adjust local claims.

Bazaar politics also involves compensation, but from a basing nation in the form of base-rental payments and military sales. This type of politics is named after traditional commercial negotiations in the Middle East. Because the amount of compensation to be provided is uncertain, bazaar politics leads to extensive bargaining. A case in point is negotiations that occurred between Turkey and the United States regarding U.S. access to Turkey before the Iraq War of 2003.

In fiat politics, material benefits are not provided and coercion is involved. This is the complete opposite of compensation politics and is often found in

dictator-ruled host nations. Land for bases is confiscated with no or little compensation, and those who oppose foreign military presence are treated harshly. This type of politics provides stable bases. As an example, Calder points to the case of South Korea before democratization in the mid-1980s.

Finally, affective politics involves neither material benefits nor coercion. In this paradigm, ethnic affinity, cultures, and values have more weight as the governing principles of base politics. For example, close ties among some Anglo-Saxon countries have been a positive factor in allowing American forces to stay, while for different cultures, such as those found in the Islamic world, a certain distance may define relations. For instance, American forces in Saudi Arabia are strictly isolated from the citizens and are required to follow local norms in public places.

Although these types are ideal, Calder finds that fiat politics and affective politics have become less widespread, and bazaar politics and compensation politics are becoming more prevalent. However, compensation politics, the most stable type, is costly to maintain and difficult to imitate. This leaves bazaar politics as the main base politics paradigm that the United States must deal with in the future. Yet he suggests that a nonfinancial mediating mechanism like the one DFAA provided in Japan should be considered an example of best practice and applied to other countries.

One characteristics of Calder's book is that he emphasizes the importance of subnational level analysis, particularly the rational decisions made by individuals and various organizations as well as the material incentives of each concerned party. He relies neither on national interest nor norms to analyze base politics as he questions the utility of such variables.

The strength of *Embattled Garrisons* is its approach to studying base politics. Most, if not all, works published earlier focused on detailed historical accounts or the

military significance of various bases. On the other hand, Calder seeks generalizations and tries to establish a policy science of base politics.[23] This novel approach makes the book an indispensable theoretical study for political scientists interested in analyzing overseas bases. Moreover, the book can be compared interestingly with Cooley's *Base Politics,* which also examines the regime-shift hypothesis but explores different variables such as contractual credibility of political institutions of host countries.

Embattled Garrisons is also valuable because it introduces various types of base politics encompassing different regions. Furthermore, it uses examples from the United States and other major powers such as the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union, and France as basing nations. This comparative perspective makes the book highly significant, as studies have tended to focus on the experiences of only one country.

As with all books, however, *Embattled Garrisons* has certain weaknesses. The first concerns the book's structure. The book introduces many interesting sub-arguments and important intervening variables, but these critical points might be more enlightening if Calder introduced them at the beginning of the book. Second, although he claims that domestic individual actors of the host countries, and not national security strategy of the basing nations, decisively affect the withdrawal of overseas military bases,[24] he may have overstated his assertion. Will Japan, for example, continue to spend significant time and money to support U.S. forces if its security environment becomes more benign? Without considering that Japan depends

---

[23] Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 2.

[24] Ibid., 45.

heavily on the United States for its security, we cannot understand why Japan continues to engage in compensation politics. Calder, of course, does not totally dismiss geopolitical factors.[25] However, it is necessary to further incorporate variables such as international structure or the security environment of the host country into his arguments and show what conditions will cause host nations to engage in particular types of base politics. Without such an understanding, what he sees as the best practice may not be successfully applied to other host nations that are in very different security environments.

Embattled Garrison is an extremely valuable book that provides readers with a variety of angles for examining base politics. It is a must-read for scholars interested in interactions between the host nation and the basing nation, as well as policymakers who are keen on sustaining a U.S. presence around the globe in the future.

In sum, those works mark the beginning of a solid scholarship on U.S. overseas military presence.[26] However, they are not explicitly tied to the question of unipolarity. Sandars does not consider the consequences of the lease-hold empire on

---

[25] Ibid., 70.

[26] Authors of disciplines other than political science have also written about this topic. For example, David Vine, sociologist, wrote *Island of Shame* (Princeton University Press, 2009). Historians have also contributed. See Elliot Converse III, "United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System," (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1984); Robert Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952* (New York: Garland, 2001); Donna Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965* (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Anni P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon, eds, *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). Chalmers Johnson, political scientist, has written well-known books, mostly to warn of dangers of militarist empires. See *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000); *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); and *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010). Andrew Yeo, political scientist, writes about antibase movements. See *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

international politics, and Calder and Cooley do not thoroughly incorporate the issue of primacy into their studies.

2.4. Summary

Three points deserve mention in the literature review. First, regarding primacy/unipolarity, the literature seems to suggest that continued primacy essentially depends on U.S. military capabilities alone or the way the United States uses its power. Thus the literature has paid too much attention to U.S. capabilities and intentions. The literature, in other words, fails to sufficiently address other factors, especially the interests of other countries, and how those interests affect the durability of the unipolar structure of international relations.

Second, the literature on alliance endurance is useful in explaining the continuing significance of the Cold War alliances in the post-Cold War world. However, it does not touch on its relevance to overseas military presence, which is a closely related issue. Nor does it explicitly consider the effects alliance endurance has on continued U.S. primacy. Moreover, while many theoretical works are concerned with NATO, those related to the U.S.-Japan Alliance have been limited. Without doubt, Asia is relatively more unstable than Europe, but we lack comparative studies to decipher the most important contributing factor for alliance endurance.

Third, the literature on U.S. overseas military bases is devoted to explaining particular bases and their technical aspects. Others focus on advancing anti-U.S., antimilitary agendas. Efforts to incorporate the topic of military bases into the discipline of political science have thus far been limited. Fortunately, works of political scientists have begun to increase in recent years.

Despite the close relationship, these three issues tend to be treated separately.

Therefore, I attempt to fill that void by linking the issues of U.S. alliance endurance and overseas presence, and to provide a novel perspective on U.S. primacy in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 3

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

This chapter presents a framework for understanding U.S. primacy after the Cold War. In this chapter, I suggest that the study of primacy requires different levels of analysis. My framework is my effort to illuminate both international and domestic factors affecting the United States on one hand and its allies and host nations on the other and to explain how those countries' interests affect two factors—alliance endurance and overseas military presence—which in turn shape the unipolar international structure.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the levels of analysis. Second, I argue why using systemic (i.e., international level or the so-called third image) analysis alone is insufficient in studying international politics. Instead, domestic-level analysis also must be incorporated to provide a better explanation. Third, I present a framework for analysis used in this dissertation.

3.1. Levels of Analysis

International politics can be examined in several ways. Kenneth Waltz's path-breaking work in *Man, the State, and War* illustrates how international politics can be analyzed at international, domestic, or individual levels, which he calls "images."[1]

The international level considers the structure of international systems.

[1] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

Unlike domestic politics, international politics has no higher authority for enforcing rules. When a country is attacked, a supranational police organization will not always apprehend the attacker. The victims have no guarantee that other countries or international organizations will rescue them. The lack of higher authority—anarchy—does not necessarily mean constant chaos, because, in fact, international politics has some degrees of order. However, a country cannot completely count on external help; states basically must rely on self-help, which sometimes leads them to act aggressively toward each other to accumulate power for future self-protection.[2]

The number of great powers also affects states' behavior according to the international level analysis. For example, in a multipolar system of more than three great powers, alliance shifts often significantly change the balance of power, producing an uncertain and unstable international environment and sometimes leading states to war.[3] On the other hand, under bipolar systems of two great powers, states act more predictably. When one great power increases its military capability, for example, the rival power does the same. Less room remains for miscalculation. As a result, balance is created between the two great powers, resulting in a relatively stable international system.[4]

---

[2] See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

[3] Ibid., 338-47. Mearsheimer argues that unbalanced multipolarity is most dangerous. For an argument combining offense-defense balance and how that might affect state actions in multipolarity, see Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137-168.

[4] Some argue that a bipolar system causes instability, and that a multipolar system is more stable. See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 391.

The domestic level looks at domestic political structure in explaining international relations. Here, whether a state is democratic or authoritarian makes a difference.[5] For example, in authoritarian governments, the dictator makes the final decision to go to war. As such, even if many citizens are opposed, the leader will ignore their voices. Authoritarian regimes, compared with democratic regimes, therefore seem to be more war prone.[6]

Democratic states yield different outcomes. The democratic peace theory, one of the most prominent theories of international politics, argues that democracies do not fight other democracies.[7] Unlike authoritarian regimes, leaders of democracies respect other democracies and tend to resolve differences through negotiations. Domestic voices will also affect the leaders, because a democratic leader who engages in a foolish war that serves no national interest will not be reelected.

Using this theory, some policymakers and scholars conclude that creating more democratic countries is the answer to realizing a peaceful world. Unlike the international-level argument, the domestic-level argument says that anarchy or the number of great powers (or polarity) does not really affect the world's appearance.

The individual-level argument considers the thoughts and behaviors of a particular leader and the effects on international politics. In other words, the

---

[5] Structural realists, on the other hand, believe that democratic states and authoritarian states should both act rationally to maximize power to survive in the international arena. Therefore, domestic political structure does not affect how states act. See Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

[6] This, however, is not necessarily true. Democracies, like the United States, have fought many wars with non-democracies.

[7] Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no 3 (Summer 1983): 205-235; Bruce Russet, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a critique, see Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (November 2003): 585-602.

characteristics of a particular leader matter rather than the international political environment or the domestic political system. For instance, it could be argued that World War II broke out because of decisions made by Adolph Hitler and Hideki Tojo, both nationalistic and aggressive leaders. One could also hypothesize that the Iraq War would not have begun if Al Gore rather than George W. Bush had been president of the United States. The individual-level approach is quite different from the international-level argument that suggests whoever the leader may be, the structural force will be the same, and therefore any leader will act much the same way.

3.2. Why Third Image Alone is not Enough

Although Waltz did not discuss the optimum level in *Man, the State, and War*, in his next book, *The Theory of International Politics,* he criticized the first and the second images as reductionist.[8] He instead suggested that the third image (or international structure) alone is best for understanding international politics.

Although the third image explanation is elegant and teaches us the significance of the force that international structure exerts on states, it has certain limitations. For instance, it fails to explain why Japan, South Korea, and China do not form a balancing coalition against the United States, the most powerful country in the region and the world, and instead consider North Korea, which is militarily incapable, to be a threat, not because of its military and economic capabilities but because of its malign intentions.

Similarly, the third image approach fails to explain why European countries, although unified, no longer engage in power politics when bigger Germany could be a

[8] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

potential threat for France and the United Kingdom. Similarly, the third image approach cannot tell us why Germany does not see France and the United Kingdom as a threat although both possess nuclear weapons while Germany has none. Furthermore, it does not explain why Canada and Latin American countries do not attempt to form an alliance to balance against the United States. In the Middle East, Iran is seen as a threat by many countries not because of robust military capabilities, but because of its intensions to destroy Israel. All these suggest that a pure structural theory based on power alone cannot fully explain international relations.

Since relying on the third image, or the international level, alone cannot thoroughly explain international politics, we must reconsider how best to understand politics among nations. To improve Waltz's balance of power theory, Stephen M. Walt has made an important modification by suggesting that states balance not just against power, but against threats. A student of Waltz, Walt defines threat as a function of several variables, including aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions of a state.[9] This theory relies on threat perception, which cannot be fully understood by material capabilities alone.[10]

Another way is to incorporate other levels, especially the domestic-level explanation.[11] For instance, hosting a foreign military base is not simply a foreign policy matter involving the international-level argument.[12] Instead, it is also a

[9] Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 22-26.

[10] This modification is in fact a significant departure from pure structural theory.

[11] Individual level argument, although important, will not be treated here, because that would significantly complicate the argument.

[12] Waltz does not think the international-level argument can explain a particular country's foreign policy. See his "International Politics is Not Foreign Policy," *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 54-57.

domestic issue since the presence of U.S. forces inevitably affects the local politics and the lives of the people. Moreover, the question of why bases disappear requires explaining what happens inside the host country, not just what happens in the international political environment. Furthermore, whether the ally is a democracy or not may influence future alliance relations.

David Singer, in his *World Politics* article in 1961, pointed out that no matter which level is used to analyze international politics, scholars are often encouraged to follow only one level of analysis. Singer asserts, "[w]e may utilize one level here and another there, but we cannot afford to shift our orientation in the midst of a study."[13] However, as discussed above, we need a more comprehensive framework for better understanding international politics. In the next section, I explain more about my research approach in this dissertation.

3.3. Research Design

My research design involves five tasks.[14]

Task 1: Specification of the Research Problem and Objectives

In this dissertation, I will examine unipolarity after the Cold War as the phenomenon. Standard realist argument implies that the United States could face a balancing coalition that would topple it from its leading position.[15] Contrary to such

---

[13] J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (October, 1961): 90.

[14] Although I do not strictly follow Alexander George's method of structured, focused comparison, he suggested some research tasks that would be instructive here. For details, see Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed. *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 43-68.

[15] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

expectations, U.S. unipolarity has not been seriously challenged. I will assess why U.S. primacy persists long after the end of the Cold War, creating a sustained unipolar structure of international relations.

Task 2: Independent and Dependent Variables

To understand unipolarity (dependent variable), I will look at alliance endurance and overseas military presence (independent variables). As figure 3.1 shows, the independent variables (i.e., alliance endurance and overseas military presence) affect the prospects for unipolarity. But independent variables themselves are also affected by various factors. Starting from the left side of the figure, international and domestic factors influence the interests of the United States and its allies/host countries, and those interests would then shape alliance endurance and overseas military presence. These in turn would affect the prospects for unipolarity (see fig. 3.2 for the overall argument).[16]

I now turn to more discussion about the international structure of unipolarity, the dependent variable of this dissertation.

[16] Certainly it is difficult to delineate which factor constitutes independent and dependent variables. Three sets of independent and dependent variables may operate here. For instance, international and domestic factors could be independent variables 1 (IV1) and the interests of the United States and its allies/host nations could be dependent variables 1 (DV1). The interests of the United States and its allies/host nations then could be independent variables 2 (IV2) and alliance endurance and overseas military presence could be dependent variables 2 (DV2). Finally, alliance endurance and overseas military presence could be independent variables 3 (IV3) and unipolarity/primacy could be dependent variable 3 (DV3). For simplicity, however, I will focus mainly on the relationship between alliance endurance and overseas military presence as independent variables and unipolarity/primacy as a dependent variable.



Figure 3.1. Framework for analysis

Dependent Variable

What is unipolarity?

Unipolarity is an international structure of only one superpower or pole. The Cold War era, in contrast, was a bipolar system in which two superpowers existed. In a unipolar world, no peer competitor exists, because the unipole's military and economic power excels that of others. For a unipolar international system to emerge, a potential unipole attempts to become the strongest country in the international system through primacy, defined as "the fact of being pre-eminent or most important."[17] The United States pursued the strategy of primacy during the Cold War (and perhaps before that as well), and seems to continue the same strategy even after the Cold War when immediate threats no longer exist.[18]

[17] *Oxford Dictionary*, s.v. "Primacy."

[18] Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their Security Aims," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (1997): 1-49.



Figure 3.2. The overall argument

The underlying drive for this aspiration is a belief shared among policymakers and some scholars that a strong America is essential for worldwide stability, and that a world in which the United States is the only superpower contributes, in turn, to the security of the United States itself.[19] The United States, according to the former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, is an "indispensable nation."[20] This perhaps is the dominant view among those who believe U.S. primacy is essential.

The concept of unipolarity, however, can sometimes be complicated as it can be measured in different ways, and thus it requires a closer look. For example, regarding the size of the economy, the United States has the world's largest. Similarly, if defense spending is used as an indicator to measure polarity, the United States is again at the top; it spent about 43 percent ($552,568 million) of the world's defense budget in 2007.[21] Although the Obama administration is trying to cut expensive defense projects, the budget still remains quite large compared with other countries.

Considering, however, the international system in terms of the number of nuclear weapons, the current structure is not necessarily unipolar; Russia still rivals the United States. The Cold War ended with the Soviet Union breaking into many independent states, but Russia's military power remained relatively intact. To a

---

[19] Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005); William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41. Stephen M. Walt, "Indispensable or Insolvent," *Foreign Policy* Blog, entry posted June 21, 2010; http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/21/indispensable_or_insolvent#commentspace (accessed June 22, 2010).

[20] Albright spoke on The Today Show on NBC-TV on February 19, 1998, in a Matt Lauer interview. See USIS Washington File, "Transcript: Alright Interview on NBC-TV February 19," http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/19/98021907_tpo.html (accessed November 13, 2012).

[21] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2009* (London: Routledge, 2009), 452.

certain extent, Russia was able to save its military capability, particularly its nuclear weapons. As of September 2012, the United States and Russia have 1,722 and 1,499 nuclear warheads, respectively,[22] although they signed a new START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in 2010 to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 1,550 within seven years of ratification. This indicates that they are still nuclear rivals. Thus, regarding nuclear weapons, international structure is bipolar.

Similarly, if one looks at the number of soldiers, the structure is less unipolar. The United States has 1,540,000 soldiers (2,519,000 including estimated reservists), while China has 2,185,000 (3,685,000 including estimated reservists and paramilitary).[23] Of course the number of soldiers does not define state power, but when considering the number of soldiers alone, China surpasses the United States.

As shown above, the structure of international system can be considered in different ways. Depending on the indicators used to measure unipolarity, the United States does not always dominate. The current international structure, however, can still be characterized as America's unipolarity. The key is in the following independent variables.

Independent Variables

What separates the United States and other major allies as well as countries like Russia and China, then, is America's overall strength, enabling swift worldwide military power projection, including key indicators such as the size of the economy

[22] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," October 3, 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/198794.pdf (accessed November 13, 2012).

[23] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2009*, 447, 449.

and the defense budget; number of nuclear weapons, soldiers, allies and friends; the absence of solid anti-U.S. alliances; and the network of U.S. military bases.

Alliance endurance and the absence of anti-U.S. alliances

Alliances come and go. When threats emerge, concerned states form alliances to counter threats. When threats disappear, alliances dissolve. This is a typical story of alliances.

On the contrary, the Cold War alliances created to face the Soviet Union did not collapse with the demise of the Soviet Union. The mere fact that Western alliances did not immediately dissolve and that those Western allies have not balanced against the United States requires an explanation. This starkly contrasts with the case of Russia. The Warsaw Treaty Organization collapsed with the end of the Cold War.[24] Russia lost many of its allies to the West and had to face a bigger NATO that even included part of its former states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, putting Russia in a vulnerable position.[25]

In contrast, the United States has no such concerns. Having no need to balance against a formidable anti-U.S. alliance saves the United States from preparing for conflicts, and thus, helps retain its power. Rising China has been unsuccessful in

[24] The reason seems to be the nature of the Soviet-bloc itself. By the end of the 1980s, revolution swept through Eastern Europe. The former Soviet-bloc countries abandoned communism and adapted market-oriented democracy. Many Eastern European countries had no strong reasons to continue close ties with the disintegrating Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union was rather a threat to the former communist countries when some were more or less forced to join the communist-bloc. The governments of the Warsaw Treaty Organizations were closely monitored and controlled. Therefore, they had incentives to escape from Soviet influence. Their desire to join NATO and the European Union (EU) is such evidence.

[25] Michael Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," *Survival* 37, no. 1 (1995): 34-52.

persuading others to form a serious anti-U.S. coalition,[26] and is an important advantage for the United States.

U.S. overseas military presence

What is equally important for U.S. primacy is American bases overseas providing deterrence, reassurance, and swift response to crises abroad. Unlike nuclear weapons, which Henry Kissinger argues cannot be a source of power in international politics,[27] overseas military presence provides means to wield global influence.

Maintaining overseas bases can be difficult for America because of local protests and budget constraints. Nevertheless, U.S. bases continue to contribute to its primary position in the world. No other country has such an extensive network of bases today. Even if China's overseas interests were threatened, they would be unable to project military power in different parts of the world as swiftly as the United States would be able to do. Russia once had its own overseas bases, but since the end of the Cold War, its overseas base network no longer exists.[28]

Counterfactual Analysis

To highlight the roles the continued Cold War alliances and U.S. overseas military presence have on U.S. primacy, I consider what would happen to U.S. power if its Western alliances no longer existed and its overseas military bases were

[26] The so-called Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, has been too weak to counter the United States.

[27] Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957; repr., Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1984).

[28] Russia has a largely symbolic naval base in Syria.

significantly reduced. Robert Keohane's work is instructive regarding the relationship between U.S. hegemony and international cooperation.[29] U.S. hegemony has been considered as the central factor in explaining successful international cooperation.[30] However, despite waning U.S. power, international cooperation did not decline. In an effort to explore the reasons, Keohane attributed the continued level of cooperation among states to the roles played by international institutions such as lowering transaction costs and solving cheating problems among states.

Keohane's approach seems useful in understanding the level of U.S. primacy. There must be reasons why U.S. primacy has not declined dramatically. I attribute the reasons to the continued U.S. alliances and the U.S. overseas military presence. To understand the effects enduring alliances and U.S. overseas military presence have on U.S. continued primacy, counterfactual analysis will be useful.[31]

What would the world be like with or without Cold War alliances and U.S. overseas military presence? Consider four scenarios.

1. A world without continued Cold War alliances

1) After the end of the Cold War, some advanced industrial countries and non-democracies find their interests do not necessarily match those of the United States.
2) Some advanced industrial countries and non-democracies increasingly balance against the United States.
3) Balance of power tilts toward an anti-U.S. alliance.
4) The United States has to counter the anti-U.S. alliance by spending more

---

[29] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[30] The most important theory explaining high international cooperation is the Hegemonic Stability Theory. See Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28, no. 3 (April l976): 317-347.

[31] On counterfactuals, see James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 169-95; Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

on defense and diplomacy.
5) As the United States exhausts its power to deal with the anti-U.S. alliance, it loses its primacy.

2. A world with continued Cold War alliances

1) Advanced industrial countries more or less share common interest with the United States and remain as U.S. allies after the Cold War.
2) Because U.S. allies are mostly advanced countries, balance of power continues to favor U.S. alliance.
3) A potential hegemon may rise, but because of the U.S. power alone and/or because of the aggregate power of the U.S allies, the potential hegemon is unable to meaningfully challenge U.S. primacy.
4) U.S. primacy likely continues.

3. A world without U.S. overseas military presence

1) Without U.S. presence nearby, a potential hegemon finds itself less constrained when considering aggressive actions.
2) Neighboring countries respond to the potential hegemon and form a regional balance of power.
3) If regional counter balancing succeeds, the United States does not intervene.
4) If the potential hegemon is likely to achieve regional hegemony, the United States intervenes.
5) The United States may stop the potential hegemon from becoming a regional hegemon. However, the rising hegemon may deny U.S. access to the region by the time it decides to return, and thus it fails to prevent the potential hegemon from becoming a regional hegemon.

4. A world with U.S. overseas military presence

1) The United States checks the rising hegemon carefully by using its overseas military bases already in place.
2) The potential hegemon tries to exert influence despite U.S. military bases nearby.
3) U.S. military presence acts as deterrence and the rising hegemon is constrained.
4) As long as the United States is powerful, and host countries agree to allow military bases, the potential hegemon rises very slowly.
5) The chances of continuing U.S. primacy are high.

Task 3: Case Selection

To examine the question of alliance endurance, I select NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, both created during the Cold War to thwart the Soviet threat. Both alliances include powerful states. And unlike the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the reasons that Western alliances did not disband are crucial for understanding

continued unipolarity.

To illustrate primary factors that influence U.S. overseas military presence, I briefly touch on countries such as Japan and Germany, South Korea, the Philippines, Iceland, Diego Garcia, and Cuba. Today, Japan, Germany, and South Korea are the three main hosts to U.S. troops. The Philippines and Iceland were important bases for the United States, but for various reasons, U.S. military personnel left those countries.[32] In Diego Garcia, the original inhabitants were removed to make room for the foreign military bases. These examples provide useful understanding as to how U.S. presence starts, ends, or endures. And they provide further understanding of the factors that contribute to U.S. presence. To be treated in another chapter will be the case of Japan showing that maintaining bases in Okinawa causes many problems, but Japan and the United States both value the bases. Also to be discussed is the case of Germany showing that many local governments want U.S. forces to stay for economic reasons. Although Japan and Germany differ in their reactions to U.S. force realignment, they are not striving to force American soldiers out. As such, continued U.S. presence is expected, which should contribute to U.S. primacy in the future.

Task 4: Factors affecting independent variable

The general debate about U.S. primacy today tends to focus only on U.S. power and interests. As such, to understand alliance endurance and overseas military presence, we must first consider international and domestic factors that affect those countries' interests.

For example, international security environment in which the United States, U.S. allies, and host countries are situated define the interests of the United States and

[32] The Philippines, however, asked the United States to return later on.

its allies and host countries. The emergence and disappearance of common threat, the decline of the power of sending nations, or the desire to hedge against uncertain security environment constitute such examples.

Domestic factors such as domestic politics, security strategy, identity, democratization, nationalism, costs, and technology also affect how the United States, U.S. allies, and host countries shape their interests. The following is the list of factors:

On alliance endurance and lack of counterbalancing

International factors affecting the United States and its allies with regard to the question of alliance endurance include:

U.S.
1. The fear of uncertainty after the Cold War
2. The wish to hedge against the resurgence of Russia
3. The wish to maintain continuing U.S. influence in Europe and Asia
4. The wish to use existing alliances for various purposes after the Cold War (ethnic conflicts, terrorism, the rise of potential contenders like China, etc.)

U.S. Allies
1. The fear of uncertainty after the Cold War
2. The wish to hedge against the rise of China
3. The need to deal with North Korea
4. The fear of the fading U.S. engagement, or the wish to keep the United States engaged (i.e., the fear of abandonment)
5. The fear of entrapment

Domestic factors affecting the United States and its allies with regard to the question of alliance endurance include:

U.S.
1. Having a strategy of primacy
2. Strategic restraint

U.S. Allies
1. The will to rely on multilateral institution in the early 1990s (Japan)
2. The culture of antimilitarism (Japan and Germany)
3. The wish to dampen suspicious feelings held by other allies as well as neighboring countries (Japan and Germany)

On overseas military presence

International factors affecting the United States and its allies with regard to the question of overseas military presence include:

U.S.
1. The end of the Cold War (force reduction and realignment)
2. Benefits gained from functions of overseas military presence
3. The need to deal with the war on terrorism after 9/11
4. Hedge against China

Host Countries
1. The concern of U.S. troop withdrawal from the region (Europe)
2. The wish for U.S. protection to deal with security issues

Domestic factors affecting the United States and its allies regarding the question of overseas military presence include:

U.S.
1. U.S. strategy to maintain primacy
2. The U.S. financial situation

Host Countries
1. Domestic politics, regime shift
2. Protests against U.S. injustice (nationalism)
3. Benefits gained from U.S. presence in the form of economic and military assistance
4. The willingness and ability to support U.S. presence financially

Task 5: General Questions

On alliance endurance, I ask:

- -How does the international security environment (i.e., the end of the Cold War) affect the decisions of the United States and its members about maintaining the Cold War alliances?
- -What dilemmas do the United States and its allies face, and how do they react to them?
- -How do domestic factors (e.g., identity, domestic politics, strategy) affect the decisions of the United States and its members about maintaining the Cold War alliances?

On overseas military presence, I ask:

- -What international factors affect the decisions of the United States and its host countries about U.S. overseas military presence?
- -What dilemmas do the United States and host countries face, and how do they react to them?
- -What domestic factors affect the decisions of the United States and its host countries about U.S. overseas military presence?

3.4. Summary

This chapter provided a basic framework for understanding U.S. primacy after the Cold War. First, it included a discussion of the issues surrounding the levels of analysis, and suggested that power alone is insufficient to understand why U.S. primacy has endured. Instead we must also explore domestic factors.

I looked at two main variables: (1) alliance endurance and (2) U.S. overseas military presence. To examine both it was important to consider not the interests of the United States, but also the interests of the allies and host nations. Furthermore, to understand those interests, I considered both international and domestic factors affecting those countries. I employed this framework to better explain U.S. primacy than could occur by focusing only on U.S. power and interest.

The next chapter is an examination of theoretical arguments about the endurance of the Cold War alliances in relation to unipolarity.

CHAPTER 4

ALLIANCE ENDURANCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Unipolarity is a state of international structure in which only one power overwhelms the rest.[1] Such international structure, nonetheless, will be difficult to maintain if "the rest" decide to counterbalance the most powerful, the United States. Obviously, the United States would have shorter time as a unipole if other powerful states formed such a counterbalancing coalition and seriously sought to diminish its power.

In this chapter, I will explain why such a counterbalancing coalition has not been formed. I will focus on why alliances created to fight the Soviet Union endured in the post-Cold War period. Realists such as Kenneth Waltz have vigorously articulated the view that without formidable adversaries, alliances will collapse.[2] However, the fact that the Cold War alliances continue to exist today has put realism on the defensive. Some critics argue that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has endured by transforming from a collective defense organization to an institution that manages internal disputes and external risks, such as the spread of ethnic conflicts to member-states. Social constructivists, on the other hand, claim that collective identity positively affects alliance endurance.[3] In this chapter, I apply the

---

[1] This chapter is based on Takafumi Ohtomo, "Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion: NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the Cold War," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 3, no. 1 (2003): 29-55.

[2] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 44-79; Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5-41; Robert Keohane and Kenneth Waltz, "Correspondence: The Neorealist and His Critics," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 204-5.

[3] Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State,"

realist, institutionalist, and social constructivist theories to NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, delineate the flaws in various arguments, and assess the problems associated with the debate. I then alternatively explain why Cold War alliances endure today. More specifically, I make four points.

First, neorealists and institutionalists are at loggerheads, not about whether alliances will endure in the post-Cold War era but about how to define the functions of alliances. Hence, depending on the definition of these functions, conclusions will also vary about whether alliances will endure.

Second, institutionalists claim that only a highly institutionalized alliance can survive a changing security environment by transforming itself. However, I argue that less institutionalized alliances are equally capable of changing their goals.

Third, constructivists assert that alliances endure because members share a collective identity. Yet, alliances that do not share such identities can also survive the changing security environment.

Fourth, to provide an alternative explanation, I build on the theory of strategic restraint,[4] which states that after a major conflict, a hegemon creates institutions that weaker states will accept and thus refrains from dominating secondary states. As a result, a hegemon can build a lasting order that prolongs the hegemon's position.

American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 392-425; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357–399.

[4] G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998/99): 67–71; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

I then combine the theory of strategic restraint with a constructivist argument about individual state identity, *not* collective identity, and consider a not-so-well discussed function of an alliance: dampening suspicion. This function, a form of costly signal,[5] is important for states struggling to convince others that they are benign status-quo seekers. They can alleviate what I call the "sheep in wolf's clothing" by remaining in an alliance even after the initial rationale for forming the alliance disappears. This alternative argument provides both demand- and supply-side arguments. Specifically, it acknowledges that powerful states matter, but it also explains why secondary and threatening states necessarily follow a hegemonic lead. It also suggests that states bandwagon for reasons other than gaining profit, and that another type of state exists besides the lions, lambs, jackals, and wolves that Schweller described.[6]

I will also look at other factors that contribute to alliance endurance. More specifically, I will explain how international security environment after the Cold War affected alliance dilemma[7]—the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment —among America's allies in Asia and Europe, and how that affected the alliance relationship.

