

# Ḥasan al-Turābī's Trial—An Aspect of Islamic Revivalism

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This is the second report of the Overseas Investigation, "Comparative Study on Religious Revivalism in the Present Islamic World.

## 1, Ḥasan al-Turābī and Sudan

While I spent the summer of 2001 in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, I found an article on Ḥasan al-Turābī in an Arabic paper, al-Khalīj, Suterday, August 11. It told that the Sudanese criminal court decided the extension of al-Turābī's term in the prison to two weeks. The extension has been renewed several times and he is still confined at a governmental house in Khartoum Baḥrī as of Nov. 2001.

Ḥasan al-Turābī is one of the most famous ideologues of the Islamic revivalism and has been a powerful leader and a speaker in Sudan, regarded as uncrowned head of the Islamic government of Sudan. He has been remarked as a fundamentalist and a custodian of some terrorists by the Western Media, however, he is sometimes alleged as a apostate modernist in his own interpretation of the Qur'ān by the traditional Islamic groups<sup>(1)</sup>. Those opposite evaluation for him, however, would hit his attitude in the Islamic revivalism and would reveal the specific aspects to his own thought.

Ḥasan 'Abd Allāh al-Turābī was born in 1932 in Kassab, Eastern Sudan, to a religious conservative family. He graduated the faculty of law, Khartoum University in 1958, earned a master's degree in law at the University of London in 1961, and Ph.D. at the University of Paris in 1964. Then he joined the faculty of law at Khartoum University as a dean but before long resigned to become Secretary General of the Islamic Charter Front founded by Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood where he had been a member since 1954. After the leftist coup d'état led by Ja'far Numeiri, he was arrested and spent 7 years in jail. From 1979 to 1982, he worked as an Attorney-General of the Cabinet under Numeiri, and he was believed to be behind Numeiri when Sudan introduced Islamic Law

officially in September, 1983. He remained as a presidential adviser for legal and foreign affairs until March in 1985 when he was imprisoned again. The fall of Numeiri's regime took him back to the political movement as a head of the National Islamic Front in 1989, and he joined the government as Attorney-General, Minister of Justice and Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 1996 to 2000, he worked as a president of the National Assembly, but he withdrew from it and established his new party, People's National Assembly in 2000. He had been supporting the present government led by 'Umar al-Bashīr and been a leader and representative of contemporary Islamic policy in Sudan.

Though he has been imprisoned since February 2001, he is still regarded as a symbol and the main ideologue of Sudan's Islamic policy and a success to some extent of the Islamic revivalist movement.

In this paper I make a survey on al-Turābī's thought of the Islamic revivalism and analyze the characteristics of his attitude through the tide of the contemporary Islamic revivalism. We will also see how different his idealism is from the real situation in Sudan that still remains surrounded with many difficult problems. I hope that my survey on al-Turābī would demonstrate the differences from other leaders of the Islamic movement such as Ṭālibān in Afghanistan, or the leaders in Islamic Republic of Iran.

## 2, al-Turābī's Revivalism

It is well marked that al-Turābī has taken his own attitude on the Islamic revivalism. His claim has not only won a reputation for pragmatism and flexibility in his Islamic movement but menaced the neighboring Arab and African countries as the most restrictive and radical thought as ever. We can see his account for the pursuit of resurgent Islam in Sudan as well as in other Islamic countries through his lecture held in Madrid, 1994, titled "Islamic Fundamentalism<sup>(2)</sup> in the Sunna and Shia World"<sup>(3)</sup>.

He started his lecture with the words; "Uncivilized Arabs took the initiative and introduced Islam world-wide" and it seems that he compares the Arabs with Sudan as a pioneer of the revival-movement at present. He assumes that Muslim themselves do not know how to go about Islam, and they have no recent precedent or model of an ideal Islamic government<sup>(4)</sup>. Then he starts his instruction with reviewing the Islamic history, from its rise and its prosperity to its decline, and finally to its resurgence.

I will approach fundamentalism as a movement of historical change, in fact. You know that every sector of humanity has played a role, the Greeks with their philosophy, the Romans, both before and after becoming Christians, the Chinese, the

Indians, the Arabs, the Muslims and the Europeans, today and perhaps tomorrow as well. This is always changing. Although people claim this is final history, whenever they are in leadership, they think this is the end of history. But history is evolution and change.

