

On rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa III

Introduction and Section I

Yoshimizu Chizuko

成田山仏教研究所 紀要第十六号
平成五年三月二十八日発行 別刷

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Introduction

Rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa (**svalakṣaṇasiddha*) -- a technical term we encounter very often in Tsoñ kha pa's works (Tsoñ kha pa Blo bzañ grags pa'i dpal 1357-1419) -- in fact plays a decisive role in his philosophical presentation. Using this term, Tsoñ kha pa systematically characterizes the most fundamental ontological ideas of the three Māhāyāna systems, i.e. the Yogācāra, *Svātantrika-

¹ This paper is my third attempt to investigate the concept of "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*," following two previous articles in Japanese entitled "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa ni tsuite*" part I (Yoshimizu 1992) and part II (Yoshimizu [forthcoming 1]), where I have discussed Tsoñ kha pa's interpretation of philosophical positions of Rañ brgyud pa (*Svātantrika) and Thal 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) and his problematic refutation of Yogācāra and Svātantrika ontology represented by this concept. Taking every detail discussed in the last two papers into reconsideration, I would like to give a more extended investigation on the same subject in this paper. Owing to limited space, I will present here only Introduction and Section I. Section II and III are to be included in the next volume (vol. 17, to be published in 1994) of *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies*. I am indebted to Prof. D. Jackson, Prof. S. Katsura, Mr. S. Kimura, Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Prof. E. Steinkellner, Prof. T. J. F. Tillemans and Prof. T. Vetter, who read the earlier versions of this paper, for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Madhyamaka and *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka,² as follows:

The Yogācāra admits things that are *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* on the ultimate level.

The Svātantrika admits things that are *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* on the conventional level.

The Prāsaṅgika admits things that are *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* neither on the ultimate nor on the conventional level.³

Tsoñ kha pa uses this term as both attributive and predicate in a sentence, which means something established as intrinsically real

² As to the designation and classification of the two Madhyamaka sub-schools, see e.g. Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 58ff.; Mimaki 1983; and Williams 1989: 1ff.

³ See e.g. LR 372b4ff.: *sems tsam pa mams kyis kun brtags ma gtogs pa gzan dbañ dañ yoñs grub gñis mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med par mi 'dod pas de gñis la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i mtshan ñid dam rañ bñin 'dod pa ni mDo dgoñs 'grel la gts'o bor bten bar snari la de'i phyir de gñis don dam par grub par 'dod pa la / slob dpon Sañs rgyas bskyañs dañ slob dpon Zla ba grags pa ni rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo yod na bden par grub par bñed la slob dpon Legs ldan 'byed la sogs pa ni de tsam gyis don dam par grub par mi 'gyur bar bñed pa yin no // "Yogācāras do not consider the two [characteristics] other than the conceptualized [characteristic], viz. the dependent and perfect [characteristics], to be non-substantial with regard to the characteristic (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa*, *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāva*); they accordingly maintain that these two [characteristics] have an [essential] characteristic (*mtshan ñid*) or self-existence (*rañ bñin*) that is established as intrinsically real. [This idea of the Yogācāras] seems to be based mainly on the SNSū. For this reason, they maintain that these two [characteristics] are established as ultimately [real] (*don dam par grub pa*). On the other hand, the master Buddhapālita and the master Candrakīrti [who admit none of these characteristics as real existence] maintain that if there exists a self-existence that is established as intrinsically real object, it is established as real (*bden par grub pa*) [i.e. as ultimately real]. The master Bhāvaviveka and other [Svātantrikas] maintain that merely on this [condition, i.e. being established as intrinsically real object (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*)] it cannot be established as ultimately [real] (*don dam par grub pa*)." In his LN, Tsoñ kha pa attempts to evidence that the Svātantrika masters, i.e. Bhāvaviveka and Kamalaśīla (whose thought is identified with that of his teacher Śāntarakṣita), hold the theory that on the conventional level things are established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*), on the ground of their acceptance of the dependent characteristic taught in the SNSū (LN 51a5f., 55a2f., cf. also Yoshimizu 1992: 615-628). I will discuss this matter again in Section II of this paper.*

(existence or object) or the state that something is established as intrinsically real (existence or object) in the same way as its synonyms such as *rañ bñin gyis grub pa* (*svabhāvasiddha*) and *rañ gi ño bos grub pa* (*svabhāvasiddha* or *svatūpasiddha*).⁴ *Grub pa* is identical with *yod pa* in meaning; the instrumental *gyis*, in my understanding, functions adverbially (not in a causal sense) to modify the verb *grub* and indicates the mode of its existence; *rañ gi mtshan ñid* (*svalakṣana*) basically refers to a real existence or the state of being real in the same way as *rañ bñin* (*svabhāva*). In this paper, I would like to render the phrase "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" by "being established as intrinsically real (existence or object)"⁵ (possibly with slight changes) meaning the state of being existent as a real object according to its sense in the SNSū in connection with the theory of *triniḥsvabhāvatā*. The most important point for interpreting this concept is, in my opinion, that it is given in the SNSū as opposition to the concept of "being postulated by means of names and conventions" (*min darñ brdas nam par bñag pa*, SNSū VII. 4). That is, a mere concept -- the concept of "pot," for instance -- that is postulated by means of names and conventions is not a real existence; it has no reality belonging to space and time. On the other hand, the object or entity that is designated "pot" is existent, since it has its own-being to be perceived in a certain space and at a certain moment. This ontological state is

⁴ The synonyms of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* indicated by Tsoñ kha pa himself are: *rañ bñin gyis grub pa*, *rañ gi ño bos grub pa* (for both Rañ brgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba), *bden par grub pa*, *don darñ par grub pa*, *yañ dag par grub pa*, *rdzas su grub pa* (for Thal 'gyur ba only). Cf. e.g. LR 381a3, 369b1; GR 88a1f. The terms *rañ gi ño bos grub pa* (*svabhāvasiddha* or *svatūpasiddha*) and *rañ bñin gyis grub pa* (*svabhāvasiddha*) are very often used by Candrakīrti especially in his CST and YŠV.

⁵ Although the word "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" is a noun, in most cases I will render it by "intrinsically real" to avoid a wordy expression such as "the self-existence that is established as intrinsically real existence" (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bñin*).

called "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" if one takes it as reality. For "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" itself, in the same way as "*rañ b'zin*" or "*rañ gi ño bo*," I will generally use the words "essential characteristic," "own-being" or "self-existence."⁶

The term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" in the above-mentioned three sentences accordingly indicates a real existence the proponents of which are called "substantialists" (*dños por smra ba*) by Tsoñ kha

⁶ The term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" has been rendered into Western languages in various ways: E.g. as being real by themselves (Obermiller 1932: 96); accomplished by own characteristic (or by a particular) (Wayman 1978: 224); the intrinsic identifiability or intrinsically identifiable status (Thurman 1984: 393 in Glossary); existence by way of its own character (Hopkins 1983: 741 in Glossary, Lopez 1987: 392 in Glossary); established with its own identity (Eckel 1985: 50, n.3); established by way of their own character (Hopkins 1987: 114, Lopez 1987: 68); established by own-character (Matsumoto 1990: 41); established by self-character (Yotsuya 1991: 207); established by own-characteristic (Seyfort Ruegg 1991: 283, n. 9); virtually self-existent (ibid.: 302); dem Eigenmerkmal nach erwiesen (Tauscher 1991: 180); établis par caractère propre (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 179).

For "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" (not including *svalakṣaṇa* in terms of the Pramāṇa school): particular essence (Obermiller 1932: 92); own-character, particular (Wayman 1978: 490 in Glossary); intrinsic identity (Thurman 1984: 191); particular, particular character (Tillemans 1990 II: 163 in Index); das Eigenmerkmal, das besondere Merkmal, das spezielle Merkmal (Tauscher 1991: 172, 179 and 180); caractère propre (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 388, Glossaire). Japanese scholars generally use the Japanese word "jiso" (自性) following the Chinese translation of *svalakṣaṇa*.

Tsoñ kha pa often draws the readers' attention to the point that this *rañ gi mtshan ñid* is neither identical with *svalakṣaṇa* that means an essential nature of a thing in terms of Abhidharma nor with that of Dharmakīrti, insofar as its definition as something that has capacity for efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthyā*) is concerned (see LR 423b5f., LÑ 4a1f., 33b3, 67a1f). This suggests, too, that this term is certainly related to an ontological issue. Therefore it seems to be better to apply a word such as "intrinsically real" in order to show that it is ontologically real existence. Thurman is aware of this point (Thurman 1984: 191, n. 1 and 292, n. 11), but the expression "the intrinsic identifiability" sounds a bit ambiguous for me. Would it be impossible to identify some unreal thing (e.g. a person in dream)? Although I am not strongly against the literal translations such as "own characteristic," "own character," etc., for the time being I prefer the translation that straightly conveys its ontological meaning in order to make my discussion clearer. See also Section I.

pa. Through this characterization of the three philosophical positions, Tsoñ kha pa seems to have presented his own interpretation of Indian Mahāyāna thought as well as of the theoretical differences among these three. He defines at first the position of Yogācāra as a kind of substantialism from the viewpoint of Mādhyamika. Then he takes up the question of how the Mādhyamikas, successors of Nāgārjuna, have treated this substantialism of the Yogācāra, which is evidently opposed to their idea of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāva*) or emptiness (*sūnyatā*). Precisely here lies the most serious theoretical difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika: The former accepts a substantial reality on the conventional level, whereas the latter does reject it.⁷

Tsoñ kha pa's distinction of fundamental ideas of the two Madhyamaka systems with regard to the postulation of *rañ gi mtshan*

⁷ For Tsoñ kha pa, this is the very reason the Svātantrika applies autonomous (*svatantra*) reasoning, while the Prāsaṅgika applies hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*). Cf. LR 425a5f.: *slob dpon Legs ldan 'byed la sogs pa / chos mams la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ gi mtshan ñid tha sñad du bžed pa'i dbu ma pa mams / rañ bgyud kyī rtags rañ gi lugs la žal gyis bžes pa'i rgyu mtshan yañ tha sñad du rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ mtshan yod pa 'di yin pas ... /* "[The Mādhyamikas] such as master Bhāvaviveka, who maintain that things have own-being that is established as intrinsically real on the conventional level, admit a logical reason of autonomous reasoning in their system also for the very reason that [they maintain] conventionally the existence of the own-being that is established as intrinsically real." Also cf. LN 86b6ff. (Thurman 1984: 327f.): *rañ gi lugs ni dGoñs 'grel las gsuñs pa ltar rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa 'dod na ni ñes par rañ rgyud bya dgos te / rañ sde dños por smra ba mams dañ Legs ldan la sogs pa bžin no / tha sñad du yañ rañ mtshan gyis grub pa'i chos mi 'dod na ni rañ bgyud khas mi len pa gdon mi za bar bya dgos pas ... /* "Our theory is [as follows]: If one asserts something that is established as intrinsically real as taught in the SNSū, one must necessarily apply autonomous reasoning as Buddhist substantialists [i.e. Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra] and Bhāvaviveka have done. If one does not admit even conventionally anything that is established as intrinsically real, there is no doubt that one must necessarily reject autonomous reasoning [as Candrakīrti has done]." Both statements have been referred to by Seyfort Ruegg (Seyfort Ruegg 1991: 283, n. 9). As to Tsoñ kha pa's criticism of autonomous reasoning, see Matsumoto 1986; Hopkins 1989; Seyfort Ruegg 1991; Yotsuya 1991; Tani 1992; and Tillemans 1992.

ñid kyis grub pa on the conventional level has been extensively discussed by many Tibetologists.⁸ However, these two different Madhyamaka positions should properly be treated together with the Yogācāra position and should be more carefully examined from this viewpoint, for Tsoñ kha pa's interpretation of Madhyamaka thought, in my opinion, essentially links to that of the Yogācāra.

The purpose of this paper is to prove my assumption that Tsoñ kha pa has built his own interpretation of the three Mahāyāna systems on the basis of the theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality (*triniḥsvabhāvatā*) expounded in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (hereafter SNSū).⁹ Although its Sanskrit

⁸ See e.g. Matsumoto 1981: 181-193; Hopkins 1983: 431-530; Lopez 1987: 55-81; Hopkins 1989: 10-16; and Yoshimizu 1992.

⁹ In this paper I will confine myself to investigating Tsoñ kha pa's own discussions in the LÑ, referring to the LR and GR. The questions of whether this interpretation is Tsoñ kha pa's original or not and how his successors within the dGe lugs pa have developed it should be answered in the future.

