

Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism

— Spaces for Convergence?

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As with all particular issues and problems stemming from the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide and debate, any possible solutions lie in finding a mutually acceptable position or outcome of balance and compromise between these two fundamental paradigmatic interpretations of the world. Each concept/definition—"cosmopolitan"/"communitarian" is a mirror image of the other—for want of better terms. They have always been with us, throughout human history. At each stage/phase of history the world evolves into something new, based upon what has gone before. To some extent the world and the so-called "intelligent beings" within it learn from the collective experience of the past and to some extent they don't—but proceed to make the same mistakes, more or less. The rational sense that we are all "in the same boat"—existentially and realistically speaking, regardless of whatever philosophical, religious or scientific attempt at understanding we may adopt, is growing day by day at an increasingly rapid rate as science and technology haul humanity together into an uncertain and possibly doomed future. Education, experience, dialogue and a collective desire to survive and evolve, at least into the foreseeable future, more or less intact and with hope are key points of both realism and idealism which this essay will again and again return to address. As Rorty and Habermas and other contemporary thinkers rightly state and explore in their sometimes contrasting/sometimes converging ways is the fact that such terms as pragmatism, democracy, realism, idealism, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism etc., are all inextricably linked together as part of our contemporary reality and we need to clarify and understand these "links" if we are to progressively evolve.

Since the beginnings of inter-continental exploration and trade, the world has rapidly become more and more inter-related and interdependent, both economically and sociologically (and, one could also argue, on some levels at any rate, and among the more well-off and better-educated—psychologically and philosophically too.) And now, as we enter the 21st Century, this process is unfolding and evolving on a vast and hitherto unprecedented scale. With the current demise of extreme political-ideological polarity—following the end of the Cold War, or the "End of History" as Francis Fukuyama would (prematurely) have it, this progressive tendency would seem to have reached, or to be reaching, its apogee. This new "unity" is of course partly real and partly illusory. Real, because economic interdependence is now greater than ever before, and cultural exchange and understanding through, for example, the mass media, travel, education and the Internet, is constantly increasing. Allied to this is the fact that Liberal Democracy, (or approximations thereof) now appears to be the dominant

ideological model in most parts of the world. We have long since become the “global village” of McLuhan’s and others’ projections. The unity is illusory however, because nationalism, xenophobia, totalitarian religious bigotry and racial and cultural separatism remain (in many instances) as stubbornly potent and intransigent as ever. The post-war efforts of the UN to promote, as comprehensively as possible, the aims and ideals of practical utility and equity (based on its liberal code of human rights), in a still deeply divided and unjust world, are often thwarted, and the various issues remain fraught with complexity and uncertainty. The perennial problem of the “haves” and the “have-nots” in the world, is now more acute than ever (and seems to be getting worse) and, as perhaps most of us would agree—because of all our greater technological resources, scientific expertise, greater levels of awareness (and the sense of moral responsibility which should accompany this), less acceptable than ever before. As Robert Gilpin comments in his book: “The Political Economy of International Relations”:

“...society no longer regards poverty as natural, the punishment of God, or one’s Karma. Because people generally believe that poverty and its consequences are created by mankind, these conditions have become unacceptable...”¹

And yet the vast majority of us, when we cease to be hypocrites, continue to tolerate, or turn a blind eye to these conditions. Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism: all are part and parcel of current day geo-political realities. But as the dynamic and both the creative and destructive processes of Globalisation spin on into the immediate and more distant future (when we will no longer be alive to witness it), it has become crucial to try to understand and analyse the process and to remedy the fear of loss of national identity and sovereignty with the realisation that we all share the broader identity of being human beings evolving simultaneously from diverse cultural and historical patterns of heritage and finding that we ultimately have more similarities in common than differences. The recurrent Cosmopolitan plea and interpretation of the world remains relevant and pressing. Education, of course, is key, as Rorty, Feyerabend and Habermas, for example, stress and without it, due to poverty, intellectual closure or corruption—the horrors of terrorism, racism and hatred will continue and worsen. But can open-ended and open-minded education be forced upon closed systems of thought, be they of a political or a religious nature? The answer is that they should be introduced and then, hopefully embraced by at least some of the community. We can see the process evolving in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, where the agendas of the intervening/invading parties may be not entirely without self-interest—but at least the wish to promote democracy and freedom of choice *is* real and is arguably yearned for by a majority in these and other Middle Eastern countries. Common sense and the need for mutual survival dictates that a certain “dovetailing” of secular and religious beliefs/efforts need to be encouraged and promoted.

I would like to bring Kant into the argument at this point. His broadly Cosmopolitan outlook, as

1 Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987) p.263

outlined in “Perpetual Peace” and elsewhere has been able to provide many pointers towards a realistic route to a peaceful world order—up to a point. Cosmopolitan thinking is undoubtedly one of the most important things to have emerged from the European Enlightenment and particularly from Kant’s own contributions. The grisly catalogue of 20th Century horrors has proved that Nationalism and rigid Communitarian thinking are destructive and divisive when adhered to in stubborn and blinkered isolation and are largely inappropriate and inadequate when it comes to dealing with issues of human rights, distributive justice, the larger questions of universal morality, the ailing environment and other shared problems concerning the present and future of this planet and its inhabitants. Today, such issues are more pertinent and urgent than ever before as we confront the realities of globalisation and complex inter-dependence and become increasingly more and more aware of the mutual and reciprocal nature of the world’s needs and problems, from environmental destruction to chronic over-population, the rich/poor gap and so on. All of which has been brought into sharper relief by the end of the Cold War and the de-polarization of world politics.

The global moves towards independence and “self-determination” after lengthy periods of European imperialism and then the inevitable regional grouping of geographically and culturally linked areas of the world are perhaps the two most significant political phenomena of the post war world (apart, of course, from the collapse of communism—in all but a few remaining areas—and the end of the Cold War since 1989.) As we begin our journey into the 21st Century, the future is very uncertain, and we can only wonder and speculate about the possible paths ahead for nations and for “global citizens” in the evolving “New World Order” (or disorder).

Most of us would agree, I think, that the existence and continuous evolution of the United Nations remains urgently necessary—if only to monitor and contain the incumbent and developing “power-blocks” of the world, such as America, Europe and China. If the UN did not exist, what recourse to forum debate, international analysis and concerted international action and co-operation would the nations of the world have in the event of massive natural disasters or wars breaking out, or the spread of hate-fuelled and irrational terrorism or indeed the invasion of weak states by stronger ones? Although Kant is well aware of human frailty and imperfection he is basically a guarded optimist and could perhaps be described as a “gradual revolutionary”. These are both significant and laudable attributes. For even if one does not share Kant’s partially religious beliefs, one can at least share in his sense of moral responsibility and attitude of *hope*. (Arguably, an atheistic/humanist or agnostic/humanist position would seem to require an even stronger sense of moral responsibility than a theistic one, since such philosophical positions have no—or little—recourse to other-worldly solutions or salvation). I would strongly argue that we *all* have a moral responsibility to be both optimistic *and* pragmatic, and to seek positive societal changes in the world—to also be “*gradual revolutionaries*”. To some degree, it could be argued, cosmopolitan and communitarian thought move towards some sort of convergence here, because change is inevitable and remorseless, and both sides recognise this, even though the immediate attitudes towards change may differ. One could easily argue that the more nationalistic and rigidly conservative strands of

communitarian thinking are naturally averse to and frightened of change. Although this is often true, it remains something of a generalization. The “*type*” of change that one considers, whether it is philosophical, political, psychological or technological, *is* important, of course, but even here there may well be overlaps and convergence, particularly when one sees the “centre” in politics expanding all the time. Generally speaking, changes will be welcomed into a community—no matter how “closed” or insular it may be—if it is largely perceived that the changes in question contribute to the well-being and positive evolution of that community, or at least to the well-being of significant numbers within that community. (However, changes are sometimes manifestly unwelcome and forced of course, as in most cases of imperialism—but even here, as Marx famously argued—there is a place for this and it is, to some extent, inevitable when considering the bigger picture of evolution and progress.) Difficulties and complexities arise when it is not immediately clear whether or not the changes taking place are in fact making a positive contribution. Take language as an obvious example. The English language, spread and perpetuated initially through imperialism, is now, manifestly, the primary “lingua-franca” (or should that be: “lingua-anglia”!) of the world. The advantage of this, from a cosmopolitan point of view, is that it brings greater ease to international communication (and hopefully, understanding) through business, tourism, scientific developments, educational and cultural exchanges and so on. One of the *disadvantages* can be seen in the way this plethora of English sometimes causes “non-native” English speakers to criticize, grow confused about or even ignore their own linguistic and cultural heritage—or conversely, refuse to have anything to do with English! Balances are often achieved of course, as they have to be, but this requires education, patience and effort.

Sport is another great medium for internationalization and universalism, of course, bringing to many different countries, both large and small, the chance to play and compete in what are, by and large, mutually healthy and beneficial pursuits. Its obvious disadvantages seem to be in the way it often bolsters and perpetuates feelings of national (and sometimes racial) pride to a sometimes arrogant and chauvinistic degree. On the whole, however, it can be seen to be a relatively harmless form of patriotic expression and release. (Humour and satire are other fundamental forms of psychological “*safety-valves*” which we can generally observe as central manifestations of human behaviour in any given society.)