---

[5]According to Andrew Kydd, "A costly signal is an act which one type of actor in a game can take that other types would find too costly. It thereby serves to differentiate the type from the other types and to identify it to other players." See his "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 141. For the original explanation of costly signaling, see Michael A. Spence "Job Market Signaling," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87, no. 3 (August 1973): 355-74. For works applying the concept, see James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68-90; James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 270-97. I thank Atsushi Ishida for directing my attention to this argument.

[6] Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107.

[7] Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461-495; Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

I investigate NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, both important alliances created during the Cold War that continue today although the initial rationale for maintaining both alliances has disappeared. Moreover, although NATO is often used to test various theoretical arguments, the U.S.-Japan Alliance is not. They differ in their attributes, and the post-Cold War strategic environment in Europe and Asia has somewhat shifted.[8] However, applying various arguments to both alliances can highlight the important factors explaining why these alliances endure.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I explore how realist arguments—balance of power and balance of threat—should predict the future of NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Second, I examine institutionalist arguments and delineate their flaws. I also discuss problems associated with the debate between neorealists and institutionalists. Third, I present and criticize the collective identity argument. Fourth, I provide an alternative explanation by introducing the theory of strategic restraint, and combine it with what I call the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem. Fifth, I discuss some other factors that contribute to alliance endurance, touching on the concept of alliance dilemma.

4.1. Neorealism and Alliances after the Cold War

Neorealism explains straightforwardly the processes of alliance formation and dissolution, and the imbalances of power or threat causing state alignment. According to balance-of-power theory, material capability is the most reliable asset

[8] Some may argue that post-Cold War Asia is more conflict-prone than post-Cold War Europe. Hence, it should be much easier to explain why the U.S.-Japan Alliance endures. However, conflicts took place not in Asia but in Europe, for example in the former Yugoslavia, and NATO, as a major alliance, was summoned to resolve the situation.

ensuring security in an anarchic world where no higher authority enforces rules. One way to increase security, besides strengthening capabilities, is to form an alliance. States can balance against, or bandwagon with, the most powerful state that poses the greatest threat. Waltz argues that states tend to balance rather than bandwagon: "Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them."[9]

While Waltzian balance-of-power theory focuses primarily on material capabilities in defining threats, Walt's balance-of-threat theory suggests that although material capability matters, it should be considered with other factors such as other states' aggregate power, aggressive intentions, offensive capabilities, and geographic proximity.[10] In other words, perceptions of threat determine alliance patterns.

Whether one applies balance-of-power theory or balance-of-threat theory, the expected conclusion is that the Cold War alliances will weaken or disappear, because neither Russia's power nor intentions seem to credibly threaten NATO or the U.S.-Japan Alliance. These predictions, however, are still too general. Some scholars offer more specific predictions. For example, Hellmann and Wolf predict that NATO members will renationalize security policy, take unilateral initiatives that decline military integration, bargain intensively, and eventually dissolve the alliance.[11] Similarly, McCalla predicts that members will cut military expenditure, renationalize security policy, and move from NATO to other less-costly forms of international

---

[9] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 127.

[10] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[11] Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 3–43.

cooperation.[12]

Although some predictions about the Cold War alliances have partially materialized, neorealism's boldest prediction—that NATO or the U.S.-Japan Alliance would disintegrate after the Cold War[13]—has not yet happened. This is where critics most challenge neorealism and attempt to provide alternative explanations.

4.2. The Critics: Institutionalization[14] and Alliance Endurance

To understand why alliances endure, institutionalists apply arguments that explain economic cooperation among states. That is a big leap for institutionalists, since neorealists often question the effects of institutions even in the realm of economic cooperation.[15]

Institutionalists argue that institutions can strongly impact state behavior. Their well-known claim is that institutions (in this case, alliances) persist because they already exist. Maintaining institutions is relatively easier than creating new ones. Moreover, institutions are said to facilitate cooperation even after the decline of the powerful states that created them because an institution's effective

---

[12] Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 445–75.

[13] Waltz, "The Emerging Structure," 76.

[14] Institutionalization here is defined as "both the presence of formal organisations charged with performing specific intra-alliance tasks (such as military planning, weapons procurement and crisis management), and the development of formal or informal rules governing how alliance members reach collective decisions." See Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 167.

[15] Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485–507; Joseph Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 1, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5–49.

information-gathering capability raises monitoring capability, which efficiently sanctions cheating.[16]

Besides these general explanations, institutionalists claim that four factors – portability of functions, reduced start-up costs, management of the security dilemma, and the positive effects anticipated by organizational theory – all work favorably to sustain alliances in the post-Cold War era. These factors, however, are not as convincing as institutionalists claim when applied to NATO and the U.S-Japan Alliance.

4.2.1. Portability of Functions

Is institutionalization a necessary condition for changing the functions of an alliance, thereby adapting it to a new environment? Institutionalists say it is, but a comparison of NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance suggests otherwise.

NATO played an important role in deterring the Soviet Union during the Cold War. NATO's well-developed joint command structure and the alliance's military assets can be utilized to settle post-Cold War security problems in the era such as ethnic conflicts. Wallander and Keohane call this ability "portability," which denotes the "ease with which the rules and practices of one institution can be adapted to other situations."[17] For example, the Gulf War and interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo could not have been accomplished without NATO's infrastructure. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General George Joulwan testified

---

[16] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[17] Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celleste Wallander (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 34.

before the House Committee that NATO provided the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) with fundamental assets essential in fighting the Gulf War such as bases, infrastructure, and pre-positioned equipment. In operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Joulwan suggested that "95% of the strategic airlift, 90% of the combat aircraft, and 85% of the naval vessels were staged from or through USEUCOM's [area of responsibility]."[18]

NATO was also used to deal with problems associated with Yugoslavia's breakup in 1991. To deter further attacks on UN safe heavens by the Bosnian Serbs, NATO executed a series of air strikes code-named Operation Deliberate Force between 1994 and 1995, forcing Bosnian Serbs to negotiate to end the war.[19] Similarly, the conflict in Kosovo could not have been resolved without NATO. To prevent Serbian forces from killing Kosovar Albanians, NATO initiated air strikes code-named Operation Allied Force on March 23, 1999. When Yugoslav forces began to withdraw from Kosovo, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana suspended the air campaign.

Like NATO, the U.S.-Japan Alliance was created to deter the Soviet Union, but in the post-Cold War era, the function of the alliance has expanded to include areas surrounding Japan. The 1978 Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation, revised in 1997, required Japan and the United States to develop a framework to further promote bilateral military-to-military defense planning as well as policy and political coordination. The guidelines also sought to develop a mechanism involving

---

[18] Philip Gordon, "Recasting the Atlantic Alliance," *Survival* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 43, 55.

[19] I. Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 162-3.

the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF), and other government agencies to ensure effective coordination if Japan were attacked or faced threats in surrounding areas.[20]

Compared to NATO, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has a low-level of institutionalization, and much joint work remains to be done. However, recent discussions between Japan and the United States regarding further cooperation attest that the U.S.-Japan Alliance is still useful after the Cold War, and that deeper integration is desired. This under-institutionalized alliance has expanded its functions without creating an entirely new organization.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, despite low institutionalization, has duplicated what NATO in shifting its main goal from deterring the Soviet Union to dealing with security issues in the post-Cold War world. This casts doubts on institutionalists' claims that highly institutionalized alliances are better equipped to transform and adjust to different environments.

4.2.2. The Economic Argument: Startup Costs and Adaptation Costs

The economic argument is another important institutionalist claim about alliance endurance. Members of a highly institutionalized alliance prefer to use existing assets to deal with new problems because creating an entirely new organization entails high startup costs. The economic argument will prove true if NATO uses or adjusts its existing assets to solve new security problems in the post-Cold War era. However, *extensive* changes to existing assets will refute the

[20] Paul Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, "Managing the New US–Japan Alliance," in *The US–Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Michael Green and Patrick Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 101-2.

institutionalist argument.

During the Cold War, NATO's command structure focused primarily on defending members' territory from Soviet attack. It had three major NATO commanders (MNCs) at the top of the structure: (1) Supreme Allied Commander (Europe) (SACEUR), who was responsible for the defense of NATO members in Europe; (2) Supreme Allied Commander (Atlantic) (SACANT), who was in charge of securing the sea-lanes between North America and Europe; and (3) Commander-in-Chief Channel, who dealt with the security of the North Sea and English Channel. In the old structure, four layers of headquarters consisted of sixty-five HQs.[21]

In the wake of the Cold War, the most conspicuous change in NATO's command structure has been the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This multinational CJTF was assembled to deal with various tasks, including crisis management. Unlike the existing static HQs, CJTF HQs can move around more quickly and can be deployed to the theater of operations. Three such HQs have been added to the command.[22]

Although institutionalists claim that NATO successfully transformed itself to adapt to the new security environment, the transformation process was rocky. One of the four layers of the command structure and one-third of the HQs were eliminated. Furthermore, NATO had to create new headquarters such as CJTF, which runs counter to the argument that NATO used the existing structure to deal with new problems in the post-Cold War period. In fact, one institutionalist concedes: "In some

---

[21] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1998/99* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 37.

[22] Ibid., 40-41.

areas, NATO's assets have undergone a great deal of adaptation – in particular, a reduction in the number of commands and the development of combined joint task forces based on NATO military practices."[23] What aspects of institutionalist theory account for this major plastic surgery of NATO?

4.2.3. Avoiding Security Dilemmas

Institutionalists also assert that members of a highly institutionalized alliance can avoid security dilemmas by giving each other information. Each year, NATO's defense planning system requires members to disclose their current military capabilities and their future force goals by using standardized questionnaires and answer formats. NATO collects and distributes these data to all member-states, allowing members to monitor and compare current and future military capabilities, preparedness, and intentions, increasing transparency among members[24] and reducing uncertainties and security dilemmas, as well as preventing the renationalization of security policy among NATO members.

Unlike NATO, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has no standardized system for revealing each member's defense planning regarding military capabilities. However, Japan and the United States can ease security dilemmas and manage their alliance somewhat through informal transnational military relationships. One example is joint military exercises. Among the three branches of Japan's SDF, the Maritime SDF maintains the closest relationship with its U.S. counterpart.

---

[23] Celeste Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000), 731.

[24] Christian Tuschhoff, "Alliance Cohesion and Peaceful Change in NATO," in *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 151.

However, Japan's bid for *kokusanka* (domestic production) of weapons raised concerns about damage to the alliance relationship.[25] Japan first embarked on developing the FSX, which was expected to be the next-generation fighter for the Japanese Air SDF.

The United States, however, feared that Japan was trying to renationalize its military policy, produce its own weapons, and distance itself from America. In hindsight, the issue was more about economic gains than about military concerns.[26] Nevertheless, this FSX debate shows that although Japan and the United States can increase transparency through joint military exercises, management sometimes becomes difficult because they lack rules to disclose information regarding each other's future force goals.

Neither Japan nor the United States, however, wants to break their alliance. Despite occasional disputes, they have had no intense security competition. Moreover, despite the lack of a highly institutionalized mechanism to mutually disclose military posture, they are no more conflict-prone than are NATO members. This raises doubts about the advantage of a highly institutional alliance in controlling the security dilemma.

4.2.4. The Power of Bureaucracy

The last effect on the endurance of a highly institutionalized alliance is

---

[25] Richard Samuels, *"Rich Nation, Strong Army" National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

[26] Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," *International Security* 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 73–113.

related to bureaucracy. NATO has generated "a large formal bureaucracy" and has created "a cadre of individuals whose professional perspectives and career prospects are closely tied to maintaining the relationship."[27] They will continue to see NATO as an important alliance even when the international structure changes. As organizational theory predicts, since the Cold War ended, individuals whose careers depended on NATO have resisted change, affirmed the organization's necessity, and adapted to change when the organization's future was threatened.[28]

NATO has survived by adapting to change, but not without cost. NATO responded to the Bosnian crisis by using the old structure, but its slow reaction caused member-states to reconsider the command structure. As a result, the number of HQs was reduced from 65 to 20. Moreover, one of the four layers was eliminated. The Commander-in-Chief Channel, one of the three most important during the Cold War, has also been removed.[29] NATO continued, but its bureaucrats found it difficult to stay employed[30] and to maintain the original structure.

What about the effects of bureaucrats on the U.S.-Japan Alliance? Because this alliance lacks a specific permanent bureaucracy, bureaucrats should exert minimal pressure to sustain the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Despite such a weak bureaucratic structure, however, the alliance continues after the end of the Cold War. This again weakens the institutionalist argument attributing alliance endurance to strong

---

[27] Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," 166.

[28] McCalla, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability," 456–461.

[29] International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1998/99*, 43.

[30] About 3,150 full-time workers are at NATO HQ, according to the *2001 NATO Handbook,* http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1001.htm (accessed October 30, 2001). The *1995 Handbook* reports 3,750. See McCalla, "NATO's Persistence," 456. The number of workers during the Cold War is unavailable, but they seem to have declined in recent years.

bureaucracy.

4.2.5. What is the Real Difference between the Two Theories?

Some institutionalists claim that NATO persists because the basic goal of the alliance has shifted from collective defense against the Soviet Union to management of threats.[31] Yet this point is not necessarily unique to the institutionalists' argument. Neorealists also predict that with the major Soviet Union threat gone, NATO will collapse, but in the short term, member states continue to use NATO until they adjust to a new, uncertain international environment[32] because institutions are maintained when member-states, especially the most powerful, think institutions serve their national interests.[33] The difference between neorealists and institutionalists, however, is that neorealists believe that a common threat is the strongest bond between states, while institutionalists believe that institutions can shape state behavior. In the long run, neorealists predict that NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance will collapse unless a common threat emerges.[34]

Thus, asking "why alliances endure" distorts the debate more than clarifies the differences between the two schools. Both neorealists and institutionalists have failed to focus on the implications of an obvious and important point: the Cold War alliances no longer serve to deter the Soviet threat. In other words, both sides

---

[31] Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability."

[32] Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse."

[33] John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49.

[34] Idem, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5–56.

misunderstand what it means for alliances to "collapse."

Consider, for example, Tokyo Tobacco, once Japan's largest tobacco producer and seller. It stopped producing tobacco, however, after Japan taxed tobacco extremely highly. Although the company was heavily damaged, many talented employees contracted with farmers around the world to enable Tokyo Tobacco to become one of the world's largest coffee sellers. Tokyo Tobacco's founder liked the company's name and kept it even after they started selling coffee. Has Tokyo Tobacco survived the changing business environment? It certainly has, but after it started selling coffee it became totally different. The company name may be the same, but the tobacco tax changed its focus to coffee.

NATO, like Tokyo Tobacco, survived the changing environment, but it no longer functions as a collective defense organization to fight the Soviet Union. It is possible to claim, therefore, that the Cold War NATO basically "collapsed" when the Soviet Union disintegrated. NATO today is no longer the NATO of two decades ago. Hence, the issue dividing neorealism and its critics is not whether alliances will collapse or endure, but rather whether alliances will continue to serve the same function.

This also suggests that the debate is about defining the function of alliances. Neorealists define an alliance as power aggregation to counter external threats. Critics of neorealism define alliance functions more broadly to include such tasks as management and restraint of alliance members. Unsurprisingly, the critics of neorealism cannot lose this debate: whichever side defines the functions more broadly has the advantage of explaining the persistence of the Cold War alliances.

To summarize two major points: First, the institutionalist explanation that a highly institutionalized alliance is better equipped to cope with a changing

environment is less convincing than they claim. Under-institutionalized alliances are just as able to adapt to change. Second, neorealists and their critics fail to recognize that their claims are not as different as they initially thought. They both misunderstand what it means for alliances to collapse. Neorealists should have simply predicted that the Cold War alliances will no longer have the function of fighting the Soviet Union. Institutionalists should have acknowledged that NATO is very different than it was during the Cold War. The real puzzle for neorealists would have been if the Cold War alliances had continued to function as organizations to fight the Soviet Union. But, of course, that is not what has happened.

4.3. Collective Identity and Alliance Endurance

Social constructivism provides another critique of neorealism. Social constructivists argue that states usually see other states as separate units, but if they see others as a part of the same community, their interests may converge. As a result, states that share a close or collective identity can form a long-lasting alliance even when international structure undergoes major change (e.g., the end of the Cold War). *Collective identity* refers to "positive identification with the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the Self rather than as independent."[35]

What processes do states need to undergo to attain a collective identity? Interdependence caused by trade and capital flows and the emergence of a common threat can be such examples. The "transnational convergence of domestic values" can be another: examples include cultural values such as "the rise of global consumerism,"

[35] Alexander Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics," in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Fredrick Kratochwil (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 57.

and political values such as "the spread of democratic governance, welfare statism, and concern with human rights."[36] Close interactions caused by these factors may affect only actors' behavior, but constructivists argue that sometimes these interactions can also change actors' identities and interests, and help shape a collective identity.

Proponents of the collective identity argument suggest that most of the NATO member-states seem to share a collective identity as democratic countries (and perhaps as Western countries). Furthermore, members respect the norms of democratic decision-making based on compromise, persuasion, and the non-use of force or coercion.[37] Wendt also argued that NATO is a collective security system in which member-states share a collective identity.[38] When a NATO state is attacked, other members must defend the victim "even *if they are not themselves individually threatened* (emphasis in the original)."[39] As such, the interests of individual NATO member-states and other member-states are difficult to distinguish.

The emergence of the Soviet threat may have initially shaped NATO's collective identity. Nevertheless, growing interdependence and continued interactions among NATO's democratic members during the Cold War further reinforced that identity. The disappearance of the Soviet threat, therefore, will not necessarily generate the collapse of NATO. Because NATO members do not clearly distinguish

---

[36] Ibid., 54-9.

[37] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community."

[38] Wendt's use of "collective security" is different from the conventional use. NATO is largely understood as a collective defense system. Alexander Wendt, "The Social Structures of Anarchy," Paper presented at the Program on International Politics, Economic and Security, University of Chicago, 1995, 53.

[39] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 400.

between their particular and collective identities, NATO is likely to endure in a changing international structure.

What does this argument say about the U.S.-Japan Alliance? Despite its endurance and strength, "the collective identity component seems to be weaker" in this alliance.[40] Although Japan and the United States are both democracies and respect the norms of democratic decision-making, they may not share a strong "we-feeling." The issue of whether to maintain the alliance has always divided the publics of both countries.

Economic interdependence, a way to attain a collective identity, grew between Japan and the United States during the Cold War, but it failed to create a strong sense of community or a collective identity. Instead, relations were hostile. A *Newsweek/*Gallup opinion poll taken in 1989 in the United States showed that 52% of Americans thought that Japan's economic power was more threatening than Soviet military power.[41] Recall that "revisionist" scholars claimed that Japan's capitalist system differs from the Western system, and advocated aggressive solutions to "correct" trade imbalances.[42] Depending on the threat Japan poses, it could be a capitalist ally or a particular kind of a capitalist state that cannot be called a friend. Moreover, on April 13, 1999, an *Asahi Shimbun* Japan-U.S. joint public opinion poll revealed that 49% of the U.S. public thought that the U.S.-Japan Alliance's purpose is to prevent Japan from becoming a military power.

Thus the United States still does not completely trust Japan, and both

---

[40] Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," 398.

[41] Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 60.

[42] James Fallows, *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994).

countries are far from sharing a collective identity. Can the U.S.-Japan Alliance endure when a threat is removed? If a collective identity is not the major factor in explaining alliance endurance, an alliance may lose coherence without a common threat. However, the U.S.-Japan Alliance continues to exist today.

Perhaps the most important problem with this argument is that although NATO members may share a collective identity while Japan and the United States do not, both alliances have survived the end of the Cold War. This indicates that having a collective identity is not necessarily a prerequisite for alliances to endure in a changing security environment.

In sum, while neorealist theory cannot fully explain why the Cold War alliances endure, neither the institutionalist nor the collective identity arguments provide convincing alternative explanations.

4.4. Why Alliances Endure: An Alternative View

This section provides an alternative explanation as to why alliances endure in the post-Cold War era. I begin with a discussion of actors and the functions of alliances, followed by the exploration of alliance demand and supply. This argument is built on the theory of strategic restraint, combined with what I call the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem.

4.4.1. Actors and Functions of Alliance

Schroeder[43] argued that alliances are formed (1) to oppose an outside threat;

[43] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, ed. Krause Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227–262.

(2) to manage a threat through a pact of restraint; and (3) to provide powerful states with a tool of management and control over weaker states (see fig. 4.1.). Students of alliances often cite Schroeder's claims, but they have not fully developed their implications, which may be instructive in understanding why alliances endure.

Schroeder's argument implies three actors in an alliance – powerful, weak, and threatening – and behaviors – deter and control/restrain. Powerful states are often hegemons and lead in maintaining an alliance. Weak states are obviously less powerful than other members, but they may not necessarily have malign intentions. Threatening states could be weak or powerful, and other alliance members do not fully trust them because of their past aggressive behavior. Within the framework of the alliance, hegemons make weaker and threatening states change their behavior if they try to act against the hegemon's preferences.



Figure 4.1. Schroeder's argument

Schroeder, however, focuses primarily on how powerful states can affect the behavior of weaker and threatening states. Weitsman expands Schroeder's argument by asserting that alliances are used not only by powerful states to control weaker ones,

but also by states of relatively equal size to control each other.[44] However, like Schroeder, she does not discuss why secondary and threatening states accept the demands of the powerful state.

To better understand the interaction between the three actors, examining various functions of an alliance may be helpful. So far, I have discussed three functions (Table 4.1., 1–3): countering external threat, controlling external risks (e.g., the spread of ethnic conflicts), and controlling internal risks (e.g., managing alliance members).

Table 4.1. Functions of alliance

No.	Functions	Model/theory
1.	Counter external threat	Balance of power/threat
2.	Control external risks	Security management
3.	Control internal risks	Security management, Pact of restraint/tethering
4.	Reassure secondary states	Strategic restraint
5.	Voice concerns to stronger partner	Voice opportunity
6.	Gain profit	Bandwagon for profit
7.	***Dampen suspicion***	***Sheep in wolf's clothing***

The fourth possible function of an alliance is to reassure others: powerful states not only control weaker and threatening states, but also reassure them.[45] The fifth function of alliances is that weaker states can use them to voice their concerns to a hegemon.[46] Unlike Schroeder's argument, this demonstrates that states other than a

[44] Patricia Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 156–92.

[45] Ikenberry, "Institution, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order"; Ikenberry, *After Victory*.

[46] Joseph Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neorealist Research Programme," *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 21–40.

hegemon can use an alliance to advance their interests.

The sixth function is that states can bandwagon for profit: states side with others – bandwagon – to gain the spoils of victory.[47] While the term balancing or bandwagoning is often discussed in terms of reacting to external threats, the bandwagoning for profit thesis posits that situations occur in which gaining a profit could be a motive for siding with others. It is difficult to say whether this thesis can be a strong factor in explaining why alliances endure.[48] Nonetheless, bandwagoning is the useful concept here.

As Schweller argues, bandwagoning could take place even when a state is not exposed to threats. Besides gaining profits, states side with others when that will help communicate certain intentions. For instance, threatening states can communicate benign intentions by remaining in an alliance after a major conflict ends, which shows that they are not going to form a counter-alliance and start realigning the balance of power. This also makes others feel that threatening states are less-frightening than initially believed. In other words, the seventh function of an alliance posits that states bandwagon to dampen suspicion.

Those functions can be divided into three general categories: control, voice, and reassurance (see fig. 4.2). Powerful states can control and reassure both secondary and potentially threatening states, while secondary states can voice their concerns to powerful states. Like secondary states, threatening states voice their concerns to

---

[47] Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit"; Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

[48] "Bandwagoning for profit" could be considered a factor in explaining alliance persistence, if remaining in the alliance ensures that profit will be gained continuously.

powerful states, but they can also reassure both secondary and powerful states.



Figure 4.2. Interaction between the three types of states within the alliance

4.4.2 Demand for and Supply of Alliance: Hegemonic Reassurance and Voice Opportunity

Explanations of alliance endurance often focus on the rationale of either powerful states or secondary and potentially threatening states. To explain more fully, it is necessary to understand the motives of both powerful states and secondary and potentially threatening states. Thus, examining not only the demand for but also the supply of alliance is essential. To do so, I combine the theory of strategic restraint and the identity argument, especially regarding Germany and Japan (see fig. 4.3).

After a major conflict, hegemons try to reassure secondary states to prolong their dominant position in the international system. One way to achieve this is to act through institutions (in this case, alliances), and limit the use of raw power.[49] Neorealists often assert that institutions are useful as long as they serve the interest of

[49] Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 18.

the most powerful state.[50] Because it is power that matters, the most powerful can more or less coerce other states into cooperation. Although I do not disagree with this view, no state can remain powerful forever, and the fall of great power is, historically speaking, inevitable.[51] Moreover, when the hegemon's power starts to wane, if it acts aggressively to maintain a superior position, secondary states may ally against it.



Figure 4.3. Demand for and supply of alliances

If, on the other hand, the hegemon creates an institutional order that limits its own power and reassures secondary states that they will not be dominated or abandoned, the order will remain more durable. A hegemon can maintain a lasting order by refraining from using its maximum power; that is, by avoiding using military means to dominate others.[52]

---

[50] Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions."

[51] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).

[52] Ikenberry, *After Victory*.

The U.S. Department of Defense's *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* reflects this concept:

> America seeks to use its current political, economic, and military advantages not to dominate others, but to build a durable framework upon which the United States and its allies and friends can prosper in freedom now and into the future.[53]

For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the United States became the world's most powerful state. However, it avoided using its power to dominate major European countries and has not abandoned its European allies in the post-Cold War era. Instead, by remaining in NATO, the United States reassures its allies in Europe against a possible revival of the Russian threat and other contingencies.

Similarly, the United States did not threaten to use military force to oppose Japan's plan to build its own next-generation fighter in the late 1980s. Instead, they negotiated to convince Japan to abandon the plan. Moreover, when Japan insisted on establishing its own information satellite system after the Cold War, the United States did not openly oppose the idea, perhaps because Japan, which still needed U.S. assistance in intelligence gathering, was highly unlikely to succeed. Nonetheless, the United States could have feared that Japan was going its own way, but still it avoided interfering.

Furthermore, Japan's economy has been in recession since the mid-1990s, but the United States has not taken advantage of the circumstances to dominate Japan.

---

[53] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 30, 2001), 1.

Neither has the United States abandoned Japan when some critics question the need to continue the alliance relationship after the Cold War.[54] Instead, the United States reassures Japan by maintaining the alliance to deter possible conflicts in the region.

These explanations alone, however, do not explicate why secondary states necessarily accept the institutional framework created by a hegemon. In other words, the demand side of the account also must be examined. Non-hegemons demand alliances for two main reasons. First, the alliance provides a forum to voice their concerns. Second, remaining in the alliance provides an opportunity to exhibit benign intentions and help resolve what I call the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem.

Grieco's "voice opportunity" thesis, originally developed to explain why EU members continue to invest in their economic arrangement, can also be applied to alliances. Alliances provide a forum for frequent consultation about security issues, so secondary states use alliances to voice their concerns to the most powerful member-state, knowing that forming a counter-coalition is costly compared with remaining in the alliance and negotiating with the hegemon.[55] Furthermore, the United States has created a relatively open system in which other members can air their concerns.

Although the Philippines is not a member of NATO or the U.S.-Japan Alliance, its case is instructive. The Philippine government decided in 1991 to close two major U.S. military bases: the Subic Bay Naval Base and the Clark Air Base. However, the Philippines became concerned about the power vacuum created by U.S. retreat and the threat of more assertive Chinese claims to the resource-rich Spratly

---

[54] Chalmers Johnson, and E.B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August, 1995): 103–114.

[55] Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty."

Islands, and thus asked the United States to return. Both countries reached an agreement in 1998 regarding the treatment of U.S. armed forces visiting the Philippines.

As the U.S.-Japan Alliance case shows, however, the voice opportunity thesis is only partially effective. For instance, Japan has expressed a desire to reduce the number of U.S. bases in Okinawa. Several instances of serious crimes by U.S. military personnel and the chronic noise pollution caused by U.S. jet fighters have become pressing concerns for the citizens of Okinawa. In the mid-1990s, the governments of Japan and the United States established SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa), but the United States did not seriously consider concrete plans to reduce or relocate the bases in a timely fashion.

As for the relationship between European NATO members and the United States, in 2000, the European members opposed the American development of the missile defense system, which would set aside the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia and destroy the mutual-assured destruction logic. The United States nonetheless pressed ahead with the project. Many European members fear that the United States will abandon its allies and defend only itself in the event of attack. Moreover, countries providing radar stations for the United States are concerned that they might also become targets for an enemy attack. Thus alliances provide opportunities for secondary states to consult with the powerful states, but this does not always guarantee that their voices are actually heard or that the powerful state will take concrete actions to address their concerns.

4.4.3. The “Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing” Problem

Although the voice opportunity thesis is not necessarily incorrect, another

important demand-side factor explains why non-hegemons, especially formerly threatening states, remain in alliances: they want to dampen suspicion to reassure others and solve their "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem.

In developing this argument, Schweller's argument is a good starting point.[56] He disagrees with the neorealist characterization of states as security maximizers that react primarily to imbalances of power or threat. Schweller criticizes this "status quo bias," and argues that some states wish to change the status quo.[57]

He metaphorically envisions four different kinds of animals to distinguish four types of states. He sees powerful revisionist states as "wolves." He calls another revisionist type "jackals," less powerful than wolves. When jackals think they can increase their gains by siding with others, such as wolves, jackals will bandwagon with the wolves. Status-quo seekers are seen as powerful "lions" and weak, often war-torn, "lambs." Neither is aggressive; they react only to attacks.

Schweller does not discuss, however, a status quo-seeking state that is more powerful than a lamb but less powerful than a lion. Let us call this type of state "sheep." The important difference between sheep and lambs is that sheep claim they have no intention of harming others but neighboring states do not fully trust them (table 4.2).[58]

Sheep believe that they act and appear as sheep, but in the eyes of others, they seem to be wolves disguised as sheep. This confuses other states as to the true

---

[56] Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."

[57] Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 90–121.

[58] Some powerful states are not to be trusted, and also some *weak* states are not to be trusted, but I do not fully discuss the latter type here because the actions of powerful states have more important consequences in international politics.

identity of the sheep state. The problem for such states, then, lies in trying to eliminate their negative image. In other words, they are troubled with the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem.

Table 4.2. Where sheep fit among various types of states

State type	Lion	*Sheep*	Lamb	Jackal	Wolf
Power	powerful	*powerful*	weak	weak	powerful
SQ* or revisionist	SQ	*SQ*	SQ	revisionist	revisionist

Note: * SQ means Status Quo.
Table created by the author.

This idea and the naming of the problem are drawn from Kydd, who captures the main concern of structural realists regarding uncertainty of intentions:

> Uncertainty about preferences . . . undermines the . . . sunny conclusion that a world of security seekers would be a peaceful place. This difficulty can be termed the 'wolf in sheep's clothing' problem. While a group of sheep can get along fine with each other if they were fully convinced that all the animals in the flock were sheep, some may be wolves in sheep's clothing. This leads to mutual suspicion and conflict between sheep even though they have no inherent desire to eat each other.[59]

While this "wolf in sheep's clothing" problem is concerned with greedy states trying to conceal their malign intentions, the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem focuses on benign, status quo-seeking states with bad reputations in trying to overcome the distrust of others, in an illustration of the costly signals argument. Glaser examines how specific military strategy (e.g., unilateral reduction in military capability) can be used to signal benign intentions.[60] Kydd explores how democracies

[59] Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," 116.

[60] Charles Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as a Self-help," *International*

are better equipped to use costly signals and avoid conflict.[61] My argument, however, focuses on why alliances endure. Moreover, I include identity.