Concerning the first question, Matsumoto has expressed the opinion that Tsoñ kha pa's interpretation of the two Madhyamaka positions that the Svātantrika admits things *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* on the conventional level, whereas the Prāsaṅgika does not admit it, is an original idea (Matsumoto 1981a: 181-193 and 205; Matsumoto 1990: 38). I suppose that this way of differentiating between the two Madhyamaka systems could be Tsoñ kha pa's original, because his contemporary Sa skya pa scholar Roñ ston Śes bya kun rig (1367-1449) called it "a silly assertion that [Tsoñ kha pa] has invented (i.e. not in accord with tradition) without profound learning of Madhyamaka system" (*dbu ma'i gzur lugs la ma sbyaṅs par rañ bzo'i blun tshig*) in his Rigs lam kun gsal (15a2, cf. also 12b4-13a1); Go ram pa bSod nams señ ge (1429-1480) also rejects Tsoñ kha pa's view that the Svātantrika applies autonomous reasoning since he admits *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* on the conventional level (dBu ma'i spyi ston 112b4f.). However, Matsumoto's interpretation that this Prāsaṅgika view [i.e. the view that even conventionally things are *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa*] "was born as a consequence of Tsoñ kha pa's criticism of the 'theory of freedom from extremes as the middle view' (*mīha' bral la dbu ma smra ba*) in defence of dependent co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*)" (Matsumoto 1990: 39, 42) is not correct since as Tsoñ kha pa himself explains in his LÑ (66af.) and GR (132a-135a) this view has already been presented by Candrakīrti in his MABh ad MA VI 34-36. Besides, it is also not acceptable that Matsumoto has identified the theory of *mīha' bral*

equivalent is not attested so far,¹⁰ the term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" used by Tsoñ kha pa actually originates in the SNSū, for it is a linguistic variant given by Tsoñ kha pa for the term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis mam par gnas pa*" (**svalakṣanena vyavasthita*, Lamotte 1935: 68) found in the explanation of the non-substantiality of characteristic (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*), one of the three kinds of non-substantiality, in SNSū VII. The concept of "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" may thus be considered to be grounded in Yogācāra philosophy.¹¹

la dbu ma smra ba propounded by Go ram pa with the view criticized by Tsoñ kha pa in the LR that the Mādhyamika has no assertion of his own. For detailed discussion of these matters, see Yoshimizu 1992: 651, n. 62 and Yoshimizu (forthcoming 2).

To answer the second question, we have to examine carefully a huge number of commentaries on the LÑ, for which see Katano 1981: 48f. and van der Kuipj 1985: 55ff. Thurman has most frequently referred to those by dPal 'byor lhun grub and Blo bzañ phun tshogs in his English translation of the LÑ (Thurman 1984) as van der Kuipj has mentioned (ibid: 57). Katano has mainly referred to the Drañ nes gzi 'dril of Don grub rgyal mtshan in his Japanese translation of the first half of the Yogācāra section of the LÑ (Katano 1981).

¹⁰ Though it appears in YŚV D13b4 ad YŚ 13 (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 51, tr. 179) and CŚT X D162a5f. (cited in LR 444b2). In YŚV D11b ad YS 10 (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 46, tr. 168) appears the expression "*rañ gi mtshan ñid du grub pa*," for which Scherrer-Schaub proposes the Sanskrit "*svalakṣaṇasiddha*" (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 168, n. 207). See note 11.

¹¹ I would tentatively suppose that even the term "*svalakṣaṇa*" or "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" did not originally belong to Madhyamaka terminology either, for the following reasons: To my knowledge, the word "*svalakṣaṇa*" is never found in place of *svabhāva* in the main works ascribed to Nāgārjuna (i.e. the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, *Śūnyatāsaptati*, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, *Vaidalyasūtra* and *Ratnāvalī*). In Candrakīrti's works, besides being used in the sense of "an essential nature of a thing" (e.g. heat of fire), it appears as synonym of *svabhāva* meaning "substantiality" or "real existence" in passages where he criticizes "substantialists" including Yogācāra and Dignāga. Possibly Candrakīrti might have adopted this word from Abhidharma tradition. In AKBh ad AK VI 14, for instance, "*svalakṣaṇa*" is referring to "an essential nature of a thing" as a synonym of "*svabhāva*" (*svabhāva evaiṣāṃ svalakṣaṇam*, Pradhan 341, 11f.). Furthermore, he obviously identified it as "real existence" propounded by "substantialists" in the same way as its synonym "*svabhāva*." Although Candrakīrti has never directly linked the term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" to "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis*

Tsoñ kha pa's view of Mahāyāna thought can clearly be seen as a whole in his LN̄. There he starts his discussion by dividing the Mahāyāna tradition into two, i.e. Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, based on their method of distinguishing between the indirect and the definitive meanings (*drañ don*, *neyārtha* and *ñes don*, *nitārtha*) of scriptures: the former follows the method of the SNSū and the latter that of the Akṣayamatirdeśasūtra (*Blo gros mi zad pa'i mdo*).¹² This

grub pa" in SNSū VII, Tsoñ kha pa seems to have identified the idea of substantial existence criticized by Candrakīrti as that of the SNSū.

The word "*svalakṣaṇa*" or "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" is found, for instance, in the following locations of Candrakīrti's works: MABh 117-124 ad MA VI 34-37 (where he criticizes *rañ gi mtshan ñid* as the Yogācāra idea of substantial reality); MABh 193 ad MA VI 92 (*rañ dañ spyi'i mtshan ñid* in the sense of Abhidharma); PPad 61, 62, 67 and 75 (where he criticizes Dignāga's theory of *svalakṣaṇa* identifying it with the *svalakṣaṇa* meaning the hardness of the earth); PPad 261 (*svalakṣaṇa* meaning the heat of fire); PPad 304 and 457 (definition of *dharma* in AKBh ad AK I 2a, *svalakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmah*); YṢV D9a-b ad YṢ 8, Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 40, tr. 156f. (where he criticizes Dignāga's epistemology); YṢV D11b ad YṢ 10, Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 46, tr. 168 (where he criticizes the idea of *rañ gi mtshan ñid du grub pa* of things); YṢV D13b4 ad YṢ 13, Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 51, tr. 179 (where he criticizes *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i no bo* of things); YṢV D15a-b ad YṢ 18-19, Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 55f., tr. 186-191 (where he criticizes the idea that a *rañ gi mtshan ñid* arises and ceases, identifying it with the *rañ gi mtshan ñid* meaning the hardness of the earth); YṢV D26a ad YṢ 46, Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 85f., tr. 287f., and YṢV D28b ad YṢ 53, Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 91f., tr. 299 (where he criticizes *rañ gi mtshan ñid*, i.e. substantial existence); CṢṬ X D162a5f. (where he asserts *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa* of things); CṢṬ XI D173a (where he criticizes Buddhists who admit a *rañ gi mtshan ñid* of things); CṢṬ XIII D196a (where he criticizes the epistemology of logicians).

¹² The Akṣayamatirdeśasūtra distinguishes between scriptures of indirect meaning and of definitive meaning according to whether they teach establishment of conventional reality or that of ultimate reality, or to whether they teach words (i.e. superficial meaning) or profound meaning, or to whether they teach self or non-self. The following passage is adduced in the LN̄, LR, PPad as well as the MĀ with slight variations: *ñes pa'i don gyi mdo sde ni gañ drañ ba'i don gyi mdo sde ni gañ ze na | mdo sde gañ dag kun rñzob sgrub pa bstan pa de dag ni drañ ba'i don zes bya'o || mdo sde gañ dag don dam pa sgrub pa bstan pa de dag ni ñes pa'i don zes bya'o || mdo sde gañ dag tshig dañ yi ge sna tshogs pa bstan pa de dag ni drañ ba'i don zes bya'o || mdo sde gañ dag zab mo*

way of distinguishing scriptures was already used by Indian Mādhyamikas in order to demonstrate their objection to the SNSū, which claims to be a sūtra teaching a definitive meaning.¹³ It may be

bltar dka' ba rtogs par dka' ba bstan pa de dag ni ñes pa'i don źes bya'o // mdo sde gañ dag bdag dañ sems can dañ srog dañ gso ba dañ skyes bu dañ gañ zag dañ sed las skye dañ sed bu dañ byed pa po dañ tshor ba po skad sna tshogs kyis bśad par bya ba bdag po med pa la bdag po lta bur bstan pa de dag ni drañ ba'i don źes bya'o // mdo sde gañ dag dños po ston pa ñid dañ mtshan ma med pa dañ smon pa med pa dañ mñon par 'du byed pa med pa dañ skye ba med pa dañ ma skyes pa dañ / sems can med pa dañ srog med pa dañ gañ zag med pa dañ bdag po med pa mam par thar pa'i sgo ston pa de dag ni ñes pa'i don źes bya ste 'di ni ñes pa'i don gi mdo sde la rton gi drañ ba'i don gi mdo sde la mi rton źes bya'o // (LÑ 42b1-5, cf. also LR 340b1-5 and MĀ D149a6-149b3) The first part deviates from the Sanskrit version cited in the PPad: *katame sūtrānū neyārthāḥ katame nītārthāḥ. ye sūtrāntā mārgatārāya nirdiśtā ima ucyante neyārthāḥ. ye sūtrāntāḥ phalāvātārāya nirdiśtā ima ucyante nītārthāḥ. yāvad ye sūtrāntāḥ śūnyatānimittāprañihitānabhisaṃskārājātānūtpādā bhāvā[nīratma]ñiḥsattvanirjvanīḥpudgalāśvāmīkavimokṣasamukhā nirdiśtāḥ, ta ucyante nītārthāḥ. iyam ucyate bhādanta śāradvatīputra nītārthasūtrāntapratīśaraṇatā, na neyārtha[sūtrānta]pratiśaraṇatā* (PPad 43, 4-9).

The following verse of the Samādhirājasūtra is also often adduced by Mādhyamikas to support this view:

*ston pa bde bar gśegs pas bśad pa ltar //
ñes don mdo sde dag gi bye brag śes //
gañ las sems can gañ zag skyes bu bstan //
chos de thams cad drañ ba'i don du śes // (Cited in LÑ 43a5f., LR 341a1f)
nītārthasūtrāntaviśeṣa jñānati yathopadiśtā sugatena śūnyatā /
yasmin punaḥ pudgala satva pūrṣo neyārtho jñānati sarvadharmān // (Cited in PPad 44, 2-5 and 276, 5-8)*

As the historical sequence of these sūtras (i.e. the SNSū, Akṣayamatīnirdeśa and Samādhirāja) is not clear, I am not able to judge whether these statements of the Akṣayamatīnirdeśa and Samādhirāja were made from the viewpoint of Mādhyamika with an awareness of the method of the SNSū.

¹³ As seen in the note above, relying on the method of the Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra and the Samādhirājasūtra, Candrakīrti regards the SNSū as a sūtra teaching an indirect meaning. He states in MA VI 97:

*de ltar luñ gi lo rgyus śes byas te //
mdo gañ de ñid ma yin bśad don can //
drañ don gsuñs pa'añ rtogs nas drañ bya zin //
ston ñid don can ñes don śes par gyis // (MABh 199, 13-16)*

Pādas b and c are cited in LR 372b2, where Tson kha pa identifies the sūtra called "*drañ don gsuñs pa*" as the SNSū.

true that this claim of the SNSū and its proposition of the three kinds of non-substantiality were the starting point of the theoretical controversy between the two schools in the Indian Mahāyāna, for this sūtra itself had clearly intended to oppose the theory of non-substantiality of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, the most important doctrine for the Mādhyamikas. All later Mādhyamikas had to confront the SNSū, not excepting Tsoñ kha pa, the 14th-century Tibetan Mādhyamika master.¹⁴ I assume that he adopted the concept of "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" from this sūtra, considering it to be representative of Yogācāra "substantialism," and applied it to explain the positions of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, focussing upon their different treatment of this idea of substantial reality. In this manner, it can be conjectured that Tsoñ kha pa might have been deeply

Kamalaśīla who follows the Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra, too, maintains the same view with regard to the method of differentiation of scriptures. However, in his MĀ he regards the SNSū as a sūtra teaching a definitive meaning by interpreting the theory of *triniḥsvabhāvatā* of the SNSū in a way different from that of the Yogācāra. See Yoshimizu 1992: 626 and Section II of this paper.

Moreover, the Blo gsal grub mtha' composed by dByl pa blo gsal in the 14th century based on MĀ discusses the same issue in the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka chapters. Cf. Mimaki 1982: 230-239; Mimaki 1983; and Moriyama 1988.

¹⁴ In this regard, it is interesting to note that Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546) comments on the context of the composition of the LN in his mKhas grub thams cad mkhyen pa gsañ ba'i rnam thar as follows (mKhas grub rje, *gSuñ 'bum*, a 8a55f., lHa sa blocks): *Chos rje g.Yag pas kyañ rje Tsoñ kha pa la drañ ñes kyi dri ba mdzad pa la lan du drañ ñes rnam 'byed / mtshan gzan legs bśad sñiñ por grags pa mdzad nas sa skyar bskur bas Chos rje g.Yag pa yañ thugs śin du 'phrogs nas rje la chos gzan par bźed nas....* "Chos rje g.Yag pa, too, made inquiries on [the intent of] indirect and definitive [meanings] to the master Tsoñ kha pa. In reply [Tsoñ kha pa] composed the well-known [work], *Drañ ñes rnam*. 'byed *alias* Legs bśad sñiñ po, and sent it to Sa skya, so that Chos rje g.Yag pa was fascinated and wished to listen to teachings from this master...." This has been indicated by van der Kuijp (van der Kuijp 1985: 64 Addendum). Van der Kuijp has identified "Chos rje g.Yag pa" as Sa skya pa scholar g.Yag ston Sañs rgyas dpal (1348-1414).

motivated and even theoretically influenced by the SNSū.¹⁵

In Section I, I will try to define the ontological meaning of the concept of "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" through examining the theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality in SNSū VII as well as Tsoñ kha pa's usage of this term. I would then like to take up the question of what relation the term *rañ gi mtshan ñid* in "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" has to the concept of "*svalakṣaṇa*" of the Pramāṇa school (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their successors). Tsoñ kha pa accepts the *svalakṣaṇa* defined as capacity for efficacy (*arthakriyāsamartha*), but rejects the idea that there exists only *svalakṣaṇa* in reality as it appears to our non-conceptual and non-erroneous perception, by taking it as identical with his *rañ gi mtshan ñid* in an ontological sense. In this connection, his interpretation of epistemological questions, which follows Candrakīrti's criticism of Dignāga's theory, should briefly be examined as well.