Consumerism, one of the central *raison d’être*’s of global capitalism, is another great “leveller” in a way, and the most prominent form of international economic competition and co-operation. It’s a bringer of obvious material benefits to those who can afford to pay—but the obvious danger is that it can (and often does) generate feelings of greed, selfishness and envy, causes enormous amounts of destruction and pollution of the natural environment and relies largely on the poorly-paid labour of millions of the “underclass” throughout the Third World. Disease too of course, is another great leveller and has no concern for national boundaries. Thankfully, medical research, knowledge and expertise is, by and large, universally promoted and shared. (Various philanthropic and humanitarian organizations, such as the WHO, the Red Cross and various VSO groups, having played their parts to engender and strengthen this sense of mutual responsibility.)

From the superficial to the profoundly serious then, internationalization and globalization are inevitably beneficial and productive in some ways and harmful and destructive in others. As with most things in life, the light cannot exist without the dark. The wise monitoring of exchange and co-operation is the responsibility both of individuals, non-governmental organizations *and* governments in open-ended communication with each other—both within states and between states. With this, most *liberal* communitarians would surely agree, and it dovetails with some of Kant's central arguments and exhortations in "Perpetual Peace" and in the "Metaphysics of Morals" where he expounds his theory of "positive right". As always, Kant stresses the *universal* application of his assertions:

*The rational idea, as discussed above, of a peaceful (if not exactly amicable) international community of all those of the earth's peoples who can enter into active relations with one another, is not a philanthropic principle of ethics, but a principle of right.*²

Kant's six preliminary articles from "Perpetual Peace" broadly inform the principles laid out in international law. They are intelligent, pragmatic and astute, but as one reads them, one's mind is filled immediately with terrifying and catastrophic images and examples of how they have been violated, abused and ignored in various ways during the course of modern history. This would have disappointed, but not surprised Kant. His formulations are basically suggestions for "ideal laws", which he could only *hope* would take effect. The bitter lessons of 20th Century history have taught us the relevance and value of many of Kant's proposals. Take Article Three, for example:

*Standing armies (miles perpetuus) will gradually be abolished altogether.*³

Great Power envy, distrust and imperialist competition, leading to mutual military build-ups and minor wars during the 19th and 20th Centuries, led both directly and indirectly to the two World Wars. Since the end of the Cold War there certainly still remains a certain amount of distrust between states, but arguably nowhere as near as much distrust as was felt during the severe ideological and economic confrontation of the Cold War years, and perhaps we are moving towards levels of greater maturity, understanding and co-operation between states that Kant hoped for and envisioned. Perhaps. The current expansions of the EU and of NATO would seem to be at least in the process of creating evidence for this point of view. The threat of nuclear catastrophe in a MAD World War Three scenario between the capitalist and communist blocs has been averted and probably eliminated, at least for the foreseeable future, and hence the reasons for an arms race and the perpetuation of a mutual deterrent have been reduced. (But the danger of nuclear attacks between smaller states, such as India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons accidents and limited nuclear exchanges

2 Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, (Trans. By H.B. Nisbet, Edited by Hans Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p.172

3 Immanuel Kant, *ibid.*, p.94

and terrorism involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction remains of course.) However, the maintenance of *moderate* “self-defence forces”, as Kant had stipulated, would seem to be the trend now emerging—at least in European countries and Japan for example. The watchwords are co-existence and co-operation.

Democratic representation has developed somewhat since Kant’s day and, arguably, the current liberal democracies of the world (or approximations thereof) come closest to fitting the bill of Kant’s “republican ideal”. The horrifying and cathartic experiences of World War Two were fundamental in helping to convince individuals and states of the potential dangers and evils of unbridled nationalism leading to fascism, war and genocide. As a result, pacific and legalistic bodies such as the United Nations and all its sub-organizations, other NGOs like Amnesty International and Greenpeace and economic and cultural co-operatives such as the EU, ASEAN and APEC continue to expand and evolve.

The political and economic realities of the world today are far more complex and cosmopolitan than in Kant’s time, of course. His proposed limitations on international movement within the framework of a “*universal hospitality*” still has some resonance however. The movement of people across the globe in this modern era of mass air travel is unprecedented. Yet the vast confluent of people moving about for a variety of reasons; such as tourism, business, employment, diplomatic exchange, international marriage and education etc., is strictly controlled by visa regulations and various legal constraints, and security is necessarily tightening with the growing spectre of terrorism. Even so—this enormous freedom of mobility has created a far more open international environment than ever before, in which people can develop their cosmopolitan instincts and desires if they so wish. Inevitably, there are numerous dangers and confusions of course, as waves of immigrants move and re-settle across the globe, creating new multi-racial and multi-cultural societies. On the whole, the trend is positive and exciting (from a cosmopolitan point of view) because the ignorance and prejudices it will help to break down are greater (in the long term) than the fears and the prejudices it will help to re-ignite and kindle. Many would dispute this of course, but, taking the United Kingdom as an example, where are the “*streets running with rivers of blood*” of Enoch Powell’s savage and cynical predictions? Occasional riots and sporadic racial attacks do not constitute a terminal crisis. The Neo-Nazi movements in parts of America, Britain, France and Germany, for example, are indeed worrisome, but they are relatively minuscule in size and appeal and are largely condemned by the vast majorities of the populations. However, racism and the dark appeal of fascism, whether overt or covert, remain nasty and unsettling under-currents in many parts of the world, and are not limited to the brutal and mean minorities among the Northern European races, as any thorough sociological survey of the contemporary world will reveal—*every* country has its racists and nascent fascists. The lingering presence of “white” racists and fascists persists and sometimes dominates the mental images one is prone to conjure up as a result of *centuries* of European imperialism and exploitation, however. The on-going and current spate of anti-Aboriginal, anti-Asian and anti-Southern European racism which continues to unfold in present-day Australia

from whites of Northern European descent, symbolized graphically by Pauline Hanson's One Nation party is one more cause for alarm and helps perpetuate this mental image. Thankfully, the paradoxes and the evidence of ignorance and plain stupidity in the propaganda of *all* organized racist groups can clearly be seen and demonstrated, and the Australian example is no exception:

*There are paradoxes in the One Nation view of Australia. It attacks migration from the point of view of one privileged migrant group, while it sees Aboriginal Australians as entitled to be called Australian only if they mimic the culture of that migrant group, and it imports messages about gun rights from the conspiracy theories and constitutional interpretations of North American militias, while stressing its Australian exclusiveness.*⁴

New York on 9/11, and the horrific bombings perpetrated by the followers of Al-Qaeda in Bali and Madrid, reveal the evil of racism and of cultural/religious misunderstanding, envy, incomprehension and exclusivity from another direction of course. For all their insecurities, inequalities and elements of hypocrisy, liberal democracies continue to prove themselves at least partially adequate barriers against the fascistic and totalitarian extremes of both the far right and the far left and of fanatical religious fundamentalism as we see it unfolding today. Today's political and sociological realities combine elements of cosmopolitan, utilitarian and communitarian thinking. It has become evident that no one, single ideology or pattern of thought is pure, completely workable or the final answer. All we can hope to achieve is to continue to grope towards improvement within the parameters of democracy, pragmatism and pluralism. We are living in a complex, pluralistic world, both modern and post-modern with echoes of medievalism and hence the inevitable fragmentation of much contemporary thinking and theorizing and experience. But the fact of our common humanity is always there, in front of us, and common sense intimations of decency, morality and duty are never very far away from our consciousness. Kant is one of those important moral philosophers who help us to identify and remember these basic ideals. In my view, the "*noble cause of peace*" will be promoted, not just through the "*spirit of commerce*" and "*mutual self-interest*", but also, and perhaps more importantly, through the increasing interaction and co-mingling of peoples within and between societies. The complex inter-dependence of which Charles Beitz (among other contemporary cosmopolitan thinkers) speaks, is manifestly a reality. The issues which he and others raise of moral responsibility and distributive justice are crucially important to confront and consider as we live in a world where nations can no longer live in isolation from each other because their possible fates are so inextricably linked and shared. Returning to Kant, his "*pragmatic idealism*" forces us to be aware of our weaknesses and faults, with the ultimate intention of reminding us that we can learn from these limitations and must strive to improve ourselves and the world—no matter how difficult the journey, nor how imperfect our attempts may be:

4 Jeff Archer, *Comparative Post-colonialism: the case of Australia*, (A paper submitted to a workshop conference: *The Dominion Concept: Inter-state and Domestic Politics in the British Empire*, held at the University of Warwick, England, July, 1998) p.11

*Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only requires of us that we should approximate to this idea.*⁵

Kant's "guarded optimism" remains a central influence on contemporary liberal and centre-left thinking. The "rights of man" argument is perennially potent and uplifting medicine for the ills of this world, and Kant continually underlines its importance in his overall moral argument:

*...philanthropy and respect for the rights of man, are obligatory. And while the former is only a conditional duty, the latter is an unconditional and absolutely imperative one; anyone must first be completely sure that he has not infringed it if he wishes to enjoy the sweet sense of having acted justly.*⁶

The cosmopolitan idealism of Marxism has so far proved itself to be far too ambitious and simplistic. Although its arguments and analysis of class-struggle provide a reasonably solid interpretation of some of the central aspects of history, they cannot satisfy or resolve the complexities and plurality of contemporary society. Liberal and Social Democratic ideas and ideals are more likely to prevail (together, of course, with some elements of Conservatism) and an evolving centre-left pattern would seem to be the only reliable framework left in which moral idealism and pragmatism can fruitfully develop. I would argue that the influence of Kant has done much to consolidate this.

Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, Bentham, Mill, Marx, Darwin and Freud are among the centrally important intellectual figures who have helped to liberate modern man from the shackles of dogmatic and unquestioning religious belief and have helped to encourage men to look to themselves for salvation and deliverance from suffering and discord, as far as this may be possible. In varying ways, their work, like that of all committed philosophers, offers us keys with which to unlock the many doors in our minds. Theists will often try to accommodate and modify the ideas and arguments of atheist or agnostic thinkers. This is quite natural, and is in many ways healthy, since it is clear that no one human argument, philosophical position or religious belief has the monopoly on the truth of existence—we are all "in the same boat".

Of all the major Enlightenment thinkers, Kant is perhaps most able to influence and inspire *both* theists and atheists or agnostics because he only stresses the *possibility* of the existence of God. In Kant's critique *and* justification of reason:

*...The worship due to God becomes reverence and devotion for the moral law. The faith which transcends belief becomes the certainty of practical reason which surpasses understanding. The object of esteem is not the Supreme Being, but the supreme attribute of rationality.*⁷

5 Immanuel Kant, *op. cit.*, pp.46-47

6 Immanuel Kant, *ibid.*, pp.129-130

7 Roger Scruton, *Kant*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) p.78

One wonders how the Islamic, Judaic and Christian faiths can progressively accommodate one another (apart from recognizing the fact that they all stem from the same monotheistic roots) *and* other World Religions *and* atheistic or agnostic positions if not by recognizing, at least to *some* degree, the unifying call of reason:

*These (linguistic and religious differences) may certainly occasion mutual hatred and provide pretexts for wars, but as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace.*⁸

The moral responsibility which can dignify and give human life meaning and hope, can also lead to the reality of perpetual peace. At the very least, Kant has shown us that we all have a duty to *try* to ensure this. We either have to swim together or sink together and, unlike the lemmings, man is not *primarily* a suicidal beast. David Held also puts forward the case for cosmopolitan pragmatism:

*...if the history and practice of democracy has until now been centred on the idea of locality (the city-state, the community, the nation), it is likely that in the future it will be centred on the international or global domain. It would be immensely naïve to claim that there are any straightforward solutions to the problems posed by global interconnectedness, with its complex and often profoundly uneven effects; but there is, without doubt, an inescapably important set of questions to be addressed. Certainly, one can find many good reasons for being optimistic about finding a path forward, and many good reasons for thinking that at this juncture democracy will face another critical test.*⁹

I would argue that the concept of Human Rights and the gradual implementation of its progress in human history is closely linked to the historical and philosophical developments of both Cosmopolitanism and Democracy. Three philosophers, not yet mentioned, are also central in the development, in different ways, of the ideas and ideals of Human Rights, namely: Locke, Rousseau and Paine. Some of the parallel ideas about Natural Rights and Natural Law would seem to have evolved from deontological and monotheistic positions (certainly in the case of Kant with the former) and are therefore opposed to the consequentialist and purely secular arguments of the Utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill. While much has been made, quite rightly, I think, of the basic logic and fairness of a unifying conception of human rights as has been embraced by the United Nations, for example, and can be briefly summed up in Warwick University's Peter Burnell's words:

*Human rights are a special sort of inalienable moral entitlement. They attach to all persons equally, simply by virtue of their humanity, irrespective of race, nationality, or membership of any particular social group. They specify the minimum conditions for human dignity and a tolerable life.*¹⁰

⁸ Immanuel Kant, *op. cit.*, pp.113-114

⁹ David Held, (Editor) *Prospects for Democracy—North, South, East, West*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) pp. 45-46

The arguments for and against the various modes and manifestations of utilitarianism *also* remain of particular and perennial relevance since they too confront such basic questions and problems as the sources of human motivation; the connections and tensions between freedom and responsibility; the relationship between individual and societal wants and needs; the tension between altruism and self-interest; the challenge and (as some would argue) the necessity, of developing a purely secular form of morality; the challenges and problems of scientific and economic development on the one hand, and of pollution, conflict, depletion of natural resources, poverty and suffering and the question of distributive justice on the other, and so on. Thus utilitarianism of one type or another (“rule” or “act”) and their chief counter-arguments (such as the need for an “agent-relative” moral view; Rawls’ complaint that “...utilitarianism gives no direct weight to considerations of justice and fairness in the distribution of goods”;¹¹ or that it is just too demanding and coldly rational—the view in part of Bernard Williams, for example, also intrude powerfully upon the questions of international justice and human rights issues with which we are all seriously faced. While utilitarianism is often perceived as negatively sceptical, I think it is more productive to view it as a rational and necessary adjunct to more personal, deontological frameworks and as a means of breaking down the barriers between cultural and religious differences in the world, which, as I have argued, is of fundamental importance if we are to go on evolving peacefully within a broadly democratic framework.

In one of his publications: “Motivating Political Morality”, another utilitarian thinker concerned with welfare and greater egalitarianism both within and between societies, Robert E. Goodin, cites a Judeo-Christian precedent to utilitarian thinking:

*The Golden Rule, in its various guises, fills that minimalist bill admirably. Morally, the Golden Rule ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’—is indeed the least common denominator. Certainly it is so at least among all extant Western moral codes, however diverse they might otherwise be.*¹²

Goodin goes on to argue that although this “Golden Rule” is minimalist and thus has limitations, it is remarkably effective in public and private life in at least curtailing and controlling “people’s ordinary avaricious impulses”. Goodin’s work generally emphasizes the need for utilitarian principles to be taken on board by governments; thereby (hopefully) ensuring that the rest of society is influenced by this and willingly adapts itself to the need for inner change, and acts upon the call for greater benevolence and equality. Aware that the inherited moral codes of monotheistic (and specifically Judeo-Christian here) religion still hold sway among millions of people in many of the more affluent and powerful countries, such as America and those of the European Union, Goodin reminds us of the natural links between those codes and the more secular ones of utilitarianism:

10 Peter Burnell (Contributor), *The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*, (Edited by Iain Mclean, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p.228

11 Simon Scheffler (Editor), *Consequentialism and its Critics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) p.2

12 Robert E. Goodin, *Motivating Political Morality*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p.11

*In legislating for the more common, standard sort of case, public policy makers will very much more often than not find that the requirements of the utility principle and those of the Ten Commandment Deontologists will dovetail nicely.*¹³

This “dovetailing” of moral standards could equally, I would argue, be achieved between the non-Western traditions of ethics such as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism and the Monotheistic traditions of the West (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and the *secular* traditions of both. Within this open-ended framework lie both the conceptions and the practical framework of human rights and their applications.

Although approaches to human rights issues may sometimes be relative, *awareness* of such issues are universal, and thus conflict between so-called “Asian Values” and so-called “Western Values” can and should be minimalised or even avoided altogether. Rather than focusing on the possible future dangers of the “Clash of Civilizations”, we should perhaps be focusing more on the gradual integration and peaceful co-existence of the civilizations, or in Vaclav Havel’s resonant phrase: “*One Civilization—Many Cultures*”.

As I believe I have stated before, dialogue and mutual respect between secular and religious persuasions of *all* kinds is of crucial importance and it is our moral duty (to return to Kant) to ensure that this will be achieved. In his book: “Reasons and Persons”, the Oxford based utilitarian thinker, Derek Parfit pleads quite convincingly for the recognition and development of “non-religious ethics”:

*There could clearly be higher achievements in the struggle for a wholly just world-wide community...Belief in God, or in many gods, prevented the free development of moral reasoning. Disbelief in God, openly admitted by a majority, is a recent event, not yet completed. Because this event is so recent, Non-Religious Ethics is at a very early stage. We cannot predict whether, as in Mathematics, we will all reach agreement. Since we cannot know how ethics will develop, it is not irrational to have high hopes.*¹⁴

Perhaps, but I think Parfit does not sufficiently acknowledge the durability and universality of religious belief in its various forms and the re-emergence of religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of Communism and the widespread incidence of ethnic conflict (in conjunction with the rapid evolution of democratization and cosmopolitanism), older religions and the clinging onto racial and cultural identities are filling a perceived vacuum for millions around the world and there is as much cause for anxiety and alarm over possible future conflicts as there is for excitement and optimism. As aforementioned in this paper, there *are* basic ethical parallels between the various religious and non-religious creeds and

13 Robert E. Goodin, “*How Ought I To Live*”, from—*A Companion To Ethics*, (Edited by Peter Singer, Oxford: Blackwell Reference, 1991) p.248

14 Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, (2nd Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) p.45

philosophies in the world. Our hopes for survival and evolution will depend, to a large extent, upon our ability and will to recognize them and to learn and grow together.

Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism. These three units of world sociological reality and analysis now dominate political and academic debates, and they are closely linked in obvious ways to the issues of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism. Obviously, all three are rapidly evolving in conjunction with each other and I would argue, along with Anthony Giddens and others, that “Globalism” is fast consolidating itself as the dominant model and that this is both inevitable and desirable if we favour peaceful evolution over the gruesome alternatives. Giddens rather simply, but poignantly, describes the realists and critics of globalization as “sceptics”, and the defenders and promoters of globalization as “radicals”. The idea that the nation-state is unchanging in its dominance over human minds, “has no rivals” and will continue in perpetuity, are illusory ideas based on a fundamental fear of change. We live in an age of rapid transition, and because we cannot possibly predict the future, we are naturally afraid in many ways. Clearly, globalization confronts the world with many problems, both economic and sociological, but it remains a fact of contemporary life, is surely irreversible and we shun it and turn a blind eye to its positive aspects and its enormous potential at our peril:

We continue to talk of the nation, the family, work, tradition, nature, as if they were all the same as in the past, but they are not. They are what I call shell institutions. They are institutions that have become inadequate for the tasks they are called upon to perform. Many of us feel we are in the grip of forces over which we have no power. The powerlessness we experience is not a sign of personal failings, but reflects the incapacities of our institutions. We need to reconstruct those that we have or create new ones in ways appropriate to the global age. We should and we can look to achieve greater control over our world in the global age. We will not be able to do so if we shirk the challenges, or pretend that all can go on as before, because globalization is not incidental to our lives today. It is a shift in our very life circumstances. It is the way we now live.¹⁵

We must continually adjust to change and remain: “pragmatically optimistic”. As change occurs, whether it is in Scientific discoveries and technological applications, in new or shifting geo-political circumstances, or in our human capacity to readjust our perceptions and sensibilities according to the evolving realities we are faced with, the desire and necessity for intellectual and moral progress is key. Democratic frameworks and pragmatic, left of centre approaches to sociological and geo-political problems are arguably the only rational frameworks and arenas of open-minded sensibility with which to proceed. Jürgen Habermas’ position has continually evolved as a left of centre, democratic socialist; a reconstructed Marxist, if you will and a “logical Pragmatist”, exploring conceptions of “universal pragmatics” and finding the most potent threats to individual and societal well-being and

15 Anthony Giddens, *Globalisation: An irresistible force*, from *The Daily Yomiuri*, (Monday, June 7, 1999) p.8

development coming from *“quasi-autonomous systems of bureaucracy and the economy.”* (Habermas, 1985)

Opposition to and deliverance from such extremes of rampant capitalism (and also from the stultifying effects of totalitarian Marxist-Leninism as was found in the old Soviet Union and is today conjoined with elements of Confucianism, feudalism and state capitalism as can be found in contemporary China and North Korea, for example) comes, in Habermas' view, *“not only from the ‘working-class’ (which invariably remains politically conservative and acquiescent) but rather amongst all those social movements which attempt to expand solidaristic forms of social life, and to bring the dynamics of money and power under democratic control.”* (Habermas, 1985)

The liberal/conservative offspring of democratic socialist movements around the world are currently engaged in attempts to engender solidarity amongst people within a given society and between national groupings, some achieving a degree of success, others, less than they might. The educated and questioning individuals amongst the younger generation in many societies, and particularly in the liberal democracies have, from the 1950's through to the present early years of the 21st Century, shown various manifestations of genuine idealism and a desire for peace and increasing awareness through the “counter-culture” expressions of rebellion and frustration with materialism and consumerism such as we see in some rock music (e.g.: Radiohead); avant-garde, conceptual art-forms and the assorted sub-groups seeking recognition and solidarity such as the various feminist, gay, lesbian and other protest and activist groupings. The various new post-war freedoms and emotional and intellectual investigations undertaken by so many on the left, right and centre in the decades following WWII have had a deep influence on countless individuals around the world and political and social philosophers such as Herbert Marcuse were right to see positive elements of a genuine desire for growth and change in these manifestations of “new sensibility”, as he termed it. Younger philosophers, such as John O'Neill, have added to and invigorated the social observation and debate by introducing such perceptive and evocative phrases as “wild sociology” to the discourse. Both Marcuse and O'Neill have realized (like Fromm and others, in their own ways) that the Western traditions of reason and rationality, while being of immense importance in themselves in helping to liberate and bring to greater awareness and freedom so many elements of human potential, both individual and social, have largely failed to acknowledge the importance of subconscious and physical elements within human nature and experience. The parallel and interrelated operations of reason and emotion are often left to the creative artists and writers in society to bring forth into a more general awareness. However, philosophers and social theorists worth their salt are not unaware of the new manifestations of human enquiry, rebellion and self-expression which are usually first perceived and expressed by the notable pantheon of avant-garde artists, musicians and writers of the last century—or of any other century for that matter. As Ben Agger deftly puts it, in his essay: “On Happiness and The Damaged Life”:

“Marcuse’s ‘new sensibility’, like O’Neill’s ‘wild sociology’, is an amalgam of bodily and mental senses, of libidinal and symbolic rationality. The bourgeois concept of reason ignores the rationality of the

*body by concentrating solely on an abstract intellectual rationality, thus denying Freud's profound naturalism and his conception of the objective subject."*¹⁶

The "new sensibility" and "wild sociology" affecting growing numbers of people from the early post-war years to the present time has arguably been given another boost of sorts with the demise of the Cold War ideological and geopolitical scenarios of confrontation. Coming to terms with the new realities; the "New World Order", the overlapping problems of the new (both unsettling and exciting) uncertainties of nationalism, regionalism and globalism, is both challenging and alarming. Inevitably, and perhaps necessarily, political positions are, in many ways, becoming ever more blurred and impure. The confusion and the pluralism is a chance for growth and new insights, however. The developing sense of unity, underlining the diversity; the awareness of the planet as both a "global village" and as an environmentally threatened entity (or even an *organism* itself, if one is prepared to take on board the rather appealing "Gaia" theory) is something which thinkers of almost every political hue or religious persuasion (neo-fascists excluded perhaps) are having to take on board and come to terms with, whether they like it or not.

There are several salient historical reasons for this new sense of internationalism and global awareness (apart from the obvious technological, economic, ethnographic, geographic, linguistic and cultural ones.)

Three of the most important in this century are the tumultuous and bitter experiences of the two World Wars and the cathartic defeat of fascism both in Europe and Asia, the enforced hammering and twisting of Marxist-Leninism and the inevitable frustration and disillusionment with this particular form of totalitarianism, and thirdly, the continuous expansion and development of capitalism as the most potent, total, influential and, more often than not, *exploitative* example of human economic and social interaction. The emergence and rise of multinational corporations has enabled not only the United States to wield its unprecedented global hegemony, but also other powerful capitalist regions and nations to assert their economic might and aspirations. As Robert Gilpin puts it in his important book, "The Political Economy of International Relations":

"Although the important role of multinational corporations in the overall economic and political strategy of the United States is without parallel, other nations have also increasingly viewed their own multinationals as instruments of national policy. European and Japanese multinationals have been employed by their governments to make their own sources of raw materials more secure. As American petroleum MNC's influence has weakened, for example, Japanese multinationals and those of other countries have endeavoured to replace them." (Vernon, 1983, ch.5).¹⁷

16 Ben Agger, "On Happiness and the Damaged Life", from—*On Critical Theory*, (John O'Neill: Editor; London: Heinemann, 1977) p.25

17 Robert Gilpin, *op. cit.*, p.244

All of these de-humanizing and brutal children of European historical and social evolution came strongly under attack from the leading members of the Frankfurt School; notably Benjamin, Fromm, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse. Taking much of their inspiration from the ground-breaking and exhilarating intellectual achievements of the European Enlightenment (specifically, that belief in human potential for growth and progress as expressed, in different ways, by Kant and Hegel) and then later, of course, from the progressive ideas of Marx and Freud, these thinkers, and later others like Habermas, O'Neill and Offe, developed the rigorous and challenging intellectual grounds upon which critical theory was founded and is yet evolving. The interrelations, parallels, overlaps and strands of divergence between critical theorists, post-modernists and post-structuralists and the ongoing deconstruction of Modernity and Post-Modernity are of abiding political and philosophical importance. The inevitable dovetailing of perceptions, values and aspirations of both Cosmopolitans and Communitarians, becomes ever more clear.

One of Habermas' main precursors from the Frankfurt school, Theodor Adorno, recognized, in modern art, (and particularly in the atonal and tense music of Schoenberg and Berg) the striking power of these aesthetic and philosophic aspects of modernity to move, to mystify and to elicit questioning and abstract thought. In retrospect, he also exhibited some "philistinism" and lack of foresight, however, in his negative attitude to jazz and popular music in general. In all fairness to him however, it was only with the post-war developments in be-bop, and other forms of early modern jazz, with the appearance of such seminal and original musicians as Parker, Davis, Coltrane, Monk and Mingus, for example, that jazz too began to scale the heights of abstraction, self-questioning, earnestness and irony. The revolutionary developments and reinterpretations in folk, blues and rock, from the early 1960's through the 1970's and 1980's and on to the present day, have also shown that these forms of music are also sometimes capable of achieving the power to "move, mystify and elicit questioning and abstract thought". (Bob Dylan, The Beatles, The Doors, The Velvet Underground, Pink Floyd, King Crimson, Brian Eno, Talking Heads—and the aforementioned Radiohead are some of the important names in this category, which spring to mind.) The activities of the avant-garde in *any* art form and in *any* age (in fine art, from, say, Delacroix and Goya, to the Expressionists, to Picasso, to Dada and Surrealism, to the Bauhaus, to latter day Abstract Expressionism, to Pop and to Fluxus and conceptual and political art of many kinds) presupposes "on the edge" activity, rebelliousness and questioning in all their vibrant and unexpected forms—whether the parameters chosen enter the realms of the serious and the "highbrow" or of the popular and the "lowbrow". Many modern and contemporary overlaps between these areas often suggest a heightened sense of creative, political and philosophical awareness and a strong desire for human change and evolution.

Returning now to more academic and literary areas, (but of course, much of the aforementioned form part of these discourses too) surely the "post-modern" explorations of a Foucault or a Bataille—examining societal evolution and the power relations engendered and melded by religious, philosophical, historical, anthropological and psychological influences—stem from, and are a further extension of, the modernist credo?