History essentially explains why the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem arises. If a state has a history of acting aggressively, it acquires a "negative" identity that is "sticky" and does not disappear easily. Even after the state has abandoned its aggressive intentions, other states continue to view the formerly aggressive state with suspicion. Hence the metaphor of a state as a sheep wearing wolf's clothing, trying to transform its misperceived identity. One way to reassure others is to communicate benign intentions, and, accordingly, demonstrate an unwillingness to act unilaterally and aggressively in the future.

Germany and Japan have become two of world's richest countries. Since World War II, they have complied with rules concerning international trade and international law, and when disputes have occurred, both countries have resolved problems peacefully. Moreover, as discussed, some argue that NATO members and Japan, mostly OECD countries, share an identity as members of the West.[62]

Nevertheless, Germany and Japan share a historical legacy as aggressors before and during World War II. Hence, other states still see Germany and Japan as wolves. In August 2001, for instance, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the Shrine in Tokyo, where the list of several Japanese Class-A war criminals

---

Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 50–90.

[61] Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing."

[62] The collective identity argument, which emphasizes Western solidarity, clashes with the other identity argument highlighting the uniqueness of particular Western countries: Germany and Japan.

of World War II are kept and worshiped. He visited the shrine to reaffirm Japan's commitment to refrain from fighting wars, but neighboring countries such as China and South Korea strongly opposed his visit because publicly paying respects to the perpetrators of the Pacific War suggested that Japan still does not fully repent their actions. Koizumi nevertheless went to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13 to avoid visiting on the symbolic date of August 15, the day Japan surrendered in 1945.

Moreover, in March 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology approved a junior high school history textbook written by scholars and non-scholars who consider Japan to be too apologetic about World War II. Significant protest erupted in Japan about the Ministry of Education's decision to endorse what seems to be a right-wing textbook. As a result, only eleven schools (521 students in total) adopted the book for their curriculum. China and South Korea nevertheless strongly criticized the Japanese government, and see such developments to signal Japanese remilitarization.

As for Germany, when the two German states were considering unification in 1989–1990, West Germany's close allies, France and Great Britain, feared that a single German state would disturb European stability. President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher boldly expressed anxiety concerning a larger and more powerful Germany.[63]

If Germany and Japan act suspiciously, NATO and USJA could collapse. If they avoid aggression and renationalization of their security policies, NATO and USJA are likely to endure. Germany and Japan ("sheep in wolf's clothing" states) will bandwagon (remain in their respective alliances) to dampen suspicion and reassure

[63] Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), 14.

the other states, both powerful and secondary.

If Japan were to renounce the security treaty with the United States, its security would be severely threatened. With several unfriendly, nondemocratic states nearby, Japan would be forced to strengthen its defensive capabilities. The United States and neighboring states would see this move as a rise of militarism. Japan's negative identity makes the security dilemma more acute. To avoid such a scenario, Japan has an interest in maintaining the alliance. Its partner, the United States, also has an interest in keeping the alliance since one of its goals is to prevent the former aggressor from going its own way.

Because Germany is also a member of other organizations, it may have less difficulty than Japan if it decides to leave NATO. Germany can communicate its benign intentions through the European Union, for example. However, the European Union is obviously not a security institution. The EU may be able to assume some of NATO's functions, but without U.S. military assets, it cannot execute effective military operations. Moreover, EU members have discussed establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but the prospects for further coordination are rather gloomy.[64] Therefore, although Germany has other resources, NATO remains its optimal forum for communicating its benign intentions to European nations.

The emergence of an antimilitarist political culture[65] further motivates sheep

---

[64] Philip Gordon, "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," *International Security* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98): 89.

[65] Thomas Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–150; Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). For more on how norms affect the state and society, see Peter Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter Katzenstein and Yutaka Tsujinaka, *Defending the Japanese State: Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s*, Cornell East Asia Series, East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1991.

in wolf's clothing states to correct misperceptions of their intentions. Political culture is defined as "the subjective orientations toward and assumptions about the political world that characterize the members of a particular society and that guide and inform their political behavior."[66] The militaries of Germany and Japan both rank among the world's largest today, and could act assertively in international security affairs, but they have refrained from taking such roles because both were heavily defeated in World War II. They have replaced their previous aggressive intentions with a culture of antimilitarism. A state that has both a negative identity and a strong antimilitarist culture will endeavor not to act unilaterally or aggressively.[67]

Their respective antimilitarist political cultures affected Germany and Japan's actions during the Gulf War in 1991. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Japan and Germany were pressured to coordinate with other allies to fight against Saddam Hussein. Both the Japanese government and the German Bundestag preferred to solve the issue through diplomatic means. The citizens of both countries also rejected the idea of combat. In January 1991, although 71% of Germans supported the allied actions, only 20% supported the participation of the Bundeswehr in the campaign. In Japan, 48.5% opposed the dispatch of the SDF in any form, and

---

[66] John Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53, no. 65 (Autumn 1999): 774. The cultural approach, however, has been heavily criticized for its inability to define, operationalize and measure cultural variables. See Michael Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 50-2. However, this problem is not only inherent in the cultural approach. The concept of "power" has also been at the center of debate for there is no agreed way to define, operationalize and measure it. See Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior," 773.

[67] The difference between Duffield's contribution (John Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification;* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998) and mine is that he discusses how political culture and international institutions have restrained Germany from acting unilaterally after the Cold War, while I focus on why alliances endure.

28.4% were not opposed if the SDF were unarmed. Only 10% of those surveyed supported sending the SDF without limitations, such as being fully armed with heavy weapons.[68]

The inability of Japan and Germany to swiftly coordinate their policies with other members of the coalition highlighted a strong antimilitarist culture in both countries. Their reluctance to act quickly may frustrate other members of the alliance, but this culture shows that both Germany and Japan are not about to disturb the stability of the international system or of their alliances.

In sum, states concerned with the sheep in wolf's clothing problem bandwagon – or remain in alliances – to dampen suspicion and to reassure both powerful and secondary states. A culture of antimilitarism acts as an intervening variable in further encouraging such a tendency. This argument fills the gap neorealists have failed to explain: why powerful countries like Japan and Germany do not renationalize their security policies, and why they voluntarily accept the institutional framework created by the United States.[69]

4.5. Other Factors Contributing to Alliance Endurance

Thus far, I have focused on the logic of alliance endurance by looking at the domestic attributes of some member states. Obviously, other factors affect members'

---

[68] Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, 172. Japan's culture of antimilitarism can also be seen in citizens' responses to the question of what to do if Japan is attacked. Of 2,114 surveyed in February 1997, 42.8% said that they would support the SDF in one way or another; 20.5% said they would resist without using any weapons, and 8.7% said they would not resist at all. These percentages have not changed dramatically since 1978. See *Heisei 11 nen do ban bouei handobukku* [Handbook for Defense 1999] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun Sha, 1999), 707.

[69] I thank an anonymous reviewer of the *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* for suggesting that I explore this point.

desires to maintain alliances. Next I examine strategic relations that induce members to value the continued existence of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and NATO.

The end of the Cold War removed the simplicity of dealing in a bipolar world between the United States and the Soviet Union. Bipolarity meant that miscalculation was less probable, compared with a multipolar system dominated by many powers.[70] The sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union brought various uncertainties into international politics. Russia's resurgence concerned the United States and its allies. But at the same time, U.S. allies worried about whether the U.S. security commitment would continue without Soviet threat. Those uncertainties gave states a rationale for maintaining the alliances. Moreover, as the post-Cold War era progressed, new issues emerged giving additional reasons to continue alliance relations, such as the September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States and the rise of China.

The concept of alliance dilemma is instructive in further highlighting the forces behind states' need to continue the alliance in the post-Cold War security environment. Snyder coined the term alliance dilemma, positing that alliance members will have two fears: the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment.[71] If an ally tries to cooperate closely with another, the ally risks being dragged into the other's conflict. From Japan's point of view, for example, contingencies in countries/regions such as Korea, Taiwan, and the Middle East are of concern, because of the possibilities of being entrapped into conflicts involving the United States. On the other hand, if one ally tries to distance itself from the other ally to avoid being

[70] For the easiness of dealing with other superpower in a bipolar international structure, see Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93, no. 3 (Summer 1963): 881-909.

[71] Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; Snyder, *Alliance Politics*.

entrapped into unwanted wars, that would increase the fear of abandonment in case a third party attacked. The degree of this dilemma will vary according to the structure of the international system. During the Cold War, the fear of entrapment was strong among NATO members. As for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the fear of entrapment was also strong. Tight bipolar alliance meant more entrapment probabilities.

In the early years after the end of the Cold War era, the U.S.-Japan Alliance was drifting apart,[72] and Japan more conspicuously feared abandonment. For instance, in 1994, under the strong initiative of Prime Minister Hosokawa, Japan established a consultative group headed by Hirotaro Higuchi, Asahi Breweries president, to devise a security strategy suitable for the post-Cold War world.[73] After 20 meetings, the final Higuchi Report was completed, four months after Hosokawa quit as prime minister.

Akio Watanabe, then professor at Aoyama Gakuin University and professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, the primary drafter of the report, felt that Japan should consider changing its strategy.[74] The final report emphasized the importance of shifting Japan's security reliance from bilateral USJA to multilateral security institutions. Clearly, changing international structure affected Watanabe's thinking. He reached this policy recommendation because Japan feared that the United States would abandon them.

---

[72] Yoichi Funabashi, *Doumei hyouryu* [Alliance adrift] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997).

[73] Tomohito Shinoda, *Nichibei doumei toiu rearizumu* [Emerging realism of the Japan-U.S. alliance] (Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 2007), 149-150.

[74] Masahiro Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta* [Japan-U.S. security dialogue has begun] (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 2002), 45; Hidetoshi Sotooka, Masaru Honda, and Toshiaki Miura, *Nichibeidoumei hanseiki: Anpo to mitsuyaku* [U.S.-Japan Alliance's half century: Security treaty and secret agreements] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 2001), 493.

The report, however, worried many U.S.-Japan relations experts in the United States.[75] They feared that Japan was considering the U.S.-Japan Alliance as secondary. U.S. primacy strategy[76] made it unacceptable for Japan to distance itself from America. Moreover, Americans wondered why Japan wanted to rely on multilateral institutions when it was of utmost importance to deepen the U.S.-Japan Alliance ties after North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1993.

The United States took the initiative in meeting the challenge by working with Japanese foreign affairs and defense officials who shared the view that Japan should play a bigger role in defense through the bilateral alliance. William Perry, U.S. Defense Secretary in the Clinton Administration, asked Joseph Nye, the international politics scholar, to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from September 1994. Nye accepted and published the East Asia Strategy Report in February 1995, reflecting Nye's thinking.[77] The Nye Report, coming six months after the Higuchi Report, basically said that East Asia and the Middle East were the two main regions where conflicts are likely to occur in the future. With regard to East Asia, the United States will maintain a hundred thousand U.S. troops and reaffirm America's commitment in the region. Moreover, the report suggested the need to redefine U.S.-Japan security relations in view of possible Asian crises,

---

[75] Tatsuo Akaneya, "The Japanese-US Alliance: A New Definition," Discussion Paper 76, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998: 6.

[76] "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival,'" *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, A14; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their Security Aims," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 1-49.

[77] U.S. Department of Defense, *East Asia Strategy Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995).

including the Korean Peninsula. By the end of 1994, Nye had shared the content of the draft with the Japanese counterpart and asked for their cooperation.[78] In June 1995, the administration of Tomiichi Murayama[79] began to discuss the new framework for ensuring Japan's defense. After ten meetings, Japan's new Defense Guidelines were completed in November 1995. This document indicated the possibilities of using the U.S.-Japan Alliance to deal with contingencies that might occur in areas surrounding Japan. The guidelines, published nine months after the Nye Report, clearly broke from the Higuchi Report that tried to shift Japan's reliance to multilateral security institutions. The North Korean missile tests and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 further cemented the view that the bilateral alliance continues to be important.

What might be called the early period of the post-Cold War era ended when an Al Qaeda terrorist group attacked the United States on 9/11. From 2001 to today, the threat has expanded to include international terrorist groups.[80] In October 2001, the United States first responded to 9/11 by attacking Afghanistan where al Qaeda

---

[78] Shinoda, *Nichibei doumei toiu rearizumu*, 151.

[79] Tomiichi Murayama, the socialist prime minister, dramatically changed his views on Japan's security after the Cold War. The Socialist Party has been a strong opponent of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Self-Defense Forces. However, after Murayama became the Prime Minister, he approved both. He said in his policy speech in 1994 that the U.S.-Japan Alliance should be firmly maintained. This too contributed to the continuation of the alliance after the Cold War. (As for the Self-Defense Forces, he said that Japan would maintain the minimum force necessary for defending itself.) See "Dai hyakusanjyukkai kokkai niokeru Murayama naikakusouridaijin shoshin shoumeienzetsu [Speech of Prime Minister Murayama in 130th session of the Diet]," July 18, 1994, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/murayamasouri/speech/murayama.html (accessed April 8, 2013).

[80] Dealing with terrorism and terrorist organizations is more difficult than countering nation states, because they are dispersed to different parts of the world, and are hard to find. U.S. strategy reflected such an environment. See U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001) http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf (accessed April 10, 2013).

was harbored. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government of Japan under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi quickly passed the antiterrorism special measures law in November 2001 allowing Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces to provide fuel mainly to American ships operating in the Indian Ocean. Since 2001, Japan has spent $4.187 billion supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan.[81] Moreover, in response to the Iraq War that started in March 2003, Japan passed another law in August 2003 concerning humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. Japan's Self Defense Forces were dispatched to Iraq to provide fresh water and medical support, and to build schools, roads, and clinics.

Japan saw the deployment of Self Defense Forces to Iraq as a major issue, because it was the first time they had taken such action since the end of World War II.[82] The decision was largely because of U.S. pressure seeking political and military support from many countries.[83] Initially, Japan feared entrapment. At the same time, they also feared abandonment. Those who supported Japan's involvement in Iraq argued that if Japan failed to support the United States this time, America might abandon Japan in future crises with North Korea.[84] In the end, the fear of

---

[81] The efforts included the construction of roads, DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration), health, medical care, education, and technical assistance, and removing landmines. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Assistance in Afghanistan: Towards Self-Reliance," January 2013, 2, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/pdfs/japan_assistance.pdf (accessed April 7, 2013).

[82] Japan has sent forces abroad to participate in the UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs), however.

[83] Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage reportedly requested Japan to "show the flag," and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, asked them to put "boots on the ground," meaning Japan should send forces to contribute in the occupation of Iraq. See Glenn Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics And Security*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), 145.

[84] "Irakusensou to nihon, kitano kyoui, kikikan shintou, Yomiuri shinbumsha zenkoku seron chousa," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 25, 2003; "'Kokuren yori bei' no meian," *Asahi Shimbun*,

abandonment prevailed over the fear of entrapment, affecting the decision to cooperate and contributing to the continuation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

The rise of China characterizes the next Cold War period: 2007 to 2013.[85] China's rapid economic growth, increasing defense budget, and assertive behavior over disputed islands have raised concerns in various countries. With growing challenges to deal with China and other issues such as the North Korean nuclear program, the United States declared in early 2012 to shift its strategic focus to Asia.[86] Such rebalancing necessitates that the United States works closely with Asian allies including Japan.

As territorial disputes with China deepen, Japan also continues to value the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The East China Sea Islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan, and the Diaoyu in China have been sources of contention between the two countries. Tensions rose when Japan purchased three of the five islands from a private Japanese owner in September 2012.[87] In December 2012, Chinese surveillance aircraft began flying near the disputed islands, and in January 2013, both countries scrambled fighter jets. On January 30, 2013, a Chinese Navy frigate pointed

---

March 19, 2004.

[85] This of course does not mean that America's concerns about international terrorist groups disappeared in 2007. See a section titled, "Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations," U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), 20-26, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed April 11, 2013). The post-Cold War era has been divided into different periods simply for the sake of analytical convenience.

[86] U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2012), 2, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed April 10, 2013).

[87] Jane Perlez, "China Accuses Japan of Stealing after Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands," *New York Times*, September 11, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/world/asia/china-accuses-japan-of-stealing-disputed-islands.html?ref=territorialdisputes&_r=0 (accessed April 11, 2013).

its fire-control radar at a Japanese destroyer, forcing the Maritime Japanese Self Defense personnel to engage in evasive maneuvers.[88]

Responding to such developments in the region, in January 2013, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that the Obama administration would oppose "any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration" of the Senkaku.[89] But U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who succeeded Clinton in February 2013, toned down America's commitment from defending "Japan's administration of the Senkaku islands disputed by China (which calls them the Diaoyu islands)" to simple confirmation "that America's security treaty with Japan covers the islands."[90] When Kerry visited Japan in April, 2013, however, he again reaffirmed Clinton's commitment:

> The United States, as everybody knows, does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands. But we do recognize that they are under the administration of Japan. And we obviously want all the parties to deal with territorial issues through peaceful means. Any actions that could raise tensions or lead to miscalculations all affect the peace and the stability and the prosperity of an entire region. And so we oppose any unilateral or coercive action that would somehow aim at changing the status quo.[91]

---

[88] Martin Fackler, "Japan Says China Aimed Military Radar at Ship," *New York Times*, February 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/asia/japan-china-islands-dispute.html?_r=0 (accessed April 11, 2013).

[89] Jane Perlez, "China Criticizes Clinton's Remarks about Dispute with Japan over Islands," *New York Times*, January 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/world/asia/china-criticizes-clintons-remarks-about-dispute-with-japan-over-islands.html (accessed April 11, 2013).

[90] "Spin and Substance: Should the United States be Impressed by Shinzo Abe—or Worried by Him?" *The Economist*, March 2, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21572795-should-united-states-be-impressed-shinzo-abeor-worried-him-spin-and-substance (accessed April 12, 2013).

[91] U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida After their Meeting, April 14, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207483.htm (accessed April 16, 2013).

Although Clinton and Kerry made such declarations, the United States is not necessarily willing to assist Japan unconditionally. Nor does America want Japan to be so confident of U.S. backing that they act overtly aggressively toward China. The United States fears entrapment from becoming entangled in unnecessary conflicts.[92] That is one reason Kerry does not want Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to revise apologies previous administrations have issued to China and Korea concerning World War II atrocities. Such acts would further intensify the relationship between Japan and its neighbors, and would raise potential risks that the United States will be dragged into Asian conflicts. Kerry asserts, "We want to avoid unilateral actions and coercive actions that take very old and contentious historical differences and somehow make them an issue of currency that threatens the peace of the region."[93]

Moreover, as Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the Clinton Administration, points out, the United States will be in a difficult position if Japan and China go into war:

> One thing is clear: If, despite all we do, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate toward literal conflict, the United States will be faced with some very tough choices. It is probably not too soon to quietly begin to analyze within government just what some of those choices might look like.[94]

This shows U.S. ambivalence to such eventuality. However, the United States would

---

[92] "Spin and Substance."

[93] Jacob M. Schlesinger and Alexander Martin, "Kerry Reassures Tokyo—For Now," *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/04/15/kerry-reassures-tokyo-for-now/ (accessed April 16, 2013).

[94] Joseph Nye, Jr., "Our Pacific Predicament," *The American Interest*, March/April 2013, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1388 (accessed April 15, 2013).

send a wrong signal to China by retracting its support of Japan and becoming neutral. Deterrence remains key.[95] These strategic circumstances encourage both Japan and the United States to maintain their alliance relations.

The situation in Europe is more complex. The collapse of the Soviet Union raised the fear of abandonment among the Europeans. The possibilities of U.S. disengagement from Europe prompted European countries to increase their security cooperation. For example, in December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacque Chirac, meeting at St. Malo, France, agreed that the European Union should have a joint military capability to respond to international crises.[96] However, as early as February 1991, the U.S. State Department issued the Bartholomew Memorandum criticizing European attempts to revive the Western European Union[97] and raising concerns that such institutions would weaken NATO. William H. Taft IV, the American ambassador to NATO, said "developing a European security would be the height of folly."[98]

Moreover in the mid-1990s, the United States refused France's attempts to enhance European roles in NATO command. Under President Charles de Gaulle's initiative, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966, although it remained a member of the organization.[99] Much has changed since the

---

[95] Ibid.

[96] " 3. British-French summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998," in *From St-Mato to Nice European Defense: Core Documents*, Chaillot Papers 47, Compiled by Maartje Rutten, Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, May 2001, 8.

[97] Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (London: St Martin's Press, 1994), 172.

[98] Alan Riding, "French and Germans Plan an Army Corps Despite NATO Fears," *New York Times*, October 13, 1996, A4.

[99] The process of distancing France from the alliance began in 1959, "when de Gaulle decided to withdraw parts of his Mediterranean fleet from war-time control by NATO. In June

days of de Gaulle, and France has increasingly been involved in out-of-the-area missions in the post-Cold War era. Naturally, France wanted a voice in NATO policymaking. It sought to place a European officer in charge of NATO's southern command, but the United States flatly rejected the proposal in October 1996.[100]

The rationale behind America's actions is the desire to maintain U.S. influence over Europe in the post-Cold War era. To achieve that end, NATO's transatlantic alliance, not the European Union or the Western European Union, was essential. The United States cannot accept Europe's move toward creating an independent European defense institution for two reasons: "decoupling and duplication."[101] Autonomous European defense armed with independent military capabilities would result in a "*decoupling* of transatlantic cooperation (emphasis in original),"[102] and would damage American influence in the region. The second concern, duplication, is that European states will devote limited resources to develop or acquire a different set of military capabilities for their own. The more important concern, however, is that "duplication could lead to a decoupling of the transatlantic

---

1960 he obliged the United States to withdraw their nuclear capable aircraft from French territory; later, French forces returning from Algeria were not put under NATO command. In 1961 he shared his thoughts on the intolerable nature of any military integration with Macmillan, and by October 1962 the British had become convinced that de Gaulle was turning away from NATO and that this development was unstoppable." See Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 102.

[100] Craig Whitney, "Paris Blames U.S. Position for Setback over NATO," *New York Times*, October 13, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/13/world/paris-blames-us-position-for-setback-over-nato.html (accessed February 1, 2013).

[101] Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 236.

[102] Ibid.

alliance."[103] Such duplication would reduce the effectiveness of the transatlantic alliance. U.S. interests emphasize complementing, rather than duplicating, each other's roles.[104]

How has 9/11 affected NATO? NATO, for the first time, invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which considers the attack on one member of the alliance as an attack on all.[105] It was relatively easier for the members of NATO and the international society to accept the legitimacy of attacking Afghanistan. After the United States defeated Afghanistan's Taliban regime, the United Nations Security Council created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2001, and NATO later assumed the leadership in August 2003 to play a larger role to reduce insurgency, increase the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), facilitate better governance, and foster development.[106]

Unlike the case of Afghanistan, however, America's decision to attack Iraq in 2003 drew little support. Protests erupted throughout the world. Although the Japanese government declared its support for the United States, NATO's major French and German European allies opposed the war.[107] U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld criticized them as "Old Europe,"[108] temporarily dividing the

---

[103] Ibid., 237.

[104] Ibid.

[105] NATO, "Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed," NATO Update, October 2, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (accessed April 6, 2013).

[106] NATO, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), About ISAF, Mission, n.d., http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html (accessed April 12, 2013).

[107] "Opposition to Iraq War Widens," BBC News, January 23, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2688117.stm (accessed April 11, 2013).

[108] "Outraged at 'Old Europe' Remarks," BBC News, World Edition, January 23, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm (accessed April 13, 2013).

alliance.

NATO continued to be relevant, however. In March 2009, France returned to NATO as a full member forty-three years after leaving NATO's military command in 1966. President Nicolas Sarkozy asked, "We send our soldiers onto the terrain but we don't participate in the committee where their objectives are decided?" He also asserted "The time has come to end this situation. It is in the interest of France and the interest of Europe."[109]

Moreover, NATO was involved in missions to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia in 2009. In 2011, it protected Libyan citizens from attacks by its own regime, and in 2013, it deployed Patriot missiles in Turkey to fend off Syrian attacks.[110]

Those missions made the continuing widening gap between the United States and other NATO members apparent with regard to military capability and defense spending. While the United States continues to shoulder much of the burden, Europe's worsening financial situation forced NATO members to spend less on defense.[111]

To maintain the alliance, keep the United States engaged in NATO, and reduce the fear of abandonment, European members have tried to increase their value as America's alliance partners, for instance, by enhancing military capabilities such as

---

[109] Edward Cody, "After 43 Years, France to Rejoin NATO as Full Member," *Washington Post*, March 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/11/AR2009031100547.html (accessed April 21, 2013).

[110] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "How to Keep NATO Strong: The Transatlantic Alliance Cannot be Taken for Granted," *Foreign Policy*, April 10, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_strong?page=0,0 (accessed April 11, 2013).

[111] Clara Marina O'Donnell, ed. *The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO's Largest Members*, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings, Analysis Paper (July 2012).

air-to-air refueling.[112] As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen says, "To remain America's partner of choice, Europe must choose to become the strong partner that America needs."[113]

Moreover, as the United States has acknowledged, European NATO members are also recognizing that it is inefficient for the European Union and NATO to develop separate military capabilities. As Rasmussen argues, "our countries have only one set of armed forces, and one budget, and they need to make the best of what they have, rather than waste resources through duplication."[114] Such thinking also contributes to continued importance of the Atlantic alliance.

4.6. Summary

Contrary to some realist predictions, Cold War alliances endure today. Understanding why they persist is important because it explains why the major Western powers have not challenged U.S. primacy after the Cold War, and have actually contributed to continued U.S. primacy.

The discussion can be summarized as follows. First, the relationship between the level of institutionalization and the prospects for alliance endurance may be weaker than institutionalists claim. A less- institutionalized alliance is just as equipped as a highly institutionalized one to survive a changing international environment. Second, neorealists and institutionalists misunderstand what it really

---

[112] Rasmussen, "How to Keep NATO Strong," *Foreign Policy*, April 10, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_strong?page=0,2 (accessed April 13, 2013).

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid.

means for alliances to "collapse," and this distorts the debate. The difference between the two viewpoints is not so much about whether alliances endure, but about how to define their functions. The difference is also about whether Cold War alliances continue to perform the same functions in the post-Cold War period. Third, the collective identity argument is inadequate for explaining why alliances endure. Fourth, states that have been historically threatening bandwagon to dampen suspicion, perpetuating alliances. Finally, the Cold War international security environment created an alliance dilemma, particularly the fear of abandonment, among America's allies in Asia and Europe. Japan and the European allies changed their initial solutions to the dilemmas because of America's power and influence, eventually bringing them closer to their alliance with the United States.

Theoretically speaking, the significance of the sheep in wolf's clothing argument for international relations theory is that it demonstrates how identity impedes smooth balances. The need to cope with the residual threat emanating from Russia, the rise of China, and ethnic conflicts are important factors affecting the prospects for alliance endurance in the post-Cold War era. However, if it were not for the sheep in wolf's clothing factor, the coherence of these alliances might have weakened more rapidly. Germany and Japan, for example, might have pursued more autonomy in security affairs, demanding that the United States remove its forces from their territories.

Although I challenged institutionalist logic in explaining why alliances endure, this does not necessarily mean that institutions *per se* are unimportant. In fact, as I have discussed, institutions can be used to communicate benign intentions to other members of alliances, which in turn helps potentially threatening states dampen suspicion. Great powers also use institutions to achieve their interests.

Overall, my argument also shows that it is important to understand the interests of not only the powerful, but also of the secondary and threatening states. Often explanations focus on only one of those actors, but reasons from both sides must be examined for a more complete approach.

If countries such as Germany and Japan had pursued independent security policy and acted outside the alliance structure, such moves could have invited security competition among the neighboring countries as well as the United States. Germany and Japan at the end of the Cold War were economically formidable and had the potential to become military powers. But others also considered them suspicious because of their identity as past aggressors. To dampen such suspicions, each remained in the alliance. The culture of antimilitarism was also a contributing factor. Both countries bandwagoned with rather than balanced against the United States.

The United States, on its part, avoided using its maximum power to dominate its allies. It continued to restrain its power by acting though bilateral and multilateral security institutions to make other countries accept U.S. leadership.[115] The lack of counterbalancing by the Cold War allies works favorably to U.S. primacy, because if they form a new alliance, they could constitute a powerful contending camp to challenge U.S. supremacy.[116] All in all, the continued alliance after the Cold War greatly depended on combined actions: the United States acting as a benign hegemon toward its Western allies and the U.S. allies, especially Germany and Japan, adhering

[115] Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restrain." The Cold War bipolar system no doubt contributed to such U.S. strategy toward its allies. Acting through institutions, however, more or less continues to this date. But as the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in 2003 shows, it sometimes ignores the voices of other allies and cannot be constrained. This negatively affected the alliance relations for a certain period.

[116] One could argue that mere lack of counterbalancing does not contribute to U.S. primacy. With relative decline in America's power, cooperation from allies is becoming essential for achieving various international goals.

to the alliance to dampen suspicions.

In addition to the sheep in wolf's clothing factor, changing security environments also prompted members to continue the alliance relationship. In response to 9/11, Japan quickly passed two laws that enabled Japan's Self-Defense Forces to go to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Japan feared that if it failed to cooperate with U.S. wars in the Middle East, the United States would withdraw its commitment to defend Japan in the case of regional crises. Moreover, as the rise of China and the North Korea nuclear issue continue, Japan and the United States find common interests in keeping the alliance ties. This again works favorably for U.S. primacy, because Japan continues to side with the United States and not with China.

Moreover, although the United States is shifting its strategic focus from Europe to Asia, America's continued interest in wielding influence in Europe affects NATO's persistence. Reduced U.S. commitment raised the fear of abandonment in the region, and induced European states to work closely with each other, but the United States halted those efforts to become too independent. From the European point of view, this seems unfair. At the same time, many European countries cannot coordinate an effective European defense policy. Without U.S. involvement, significant military operations are not possible.

9/11 negatively affected NATO, especially the relationship between Germany and France on one hand and the United States on the other. But the sour relations were short-lasting, and NATO continued to play a role in Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Turkey. Furthermore, European members have been trying to contribute to the alliance by enhancing their military capabilities to demonstrate their value as useful members of the alliance. U.S. and European interests both contribute to NATO's endurance.

The following list summarizes international and domestic factors affecting the United States and its allies:

> ***International factors*** affecting the United States and its allies with regard to the question of alliance endurance include:
>
> U.S.
> 1. The fear of uncertainty after the Cold War
> 2. The wish to hedge against Russia's resurgence
> 3. The wish to continue U.S. influence in Europe and Asia
> 4. The wish to use alliances for various purposes after the Cold War, including ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and the rise of potential contenders such as China.
>
> U.S. Allies
> 1. The fear of uncertainty after the Cold War
> 2. The wish to hedge against China's rise
> 3. The need to deal with North Korea
> 4. The fear of fading U.S. engagement; the fear of abandonment
> 5. The fear of entrapment
>
> ***Domestic factors*** affecting the United States and its allies regarding the question of alliance endurance include:
>
> U.S.
> 1. Having a strategy of primacy
> 2. Strategic restraint
>
> U.S. Allies
> 1. Japan's willingness to rely on multilateral institutions in the early 1990s
> 2. Japan and Germany's cultures of antimilitarism
> 3. Japan and Germany's wishes to dampen suspicions held by other allies and neighboring countries

Enduring alliances help support U.S. unipolarity. But this is only one factor contributing to U.S. primacy. In addition to having many powerful friends, the United States also possesses the capabilities to project its military power well beyond its borders. No other country has such a capability, and this is the topic I turn to in the next several chapters.