In Section II, I will discuss the theoretical grounds of the Madhyamaka positions: On what textual authority does Tsoñ kha pa base his interpretation of the ontological and epistemological positions of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika? In order to prove the Svātantrika position, he adduces some statements of Bhāvaviveka and Kamalaśīla about the theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality in the SNSū and that about *svalakṣaṇa* defined as an object of non-erroneous perception. As to his own position, i.e. the theory of Prāsaṅgika, Tsoñ kha pa explains it relying on Candrakīrti's statements. We will see that the theory of the SNSū plays a decisive role in determining the two Madhyamaka positions.

In the last section, Section III, I would like to take Tsoñ kha pa's own Prāsaṅgika position into consideration. Having negated the

¹⁵ I think that more or less the same thing can be said about Candrakīrti. It would require another investigation to confirm that, but it would be natural that Tsoñ kha pa followed his spiritual teacher's way in this most basic matter.

substantial reality of things, the Prāsaṅgika concludes that yet, on the conventional level, these unreal "things" are existent as designation (*btags yod, prajñaptisat*), which arise in mutual dependence (*phan tshun ltos pa, parasparāpekṣā*) like the concepts "father" and "son," i.e. for the Prāsaṅgika, "things" that arise and cease (the subject of *pratītyasamutpāda* or origination in dependence) are merely designations or concepts occurring in our mind. This is the very answer Tsoṅ kha pa has given to the question of how things come into existence, though they are not *ran gi mtshan nīd kyis grub pa*, and he thereby presents his conclusive refutation of the "substantialism" of the SNSū. In other words, it might be said that the Prāsaṅgika position is established through a refutation of the Yogācāra ontology. Tsoṅ kha pa as a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika thus replied to the objection of the SNSū to the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras after an intervening period of over a thousand years.

I. Investigation of the Concept of "*ran gi mtshan nīd kyis grub pa*"

1. *ran gi mtshan nīd kyis grub pa* in SNSū VII

SNSū VII begins by introducing two contradictory teachings of the Buddha that are ascribed to the first Turning of the Doctrine (*'khor lo dan po*) and the second Turning of the Doctrine (i.e. the teachings of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra) respectively.¹⁶

The Lord has taught many times the essential characteristic [i.e.

¹⁶ See SNSū VII,30 (Lamotte 1935: 85).

the own-being¹⁷ (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*) of the aggregates (*phuñ po mams*); he has taught (their) characteristic of arising (*skye ba'i mtshan ñid*), characteristic of cessation (*'jig pa'i mtshan ñid*), abandonment (*span ba*) and comprehension (*yoñs su šes pa*) (of them) as well¹⁸ On the other hand, the Lord has also taught¹⁹ that all things are non-substantial (*ño bo ñid ma mchis pa*), all things are neither produced (*ma skyes pa*) nor destroyed (*ma 'gags pa*), originally calm (*gzod ma nas ži ba*) and completely liberated by nature (*rañ bžin gyis yoñs su mya ñan*

¹⁷ Although I will render "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" (*svalakšana*) by "essential characteristic" in the case that it occurs together with other characteristics such as "arising" and "cessation," it should be noted that this *svalakšana* does not mean mere essential nature of a thing such as "heat of fire" etc. It is obviously a synonym of *svabhāva* that indicates an existent entity itself (e.g. the entity designated "form-aggregate").

¹⁸ The essential and various attributive characteristics of the following things are subsequently enumerated: the (twelve) spheres (*skye mched, āyatana*), (twelve members of) dependent origination (*sten cin 'brel par 'byuñ ba, prañīyasamutpāda*), (four) foods (*zas, āhāra*), (four noble) truths (*bden pa, satya*), (eighteen) elements (*kham, dhātu*) and the thirty-seven elements leading to enlightenment (*byañ phyogs so bdun, sapta-triṅśad-bodhipākṣika*) consisting of the four contemplations (*dran po ñe bar bžag pa, smṛtyupasthāna*), four right endeavours (*yañ dag par spoñ ba, samyagprahāna*), four bases of miracle power (*rdzu 'phrul gyi rkañ pa, ṛddhipāda*), five (intellectual) abilities (*dbañ po, indriya*), five powers (*stobs, bala*), seven members of practice for enlightenment (*byañ chub kyī yan lag, bodyaiga*) and the noble eightfold path (*'phags pa'i lam yan lag bryad pa, āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*).

These topics are listed in the Mātrkā or Mātikā literatures of Pāli-Abhidharma tradition. See e.g. VM XXII (Warren & Kosambi 1950: 582 and 583); Warder 1961: x-xxi; Frauwallner 1971: 107-121; Frauwallner 1972: 133-136 (Tables). For the *saptatriṅśad-bodhipākṣika*, cf. also AKBh ad AK VI 67cd-69ab (Pradhan 1975: 383f.).

¹⁹ For the corresponding teachings found in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, see Lamotte 1935: 192, n. 2.

las 'das pa).²⁰

Then Paramārthasamudgata (*don dam yañ dag 'phags*) asked the Buddha his real intention in these teachings. Tsoñ kha pa comments on this passage as follows:

Here [the following is described]: Some scriptures teach that all things are non-substantial (*ño bo ñid med pa*) and so on, whereas other (scriptures) teach that there exists the essential characteristic (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*) and other [characteristics (*mtshan ñid*)] of the aggregates, etc. Although (these) two (statements) are contradictory if being affirmed literally, there must be no contradiction (among the teachings of scriptures). Therefore (Paramārthasamudgata) asked (the Buddha) with what intention (the Buddha) has taught non-substantiality etc. (of things). It is thereby also indirectly (*don gyis*) inquired with what intention (the Buddha) has taught the existence of the essential characteristic (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*) (of the aggregates etc.) and so on.²¹

A literal contradiction among the two teachings is clearly indicated by Tsoñ kha pa in the form of verb: "yod pa" and "med pa" in the expressions "*rañ gi mtshan ñid yod pa*" and "*ño bo ñid med pa*." This implies that "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" and "*ño bo ñid*" are the same in

²⁰ Lamotte 1935: 65, 4-66, 27 in VII. 1, tr. 192 (cited in LÑ 3a4-3b3, Thurman 1984: 191): *bcom ldan 'das kyis mam grañs du mar phuñ po mams kyī rañ gi mtshan ñid kyañ bka' stsal / skye ba'i mtshan ñid dañ / 'jig pa'i mtshan ñid dañ / spañ ba dañ yoñs su šes pa yañ bka' stsal / ... la' bcom ldan 'das kyis chos thams cad ño bo ñid ma mchis pa / chos thams cad ma skyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas ži ba / rañ bžin gyis yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa žes kyañ bka stsal lags na /*

²¹ LÑ 3b5-4a1, Thurman 1984: 192: *'dis ni mdo sde kha cig tu chos thams cad ño bo ñid med pa sogs su gsuñs pa dañ / kha cig tu phuñ po la sogs pa'i rañ gi mtshan ñid la sogs pa yod par gsuñs pa gñis sgra sor bžag na 'gal na'añ 'gal ba med dgos pas ci la dgoñs nas ño bo ñid med pa sogs su gsuñs žes dris te / des ni rañ gi mtshan ñid yod pa sogs su gsuñs pa yañ ci la dgoñs nas gsuñs pa don gyis žus so //*

meaning.²² The subjects of these verbs should consistently be taken to be the same: the *dharmas* enumerated in the first part, "the aggregates (*phun po*) etc.," are to be included in "all things or *dharmas*" (*chos thams cad*). Also with regard to other characteristics of things, one can see contradictory expressions: Some scriptures teach "characteristic of arising" (*skye ba'i mtshan ñid*) and "characteristic of cessation" (*'jig pa'i mtshan ñid*) of things, whereas other scriptures negate these characteristics by teaching "all things are neither produced nor destroyed" (*ma skyes pa, ma 'gags pa*).

The author(s) of the SNSū who disagreed with the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra on its "nihilistic" interpretation of this ontological issue set forth the theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality in answer to the inquiry of Paramārthasamudgata, whereby the SNSū stressed the importance of distinguishing real existence from non-existence:

- 1) The non-substantiality of characteristic (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid, lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*): Any conceptualized characteristic (*kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid, parikalpitalakṣaṇa*) is non-substantial.
- 2) The non-substantiality of origination (*skye ba ño bo ñid med pa ñid, utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*): The dependent characteristic [i.e. entity]²³ (*gžan gi dbaṅ gi mtshan ñid, paratantralakṣaṇa*) does

²² The words "*ño bo ñid*" (*svabhāva*) and "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" (*svalakṣaṇa*) in this passage of the SNSū should evidently be taken as synonyms as Tsoñ kha pa does. Tsoñ kha pa clearly rejects the interpretation of Wen tshig (Wōn ch'uk) alias Yüan-t'ŕse that the *rañ gi mtshan ñid* here means a specific characteristic (*thun moñ ma yin pa'i mtshan ñid*), since even merely conceptualized unreal existences have their own characteristics (LN 4a1f, Thurman 1984: 192). For Wen tshig's commentary on the SNSū (the Āryagambhīrasamdhinirmocanaṭikā, P5517, D4016), see Steinkellner 1989: 233ff.

²³ Although I will render "*paratantrasvabhāva*" or "*paratantralakṣaṇa*" by "the dependent nature" or "the dependent characteristic" in the same way as the other two natures or characteristics, I basically understand that it refers to inexpressible

arise on the strength of others, but not by itself.

- 3) The ultimate non-substantiality (*don dam pa no bo ñid med pa ñid, paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*): (a) The dependent characteristic is not a pure object (i.e. not an object of a saint). (b) The perfect characteristic (*yoñs su grub pa'i mtshan ñid, pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*) is selflessness of things (*chos bdag med pa, dharmānairātmya*).²⁴

In this theory it is significant that the object of negation, i.e. what is non-substantial, is clearly restricted. Only in the case of 1) the conceptualized characteristic, the substantiality of such characteristic itself is negated. In 2) and 3), "arising by itself," "being a pure object"

and perceivable entity, which arises and ceases (i.e. which appears to one's perception and disappears from it).

²⁴ Cf. Lamotte 1935: 67-69, VII. 4, 5 and 6, tr. 194.

As to these three kinds of characteristics, I would like to explain my tentative interpretation of the word "lakṣaṇa" (*mtshan ñid*): 1) The *lakṣaṇa* in the compound *parikalpītalakṣaṇa* refers to designation or concept of something with regard to its essence (*svalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva*) and particularities (*viśeṣa*) in accord with verbal usage and conventions as explained in SNSū VII. 25: E.g. the concept "form-aggregate" (*gzugs kyi phuñ po*), "arising of the form-aggregate," "abandonment of the form-aggregate," etc. Tson kha pa takes the *mtshan ñid* in the compound *mtshan ñid no bo ñid med pa ñid* as *rañ gi mtshan ñid* (LR 372a3: *mtshan ñid no bo ñid med pa'i mtshan ñid ni rañ gi mtshan ñid dam rañ bzin yin*); 2) The *lakṣaṇa* in the compound *paratantralakṣaṇa* refers to inexpressible and perceivable phenomenal entity -- each distinctive individual existence -- which comes into existence in dependence on others; 3) The *lakṣaṇa* in the compound *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* refers to the reality of the dependent characteristic.

Another expression for these three, viz. "svabhāva" of three kinds (*parikalpita-, paratantra- and pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is, in general, not considered to be different in sense from the three *lakṣaṇas*. I would very tentatively suppose the reason why the word "lakṣaṇa" appears in place of "svabhāva" in this chapter of the SNSū as follows: Even the author(s) of this sūtra, who propounded his or their own interpretation of the theory of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of things and asserted the existence of phenomenal entities, could not negate Buddha's teaching in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra by using the expressions such as "things have their *svabhāva*" or "there is *svabhāva*," insofar as he was or they were Mahāyāna Buddhist(s). Therefore the SNSū might have applied the word "lakṣaṇa" to the discussion of existence and non-existence.

and "being self" are negated. This suggests that the dependent characteristic and its arising on the strength of others as well as the perfect characteristic are existent in reality. Thereby the author(s) of SNSū must have intended to avoid annihilation of all existences that he or they thought was the view of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras. The SNSū states:

Those who do not understand my profound and right intentional teaching as it really is and, in spite of (their) faith to this teaching, maintain only the literal meaning of the teaching, i.e. "all these things are non-substantial at all, all these things are neither produced nor destroyed at all, originally calm and completely liberated by nature," come to obtain on this ground the view that there exists nothing (*med par lta ba*) with regard to all things and the view that there exists no characteristic (*mtshan ñid med par lta ba*). Having obtained the view that there exists nothing (*med par lta ba*) and the view that there exists no characteristic (*mtshan ñid med par lta ba*), (they) further deny (*skur pa 'debs, apavāda*) all things with regard to all characteristics (*thams cad la mtshan ñid thams cad kyis*) (They deny all the three characteristics, for) insofar as the dependent characteristic and perfect characteristic exist, the conceptualized characteristic can also be known; however, those who view the dependent characteristic and perfect characteristic as non-existent, deny the conceptualized characteristic too.²⁵

²⁵ Lamotte 1935: 77, 5-23, VII, 20, tr. 200f. (cited in LN 8a1-6, Thurman 1984: 198f): *ñā'i dgoñs te bśād pa zab mo yañ dag pa ji lta ba bñin mi śes te / chos de la mos kyañ chos 'di dag thams cad ni ño bo ñid med pa kho na yin no // chos 'di dag thams cad ni ma skyes pa kho na'o // ma 'gags pa kho na'o // gzod ma nas ũi ba kho na'o // rañ bñin gñis yoñs su mya ñan las das pa kho na'o ũes chos kyi don la sgra ji bñin kho nar mñon par ũen par byed de / de dag gñi des na chos thams cad la med par lta ba dañ / mtshan ñid med par lta ba 'ihob par 'gyur te /*

From this passage it can be assumed that the SNSū identifies the idea of non-substantiality (*ño bo ñid med pa, niḥsvabhāva*) with the idea of non-existence (*med pa, abhāva*). That is, whatever is non-substantial does not exist anywhere. About a non-existent thing it is impossible to say that it is either produced or destroyed.