After the early centuries of the rise of Islamic religion and civilization, the latter centuries were centuries of decline and shrinkage of Islamic spirit, intellect and action. Compare that with Christian history if you like. Faith at first was aligned with the belief in the Oneness of God and the oneness of life as a program of worship to God and time in the Here and in the Hereafter, beyond death. That was belief. But gradually, religion became less of an inspiration that mobilizes life and organizes life. It became just an identity. You became historically a Muslim. And allowed space for non-religious spirits to develop into our culture<sup>(5)</sup>.

All religions are capable of rise and fall. All cultures rise and fall. There are special Islamic potentialities for return, religious potentialities. One, our doctrine, our creed—Devotion to God is eternal in its values. It's always vulnerable to decadence and therefore has to be renewed continuously. Islam means devotion to God. It is not the religion of Muhammad, but the so-called religion of Abraham, which decayed and later on had to be renewed by Moses, and it decayed, then it had to be renewed by Jesus, and it decayed, then it had to be renewed by Muhammad. This is the last prophet. But he told us that it would continuously become decadent and fall behind the times and you'll have to keep renewing it and modernizing it perpetually.<sup>(6)</sup>

Thus he summarizes the way of arbitrary politics taken by the Sudanese authorities in his country as a way of just beginning of "a movement of historical change", saying that Sudan is seeking a new model of government. In him Sudan is still in a transitional stage and may not be able to manage well with the freedom of human-being, which has been caused the harsh treatments to its nations; such as the violation of human rights, sudden arrest of political foes, restriction on women's clothing, and etc<sup>(7)</sup>.

The movement of Islamic revival has phases. First, spiritual revival, that's why they call it the revivalist movement—the revival of Islam—sometimes. An identity and an awakening of the spirit. Then a Renaissance, intellectual renaissance. Not the old traditional literature but let us produce new literature and address it to contemporary problems and challenges. And then a resurgence of new action, not

just preserving your religion defensively, but a resurgence. There were a few intellectuals, pioneers of fundamentalism in North Africa, in the Middle East, in India and later on came movements. Most of them were elitist movements because the elites were the ones that were directly exposed to the West. Therefore, they were the ones who responded first to the challenge. Not the masses.<sup>(8)</sup>

Though he often regards himself not as an elite and the Sudanese Islamism has not been led by the elite, he is obviously one of the elites who studied in London and Paris during the confused period of the aftereffects of independence in 1956. It is natural to say that his Islamic Republic should have been pursued by the elite through the means that included the dictatorship and despotic power. Actually the two big successful achievements by his party; adoption of *shari'ah* law in 1983 and recovery of the power in 1989 are realized by the dictatorial authorities.

— The principle of Islam taught the other that you have to talk, have a dialogue, in order to have a state of peace. Basically, to have cooperation with the other. Don't sever yourself, don't break away from the other at all. If he's a Muslim or a non Muslim, or someone who doesn't believe in any religion at all, talk to him and make peace prevail as a means of communication with him. But, if he takes the initiative of aggression of force then don't turn the other cheek, don't surrender to him. Reciprocate and defend yourself, word for word, force for force.<sup>(9)</sup>

This is literally what the word jihad means. Just struggle against the other, but you have to relate to him peacefully. You can take the initiative in the peaceful relationship with the other, and you have to take initiative to talk to him before he talks to you, but don't take the initiative of aggressive force at all. But take the defence, that is the principle.<sup>(10)</sup>

al-Turābī advocates often the use of force, not offering the other cheek as Jesus taught to his followers, and he insists that the Islamic movement needs the full right to resort power including military forces. In fact, his nation is sometimes regarded as a source of terrorism or one of the vagabond countries<sup>(11)</sup>. Gregory Sanders told, "He has spoken of his desire to improve relation with the West but unless he gains or shows better understanding this is likely to be impossible. Considering that the Western nations are source of aid and investigation to a Sudan in ruins, which al-Turābī has expressed a desire to gain, his action are regarded quite counter progressive<sup>(12)</sup>."

Actually his programs to reopen the door of *ijtihād*<sup>(13)</sup>, that has been shut since 10th century, and to reform the Islamic law has not attained yet. Sanders says, “His attempted reforms of the *fiqh*<sup>(14)</sup> and *uṣūl*<sup>(15)</sup> do not appear to be progressing and his opening the door to *ijtihād* depend the existence of free speech which Sudan is not yet ‘stable’ enough to handle by his arguments”<sup>(16)</sup>. Sanders also says the only one outstandingly bright spot on his record is his progressive treatment for the Sudanese women to give them the political rights. On this issue, I will return to analyze later.