CHAPTER 5

U.S. GLOBAL MILITARY PRESENCE

In the discussions of unipolarity, U.S. power is primarily measured in terms of its material capabilities.[1] The argument[2] is that the United States has the largest economy in the world. Its defense budget is larger than budgets of all other major countries in the world combined, and America is equipped with the world's most advanced weapons system. The United States, therefore, is simply too powerful for other countries to counterbalance. However, at the same time, many argue that America's power is in relative decline. But will U.S. advantage quickly end when some rising country matches its economic and military power?

One of my central arguments is that material capabilities alone do not contribute to American power. In fact, the proponents of durable U.S. unipolarity agree that U.S. bases and soldiers stationed overseas allow the U.S. military to project force well beyond its borders and thereby contribute to U.S. primacy.[3] Without such assets, the United States could not wield its military and political influence effectively. However, beyond simply stating the importance of overseas military presence, proponents of U.S. unipolarity fail to discuss that power more deeply.

In this chapter, I seek to show the significance and extensiveness of the worldwide American military base network. I provide a comprehensive overview of

---

[1] This chapter draws from Takafumi Ohtomo, "Predominance of U.S. Global Military Presence: Personnel, SOFAs, and the Command Structure," *Area Studies Tsukuba*, no. 31 (2010): 93-112.

[2] Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); William Wohlforth, "The Stability of Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41.

[3] Wohlforth, "The Stability of Unipolarity."

the scale of the U.S. military presence by looking at various data from different angles. More specifically, I consider three main questions: (1) How dominant is U.S. overseas military presence? (2) What remains constant and what seems to be changing in overseas military presence? (3) How does U.S. regional command structure affect U.S. primacy? Answers to these questions should better explain U.S. global presence by showing not only the magnitude of soldiers stationed overseas, a popular measure, but also by explaining their significance. I also discuss the trend regarding SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements), especially after the Cold War, and look at the global command structure virtually covering the globe. Taken together, these discussions comprehensively indicate the degree of worldwide U.S. military dominance.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss main functions of overseas military presence. Without knowing the merits of having bases overseas, we cannot understand why the United States would want them. Second, I provide a basic analysis of U.S. global presence by examining statistical data of U.S. military personnel stationed throughout the world. I briefly discuss international events to give more meaning to the data. Third, I give basic information about the number of U.S. bases, and fourth explore their types to show U.S. continuity in classifications. Fifth, I look at SOFAs to examine the trend, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sixth, I examine the history and structure of U.S. regional military commands, which shows the extensiveness of U.S. military outreach contributing to U.S. primacy. Seventh, I discuss joint military exercises involving the United States and other countries. Military exercises themselves tell nothing about U.S. primacy per se, but numerous exercises with formal and informal allies shows that more states are closely aligned with the United States, tilting the balance of power toward the United States even further.

5.1. Functions of Overseas Military Bases[4]

The number of U.S. soldiers and assets deployed overseas has declined dramatically since the Soviet Union collapsed, but U.S. forces remain located throughout the world.[5] By understanding the functions such bases play, we can grasp why the United States—or any other major power—would want to use them to advance their national interests. I have identified six general functions of overseas military bases and discuss each in turn.

The first function of overseas bases is to provide logistical support.[6] For example, when battle ships travel across the Pacific or Atlantic, the U.S. Navy needs safe places to refuel, replenish food and water, and repair damages. In the 1820s, Hawaii was an ideal stopping place for those who engaged in trade with China and for those who sought to convert the Chinese to Christianity. Moreover, in the 1850s, when Commodore Matthew Perry sailed to Japan to end Japan's so-called *sakoku* policy (of keeping the country closed to outside world), he visited the Ryukyu Islands

---

[4] This section is drawn from Takafumi Ohtomo, "Reisengo no Doumei to Beigun Kaigai Kichi Tenkai [U.S. overseas bases and alliances after the Cold War], *Kokusai seiji keizaigaku kenkyu* [International political economy] (University of Tsukuba), no. 10 (October 2002): 64-66.

[5] The number of U.S. forces has dropped by half since the end of the Cold War. However, Germany, Japan, and South Korea continue to be major host countries.

[6] According to the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), overseas bases "(1) provide initial crisis response, (2) deter potential aggressors, (3) reassure allies of U.S. support, and (4) influence events overseas in ways favorable to the United States." See GAO, *Overseas Presence: More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine Whether Cost-Effective Alternatives Exist* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1997), 3. Similarly, Akihisa Nagashima argues that functions include (1) initial crisis response, (2) establishing bridgeheads, and (3) shaping regional strategic environment. See *Nichibei doumei no atarashii sekkeizu* [New plans for the Japan-U.S. alliance], 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Nippon Hyouron Sha, 2004), 34-5. Takashi Kawakami adds "costs reduction" for fighting a war in terms of transportation and in the form of host nation support. See *Beigun no zenpou tenkai to nichibei doumei* [U.S. forward presence and Japan-U.S. alliance] (Tokyo: Doubunkan Shuppan, 2004), 13-4.

and forcefully established a coaling station.[7] With the introduction of long-range aircraft, air fields have become important bases as well for refueling purposes.

In more recent years, Yokosuka, Japan has been the homeport of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which covers the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Yokosuka and other bases in Japan are important U.S. assets because they provide fuel, food, and water. Moreover, Japan's high level of technology has made Japan useful for repairs to state-of-the-art U.S. military equipment including aircraft carriers, aircraft, and other forms of military equipment. Yokosuka is also valuable because it is located in a very stable host country where political turmoil is rare. Before Yokosuka, the home port of the U.S. Seventh Fleet was in Subic Bay, the Philippines, but President Corazon Aquino ordered the United States to leave in 1992, and Yokosuka's importance has risen since then.

The second function of bases is to serve as locations for exercises. Although exercises can be conducted in the United States, it is beneficial to study the effects of battle in other climates. For example, when military leaders expect to be fighting in jungle-like environments, they value conducting exercises in places such as Okinawa. Moreover, host countries and other participating countries improve their skills by performing joint exercises with the United States. Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia are among those participating in bilateral or multilateral joint exercises with the United States.

The third function is the capability to attack enemies from a forward base. Obviously, this function is important during war, when the number of such bases increases. At the beginning of World War II, the United States had about 100 overseas

---

[7] Kenichi Matsumoto, *Kaikoku and ishin, 1851-1871*, Nihon no kindai 1 [Opening of Japan and revolution, 1851-1871, Modern Japan 1] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1998), 38.

bases.[8] By the time the war ended, they had about 2,000.[9]

According to Global Policy Forum, a nonprofit organization based in New York, from 1798 to 2005 the United States was involved in 187 interventions.[10] This list does not include operations during World Wars I and II, but it still shows the extensiveness of U.S. overseas activities. Most of those missions could not have been achieved without extensive bases abroad. Although some states consider that possessing nuclear weapons would enhance their power, such weapons would add less than they think.[11] More overseas military bases and conventional weapons are important in wielding power abroad. In this sense, overseas bases give power beyond nuclear weapons alone.

The fourth function, closely related to the third, is the ability to deter potential threat. Bases provide opportunities for initial crisis response.[12] Compared with the option of sending troops and equipment from the continental United States, the United States can deal more effectively with crises in distant locations if U.S. forces are already deployed near trouble spots. By being able to respond to crises quickly, the United States can limit the damage that would have occurred without forward-deployed forces.

---

[8] Duncan L. Clarke and Daniel O'Connor, "U.S. Base Rights Payments after the Cold War," *Orbis* (Summer 1993), 442.

[9] James Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma* (New York: Praeger 1990), 21.

[10] See Global Policy Forum, "US Interventions: US Military and Clandestine Operation in Foreign Countries: 1798-Present," December 2005, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/26024.html (accessed April 16, 2013).

[11] Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957; repr., Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1984).

[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Overseas Presence*, 3.

Host countries also benefit from the deterrence function, especially when a neighboring country is also a threat. If a neighbor attacks a U.S. host country, U.S. forces act as a tripwire, inviting U.S. involvement in the conflict and deterring attempts to attack the host country.

Forward bases also deter the host country where U.S. forces are stationed. Japan and Germany after World War II are good examples. The most essential goal during the Cold War was to deter the Soviet Union, and Japan and Germany were considered helpful in achieving that end, although both countries were previously enemies and not fully trusted. Bases in Japan and Germany were used not only to deter the Soviet Union, but also to hold down the two host nations.

Fifth is the political function of assuring allies.[13] The stationing of U.S. troops in a particular country signals that the United States is willing to defend the host nation, to stay and contribute to regional stabilization, even after the end of the Cold War. U.S. forces continue to act as a tripwire, ensuring U.S. military involvement in the event of attacks. For example, U.S. troops in South Korea send a message to the South Korean government regarding commitment to fight North Korea if necessary.

The sixth function is intelligence gathering. Intelligence has many faces. For example, overseas bases can be used to detect nuclear testing in other countries, or to intercept and decode cryptograms. An interception system called ECHELON, of which the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are members, is useful during both wartime and peacetime. ECHELON can be used to gather important information regarding commercial communications as well.[14] In the

---

[13] Ibid.

[14] European Parliament, Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System,

Asia-Pacific region, installations for interception are said to be located in Japan (Misawa U.S. Air Base), Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, Australia, and New Zealand.[15]

Let us now turn to U.S. global manpower.

5.2. **U.S. Global Manpower: Historical Overview**

The U.S. global military presence is overwhelming (see fig. 5.1.). No other military can match the extent to which the United States can reach different parts of the globe. Although the number of U.S. forces has declined since the height of the Cold War, the United States still maintains the most forces deployed overseas.

As of March 31, 2009, U.S. troops numbered 1,412,529. About 20 percent, or 293,701 soldiers, were deployed in foreign countries. This figure excludes 174,200 in Afghanistan and 41,300 in Iraq. Adding these numbers to the peacetime foreign military presence figure and the worldwide total, about 31 percent, or 509,201 soldiers, would be considered stationed outside the continental United States and its territories.[16] Just to consider the peacetime presence figure (293,701) alone in perspective, it is larger than Japan's Self Defense Forces of about 250,000.[17]

"Working Document in Preparation for a Report on the Existence of a Global System for Intercepting Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON interception system)," May 4, 2001, 11.

[15] Kensuke Ebata, *Saishin amerika no gunjiryoku* [America's military power, new ed.] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002), 218.

[16] U.S. Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A), March 31, 2009, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0903.pdf (accessed October 2, 2009).

[17] As of March 31, 2009, there were 248,303 personnel. Bouei Shou, *Bouei hakusho, Heisei 21 nendo ban* [Defense while paper, 2009], http://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/mod_sdf/kousei/index.html (accessed November 22, 2012).



Source: Created from U.S. Department of Defense, "Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A)," 1950-2009. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm (Accessed October 2, 2009).

Note: Data for 1951-1952 are not available.

Figure 5. 1. U.S. soldiers stationed overseas, 1950-2009

Before the 1940s, a limited number of U.S. soldiers were stationed overseas. The United States did not have an extensive base network around the globe. In fact, it did not even have a strong military in the 1890s, and the size of its military did not match the size of its economy. It had only about 25,000 in the Army and very few in the Navy. Fifty years before World War II, about 1890, the U.S. Army was ranked 14th (after Bulgaria). Moreover, the U.S. Navy was smaller than Italy's, although America's industrial strength was 13 times greater.[18] The United States was busy

[18] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 37

expanding its territory in the North American continent through purchasing land and fighting wars in the name of Manifest Destiny.

U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 marked the beginning of major U.S. overseas expansion.[19] The United States gained a naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba, now the oldest U.S. overseas base. Moreover, the United States occupied the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, which were under Spain's control. Hawaii was also annexed as a U.S. territory. Despite such overseas expansions, no significant U.S. military network was created until World War II entered full swing.[20]

The number of U.S. bases dramatically increased during World War II, because more bases were needed near the Axis countries as the United States scored victories and advanced well into the heart of the enemy territories. The fact that more bases were built during wartime is unsurprising: bases constitute a crucial component for conducting military operations abroad during wartime. The United States had fewer than 100 overseas sites before World War II, but by the end of the war they had more than 2,000 base sites throughout the globe. No other country has ever built so many bases in such a short period.[21]

After World War II, many American soldiers returned home, and the number of U.S. soldiers stationed overseas dropped significantly. However, some remained abroad to occupy defeated powers such as Germany and Japan. Bases used during the occupation in Japan and Germany, as well as others, were later used to contain the

---

[19] However, some small islands were incorporated before the Spanish-American War, for example, the 1867 Midway annexation. See Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[20] Why the United States did not remain at its overseas bases after World War I is a puzzle. U.S. isolationist strategic thinking may have been the cause.

[21] James Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, 21.

Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The number of U.S. soldiers overseas rose again during the Korean War. Bases in Okinawa played a pivotal role in providing logistical support. The Korean War shocked both the U.S. administration and America's European allies. Suspected Soviet Union support of North Korea worried U.S. allies. Fear of Soviet aggression, in particular, consolidated the Western allies.

Another cause for increased U.S. soldiers overseas came with the Vietnam War. U.S. Vietnam involvement was at its peak when Richard Nixon took office in 1969.[22] More than 750,000 soldiers were in East Asia and the Pacific region, and more than 500,000 were stationed in South Vietnam. For the next six years, U.S. troop presence continued to decline in the region to about 140,000, including routine presence in Japan, South Korea, and Thailand, but U.S. troops in South Vietnam dropped significantly, to about 150. The draft ended in 1973 marking a return to a volunteer system and contributing to the considerable loss of active-duty military personnel—more than 1 million, about a third of all service members. Moreover, the United States was less willing to deploy a large presence, especially after the Vietnam experience. However, in the Middle East, the number of U.S. soldiers increased by about 50 percent between 1969 and 1974, from 938 to 1,460 troops.

The United States officially withdrew from Vietnam when Saigon fell on April 30, 1975.[23] During the Ford administration, the U.S. military did not engage in

---

[22] This part relies on "Richard M. Nixon Administration (1969-1974)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/ (accessed October 24, 2009).

[23] This part relies on "Gerald R. Ford Administration (1975-1976)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/2.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

military interventions. Moreover, since the 1950s, the United States had an extensive military presence in Thailand but withdrew most of its 15,000 troops in 1976.

In the late 1970s, the Middle East was the main focal point of America's foreign policy,[24] especially during the Carter administration. In 1979, President Carter negotiated a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, which helped them to resolve their border disputes. In the same year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The U.S.-Iran relationship deteriorated rapidly during the Iranian Revolution when Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy and held U.S. hostages for 444 days. Because of the dramatic change in relations, the United States withdrew its troops from Iran which had hosted about 600 to 1,000 U.S. troops yearly. To compensate for the withdrawal, the United States increased the number of troops afloat from 1,000 a few years before to more than 18,000. In Asia, China and the United States normalized relations on January 1, 1979 through the secretive and bold diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor under Nixon. Ten troops were stationed there for the first time since 1947. Part of the deal between China and the United States involved the permanent withdrawal of about 700 U.S. troops from Taiwan.

During the Reagan administration, the United States recorded the largest peace time military build-up.[25] The number of troops continued to rise until 1987. The United States had been refraining from military intervention after the Vietnam

---

[24] This part relies on "Jimmy Carter Administration (1977-1980)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/3.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

[25] This part relies on "Ronald R. Reagan Administration (1981-1984)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/4.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

War, but for the first time since Saigon fell, the United States sent forces to invade Soviet-leaning Grenada in 1983, worsening the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, U.S. forces in Germany were increased to about 250,000 per year, more than present during the Carter administration.

As the United States restored formal relations with Iraq in 1984, eight U.S. troops were stationed there for the first time since 1967, when Iraq had broken off ties during the Arab-Israeli War.[26] In Southeast Asia, U.S. troop presence increased in the Philippines every year during the Reagan administration mainly to counter the Soviet navy base located close by. The United States feared a possible coup that might oust unpopular but U.S.-backed President Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos was voted out of office, and by the time he was sent into exile in 1986, more than 16,000 U.S. troops were stationed in the Philippines. In North Africa, in 1986, the United States conducted air strikes against Libya, a country suspected of sponsoring terrorism. In response, in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, troop levels peaked at 20,000 in 1987. During the second Reagan administration, U.S. troops deployed worldwide continued to grow and in 1987, the number reached 2,174,217, a post-Vietnam high.

Not long after George Bush took office, 20,000 U.S. troops were sent to Panama to capture President Manuel Noriega, who was wanted for narcotics charges.[27] The Bush administration then faced dramatic changes in the international

---

[26] This part relies on "Ronald R. Reagan Administration (1985-1988)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/5.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

[27] This part relies on "George H. W. Bush Administration (1989-1992)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/6.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

environment with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These events contributed to the significant decline of the number of U.S. forces abroad. In Europe, at the end of Reagan's second term, they numbered about 350,000, but by the end of the Bush administration, they declined to 200,000 — a 40 percent decrease. East Asia and the Pacific region also showed similar trends, falling by 30 percent from about 135,000 in 1988 to 95,000 in 1992. However, this was partially because of the temporary concentration of forces in the Middle East to fight the 1991 Gulf War. Of the approximately 70,000 U.S. troops in the Middle East, about 30,000 were in Saudi Arabia and 40,000 were afloat. By the autumn of 1992, the troop levels in the Middle East returned to just above their 1989 numbers. President Bush, right before leaving office, sent 25,000 U.S. soldiers to Somalia for famine relief.

In the next administration, President William J. Clinton continued to deal with the problem in Somalia.[28] He reduced the troop level to 5,000, and ordered a complete withdrawal after 18 U.S. Rangers were killed there. However, Clinton decided to send 25,000 U.S. troops to Haiti where social order had been deteriorating since 1991 when President Aristide was removed from office in a coup. The United States, however, sent only a handful troops to Rwanda in 1994, where more than 800,000 were killed in 100 days.[29] From September 1995 to September 1996, approximately 19,000 U.S. forces were sent to the three former Yugoslavian countries

[28] This part relies on "William J. Clinton Administration (1993-1996)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/7.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

[29] For a detailed account of non-U.S. involvement, see Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

and participated in the attack on Bosnian Serbs, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the United States was engaged in three theaters, Clinton continued with military downsizing. As a result, in 1996, during the first Clinton administration, the number of troops was reduced to 1,470,000, a reduction of about 30 percent from 2,140,000 in 1988 during the Reagan administration.

Clinton continued to decrease America's worldwide military presence in countries where it enjoyed a stable presence.[30] U.S. troops in the nation's closest ally, the United Kingdom, fell from 20,000 (1992) to 11,000 (2000). In Panama the number was reduced from 10,000 to a mere 20. In a NATO-led war in Kosovo, the United States participated in operations to halt ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serb nationalists. When the conflict was at its peak in 1999, about 13,500 U.S. forces were deployed in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia.

Additional troops were deployed in the Middle East, where Iraq had failed to cooperate with the U.N. team inspecting Iraq's weapons. The number rose from 12,400 in 1997 to 29,800 in 1999 throughout North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia (a region that includes Iraq). By deploying aircraft carriers to the region, the United States threatened to attack Iraq. Within the region, about 5,500 U.S. troops were in Saudi Arabia, 4,000 in Kuwait, and 16,100 afloat. Although no ground troops were deployed, the United States launched a cruise missile attack on Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the bombing of U.S. embassies carried out by Osama bin Laden.

A notable change occurred after September 11, 2001, when a terrorist group attacked the World Trade Center in New York and the Department of Defense in

[30] This part relies on "William J. Clinton Administration (1997-2000)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/8.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

Washington, D.C. In response, on October 7, 2001, the United States started a bombing campaign in Afghanistan to bring down the Taliban regime harboring the al Qaeda terrorist group.[31] The United States quickly turned toward Iraq, searching for links with al Qaeda. Without clear evidence of such links, the United States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, with approximately 200,000 soldiers, and achieved a quick military victory in three weeks and then maintained more than 200,000 troops to continue the occupation. Because of the need to reinforce U.S. presence in the Middle East, the number of U.S. soldiers in the Western Hemisphere decreased from about 14,000 troops in 2001 to only 2,000 in 2004. In the second Bush administration, the president ordered a so-called surge to increase the number of troops in Iraq. During the Obama administration, more troops were redirected to Afghanistan as the new administration shifted the focus from Iraq to Afghanistan.

In sum, the number of U.S. forces abroad has fluctuated, and it has been most significantly affected by wars. The Korean and Vietnam Wars were cases in point. After the Cold War, the overall troop level declined, and then remained stable until 9/11. After 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq increased the number of overseas troops, while in other regions, especially in Europe and Latin America, the number declined. During peacetime, the policies of different administrations have influenced the trend. For example, Reagan's eagerness to strengthen defense was reflected in troop levels both at home and abroad. Overall, despite a general trend of reduced overseas troop presence, the United States seems willing to continue wielding its influence around the world to pursue primacy.

---

[31] This part relies on "George W. Bush Administration 2001-2004)," Rumsfeld's War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present, Frontline, October 26, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/4.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

5.3. Bases around the Globe in Number

The number of U.S. bases is another indicator to measure U.S. primacy (see table 5.1.). But first, to reiterate the importance of military bases:

> Our physical infrastructure provides the critical framework supporting our military forces globally. While the Department continues the transformation of its business processes, ….. the location and quality of our facilities continue to be our key focus as a critical component of the Department's readiness. The Department embraces modern asset management techniques and best business practices to enhance the vast physical infrastructure. …. Our network of quality operational and support facilities located at sites around the world are core to U.S. combat power, an inseparable element of the nation's military readiness and wartime effectiveness.[32]

According to U.S. Department Defense *Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2009 Baseline*, 4,742 bases are the United States, 121 in U.S. territories, and 716 in foreign countries. Most bases abroad are in Germany (213), Japan (123), and South Korea (87).[33]

Table 5.1. DOD sites in the U.S., U.S. territories, and foreign countries (Sept 2008)

	50 U.S. States	7 U.S. Territories	38 Foreign Countries	Total
No. of Sites	4,742	121	716	5,579

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2009 Baseline*

[32] Ibid., 20.

[33] U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report 2009* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2009), 7.

> To be listed in this report, a base or
>
> a site located in the United States must be larger than 10 acres AND have a PRV (Plant Replacement Value) greater than $10 million. If the site is located in a foreign country, it must be larger than 10 acres OR have a PRV greater than $10 million to be shown as a separate entry. To preserve the comprehensiveness of the report, sites that do not meet these criteria are aggregated as an "Other" location within each state or country. Due to the typical smaller size of the Army National Guard State Sites, the criteria is slightly reduced to show approximately the same percentage of the total number of sites as shown in the rest of the report. State sites are shown if the site is larger than five acres AND has a PRV greater than $5 million. State sites not meeting this criteria are aggregated as "Other" for each state.[34]

PRV stands for Plant Replacement Value and represents "calculated cost of replacing the facility and its supporting infrastructure using today's construction cost (labor and material for that particular area) and standards (methodologies and codes)."[35]

Outside the 50 U.S. states, 121 sites are located in seven U.S. territories, including Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Johnston Atoll, Northern Mariana Islands, and Wake Islands. U.S. sites are also located in 38 foreign countries, including Antigua, Aruba, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Br Indian Ocean Territories, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, Netherlands Atoll, Norway, Oman, Peru, Portugal, Saint Helena, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

The list, for some reason, does not include Iraq and Afghanistan where many bases and soldiers are present. Moreover, Bulgaria and Romania offer their own

---

[34] Ibid., 3.

[35] Ibid.

military bases to U.S. forces, but they are not listed because they are not "U.S." bases, but are rather joint-use bases. Moreover, some bases are not listed because they do not meet the criteria to be listed here, or simply because they are treated as a secret base.

Those figures show the extensiveness of U.S. bases around the globe. No other countries have so many bases abroad for various purposes, from fighting wars to deterrence. While the importance of bases is not disputed, some are more important than others.

5.4. Types of Bases

Generally, bases include four types: (1) main operating bases (MOB), (2) forward operating bases (FOB), (3) forward operating sites (FOS), and (4) cooperative security locations (CSL). MOBs are the most developed and permanent, while CSLs are the least permanent (See fig. 5.2).[36]

Main operating bases (MOB) are "[facilities] outside the United States and U.S. territories with permanently stationed operating forces and robust infrastructure. Main operating bases are characterized by command and control structures, enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures."[37] Examples include bases in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.

Forward operating bases (FOB) are "[Airfields] used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. The base may be used for an

---

[36] The literature often uses the term *permanent,* giving the impression that the base will be there forever, although that may not necessarily be the case.

[37] Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, s.v. "Main operating base," http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/m/18920.html (accessed August 1, 2010).

extended time period. Support by a main operating base will be required to provide backup support for a forward operating base."[38] Bases in Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples.



Figure 5.2. Types of bases

A forward operating site is

> A scal[e]able location outside the United States and US territories intended for rotational use by operating forces. Such expandable 'warm facilities' may be maintained with a limited US military support presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment. Forward operating sites support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and are a focus for bilateral and regional training.[39]

Singapore and Djibouti are examples.

Cooperative security location is

> A facility located outside the United States and US territories with little or no permanent US presence, maintained with periodic Service, contractor, or

[38] Idem, s.v. "Forward operating base," http://www.military-dictionary.org/forward_operating_base (accessed August 1, 2010).

[39] Idem, s.v. "Forward operating site," http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/f/18919.html (accessed August 1, 2010).

> host-nation support. Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistic support, and rotational use by operating forces and are a focal point for security cooperation activities.[40]

Examples include Ecuador, Aruba, Uganda, and Gabon.

These categorizations seem familiar. In fact, before World War II ended, the United States created four similar groupings: (1) primary base areas, (2) secondary base areas, (3) subsidiary base areas, and (4) minor base areas (see table 5.2).

Many years have passed since 1945 when the JCS570/40 report[41] was completed, but, remarkably, the United States continues to evaluate American overseas bases. In both cases (JCS570/40 and the most recent categorizations), they divided the bases into four types in the order of importance. Although the categories differ, and the most important bases have changed locations over the past decades, the classifications show that American strategic thinking on overseas bases has changed little since ideas about bases were first formulated. It shows that overseas bases are still an important tool for achieving U.S. security aims.[42]

In the next section, I examine the trends of U.S. overseas military presence by focusing on the number of the State of the Forces Agreements (SOFAs) signed between the United States and its host countries before and after the Cold War. It shows yet another attempt by the United States to preserve unipolarity.

---

[40] Idem, s.v. "Cooperative security location," http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/18918.html (accessed August 1, 2010).

[41] I thank Robert Eldridge for sharing this document.

[42] Another notable difference regarding the trend of U.S. overseas bases between the pre- and the post-WWII era is that while islands were mainly considered as the base sites in the pre-WWII years (and also during WWII), defeated countries such as Japan, Germany, and Italy have hosted U.S forces in the post-WWII era. Consequently, U.S. bases have become more publicly visible in foreign countries, and in some host countries, U.S. presence has created political, military, and social problems.

Table 5.2. Types of Bases (JCS 570/40)

Types	Definition	Locations
Primary Base Areas	Foundation of a base system strategically located and essential to U.S. security, its possessions, the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines and for projecting military operations.	Panama Canal Zone, Hawaiian Islands, Marianas Islands, Philippine Islands, Ryukyu Islands, Southwestern Alaska-Aleutian Area, Newfoundland, Iceland, Puerto-Rico Virgin Islands, Azores
Secondary Base Areas	Essential for protecting and/or accessing primacy bases, and projecting military operations.	Fairbanks-Nome-Central and Western Alaska, Midway Island, Johnston Island, Wake Island, Marcus Island, Bonin-Volcano Islands, Truk Island, Kwajalein Island, Manus, American Samoa, Galapagos, Islands, Canton Island, Bermuda, Greenland, Cape Verde Islands, Ascension Island, Guantanamo (Cuba), Trinidad, Airfields in Republic of Panama, Natal-Recife Area (Brazil)
Subsidiary Base Areas	Required for increasing the flexibility of primary and secondary bases.	Anette (Alaska), Yakutat (Alaska), Yap-Ulithi, Eniwetok, Tarawa, Majuro, Palmyra, Palau, Formosa, Funa Futi, Takara (Peru), Canary Islands, Georgetown (British Gurana), Belem (Brazil), St. Thomas, Antigua, St. Lucia, Bahamas
Minor Base Areas	Require transit privileges and varying military rights if not already obtained to insure further availability as needed to increase base system flexibility.	Morotai, Biak, Guadalcanal-Tulagi, Espiritu Santo, Noumea (New Caledonia), Viti Levu, Edomonton-Whitehorse Route to Alaska, Ft. Chimo-Frobisher Bay Route to Greenland, Salinas (Ecuador), Batista Field (Cuba), St.Julian-Lafe (Cuba), Curacao, Christmas Island, Bora Bora Island, Clipperton Island, Upolu, British Samoa, Jamaica, Surinam, Casablanca (Port Lyautey), Dakar, Monrovia, Goose Bay (Labrador)

Source: "JCS 570/40 Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights (October 25, 1945)," Section 9, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

5.5. Status of Forces Agreements

A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is concluded between a sending nation and a host country, negotiated individually with each host country. SOFAs stipulate various rights and responsibilities between, for example, the United States (the sending nation) and Japan (the host government). NATO, the only exception, established a multilateral SOFA among its members. In principle, SOFAs are essentially the same although specific situations in host countries may change them somewhat in certain areas. SOFAs alone do not permit the United States to station forces on the soil of other countries. Instead they are normally a central part of the overall military bases agreement that permits U.S. forces to stay in the host country.

SOFAs normally deal with everyday life matters "such as entry and exit of forces, entry and exit of personal belongings (i.e., automobiles), labor, claims and contractors, and susceptibility to income and sales taxes" as well as issues surrounding facilities related to post offices, recreation, and banking for long-term U.S. presence. Issues also include "the wearing of the uniform, the carrying of arms, and resolving damage claims."[43] A more significant issue involving SOFAs relates to civil and criminal jurisdiction. A central issue is protection against unfair trial and imprisonment of U.S. soldiers stationed abroad. Host countries see this as an area of contention. Some find it unfair when they learn that other host countries have more legal power in handling U.S. personnel involved in crimes.

[43] This section relies on "Status-of-Forces Agreement," GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm (accessed October 1, 2009)

Table 5.3. List of countries signing SOFAs by year (1945-1999)

1945	Turkey*
1946	
1947	
1948	
1949	
1950	
1951	Iceland, Spain
1952	United Kingdom***
1953	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France*, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia
1954	
1955	
1956	
1957	Ascension Island
1958	
1959	New Zealand
1960	
1961	
1962	
1963	Jamaica**, Trinidad and Tobago**
1964	Australia, Germany, Greece
1965	
1966	
1967	Diego Garcia, Korea
1968	
1969	
1970	
1971	Bahrain
1972	
1973	
1974	
1975	
1976	Antigua and Barbuda
1977	
1978	
1979	Panama, St Lucia**, Turks and Caicos Island
1980	Oman, Somalia
1981	Egypt, Sudan
1982	Honduras, Morocco
1983	Bahamas
1984	
1985	
1986	Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands
1987	St. Kitts & Nevis
1988	Dominican Republic
1989	
1990	Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Western Samoa
1991	Bermuda, Kuwait, Solomon Islands
1992	Qatar, Tonga
1993	Grenada
1994	Brunei, Ethiopia, Israel, Palau, United Arab Emirates
1995	Bosnia-Herzegovina (for IFOR/SFOR), Croatia (for IFOR/SFOR), Haiti, Sri Lanka
1996	Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYROM (Macedonia), Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Uzbekistan (provisionally)
1997	Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mali, Moldova, Poland, Uganda, Ukraine (provisionally)
1998	Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Philippines
1999	South Africa

Source: This table was created based on the information retrieved from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)). 1999. "Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)," http://policy.defense.gov/sections/policy_offices/isa/inra/da/list_of_sofas.html (accessed January 2, 2010).