Paramārthasamudgata, I (i.e. the Buddha) taught that all things are non-substantial, intending the three kinds of non-substantiality. Paramārthasamudgata, intending the non-substantiality of characteristic [i.e. the non-substantiality of the conceptualized characteristic] among the [three kinds of non-substantiality], I taught that all things are neither produced nor destroyed, originally calm and completely liberated by nature. Why? Paramārthasamudgata, namely, whatever does not exist as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi med pa*) is not produced; whatever is not produced is not destroyed; whatever is neither produced nor destroyed is originally calm; whatever is originally calm is completely liberated by nature; in whatever is completely liberated by nature there is nothing to be liberated at all.²⁶

med par lta 'ba dañ / mtshan ñid med' par lta ba thob nas kyañ thams cad la mtshan ñid thams cad kyi skur pa 'debs te / gzan gyi dbaṅ gi mtshan ñid dañ / yoṅs su grub pa'i mtshan ñid yod na ni / kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid kyañ rab tu šes par gyur na / de la gañ dag gzan gyi dbaṅ gi mtshan ñid dañ / yoṅs su grub pa'i mtshan ñid med par mthoñ ba de dag gis ni kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid la 'aṅ skur pa btab pa yin pa'i phyir te /

²⁶ Lamotte 1935: 69, 22-34, VII. 8, tr. 195 (cited in LÑ 8b5-9a2, Thurman 1984: 199, where the first sentence is omitted): *don dam yañ dag 'phags nas ño bo ñid med pa 'di mam pa gsum po de dag las dgoṅs nas chos thams cad ño bo ñid med pa'o žes bstan to / don dam yañ dag 'phags de la mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid las dgoṅs nas / nas chos thams cad ma skeyes pa / ma 'gags pa / gzod ma nas ži ba / rañ bžin gyis yoṅs su mya nan las 'das pa'o žes bstan to || de ci'i phyir že na / don dam yañ dag 'phags 'di ltar rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi med pa gañ yin pa de ni ma skeyes pa yin / ma skeyes pa gañ yin pa de ni ma 'gags pa yin / ma skeyes pa dañ ma 'gags pa gañ yin pa de ni gzod ma nas ži ba yin / gzod ma nas ži ba gañ*

Thus, according to the SNSū, the substantiality (*ño bo ñid, svabhāva*) should be posited as the basis of every existence and phenomenal change. This is the very reason the SNSū takes the view of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra -- that all things are non-substantial -- to be nihilistic. It may be said that for the SNSū all objective things are to be divided into two, i.e. real existence and non-existence, according to whether they are substantial or non-substantial. Namely, the dependent and perfect characteristics exist since they are substantial, whereas the conceptualized characteristic exists nowhere since it is non-substantial. The term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi ma grub pa*" is used to explain this non-substantiality of the conceptualized characteristic:

Paramārthasamudgata, among them (i.e. the three kinds of non-substantiality) what is the non-substantiality of characteristic of things? It is the conceptualized characteristic. Why? It is, namely, a characteristic postulated by means of names and conventions (*miñ dañ brdas mam par bžag pa'i mtshan ñid*),²⁷ but not established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi nam par gnas pa ni ma yin pa*).²⁸ Hence it is called non-substantiality of characteristic.²⁹

yin pa de ni rañ bžin gyis yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa yin / rañ bžin gyis yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa gañ yin pa de la ni / yoñs su mya ñan las 'das par bya ba cuñ zad kyañ med de /

²⁷ I adopt Tsoñ kha pa's reading "*miñ dañ brdas*" instead of "*miñ dañ brdar*" of the SNSū. Lamotte proposes the Sanskrit compound "*nāmasaṃketavyavasthita*" for this phrase and gives the translation "etabli par des noms et conventions," which corresponds to Tsoñ kha pa's reading.

²⁸ The old Tibetan translation of the SNSū (Stein No. 194) reads "*bđagi mtshan ma ñid gyis btags pa*" (Hakamaya 1984: 11). Lamotte proposes the Sanskrit "*svalakṣaṇena vyavasthita*" for this phrase.

²⁹ Lamotte 1935: 67, 32-68, 4, VII. 4, tr. 94 (cited in LN 5a3, Thurman 1984: 194): *don dam yañ dag 'phags de la chos mams kyi mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid gañ ze na / kañ brtags pa'i mshan ñid gañ yin pa'o / de ci'i phyir ze na / 'di ltar de ni miñ dañ brdar* mam par bžag pa'i mtshan ñid yin gyi / rañ gi mtshan*

"A characteristic postulated by means of names and conventions" is illustrated elsewhere in the SNSū as follows:

The conceptualized characteristic is that which is postulated -- with reference to [the dependent characteristic] that is a sphere of conceptualization (*mam par rtog pa'i spyod yul*), a basis (*gnas*) of the conceptualized characteristic as well as a ground of conditionings (*'du byed kyi mtshan ma, saṃskāranimitta*) -- as the essential characteristic (*ño bo ñid kyi mtshan ñid, svabhāvalakṣaṇa*) or particular characteristic (*bye brag gi mtshan ñid, viśeṣalakṣaṇa*)³⁰ by means of names and conventions³¹ such as "[this is] the form-aggregate" (*gzugs kyi phuñ po*), and which is postulated as the essential characteristic or particular

*ñid kyas mam par gnas pa ni ma yin pas de'i phyir de ni mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid ces bya'o | *miñ dañ brdas LN*

³⁰ These two kinds of qualification of characteristic can be understood as qualifications of subject (i.e. what it is) by a substantive and of its attributes or particularities by predicates with reference to a real entity. In the Bodhisattvabhūmi these are included in the eight kinds of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) (BBh 34, 23 seq; BBh(W) 50, 25 seq.) For the explanation thereof, see note 47.

³¹ Also in early tradition of Buddhist logic, it is used for classifying what is to be proven (*sādhyārtha/sādhyadharmā*). The Śrutamayibhūmi states: *sādhyo 'rtho dvividhaḥ katamaḥ. svabhāvo viśeṣaś ca. tatra svabhāvaḥ sādhyah. sac ca sato 'sac cāsataḥ. viśeṣaḥ sādhyah sottaraṇi ca sottarato 'nuttaraṇi cānuttarataḥ, nityo nityataḥ, anityo 'nityataḥ, rūpi rūpito 'rūpy arūpito yathā rūpy arūpi tathā sanidarśano 'nidarśanaḥ sapratigho 'pratighaḥ sāsravo 'nāsravaḥ saṃskṛto 'saṃskṛta ity evamādinā prabhedanayena viśeṣasya sādhyatā draṣṭavyā.* (Yaita 1992: 515, 7-13; Pandeya 1986: 336, 19-24) Also cf. AS 105, 3f.; ASBh 151, 8-11; AKBh 300, 18-21 (indicated in Yaita 1992: 550 n. 6, 7 and 551, n. 1.). Furthermore in PSV III ad PS III 2, the distinction between *rañ gi ño bo (svarūpa)* and *khyad par (viśeṣa)* of *dharma* and *dharmin* in a thesis are mentioned (Kitagawa 1973: 130-13, text 4472f.)

³¹ I retain the reading "*miñ dañ brdas*" in accord with the previous passage (VII. 4). Tsoñ kha pa exceptionally gives here "*miñ dañ brdar*" as the SNSū does (also in the Peking edition of the LN), but it is most likely to be a misprint because in the repeated phrase "*miñ dañ brdas*" appears for "*miñ dañ brdar*."

characteristic by means of names and conventions³² such as "the form-aggregate arises" (*gzugs kyi phuñ po skye'o*), "(the form-aggregate) ceases" (*'gag go*), "the form-aggregate is abandoned" (*gzugs kyi phuñ po spañ ba*) and "(the form-aggregate) is comprehended" (*yoñs su šes pa*).³³

The four examples correspond to the topics of Buddha's first teaching in the introductory part (VII. 1): the essential characteristic of the aggregates, their characteristics of arising and cessation, and abandonment and comprehension of them. These concepts of characteristics with reference to an entity are defined as "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis mam par gnas pa ma yin pa / ma grub pa*" (not being established as intrinsically real) or "*miñ dañ brdas nam par bžag pa*" (being postulated by means of names and conventions). In this manner, the SNSū brings out the idea of "*miñ dañ brdas nam par gžag pa*" in opposition to the idea of "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*." Precisely this ontological perspective seems to have greatly influenced Tsoñ kha pa's own ontological interpretation as will be seen later.³⁴

³² The phrase "which is postulated as essential characteristic and particular characteristic by means of names and conventions" is found twice each before the first and the other three examples, but it may be proper to understand that the first example illustrates the essential characteristic and the rest illustrate the particular characteristics as Tsoñ kha pa reads: "*di gzugs phuñ po šes no bo dañ gzugs phuñ skye'o šes sogs su btags pa ni bya brag gam khyad par du btags tshul yin te* (LN 10b1).

³³ Lamotte 1935: 81, 1-11, VII 25, tr. 203 (cited in LN 10a4ff., Thurman 1984: 201): *mam par rtog pa'i spyod yul kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid kyi gnas 'du byed kyi mtshan ma la / gzugs kyi phuñ po šes no bo ñid kyi mtshan ñid dam / bye brag gi mtshan ñid du miñ dañ brdar nam par bžag pa dañ / gzugs kyi phuñ po skye 'o ze am / 'gag go ze 'am / gzugs kyi phuñ po spañ ba dañ / yoñs su šes pa šes no bo ñid kyi mtshan ñid dam / bye brag gi mtshan ñid du miñ dañ brdar* mam par bžag pa gañ lags pa de ni kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid lags te / *miñ dañ brdas LN*

³⁴ The fact that Tsoñ kha pa adopts the concept "*miñ dañ brdas nam par bžag pa*" to define the conventional existence from the viewpoint of Prāsaṅgika

On the other hand, the SNSū asserts that the basis of conceptualization -- the dependent characteristic -- is real existence. Consequently Tsoñ kha pa terms it "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" together with the perfect characteristic:

The view that there is no characteristic (*mtshan ñid med pa*) with regard to the dependent and perfect characteristics is the view that both of them are not established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa*) If arising and cessation are not established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub na*), there is neither arising nor cessation. [This is] the theory [expounded here in VII. 20].³⁵

Namely, if the dependent characteristic that is established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*) does not exist, [its] arising and cessation are impossible. Therefore [the view that the dependent characteristic does not exist] denies the [dependent characteristic]. And if the perfect characteristic does not exist as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis med na*), it would not be nature of existences (*dños po'i gñis*). [This is] the theory [expounded here in VII. 20].³⁶

Because the unestablishment as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa*) is given as the reason there is neither arising nor cessation (*skye 'gag med pa*) with regard to the conceptualized characteristic, it is taught (here in VII. 8) that

supports this assumption. See Section III.

³⁵ LN 8b2ff., Thurman 1984: 199: *gzan dbaṅ daṅ yoṅs grub kyī mtshan ñid la mtshan ñid med par mthoṅ ba ni de gñis rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub par lta ba ste / skye 'gag rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub na skye 'gag med par 'gyur ba'i lugs so //*

³⁶ LN 7b4f., Thurman 1984: 198: *'di ltar gzan dbaṅ rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa med na skye ba daṅ 'gag pa mi nuṅ bas de la skur pa 'debs pa yin la yoṅs grub rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis med na dños po'i gñis su mi 'gyur ba'i lugs so //*

if there are arising and cessation (*skye 'gag yod na*), they are established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*), and that there are arising and cessation that are established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye 'gag yod pa*) with regard to the dependent characteristic. That which is free of arising and cessation is the unconditioned (*'dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta*). Therefore it cannot be a thing of defilement (*kun nas ñon moṅs, saṃkleśa*). Accordingly it is taught to be originally calm and completely liberated by nature, for suffering (*mya ñan, śoka*) means defilement here.³⁷

It should be noted that here not only the dependent characteristic but also its arising and cessation are described as being established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*).

To sum up, one may define the fundamental ontological idea of the SNSū in accord with Tsoñ kha pa as follows:

- 1) Whatever is non-substantial is non-existent.
- 2) Whatever is non-substantial neither arises nor ceases.

The sūtra postulates the substantial reality (*svabhāva* or *svalakṣaṇa*) as the ground of every existent thing and phenomenal change. There is no existence without *svabhāva* or *svalakṣaṇa*. This is the very idea that in turn received for centuries a strict criticism from Mādhyamikas, who have maintained that there is no existence with *svabhāva*.