### 3, al-Turābī’s Democracy

al-Turābī has been aiming to establish the rule of *sharī‘ah*, not the theocracy nor tyranny, in “his Sudan”. He insists that the individual freedom, religious freedom, possessive right and proprietary should be guaranteed there, and he declares the racial equality and abolition of sexual discrimination. He also guarantees to open the *ijtihād* in Islamic jurisprudence so that people could express his own opinion through the *shūrā*<sup>(17)</sup>. This is the outline of his democracy in Sudan.

Asked that the Islamic movement could not realize the true democracy, he replied as follows.

Along with its historical course in the West, it has become associated with secularism, and that is definitely anathema to Islamic movement; with politics which is amoral if not immoral, and that’s definitely something objectionable; and with cutthroat competition for power, and that doesn’t sound very religious, does it? So some people who attack democracy probably need to attack it in this way. But people, either deliberately or mistakenly, call them antidemocratic. But these movements are essentially grassroots movements; they are populist movements. And if you scrutinize the model of the movement itself, it’s highly democratic.<sup>(18)</sup>

We have already seen above that he criticized the Islamic reform by the hand of elites. Thus he doesn’t admit the early Islamic movement such as the Muslim Brethren in Egypt led by Ḥasan al-Bannā<sup>(19)</sup> because it was bound by a Shaikh, a charismatic leader and had not created the consultative organization that is the democratic system. This is the main reason why it was abandoned soon. On the contrary, his movement is popular democracy based on the *majlis*<sup>(20)</sup>, the public election, and there the tyranny or the absolutism is avoided. He says that in Islam the democracy is not introduced from the secularism but from the religion. Then he criticizes the former Sudanese government

that was led by Numeiri who mentioned that he came in order to destroy the Islamic constitutional document.

Government is also limited not only as to function but as to power. There can never be an absolute government, because the sharia is always there on top. When Muslim governments were de-Islamised, when we were deprived of the sharia, we become exposed to absolutism for the first time because the sharia provided an absolute limitation on government. That's why in our history you don't read a lot about oppressive government, about crises in human rights, and so on and so forth, because government was limited.<sup>(21)</sup>

He says that through the history, people had been protected by the *shari'ah*. Under the colonialism by the West, however, the *shari'ah* was deprived and people were left in the manmade positive law that enabled the government to remove the limitation imposed by the *shari'ah*. This is the reason why the post-colonial government became very absolute and it perished the popular democracy based on the religion. Even though the word "democracy" is spoken, it is the democracy of the elite, he says, just like the democracy in the French Revolution. To make the democracy a true religious democracy in him, the government should be chosen through the consultation, *shūrā*. The *shūrā* is the only way for the people to access to the government.

The difference between shura and democracy—I'm going to avoid the association with democracy in the West, but democracy as government of the people—is that the higher law in Islam is so intensive that the legislature has much less to do so or say. The legislature, the Congress or Parliament or whatever is not sovereign at all.<sup>(22)</sup>

With these arguments al-Turābī claims the absolute justice in treatment to Muslim people saying that Muslims don't accept a deal which is not fair to them. But he denies that Islam should be hostile to Christianity, nor it be anti-Western, and he insists Christianity be a part of Islam.

Most Islamic leaders have been educated in the West and they are partially, like myself, a part of Western culture. They know the West very well, and they are part of it and they are not, definitely not, hostile. It would only be transitional, hopefully, until we somehow bring about more equilibrium in the world order and

them, perhaps, we would enjoy a peaceful world with a measure of plurality and multiplicity. The Muslims will not allow the world to be moulded in one pattern, one form of democracy, one form of economic system, one form of whatever.<sup>(23)</sup>

Even though he had received higher education both in London and Paris in his younger days and he must be one of the modernists in Islamic world, he is never partial toward Western civilization. People should be allowed the freedom to develop different models of culture, democracy, and policy. In him, the globalization means the unity of the cultures and way of life into one form. He says that the people who enjoy an advantage of the monopoly of information, technology, armament, or even power to rule would see the Muslims challenges to the rest of the world in order to constitute an Islamic world, that is a new world order<sup>(24)</sup>.

To him *shari'ah* is simply the way of life, not means the law. It is essential way of life for all Muslims, and it should not only promote their life but their civilization. However, as has been mentioned, the way of life often declined to be only a legacy, and there came the time to revive the civilization. He says this is the background for the so called fundamentalism.