Note: Information for the years after 1999 has not been updated.
*Both France and Turkey have resisted the application of the NATO SOFA to activities in their territory that are not in support of NATO purposes.
**SOFA provisions of 1941 United States-United Kingdom Lend Lease Agreement apply, and were continued in application by former United Kingdom territories when they gained their independence.

SOFAs increased dramatically after the Cold War ended and the Soviet threat declined (see table 5.3). Between 1945 and 1999, of 92 SOFAs, 40 were signed during the Cold War; 52 were signed afterward. Considering that 40 SOFAs were signed within 54 years (1945-89), 52 within ten years (1989-1999) is extremely high. This means, on average, about 0.7 agreements were signed every year during the Cold War, while 5.2 were signed per year in the post-Cold War era—more than a seven-fold increase.

As table 5.3 shows, more countries signed SOFA agreements in 1953 than in any previous year. Most were NATO members, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. In addition, Japan and Saudi Arabia signed SOFAs in 1953. The largest increase in the post-Cold War era was in 1996, when 16 countries signed SOFAs as NATO expanded eastward and candidate countries participated in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland formally joined NATO two years later.

Why did SOFAs increase so dramatically after the Cold War? First, the end of the Cold War caused some Asian countries to fear China's potential threat if the United States retreated from the region and created a power vacuum. Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, and the Philippines signed SOFAs with the United States after the Cold War. The most interesting case is that of the Philippines, which withdrew its offer to allow U.S. forces in 1991. However, China's aggressive behavior over the disputed Spratly Islands, a resource-rich area several countries have claimed, made the Philippines regret their decision about U.S. withdrawal.[44] The Filipino nationalism that drove out American forces could not

[44] Diane K. Mauzy and Brian Job, "Limited Re-engagement after Years of Benign Neglect," *Asia Survey* XLVII, no. 4 (July/August 2007), 627.

ignore the international environment. In 1998, the Philippines and the United States signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), a miniature version of a SOFA, regarding treatment of U.S. armed forces visiting the Philippines. Consequently, occasional U.S. forces visits made the Philippines feel more secure. While U.S. alliance partners sought U.S. presence, the China factor also created a rationale for the United States to remain engaged in the region.

In Europe, former Soviet republics, continuing to fear Russia, wanted to move closer to European NATO members and the United States for some guarantee against potential risks. They have shown interest in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Status of Forces Agreement and in expanding U.S. bases. The United States saw NATO's expansion as an opportunity to upset the power balance even more favorably to itself and the European allies.

The number of countries signing SOFAs with the United States has increased, indicating that the form of U.S. global predominance has changed since the Cold War ended. The overall U.S. overseas troop level has declined, but the number of countries hosting U.S. forces has increased. This continues to give the United States the most access to different parts of the world and allows it to achieve primacy in terms of global military presence.

In addition to SOFAs, the United States has a command structure that helps maintain its global military presence. The next section looks at such command structure, which virtually spans the entire globe.

5.6. U.S. Regional Commands

The military's primary mission is to defend its homeland, but U.S. military responsibilities are not limited to U.S. territory. Of course, they are not responsible for

solving every military conflict in the world, but their global command structure comes close to encompassing the globe. No other country has such an extensive command structure. Moreover, the commander-in-chiefs, or "CinCs," of those regional commands are powerful figures in regional diplomacy.[45]

Regional commands have merged over time, and some are newly created, but as of January 2010, there are six: the Northern Command, the Pacific Command, the European Command, the Southern Command, the Central Command, and the African Command. The Pacific Command is the oldest, and the African Command is the most recent. Along with these regional unified combatant commands are four functional commands dealing with specific military functional aspects: the Joint Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, the Strategic Command, and the Transportation Command. Although they are important, I focus on regional commands as they pertain to the geographical areas that the United States covers worldwide. For each command structure, I examine a brief history, areas of responsibility, and some characteristics.

5.6.1. The U.S. Pacific Command

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), established January 1, 1947, is the oldest unified command. Currently, "it encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole."[46] It covers the largest area of all of the regional

---

[45] See Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 61-120.

[46] United States Pacific Command, "USPACOM Fact Sheet," n.d., http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/uspacom/printfacts.shtml (accessed July 22, 2009).

combatant commands.

Its area of responsibility (AOR) includes 36 countries: China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.[47]

Obviously, the AOR of USPACOM is quite diverse. It covers more than half the world's population speaking three thousand languages. Some major military powers and major economies are within this AOR, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia, important American allies; North Korea, an unfriendly nation; China, a potential rival and the world's most populous country; Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation; and India, the largest democracy.[48]

Because it covers such a vast area, approximately one-fifth of the overall U.S. military serve in the area, including not only those stationed in particular countries, but also those on vessels (or "afloat"). As such, the Navy and the Marines account for the largest percentage of the military presence in USPACOM.[49]

A basic assumptions held by USPACOM regarding its presence in the region is that it will retain "at least the current level of force presence and posture."[50] This

---

[47] United States Pacific Command, "Strategy: Partnership Readiness Presence," April, 2009, http://www.pacom.mil/web/pacom_resources/pdf/pacom%20strategy%2002APR09.pdf (accessed July 22, 2009).

[48] United States Pacific Command, "USPACOM Fact Sheet."

[49] Ibid.

[50] United States Pacific Command, "Strategy: Partnership Readiness Presence," 6

suggests that it does not intend to leave the region any time soon, and considers maintaining such force presence and posture to be essential for creating stability. Also, to achieve its strategic objectives (e.g., protecting the homeland through maintaining a strong military capabilities and strengthening security arrangements with allies and partners, among others), USPACOM values "[b]i-lateral and multilateral alliance agreements, including mutual defense treaties governing access to and interoperability with AOR nations."[51] Alliance agreements that allow U.S. access are crucial for achieving U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

5.6.2. The United States Africa Command

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the newest of regional commands. President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the creation of AFRICOM in February 2007, and it was formally established in October 2007. The U.S. European Command, which previously shared some responsibilities for Africa with other regional commands, managed AFRICOM's activities in its first year.[52] On October 1, 2008, AFRICOM became independent, using existing facilities in Germany's Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart. AFRICOM is now searching for candidate locations in Africa to set up headquarters.[53]

AFRICOM's area of responsibility includes all countries in the African

---

[51] Ibid., 9.

[52] United States Africa Command, "About AFRICOM," n.d. http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp (accessed August 7, 2009).

[53] United States Africa Command, "Questions and Answers About AFRICOM," n.d., http://www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp (accessed August 7, 2009).

continent except Egypt: Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Republic of the Cape Verdi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Liberia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Angola, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Malawi, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.

After the Cold War ended, the Department of Defense (DoD) discussed the need for a separate command focused on Africa. The United States valued Africa's peace and stability but had never assigned a single regional command to take sole responsibility there. In fact, America maintained its relations with African countries through "three different U.S. military headquarters."[54] With the creation of AFRICOM, the DoD can now devise a more comprehensive strategy and focus its resources on a single headquarters site. As for African countries, AFRICOM acts as an "integrated DoD coordination point that helps achieve security and related needs."[55]

U.S. reasons for setting up a command in Africa have been debated. One reason may be that China has increased its activities there. Some argue that China's growing demand for energy drives such activism. The United States, too, is interested in oil produced in Africa, which increases the need to become involved in the region. Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, stated in

[54] United States Africa Command, "About AFRICOM."

[55] Ibid.

a February 2007 briefing, "This is not about a scramble for the continent."[56] However, it is estimated that by the next decade, "the continent will account for 20 to 25 percent of U.S. energy imports."[57]

Deterring terrorist activities is perhaps the most important reason behind the move. As the posture statement indicates, the strategic objective is to "[d]efeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its associated networks."[58] Whatever the specific reason, with a formalized new command focusing on Africa, the United States intends to strengthen its presence by expanding its military coverage even farther.

5.6.3. The United States Central Command

Established January 1, 1983, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTROM) covers the areas between the European Command and the Pacific Command, including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[59] Geographically speaking, Egypt may be within the AOR of the Africa Command, but because of Egypt's relationship with other countries in CENTCOM's AOR, Egypt is included here.

---

[56] Stephanie Hanson, "The Pentagon's New Africa Command," May 3, 2007, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13255 (accessed May 7, 2007).

[57] Jackie Northam, "Pentagon Creates Military Command for Africa," NPR, February 7, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7234997 (accessed May 5, 2009).

[58] United States Africa Command, *2009 Posture Statement: Partnership, Security, Stability*, 2009, http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement.pdf (accessed August 7, 2009), 11

[59] United States Central Command, "AOR Countries," n.d., http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/aor/ (accessed January17, 2010).

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in Iran in 1980 called for further U.S. interest in the region. In March 1980, President Jimmy Carter created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in response to these crises, and Ronald Reagan transformed RDJTF into the more permanent USCENTCOM in 1983.

USCENTCOM's importance has risen since the Cold War ended. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, U.S. and coalition forces launched Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991. It began with an overwhelming air interdiction campaign, setting the stage for a ground assault and culminating when the forces liberated Kuwait on February 27—just one hundred hours after the ground campaign began. The United States responded so quickly because USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief General H. Norman Schwarzkopf shifted the focus of USCENTCOM's primary planning event, the Internal Look exercise, from a potential Soviet invasion of Iran to a new regional threat—Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In fact, the command exercise was strikingly similar to the actual movement of Iraqi forces that led to the invasion of Kuwait.[60]

Since the end of Gulf War of 1991, a series of terrorist attacks have affected USCENTCOM's activities. USCENTCOM commenced Operation Desert Focus to relocate Saudi Arabia American installations to safer locations within the country after 19 Americans were killed in the bombing of Khobar Towers where U.S. military personnel were housed in 1996. Terrorists also killed 12 Americans in attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and 17 Americans in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. Moreover, in response to 9/11, USCENTCOM launched

[60] United States Central Command, "USCENTCOM History," n.d., http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-history/ (accessed January 17, 2010).

Operation Enduring Freedom to drive the Taliban government out of Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom to invade Iraq. USCENTCOM continues operations in these two countries.[61]

Regarding U.S. access to Afghanistan, Central Asian countries falling within USCENTCOM's AOR play a pivotal role. Northern Distribution Network supply lines have been established to transport supplies to support U.S., NATO, and Afghan security operations.[62] Some Central Asian countries and the United States encountered thorny negotiations about access agreements. Uzbekistan, which allowed the United States to use an airport shortly after 9/11, asked them to leave in July 2005.[63] In February 2009, Kyrgyzstan announced that it would close its base to the United States after Russia promised $2 billion in aid and credit. However, in renewed negotiations, the United States agreed to pay $180 million, extending their use of the airport.[64]

5.6.4. The United States European Command

The U.S. European Command was established on August 1, 1952. During the Cold War, it was the leading command to deal with the Soviet threat. Today, EUCOM's area of responsibility includes Europe, Russia, Iceland, Greenland, and

---

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Robin Wright and Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. Evicted From Air Base In Uzbekistan," *Washington Post*, July 30, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072902038.html (accessed July 10, 2009).

[64] Philip P. Pan, "Kyrgyzstan Threatens To Close U.S. Base," *Washington Post*, February 4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/03/AR2009020303459.html (accessed November 29, 2012).

Israel. The headquarters are located in Stuttgart, Germany.[65]

As World War II ended, rapid demobilization accompanied by the end of the occupation of Germany in 1949 raised questions regarding the commitment to the defense of Western Europe. The North Korean attack of South Korea in June 1950 shocked the United States and its allies. Fearing that the Soviet Union might engage in a similar attack, U.S. military personnel in Europe grew between 1950 and 1953, from 120,000 to more than 400,000. In the 1970s, concern grew again in Europe as the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, the United States did not increase its troop levels because it was tied down in the Vietnam War and had balance of payment problems. Consequently, troop levels decreased to 265,000 by 1970.[66]

With the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet threat, troop levels in the region fell dramatically. However, the United States maintained a stable presence with 100,000 troops, or roughly the same number as in Asia. Although the relative importance of bases located in Europe has declined, bases located in countries such as Germany continue to be valued. Established democracies, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, do not require exorbitant rent.[67]

5.6.5. The United States Southern Command

The AOF of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) includes 31 countries and 10 territories, representing "about one-sixth of the landmass of the

---

[65] United States European Command. "A Brief History," n.d., http://www.eucom.mil/english/history.asp (Accessed November 4, 2009).

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

world assigned to regional unified commands."[68] More specifically, countries and territories in this area include Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, the Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

USSOUTHCOM originated in the early 20th century, when the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration established the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command to defend the Panama Canal and the surrounding area. Located in Panama, SOUTHCOM was engaged in regional defense, including antisubmarine warfare and counter-espionage activities. Military training was another primary activity. These wartime headquarters were then transformed into the U.S. Caribbean Command, with expanded responsibilities including security cooperation in Central and South America.

However, during the 1950s, the Caribbean Basin was removed from the AOF. The Caribbean Basin would have been essential to hemispheric antisubmarine operations in case of war with the Soviet Union, but the U.S. Atlantic Command, based in Norfolk, Virginia, were to conduct the operations. On June 6, 1963, during the Kennedy Administration, the name was changed to the U.S. Southern Command to reflect the AOF. In the 1960s, the U.S. Southern Command was in charge of a military assistance program for Central and South America. After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Southern Command's roles were significantly reduced. However, in the 1980s, as internal conflicts intensified in countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador, the

[68] This section relies on United States Southern Command, "Area of Focus," January 6, 2009, http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/aoi.php (Accessed November 4, 2009).

Reagan administration renewed U.S. interest in the region and revitalized the Southern Command.

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Southern Command's objective focused on counter-narcotics operations and again included the Caribbean within its AOF. In 1997, the command was moved to Miami, Florida from Panama, two years before the return of the Panama Canal in 1999.[69] No countries covered in this command structure seriously threaten America's national security today. Alternatively, one could argue that because of sheer U.S. power and presence, no countries in the region contemplated threatening the United States.

5.6.6. The United States Northern Command

In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, USNORTHCOM was created on October 1, 2002, to protect the U.S. homeland and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. Such activities include domestic relief operations for hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes. USNORTHCOM's AOR includes

> air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, portions of the Caribbean region to include The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas.[70]

The Northern Command was one of the last regional commands to be created.

---

[69] Bradley Coleman, "Command History Overview, United States Southern Command," August 19, 2009, http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=76 (Accessed November 4, 2009).

[70] United States Northern Command, "About USNORTHCOM," n.d., http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (Accessed November 4, 2009).

This does not mean that homeland defense was ignored in the past, but it perhaps shows that the United States was relatively more concerned about what was happening beyond its borders. The very existence of the global command structure attests to such thinking. In addition, the fact that the United States continues to maintain its global command structure or create new commands partially illustrates America's willingness to sustain its primacy in the world.

5.7. Joint Military Exercises

The United States engages in numerous joint military exercises with its allies and friends (see table 5.4.). Many exercises occur at overseas bases and demonstrate that America maintains close ties and interoperability with the militaries of other countries. The exercises have the effects of deterring potential enemies, who sometimes join as observers.[71]

Well-known joint military exercises include Rimpac[72] (since 1971: U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea Russia New Zealand, Chile, Mexico, Singapore, France, etc.); Cobra Gold[73] (since 1980: U.S., Thailand, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea); Commando Sling (since 1990: Singapore, U.S.); Cope Tiger (since 1998: Thailand, U.S., Singapore), Tandem Thrust[74] (since 1997: Australia, U.S.),

[71] Audrey McAvoy, "China to get 2014 RIMPAC invite," *Navy Times*, September 19, 2012, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/09/ap-china-to-get-rimpac-2014-invite-091912/ (accessed February 21, 2013).

[72] Rimpac 2012, Participating Forces, July 9, 2012, http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2012/forces/ (accessed February 21, 2013).

[73] Donna Miles, "Cobra Gold 2012 to Promote Partnership, Interoperability," American Forces Press Service, U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=66803 (accessed February 21, 2013). Some countries such as Indonesia have just joined recently.

[74] Memorandum for Correspondents, Memorandum, No. 015M, Defense Link, U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/feb1997/m021197_m015-97.html

Talisman Saber[75] (since 2005: Australia, U.S.); and Cope North[76] (since 1978: Japan, U.S., Australia).

Table 5.4. Major joint military exercises

Exercise	Type	Year-	Place	Main participants
Rimpac	N	1971	Hawaii	U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea
Cobra Gold	N, AF, A M	1980	Thailand	U.S., Thailand, Japan Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea
Commando Sling	AF	1990	Singapore	U.S., Singapore
Balikatan	N, AF, A M	1991	Philippines	U.S., Philippines
Cope Tiger	AF	1998	Thailand	U.S., Thailand, Singapore
Tandem Thrust	N, AF, A	1997	Australia	U.S., Australia
Talisman Saber*	N, AF	2005	Australia	U.S., Australia
Cope North	AF, N	1978	Guam	U.S., Japan, Australia
Keen Sword/ Keen Edge	AF, N, A M	1986	Japan	U.S., Japan
Team Spirit	N, AF, A M	1976-1993	Korea	U.S., Korea
Invincible Spirit	AF	2010	Korea	U.S., Korea

Note: N=Navy, AF=Air Force, A=Army, M=Marines
*combining Tandem Thrust, Kingfisher, and Crocodile.

Some joint exercises have a long history; as the strategic environment changed, new participants joined. The United States has built closer and deeper ties with its allies through these exercises, many made possible by using American bases

(accessed February 21, 2013).

[75] Rick Chernitzer, "Talisman Saber Exercises 'Framework for Action' Concepts," American Forces Press Services, U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=16450 (accessed February 21, 2013).

[76] Cope North, Anderson Air Force Base, U.S. Air Force, http://www.andersen.af.mil/library/events/copenorth/index.asp (accessed February 21, 2013).

overseas.

5.8. Summary

My analysis here shows the dominance of U.S. military presence abroad. Although overall numbers have declined since the end of the Cold War, the United States remains the largest sender of troops abroad. The number of SOFAs also shows that America expanded its access even after the Cold War ended. Moreover, no other country has a command structure that goes beyond its own borders and one that encircles almost the entire globe. The predominance of U.S. power is reflected in the existence of such a command structure, and the newly created commands further attest that the United States is not willing to retreat from various regions of the world any time soon. Moreover, by using its overseas bases, the United States conducts joint military exercises to enhance interoperability with allies and friends and to increase deterrence against potential threats.

Taken together, the United States continues to sustain its predominant military presence around the globe. But what international and domestic factors affect future prospects for successful U.S. overseas military presence? This is the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

UNDERSTANDING U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE: HOW IT BEGINS, ENDS, AND ENDURES

In this chapter, I explain conditions that cause bases to be established or closed.[1] I also explore why bases endure despite changes in the international security environment. I identify favorable and negative conditions that might affect U.S. military presence. In general, although it is difficult to establish and maintain bases, successful factors rather than negative factors are more likely to influence their presence. Moreover, the negative factors, however real, seem relatively less prevalent today. These factors contribute to continued U.S. presence and help sustain U.S. primacy.

In this chapter, first I briefly touch on the peculiar nature of overseas military presence, and explain why certain puzzles and questions emerge. Second, I examine the usefulness of balance of power theory in explaining where bases are likely to be located. Third, I discuss why overseas military presence begins and consider some important processes of base establishment. Fourth, I suggest factors that lead to the closing of bases. Fifth, I discuss some reasons that bases endure despite changes in the international security environment. Finally, I discuss theoretical and policy implications.

6.1. Usual or Unusual? The Nature of Overseas Military Presence

Foreign forces stationed on the territories of other countries are found

[1] This chapter is based on Takafumi Ohtomo, "Understanding U.S. Overseas Military Presence after World War II," *Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies*, no. 4 (March 2012): 17-29.

commonly throughout the world. The United States has used Cuba's Guantanamo Bay since 1898, except for a lag of several years. Even advanced industrialized countries such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Italy have hosted U.S. forces for decades. For many people living in the host countries, the presence of U.S. military base is a part of their lives. But is this usual?

Such a situation seems particularly peculiar by visualizing America as a host to Russian bases, or imagining Japanese bases in Chinese cities, where Japanese soldiers are not subject to Chinese domestic laws. Even if we imagine friendly British rather than Russians based in the United States, or North Koreans rather than Japanese based in China, such hypothetical situations still seem odd.[2]

An unusual situation of U.S. military presence overseas prompts three questions. First, despite the peculiarity of allowing foreign bases on their territory, why do so many countries agree to host U.S. bases? Second, considering that countries sometimes reap exorbitant financial and military benefits by allowing U.S. bases in their country, why do some close them? Third, if bases were originally created to deter particular threats or fight wars, why do they persist even after they have accomplished their main objectives?

In spite of the subject's political and military importance, international relations scholars have rarely considered U.S. military bases worldwide. Much available research is informative but largely descriptive.[3] In that sense, Calder's *Embattled Garrisons* and Cooley's *Base Politics* are long-awaited additions by

[2] David Vine makes a similar point. See his *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 17.

[3] For example, see Robert Harkavy, B*ases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

providing more conceptual frameworks for understanding overseas military presence.[4] Those works touch on how bases begin, end, or endure, but they are not necessarily comprehensive. Cooley looks mainly at how domestic politics affect base closures. Calder briefly discusses the life cycle of bases (preparation, establishment, expansion, decline, and closure).[5] Harkavy explains how bases have been acquired and retained.[6]

For systematically analyzing reasons for starting, maintaining, or dismissing bases, I first turn to balance of power theory for understanding overseas military presence.

6.2. Balance of Power and Overseas Military Presence: A First Cut

Are state alignments and base locations related? Balance of power theory argues that when one state becomes too powerful, others will try to counter that threat.[7] This theory basically explains how states choose friends in the international political arena, but not the details of overseas military presence. However, the theory may still be useful in suggesting where bases may be located.[8]

Although allies[9] cannot always keep security commitments, formal ties often

---

[4] Kent Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

[5] Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 68-69.

[6] Robert Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000* (London: Routledge, 2007).

[7] Another balancing method is for the country to build its own capabilities. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979), 168.

[8] For a work that tries to use Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory to explain U.S. expansion, see Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[9] Alliance is defined as "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation

indicate a willingness to uphold agreements. Therefore, we can fairly assume that U.S. bases are more likely to be located where they have formal alliance ties, a relationship I call the *ally-base nexus,* a pattern that surfaces when states share similar strategic interest and agree to allow bases. For example, Japan and the United States have a security agreement that signifies their mutual strategic interests and opens Japan to U.S. bases.[10] We also find major U.S. bases in Germany and South Korea—both close U.S. allies.

Although balance of power theory explains generally where bases might be located, some cases fail to neatly fit the ally-base nexus (Type I) category (table 6.1). In some instances, U.S. bases are located in non-ally countries (Type 2), where bases are established coercively, often in the sphere of influence. In other cases, allied countries, such as France, allow U.S. troops to be stationed on their territory, but later ask them to leave (Type 3). To understand those variations, we must consider international and domestic factors explaining how bases begin, end, and endure (see table 6.2). First, consider international factors that affect how bases begin.

---

between two or more sovereign states." See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 1.

[10] Article II of the 1951 Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, signed September 8, reads, "Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third Power." Moreover, Article VI of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, signed January 19, reads, "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use of its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."

Table 6.1. The relationship between base/presence and ally

		Ally	
		Yes	No
Base/Presence	Yes	TYPE 1 (*Ally-Base Nexus*) Agreed Firm Presence -Formal Ally Presence -Informal Ally Presence (Balance of power concerns)	TYPE 2 Sphere of Influence Presence (Power relations)
	No	TYPE 3 Allied But No Presence	TYPE 4 NA

Note: Table created by the author.

6.3. How Bases Begin

6.3.1. International Factors

6.3.1.1. Strategic Interest

Grasping U.S. strategic interest is essential in understanding why bases are established. In general, responding to a particular threat and seeing a need for locating a base near the enemy, the United States or other great powers will have incentives to establish bases.

As discussed, bases could be located in friendly or even in hostile states (e.g., Cuba, Afghanistan, and Iraq), but why would having a base contribute to U.S. interests? This evokes the question of the roles bases play discussed in Chapter 5. Among many, the roles include deterring threats, fighting wars, collecting intelligence, staging exercises, and providing transit.[11]

[11] Takafumi Ohtomo, "Reisengo no doumei to beigun kaigai kichi tenkai [Alliances after the Cold War and U.S. overseas military presence]," *International Political Economy* (University of Tsukuba), no. 10（October 2002）, 63-71.

Table 6.2. International and domestic factors explaining how bases begin, end, or endure

How Bases Begin	End	Endure
International Factors		
(US)	(US)	(US)
Strategic interest	Changes in strategic interest	Hedge against future uncertainties and potential threats
	Declining power of the sending nations	Sphere of influence/backyard
(US & Host)	(US & Host)	
Common strategic interest**a	Disappearance of common strategic interest*a	
[*Processes of base establishment*]		
Outright conquest		
Defeat and occupy		
Hand down		
Remove original inhabitants		
Payment		
Domestic Factors		
(US)	(US)	
Expansionist policy*b	Isolationist policy**b	
(Host)	(Host)	(Host)
Pro-U.S. (or sending nation) regime shift	Anti-U.S. (or sending nation) regime shift/revolution	Host Nations Support
	Nationalism	Economic gains
Other Factors		
(US)	(US)	
Technological advancement	Further technological advancement	

Notes: * Factors *a (disappearance of common strategic interest) and *b (expansionist policy) are not treated independently in this chapter.
** Where factors ** a (common strategic interest) and **b (isolationist policy) are discussed, factors *a and *b will be briefly mentioned.

When the United States alone is interested in establishing bases, forcible means tend to be applied to secure a base. This was often the case in the early years of base establishment. I return to this point later in this section. Less forcible means are also applied, as I discuss next.

6.3.1.2. Common Strategic Interest

In some cases both the United States and the host countries share a common strategic interest in establishing bases to counter a common threat. The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is a good example. U.S. bases in the United Kingdom began during World War II, and U.S. soldiers have been stationed there since.[12] Having fought with the United States in the Korean War (1950-1953), South Korea and the United States continue to see similar threats. Occasionally, Korean citizens protest, and some have called for U.S. forces to withdraw. However, veterans have basically agreed to maintain U.S. presence in South Korea.[13] The North Korean threat still binds the two countries, and thus common interest keeps U.S. bases in South Korea.

Moreover, although Germany and Japan were enemies during World War II, they shared common strategic interests with the United States during the Cold War.[14] Today, the United States continues to station its forces in Japan, as both agree that China and North Korean are a common security concern.

6.3.2. Processes of Base Establishment

Agreement among concerned states is not the only way a presence begins. In addition to exploring the reasons bases are established, it is essential to explore the

---

[12] Simon Duke, *U.S. Defence Bases in the United Kingdom* (London: Macmillan, 1987).

[13] Franklin Fisher, "Thousands rally for, against U.S. Presence in South Korea," *Stars and Stripes*, December 13, 2005, http://www.stripes.com/news/thousands-rally-for-against-u-s-presence-in-south-korea-1.42332 (accessed December 10, 2011).

[14] Certainly it is rare for countries to have harmonious strategic interests. Rather they share interests strong enough to bring them together. Also interests tend to be different at state and citizens' levels. The Japanese government prefers to have U.S. forces in Japan, but citizens living near U.S. bases may not.

processes of base establishment. Bases may be established in response to situations of (1) outright conquest, (2) defeat and occupy, (3) hand down, (4) forceful removal of original inhabitants, and (5) payment. These classifications are not mutually exclusive.

6.3.2.1. Outright Conquest[15]

In the case of outright conquest, a powerful country forcefully occupies a weaker country. For great powers, outright conquest is perhaps the most direct way to acquire overseas bases, although the purpose of conquest is often beyond the establishment of bases. Great powers target the "receiving" countries – the host countries – because of their strategic value, their weakness, or both.

An important point is that the conquered countries did not necessarily declare war on the United States nor did they pose serious security threats. Instead, the U.S. military presence was a result of U.S. imperialistic expansions.[16] Hence, how this presence started has relatively less to do with the balance of power logic.[17] This clearly reflects simple power relations between the United States and the conquered.

Cuba, located south of the United States, is a good example.[18] In 1898, the

---

[15] The term "outright conquest" is used in Robert Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000* (London: Routledge, 2007), 17.

[16] Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power,* argues that the United States expanded at the turn of the twentieth century, not because it faced external threat. He challenges Walt's balance of threat theory, but Sean M. Lynn-Jones criticizes Zakaria for deducing a wrong hypothesis from the theory and applying it to the discussion of U.S. expansion. See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 157-182.

[17] Of course, attempts to occupy foreign lands may have been caused by the fear of other rival countries trying to occupy the same land; hence, the balance of power logic may be in effect. However, here I am interested in whether the conquered (targeted) state itself is a direct security threat to the United States.

[18] However, Cuba was considered a threat during the Cold War, although that was not initially the case.

United States attacked this Spanish-controlled island, claiming that Spain had sunk a U.S. ship. Whether Spain actually did so is unclear. It is more likely that the United States falsely accused Spain to justify attacking Cuba. In the resulting Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States also attacked and set up bases in other Spanish colonies, including the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico.

6.3.2.2. Defeat and Occupy

This usually occurs when a war is fought between a great power and its enemy. After the enemy is defeated, the victor – the great power – occupies the land and sets up bases. This seems similar to outright conquest, as both involve fighting. The difference, however, is that the relationship between the sending country and the host country is initially characterized as one of enmity.

Japan and Germany after World War II are good examples. After some years of occupation, U.S. forces remained in these countries to deter a possible Soviet attack. U.S. presence also showed America's willingness to defend them through conventional and nuclear weapons. Germany, Japan, and Italy, once targets of destruction, became U.S. allies. They provided U.S. forces with useful bases needed to counter a new threat—the Soviet Union. Japan and Germany saw U.S. forces as necessary for maintaining their security.

6.3.2.3. Hand Down

When sending nations can no longer afford to maintain their current overseas base systems, they either simply leave or hand down their bases to another country. The new sending nation avoids the costs of starting a presence, because the former

occupant paid the initial start-up costs.[19]

Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and British Guiana provide good examples. These were originally British territories, but the United Kingdom, facing financial and security problems during World War II, asked the United States to provide 50 old destroyers "in exchange for the use of naval and air bases in eight British possessions on the Avalon Peninsula, the coast of Newfoundland and on the Great Bay of Bermuda."[20] The Destroyers-for-bases Agreement, signed between the United States and the United Kingdom in 1940, further extended U.S. access to bases in other locations including the Bahamas, Jamaica, St Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and British Guiana. The lease was guaranteed free for 99 years.

*6.3.2.4. Remove Original Inhabitant*s

Bases may also be secured without direct military force but rather through coercive measures against local citizens of weak countries or groups, particularly on small islands inhabited by very few who could be moved to readily available land.[21]

After 9/11, Diego Garcia, an island located 1,000 miles south of India, attracted global attention for being the site of operations to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan. During the Cold War, the original inhabitants were forced to move to the

[19] America's global base structure was created in a matter of years, while the United Kingdom's took much longer. As a latecomer, the United States had an advantage. For the original argument explaining how the latecomers have the advantage in case of development, see Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).

[20] BBC, "WW2 People's War," http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1138420.shtml (accessed January 15, 2010).