Let us go on examining the idea of substantial existence in the Yogācāra system. In SNSū VII, the dependent characteristic is

³⁷ LÑ 9a2ff., Thurman 1984: 199; *kun brtags la skye 'gag med pa'i rgyu mtshan du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa bkod pa'i phyir skye 'gag yod na rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa dañ gzan dbaṅ la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye 'gag yod par yañ bstan no // skye 'gag dañ bral ba ni 'dus ma byas yin pas kun nas ñon moṅs kyī chos su mi nuñ pa'i phyir gzod ma nas ži ba dañ rañ bžin gyis mya ñan las 'das par bstan te mya ñan ni 'dir kun ñon yin pa'i phyir ro //*

identified as a perceivable, inexpressible and conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) entity to which our mind activities are directed.³⁸ Tsoñ kha pa understands that the existence of such a substantial entity is also asserted in later Yogācāra tradition. In order to prove that, he adduces a lot of supporting statements from the Mahāyānasamgraha, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, the Madhyantavibhāga, the Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthā of Dignāga and the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti.³⁹ I would like to introduce here just the following passages from the Tattvārtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi,⁴⁰ where the character of the real existence is clearly described:

(The superimposition [*sgro 'dogs, samāropa*] is:) Someone superimposes a non-existent essential characteristic (*rañ gi mtshan ñid yod pa ma yin pa*) of which the nature is designation (*'dogs pa'i tshig, prajñaptivāda*)⁴¹ upon an entity (*dños po, vastu*) such as form and so on of things (*chos rnams*) such as form and so on, and then attaches to [this non-existent essential characteristic]. (The denial [*skur 'debs, apavāda*] is:) Someone denies a real entity (*yañ dag pa'i dños po*) that exists as

³⁸ In the sixth chapter of the SNSū, the dependent characteristic is explained as the twelve membered origination in dependence (*prattiyasamupāda*) (Lamotte 1935: 160f.).

³⁹ Cf. LÑ 15a4-42a4, Thurman 1984: 209-252. Each citation is identified by Thurman.

⁴⁰ For this chapter, the following translations in modern languages are available: J. D. Willis, *On Knowing reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi* (New York 1979); Sōma Kazui, "Bosatsuji' Shinjitsu-shō Shiyaku" (A Japanese Translation of the *Tattvārthapaṭala*, the Fourth Chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*) in *Nanto Bukkyō (Journal of the Nanto Society of Buddhist Studies)* 55, 1986.

⁴¹ Tsoñ kha pa notes that the phrase "*'dogs pa'i tshig gi ño bo ñid (prajñaptivādasvabhāva)*" should be understood as meaning "*tshig gi btags pa'i ño bo ñid*," not as meaning "*'dogs byed kyi tshig*" (LÑ 16a4f.).

ultimately [real] (*don dam par yod pa*) on account of its inexpressible nature and that is a basis of appearance of designation, in other words, a ground of appearance of designation, [by] thinking that there exists nothing at all.⁴²

For one who denies a pure entity (*dños po tsam, vastumātra*) of things (*chos rnams*) such as form and so on, there does not exist either reality (*de kho na, tattva*) [i.e. the perfect characteristic] or designation [i.e. the conceptualized characteristic]; both are unreasonable.⁴³

For instance, insofar as there exist the aggregates such as form and so on, it is possible to designate [them] "person," but if they did not exist at all, there would occur no designation of

⁴² According to the Sanskrit text, it should be read: "Having denied an entity, someone annihilates the ultimate existence that is [ultimate existence] on account of its essence of being inexpressible and that is a basis of appearance of designation, [in other words] a ground of appearance of designation, [by] thinking that there exists nothing at all."

BBh D25b3ff., P30a8ff. (cited in LÑ 16a1f., Thurman 1984: 210), BBh 30, 26-31, 2, BBh(W) 45, 14-19: *gzugs la sogs pa'i chos rnams* gzugs la sogs pa'i dños po la 'dogs pa'i tshig gi ño bo ñid kyī rañ gi mtshan ñid yod pa ma yin pa la sgro btags nas mñion par zen pa gañ yin pa dañ / 'dogs** pa'i tshig gi mtshan ma'i gzi 'dogs** pa'i tshig gi mtshan ma'i rten du gyur pa / brjod du med pa'i bdag ñid kyis don dam par yod pa yañ dag pa'i dños po la thams cad kyī thams cad du med do zes skur 'debs śiñ chud gzon par byed pa gañ yin pa .../ *rnams la BBh D: rnams dañ LÑ **btags LÑ*

yaś ca rūpādānāṃ dharmānāṃ rūpādikasya vastunaḥ prajñaptivādasvabhāvaṃ svalakṣaṇam asadbhūtasamāropato 'bhiniviśate. yaś cāpi prajñaptivādanimitādhiṣṭhānaṃ prajñaptivādanimittasanniśrayaṃ nirabhilāpyātmakatayā paramārthasadbhūtaṃ vastv apavādamāno nāśayati sarveṇa sarvaṃ nāstati.

⁴³ BBh D25b7, P30b5f. (cited in LÑ 16b6f., Thurman 1984: 211), BBh 31, 6f., BBh(W) 45, 25-46, 2: *gzugs la sogs pa'i chos rnams kyī dños po tsam la skur 'debs pa la ni de kho na yañ med pa* la 'dogs pa yañ med de** de gñis ka*** yañ mi rigs so / *med LÑ **med de omitted P ***gñi ga D rūpādānāṃ dharmānāṃ vastumātram apavādato* naiva tattvaṃ nāpi prajñaptis tadubhayaṃ etan na yujyate. *apavādamānasya BBh(W)*

"person" to these non-entities (*dños po med pa, nirvastu*). In this manner, insofar as there exists a pure entity (*dños po tsam, vastumātra*) of things (*chos mams*) such as form and so on, it is possible to apply designation [to it]. If it did not exist at all, there would occur no designation to this non-existence. In the case that there is no basis of designation at all, it would follow that there is no designation since there is no basis (of designation).⁴⁴

Tsoñ kha pa cites these passages as evidence that the Bodhisattvabhūmi maintains the non-existence of the conceptualized characteristic and the existence of the other two characteristics: The conceptualized characteristic is termed here "*prajñapti*" or "*prajñaptivāda*" and the dependent characteristic "*vastu*" or "*vastumātra*." This real entity called "*vastu*" -- a basis of designation as well as inexpressible (*nirabhilāpya*) ultimate existence (*paramārthasat*)⁴⁵ -- is also characterized in the same chapter as "object of non-conceptual cognition," "inexpressible self-existence

⁴⁴ BBh D26a1ff., P30b6-37a1 (cited in LN 17a3-6, Thurman 1984: 212), BBh 31, 7-10, BBh(W) 46, 2-7: *dper na gzugs la sogs pa'i phuñ po rnams yod na gañ zag gdags su ruñ gi med du zin na ni dños po med pa la gañ zag gdags su med do // de bñin du gzugs la sogs pa'i chos mams kyi dños po tsam yod na gzugs la sogs pa'i chos 'dogs pa'i tshig ñe bar gdags su ruñ gi / med du zin na dños po med pa la gdags pa'i tshig gi ñe bar 'dogs pa med do // de la 'dogs pa'i gñi med du zin na ni gñi med par 'gyur* pas 'dogs pa yañ** med par 'gyur ro // *gyur DP ***añ DP tad yathā satsu rūpādīṣu skandheṣu pudgalaprajñaptir yujyate. nāsatsu, nirvastukāpudgalaprajñaptiḥ. evaṃ sati rūpādīnāṃ dharmāṇāṃ vastumātre [sa]rūpādīdharmaprajñaptivādopacāro yujyate. nāsti, nirvastukāḥ prajñaptivādopacārah. tatra prajñapter vastu nāstīti niradhiṣṭhānā prajñaptir api nāsti.*

⁴⁵ For *paramārthasat* in connection with other two kinds of *sat*, *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat*, propounded in the Yogācārabhūmi, see Mukai 1973. Among these three kinds of *sat*, only the *paramārthasat* (= *vastumātra*) is regarded to be free of conceptualization; *dravyasat* that refers to a concept of a fundamental element such as "form-aggregate" etc. is differentiated from *paramārthasat* in this treatise in contrast to the AK, where they are identified.

(*svabhāva*) of all things" and "suchness" (*tathatā*).⁴⁶

It is thus evident that the idea of "*vastumātra*" as substantial existence is opposed to that of "*prajñaptimātra*" as non-existence. In the same way that the SNSū asserts non-substantiality of the conceptualized characteristic by stating that "the conceptualized characteristic is that which is postulated as the essential characteristic (*svabhāvalakṣaṇa*) and particular characteristic (*viśeṣalakṣaṇa*) by means of names and conventions," the Bodhisattvabhūmi asserts non-substantiality of designation by stating that "one should know that the designation of the essential characteristic of things (*svalakṣaṇaprajñaptir dharmāṅām*) [from] "form[-aggregate]" (*rūpa*), "sensation[-aggregate]" (*vedanā*) up to "nirvāṇa" as explained before"⁴⁷

⁴⁶ See BBh 28, 9ff, BBh(W) 41, 15-18: *sa khalu bodhisattvas tena dūrānupraviṣṭena dharmanairātmayajñānena nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatām sarvadharmāṅām yathābhūtaṃ viditvā na kiñcid vikalpayati * nānyatra vastumātram gṛhṇāti tathatāmātram.*

**na kiñcid dharmam kathamcit kalpayati* BBh(W)

"Having indeed understood the inexpressible self-existence of all things as it really is through a deeply penetrating knowledge of selflessness of things, the Bodhisattva does not conceptualize anything, except that* he grasps a pure entity, [i.e.] pure suchness." *This reading of *anyatra* is supported by BHSD.

Thus it is known that the *vastumātra* is the inexpressible self-existence of all *dharmas*. This *vastu* is also said to be free of [the concepts of] existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāva*), consisting in characteristics of things (*dharmalakṣaṇasaṃgraha*), and non-dual (*advaya*) (BBh 27, 4ff., BBh(W) 39, 23ff.: *...bhāvābhāvabhyām vinirmuktaṃ dharmalakṣaṇasaṃgrhītaṃ vastu, tad advayaṃ, ...*). The term "*vastumātra*" and this passage are also briefly discussed in Schmithausen 1969: 108, note (46).

⁴⁷ See BBh 26, 18-25, BBh(W) 39, 3-17, where various designations of things such as "form[-aggregate]" and so on are enumerated, which are referring to essential nature (*svabhāva*) of each thing and regarded as "existence" (*bhāva*) in the world (*prajñaptinirūḍhaḥ svabhāvo dharmāṅām lokasya bhāva ity ucyate*).

This designation of *svabhāva* can be identified with "*svabhāvavikalpa*" that is included together with "*viśeṣavikalpa*" in the eight kinds of conceptualization (BBh 35, 13-19, BBh(W) 51, 21-52, 2): *tatra svabhāvavikalpaḥ katamaḥ rūpādīśarñjñake vastuni rūpam ity evamādir yo vikalpaḥ viśeṣavikalpaḥ katamaḥ. tasmīn eva rūpasarñjñake vastuni ayam rūpī ayam arūpī ... ity evaṃbhāgyenāpramāṇena prabhedanayena yā svabhāvavikalpādhiṣṭhānā*

is nothing other than mere designation (*prajñaptimātra*).⁴⁸ Namely, the descriptions "being mere designation" as well as "being postulated by means of names and conventions" mean the state of being neither substantial nor existent. Based on this argument, the Bodhisattvabhūmi criticizes Mādhyamikas who are considered to claim, to the contrary, that there exists nothing substantial, therefore the mere designation is reality of things. Those Mādhyamikas are called "nihilists" (*nāstika*).⁴⁹

In short, Tsoñ kha pa considers that this idea of substantial and non-substantial existences of the Yogācāra has not basically changed in the later tradition. As the theory of three kinds of nature (*trisvabhāvata*) came to be linked with that of *vijñaptimātratā*, the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) also came to be identified as *vijñapti*.⁵⁰ But its ontological characteristic remains the same: The

tadviśiṣṭārthavikalpanā. "What is the conceptualization of essential nature [i.e. self-existence]? It is the conceptualization such as 'form' and so on, which refers to the entity to be named 'form' and so on What is the conceptualization of particularity? It is the conceptualization based on the conceptualization of the essential nature with regard to objects distinguished through arbitrary [or endless?] (*apramāna*) discrimination such as 'it has a form,' 'it does not have a form,' ... referring to the same entity to be named 'form' and so on." In the AKBh, *svabhāvavikalpa* is listed as one of the three *vikalpas*, viz. *svabhāva*-, *abhiniroparā*- and *anusmaranavikalpa* (AKBh ad AK I. 33ab, Pradhan 1975: 22; Ejima 1989: 35).

⁴⁸ BBh 30, 2f., BBh(W) 43, 25f.: *yeyam svalakṣaṇaprajñaptir dharmāṇāṃ yad uta rūpam iti vā vedaneti vā pūrvavad antato yāvan nirvāṇam iti vā prajñaptimātram eva tad veditavyam.*

⁴⁹ See e.g. in BBh 31, 13f., BBh(W) 46, 12f.: *prajñaptimātram eva sarvam, tad ca tattvam, yaś caivam paśyati sa samyak paśyati*. "All (things) are none other than mere designation. This is reality. Whoever observes in this way observes in a right way." He is called "chief nihilist" (*pradhāno nāstiko*) (BBh 31, 17, BBh(W) 46, 18).

⁵⁰ E.g. the Mahāyānasamgraha (Lamotte 1973 I: 24, Chapter II 2) states: *de la gzan gyi dbaṅ gi mtshan ṅid gaṅ ze na | gaṅ kun gzi mam par śes pa'i sa bon can yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun rlog pas bsdus pa'i mam par rig pa'o |*

dependent nature is ultimate existence as well as a basis of conceptualization.⁵¹ Tsoñ kha pa terms it "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*."