In some essential ways, post-modernist deconstruction, fragmentation and experimentation are

simply extensions of the questioning and exploratory nature of modernity itself, and thus perhaps, ultimately, the term *post-modernity* will become redundant, or will simply be consumed and preserved as a sub-section within the belly of “modernity”. Deconstruction, critical analysis, nihilistic decadence *and* constructive sociological applications of abstract thought are *all* present within the evolving body of modernity. They do not cancel each other out—room for manoeuvre and the cross-fertilization of ideas always remains.

In the following quotation, Jay Bernstein points out how Adorno identifies the important philosophical challenges of modern art and how its myriad forms can lead us continuously, into new realms of thought and reasoning:

*In ‘Aesthetic Theory’ Adorno argues that the kind of non-identity thinking aimed at by negative dialectics is, for the time-being at least, adumbrated in modernist works of art. Successful works of art claim us beyond our ability to redeem their claims conceptually. They are particulars demanding acknowledgement while simultaneously resisting being fully understood or explained: in fact it is their unintelligibility which reveals the wounding duality between particularity and universality in modern rationality. Art prefigures what it would be like to comprehend individuals without dominating them. For Adorno, modernist art enacts a critique of subjective reason, and reveals the possibility of another form of reason.*¹⁸

In creative writing, modernist forms of experimentation and expression have led to some exhilarating and liberating explorations of literary form. From Woolf, to Kafka, to Joyce, to Beckett, to Pound, to Eliot, to Ginsburg, to Kerouac, to Burroughs and so on, (to name just a few of the notable and influential experimenters). Literary “post-modernism” often extends the avant-garde fictional genre into challenging areas of self-questioning and angry and playful irony. The works of Salman Rushdie and Kathy Acker (in the English Language), for instance, are two very powerful, contrasting examples of this.

For academics and theorists—the challenge of writing today is both exciting and daunting; there now being such a plethora of knowledge, information and expressive approaches to choose from. The ultimate value and reward of serious reading and writing lies in the intellectual difficulties which they present us with—often opening up new channels of sensibility and insight in our minds and psyches. A simple, but illuminating comment which Foucault makes in the Preface to “The History of Sexuality, Vol.2”, neatly sums up his positive attitude to thought and study. It is a perennial and important statement which lies at the heart of the true meaning of reading and writing:

*I also reminded myself that it would probably not be worth the trouble of making books if they failed to teach the author something he hadn’t known before, if they didn’t lead to unforeseen places, and if they didn’t disperse one toward a strange new relation with himself. The pain and pleasure of the book is to be an experience.*¹⁹

18 Jay M. Bernstein, “Adorno, Theodor W.”, J.O. Urmson and Jonathan Ree (Editors), *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.1

Jean Baudrillard's hatred (enjoyment?) of the contemporary plethora of communication overload, makes for some entertaining reading—but it is insightful too. Describing and reflecting upon current reality in a style combining echoes of McLuhan, Toffler and Burroughs (for instance):

*The hot, sexual obscenity of former times is succeeded by the cold and communicational, contractual and motivational obscenity of today. The former clearly implied a type of promiscuity, but it was organic, like the body's viscera, or again like objects piled up and accumulated in a private universe, or like all that is not spoken, teeming in the silence of repression. Unlike this organic, visceral, carnal promiscuity, the promiscuity that reigns over the communication networks is one of superficial saturation, of an incessant solicitation, of an extermination of interstitial and protective spaces. I pick up my telephone receiver and it's all there; the whole marginal network catches and harasses me with the insupportable good faith of everything that wants and claims to communicate. Free radio: it speaks, it sings, it expresses itself. Very well, it is the sympathetic obscenity of its content.*²⁰

Like Foucault and Baudrillard, Paul Virilio and James Der Derian are also interesting, wide-ranging and committed observers and commentators: extending the dialogue of sociological experience and blurring the divisions between cosmopolitan and communitarian views of the world. Rather than simply advocating and celebrating the chaotic and fragmented present, (“anything goes means that everything stays”) they are describing and attempting to deconstruct and analyse it. This is surely a critical, constructive *and* deconstructive activity and thus escapes Habermas' accusation that these so-called “Young Conservatives” are merely indulging in indifference and escapism. With Virilio, the preoccupation with sex and the body, as acted upon and as acting within the world—as with Foucault, Baudrillard and Bataille—continues. For such writers, “truth” cannot be found in reason alone (if there at all...) Rather, the basis of truth about the world lies originally in the natural world—in biology and chemistry and physics. It is only later, with the cumulative developments of technology, history, culture and language that the needs and functions of the body are modified, perverted and suppressed. Virilio sees everything in terms of movement and journeying of some kind. The human condition is but one type and one result of biological evolution—constantly in motion—stemming from and ultimately being rewarded and/or punished by sex:

*Man is the passenger of woman, not only at birth but also in their sexual relations...Paraphrasing Samuel Butler, we could say that the female is the means the male has found to reproduce himself, in other words to come into the world. In this sense, woman is the species' first means of transport, its very first vehicle. The second would be the mounting and coupling of dissimilar bodies fitted out for migration, the voyage in common.*²¹

19 Michel Foucault, “Preface to *The History of Sexuality*, Vol.2”, Paul Rabinow (Editor), *The Foucault Reader*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991) p.339

20 Jean Baudrillard, “*The Ecstasy of Communication*”, Hal Foster (Editor), *Postmodern Culture*, (Pluto Press, 1985) p.131

“Speed and Politics—an Essay on Dromology” (“Dromomaniacs. Name given to deserters under the ancient regime, and in psychiatry to compulsive walkers.”)²². is an exhilarating, headlong rush through Western history—with the central emphasis on the evolution of technology modified for warfare and revolution. It’s an entertaining and interesting brief read, but ultimately, it’s pessimistic:

*...the more speed increases, the faster freedom decreases.*²³

Virilio relates the headlong rush towards the dangers of an unpredictable future with more and more consumers and less and less to consume. Man will presumably extend himself into space for his final “lebensraum”:

*The violence of speed has become both the location and the law, the world’s destiny and its destination.*²⁴

For Virilio, the “self” can never be sovereign or free. The continuous violence and devastation wrought upon the planet by man’s activities is further illuminated in Der Derian’s “Antidiplomacy—Spies, Terror, Speed and War”, where he potently weaves intertextuality into a debate about the constant insecurity and instability of current affairs and realities. He quotes freely and widely, and most of the material he cites is harsh and pessimistic. Sadly and uncomfortably, one finds oneself slipping into a grudging acquiescence that yes, the future does indeed look bleak and hopeless...

The quote that follows is from William Burroughs in “The War Universe”:

*This is a war universe. War all the time. That is its nature. There may be other universes based on all sorts of other principles, but ours seems to be based on war and games. All games are basically hostile. Winners and losers. We see them all around us: the winners and the losers. The losers can oftentimes become winners, and the winners can very easily become losers.*²⁵

Der Derian’s own words and observations generally echo this bitter and alienating vision, and he too would seem to be without hope for an effective and realizable project of emancipation and progress. Some notes of hope *are* sounded however, and at the end of the chapter on speed, he quotes from Mikhail Bakhtin. Here I would strongly concur with Der Derian’s prediction and prescription, which, if anything, is a cosmopolitan one—that the only future hope for the world lies in mutual recognition of the ever-present dangers of ecological and international turmoil and

21 Paul Virilio, *Speed and Politics—an Essay on Dromology*, Translated from the French by Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series, 1990) p.159

22 Paul Virilio, *ibid.*, p.153

23 Paul Virilio, *ibid.*, p.142

24 Paul Virilio, *ibid.*, p.151

25 William Burroughs, “*The War Universe*”, from—James Der Derian, *Anti-diplomacy—Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*, (Cambridge MA and Oxford UK: Blackwell, 1992) p.196

destruction, and, through this recognition, a wish to grow together and avert catastrophe:

The second insight comes from the great Soviet linguist and literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin. Although writing about the work of Dostoevsky, he best plots the link between word and world orders, showing us how diplomacy—like language itself—must negotiate the meaning and values that constitute identity out of difference. He provides what I believe should be the first and last entry for a travelogue of the new world order:

*'To be means to be for the other, and through him, for oneself. Man has no internal sovereign territory; he is all and always on the boundary; looking within himself, he looks in the eyes of the other or through the eyes of the other...I cannot do without the other; I cannot become myself without the other; I must find myself in the other, finding the other in me.'*²⁶

In their commitment and concern to deconstruct and analyse the meanings and implications of the Western tradition of political philosophy, the inter-paradigm debate within the field of International Relations (in some cases) and the whole tortuous (but centrally relevant and important subject of the inter-relations between Modernity, Critical Theory and Post-Modernity—as patterns of interpretation and as intellectual vessels by which creative dialogue and pluralistic approaches and insights can remain open and alive—academic writers and thinkers such as Habermas, Foucault, Baudrillard, Bataille, Offe, Der Derian, Walker, Ashley, Connolly, Rengger, Shapiro, Hoffman, Brown, Chan and others are *concerned and creative intellectuals* and cannot be simply pigeonholed as being either “young conservatives” or “young radicals” or whatever, as Habermas would have it.