[21] This of course does not mean that the original inhabitants relocate without cost.

western Indian Ocean islands of Mauritius and the Seychelles and had not been allowed to return to their homes since then.[22]

Similarly, some Okinawans were also removed from their homes to make room for U.S. bases. Although the Japanese government compensated for the losses, the Okinawan case is similar to Diego Garcia in the loss of land and homes. In 2006, South Koreans were also forcefully removed to allow the U.S. base in Pyongtaek to be expanded.[23]

6.3.2.5. Payment (Economic and Military)

When the sending nation and the host nation agree on compensation the sending nation will pay the host, the presence is permitted.[24] The host country may not necessarily share the same level of strategic interest as the sending nation, but it may nonetheless agree to offer base sites because of the benefits gained in economic and military assistance.[25] The Philippines, Turkey, and Spain have been the main

---

[22] For an excellent study, see Vine, *Island of Shame*.

[23] Associated Press, "U.S. Move Is Spurring Evictions in S. Korea," *Washington Post*, March 19, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/18/AR2006031801132.html (accessed December 10, 2011).

[24] See Duncan Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, *Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 149-168.

[25] Financial and other incentives contribute to receiving countries' willingness to host the United States. Bargaining involving payment sometimes fails, more so especially after the Cold War. Potential host nations seem to be bargaining *too* hard, hoping to get the most possible, but they fail to adequately grasp that the United States is no longer operating under the Cold War zero-sum environment and is not under enough pressure to accept extravagant demands. It has relatively wider choices for potential host nations, including former Soviet countries. In other words, America can choose from other nearby candidates if the current negotiation fails. Negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and Kirgizstan are instructive. See Alexander Cooley, "The Price of Access: How the U.S. Lost its Kirgizstan Air Base," *New York Times*, February 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/opinion/10iht-edcooley.1.20075778.html (accessed March 10, 2009).

recipients of U.S. aid. (Often such payments went to dictators.) Moreover, Russia has naval bases in Ukraine, and the two countries agreed to extend the lease for additional 25 years on April 21, 2010. In return, Russia agreed to cut the price of natural gas by about 30 percent.[26]

6.3.3. Domestic Factors

6.3.3.1. Pro-U.S. (or sending nation) Regime Shift

Sending nations can find newly opened possibilities for previously unavailable bases when a pro-sending government defeats the previous government that opposed the foreign base. For example, President Viktor A. Yushchenko initially decided not to release Ukraine's bases to Russia after 2017 when the term was scheduled to expire. However, after the new president Viktor F. Yanukovich came into power, the new government extended the lease beyond 2017.[27]

6.3.4. Other Factors

6.3.4.1. Technological Advancement

Technological advancement can be another reason for establishing bases. One of the first rationales for establishing bases overseas was the need for coal stations for naval ships. Moreover, the advancement of aerocraft technology required airfields throughout the world. The U.S. post-World War II plan is a good example:

---

[26] "Ukraine President Extends Lease on Russian Naval Base," *International Herald Tribune*, April 23, 2010, 4.

[27] Clifford J. Levy, "Ukraine Woos Russia with Lease Deal," *New York Times*, April 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/world/europe/22ukraine.html (accessed September 15, 2011); Luke Harding, "Ukraine Extends Lease for Russian's Black Sea Fleet," *Guardian*, April 21, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia (accessed September 15, 2011).

U.S. military leaders needed overseas air bases to project long-distance force. In addition to military uses, commercial purposes were essential for developing airfields overseas in the post-war era.[28]

Advancement in intelligence technologies also called for worldwide bases. Intelligence facilities were built in English-speaking countries to track communications.[29] Some bases were established to detect nuclear testing.

6.4. How Bases End

I now turn to factors that contribute to the closure of U.S. bases overseas: (1) changing strategic interests, (2) declining power, (3) disappearing common strategic interests, (4) isolationist policy, (5) anti-U.S. regime shift/revolution, (6) nationalism, and (7) further technological advancement.

6.4.1. International Factors

6.4.1.1. Changes in the strategic interest

Once the strategic significance of a base disappears, the basing nation may withdraw. Shifts in international structure, such as at end of the Cold War, are most likely to cause declining strategic significance. Iceland is an example of that change.

Initially, the Nazis occupied Iceland during World War II, but the British pushed them out. U.S. forces later occupied Iceland until 2006. During the Cold War, Iceland was an important naval base for carrying out submarine warfare against the

---

[28] Elliot Converse, III, "United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Bases System, 1942-48," (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1984).

[29] Jeffery Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community*, 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007).

Soviet Union. The Iceland bases have become less relevant in the present security environment, however. Rear Admiral Noel Preston, a European regional commander of the Navy, said "Now the world has changed, and we are facing a war on terrorism. We are changing how we plan and prepare for this war."[30] Also according to Stratfor, an American global intelligence company, "[i]n terms of sheer volume, the threat has almost completely evaporated."[31] In March 2006, the United States announced its decision to close Iceland bases, and U.S. service members left on September 30, 2006.

6.4.1.2. Declining power of the sending nations

Sending nations might have been quite powerful and wealthy when they first established bases around the globe. However, once their national power declines so extensively that maintaining overseas bases becomes impossible, they let them go. The British Empire is a case in point. As discussed previously, when the United Kingdom could no longer able maintain its bases around the world, it shifted base management to the United States. That marked the beginning of the U.S. control of worldwide overseas bases and the ending of the British base system. The term "imperial overstretch," coined by Paul Kennedy, provides a useful concept in understanding the decline of the United Kingdom.[32]

---

[30] "US military Set to Quit Iceland," BBC News, September 27, 2006, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe (accessed April 27, 2007).

[31] Strategic Forecasting, "The End of an Era: New Technologies and the Withdrawal of Orions from the North Atlantic," Premium, September 29, 2006, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=276658 (accessed April 27, 2007).

[32] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).

6.4.2. Domestic Factors

6.4.2.1. Isolationist Policy of the United States

Domestic politics of host nations have often been studied,[33] but domestic U.S. politics are also important in understanding overseas military presence.

First, different U.S. strategic philosophies affect U.S. global military presence. Expansionists/maximalists advocate more presence abroad. Isolationists/minimalists call for minimal engagement. Liberals who want to spread democracy and the rules of law are more willing to engage in foreign missions than are minimalists, while realists call for engagement rather than total withdrawal when a regional hegemon seems to be rising.[34] Power balances among key policymakers influence whether an expansionist or an isolationist policy is adopted. If the power balance tips toward those who prefer an isolationist/minimalist policy, U.S. troops are more likely to withdraw. America's financial problems could strengthen isolationist views, as overseas military activities are costly.

Moreover, the sense of uneven burden sharing in security affairs affects U.S. overseas military presence. For example, some argue that U.S. soldiers should not be asked to defend Japan while it simply free-rides on U.S. protection. These opinions are expressed occasionally as a rationale for withdrawing U.S. troops from Japan, or to pressure Japan to contribute more militarily and financially.

6.4.2.2. Anti-U.S. regime shift/revolution

When a previous U.S.-backed government is replaced by a new government

---

[33] See Cooley, *Base Politics*; Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*.

[34] Robert Art, *Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

that tries to distance itself from U.S. influence, American military presence will be negatively affected. Regime shifts in host nations often terminate U.S. military presence.

Revolution can also change the strategic environment dramatically as occurred in the Iranian Revolution[35] when a strong anti-American government replaced a pro-American regime. Friendly relations suddenly ended, along with the prospects for continued U.S. presence.

6.4.2.3. Nationalism

Nationalism also works against continued U.S. presence. When citizens resent having their sovereign nation host outside military bases, nationalism can be ignited. In 2002, massive demonstrations in Korea called for U.S. forces to withdraw after an accident killed Korean schoolgirls. In 1996, massive demonstrations after an Okinawan schoolgirl was raped provoked an agreement to close Futenma air base, although that has not yet happened.

6.4.3. Other Factors

6.4.3.1. Further technological advancement

Technology is reducing the need for overseas bases. As discussed previously, the advancement of the aerospace technology required the availability of many airfields, but further technological improvements enabled planes to travel longer distances. For instance in 1991, "the U.S. B-52 bombers, with the aide of tankers,

[35] For the argument that revolution quickly changes the security environment, as well as the relationship between revolution and the likelihood of war, see Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

conducted bombing raids over Iraq all the way from a base in Louisiana."[36] Similarly, nuclear-powered submarines can spend more time under the sea than conventional submarines can, thereby reducing the need for bases.

In sum, those factors do not always abruptly end military presence, but they surely contribute to the decision to withdraw U.S. troops.

6.5. Why Some Overseas Presence Continues

When the factors that created the bases disappear, some lose their *raison d'être* and disappear, but not in all cases. Despite shifts in international structure, some continue because they (1) provide hedges against uncertainties and potential threats, (2) are located in the sphere of influence/backyard, (3) and offer lower costs of presence. The underlying assumption of these arguments is that bases could have different purposes over time, and that the United States would use them to advance power/influence even under no immediate threat.[37]

6.5.1. International Factors

6.5.1.1. Hedge against future uncertainties and potential threats

Although strategic environment changes make some bases seem obsolete, that does not necessarily lead to their immediate and complete withdrawal, particularly when changes in the international structure are expected to create uncertainties.

Russia's resurgence was an initial concern for the post-Cold War United

---

[36] Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000*, 26.

[37] Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their Security Aims," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 1-49.

States and its allies; thus a hedge was essential. While the overall number of U.S. forces stationed overseas indeed dropped notably, Europe and Asia each maintained about 10,000 U.S. troops for some time to deal with future uncertainties.[38]

NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance are still considered useful[39] for dealing with the post-Cold-War strategic environment, and thus they remain. To be sure, alliances and bases are closely linked. Many alliance agreements allow U.S. forces to use the bases located in the allies' territories. As alliances continue, U.S. presence overseas also continues.[40]

6.5.1.2. Sphere of influence/Backyard

Some bases seem unaffected by changes in the international strategic environment, especially when the bases are located near a great power or in its sphere of influence. For example, despite changes in the international security environment

[38] United States, Department of Defense, *East Asia Strategy Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1995).

[39] For discussions about the endurance of post-Cold War alliances, see Gunther Hellmann *and* Reinhard Wolf*,* "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 3-43; Celeste Wallander, "NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4, (Fall 2000): 705–735; Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 156–179; Charles Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best," *International Security* 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 5-50; Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2005-06), 145–167; Takafumi Ohtomo, "Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion: NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the Cold War," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 3, no. 1 (2003): 29-55.

[40] At the same time, if U.S. commitment becomes less certain than it was during the Cold War, U.S. forces could decide to withdraw from Japan. In that case, Japan would be without U.S. physical protection and therefore would be vulnerable. In such a circumstance, Japan cannot help but to strengthen its own military. Japan, however, acknowledges that doing so would be costly both politically and economically. If Japan were to enhance its military, neighboring states would find Japan's move to be a sign of aggressiveness, igniting security competition among major states in the region. Moreover, it would be costly for Japan to build its military when Japan is in financial trouble. Those political and economic disadvantages make Japan prefer to keep the U.S. presence. For a discussion of the ideal way to create a stable Europe after the Cold War, see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 5-56.

in the past century, U.S. troops continue to be stationed at Guantanamo Bay as the result of the significant power imbalances between the two countries. The global shift in balance of power has failed to influence presence patterns in this case.

6.5.2. Domestic Factors

6.5.2.1. Low cost

Financial support by the host nation contributes to the continued use of bases. Japan's host nation support is a good example. In 2002, the Japanese government provided about $4,400 million to support U.S. presence, offsetting about 75 percent of the total stationing cost.[41] This is about half the total support provided by the rest of the host nations combined. The more expense the host country is willing to shoulder, the more likely the bases will remain.

Although low cost contributes, it is not necessarily a deciding factor. A word about the relationship between financial support and U.S. presence is in order.

6.5.2.2. The Relationship between Strategic Value of Bases and Compensation

If the United States needs a particular base, it will pay a great deal to secure it. Rarely has it failed to secure an overseas base for the lack of money. Rather, host countries have sometimes applied domestic pressures to end U.S. presence. Although that falls under the discussion of how bases end, it also illustrates the relationship between financial compensation and strategic needs.

For example, the United States considered their Philippines bases so

---

[41] U.S. Department of Defense, *2004 Statistical Compendium to the Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004), E-4.

important that they agreed to pay $200 million per annum[42] in the August 1991 agreement. However, after the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 fell, Corazón Aquino's new reformist government was "heavily cross-pressured by activist, antibase NGOs and populist politicians who had been its principal backers in the anti-Marcos struggle."[43] Consequently, the extension of U.S. presence became increasingly difficult and eventually ended.

Here is a different case. The United States might see that a base has low strategic value but still decide to stay because of the low cost of stationing troops. In that case, if the host country stopped providing support, the United States would leave. Some argue that Japan might fit that category.[44]

However, Japan perhaps still has strong strategic value. China, with its growing economic and military strengths, must be watched closely. Japan provides the only homeport outside the United States for an aircraft carrier, and it also has the technologies to repair sophisticated weapons. Also Japan is a staunch ally of the United States, and has one of the most stable societies in the world. As such, the Japanese government is highly unlikely to forcefully retake U.S. bases. In all, the United States has good reason to remain in Japan for its strategic importance and the low cost for maintaining bases.

At the same time, China's growing military capabilities are worrisome. Japan is so close to China that U.S. forces stationed in Japan could be susceptible to a first

---

[42] Christopher Sanders, *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 125.

[43] Calder, *Base Politics*, 147.

[44] Calder argues, "[s]ome analysts suggests that 'if the U.S. ever leaves Japan, it will be because Japan 'turns out the lights''—cuts support payments rather than directly requests withdrawal—and there is potential truth in this statement." See his *Base Politics*, 189.

strike. If the United States eventually senses danger in remaining in Japan, U.S. soldiers may leave, no matter how much Japan pays for the costs of U.S. presence.

6.6. Summary

This chapter attempts to provide a systematic analysis of how U.S. overseas military presence begins, ends, and endures. Logic seems to differ as to how bases are established and end.

In the establishment of overseas bases, great power logic, among other factors, almost always prevails. This is dominated by the structure of the international system in which powerful countries have the initiative. U.S. strategic interests and shared strategic interests between the United States and host countries motivate base establishment. Different factors, however, cause foreign presence to end. Domestic politics of host nations could dictate termination despite huge financial support. If nationalism, noise pollution, and accidents are severe enough, monetary compensation will not be enough, whatever the amount. The question of why bases persist is relevant to the issue of why alliances endure and the more general need to hedge against uncertainties for future security. In addition, the sphere of influence and the low cost of stationing U.S. troops affect base endurance. Overall, the United States is not severely constrained by host nation demands because it has increased choices for potential host countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some may argue that the logic of U.S. presence can be explained by the balance of power of the international system. Others suggest the importance of host countries' domestic politics in explaining U.S. withdrawal. I argue, however, that focusing either on international systems or domestic politics alone is insufficient. As such, I look at both international and domestic interests of the United States and host

nations, which proves to be better for understanding the base issue, as well as U.S. unipolarity.

Having examined factors that affect U.S. overseas military presence, I now turn to cases of the two major host countries that provide bases to the United States: Japan and Germany.

CHAPTER 7

U.S. MILITARY BASES AND FORCE REALIGNMENTS IN JAPAN AND GERMANY

In this chapter, I will examine the relationship between Japan and the United States with regard to U.S. military presence and the prospects for America's continued presence in Okinawa, Japan, which in turn would affect America's unipolarity.[1] Germany's case will also be examined for a comparative perspective. I choose these two countries because both are major allies of the United States as well as main host countries to U.S. forces situated in different security environments.

In Chapter 6, I explored the relationship between military presence and alliance. I showed that Japan and Germany are considered Type 1 locations, "Agreed Firm Presence (Formal Ally Presence)," which is supposed to be the most stable type of U.S. military presence and which should be an advantage for the United States in its desire for continued use of bases. In Germany, domestic pressure against U.S. bases is rare. In Okinawa, however, local protest is strong. Moreover, Yukio Hatoyama, the first Democratic prime minister, who served from September 2009 to June 2010, sought to relocate the major U.S. base in Okinawa to another prefecture in Japan. Nevertheless, the Japanese government, led either by the Democratic Party or the Liberal Democratic Party, has not demanded the total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Okinawa. The fact that the Japanese government values Okinawa's importance is a significant factor supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance. By looking at international and domestic interests of those two countries, the cases of Japan and Germany show

[1] The original version of this chapter was presented at the conference, "Managing the Medusa Project: U.S.-Japan Alliance Relations in Comparison with US-UK and US-Germany Ties," Hokkaido University, August 29-30, 2006.

why U.S. bases are likely to remain in those countries in the near future, which in turn helps the United States maintain unipolarity in the post-Cold War era.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I explain the background for force realignment in Japan, focusing on the history of Okinawa's anti-base movement since 1995. Second, I explain America's international and domestic interest by touching on the issues of transformation and global posture review. Third, I briefly explain agreements between Japan and the United States in the force realignment plan. Fourth, I explore how Japan's international and domestic interests affected Japan's reactions to the force realignment. Fifth, as a comparative study, I discuss the German case. Finally, I provide concluding remarks.

7.1. Background for Force Realignment in Japan: Protest Movement in Okinawa and SACO

U.S.-Japan alliance and base issues cannot be understood without analyzing Okinawa, which constitutes about 0.6 percent of Japanese land but is a host to about 75 percent of U.S. bases in Japan. On May 15, 1972, the United States returned Okinawa to Japan, but Okinawa residents continue to endure noise pollution and the fear of accidents caused by U.S. forces. This section focuses on developments after the Cold War ended.

When three U.S. service men stationed in Okinawa raped a Japanese schoolgirl on September 4, 1995, accumulated anger erupted. Dissatisfaction over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that favorably treats suspects also provoked a massive protest on October 21, 1995. According to the demonstration organizer, 85,000 protestors demonstrated in Naha, the capital of Okinawa.[2]

[2] Okinawa Times, *Okinawa kara: Beigun kichi mondai dokyumento* [From Okinawa:

Ten days later, on October 31, the United States and Japan set up a consultative group on base issues, SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa), which first met on November 20, 1995, to discuss how to deal with the growing anti-base movement. Five months later, on April 12, 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale, announced that the Futenma Air Base, located in a crowded residential area in Okinawa, would be returned to Japan within the next five to seven years. This agreement was included in the interim SACO report that came out three days later.[3]

On April 17, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton met in Santa Monica, California, to announce a joint security declaration, emphasizing the importance of the alliance between the two countries.[4] However, on September 8, 1996, to emphasize their objections clearly, Okinawans held Japan's first prefectural referendum (59.53 percent voting rate) in which 89 percent voted to downsize U.S. bases in Okinawa and to revise SOFA.[5] The final SACO report was completed on December 2, 1996.[6] It confirmed that Futenma Air Base would be returned within

---

The document of U.S. base problem] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1997), 55.

[3] Ibid., 181. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report, April 15, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html (accessed December 1, 2012).

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," April 17, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (accessed December 1, 2012).

[5] Okinawaken kobunshokan [Okinawa Prefectural Archives], Kobunshokan tsuushin, Anohino Okinawa, 9 gatsu 8 ka kenmintouhyou (1996 nen) [Archives news, Okinawa on September 8, 1996, prefectural referendum], http://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/publication/2012/09/post-81.html (accessed April 30, 2013).

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html (accessed December 1, 2012).

five to seven years along with ten other facilities, amounting to about 21 percent (or 5,000 hectares) of the total U.S. bases in Okinawa.

At that time, Japan and the United States were revamping their drifting alliance ties, and were challenged to respond to changing and deteriorating East Asian security environments, including the North Korean nuclear crises (1993-94) and the Taiwan Straight Crisis (1996). The strong local opposition to U.S. presence in Okinawa could have been detrimental to the alliance, and Japan and the United States sensed that both countries could not take that risk.

Despite the conclusion of the SACO agreement in 1996, however, almost nothing happened. Futenma Air Base was never moved to the proposed relocation site, the shore of Henoko by Camp Schwab in Okinawa, because local activists stiffly resisted it and even rejected the government's environmental assessment, a prerequisite for the relocation. Environmental activists filed a lawsuit against the DOD, further delaying the plan. They argued that constructing the airbase would produce fill-in that would endanger the dugong, a sea cow. They demanded that DOD comply with the U.S. National Historic Preservation Act.[7]

When DOD was negotiating the SACO deal, the United States began the so-called transformation process calling for adjusting U.S. forces in response to a new security environment. As part of transformation, the global posture review (GPR)

[7] A little more than a year later, on February 6, 1998, Okinawa Governor Masahide Ohta, who worked with the local citizens to reduce U.S. bases in Okinawa by refusing to grant the use of Okinawa land to U.S. military, publicly opposed the plan to relocate Futenma to a floating port to be constructed by Camp Schwab. In November 1998, a new governor, Keiichi Inamine, was elected with a promise to limit the U.S. use of the Futenma replacement facility to 15 years. Tateo Kishimoto, the mayor of Nago City, where Camp Schwab is located, also agreed to the 15-year limit. On December 28, 1999, one day after Kishimoto's agreement, the Japanese cabinet officially confirmed the relocation of Futenma to the shore near Camp Schwab. But more than two years later, on July 29, 2002, the Japanese government changed the construction method of the replacement airfield to land-fill.

called for the realignment of U.S. bases overseas. It turned out that the GPR involving Japan is quite similar to the SACO plan created about a decade earlier.

7.2. U.S. Interest: Transformation and Global Posture Review

Transformation began in 1996 by the initiative of the DOD to reexamine the post-Cold War strategy and tactics of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, as well as to explore how these military organizations should be run more efficiently. According to DOD's *Transformation Planning Guidance*, transformation "is a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."[8]

The key concept especially regarding the importance of overseas presence appeared in *Joint Vision 2010*, published in 1996, by the joint chiefs of staff: "Power projection from the United States, achieved through rapid strategic mobility, will enable the timely response critical to our deterrent and warfighting capabilities. Our overseas presence and highly mobile forces will both remain essential to future operations."[9]

The U.S. national security goal is to transform the military from dealing with Cold War threats (threat-based model) to 21st century threats (capabilities-based model). As the 2001 Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review* states, the "capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than

---

[8] U.S. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003), 3.

[9] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 4-5.

specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur."[10] In other words, instead of focusing on "who the adversary might be and where a war might occur," the capabilities-based model focuses on preparing for troubles that cannot be predicted. This approach seeks to improve flexibility and mobility to send U.S. forces to future unknown trouble spots swiftly.

President George W. Bush's speech, made at the Joint Session of Congress on September 20, 2001, also included in the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, emphasized that "[t]o contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and station within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces."[11]

In August 2003, the United States announced the global posture review (GPR), which calls for realigning U.S. forces abroad. The purpose is to deploy U.S. soldiers stationed overseas more effectively and efficiently for confronting new types of threats such as terrorism. On November 25, 2003, Bush announced that the United States would review its relationships with its allies around the globe: "Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with the Congress and our friends, allies, and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our overseas force posture. We will ensure that we place the right capabilities in the most appropriate locations to best address the new security environment."[12] On August 16, 2004, Bush

---

[10] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), iv.

[11] White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 29.

[12] Statement by President George W. Bush, November 25, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031125-11.html (accessed November 19, 2006).

said "Over the next ten years, the President's plan will close hundreds of U.S. facilities overseas and bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees."[13]

The 2006 Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review* also suggests that the United States has been "adjusting the U.S. global military force posture, making long overdue adjustments to U.S. basing by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe."[14] Such force realignment is now underway in allies that provide U.S. bases.

7.3. The Force Realignment Plan and Japan

As a country providing major bases to the United States, Japan was affected by the force realignment plan. Three steps would be taken before both countries reached a final plan. In the first stage, Japan and the United States would agree on common strategic objectives. In the second stage, both countries would decide on the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces. In the final stage, Japan and the United States would devise a roadmap for realignment implementation.

First, on February 19, 2005, the Joint Statement U.S. Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC)[15] set common strategic goals at a regional level. The

---

[13] The White House, Fact Sheet: Making America More Secure by Transforming Our Military, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-5.html (accessed November 19, 2006).

[14] U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February, 2006), v.

[15] "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," February 19, 2005 file://G:¥www_bk¥j¥news¥youjin¥2005¥02¥0219_2plus2¥04.htm (accessed January 24, 2006).

goals included peaceful unification of the two Koreas, peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear programs, and resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue. The four ministers (defense and state ministers of both countries) also sought transparency for China's military. At a global level, both countries agreed to tackle terrorism and the spread of WMDs.

Second, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future"[16] (October 29, 2005) discussed the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and of the U.S. forces, as well as force posture realignment. It basically approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

Third, "The Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" (May 1, 2006)[17] discussed the finalized content. Following the SCC meeting, the four ministers released a joint statement[18] in which the United States and Japan affirmed that both nations wanted to continue the alliance to deal with future threats, and that both desired to adjust the alliance to meet demands from the changing security environment. Touching on the issue of implementing U.S. force realignment: "these realignment initiatives are essential to strengthen the foundation of alliance

---

[16] Security Consultative Committee, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," http://www.jda.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2005/10/1029_2plus2/29_e.htm (accessed January 20, 2006).

[17] "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" issued following May 1, 2006 Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee involving Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, May 1, 2006," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/65517.htm (accessed May 2, 2006).

[18] Joint Statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, May 1, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/65523.htm (accessed May 2, 2006).

transformation." Defense Minister Nukaga said that on the day the meeting was held the alliance seemed to be reaching a new height.[19] The term, "alliance transformation" was new. Obviously both countries desire not only further cooperation but also to change the nature of alliance from one in which the United States protects Japan and Japan provides the bases to one in which Japan cooperates on military missions.

The roadmap was considered important because it would affect not only where U.S. forces will be deployed, but also how it strengthens U.S.-Japanese security ties, especially considering when some SDF and U.S. headquarters will be located at the same base in Japan.

The roadmap discusses six issues: (1) realignment in Okinawa; (2) improvement of U.S. Army command and control capability; (3) Yokota Air Base and Air Space; (4) relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni; (5) missile defense; and (6) training relocation. The first two are especially significant.

The replacement facility (Futenma Replacement Facility or FRF) was to be completed by 2014. Unless the FRF is completely operational, the United States does not plan to relocate forces there. The configuration of FRF, constructed basically as landfill, includes "two runways aligned in a 'V'-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls." So far, the United States does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from FRF. Hence, before MCAS Futenma is returned to Japan, the United States will examine bases used by the Air SDF at Nyutabaru (Miyagi) and Tsuiki (Fukuoka). If needed, facility improvements will be made, but

[19] "Nihon no se ni omoi yakusoku [Japan shoulders a heavy promise]," *Asahi Shimbun*, May 2, 2006, 5.

the roadmap does not clarify which country will bear the costs.

In the relocation plan scheduled to be completed by 2014, about 8,000 Marine personnel (III Marine Expeditionary Force, or IIIMEF) and about 9,000 dependents were to be relocated from Okinawa to Guam. Units not directly engaged in combat are planned to relocate (MEF Command Element, Third Marine Division headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Groups–formerly Force Service Support Group headquarters, First Marine Air Wing headquarters, and Twelfth Marine Regiment headquarters). U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces (Marine air-ground task force elements, including "command, ground, aviation, and combat service support") and "a base support capability" will remain to ensure deterrence.

This relocation plan affects units mainly from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area. The cost for the relocation is estimated at $10.27 billion. Japan has agreed to cover 59 percent ($6.89 billion with $2.8 billion in direct cash), and the United States, 31 percent ($3.18 billion).

Moreover, by U.S. fiscal year 2008, the United States will transform the structure of Camp Zama's Army command and control, integrating command functions for U.S. Army's First Corps at Fort Lewis in Washington state with Camp Zama. Furthermore, by Japan fiscal year 2012, Ground SDF Central Readiness Force headquarters will be co-located at Zama, and SDF helicopters will be able to use Camp Zama's Kastner heliport. Using its own funds, the United States will construct a battle command training center and various support facilities inside the Sagami General Depot (SGT).

The Japanese public often regards easing the burden of people living close to U.S. bases in Okinawa as the most important aspect of the agreement, and the media

often treats the issue from that perspective. The Japanese government also talks about maintaining deterrence through realignment. I now consider the dilemmas Japan faces in dealing with the plan.

7.4. Japan's Interests

International and domestic factors constrain Japan in its dealings with the United States.

7.4.1. International Factor: Alliance Dilemma and Base Issues

The concept of the alliance dilemma[20] mentioned in Chapter 4 in discussing alliance endurance can also be useful in examining base issues. As Glenn Snyder argued, when states decide to cooperate with their allies, they increase their risks of being entrapped in unwanted conflicts. If they decide not to cooperate, they risk being abandoned. In a multipolar system, alignment patterns are more fluid, so the fears of abandonment and entrapment are both present; thus heightening the dilemma.

During much of the bipolar Cold War, allying with the United States was considered Japan's best option. At the same time, relying on the United States under bipolarity for security meant a dominant fear of entrapment. This, however, did not imply that the fear of abandonment was absent. With the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, Japan also feared the risks that the United States would abandon them.[21]

---

[20] Glenn Snyder "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461-95.

[21] On alliance dilemma and U.S.-Japan alliance, see Jitsuo Tuchiyama, "Araiansu jirenma to nihon no doumei gaikou: nichibei doumei no owari [Alliance dilemma and Japanese alliance politics]," *Leviathan*, no. 13 (1993): 50-75.

Has the balance between the two risks changed with the end of the Cold War? Theoretically, the end of a bipolar system should relax U.S.-Japan ties. As Yoichi Funabashi pointed out, the U.S.-Japan Alliance was "drifting apart" in the immediate years after the Cold War.[22] An alliance without a common threat should lose rationale for its existence. Such a situation should generate fears of both entrapment and abandonment. But the Japanese feared abandonment relatively more strongly because that fear had been relatively weak for the past 40 years or so.

The time for drifting apart was short, however. The alliance began to tighten after the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis and the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. These crises showed that East Asian states are relatively freer to act now that the superpowers impose weaker structural constraints after the Cold War. With the security environment directly threatening Japan, without doubt Japan wishes to cooperate closely with the United States. But Japan hopes to do so mainly in East Asia, whereas the United States expects cooperation on a global level.

One force realignment plan included moving army command from the U.S. state of Washington to Camp Zama in Kanagawa prefecture. The command in Washington oversees operations from Singapore to the Indian Ocean. Article 6 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, however, stipulates that the United States is allowed to use bases/facilities in Japan to contribute to Japan's security as well as to peace and security of the Far East. Japan is concerned that it would be supporting wars in areas beyond the Far East if integrations between U.S. forces and Japanese SDF proceed further, as was stated in the October 2005 2 Plus 2 (or Security Consultative Committee) document.

In August 2004, with approval of Hiroyuki Hosoda, cabinet secretary;

[22] Yoichi Funabashi, *Doumei houryuu* [Alliance adrift] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997).

Shigeru Ishiba, top of the Japan Defense Agency; and Yoriko Kawaguchi, foreign affairs minister; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japan Defense Agency (JDA) secretly drafted a letter to the United States objecting to the U.S. Army Corps I in Camp Zama because it would stretch to the Middle East, and thus violate the "Far East" clause.[23] Moreover, on August 27, 2004, Shin Ebihara, MOFA head of the North American Affairs Bureau and Kazuki IIhara, JDA director-general of the Defense Policy Bureau, met with Richard Armitage, then Deputy Secretary of State at the State Department, and reiterated the difficulties of accepting a new command to Zama.[24]

MOFA's Treaties Bureau (currently International Legal Affairs Bureau) has particularly advocated keeping strictly to the letters of the article. That thinking is increasingly becoming meaningless, however, because Marines in Okinawa have already been sent to Iraq, violating both the letters and spirit of the Article. MOFA used *tatemae* or nominality to shield Japan against further risks of entrapment. The U.S. side, in the end, conceded, and announced that the activities of U.S. Army I Corps will be limited within the Far East. However, Japan is skeptical on that point.[25]

Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) have already supported U.S. wars even before integration in Zama progressed. Japan quickly passed two laws specifically to back U.S. wars, one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq.[26] Although Japan was not

---

[23] Masahiko Hisae, *Beigun saihen* [U.S. force realignment] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2005), 112.