Aramaki has indicated the nine characteristics of *paratantrasvabhāva* expounded in the MS: *sarvadharmāpratibhāsāraya, praṭīyasamuṭpāda, vijñaptimātrata, na bhinnā nāpy abhinnā, māyādivat, saṃkleśāṃśīko vyavadānāṃśīkaś ca, ālambanam pṛṣṭhalabdahajñānasya, apratiṣṭhitanirvāna* and *dharmakāya*. He has presented the relevant explanations in the reconstructed Sanskrit text as well as in the Tibetan and Chinese translations (Aramaki 1963: 39-57).

It might also be said that the *paratantrasvabhāva* has such characteristics of the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) as being dependent and momentary existence. Tsoñ kha pa cites MSA XI 50 that teaches the three aspects of the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and identifies it with the *paratantrasvabhāva* (LÑ 25b6). MSA XI. 50 states (Lévi 1907: 67; Lévi 1911: 121):

svayaṃ svenātmanā 'bhāvāt svabhāve cānavasthiteḥ |

grāhavat tadabhāvāç ca-niḥsvabhāvatvam isyate || *tadābhāvāv Lévi*

"[The conditioned that depends on its condition] does not exist by itself; [the conditioned that has ceased] does not exist as its own-being; [the conditioned that is momentary] does not last in the self-existence. This [conditioned] does not exist as [fools] conceive of. Therefore it is recognized as non-substantial."⁵¹

The first pāda of this verse cited in the LÑ deviates from that in the bsTan 'gyur edition of the MSA (*rañ dañ rañ gi mtshan ñid du* LÑ : *rañ dañ rañ gi bdag ñid du* D15a5f., P17a3). Mimaki has pointed out that the same verse consisting of five pādas is found in the Blo gsal grub mtha' (Mimaki 1982: 99; Mimaki 1988: 407)

⁵¹ Tsoñ kha pa interprets that in the Yogācāra tradition the dependent characteristic is consistently recognized as real and ultimate existence (*paramārthasat*). In order to explain the reason why there appear the statements in some Yogācāra treatises that the dependent characteristic is conventional existence (*saṃvṛtīsat*), Tsoñ kha pa applies two different criteria for classifying two kinds of *sat*: 1) From the ontological viewpoint, whatever is established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*) is defined as ultimate existence; 2) From the epistemological viewpoint, whatever is an object of an undefiled (*zag med, anāvara*) non-conceptual knowledge in meditation (*mñam bžag ye šes, samāhitajñāna*) is defined as ultimate existence. According to the criterion 1), the dependent characteristic is ultimate existence, whereas according to the criterion 2) it should be regarded as conventional existence. See LÑ 22b4-25b5. Cf. Takada 1990.

2. Tsoñ kha pa's usage of the term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*"

Here I will give a list of phrases including the term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" (or its synonyms)⁵² extracted from the LR, LN, RG and GR.⁵³ Tsoñ kha pa's usage of this term will also confirm that the concept of "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" has come down from the Yogācāra system as we have discussed above.

The phrases are divided into three groups according to syntactical construction:

Type 1: X *la* *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*'i Y *yod pa* or *med pa*

Type 2: *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*'i Y

Type 3: Z *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*

In Type 1 and 2, "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" is used as attributive, whereas in Type 3 as predicative or apposition of Z. A noun that occurs in place of Y in Type 1 and 2 as well as Z in Type 3 is a noun modified by "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*," i.e. what is established as intrinsically real. X in Type 1 is its locus.

The underlining in the list indicates the word that refers to a general thing (*dharma*) or one of the three kinds of nature (*trisvabhāva*) to which the characteristics such as *rañ gi mtshan ñid*, *skye 'gag* and so on are attributed; the boldface indicates the word that refers to either essential or particular characteristics such as *rañ gi mtshan ñid*, *skye 'gag*, etc.

⁵² I.e. *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* = *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis yod pa* = *rañ gi ño bos grub pa* = *don dam par grub pa* = *de kho nar grub pa* = *rdzas su grub pa*; *rañ bzin* = *ño bo ñid* = *rañ gi mtshan ñid* = *bdag ñid*; *grub pa* = *yod pa*

⁵³ The term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" and its synonyms are actually found in any passage in Tsoñ kha pa's works where an ontological issue is discussed. As the same expression appears repeatedly, I will not give every location in the list.

Type 1: *X la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i Y yod pa* (or *med pa*)

1-1 (Thing X has self-existence that is established as intrinsically real = Thing X exists in reality)

1) *chos thams cad la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ bžin rdul tsam yañ med* (LR 348b6, 354a5f.)

2) *chos rnams la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ gi mtshan ñid tha sñad du bžed pa* (LR 425a5)

3) *chos rnams la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo ñid / rañ bžin yod / med* (LR 388a6f., LÑ 14a3, 47a3, GR 131a1)

4) *chos 'di dag la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ mtshan dmigs bžin du de med* (LÑ 20b2)

5) *dños po rnams la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ bžin med na* (LR 354b1)

6) *dños po rnams la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bžin yod na* (LÑ 109a2f.)

7) *gzugs sgra sogs la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bžin med na* (LR 370a1)

8) *gzugs la sogs la tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo yod par* (LR 371b2)

9) *phuñ po la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ bžin nam bdag bkag pa na* (LR 383a3)

10) *myu gu lta bu la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ bžin med* (LR 383b2)

11) *kun brtags la rañ gi mtshan ñid du grub pa'i ño bo med pas* (LR 371b2)

12) *gžan dbañ la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bžin mi bžad pa* (LR 372b3f.)

13) *gžan dbañ dañ yoñs grub gñis la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i mtshan ñid dam rañ bžin 'dod pa* (LR 372b4f.)

14) *gžan dbañ la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo yod pa* (LÑ 51a3)

1-2 (Thing X has [the characteristics of] arising and cessation that are established as intrinsically real = Thing X arises and ceases in reality)

15) *gzugs sogs la rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i skye 'gag yod med* (LR 364a2f.)

16) *gžan dbañ la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye 'gag yod pa* (LÑ 9a2)

Type 2: *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i Y*

2-1 (The self-existence established as intrinsically real)

1) *gzugs dañ tshor ba la sogs pa'i rañ gi mtshan ñid de rañ gi ño bo ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bžin* (GR 130a4, MA VI. 34)

2) *rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ bžin med* (LR 349b5, 355b6, 425a4, 425a6)

3) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bžin* (LR 398b3)

4) *rdzas te rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i bdag ñid* (GR 134a4)

5) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo bžed / med* (LR 371b3, 4, LÑ 104b1)

6) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo dañ skye 'gag sogs med pa* (LÑ 44b2)

2-2 ([The characteristics of] arising [and cessation] established as intrinsically real)

7) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo dañ skye 'gag sogs med pa* (LÑ 44b2)

8) *rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i skye ba* (LR 364a5)

9) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye ba* (LÑ 17b4, GR 130b3)

10) *rañ bžin gyis skye ba ni rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye ba* (LÑ 53a2)

11) *rdzas su grub 'arn rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye ba* (LR 381a3f.)

12) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i gzan skye* (GR 128a4)

2-3 (The external and internal existences, i.e. objective things and mind, established as intrinsically real)

13) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis yod / grub pa'i don* (LR 374a6, 422a3, 426a3, 428b5, LÑ 112a4)

14) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i sems yod pa* (GR 155b5)

2-4 (The concepts such as "eternity," "otherness," "separateness," "being provided," "cause," "effect," "thesis," "reason," "example," "what is to be conceived," "what is to be negated" and "that which negates" established as intrinsically real)

15) *don dam par ram rañ gi no bos grub pa'i rtag sogs* (LR 379a3)

16) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis rten brten par grub pa'i gzan* (LR 435a5)

17) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i gzan (ñid)* (GR 91b5, 97b1, 99a5, 99b1, 102b3, 128a6, 163a6, 176a3f., 177a3)

18) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i so so ba* (GR 163b5, RG 34b3)

19) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ldan pa* (LR 435b3)

20) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rgyu 'bras* (LÑ 66a3)

21) *rañ mtshan gyis grub pa'i phyogs dañ rtags dañ dpe* (LÑ 89a6)

22) *rañ gi no bos grub pa'i gzal bya* (LR 431a5)

23) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i dgag bya dañ dgog byed med pa* (LR 415b2).

Type 3: *Z rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*

3-1 (Thing Z is established as intrinsically real)

1) *chos mams* *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis yod pa* (LÑ 11b5)

2) *chos mams* *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* (LÑ 100a2, GR 132b2)

3) *chos thams cad* *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa med pa* (LÑ 102a2)

4) *dños po mams* *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa* (LR 444b2, CŚT)

X D162a5)

- 5) dños po nmams rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub na (LÑ 109b1)
- 6) phyi rol rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa mi srid pa (LÑ 80b1f.)
- 7) gzugs la sogs yul lña de nmams rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub bzin du (LR 369b5)
- 8) gzugs sogs rtog pa'i zen gzi yin pa de don dam pa'am rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par 'dzin na (LÑ 33a3)
- 9) gzugs sgra sogs rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par snañ la (LR 374a4)
- 10) gzugs sogs rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub na (LÑ 103b6)
- 11) myu gu rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub na (LÑ 104a1)
- 12) myu gu rañ gi ño bos grub pa (med pa) (LR 355a6f., LR 424a4)
- 13) nam pa rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par 'dzin pa (RG 17a3)
- 14) gañ zag rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par (LR 398a3, LÑ 66b4)
- 15) gañ zag dañ chos nmams don dam par rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis yod pas stoñ (LÑ 100a4)
- 16) gzan dbañ ño bo dañ khyad par du brtags pa'i ño bor rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa (LÑ 52b5)
- 17) gzan dbañ rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis (ma) grub pa (LÑ 7b4, 58a5, GR 131a3)
- 18) gzan dbañ gi chos de nmams rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pas (LÑ 58b1)
- 19) yoñs grub rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis med na (LÑ 7b5)

3-2 (The characteristics of arising and cessation are established as intrinsically real)

- 20) skye 'gag la sogs pa rañ gi ño bos grub pa'am de kho nar grub na (LR 364a2)
- 21) skye 'gag rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub na (LÑ 8b3)

3-3 (The concepts such as "emptiness," "act," "agent," "support" and "what is supported" are established as intrinsically real)

22) *ston pa ñid ces bya ba rañ gi ño bos grub pa* (LR 384a3, CŚT XVI k.382)

23) *las dan byed pa po gñis rañ gi ño bo ñid kyis grub pa min pa* (LÑ 75a2)

24) *ren dan brten pa rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* (LR 435a5)

Among the three types, Type 1 presents the most basic concept that "thing X has the essential characteristic (or self-existence) (*rañ bžin / ño bo, rañ mtshan*) or characteristics of arising and cessation (*skye 'gag*) that are established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*)." Type 2 has the same structure and meaning as Type 1; in Type 2, just the locus X is omitted. Type 3 is a kind of variation of Type 1: 3-1 means the same as 1-1, i.e. the expression "Thing Z is established as intrinsically real" (*Z rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*) can be reformulated into the expression "Thing Z has self-existence that is established as intrinsically real" (*Z la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bžin yod pa*); 3-2 corresponds to 1-2.

One may notice that *rañ bžin* (or its synonyms) and *skye 'gag* appear most often as a noun modified by "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*," i.e. as what is established as intrinsically real (Type 1-1, 1-2, Type 2-1, 2-2, Type 3-1, 3-2). Although the examples in Type 2-3, 2-4, 3-3 show that the term "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" can be applied to any object of investigation, it is safe to understand that *rañ bžin* and *skye 'gag* are the main topics with which "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" is concerned. And they are exactly the topics of the first inquiry of SNSū VII. 1: "Whether do the essential characteristic (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*) of the aggregates etc. and their characteristics of arising and cessation (*skye ba, 'jig pa / 'gag pa*) exist, or not?" The expression in SNSū VII. 1 "*phuñ po mams kyi rañ gi mtshan ñid, skye ba'i mtshan ñid, 'jig pa'i mtshan ñid (yod pa)*" is transformed by Tsoñ kha pa into

the expression consisting of the same two items X and Y; and Y is modified by "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*": "*phuñ po mams (X) la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bzin / rañ gi mtshan ñid* or *skye 'gag (Y) yod.*"

Why then should even *rañ bzin / rañ gi mtshan ñid* be modified by "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa / rañ ño bos grub pa*" like "*rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ bzin*", or "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ mtshan*"? At first sight, this modification does not seem to be necessary since the word "*rañ bzin (svabhāva)*" itself can indicate an independent substantial reality in terms of Mādhyamika. The reason will be clear if we remember Yogācāra's usage of the word "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" or "*ño bo ñid kyī mtshan ñid*" and "*(bye brag gi) mtshan ñid*" and their theory of the non-substantiality of the conceptualized characteristic. In the system of the SNSū, any characteristic or nature that is merely conceptualized (cf. SNSū VII. 25) is non-existent, which should be differentiated from real existence (i.e. something that is *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*). Therefore, Tsoñ kha pa puts the attributive "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" to "*rañ bzin*" or "*rañ mtshan*" in order to clarify that this *rañ bzin* is not merely conceptualized, but real existence. Namely, he differentiates from *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bzin / rañ mtshan* from *miñ dañ brdas nam par bzag pa'i rañ bzin / rañ mtshan* as the SNSū has done.