As Chris Brown clearly illustrates in his useful and comprehensive book, “International Relations Theory—New Normative Approaches”, there are inevitable and interesting overlaps between the critical theorists and the post-modernists. The major difference being, of course, that the former are more immediately concerned to develop the strengths and potentials of human reason which have evolved from the intellectual inheritance of the Enlightenment Project, as they see it, and the latter are generally less optimistic about “human nature” or potential and are more sceptical about the whole inheritance of modernity. Both, however, have interesting and important things to say, and should be continually and thoroughly studied and discussed.

Such academic intellectuals are usually well aware of their *institutionalization* and sometimes fear, no doubt, that their voices will only be heard by the educated few. Everything must have a beginning however—plurality and dialogue, as Brown and others remind us, and as most informed people would doubtless agree, are most sorely needed if the world is to progressively evolve. The discourse between students and teachers in the schools and universities and other institutions of education, and the reading and writing of articles and books, are solid foundations upon which to build. The discourse can and will (and sometimes does) extend itself through other media and into

26 James Der Derian, Mikhail Bakhtin, *ibid.*, p.165

other forums of human interaction and communication. The struggle to learn and to grow and to develop our hearts and minds goes on. The keywords are (or should be): open-mindedness, patience, thought and communication. Granted this, then there *is* hope for the future.

The late and much lamented Edward Said's books, such as "Orientalism" and "Culture and Imperialism" have done much to redress, deconstruct and counter the often arrogant Eurocentric and Anglo-American views of so many scholars and political pundits in the West. His groundbreaking work is interestingly complemented and taken in new directions by, among others: J.J. Clarke of Kingston University in England, in his book: "Oriental Enlightenment—The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought"; Fred Dallmayr of the University of Notre-Dame in the United States in his book: "Alternative Visions—Paths in the Global Village" and the Finnish scholar, Vilho Harle with his book: "Ideas of Social Order in the Ancient World".

Clarke explores how various aspects of Eastern thought, from Hinduism to Buddhism to Taoism to Confucianism have influenced some major Western thinkers from the time of the Renaissance (and before) through the consolidating period of Modernity in the European Enlightenment to further 19th and 20th Century encounters. Important Western philosophers such as Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Heidegger were all influenced to some degree and did much, one could argue, to reveal important aspects of the universal nature of human experience. Thus, in philosophical and intellectual terms, there was a fair amount of "two-way traffic" between the East and the West well before the onset of 19th and 20th Century imperialism and nationalism. Awareness of this helps to counteract the negative influence of such communitarian and imperialist slogans as Rudyard Kipling's famous lines: "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet..."

Clarke also investigates how certain ethical parallels have emerged within the current post-colonial and post-modern times. Fred Dallmayr's work provides further fascinating evidence of ethical and cultural parallels and interrelated philosophical perspectives from all around the world and includes the oft forgotten or marginalized experience of Africa. One of the introductory quotations is from the Bhagavad-Gita and expresses, one could argue, the sentiments of almost any philosopher worth his or her salt:

*Let thy aim be the good of all or world maintenance and thus carry on thy task in life.*²⁷

Concluding his chapter on "Humanity and Humanization", Dallmayr cites a poignant Confucian source. It is moving in a profound way and should be required reading for all those who would insist on division and discrimination:

In the Confucian tradition there is a passage by Chang Tsai (1020-1077) often called the "Western Inscription". It is a passage that Tu Wei-Ming loves to quote—and which indeed deserves to be quoted

²⁷ Fred Dallmayr, *Alternative Visions—Paths in the Global Village*, (Lanham, USA: Rowman&Littlefield, 1998)—quoting from the Bhagavad-Gita, on a prefatory page

and even memorized:

*'Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.'*²⁸

Another important and fascinating book which dissects some of the underlying parallels between various ethical, historical, political, religious and philosophical traditions is Vilho Harle's "Ideas of Social Order in the Ancient World". His work adds another voice and dimension to the rising call to broaden and deepen the inter-paradigm debate within the academic discipline of International Relations and also stresses the necessity for open-ended interdisciplinary awareness and research—particularly in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Although, as the Norwegian scholar, Johan Galtung points out in his forward, Harle has omitted discussion of Islam and Shinto, which he suggests that perhaps others can and will take up, the book still dazzles and provokes in its audacious scope and insights. To give some idea of that scope and the challenges which it presents to us, Galtung's forward gives some eloquent hints:

We live in a globalizing world, International relations are global relations, not only the foreign policy of a major country or regional relations. How can anyone dare draw upon theory developed in only one region? What kind of provincialism sustains that type of intellectual laziness?

*Then Harle brings us back to the classics. Some may be surprised to find Jesus among them, and yet he evidently had a theory of both chaos and order. Together with Jesus, figure Confucius, Kautilya, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Livy and Virgil, and the concrete persons behind such schools as (Chinese) Legalism, Mohism, Daoism, ancient Indian thought, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, ancient Hebrew thought, Judaism, early Christians and Church.*²⁹

Plurality and dialogue, as Chris Brown of the LSE reminds us (in his book: "International Relations Theory—New Normative Approaches"), and as most of us would probably agree, are most sorely needed if the world is to progressively evolve. Brown's book is a comprehensive synthesis and analysis of certain major strands in Western Enlightenment thought through Kant and Hegel and on to the present day, with a brief synopsis of the Greek intellectual inheritance and an interesting discussion of recent critical and post-modern theory. In relating, as it does, the various traditions of Western ethics to the problems of normative international relations theory, the book touches upon a number of perennially important issues, such as the influence of cosmopolitan views of the world, stemming from Kant's political writings in large part, in contrast to the influence of communitarian views, stemming largely from right-wing interpretations of Hegel in similar fashion and going on to

28 Fred Dallmayr, *ibid.*, p.141

29 Johan Galtung, from the Foreword to Vilho Harle's *Ideas of Social Order in the Ancient World*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998)

analyse the rise of cosmopolitan awareness in the work of the Utilitarians (such as Bentham and Mill) and then the more contemporary consolidation of this in the work of neo-cosmopolitans such as Charles R. Beitz and neo-utilitarians such as Peter Singer, not forgetting the neo-communitarianism of Mervyn Frost and the on-going quest for justice in international ethics from the deontological perspectives of Rawls to the Just-War theories of Walzer to the post-enlightenment cosmopolitanism of Habermas to Rorty's quasi-communitarianism and so on.

One of the things which becomes forever clearer is that both cosmopolitans and communitarians have valuable things to say about present day realities and that both perspectives are, and will remain of some interest and usefulness in coming to terms with, analysing, and then seeking to look beyond "the way things are". Having said that, I strongly believe that the cosmopolitan emphasis on human similarity rather than difference is most sorely needed if the world is to peacefully and creatively evolve and that such an emphasis can only help to bolster the idealistic *and* pragmatic strains of democratization and human rights. As Peter Singer perceptively notes:

...If ethics is a jigsaw puzzle, then we are now at the stage where we have laid out all the pieces, and are beginning to see the outline of the picture. For ethics is not a meaningless series of different things to different people in different times and places. Rather, against a background of historically and culturally diverse approaches to the question of how we ought to live, the degree of convergence is striking. Human nature has its constants and there are only a limited number of ways in which human beings can live together and flourish...

*some of the features common to the nature of human beings in different societies are common to the nature of any long lived, intelligent social mammals, and are reflected in our behaviour as they are reflected in that of other primates. Hence what is recognized as a virtue in one society or religious tradition is very likely to be recognized as a virtue in the others: certainly, the set of virtues praised in one major tradition never make up a substantial part of the set of vices of another major tradition. (Exceptions tend to be short-lived societies in the process of decay or self-destruction.)*³⁰

Those of us who are lucky enough to live in, or to have been born into liberal democratic societies (or approximations thereof) such as Japan, America and Britain (the last being the land of my birth, upbringing and education)—to name but three, often take for granted the freedoms and opportunities which such societies grant us—i.e. in terms of what most of us would regard as the fundamental human rights of being free (in the majority of cases) of extreme levels of poverty, of having access to education (although again, the *quality* of this right or opportunity is relative), of having the right to work (again relative), of having access to subsidized health-care, the protection of law, the freedom to travel to other countries, the freedom to express one's own opinion without hindrance or fear of incarceration, the right to vote for a particular political party of our free choosing and so on. (The "relativity" I speak of is of course a reflection of the inevitable inequalities of wealth

30 Peter Singer, "Afterword", Peter Singer (Editor), *A Companion To Ethics*, (Oxford: Blackwell Reference, 1991) pp.543-544

and income in any given democratic and capitalist society and the pro and contra forces placed on this from the political right, centre and left within any given democracy.) When we see or read about the gross minimalisation or even absence of such rights in various second or third world countries and countries in the grip of non-democratic, totalitarian or *less* democratic regimes, such as the former Soviet Union, the former Afghanistan and Iraq and in present-day North Korea and China, for example, most of us would be very quick to count our blessings, if we're being honest with ourselves.

Over time, every country experiences the evolution of its culture and society based on its heritage of history, religion and political philosophy, whether it recognizes the roots of these building blocks of human society or not. Safe to say, perhaps, that the vast majority of any given country do not fully recognize and comprehend their own cultural and historical roots—and the fault for this must lie of course with educational systems...

Within the particular lies the universal and even in the most nationalistic forms of culture, religion and historical identity, can be found elements of the universal and common nature of human experience and aspiration. Let us take the case of Japan and briefly investigate the phenomenon of Shintoism to illustrate this.