[24] Ibid., 115-6.

[25] "Beigun shireibu iten," *Asahi Shimbun*, April 13, 2005, 1.

[26] For more on post-9/11 U.S.-Japan relations, see Daniel Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World*, The Washington Papers 183, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).

engaged in combat missions, by sending troops to the Indian Ocean and Iraq they may already be entrapped into U.S. wars outside the Far East. It also means that the SDF have expanded their geographical responsibilities.

Such developments are because Japan's fear of abandonment outweighs the fear of entrapment. The East Asian security environment is fluid, and Japan needs U.S. bases to counter future contingencies. As such, Japan cannot reject U.S. demands to bring the command from Washington, although it entails more activities beyond the Far East. Moreover, Japan will shoulder 60 percent of costs for the relocation of Marines to Guam, but this too is because Japan fears abandonment. Japan's dependence on the United States for its own security renders these actions.

7.4.2. Domestic Issues

Finding a relocation site for Futenma Base in Okinawa has met stiff anti-base resistance. Continuing to maintain Futenma in a densely populated area is dangerous. If another serious incident occurs, it will arouse stronger anti-base and anti-U.S. protests across Okinawa, which would not only threaten U.S. military presence in Okinawa but also the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Removing Futenma from the center of the city to a less densely populated area would reduce the chances of accidents, but strong resistance at candidate sites has made the relocation process difficult. In 2004, Prime Minister Juichiro Koizumi announced that Okinawa's burden would be shared by local governments in mainland Japan.[27] Camp Fuji (Gotemba, Shizuoka Prefecture), for example, was a candidate, but the mayor refused, saying *no* to both MOFA and JDA in July 2004.[28] The United

[27] "Shushou hondo iten wo meigen," *Asahi Shimbun*, October2 , 2004, 1.

[28] "Kichino jimoto hamon hirogaru," *Asahi Shimbun*, October 2, 2004, 38.

States is frustrated that Japan is giving local government virtual veto power.[29] Henoko in Nago city in Okinawa has been another proposed relocation site since the mid-1990s, but again strong protests interfere.

Under the new and first Democratic government, Prime Minister Hatoyama (September 2009-June 2010) increased Okinawans' expectations, during the election campaign, by discussing moving Futenma Base from Okinawa. He negotiated with the island of Tokunoshima, Kagoshima Prefecture, to no avail. He also mentioned having another plan but never revealed it. His attempt to reconsider a previously arranged plan raised U.S. concerns and damaged the bilateral relationship. In the end, he could not find a relocation site, and stepped down to take responsibility for the debacle.

In the new administration, the Liberal Democratic Party's Shinzo Abe (December 2012-), an ardent supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, is trying to hasten the relocation plan by increasing the Okinawa Promotion Funds[30] and by linking the issue of the return of five U.S. bases located in the southern part of Okinawa with the Futenma relocation.[31] The previous Democratic government delinked the Futenma relocation and the return of the five bases to soften the criticisms against the Democrats, but the Liberal Democratic Party re-sent the message to Okinawa that

---

[29] "Bei, jimoto chousei nankou ni fuman," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 14, 2006, 2. In the relocation plan involving other base, 90 percent of the citizens in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi prefecture, have opposed the relocation of fighters from Atsugi, Kanagawa. "Beigun ukeire hantai 9 wari," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 13, 2006, 1.

[30] "Okinawa shinko 3001 okuen, 3nenrenzoku rainendo seifu yosanan," *Nippon Keizai Shimbun*, January 30, 2013, http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNZO51136280Z20C13A1LX0000/ (accessed April 1, 2013).

[31] "Okinawa beigunkichi Kadena inan henkan 'Futenma kirihanashi' o tekkai," March 31, 2013, *Mainichi Shimbun*, http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20130331k0000m010076000c.html (accessed April 5, 2013).

unless Futenma is relocated, those other bases would not be returned, thereby giving more incentives and pressures to Okinawa to take actions toward the Futenma relocation plan.

At the top level, neither Japan nor the United States considers the withdrawal of U.S. forces rational, as strategic calculations shape force deployment plans. For example, as Chinese military capabilities grow in Asia and vulnerabilities of U.S. bases increases, policymakers have begun to consider moving U.S. troops from Okinawa to Guam, and even farther to Australia. Nonetheless, Japan and the United States agree about the continued importance of Okinawa in the post-Cold War era. In addition, Japan pays host-nation support that partially shoulders the costs of U.S. military presence in Japan, which eases the burden of U.S. military presence. Moreover, while former Prime Minister Hatoyama's stance on Okinawan base was unique, even he did not call for totally eliminating major American bases in Okinawa or for ending the alliance. He said, "deterrence including nuclear deterrence as well as Japan-U.S. Security Treaty are needed in the Asia-Pacific region."[32] In fact, no serious politicians, Democrats or Liberal Democrats, have opposed the U.S.-Japan alliance and the significance of Okinawan bases. In the near future, bases in Japan as well the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely remain, in turn contributing to prolonged U.S. primacy.

7.5. Germany Compared

In stark contrast with Japan where many Okinawans longed for U.S. troop

[32] "Hatoyama Shushou 'Kakuyokushiwa hitsuyou' hikaku sangensoku kenji o kyouchou," March 10, 2010, *Ryukyu Shimpo*, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-159025-storytopic-3.html (accessed April 1, 2013).

withdrawal, and where potential sites resisted base relocations, Germany was reluctant to lose U.S. forces.[33] Why did the Japanese and Germans react to alignment so differently?

7.5.1. U.S. Presence in Germany

Before answering that question, a brief review of U.S. presence in Germany is in order. When the Cold War ended, more than 300,000 U.S. troops were in Europe; in the late 1990s, 244,200 were in Germany.[34] By 2004, U.S. forces in Europe were cut by one third to 114,000, but Germany remains the largest host to U.S. troops in Europe and outside the continental United States. Over 70,000, or about 60 percent of U.S. troops stationed in Europe, were in Germany.[35] (In December 2012, according to U.S. Department of Defense, the number was down to 45,596.[36])

7.5.2. The Plan

On March 25, 2004, the *Washington Post* reported that U.S. Department of

---

[33] The government of Japan, however, has a different view that the U.S. presence is needed for the security of Japan.

[34] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990/91* (London: Brassey's, 1990).

[35] "Moving On: America's Troop Deployments," *The Economist*, August 19, 2004, http://www.economist.com/background/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=3107... (accessed May 23, 2005).

[36] U.S. Department of Defense, Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD), Personnel and Procurement Statistics, December 31, 2012 (DMDC data) http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm (accessed April 3, 2013). SIAD provides the data, "Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by Region/Country, which has been updated quarterly since 1950 (except for 1951-52), but no longer does so after March 31, 2012. Defense Manpower Data Center's (DMDC) data beginning June 30, 2013 is included in the website as it provides similar data. DMDC serves under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The name of the DMDC data is "Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength."

Defense had drafted plans to withdraw U.S. forces from Germany and other countries such as South Korea. It basically said that the United States would cut the number of US forces in Germany by as much as 50 percent of those 71,000 stationed there. Commenting exclusively on the Army, one official said the U.S. would withdraw "more than 60 percent of its 56,000 (Army) troops in Germany."[37]

Although officials declined comment, top U.S. officials met on May 20, 2004, to discuss the Pentagon plan.[38] According to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker, the U.S. Army's top general, the United States is planning to withdraw two heavy divisions from Germany: First Armored Division and First Infantry Division, located in Bavaria, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate. These divisions constitute more than half of those stationed in Germany, many of whom served in Iraq. Once the divisions return to the United States, they may be replaced by the Stryker division, which is much smaller but more lightly armored and mobile than traditional divisions.[39] If those plans are implemented, about 40,000 troops will remain in Germany.

7.5.3. U.S. Interest: International Factor

President Bush spoke about global posture review on August 16, 2004. Regarding the expected changes in Europe, he emphasized that infrastructures built

---

[37] Bradley Graham, "U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany," *Washington Post*, March 25, 2004, A1.

[38] Michael Gordon, "A Pentagon Plan would Cut Back G.I.'s in Germany," *New York Times*, June 4, 2004, A1.

[39] "U.S. Confirms Troops Reduction in Germany," *Deutsche Welle*, June 16, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,1237566,00.html (accessed December 21, 2006.)

during the Cold War are no longer relevant and should be eliminated. Heavy forces used for land warfare will no longer be needed and will return to the United States. He reiterated that heavy divisions in Germany would be replaced with rapidly deployable forces.[40]

In late July 2005, the Department of Defense announced that 11 bases will be return to Germany in fiscal 2007. These returns "are scheduled as part of plans for the 1st Infantry Division headquarters' return to the United States with its divisional flag in the summer of 2006. Additionally, the 1st Infantry Division's subordinate units, as well as selected V Corps and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) units will return to the United States, inactivate entirely, convert, or be reassigned in Europe to support Army transformation in fiscal 2006."[41]

7.5.4. The Iraq War and Germany

As mentioned, the U.S. military presence in Germany has been reduced since the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the fear of what I call "soft abandonment" arose in Germany after it opposed the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in 2003. The United States tried to pass a United Nations resolution to increase legitimacy of its decision to go to war with Iraq. Secretary of State Collin Powell tried to make a case by suggesting that Iraq was clandestinely developing WMDs, and refusing to cooperate with inspectors. However, oppositions from Germany, France, and Russia killed the

---

[40] The White House, Fact Sheet: Making America More Secure by Transforming Our Military, August 16, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040816-t.html (accessed December 17, 2004).

[41] U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release, "DoD Announces Installation Realignment in Germany," July 29, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/realeases/2005/nr20050729-4262.html (accessed April 20, 2006).

resolution, upsetting U.S. plans. Like U.S.-French relations, U.S.-German relations soured as German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opposed the resolution mainly for domestic political reasons. The difference between France and Germany, however, was that France did not expect deteriorated relations with the United States to change its security setting dramatically, but Germany anticipated potential changes in the security environment since most of U.S. troops in Europe were stationed in Germany.

In response to German opposition to the Iraq War, the United States announced plans to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany. Fearing more opposition from allies, the United States sent a signal to those that might be contemplating defiance of U.S. leadership, showing what would happen if they refused to cooperate. On February 11, 2003, Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, announced hearings concerning U.S forces in Europe, primarily focused on Germany. He emphasized that the planned hearings were not intended to punish Germany for opposing America's plans to attack Iraq. But, he said, "Germany's and France's opposition of the use of military force to oust Saddam Hussein has 'brought the issue to the forefront.'" He also mentioned that withdrawing troops was not just about bringing troops and families back home, but also about "creating bases in 'more cost-friendly environments' in some of the Eastern European nations that have recently joined or been invited to join NATO."[42]

The United States is adjusting the force structure overseas to reflect the current security environment. As such, Germany's opposition to the Iraq War per se was probably not the primary reason for the announcement about pulling U.S. soldiers

[42] Sandra Jontz, "Panel to Hold Hearings to Discuss U.S. Military Presence in Europe," *Stars and Stripes*, February 13, 2003, Pacific edition, http://www.estripes.com/articleprint.asp?section=104&article=12521&archive=true (accessed December 26, 2006).

out of Germany. Douglas J. Feith, Pentagon undersecretary for policy, said that "the changes in troop levels were in no way connected to Germany's opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq."[43]

Although the United States may genuinely try to realign U.S. forces overseas to adjust its global posture, we find some elements of surprise. "Last month [February 2003], German Defense Minister Peter Stuck said he was told the United States had no plans to reduce its troops in Germany, but White House spokesman Ari Fleischer hinted several days later that the United States was mulling over plans to restructure its overseas troops."[44] Moreover, "the German military attaché here, Col. Carsten Jacobson, expressed surprise when told the force reduction could end up in the range of 50 percent. 'It's definitely higher than what we've heard so far,' he said, adding that his understanding was the proposed cuts were in the rage of 20 to 30 percent."[45] Although Europe's security environment is quite stable, with no formidable adversaries, a much smaller U.S. presence could have repercussions of uncertainties for Germany. But when examined closely, German concern is related not only to security but also economic factors.

7.5.5. U.S. Interests: Domestic Factors

When Germany opposed U.S. plans to invade Iraq, U.S. officials, especially

---

[43] "U.S. Troop Pullout Would Hit Germany Hard," *Deutsche Welle*, March 26, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,1152253,00.html (accessed November 17, 2006).

[44] "US Plans Troop Reduction in Germany," *People's Daily Online*, March 3, 2003, http://english.people.com.cn/20030303/03./print20030303_112618.html (accessed December 21, 2006). Story based on the *Die Welt* newspaper.

[45] Bradley Graham, "U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany," *Washington Post*, March 25, 2004, A1.

at the Department of Defense, were furious at the Germans. They wanted to damage economic relations between the two countries by terminating military and industrial cooperation. The hawks in the Department tried to make an example by showing what would happen to a country for defying the United States. According to one Pentagon source, "The aim is to hit German trade and commerce. It is not just about taking out the troops and equipment; it is also about cancelling commercial contract and defense-related arrangements."[46]

Industries in Germany support the U.S. Army in Europe by providing missiles and equipment. Defense companies such as Diehl, a missile maker; EADS Deutschland, aerospace and defense giant; Rheinmetall, armaments maker; and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, a vehicle maker, are said to earn billions of euros every year, and they are most likely to lose from U.S. withdrawal.[47]

Small towns in Germany where U.S. forces are stationed also fear that U.S. withdrawal would damage the local economy.[48] The U.S. Army's First Infantry Division's home is in the southern city of Wuerzburg. A spokesman there worries about base closure, because thousands of local jobs depend on U.S. forces.[49] The Kaiserlautern Military Community (KMC) will also likely be affected because it has

---

[46] Peter Beaumont, David Rose and Paul Beaver, "US to Punish Germany 'Treachery,'" *Observer*, February 16, 2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,4606875-102275,00.thml (accessed November 30, 2006).

[47] Ibid.

[48] This starkly contrasts with the Japanese case where most local governments do not want U.S. forces. Of course, some in Japan would lose economically, but their voice is not strong enough to lobby for continued U.S. presence. Rather, the Japanese *government* wants the United States to stay for *security* purposes.

[49] "Shake-up for US Troops Overseas," BBC News, August 17, 2004, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/a... (accessed June 16, 2005).

more than 20,000 Army and Air Force troops, civilians, and retirees, and the same number of U.S. dependents. According to the annual report at the 435th Comptroller Squadron at Ramstein Air Base, in 2003 KMC brought about $1.29 billion to the local economy.[50] About 20 percent of Birkenfeld district's GDP depends on the Baumholder military base, where parts of the First Infantry Division are currently stationed. Werner Knauth, press spokesman for the district is greatly concerned about repercussions from base closings.

7.5.6. Force Realignment and Germany's Reactions

German officials have been trying to convince the Americans to remain in Germany. Eric Schaefer, press spokesman for the Interior Ministry of Rhineland-Palatinate said, "We're now in negotiations with the Americans, trying to make it appealing for them to stay at their current sites."[51] Mayors in German towns where U.S. troops are stationed have also tried to halt further withdrawal with a strategy I call *bond appealing*.

Thirteen mayors from Germany visited Washington to talk with members of Congress: "They met with several members of Congress, including House Speaker Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., and a team from the Pentagon, including Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of the Air Force James Roche and acting Secretary of the Amy Les Brownlee." The mayors "praised

---

[50] "U.S. Troop Pullout Would Hit Germany Hard," *Deutsche Welle-World*, March 26, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,1152253,00.html (accessed November 17, 2006).

[51] Kyle James, "US Troop Pullout To Hit Local German Economies," *Deutsche Welle-World*, August 17, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,1299315,00.html (accessed November 17, 2006).

U.S. service members and their families for being wonderful guests," and argued that Germany already has the necessary infrastructure, and that they can "guarantee a good future for troops."[52]

The following story also shows how the Germans try to appeal their social ties with the United States:

> American GIs walk the streets, eat at local restaurants, and marry Baumholder's daughters. Female soldiers and the wives of GIs have their hair done at the local beauty parlor, and their children play on local soccer teams. Sigrid Zimmer, proprietor of the Berghof Hotel, has often taken an active role supporting US troops in Baumholder. When the soldiers from the base shipped off to Iraq last year, she organized a drive to send care packages. "When they left for Iraq it was just terrible," she says. "Those are our boys, too. It just won't be the same without them." Zimmer pulls out a handful of thank-you letters that soldiers wrote from Iraq. She is particularly fond of a letter from Pfc. [private first class] Roy Scranton, who wrote: "It is the thought of such kind and openhearted people back home that makes out hard work here worthwhile and carries us through out daily struggle." "When he referred to Baumholder as home, I just cried my heart out," she says.[53]

In Schweinfurt in 2003, more than 10 percent of the 300 marriages were between Germans and Americans. The relationships between the base and town were "at times, even a love affair."[54]

---

[52] Patrick J. Dickson, "German Mayors Push to Keep U.S. Bases," *Stars and Stripes*, June 13, 2003, European edition, http://www.estripes.com/articleprint/asp?section=104&article=15410&archive=true (accessed December 26, 2006).

[53] William Boston, "US Troop Shift: A Tale of Two Cities," *Christian Science Monitor,* August 20, 2004, 6.

[54] Mark Landler, "Proposed U.S. Base Closings Send a Shiver Through a German Town," *New York Times*, August 22, 2004, 8.

7.5.7. Germany and Japan Compared

First, as discussed, the economic factor is quite important in the German case. Okinawans worry that Japan's government will cut off their income from land rents once the base is returned. Like Germany, local business would also be greatly affected. But overall, the Japanese government heavily subsidizes Okinawa.[55] This does not mean that those living near U.S. bases are satisfied. Rather the point is that more Germans are concerned than the Okinawans about the economic impact of U.S. withdrawal.

Second, the relationships between U.S. soldiers and the local people are less strained in Germany. In fact, they get along quite well. "No one is afraid of the Americans, who, with 13,000 people, make up the town's majority—the base has the largest concentration of combat arms soldiers outside the mainland United States. Instead, most of Baumholder's 5,000 German residents are willing to show some leniency toward the young troops. Friendships have developed over the years and the Germans worried along with American families about the spouses, parents and friends in Iraq. Before that, it was Kuwait. Before that, Vietnam."[56] This is in stark contrast with the case of Okinawa.

Some Germans worry about U.S. presence not because of their relations with U.S. soldiers per se, but because of security concerns. In general, Germany faces no imminent international threats. However, after 9/11, some worried that continued U.S.

---

[55] In fiscal year 2012, Okinawa received JPY 293.7billion in subsidies. The amount has been declining since 1998, however. "(Yoku aru shitsumon) Okinawa shinkou yosan nitsuite," Okinawa ken, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/kikaku/chosei/kikaku/yokuaru-yosan.html (accessed March 20, 2013).

[56] Peter Philipp, "Losing 'The Boys,'" *DW-World*, August 19, 2004, http://www.dw-world.de/popups/popup_printcontent/0,,1301658,00.html (accessed November 17, 2006).

presence might invite trouble. According to Winfried Hermann, a member of the German Parliament from the Green Party, "People nowadays fear that the American Army or American military installations could be the target of a terrorist attack." Nevertheless, public objection to the sustained U.S. presence is minimal. Moreover, "many Germans say they will always appreciate what the U.S. armed forces did to rebuild their country and open the way for reunification."[57]

All in all, despite strong domestic opposition, the Japanese government is willing to maintain U.S. bases. In the case of Germany, while the United States is continuously reducing the number of U.S. troops and despite Germany's opposition to Iraq War, the locals call for sustained U.S. presence. Both countries are the major hosts to U.S. soldiers, and the fact that both are willing to accept U.S. military presence, either for international or domestic reasons, contributes to continued U.S. presence.

7.6. Summary

This chapter shows that international structural change induced the United States to reconsider its strategy from focusing on containment of the Soviet Union to flexibility in dealing with terrorism and the rise of China. Along with this change, U.S. strategy is to realign U.S. forces stationed overseas. In this chapter, I compared Japanese and German reactions to force realignment by looking at their international and domestic factors.

Strong anti-base movements exist particularly in Okinawa, but Japan needs U.S. bases and the U.S.-Japan alliance because of the security environment. The

[57] Craig Whitlock, " 'American Army Place' Faces Uncertain Fate: Germans Fear Town will Die if Troops Depart," *Washington Post*, September 19, 2004, A28.

Japanese government has basically maintained its stance regarding force realignment: reduce the burden in Okinawa and maintain the level of deterrence. Despite local opposition to U.S. bases, top Japanese politicians recognize that U.S. military presence is still crucial for Japan's security and for maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance. This aligns with U.S. interest in exerting regional influence through sustained military presence in Japan, which in turn supports U.S. unipolarity.

I compare Germany's case with Japan's to highlight the differences between the two countries in their dealings with U.S. force realignment and U.S. military presence in general. Despite Germany's open opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, the local host municipalities wanted continued U.S. troop presence primarily for economic reasons. Germany's opposition to war alarmed policymakers in Washington, and some called for punishing Germany by cutting defense-related business opportunities and reducing the number of U.S. troops more than initially agreed. Mayors of some Germany cities even travelled to Washington, D.C. to lobby for the continued U.S. presence in Germany. Differences in international and domestic environments in Japan and Germany explain these variations in reactions.

The following list summarizes important factors affecting U.S. overseas military presence:

> ***International factors*** affecting the United States and its host countries with regard to the question of overseas military presence include:
>
> U.S.
> 1. The end of the Cold War (force reduction and realignment)
> 2. Benefits gained from functions of overseas military presence
> 3. The need to deals with the war on terrorism after 9/11
> 4. Hedge against China
>
> Host Countries

1. The concern of U.S. troop withdrawal from the region (Europe)
2. The wish for U.S. protection to deal with security issues (Japan)

Domestic factors affecting the United States and its host countries with regard to the question of overseas military presence include:

U.S.
1. U.S. strategy to maintain primacy
2. The financial situation of the United States

Host Countries
1. Domestic politics, regime shift (Japan)
2. Protests against U.S. injustice (Okinawa)
3. Benefits gained from U.S. presence in the form of economic and military assistance (Germany)
4. The willingness and ability to support U.S. presence financially (Japan)

Some of these points above were discussed in Chapter 6.

Recent literature on U.S. bases has focused on domestic politics of host nations in explaining the prospects for U.S. presence. Generally, one would expect that powerful domestic opposition could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Nonetheless, as discussed, the international environment continues to force Japan to rely on the United States. In the end, Japan's security dependence on the United States and America's desire to remain in Japan play significant roles for continued U.S. presence and alliance. In the case of Germany, although local Germans and U.S. soldiers maintain good relations and some towns struggle to retain U.S. bases, the United States continues to reduce American presence.

However, this does not mean that domestic factors are irrelevant. For instance, although Germany's strategic importance has declined in the post-Cold War era, and it seems natural that U.S. forces should be reduced there, the U.S. withdrawal scheme did not go as initially planned because of local attempts to halt American

withdrawal. Similarly, anti-U.S. base movements in Okinawa and other parts of Japan show that managing overseas military presence is not always easy despite Japan's dependence on the United States for protection. Sending nations and host countries must continually work to coordinate efforts.

The framework of this dissertation helps us understand how domestic and international factors within and surrounding Japan and Germany caused different reactions to U.S. interests. At the same time, I have shown that neither Japan nor Germany is willing to request closure of U.S. bases any time soon. The United States can hence continue to wield its influence in the world's most important regions, Asia and Europe, and to sustain unipolarity.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I first summarize my main argument. I then discuss possible counterarguments, theoretical and policy implications, and future research possibilities.

I began this dissertation by asking why U.S. primacy has continued after the end of the Cold War, contrary to some expectations. My research reveals that the enduring Cold War alliances and the vast network of U.S. overseas military presence are keys to answering the question.

Why have Cold War alliances endured despite the collapse of the Soviet Union? Without common threats, alliances are expected to dissolve. Thus, realists expected that the end of the Cold War would also end the Cold War alliances.[1] However, the alliances have continued, because countries such as Japan in the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shied away from pursuing independent security policies, despite their capacities to do so. Why?

Generally, Japan and Germany have no observable aggressive intentions, but neighboring states are still wary of them because of their histories as aggressors. To ameliorate their negative identity as past aggressors, or to resolve what I call the "sheep in wolf's clothing" problem, both Japan and Germany act through alliances rather than pursue independent security policies to reassure their neighbors and their

[1] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 44–79; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5–41.

alliance partners. In other words, rather than balance against the United States, Japan and Germany bandwagoned with the United States to dampen suspicion.

The international security environment has also made alliances cohesive. The North Korean threat and the rise of China have necessitated the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Moreover, the fear of possible U.S. disengagement pushed European NATO members to tighten their relations. The United States did not openly welcome such developments, and tried to wield its influence by continuing to work through NATO. These factors in turn help explain why Cold War alliances endure.

The second factor, overseas military presence, facilitates the expansion of U.S. military reach and influence well beyond its borders. No other states can easily imitate this capability. Overseas military bases play multiple roles, including deterring potential threats, attacking enemies, conducting military exercises, gathering intelligence, and containing the country where U.S. forces are stationed. Some states seek to acquire nuclear weapons to increase state power, but having nuclear weapons alone does not necessarily add much in wielding influence abroad. For states to fight wars or intervene in crises, having secure access to overseas bases is crucial, because when soldiers are sent abroad, they use conventional weapons. Having such bases around the world, therefore, constitutes an important source of state power.

The United States is reducing its forces stationed overseas and adjusting to the new international environment after the Cold War. But simultaneously, it has increased the number of the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) that set legal outlines for U.S. forces stationed in host countries after the end of the Cold War. This indicates that the United States has expanded its global reach to strengthen its unipolar position.

America's goal of maintaining its primacy has caused U.S. allies some

anxiety. For example, Japan worries about being entrapped in U.S. global wars, while Germany is concerned about being abandoned. Dilemmas are surfacing in these countries, forcing them to devise various tactics. Nonetheless, Japan's concerns have not been powerful enough to demand U.S. troop withdrawal. Germany's local citizens especially want to continue their support of U.S. troops. All in all, major hosts to U.S. forces will not be demanding U.S. withdrawal in the near future. As a result, U.S. interest and primacy will continue.

Although I discuss alliances and bases separately, they are closely interrelated. Often alliance agreements include clauses permitting the United States to use bases in host countries. The United States can expect stable bases when they are hosted by close allies. However, host countries do not necessarily have to be allies. In extreme cases, even hostile countries could host U.S. bases. Cuba is a prime example. Moreover, countries that are indifferent to U.S. strategic interest could also provide bases, but they often bargain hard for favorable deals. While such cases exist, major U.S. bases are fortunately located on the territories of friendly allies that do not always request exorbitant compensations. In addition, U.S. bases are so numerous that closing one particular base does not immediately affect overall U.S. power projection capability. That is good news for the United States.

8.1. Counterarguments

As with any argument, counterarguments should be considered. First, some argue that U.S. overseas military presence is not a cause of U.S. primacy but a source of decline. Second, they argue that even Western allies are already balancing against the United States. Third, they argue that the declining U.S. economy casts doubts on prospects for America's primacy.

The first counterargument is that U.S. overseas bases are a source of vulnerability, not a source of power and influence, because establishing U.S. overseas bases in the territories of other countries can provoke resentment.[2] Consequently, U.S. presence makes more enemies than friends. After all, the mastermind and many of the collaborators of the 9/11 attacks were from Saudi Arabia. They resented U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War of 1991. In addition, Muslims worldwide resent America's unconditional support of Israel. Such an international environment would, in turn, contribute to the decline, and not primacy, of the United States. This concern is legitimate, and I return to this point when I later talk about U.S. policy implications.

U.S. primacy is also threatened by another related harmful effect of U.S. overseas military presence: the danger of entrapment. If, for example, the relationship between Japan and China deteriorates further and the United States shows strong resolve to intervene, China will likely hit U.S. bases in Okinawa and other cities in Japan where U.S. bases are located to preempt U.S. attacks. Similar development can be expected if Taiwan and China should conflict, and the United States intervenes on Taiwan's behalf.

Such scenarios would have devastating consequences for the United States and Japan. China, on the contrary, might gain, but only in the short-run, because the United States will most likely retaliate with full force. Such possibility of war might prevent potential aggressors from attacking U.S. overseas bases. This is not to say that U.S. bases overseas will never be attacked, but since 1945, no country has mounted a

---

[2] Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000); Chalmers Johnson, The *Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republi*c (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004).

massive conventional or nuclear attack on U.S. bases overseas to *resolve a dispute with a country hosting U.S. soldiers*.

The second counterargument is that although Cold War alliances continue, Western allies, dissatisfied with America's primacy, want to challenge it. According to the proponents of that argument, Western states are using "soft balancing" policies to limit or deflect U.S. actions.[3] *Soft balancing* identifies nonmilitary acts of countering U.S. primacy. What begins as soft balancing, however, may eventually lead to "hard" military balancing.

Although some suggest that Western countries may already be balancing against the United States, soft balancing is unlikely to escalate into full-fledged military balancing. Rather, soft balancing is difficult to distinguish from normal diplomatic disputes that happen quite frequently in international politics.[4] More important, the United States does not threaten Western countries with force; therefore, they do not have to fear direct U.S. military attacks. Some argue that German and French opposition to the Iraq war in 2003 was the beginning of serious balancing, but no substantial counter-U.S. alliance has been formed in the past decade.

The third counterargument suggests that America's declining economy makes it difficult to maintain its unipolar position. The financial crisis of 2008, the so-called Lehman shock, seriously damaged the American economy and other economies worldwide. As the U.S. defense budget declines, China's overall economy and defense budget are projected to surpass that of the United States.[5] However, as I

---

[3] Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7 -45.

[4] Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is Not Pushing Back," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 109-139.

[5] *The Military Balance 2013* published by the International Institute for Strategic

explained in the introduction, economic growth is usually nonlinear. As such, predictions about future wealth are difficult, unreliable, and often wrong.[6]

On the positive side, although the United States pays to stay in some countries, many important host nations provide financial support, shouldering America's burden of overseas military presence. In 2002, the United States received cost-sharing assistance from NATO allies, Japan, Korea, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, a total of about $8.5 billion.[7] Japan shouldered about 75 percent of the stationing cost; Saudi Arabia 60 percent; Qatar, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Spain and Turkey between 50 and 60 percent, and Italy and Korea about 40 percent. No other country but the United States receives such backing for overseas stationing, and such assistance contributes to its primacy.

Studies suggests that China's defense spending could converge with that of the United States by as early as 2023. See "The Military Balance: When will China Overtake America in Defence Spending?" *The Economist*, March 18, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/03/daily-chart-11 (accessed April 1, 2013).

[6] Moreover, the U.S. dollar is still and likely to remain the key currency, signifying not only the strength of its economy, but also its political, military, and diplomatic power and prestige. America's great power status insures that many countries trust American power. Unlike Japanese companies that rely heavily on exports, U.S. corporations, trading in dollars, have no fear of exchange rate fluctuations. Some suggest that the Chinese renminbi might replace the U.S. dollar as the key currency, but that cannot happen until China surpasses on all indicators, not only economic, but also political, military, and diplomatic power and prestige. Even if that occurred, it would take years to replace the U.S. dollar. See Climbing Greenback Mountain," *The Economist*, September 24, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21528988 (accessed November 2, 2012); Eswar Prasad and Lei Ye, "Will the Renminbi Rule?" *Finance & Development* (March 2012), 26-29, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/03/pdf/prasad.pdf (accessed November 1, 2012). Countries worldwide are not ready to accept Chinese hegemony soon or to accept the renminbi as the currency of choice. Until then, the United States will continue to enjoy the advantage.