#### **4, al-Turābī's concept of women**

Among the ideologues of Islamic revivalism, al-Turābī is only one that insists on women's privilege and dignity. His attitude on this issue is recognized as the only outstanding success in his Islamism.

But all the Islamic movement at first start by educating their members in ritual practice and normal conduct. Only very rarely do they address this message of the re-education of the soul to the masses. Only a few could overcome our traditional custom of leaving women behind. This is meant for men who aspire to change, who want to lead change. But some Islamic movements were responsible for the movement of women's liberation in Muslim societies, in the name of religion itself. And the model of the Prophet's wives, they crushed customary conduct of segregating women or ignoring women.<sup>(25)</sup>

In the religion of Islam, a woman is an independent entity, and thus a fully responsible human being. Islam addresses her directly and does not approach her through the agency of Muslim males. A woman would assume full capacity and

liability once she has attained maturity and has received the message of Islam.<sup>(26)</sup>

In the early stage of Islamic history, women used to participate in the military campaign of the Prophet, bringing the water to the thirsty soldiers, treating the wounded, carrying them to safety, or even taking sword and engaging in active warfare<sup>(27)</sup>. On the contrary to these Prophetic tradition, actually on the whole, Islamic revivalism restricted women's situation. al-Mawdūdī<sup>(28)</sup> strongly affirmed the traditional segregation and subordination of women, and their exclusion from political life, and defended the four wives and child marriages<sup>(29)</sup>. We could see the same treatment of the women in Ṭālibān's politics practiced until recently in Afghanistan. Even the Muslim Brethren in Egypt recognized the equality of men and women but they postponed women's political right until both men and women could be enough educated. Among them, al-Turābī has been only one who acquired the equality for women in marriage, the acceptance of monogamy, the equal right of divorce, the equality in education, and the right for the vote<sup>(30)</sup>.

The documentary report from Sudan by Ellen Gruenbaum tells us the heavy political pressure and restriction on the women while the nation are stressed with the shortage of living.

Under the condition like these, employed women are desperate to keep their jobs. But there is ideological pressure from the government and state-sponsored Islamic organization to stay at home and follow the movement-defined Islamic roles for women. The Islamist argue that women's true cultural heritage is to be found in their interpretation of Islamic law, and they criticize even the traditional modest dress of northern Sudanese women, the tobe, as too revealing. This head to foot wrap-around veil, which does not conceal the face, is usually of a light fabric worn over other clothes. According to Islamists, clothes that do not adequately cover hair, the forearms, and the neck lead to public disorder and should be replaced by hijab "Islamic dress."<sup>(31)</sup>

Gruenbaum told the worried cases of arresting women on the street who might be criticized and accused of their violation of the unwritten dress code even though they were dressed modestly in a long skirt and loose shirt<sup>(32)</sup>. It might be true that the women inside the movement of National Islamic Front have been enjoyed their status equal to men, and creating the new dispositions of proper Islamic women. They might deny the oppression of both the religious and political authorities. Sudanese women on the whole should observe the Islamic dress code unless they should not loose their opportunities for



job and education, and consequently the Sudanese tradition<sup>(33)</sup> might be suppressed in favor of the ruling Islamism. Here again al-Turābī's idealism or dream has been shaded up and distorted by the harsh reality in Sudan.

## 5, Characteristics of al-Turābī's Islamism

He has been regarded as a chief ideologue of global Islamism, and alleged as a virtual sovereign in Sudan that has become the only Islamic state in the present-day world to declare officially on adopting the Islamic law, *sharī'ah*, as a constitutional law. In the country where the land has been exhausted and wasted by a long civil war, al-Turābī was often obliged to sacrifice his ideals to construct the Islamic state. There, we can see the reality opposite to the ideals of Islamic state ; oppression of the human right, large arrests of the political prisoners, continuous struggles for the power, and tyranny.

As I have shown above, he has been regarded as a leading fundamentalist by the Western analysts but has been seen as an apostate modernist by the Islamic classicists. With the higher education in the West, he insists that the Islamic Awakening, or Islamism, is a development of a mixture of different civilizations ; it is a movement of unification led by intellectuals, many of them were educated in Western countries and influenced by the Western intellectual culture<sup>(34)</sup>. Though he criticizes the Islamic movements led by the elites, he recognizes Islamism as an intellectual project that is concerned with the material history and the humanity. It seems that this is the reason why he is accused apostate modernist by his opponents. His interpretation of the history aims to the philosophy of praxis in the long run.