In his useful, short and clear introduction to Shintoism: "Shinto: The Kami Way", Sokyō Ono observes how the Meiji Restoration helped to pave the way, not only for the opening of cultural and political doors to the West, but also for the growth of Japanese nationalism allied to Shinto and imperial mysticism. He goes on to explain how Shinto has become synonymous with Japanese Nationalism in the minds of many:

*Threatened with oppression and even absorption by Buddhism and Confucianism, Shinto became a bulwark for the preservation and independence of the racial culture.*³¹

The inherent racial/ethnic/cultural process of identification with Shinto for many Japanese, whether fully conscious or not, formulates itself into a *problematique* for cosmopolitan thinkers. However, such racial, ethnic and cultural mores inhabit and inform most other manifestations of religious belief and practice in the world too; whether it is, for example, Confucian arguments for "Asian Values" or the dogmatic principles heralded in the three culturally specific Monotheistic faiths of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The basically fundamentalist and proselytizing nature of these faiths can also present massive problems to the world, as past and current events only make too clear. As with *all* religious or religious/philosophical forms, Shinto also possesses *universal* aspects, or at least, can be *interpreted* in a universal way, when one recognizes it as just one more example of human beings trying to come to terms with the basic mysteries of life and death which, ultimately, are the same for us all.

In his concluding remarks, Ono acknowledges and separates both the communitarian *and* the

31 Sokyō Ono, *Shinto—The Kami Way*, (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1962) p.78

cosmopolitan aspects of this particular religion:

Shinto is a racial religion. It is inextricably interwoven with the fabric of Japanese customs and ways of thinking...

But this does not mean that there is no concern in Shinto for the people and welfare of mankind; nor does it mean that Shinto is not worthy of respect from those of other faiths in the world at large. People of all races and climes cannot help but express gratitude to the spirits of the land and of nature, to their ancestors, to the benefactors of society and the state. In so far as they recognize this feeling within them, they cannot but understand the spirit of Shinto, and find in it an undeniable truth which supports and heightens man's noblest values.

*Thus, while Shinto is a racial faith, it possesses a universality which can enrich the lives of all people everywhere.*³²

Clearly, such aspects of identification with a particular land, with the beauties and mysteries of its nature, (whether interpreted in an animist, pantheist, monotheist or even rationalist/scientific way), with historical figures of the past, with its own particular food and drink and customs and so on are the natural feelings of *all* lands or peoples—anywhere on the Earth.

With thought, education, experience of other cultures and the ability to empathize—mutual understanding, or at least, toleration between different cultural, religious and philosophical traditions can always be achieved. However, there seems to be little enough of this lofty ideal in the world today. It is there of course—at least amongst some of the educated, but there is also a dangerous polarization going on between the rich and the poor, the liberals and conservatives of the West and the conservatives and fundamentalists of the Islamic world (to take the prime contemporary example). Global Terrorism and the “War on Terrorism” and the on-going debates about who is to blame and are the anti-terrorists now as bad as the terrorists themselves, in the light of on-going revelations of torture and abuses of human rights by the American forces and her allies. The confusions, hypocrisies and the spiralling rapidity of globalism, the benefits it brings and the chaos and resentment it causes are all part and parcel of today's realities. As Habermas, Virilio and others have shown, from different perspectives, the pace of change can hardly be slowed down. Humanity has now reached a stage in its evolution whereby it must continuously integrate, absorb, co-exist—turning the clock back or slowing down the pace are not really realistic options—or are they? As Ackbar Abbas notes in his essay: “Cosmopolitan De-scriptions: Shanghai and Hong Kong:

If the speed of change is creating spaces we do not understand, then one strategy might be to slow things down—to preserve some almost erased concept of civility and respect for otherness in the midst of chaos. This was what the older cosmopolitanisms had strived for. But, it seems to me, such a conservative

³² Sokyō Ono, *ibid.*, pp.111-112

*strategy has little space for manoeuvre.*³³

We are strapped together in the forward rush of social evolution and we must find ways to survive and help one another on this single planet which we share. To alleviate the current apparent “clash of civilizations” between the hijacked militant form of Islamic fundamentalism and the (as some would describe it) neo-imperialism of the power-hungry and wealthy West, led by the United States, and to avoid a worsening of the situation and even more dire clashes in the future, much obviously needs to be done in terms of economics, political stabilization, the evolution of democracy and the development of education. Can Democracy be successfully “exported”? Can the seeds of Democracy grow in the old autocracies of the Middle East? These are clearly two of the key questions facing the world right now. Should the current attempts to introduce and stabilize democratic forms of government in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to fail, due to the on-going violent insurgencies, then the future, at least in these regions, remains bleak. Multi-culturalism has not yet taken root in most Arab States to the extent that it has in most liberal democracies around the world, and this, added to problems of corruption and economic deprivation and stagnation, racism and religious bigotry, fuels the fires of hatred and resentment of “the West”. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the coming to terms with the realities of European (and later American) economic and military superiority, from the 19th Century through to the end of the 20th Century has left the majority in the Middle East facing an on-going crisis of identity and an uneasy correspondence with Democracy and Globalization, leading Sami Zubaida to conclude, in his essay: “Middle Eastern Experiences of Cosmopolitanism”:

*Mass higher education produces a proletarianized, poorly educated intelligentsia, poor and resentful, directing its ‘re-sentiment’ against the Westernized elites, seen as the agents of cultural invasion. These are the main cadres of nationalist and religious xenophobia, currently so powerful in the region. While some degree of liberalization has benefited the cultural production in Egypt and elsewhere in recent decades, these limited gains have been very insecure, specially now that they are threatened by religious censorship and intimidation, which also extend to the urban spaces, such as cafes and bars, which form the social milieux of intellectuals and artists. It is not surprising, therefore, that the main cultural flourishing of Middle Eastern cosmopolitanism now occurs in London and Paris.*³⁴

Opportunities for intellectual exchange and dialogue can best flourish in the cosmopolitan centres of the big cities around the world, of course, but such exchange and dialogue should continue as much as possible, everywhere, through the aid of the media, the internet and individuals working

33 Ackbar Abbas, “*Cosmopolitan De-scriptions: Shanghai and Hong Kong*”, from—Carol A. Breckenridge, Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, Dipesh Chakrabarty (Editors), *Cosmopolitanism*, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2002) p.224

34 Sami Zubaida, “*Middle Eastern Experiences of Cosmopolitanism*”, from—Steven Vertovic and Robin Cohen (Editors), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism—Theory, Context, and Practice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.41

in an educational or voluntary capacity abroad.

The key issues of justice, of distribution and redistribution of wealth need of course to be constantly addressed and gradual, pragmatic, social democracy and liberalism are the only realistic and attainable ways ahead, in this writer's view, at the current time. There are no easy answers and an evolving dialogue based on goodwill and the deep-rooted desire to improve the human condition as we experience it now, in 2005, is all we are able to do. Which brings us back to Kantian assumptions of our common humanity and general obligations towards one another. This remains a solid point from which to move forward and seeking points of common interest and idealism, without prejudice or hypocrisy, but seeking real, workable answers to the mounting problems which beset us and drawing on elements of both idealism and pragmatism, whether they stem from the cosmopolitanism evolving from Kant through Habermas or the communitarianism evolving from Hegel through Rorty and on to the so-called post-modernist attitudes of play and reassessment evolving from Nietzsche through Foucault and so on. Which leads me to conclude that I am basically a Kantian liberal and the pragmatist within me is readier to engage with Rawls' definition of society as a "*co-operative venture for mutual advantage*"³⁵. than the idealist and revolutionary within me is ready to engage with Antonio Negri's and Michael Hardt's re-invention of communism in their intellectually busy and stimulating book: "Empire". Finally, their idealism and earnestness is misplaced, as far as I can see, and the brutality, corruption, greed and waste of the current American or Western Empire will be much more effectively challenged and modified from within its own parameters of democracy and liberal inclusiveness, than through implacable confrontation and revolution. The defeat of 20th Century Fascism needs no apology or explanation. The demise of 20th Century Communism likewise, since it shared with both fascism and capitalism, its own elements of brutality, corruption, greed and waste. But of course communism plucks at our idealistic heartstrings in a way which fascism cannot even begin to—being the epitome of evil. Negri's and Hardt's concluding paean to militancy, however, heralds its own inherent weakness and impossibility:

There is an ancient legend that might serve to illuminate the future life of communist militancy: that of Saint Francis of Assisi. Consider his work. To denounce the poverty of the multitude he adopted that common condition and discovered there the ontological power of a new society. The communist militant does the same, identifying in the common condition of the multitude its enormous wealth. Francis in opposition to nascent capitalism refused every instrumental discipline, and in opposition to the mortification of the flesh (in poverty and in the constituted order) he posed a joyous life, including all of being and nature, the animals, sister moon, brother sun, the birds of the field, the poor and exploited humans, together against the will of power and corruption. Once again in postmodernity we find ourselves in Francis's situation, posing against the misery of power the joy of being. This is a revolution that no power will control—because biopower and communism, co-operation and revolution remain

35 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) p.4

*together, in love, simplicity, and also innocence. This is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist.*³⁶

All in all, I think it's better (and certainly inevitable and easier *and* more difficult) to stick with the remorseless heaviness and existential acceptance of being a liberal...