3. *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* and *svalakṣaṇa* of the Pramāṇa school

As to the relation of the concept of "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" and that of "*svalakṣaṇa*" in terms of the Pramāṇa school, I will

confine myself to discussing the following two questions:⁵⁴

⁵⁴ I am not in a position either to judge how Tsoñ kha pa estimated the logical and epistemological systems of the Pramāṇa school, or to point out its theoretical relation to Tsoñ kha pa's Madhyamaka. In order to give a final answer to this question, we will have to consider the problem in all aspects. Owing to recent studies such as Kimura 1988, 1990a, 1990b and Seyfort Ruegg 1991, however, it has become clear to some extent. I would tentatively assume that Tsoñ kha pa has highly estimated the system of logic presented by the Pramāṇa school and applied it to his own Madhyamaka interpretation. Following Candrakīrti, however, he has strictly rejected their ontological as well as epistemological interpretation. Here I would like to note some grounds for both positive and negative aspects on this matter.

[Positive aspects]:

1) Tsoñ kha pa received a good education of Pramāṇa doctrine from various teachers who were in the tradition of Sa skya pa following Sa skya Pañḍita's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's treatises (e.g. *Nya dbar Kun dga' dpal*, *Red mda' ba gZon nu dpal*). Cf. Kaschewsky 1971, Vol. 1: 83-87; van der Kuip 1985b: 76f.; Jackson 1987 I: 141-145; Jackson (forthcoming), the section with the title "Tsong-kha-pa on a Prevailing Tibetan Interpretation."

2) Although Tsoñ kha pa himself composed only a small work on Buddhist logic entitled "sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer Yid kyi mun sel," his disciples, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen and mKhas grub rje, composed extensive commentaries on Dharmakīrti's works. Tsoñ kha pa himself held lectures on Pramāṇa doctrine of which the notes by Darma rin chen are known as the *Tshad ma'i brjed byañ chen mo*.

3) Tsoñ kha pa highly esteemed the study of logic and regarded it as an important path to liberation. In this respect, he was especially influenced by the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika. For instance, in his *bDun legs ma*, a brief autobiographical work, he criticizes the view of Tibetans that neither Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya nor Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises include any teaching of practice for proceeding to Awakening (*byari chub*) (*bDun legs ma* 64a2f.). Cf. Steinkellner 1983: 279; Matsumoto 1982: 12; Jackson (forthcoming): n. 35. mKhas grub rje also describes in his *Dad pa'i 'jug ñogs*, a biography of Tsoñ kha pa, that Tsoñ kha pa gained a very strong belief in Dharmakīrti's treatises and in reasoning (*rigs pa*) when he studied the explanation of path in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter through 'U yug pa's commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika (*Dad pa'i 'jug ñogs* 17b1f.). Cf. Kimura 1990a: 127 and 122, n. 5. Kimura has revealed that the verses of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter are in fact often cited in Tsoñ kha pa's five main works (the *Legs bsad gser phreñ*, LR, LÑ, RG and GR). See his useful list of citations from the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇavinīscaya in these five works (Kimura 1990a: 71, n.8).

4) Tsoñ kha pa maintains that the Mādhyamika has his own assertion, accepts valid cognition (*tshad ma*, *pramāṇa*) and uses inferential reasoning (*rjes dpag*).

1) Why does Tsoñ kha pa accept the *svalakṣaṇa* defined by Dharmakīrti as a capacity for efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*)?

2) How does Tsoñ kha pa reject real existence of *svalakṣana* as a basis of efficacy?

1) Dharmakīrti's definition of *svalakṣaṇa* includes both capacity for efficacy and ultimate existence (PV III 3ab, Tosaki 1979: 61: *arthakriyāsamarthaṅ yat tad atra paramārthasat*). Nevertheless, Tsoñ kha pa accepts the first one only and distinguishes it from the second one. He states:

That which is called "*rañ gi mtshan ñid*" here does not mean mere [capacity for] efficacy (*don byed pa kho na*) as logicians have maintained.⁵⁵

The *rañ gi mtshan ñid* explained as mere capacity for efficacy (*don byed nus pa kho na*) in the treatises of logicians ... and the *rañ gi mtshan ñid* in (the expression) "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub*

anumāna) consisting of thesis, reason and example based on the *trīrūpa-līṅga* in conformity with the worldly convention. Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1983, 1991; Matsumoto 1990; Yotsuya 1991; Yoshimizu (forthcoming 2).

[Negative aspects]:

1) Tsoñ kha pa explicitly states in his LN that Dignāga as well as Dharmakīrti concur with the early Yogācāra masters in maintaining substantial existence of the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) (see LN 29b4ff, Thurman 1984: 229f. and Kimura 1988: 261f.). He understands Dignāga's Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasamgraha and Dharmakīrti's PV III 214-216 (Cf. Tosaki 1979: 314) as representing this ontological idea.

2) As will be discussed below in the body of my study, Tsoñ kha pa rejects real existence of *svalakṣaṇa* as a basis of efficacy (*arthakriyā*) and the fundamental epistemological theories of the Pramāṇa school that "*svalakṣaṇa* is cognized by *pratyakṣa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is cognized by *anumāna*" and that "*pratyakṣa* is non-erroneous cognition."

⁵⁵ LR 423b5: '*dir rañ gi mtshan ñid ces pa ni rtog ge pa dag 'dod pa ltar don byed pa kho na la byed pa min gyi* /

pa" are totally different from each other.⁵⁶

He accepts this logicians' concept "*arthakriyāsāmarthya*" because he identifies it with the "relation of cause and effect" (i.e. *pratītyasamutpāda*), which is a fundamental doctrine of Madhyamaka.

Let us see the following passages from the LR:

Therefore, one does not fall into the extreme of substantialism (*yod mtha'*) by understanding that all things have by no means [self-existence] that is established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi ño bos grub pa*). Even that is so, on the other hand, one eliminates the extreme of nihilism (*med pa'i mtha'*) too if one draws an ascertained knowledge (*ñes śes*) that confirms that things (*dños po mams*) such as a sprout etc. cannot be non-existence (*dños med*) that lacks a capacity for efficacy (*don byed nus pa*) and that they have a capacity for each work (*rañ rañ gi bya byed*).⁵⁷

⁵⁶ LÑ 67a1f: *rtog ge'i gñuñ nas don byed nus pa kho na la rañ mtshan dañ | mñon pa'i mdo la sogs par gñan dañ thun moñ ma yin par mtshon pa me'i tsha ba lta bu la rañ gi mtshan ñid du bśad pa dañ | rañ gi mtshan ñid kyiś grub pa'i rañ mtshan ni ches śin tu mi 'dra'o ||*

⁵⁷ LR 356b1ff: *des na chos thams cad la rañ gi ño bos grub pa rdul tsam yañ gdod ma nas med par rtogs pas yod mthar mi ltuñ ba yin la de lta na 'añ myu gu la sogs pa'i dños po mams don byed pa'i nus pas stoñ ba'i dños med du mi 'gro bar rañ rañ gi bya byed pa la mthu yod par ñes pa'i ñes śes 'droñs na med pa'i mtha' spoñ pa yin no ||*

The expression "things such as a sprout etc. cannot be non-existence that lacks a capacity for efficacy" in this statement recalls PV III 4 where Dharmakīrti states that a capacity of a seed for producing a sprout is existent and may be admitted as conventionally established (Tosaki 1979: 62: *aśaktaṃ sarvaṃ iti ced bijader aṅkurādīṣu | dṛṣṭā śaktir matā sā cet samvṛtyā 'stu yathā tathā ||*). Tsoñ kha pa cites this verse when he argues that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti concur with Yogācāras in asserting substantial existence of the dependent nature, and gives a very brief comment that "this statement is essentially the same [in meaning] as that of the bsDu ba (Viniścayasamgrahaṇī) (cited) above" in LÑ 30a6 (... *ñes gsuñs pa ni śhar bsDu ba las gsuñs pa dañ gnad gcig go ||*). This comment is ambiguous, because it is unknown how Tsoñ kha pa himself has understood the last expression of this verse "*astu yathā tathā*" (*ji ltar de ltar 'gyur*). It is interesting to note that Tsoñ kha pa's important disciples, Dar ma rin chen and mKhas grub rje, have presented a different interpretation thereof from that

of Indian commentators. I will sum up these two problematic interpretations:

1) Tosaki reads the last half of this verse based on Indian commentaries as follows: "If you [Mādhyaṃikas] say that this capacity is conceived as conventional, it may be so" (Tosaki 1979: 62). Steinkellner interprets the last pāda as follows: "(Answer:) Be it as it may [we are not interested in discussing this here]" (Steinkellner 1990: 75). According to Shirasaki and Steinkellner, Indian doxographers Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta from the late period (10-13th centuries) take Dharmakīrti's arguments in this verse as well as in 208-210 and 359 of PV III as evidence for the opinion that he was a Mādhyaṃika in his final position (Shirasaki 1986 and Steinkellner 1990: 72). Zwilling has indicated that within Indian commentators Prajñākaragupta, Jīna, Ravigupta and Jamāri (=Yamāri) read *yathā* as an expression of affirmation and thereby claim Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyaṃika, whereas Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati (=Śākyabuddhi) consider it as meaning that one cannot disavow causal efficiency, regardless of what one calls it, the efficient entity to which the Mādhyaṃika applies the qualification "conventional" must also be accepted by them since to deny the existence of an efficient entity is to go against perception, inference, and common experiences (Zwilling 1981: 308f.). Matsumoto has discussed that on the question of the two kinds of reality (*satyadvaya*) in connection with this verse and the previous one (i.e. PV III 3 and 4) there was a controversy between the masters such as Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi whose standpoint is considered to have been Yogācāra and the masters such as Jīnāgarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prajñākaragupta from the Mādhyaṃika side (Matsumoto 1980, 1981b and 1981c). Steinkellner, however, is of the opinion that it is only Ravigupta who reads in this verse Dharmakīrti's consent to the Mādhyaṃika (Steinkellner 1990: 75).

2) Yet Dar ma rin chen and mKhas grub rje seem to have understood that in the last pāda Dharmakīrti refutes the Mādhyaṃika who asserts the capacity for efficacy to be merely conventional. Dar ma rin chen comments: "... If [the Mādhyaṃika] says that the capacity for efficacy is admitted to be conventionally established, but not ultimately, then [the following undesirable results would follow:] (a) Supposing that the act of producing a sprout is not done by self-nature of a seed, then the production of effect is not established even conventionally, since the production of the effect from the seed disappear from cognizable [domain] (b) Supposing that the act is done by a specific self-nature [of a seed], then how can it be correct that [the sprout] arises conventionally as you said? It cannot be correct, since the object that arises is completely established in ultimate reality" (Thar lam gsal ba, *cha* 212a2-5: *don byed nus pa de kun rdzob du grub par 'dod kyi / don dam par grub par mi 'dod do ze na / sa bon gyi thun moñ mñ pa'i sdod lugs kyi ño nas myu gu bskyed pa'i bya ba mi byed na / sa bon gyi ño nas 'bras bu bskyed pa šes bya la khags pa'i phyir / 'bras bu bskyed pa kun rdzob tu yañ mi 'grub par thag khra la sbrul du rlom pa ltar 'gyur la / thun moñ mñ pa'i ño nas bya ba byed na / ci ste kun rdzob tu skye'o zes bya ba de ltar 'thad par 'gyur te mi 'thad par thal / don dam par skye ba'i don legs*

par grub pa'i phyir /).

And mKhas grub rje: "If [the Mādhyamika] says that this [capacity for efficacy] is admitted to be conventional, [it is not correct:] If it is conventional, how can it be as it is directly cognized by perception? That [the conventional object] can be [or exists as it is perceived] is not correct, since there is no non-erroneous cognition at all in which a false object appears. Namely, [Dharmakīrti] means that insofar as it is non-erroneous cognition, it is equally pervaded by [having] an appearance of a real object. Any essential [point] is not found in the explanations of Tibetan commentaries on this theory" (Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho da 10a1ff.: *gal te de kun rdzob tu 'dod du ze na / ci ste kun rdzob yin na mñon sum gyis dños su dmigs pa de ltar ji ltar 'gyur te 'gyur ba mi 'thad de / yul brzan pa snañ ba'i ma 'khrul ba'i šes pa ni 'ga'yañ med pa'i phyir ro // mдор na ma 'khrul pa'i šes pa yin na / yul bden pa snañ bas khyab sñam du dgoñs pa'o // gñuñ 'di'i bod kyi 'grel pa dag gi bñad pa la sñiñ po ma mñoñ ro //*).