[7] U.S. Department of Defense, *2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004) E-4, E-6.

8.2. Theoretical Implications

I suggest three major implications from my findings. First are suggestions for approaching the study of international relations. Second are better understandings of the roles of nuclear weapons and satiability in Europe. Third are best ways to treat culture in international relations.

First, I looked at both international and domestic factors for their effects on the interests of not only the United States but also its allies and host nations. My approach contrasts with the neorealist school that focuses on the international-level argument.[8] While the international-level factor is certainly useful in understanding general trends in international relations, domestic level factors must be incorporated for a fuller picture of international phenomena. Figure 3.1 shows the framework.

In the discussion of alliance endurance, for example, I incorporate domestic factors such as antimilitarism culture and the issue of identity. Japan and Germany's negative identity as past aggressors played a crucial role in their choices to refrain from pursing independent security policies and to remain in the alliance instead. The United States, on its part, had an interest in prolonging its power in the post-Cold War world. It chose to refrain from using maximum power and instead to work through institutional alliances. The Cold War alliance persisted because the members, both powerful and less powerful, had converging interests, both international and domestic. Alliances persisted not simply because of U.S. interests and power.

Similarly, I discussed bases, examining the interests of both the United States and host countries, which proved to be more fruitful than looking only at U.S. power. While U.S. power and interest generally affect the reasons and processes of base

[8] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

establishment, understanding U.S. withdrawals requires understanding domestic politics of the host countries. Cultural factors may also explain why host countries, such as in the Middle East, are less comfortable than industrialized democracies in permitting U.S. military presence.

Second, I suggest reconsideration of John Mearsheimer's claim that Germany should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons[9] to prevent Europe from returning to power politics after the Cold War. Mearsheimer suggests that although such a solution would be less stable than the Cold War era, it is better than other alternatives. It is possible, however, to argue that Germany chose instead to bandwagon with the United States and other alliance members, thereby eliminating their needs for nuclear weapons.[10]

Third, I suggest two points regarding the importance of culture. First, rather than advancing particular schools of thought, such as constructivism, I strongly believe that realist thinking gives more useful insights into the study of international politics. In fact, realism explains why Japan remains allied with the United States. But to explain Japan and Germany's tendencies to refrain from renationalizing their security policies, I look to cultural explanations. I willingly use analytical tools when they help explain international phenomena. Second, culture can change. Japan's attitude toward international security would change dramatically if the United States withdrew its protection, perhaps by refusing to extend nuclear deterrence, by totally withdrawing U.S. forces from Japan, or ending the alliance relations. If Japan's

---

[9] John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 38.

[10] Of course, the implications of Mearsheimer's recommendation will not be clear until the Cold War completely ends with total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. Perhaps his argument will prove true, but we must consider why U.S. troops, while reduced, continue to stay in Europe 20 years after the Cold War ended.

security environment required self-defense, Japan would certainly take necessary measures to counter the threat. At that point, the culture of antimilitarism would inevitably change.

8.3. Policy Implications

After the Cold War, the United States has encountered difficulties and complexities in convincing host countries to allow its continued presence, and for the host countries to convince local citizens to tolerate the bases. Moreover, in some parts of the world, it is even counterproductive to maintain U.S. military presence. Considering those concerns, combined with the issue of alliance, I next consider regional-specific policies. But before that, let me touch on the issue of the so-called offshore balancing.

Offshore balancing, a concept recently gaining popularity among scholars, journalists, and policymakers,[11] basically advises that the United States should reduce its military forces around the world. The idea differs from isolationism, however. Rather, it warns that the United States is approaching a situation of "imperial overstretch," a term popularized by Paul Kennedy. Offshore balancing suggests that balancing does not always require U.S. forces to be present. Instead, the United States could retreat from regions where regional hegemons pose no threats. Unless the regional power balance collapses, the United States should stand aside, watch, and

[11] In addition to Christopher Layne, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Thomas Friedman, Barry Posen has recently joined as the main proponents of this view. See his "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2013) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138466/barry-r-posen/pull-back (accessed February 21, 2013). For a recent piece opposing off-shore balancing, see Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment," *International Security* 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/13): 7-51.

intervene only if a regional hegemon rises.

The logic behind this policy prescription is that balancing is neither easy nor automatic; buck-passing is more common.[12] Balancing entails costs, and without real necessity, states prefer letting others do it instead. America's late entry to World Wars I and II illustrates the tendency to follow buck-passing strategies. The United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union also refrained from confronting Nazi Germany, hoping other countries would deal with Hitler.

Offshore-balancing strategists suggest that U.S. force level should decline in Europe and other regions, but be retained in East Asia. I agree with the policy *content*, but I disagree somewhat with their reasoning. That is, I argue that their policy recommendation does not logically follow from their theory. In my view, the correct application of offshore balancing in East Asia would mean U.S. withdrawal from the region to let Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India balance against China. If difficulty arises, then the United States would return to the region. However, U.S. retreat from the region might hasten China's rise as a regional hegemon, and the United States would find it difficult to stop China later. The proponents of offshore balancing might say that is exactly why the United States remains in the region. But if that is so, the assumption of buck-passing, an important factor, becomes meaningless, and the logic of the overall argument collapses.

At any rate, let us reexamine each region. The effect of the change in the international structure is most evident in Europe. Although imminent threats are nonexistent, the United States should maintain its alliance relations and military

[12] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 137-168.

presence to show its political and military commitment. U.S. presence in friendly nations is still an asset, although U.S. troop level in Europe can be reduced.

The Middle East presents a different challenge. U.S. military presence in the Middle East has been a major cause of animosity. Osama Bin Laden's main reason for despising the United States was that U.S. forces were stationed in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War.[13] He was particularly disturbed because Saudi Arabia is home to Mecca and Medina, two Muslim holy cities. In fact, many suicide bombings protest the presence of U.S. troops in Arab nations.[14]

Many Middle Eastern governments, but not the people, support U.S. presence by providing space and money, but stationing of U.S forces still drains resources, both money and soldiers, and weakens overall U.S. power. Each soldier in Afghanistan costs an annual $1.1 million, the adjusted equivalent of $67,000 per year per soldiers during WWII and $132,000 during the Vietnam War.[15] Therefore, decreasing presence levels in the Middle East might prolong U.S. primacy.

Asia is more complicated. The United States and some neighboring countries of Japan, such as South Korea and China, want U.S. presence to continue in Japan to keep Japan from acting aggressively again. At the same time, Japan and the United States have a common interest in maintaining U.S. forces in Japan to deal with crises in the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps most important, the rise of China. As such,

---

[13] With U.S. backing, he also fought in Afghanistan to resist the Soviet Union, but felt betrayed when the United States suspended its support.

[14] Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2006); Robert Pape and James Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010)

[15] Todd Harrison, *Analysis of the FY2011 Defense Budget*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY.pdf (accessed July 26, 2010).

troop level in this region should not be reduced dramatically, and alliance relations with Japan and South Korea should be maintained. The Obama administration has announced intentions to shift strategic focus from Europe to Asia, and that is a right decision.

China has been expanding its military capabilities commensurate with its economic power. Their acquisition of aircraft carriers signifies their intention to challenge America's naval predominance in the region. China may not be a formidable threat soon, and some even expect that it will enter into international society smoothly, but others predict inevitable conflict between the United States and China.[16] Whatever occurs, American military presence is a valuable asset for the United States and Japan in a changing security environment. However, maintaining bases in places such as Okinawa is becoming more difficult, especially under increasing negative incidents involving U.S. troops and local citizens. Both governments, therefore, should handle the base issue with care and patience, because continued alliance relations and U.S. presence in Japan are important assets for coping with the rise of China. This is important for Japan as well as for maintaining U.S. unipolarity.

8.4. Future Research

My research suggests several possible future research topics, and I mention two intriguing puzzles here. First is a question about the history of overseas military presence. After World War I ended, U.S. soldiers returned home; many expected the

[16] See Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; John Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (2010): 381-396.

same to happen in 1945. Why did the United States keep troops in Europe to deal with the Soviet Union after World War II, but did not do so to contain Germany after World War I? What were the underlying reasons for the difference? How did the international structure differ in these two periods? What was the state of overseas military presence in the interwar period? Historian William McNeill suggests that the United States kept troops in Europe and Japan after World War II to contain Stalin.[17] But that prompts me to wonder why the United States chose to leave Europe after World War I. Although this dissertation focuses mainly on the post-Cold War world, comparing the interwar period and the post-World War II period should reveal interesting findings.

Second, constructivist research has focused on Japan and Germany, but not on the United States. Scholars argue that American identity and interests do not determine U.S. foreign policy choices. Rather, the great power status compels American actions. However, few scholars discuss the uniqueness of American behavior. Can American actions be explained by U.S. identity and interests? Can its tendency to expand through acquiring overseas military presence and its aggressive behavior come not from its power but from its culture? These questions obviously are difficult to answer, because both materialist and ideational approaches may reach the same conclusion. Nonetheless, it would be intellectually interesting to explore a constructivist approach in understanding American foreign policy.

8.5. A Final Word

Unipolarity is a unique phenomenon in international politics. We are not

[17] William H. McNeill, *A World History,* 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 517.

certain how American unipolarity will eventually unfold. Whether the system proves peaceful or dangerous is of great importance not only for the United States but also for the rest of the world. Moreover, whether it will be long-lived or short-lived is another issue of concern. If the system proves to be dangerous and long, states will have much to worry about, but if the system is peaceful and long, it will benefit the international community. I hope that my dissertation has delineated factors that have contributed to U.S. primacy in the first 20 years since the end of the Cold War. I also hope that I have added understandings about the prospects of this distinctive international system that so far has been largely stable, at least for highly industrialized democratic countries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akaneya, Tatsuo. "The Japanese-US Alliance: A New Definition." Discussion Paper 76. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1998.

Akiyama, Masahiro. *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta* [Japan-U.S. security dialogue has begun]. Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 2002.

Alvah, Donna. *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965*. New York: New York University Press, 2007.

Arakaki, Tsutomu, Daisuke Ebihara, and Akiyoshi Murakami. *Nichibei chii kyoutei: Kichi higaisha kara no kokuhatsu* [Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement: Accusation from the victims of military bases], Iwanami Booklet, no. 554. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001.

Art, Robert. *Grand Strategy for America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Bacevich, Andrew. *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008.

Baker, Anni P. *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.

Barnett, D. Sean, and James S. Thomason. "Flexible Presence in the 21st Century." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 20 (Autumn/Winter, 1998/99): 7-14.

Beckley, Michael. "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure." *International Security* 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 41-78.

Berger, Thomas. "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism." *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–150.

------. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Blaker, James. *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma*. New York: Praeger 1990.

Bouei Shou. *Bouei hakusho, Heisei 21 nendo ban* [Defense while paper, 2009]. http://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/mod_sdf/kousei/index.html (accessed November 22, 2012).

" British-French summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998." In *From St-Mato to Nice European Defense: Core Documents*, Chaillot Papers 47, Compiled by Maartje Rutten, Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, May 2001.

Bromley, Simon. "The Limits to Balancing." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 129-134.

Brooks, Stephen G., and William Wohlforth. "American Primacy in Perspective." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 20-33.

------. "Hard Times for Soft Balancing." *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72-108.

------. *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

------. "Assessing the Balance." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (2011): 201-219.

Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment." *International Security* 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/13): 7-51.

Brown, Michael. "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion." *Survival* 37, no. 1 (1995): 34-52.

Calder, Kent. *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Clarke, Duncan, and Daniel O'Connor. "U.S. Base Rights Payments after the Cold War." *Orbis* (Summer 1993), 441-457.

Clarke, Duncan, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis. *Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

"Climbing Greenback Mountain." *The Economist*, September 24, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/21528988 (accessed November 2, 2012).

Coleman, Bradley. "Command History Overview, United States Southern Command." August 19, 2009. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=76 (Accessed November 4, 2009).

Coletta, Paolo E., ed. *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985.

Converse III, Elliot. "United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System." PhD diss., Princeton University, 1984.

Cooley, Alexander. "Base Politics: Redeploying U.S. Troops." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 79-92.

------. *Base Politics: Democratic Change and The U.S. Military Overseas*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Copeland, Dale. *The Origins of Major War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.

"Dai hyakusanjyukkai kokkai niokeru Murayama naikakusouridaijin shoshin shoumeienzetsu [Speech of Prime Minister Murayama in 130th session of the Diet]." July 18, 1994. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/murayamasouri/speech/murayama.html (accessed April 8, 2013).

Desch, Michael. "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies." *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 141-170.

Doyle, Michael. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no 3 (Summer 1983): 205-235.

Duffield, John. "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53, no. 65 (Autumn 1999): 765-803.

------. *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Duke, Simon. *U.S. Defence Bases in the United Kingdom*. London: Macmillan, 1987.

------. *The New European Security Disorder*. London: St Martin's Press, 1994.

Ebata, Kensuke. *Saishin amerika no gunjiryoku* [America's military power, new ed.] Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002.

Eldridge, Robert. *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952*. New York: Garland, 2001.

European Parliament, Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System. "Working Document in Preparation for a Report on the Existence of a Global System for Intercepting Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON interception system)." May 4, 2001.

Fallows, James. "Containing Japan." *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1989.

------. *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1994.

Fearon, James. "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science." *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 169-95.

------. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68-90.

Finnemore, Martha. “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be.” *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 58-85 .

Friedberg, Aaron. *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2011.

Frontline. “Richard M. Nixon Administration (1969-1974).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/ (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “Gerald R. Ford Administration (1975-1976).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/2.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “Jimmy Carter Administration (1977-1980).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/3.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “Ronald R. Reagan Administration (1981-1984).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/4.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “Ronald R. Reagan Administration (1985-1988).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/5.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “George H. W. Bush Administration (1989-1992).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/6.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “William J. Clinton Administration (1993-1996).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/7.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “William J. Clinton Administration (1997-2000).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/8.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

------. “George W. Bush Administration (2001-2004).” Rumsfeld’s War: U.S. Military Deployment 1969 to Present. October 26, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/maps/4.html (accessed October 24, 2009).

Funabashi, Yoichi. *Doumei hyouryu* [Alliance adrift]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of The Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

George, Alexander. “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison.” In *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy,* edited by Paul Gordon Lauren, 43-68. New York: The Free Press, 1979.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962.

Gerson, Joseph, and Bruce Birchard, eds. *The Sun Never Sets…:Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases*. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991.

Giarra, Paul, and Akihisa Nagashima. “Managing the New US–Japan Alliance.” In *The US–Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, edited by Michael Green and Patrick Cronin, 94-113. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.

Gillem, Mark L. *America Town: Building the Outpost of Empire*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.

Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Glaser, Charles. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as a Self-help.” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 50–90.

------. “Why Unipolarity Doesn’t Matter (Much).” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 135-147.

GlobalSecurity.org. “Status-of-Forces Agreement.” n.d. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm (accessed October 1, 2009).

Gordon, Philip. “Recasting the Atlantic Alliance.” *Survival* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 32-57.

------. “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy.” *International Security* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98): 74-100.

Green, Michael. *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Grieco, Joseph. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485–507.

------. *Cooperation among Nations.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

------. "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neorealist Research Programme." *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 21–40.

Hanson, Stephanie. "The Pentagon's New Africa Command." Council on Foreign Relations. May 3, 2007. http://www.cfr.org/publication/13255 (accessed May 7, 2007).

Harrison, Todd. *Analysis of the FY2011 Defense Budget*. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY.pdf (accessed July 26, 2010).

Harkavy, Robert. *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.

------. B*ases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

------. *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000*. London: Routledge, 2007.

Hebert, Adam. "Black September 11." *Air Force Magazine*, September 2002. http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2002/September%202002/0902black.pdf (accessed September 29, 2012).

Heisei 11 nen do ban Bouei Handobukku [Handbook for Defense 1999]. (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun Sha, 1999).

Hellmann, Gunther, and Reinhard Wolf. "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of NATO." *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 3–43.

Heuser, Beatrice. *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000*. London: Macmillan Press, 1997.

Hisae, Masahiko. *Beigun saihen* [U.S. force realignment]. Tokyo: Kodansha, 2005.

Höhn, Maria, and Seungsook Moon, eds. *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

Hoffmann, Stanley. *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the*

Cold War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.

Hook, Glenn, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson. *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Routledge, 2005.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Why International Primacy Matters." *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 68-83.

------. *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Ikenberry, G. John. "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order." *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998/99): 43-78.

------. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Ikenberry, John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth. "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences." *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 1-27.

Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William Wohlforth, eds. *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1990/91*. London: Pergamon, 1990.

------. *The Military Balance 1998/99.* London: Oxford University Press, 1998.

------. *The Military Balance 2004-05.* London: Oxford University Press, 2004.

------. *The Military Balance 2009*. London: Routledge, 2009.

International Monetary Fund. *World Economic Outlook: Tensions from the Two-Speed Recovery* (Unemployment, Commodities, and Capital Flows). April 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf (accessed September 22, 2012).

Jacques, Martin. *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.

"JCS 570/40 Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights (October 25, 1945)." Section 9, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

Jervis, Robert. "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective." *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 188-213.

Johnson, Chalmers. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000.

------. *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004.

------. *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.

------. *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010.

Johnson, Chalmers, and E. B. Keehn. "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 1995, 103–114.

Jones, Seth G. *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996).

Joint Statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga. May 1, 2006. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/65523.htm (accessed May 2, 2006).

"Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee." February 19, 2005. file://G:¥www_bk¥j¥news¥youjin¥2005¥02¥0219_2plus2¥04.htm (accessed January 24, 2006).

Kagan, Robert. *The World America Made*. New York: Knopf, 2012.

Kapstein, Ethan B., and Michael Mastanduno, eds. *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Katzenstein, Peter. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Katzenstein, Peter, and Yutaka Tsujinaka. *Defending the Japanese State: Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s*. Cornell East Asia Series, East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1991.

Kawakami, Takashi. *Beigun no zenpou tenkai to nichibei doumei* [U.S. forward presence and Japan-U.S. alliance]. Tokyo: Doubunkan Shuppan, 2004.

Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers*. New York: Random House, 1987.

Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Politics*.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane, Robert, and Kenneth Waltz. "Correspondence: The Neorealist and His Critics." *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 204-5.

Kindleberger, Charles. *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

Kissinger, Henry. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. 1957. Reprint, Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1984.

-----. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Kliman, Daniel. *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World*, The Washington Papers 183, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).

Krasner, Stephen. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28, no. 3 (April l976): 317-347.

Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (Winter, 1990/91): 23-33.

Kupchan, Charles A. "The False Promise of Unipolarity: Constraints on the Exercise of American Power." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 165-173.

Kydd, Andrew. "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other." *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (1997): 114-145.

Labs, Eric. "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their Security Aims." *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (1997): 1-49.

Layne, Christopher. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise." *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5-51.

------. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing." *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 86-12.

------. "Offshore Balancing Revisited." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 233-248.

------. *Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

------. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41.

------. "The Unipolar Exit: Beyond the *Pax Americana*." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 149-164.

------. "The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing." *The National Interest*, January 27, 2012. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405 (accessed September 27, 2012).

Legro, Jeffrey W. "The Mix that Makes Unipolarity: Hegemonic Purpose and International Constraints." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 185-199.

Lieber, Keir, and Gerard Alexander. "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back." *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 109-139.

Lieber, Robert. *Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States is Not Destined to Decline*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Lynn-Jones, Sean M. "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay." *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 157-182.

Lutz ,Catherine, ed. *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*. London: Pluto Press, 2009.

Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Dawn of Peace in Europe*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996.

------. *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.

Mastanduno, Michael. "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy." *International Security* 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 73–113.

------. "System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy." *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 121-154.

Matsumoto, Kenichi. *Kaikoku and ishin, 1851-1871*. Nihon no kindai 1 [Opening of Japan and revolution, 1851-1871. Modern Japan 1]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1998).

Mauzy, Diane K., and Brian Job. "Limited Re-engagement after Years of Benign Neglect." *Asia Survey* XLVII, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 622-641.

Mearsheimer, John. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International Security* 15, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 5-56.

------. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 1, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5–49.

------. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.

------. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia" *The Chinese*

Journal of International Politics, no. 3 (2010): 381-396.

------. "Imperial by Design." *National Interest*, January/February 2011, 16-34.

NATO. *2001 NATO Handbook*. http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1001.htm (accessed October 30, 2001).

------. "Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed." NATO Update, October 2, 2001. http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm (accessed April 6, 2013).

McCalla, Robert. "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 445-75.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Japan's Assistance in Afghanistan: Towards Self-Reliance." January 2013. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/pdfs/japan_assistance.pdf (accessed April 7, 2013).

Monteiro, Nuno P. "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful." *International Security* 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 9-40.

Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985.

Morrow, James D. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 270-97.

"Moving On: America's Troop Deployments." *The Economist*, August 19, 2004. http://www.economist.com/background/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=3107... (accessed May 23, 2005).

Nagashima, Akihisa. *Nichibei doumei no atarashii sekkeizu* dai 2 han [New plans for the Japan-U.S. alliance. 2nd ed.). Tokyo: Nippon Hyouron Sha, 2004.

Navy.mil. "The Carriers: The List." http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-list.asp (accessed November 13, 2010).

------. "The Carriers—Why the Carriers?" http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-why.asp (accessed November 15, 2010).

McNeill, William H. *A World History*. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Medeiros, Evan S. "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability." *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2005-06), 145–167.

Northam, Jackie. "Pentagon Creates Military Command for Africa." NPR, February 7, 2007. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7234997 (accessed May 5, 2009).

O'Donnell, Clara Marina, ed. *The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO's Largest Members*, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings, Analysis Paper (July 2012).

Ohtomo, Takafumi. "*Reisengo no doumei to beigun kaigai kichi tenkai* [U.S. overseas bases and alliances after the Cold War]." *Kokusai seiji keizaigaku kenkyu* [International political economy] (University of Tsukuba), no. 10 (October 2002): 63-71.

------. "Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion: NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the Cold War." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 3, no. 1 (2003): 29-55.

------. Review of *Embattles Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism*, by Kent Calder. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9, no. 1 (2009): 197-200.

------. "U.S. Military Bases and Force Realignments in Japan." Paper presented at the Managing the Medusa Project: U.S.-Japan Alliance Relations in Comparison with US-UK and US-Germany Ties, Hokkaido University, August 29-30, 2006.

------. "Predominance of U.S. Global Military Presence: Personnel, SOFAs, and the Command Structure." *Area Studies Tsukuba*, no. 31 (2010): 93-112.

------. "Understanding U.S. Overseas Military Presence after World War II." *Journal of International and Advanced Japanese Studies*, no. 4 (March 2012): 17-29.

Okinawa Times. *Okinawa kara: Beigun kichi mondai dokyumento* [From Okinawa: The document of U.S. base problem]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1997.

Pape, Robert. "Soft Balancing against the United States." *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7-45.

------. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 2006.

Pape, Robert, and James Feldman. *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.

Paul, T.V. "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy." *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46-71.

Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitude Project. "China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower." July 13, 2011,

http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/13/chapter-1-the-global-balance-of-power/ (accessed August 28, 2012).

Posen, Barry. "The Case for Restraint." *American Interest*, November/December 2007. http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331 (accessed September 27, 2012).

------. "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2013).

Power, Samantha. *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Prasad, Eswar, and Lei Ye. "Will the Renminbi Rule?" *Finance & Development*, March 2012. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/03/pdf/prasad.pdf (accessed November 1, 2012).

Preble, Christopher. *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Prosperous, and Less Free*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003.

Rasmussen, Anders Fogh. "How to Keep NATO Strong: The Transatlantic Alliance Cannot be Taken for Granted." *Foreign Policy*, April 10, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/how_to_keep_nato_strong?page=0,0 (accessed April 11, 2013).

Richelson, Jeffery. *The US Intelligence Community*. 5th ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2007.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 357–399. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

------. *Cooperation among Democracies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Rosato, Sebastian. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (November 2003): 585-602.

Russet, Bruce. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Samuels, Richard. *"Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

Sandars, Christopher. *America's Overseas Garrisons*. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2000.

Schwarz, Benjamin and Christopher Layne. "A New Grand Strategy." *Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002.

Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107.

------. "Neorealism's Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 90–121.

------. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

------. "The Future is Uncertain and the End is Always Near." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 175-184.

Security Consultative Committee. "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." October 29, 2005. http://www.jda.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2005/10/1029_2plus2/29_e.html (accessed January 20, 2006).

Shinoda, Tomohito. *Nichibei doumei toiu rearizumu* [Emerging realism of the Japan-U.S. alliance]. Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 2007.

Shirk, Susan. *China: Fragile Superpower*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Simms, Brendan. "Introduction: World Out of Balance." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 119-120.

Singer, J. David. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (October 1961): 77-92.

Snyder, Glenn. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461-495.

------. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

Snyder, Jack, and Thomas Christensen. "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity." *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137-168.

Snyder, Jack, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon. "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home." *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 155-187.

Sotooka, Hidetoshi, Masaru Honda, and Toshiaki Miura. *Nichibeidoumei hanseiki: Anpo to mitsuyaku* [U.S.-Japan Alliance's half century: Security treaty and secret agreements]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 2001.

Spence, Michael A. "Job Market Signaling." *Quarterly Journal of Economic* 87, no. 3

(August 1973): 355-74.

Strategic Forecasting. "The End of an Era: New Technologies and the Withdrawal of Orions from the North Atlantic." Premium, September 29, 2006. http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=276658 (accessed April 27, 2007).

Sunohara, Tsuyoshi. *Doumei henbou: Nichibei ittaika no hikari to kage* [Alliance transformed]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Shuppan Sha, 2007.

Tetlock, Philip, and Aaron Belkin, eds. *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

"The Dating Game." *The Economist*, December 27, 2011. http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/save_date (accessed September 22, 2012).

Tsuchiyama, Jitsuo. "Araiansu derenma to nihon no doumei gaikou: Nichibei doumei no owari [Alliance dilemma and Japanese alliance diplomacy]." *Leviathan*, no. 13 (1993): 50-75.

Thies, Wallace J. *Why NATO Endures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Thomas, I. Q. R. *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.

Tuschhoff, Christian. "Alliance Cohesion and Peaceful Change in NATO." In *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, edited by Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, 140-161. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Umebayashi, Hiromichi. *Jyouhou koukai hou de toraeta zainichi beigun* [Understanding U.S. forces in Japan through U.S. Freedom of Information Act]. Tokyo: Koubunken, 1992.

------. *Jyouhou koukai hou de toraeta Okinawa no beigun* [Understanding U.S. forces in Okinawa through U.S. Freedom of Information. Tokyo: Koubunken, 1994.

------. *Zainichi beigun* [U.S. forces in Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002.

"United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" issued following May 1, 2006 Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee involving Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, May 1, 2006." http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/65517.htm (accessed May 2, 2006).

U.S. Africa Command. "About AFRICOM." n.d.,

http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp (accessed August 7, 2009).

------. "Questions and Answers About AFRICOM." n.d. http://www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp (accessed August 7, 2009).

------. *2009 Posture Statement: Partnership, Security, Stability*. 2009. http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement.pdf (accessed August 7, 2009).

U.S. Central Command. "AOR Countries." n.d. http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/aor/ (accessed Jan 17, 2010).

------. "USCENTCOM History." n.d. http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-history/ (accessed January 17, 2010).

U.S. Department of Defense. *East Asia Strategy Report*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995.

------. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 30, 2001.

------. *Transformation Planning Guidance*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003.

------. *2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004.

------. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). News Release, "DoD Announces Installation Realignment in Germany." July 29, 2005. http://www.defenselink.mil/realeases/2005/nr20050729-4262.html (accessed April 20, 2006).

------. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006.

------. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A). March 31, 2009. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0903.pdf (accessed October 2, 2009).

------. *Base Structure Report 2009*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2009.

------. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report.* Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010. http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed April 11, 2013).

------. Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations & Environment). *Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline* (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory). http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/bsr2011baseline.pdf (accessed September 27, 2012).

------. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2012. http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed April 10, 2013).

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms." October 3, 2012. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/198794.pdf (accessed November 13, 2012).

U.S. European Command. "A Brief History." n.d. http://www.eucom.mil/english/history.asp (Accessed November 4, 2009).

------. "Area of Focus," January 6, 2009. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/aoi.php (Accessed November 4, 2009).

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Overseas Presence: More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine Whether Cost-Effective Alternatives Exist*. Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1997.

U.S. Northern Command. "About USNORTHCO." n.d. http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (Accessed November 4, 2009).

U.S. Pacific Command. "USPACOM Fact Sheet." n.d. http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/uspacom/printfacts.shtml (accessed July 22, 2009).

------. "Strategy: Partnership Readiness Presence." April, 2009. http://www.pacom.mil/web/pacom_resources/pdf/pacom%20strategy%2002APR09.pdf (accessed July 22, 2009).

USIS Washington File. "Transcript: Alright Interview on NBC-TV February 19." February 19, 1998. http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/19/98021907_tpo.html (accessed November 13, 2012).

Vine, David. *Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Voten, Erik. "Unipolar Politics as Usual." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 121-128.

Wallander, Celeste. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War." *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 705-735.

Wallander, Celeste, and Robert Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions." In *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, edited by Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celleste Wallander, 21-74. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1999.

Walt, Stephen. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

------. *Revolution and War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

------. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse." *Survival* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 156-79.

------. *Taming American Power: The Global Response To U.S. Primacy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005.

------. "Alliances in a Unipolar World." *World Politics* 61, No. 1 (January 2009): 86-120.

------. "Indispensable or Insolvent." *Foreign Policy* Blog, entry posted June 21, 2010. http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/21/indispensable_or_insolvent#commentspace (accessed June 22, 2010).

------. "The End of the American Era." *National Interest*, November/December 2011. http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037?page=show (accessed September 20, 2012).

Waltz, Kenneth. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

------. "The Stability of a Bipolar World." *Daedalus* 93, no. 3 (Summer 1964): 881-909.

------. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.

------. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 44-79.

------. "International Politics is Not Foreign Policy." *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 54-57.

------. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5-41.

Weitsman, Patricia. "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances" *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 156–92.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 392-425.

------. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 392-425.

------. "The Social Structures of Anarchy." Paper presented at the Program on

International Politics, Economic and Security. University of Chicago, 1995.

------. "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics." In *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, edited by Yosef Lapid and Fredrick Kratochwil, 47-64. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.

------. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

White House. Fact Sheet: Making America More Secure by Transforming Our Military. August 16, 2004. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-5.html (accessed November 19, 2006).

------. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.* Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002.

------. Statement by President George W. Bush. November 25, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031125-11.html (accessed November 19, 2006).

Wohlforth, William C. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41.

------. "U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World." In *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*, edited by G. John Ikenberry, 98-118. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.

------. "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War." *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 28-57.

"WW2 People's War." BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1138420.shtml (accessed January 15, 2010).

Yeo, Andrew. *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

"(Yoku aru shitsumon) Okinawa shinkou yosan nitsuite." Okinawa ken. http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/kikaku/chosei/kikaku/yokuaru-yosan.html (accessed March 20, 2013).

Zakaria, Fareed. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Zelikow, Phillip D., and Condoleezza Rice. *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.