Ronald A. T. Judy points out that al-Turābī's characterization of Islamism is based on the familiar distinction between modernization and modernity. He regards modernization as science-based material progress, and modernity as an attitude of thought which aims at determining the absolute universal conditions of moral-being through reason<sup>(35)</sup>. Judy also points that the most radical aspect of al-Turābī's project is his appropriating to Islam the post-Enlightenment theory of civil society as heteronomous domains of agency as though it had always been the dynamic force of Islamic development. al-Turābī's purpose is to form the concept of civil society, sustained by the *sharī'ah*, that has the internal capacity to supersede its historical anachronisms. Here is also the paradox of modernity ; modernity should be based on the human reason, while *sharī'ah* is based on the revelation. Judy adds that al-Turābī's Islamism is predicated on the freedom of the individual to submit absolutely to divine law, and is also the praxis of individual sovereignty<sup>(36)</sup>. In fact, al-Turābī recognizes the freedom of having different

views to Muslims, and he confesses that he himself has some views that run against all of the orthodox schools of law, especially on the status of women<sup>(37)</sup>.

Gregory Sanders criticizes that al-Turābī oversimplified the Western democratic system and other aspects of Western existence, and says, "This could merely be a politician speaking to a sympathetic audience which is as ignorant of the West as the average American would be ignorant of Sudan, but then this is worse than merely demagoguery out of ignorance"<sup>(38)</sup>. Sanders concludes his critics on al-Turābī's Islamism, "Ultimately he is a complex figure of high ideals and low tactics who may have prevented Sudan from developing into a successful secular state and who as yet to realize an Islamic one."<sup>(39)</sup>

Antony Black tells that al-Turābī worked out his own approach, which combines elements of both modernism and fundamentalism and balances the two to create a new and original Islamic state. The legal and social program of Islam must be interpreted anew in the light of the basic principles, and Islam must find new solutions for modern problems with help from the social sciences. Therefore, *ijtihād* should be undertaken, not by one inspired individual, as he says elite, but collectively, as a mass<sup>(40)</sup>. However, both in Sudan and in most of Islamic countries at present, a mass has not yet grown enough to owe full responsibility to pursue the *ijtihād* and to construct a new Islamic state as al-Turābī has been dreamed.

It seems to me the Islamic State of Sudan had been a great experimental field for al-Turābī who as a Western-educated ideologue, asserts the individual freedom, but as a radical Islamist, interprets that this freedom is to submit completely to the divine law. It must be very important and interest to survey al-Turābī's paradoxical theory of modernity and Islamism, for his scheme has been aiming the New World Order in this post modern world. Though he has been excluded from the ruling position in Sudan since February, 2001, his unique Islamic revivalism would continue influencing upon the other Islamism in the world.

It is too early to judge that al-Turābī's trial has influenced much on the whole of Islamic movement or has failed when he was arrested by the Sudanese authority. He is still one of the most outstanding religious and political leader alive not only in Sudan but in the present Islamic world. I hope that his ideology and his role in the Islamic revivalism would give us the significant key and clue to understand and analyze the various types of Islamic revivalism found all over the world now at the first stage of 21 century.