What Richard Rorty lacks in terms of idealism he makes up for in revivifying pragmatism as a philosophy of hope. Hope for social justice, hope that man may learn from his mistakes, hope that man may go on learning and questioning, and taking bits of moral guidance and wisdom from whatever bodies of knowledge or belief-systems he encounters, and then weighing them up and utilising them as tools for individual and collective improvement and progress, not as the final arbiters of truth:

*The inspirational value of the New Testament and the Communist Manifesto is not diminished by the fact that many millions of people were enslaved, tortured or starved to death by sincere, morally earnest people who recited passages from one or the other text in order to justify their deeds. Memories of the dungeons of the Inquisition and the interrogation rooms of the KGB, of the ruthless greed and arrogance of the Christian clergy and of the Communist nomenklatura, should indeed make us reluctant to hand over power to people who claim to know what God, or History, wants.*³⁷

Let there be no more gods or ideologies placed on pedestals then. The experience of history and of our contemporary crisis has taught us, if nothing else, to be wary of all *pure* paths to enlightenment, peace, justice and well-being. But this is not a call for complacency or cynicism either. Habermas rightly warns of the dangers of an unrepentant form of Social Darwinism driving the forces of Modernity and neglecting the call of reason and concern, which are the brighter sides of the Enlightenment Project. Dangers which are driving the forces of fast forward technological development and feeding the appetites of military-industrial powers the world over. Perhaps, in the light of the current "War on Terrorism", the neo-conservatives in "Fortress America" will revivify the Star Wars project, which Habermas has described as:

*- an innovative thrust that would give the colossus of worldwide capitalism sufficient footing for its next round of technological development.*³⁸

The reality of the modern world *is the reality we face* and we need to work together as rational

36 Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Empire*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2000) p.413

37 Richard Rorty, "Failed Prophecies, Glorious Hopes" (1998), from—*Philosophy and Social Hope*, (England, Penguin Books, 1999) p.204

38 Jurgen Habermas, Lecture XII—"The Normative Content of Modernity", from—*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, (Translated by Frederick Lawrence; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) p.366

social beings in different groups with common needs and facing the same global crises. We don't have time for the "War on Terrorism" and the "Clash of Civilizations", although elements of these phenomena are now upon us and we are forced to deal with them. We must use our intelligence and capacity for goodwill and reason to rise above and practically remedy the ills of pollution, depletion of natural resources, racial hatred and gross inequality which we have created through our social and technological evolution. It's a very messy and complicated task—but that is the task we face, as Habermas reminds us:

*Enlightenment and manipulation, the conscious and the unconscious, forces of production and forces of destruction, expressive self-realization and repressive desublimation, effects that ensure freedom and those that remove it, truth and ideology—now all these moments flow into one another.*³⁹

Now, more than ever, we need the aggressive optimism of radical liberals such as Anthony Giddens to drive us forward through all the muck and mire of our ailing Earth to seek new wellsprings of hope and strength to bring us together in a union of cosmopolitan *and* communitarian experiences of similarity and difference. To make us remember that our *ultimate* identity is that of being human:

*Unpredictability, manufactured uncertainty, fragmentation: these are only one side of the coin of a globalizing order. On the reverse side are the shared values that come from a situation of global interdependence, organized via the cosmopolitan acceptance of difference. A world with no others is one where—as a matter of principle—we all share common interests, just as we face common risks. Empirically, many disastrous scenarios are possible—the rise of new totalitarianisms, the disintegration of the world's ecosystems, a fortress society of the affluent in permanent struggle with the impoverished majority. But there are counter-trends to these scenarios in reality, just as there are forces counterposed to moral nihilism. An ethics of a globalizing post-traditional society implies recognition of the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization—coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and an attitude of respect towards non-human agencies and beings, present and future. Far from seeing the disappearance of universal values, this is perhaps the first time in humanity's history when such values have real purchase.*⁴⁰

Much of what Giddens is saying seems to return to the aforementioned need for the "dovetailing" of ethical value systems in order to approach and promote the most reasonable and practical routes towards social and individual improvement. As previously argued, both deontological and utilitarian ethical approaches can be utilised for the promotion of the good. In "A Theory of Justice", Rawls tries to refute the idea of utility as justice with the idea of justice based rather upon

39 Jurgen Habermas, *ibid.*, p.338

40 Anthony Giddens, "Questions of Agencies and Values", from—*Beyond Left and Right—The Future of Radical Politics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) p.253

contractarian grounds. Throughout his book, Rawls attempts to defend his thesis that justice based upon “fairness” is an alternative and superior conception of justice to any which is based upon utility. Yet at the same time, he constantly alludes to those points of similarity between utilitarianism and his own sketches for a system:

*Contract theory agrees, then, with utilitarianism in holding that the fundamental principles of justice quite properly depend upon the natural facts about men in society.*⁴¹

Rawls suggests that utilitarianism requires a degree of unanimity in society, which, in any literal sense, would be very hard to achieve—perhaps impossible...But both Rawls and the utilitarians are interested in a “well-ordered society”. It seems to me, that liberals such as Rawls, who stress fairness and “freedom and equality”,⁴² and utilitarian liberals who seek to promote greater justice in society and the world through the principle of utility and the requirements of benevolence, are like “climbers roped together on the same mountain” (to paraphrase Picasso, or was it Braque?) But unlike Picasso and Braque—the re-interpretations of vision and form with which they deal are not painterly and pictorial interpretations of the visual world, but are to do with the more urgent and important concerns of social justice. The usefulness of the analogy with Cubism lies perhaps in the fact that the problems with which they deal have to be viewed from a variety of perspectives. And where the imperatives of individual freedom and of welfare for others have to continually co-exist and evolve together—the one feeding the other in turns, rather than (one hopes) the one feeding *upon* the other in some way.

The aforementioned Peter Singer is a fairly straightforward liberal utilitarian in the noble tradition. Concerned with applying utilitarian ethics to real-life problems, he is presumably the type of earnest, pragmatic idealist that cynical neo-conservatives and anti-utilitarians love to hate, or simply dismiss (to their own loss). The range and scope of his intellectual interests and sympathies is wide-ranging. For a contemporary utilitarian, such breadth of interest and concern is inevitable and necessary, because the possible future consequences of contemporary human actions are so wide open. With the plethora of knowledge and experience in the world today, it is virtually impossible for any thinking person not to see things in global terms and not to be concerned about the multiple dangers which confront us. Refusal to do so implies a selfish, even childish desire to live in a “fool’s paradise”. Singer’s essays regarding the problem of the distribution of wealth in the world, remind us of the chronic imbalance that exists in this area, and of the gross amounts of unfairness, injustice and apathy which this implies. He points out the value of both act-utilitarianism (taking it upon ourselves as individuals to get more involved in relief and charitable efforts in some way), and of rule-utilitarianism (whereby the governments of affluent countries are obliged to contribute towards aid

41 John Rawls, *op. cit.*, p.159

42 Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, *Rawls—A Theory of Justice and its Critics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) p.92

and relief). Singer thinks that both are important, and laments the fact that both individuals and governments in the affluent countries are, on the whole, vastly indifferent to the suffering of millions around the world. He argues that a change of heart and mind is needed to make those in the more well-off countries act more compassionately from a sense of duty and responsibility. He believes that we can do a lot more to help without necessarily hurting ourselves (although naturally, we must be prepared to make *some* sacrifices.) And that we *should* help, because this would be the morally correct thing to do—which returns us to Kant once more:

*.....if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought morally to do it.*⁴³

Singer points out that, from a utilitarian point of view, helping starving people, thousands of miles away should carry as much weight with us, as helping our immediate neighbours. Unfortunately, the “I’m alright, Jack” mentality of so many who have grown used to a competitive, consumer-obsessed existence, does not allow for even the assistance of our immediate poor neighbours, beyond token gestures of offering low-paid menial employment and minimum welfare benefits. Were people to change, even a *little*, and to be less self-interested, the money is abundantly there to end all the suffering, both at home and abroad. But getting everyone who can, to contribute something to a relief fund or a charity, is easier said than done. The consumer temptations which surround us everyday, and eat into our hearts and minds as we watch TV, listen to the radio, read a newspaper or magazine, surf the internet, drive a car or ride a bus or train to work or play—numb us towards the bitter realities of poverty, dispossession and struggle lurking behind and beneath the materialistic façade. But the same media images sometimes remind us too of those unpleasant realities. Thus we are at least made aware of the most recent cases of suffering, injustice and atrocities. Singer argues that we ought to do something—not just from an urge to be charitable, to assuage our guilty consciences, but that we ought to act because we have a *duty* to do so. He is simply arguing, from a utilitarian point of view for a “minimal moral code” (in Goodin’s words), whereby the motivations and incentives towards behaving more compassionately towards our fellow human beings outweigh the more familiar ones of being greedy, selfish and indifferent. At another point in his essay, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, in an attempt to dig at the consciences of those who profess to be Christians, he quotes Thomas Aquinas:

*Equally, whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance.*⁴⁴

43 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, from—C.R. Beitz, M. Cohen, T. Scanlon, A.J. Simmons (Editors), *International Ethics*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985) p.249

44 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica, II-II, Question 66, Article 7*, in *Aquinas, Selected Political Writings*, (ed. A.P. d’Entreves, trans. J.G. Dawson, Oxford, 1948), p.171—as quoted by Peter Singer, *ibid.*, p.257

Were *this* moral teaching to be followed *to the letter*, there would surely be no more poverty *anywhere...*

The future lies within our own hands then, to either bring the present towards a fairer, safer and more enlightened fruition or to disable, and ultimately, to destroy it. I hope that this paper has made some progress in helping to delineate the need for cosmopolitans and communitarians to realise and come to terms with their similarities, to work together for the sake of our common heritage and future and to remain constantly aware of the fact that : within our differences lie our similarities.