## Notes

- (1) Gregory Sanders, "Dr. Hasan Al-Turabi His Political Philosophy in Context of Religion and Progress", November 12 1998, p.1/7. Sanders says that al-Turabi is not a classicist and he aims on modernizing parts of Islam.  
<http://www.wam.umd.edu/~gsanders/text/alturabi.html>
- (2) "Islamic Fundamentalism" has been used to mean the fanatic, extreme, radical movements with armaments and military campaign and to distinguish them from other Islamic Revivalism, though "Fundamentalism" itself has been used originally for Christian movements that designates a form of conservative evangelical movement among the Protestant groups. "Islamic Fundamentalism" has become so popular that we might be allowed to use here in showing the radical Islamic movement.
- (3) MSANEWS: "Dr. Hasan Turabi: Islamic Fundamentalism In The Sunna and Shia World" The Electronic Whip "The International Political On-Line Electronic Magazine" <http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/199606/19960516.5.html>
- (4) Nissim Rejman, *The Many faces of Islam*, Florida, 2000, pp. 36-37.
- (5) MSANEWS, pp. 2/9-3/9.
- (6) Ibid., 3/9.
- (7) *The Many Faces*, p.37, Ellen Gruenbaum, "Sudanese Women and the Isalmist State" in *Women and Power in the Middle East*, ed. by Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics, pp. 119-125. Sandra Hale, "Islamic State and Gendered Citizenship in Sudan" in *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East*, ed. by Suad Joseph, Stracuse, 2000, pp. 96-104..
- (8) MSANEWS, p. 5/9.
- (9) Ibid., p.6/9. *The Many Faces*, p. 189.
- (10) MSANEWS, p. 6/9.
- (11) Gregory Sanders, 4/7. Sanders reveals that al-Turābī never concedes the Ḥamas as a terrorist group and justifies Usāmah ibn Lādin's action in 1998.
- (12) Sanders, pp. 4/7-5/7.
- (13) *ijtihād* means "efforts" or "endeavor" in Arabic, and in Islamic jurisprudence, it means "Independent judgment" in a legal or theological question based on the interpretation and application of the 4 basic legitimate schools. The gate of *ijtihād* was closed in 10<sup>th</sup> century, and its reopen has been demanded for centuries till now.
- (14) *fiqh* means Islamic jurisprudence and actually points the investigation on the cases and the judgments in Islamic court.
- (15) *uṣūl* means the basic principles or basic rules, and the 4 foundations of the Islamic jurisprudence, they are the Qur'ān, Sunnah (traditions from Muḥammad's deeds and action), *ijmā'* (consensus), and *qiyās* (analogy).

- (16) Sanders, p. 5/7.
- (17) *shūrā* means consultation and counsel, from this comes the state counsel.
- (18) Sudan Foundation, Religious File Number 5, "Islam, Democracy, the State and the West : A Round Table with Dr. Hasan al-Turabi", p. 8/17,  
<http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/reli005.htm>
- (19) Hasan al-Bannā (1906-49), founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, born in a small town some 90 miles northwest of Cairo, educated in the local Quranic school and then graduated from a higher-level teacher training institution in Cairo 1927. The Muslim Brethren was founded in Ismailiyah in 1929, then it expanded beyond the Egyptian border into Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Sudan. In 1949, he was assassinated by the government-instigator. See the detail in *Religion and the State* (L. Carl Brown, New York, 2000.) pp. 143-148.
- (20) *majlis* means seat or session room originally, then meeting, assembly and council. Here this word is used as parliament or council of the state such as *majlis shūrā*.
- (21) A Round Table with Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, p. 11/17.
- (22) Ibid., p. 12/17.
- (23) Ibid., p. 16/17.
- (24) Ronald A.T. Judy, "Islamiyya and the Construction of the Human Being", in *Islamic Fundamentalism, Myths and Realities*, ed. by Ahmad S. Moussalli, Beirut, 1998, p. 111. Here Judy used "the New World Order" for the movement held against the concept of human right in the Western Imperialism, and focused on the question of the religious function in the New World Order that the Islamic revivalism could join taking its specific role not as the clash of the civilization. It is very interesting that the author takes the question of the human rights in Islam through the surveys on various positions including the so-called Islamic fundamentalists.
- (25) SMANEWS, p. 5/9.
- (26) Sound Vision Online, Chapter 1, The verdict of Faith, 1/6,  
<http://www.soundvision.com/women/turabi1.shtml>
- (27) There are many researches on this issue, for example see Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, New haven & London, 1992, pp. 41-63.
- (28) Abū al-A'lā Mawdūdī (1903-79), Pakistan Islamic leader. *Religion and the State*, pp. 148-153. *Islam to Kindai* (『イスラムと近代』 Nakamura Kojiro, Iwanami-shoten, 1997), pp. 155-163.
- (29) Antony Black, *History of Islamic Political Thought*, Edinburgh, 2001, p. 343.
- (30) According to Sanders, the Sudanese Parliament demands that at least 10% of the members should be female. At the time of 1998, it is said that one quarter of the members were female. 3/7
- (31) Gruenbaum, "Sudanese Women", p. 117.
- (32) Ibid., p. 118. Muslim women had experienced strong social pressure from Islamist to wear the ḥijāb instead of traditional tobe costume, but these dress codes did not apply to the women of Christian background.

- (33) Ibid., pp. 116-119.
- (34) Judy, "Islamiyya", p. 107.
- (35) Ibid., p. 108.
- (36) Ibid., p. 111.
- (37) Ibid., p. 116.
- (38) Sanders, p. 4/7.
- (39) Ibid., p. 6/7.
- (40) Black, *History*, pp. 336-337.