In this manner, Dar ma rin chen and mKhas grub rje agree that Dharmakīrti has maintained the ultimate existence of capacity for efficacy, although they interpret the expression "ji ltar de ltar 'gyur" differently (the fact that Darma rin chen and mKhas grub rje have given the different explanations suggests that, as far as this verse is concerned, they had not gained any clear teaching from Tsoñ kha pa). According to Thurman, the later dGé lugs pa scholar Blo bzang phun tshogs explains it basically in the same way in his commentary on the LN (Thurman 1984: 230, n.64). It may be true, as mKhas grub rje has stated, that the meaning of this verse has been ambiguous for Tibetans. 'U yug pa's commentary is unclear to me. I will give the Tibetan text only: *ci ste de ltar žes pa 'o skol gñis miñ ma mñun pa tsam du zad kyi don la khyad par med de gñis kas rgyu la 'bras bu skye bar mñoñ ba'i phyir ro // yañ na khyod kyis kun rdzob ces pa de ci 'añ med pa la 'dod dam skye ba la sogs pa brjod / dañ po ltar na ci ste kun rdzob tu skye'o žes bya ba de ltar 'gyur te ci 'añ med pa la skye ba 'gal'ba'i phyir te ri boñ gi ra las 'ga' žig skye'o žes brjod pa bzin no // gñis pa ltar na kun rdzob tu skye žes pa dañ skye ba skye'o žes brjod pa khyad med du 'gyur la / de ltar na mi 'thad de skye ba la skye rgyu gñan med pa'i phyir ro // rGyan gyis 'di'i lugs bkag nas gñan du 'chad do // 'di dag kyañ dbu ma pa dañ / dños por smra ba'i bden pa gñis kyi 'jog lugs ma mñun pa'i rtsod pa yin no //* (Rigs pa'i mdzod L.169a2-5). Although the middle part of this argument is similar to that of Dar ma rin chen, I am not able to judge which opinion (1) or 2)] U 'yug pa has. Does "'o skol" in the first sentence mean Dharmakīrti and the Mādhyamika?

Let us go back to Tsoñ kha pa's brief comment. Accordingly, it can be interpreted in the following two ways:

1) Supposing that Tsoñ kha pa follows the opinion 1), he would say: "This verse has the same meaning as the statement of the Viniścayasamgrahañi cited in LN 24a5f." That portion of the Viniścayasamgrahañi says: "Cause (*rgyu mtshan*) [i.e. *paratantrasvabhāva*] and conceptualization [i.e. *parikalpitasvabhāva*] exist conventionally (*kun rdzob tu*) because they cause defilements (*kun nas ñon moñs pa*) and because they are basis of designations (*gdags pa'i gži*)." This is another

This (statement of the CŚT),⁵⁸ moreover, negates [the theory of] those who assert real existence (i.e. substantialists) (*dños po yod par smra ba*) by explaining that "origination in dependence" (*rtēn 'brel*) means "non-origination by self-nature" (*rañ bñin gyis ma skyes pa*); it negates [the theory of] those who negate any existence (i.e. nihilists) (*dños po med par smra ba*) by teaching that "origination in dependence" means "arising of

way of classifying ultimate and conventional existences that appear also in Yogācāra treatises, as I have indicated in n. 51, according to which the dependent nature exists conventionally (*kān rdzob tu yod pa*). Although according to this criterion, the dependent nature is regarded to be conventional, it does not contradict the ontological definition that the dependent nature is ultimate existence (*don dam tu yod pa*) since it is established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*). In this way, Dharmakīrti's verse PV III 4 does not contradict his own idea of real existence of *arthakriyāsamartha* or the dependent nature.

2) Supposing that Tsoñ kha pa has the opinion 2), he would say: "This verse has the same meaning as the arguments of the Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī cited in LÑ 19a3, 19a5f. and 19b5ff, which refute the Mādhyamika."

I assume that Tsoñ kha pa's own position was the second one, as Thurman has indicated (Thurman 1984: 230, n. 64), because it accords with his criticism of "logicians" in the LR that will be seen below.

⁵⁸ CŚT XIV D220b4ff., P250b3 (cited in LR 357b4ff.): *bdag gi* dños po med par smra ba ma yin te rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba smra ba yin pa'i phyir ro // ci khyod dños por smra ba žig gam že na / ma yin te rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba smra ba yin pa ñid kyī phyir ro // khyod ci 'dra ba** žig ce na / rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ bar*** smra ba'o // yañ rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba'i don gañ žig ce na**** // rañ bñin med pa'i don te**** rañ bñin ma skye pa'i***** don dañ sgyu ma dañ smig rgyu dañ gzugs brñan dañ dri za'i groñ khyer dañ sprul pa dañ rmi lam dañ mtshuñs pa'i rañ bñin can gyi 'bras bu 'byuñ ba'i don dañ stoñ pa ñid dañ***** bdag med pa'i don no // *ni P, LÑ **ci smra ba P, LÑ ***ba LÑ ****gañ že na P *****dañ P *****rañ bñin gyis ma skyes pa'i P, LÑ *****dañ omitted P*

"We are not nihilists since we teach origination in dependence. (Question:) Are you then substantialists? (Answer:) No, since we teach origination in dependence. (Question:) What do you teach? (Answer:) We teach origination in dependence. (Question:) What is the meaning of the origination in dependence? (Answer:) It means non-substantiality; it means non-origination [of things] by self-nature; it means arising of effect whose nature is the same as [that of] illusion, mirage, reflection, castle of Gandharva, phantom and dream; it means emptiness and selflessness."

effect" like illusion and so on. Therefore, the "existence" (*dños po*) [in the expression "*dños po yod par smra ba*"] means [substantial] self-existence (*rañ bñin*) and the "existence" [in the expression "*dños po med par smra ba*"] means capacity for efficacy (*don byed nus pa*). Among these two, the "existence" (*dños po*) [asserted] by substantialists means nothing other than [the existence] established as intrinsically real (*rañ bñin gyis grub pa kho na*), whereas the "existence" (*dños po*) [negated] by nihilists means the existence of [capacity for] efficacy (*don byed pa'i dños po*), for it (i.e. the statement of the CŚT) negates a substantial existence (*rañ bñin*) and teaches the existence of cause and effect, negating both [theories of substantialists and nihilists].⁵⁹

2) It is also clearly demonstrated in the above-quoted statements that the Madhyamaka, the Middle Way, consists in negation of substantiality and establishment of causality. This is based on the theory that only non-substantial things have a capacity for producing effects. Candrakīrti formulates it in his PPad: "(Since) whatever is substantial has no function [of producing effects]; only that which is non-substantial has function [for producing effects]."⁶⁰ This is a complete opposition to the Yogācāra, who asserts that whatever is non-substantial neither arises nor ceases as we have seen in the first

⁵⁹ LR 357b7-358a3: *de yañ rten 'brel gyi don rañ bñin gyis ma skeyes pa la bñad pas ni dños po yod par smra ba sel la sgyu ma la sogs pa dañ 'dra ba'i 'bras bu 'byuñ ba rten 'brel gyi don du bstan pas ni dños po med par smra ba sel ba yin no // des na dños po ni rañ bñin la byed pa dañ don byed nus pa la byed pa grñis las dños po yod par smra ba'i dños po ni rañ bñin gyis grub pa kho na la bya la dños po med par smra ba'i dños po ni don byed pa'i dños po la bye ste de grñis sel ba na rañ bñin bkag ciñ sgyu ma la bu'i rgyu 'bras yod par bstan pa'i phyir ro //*

⁶⁰ PPad 329 ad MMk XVII 30 (cited in LR 357a1): *sasvabhāvānām eva vyāpāradarśanān niḥsvabhāvānām eva vyāpāradarśanān.*

part of this section. Tsoñ kha pa describes it in his LR as follows:

Substantialists call Mādhyamikas "[nihilists] who view that there exists nothing" (*med pa pa*) or "[those] who negate [every existence]" (*chad lta ba*), conceiving that if one negates [substantial] self-existence (*rañ bžin*) one must necessarily negate [the relation] of cause and effect too.⁶¹

In short, it may be said that the most crucial theoretical difference between Mādhyamikas and "substantialists" consists in how to interpret the relation of (A) substantial reality and (B) function of or capacity for producing effects: Which should be postulated as ground of (B), (A) or non-(A)?⁶²

Exactly from this viewpoint, Tsoñ kha pa regards "logicians" as "substantialists" and rejects their ontological idea of *śvalakṣaṇa* (that is not mere *arthakriyāsāmarthyā*). In the LR he criticizes even logicians' epistemological system on the basis of this ontological

⁶¹ LR 357a3f.: *dños smra bas ni rañ bžin 'gog na rgyu 'bras kyañ ñes par 'gog dgos śñam nas dbu ma pa la med pa pa 'am chad lta ba žes zer ro l*

⁶² Yamaguchi has discussed that for Tsoñ kha pa the doctrine of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) enables to establish capacity for efficacy (Yamaguchi 1989: 290-300).

Tsoñ kha pa has revealed that not only "substantialists" but also most of Tibetan masters who claimed to be Mādhyamikas maintained the same idea. He says: "The majority of those Tibetans who claim to be Mādhyamikas assert that if one negates the [substantial] self-existence, [the relation] of cause and effect must also be negated by the (same) reasoning [as that by which the (substantial) self-existence is negated]. This (assertion) seems to concur with the substantialists. Nevertheless, conceiving that it is the Mādhyamaka system to negate [the relation of] cause and effect through right reasoning, they seem even to believe so." (LR 357a4f.: *bod kyi dbu ma par khas 'che ba phal che ba ni rañ bžin 'gog na rigs pa des rgyu 'bras kyañ dgag dgos par 'dod dños smra ba mams dañ mthun par snañ la 'on kyañ rgyu 'bras rigs pas 'gog pa dbu ma'i lugs su byas nas de la mos par snañ no l*) For Tsoñ kha pa's criticism of these Tibetan Mādhyamikas and the question who they actually were, see Seyfort Ruegg 1983, Williams 1985, Matsumoto 1990 and Yoshimizu (forthcoming 2).

argument.⁶³ Let us briefly examine main points of his argument. Following Candrakīrti, who criticizes Dignāga's definition of

⁶³ This criticism of "logicians" in the LR has been extensively studied by Matsumoto (1990) and Kimura (1990b). Kimura has made it clear that Tson kha pa is based on the theory that only non-existence of [substantial] *svalakṣaṇa* enables *arthakriyā*, whereas the "logicians" are based on the theory that only existence of [substantial] *svalakṣaṇa* enables *arthakriyā* (Kimura 1990b). In this regard, it is interesting to note that Dar ma rin chen explains in his commentary on the PV the way of establishing two kinds of reality (*bden pa gñis pa*) according to "substantialists" and "non-substantialists" with reference to Dharmakīrti's PV III 3 (*arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat*) (Thar lam gsal ba, *cha* 210a2-b3):

1) Those who assert real existence (*dños por smra ba*) assert that the capacity for efficacy (*don byed nus pa*) is not merely conceptualized (*rtog pas btags pa tsam ma yin*), but ultimate existence (*don dam par yod pa*) that is established by its own nature (*rañ gi sdod lugs kyī ños nas grub pa*).

2) Among those who teach non-substantiality [of things] (*ño bo ñid med par smra ba*), Svātantrikas assert that things [that produce effects] are established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*), but they are just conventional existence (*kun rdzob tu yod pa*) established on the strength of their appearance to one's cognition.

3) Prāsaṅgikas assert that in their own system things that produce effects are established by means of valid cognition, but not as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa*) at all.

Dar ma rin chen continues: "This master (Dharmakīrti) refuted even the second system (i.e. the Svātantrika) in order to set forth correctly the teaching of the first system [of his own] and prove it; he considered the third system (i.e. the Prāsaṅgika) to be main object of refutation as the master Devendrabuddhi has maintained. Therefore, in order to teach these [points], the master (Dharmakīrti) composed this treatise (i.e. the PV); the lord of scholars, Kamalaśīla, has conceived that the master (Dharmakīrti) did not deny the ultimate existence of things and established [the system of] proving [it] in his Seven Treatises in order to lead gradually those who are unable to enter directly the great sea of reality" (Thar lam gsal ba, *cha* 210b4ff. [translated in Kimura 1990b: 11, n. 8]: *lugs dañ po'i gzuñ legs par btugs nas sgrub pa'i ched du / lugs gñis pa yañ 'gog ciñ / slob dpon lHa dbarñ blo'i bzed pa ltar na / lugs gsum pa dgag bya'i gts'o bo ñid du mdzad do // des na de dag bstan pa'i phyir tu slob dpon gyis gzuñ 'di smos so // mkhas pa'i dbarñ po Kāmala śī la ni / dños su don dam pa'i rgya mtsho la 'jug mi nus pa mams rim gyis bkris pa'i ched du / slob dpon gyis sDe bdun 'dir dños po don dam par grub pa ma bkag ciñ sgrub pa'i mam gzag mdzad par bzed do //*)

pratyakṣa,⁶⁴ Tsoñ kha pa takes up Dharmakīrti's definition that perception is non-conceptual and non-erroneous (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*),⁶⁵ and refutes its validity for a substantial particular as follows:

Since this master (i.e. Candrakīrti), as will be explained later, does not even conventionally admit anything established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi ño bos grub pa 'am rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*), how can he admit these sensory cognitions (i.e. perceptions) as valid cognition (*tshad ma*) for a [substantial] particular (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*)?⁶⁶ Therefore, the negation of their being valid cognition here [in the CST] is the negation of the assertion that these (sensory cognitions) are valid cognitions for the [substantial] particular of the five kinds of object [such as form, sound, etc.] The five kinds of object such as form, sound, etc. appear to the sensory cognitions as [if they were substantial] particulars, although they are not established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa*). Hence they are not valid cognition for the [substantial] particular.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Cf. CST XIII D196b2ff., Tillemans 1990 I: 177, II: 64 (cited in LR 369a3ff.), where Candrakīrti adduces Dignāga's definition "*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyādiyojanā*" from the PS (*Pratyakṣa*) 3 (Hattori 1968: 25).

⁶⁵ NB (*Pratyakṣa*) 4 (NBT 40); Pvin I 4 (Vetter 1966: 40).

⁶⁶ I render the word "*svalakṣaṇa*" in terms of the Pramāṇa school by "particular"; the adjective "substantial" will be supplied in the case that a substantial *svalakṣaṇa* (not mere *arthakriyāsāmānyā*) is meant by Tsoñ kha pa.

⁶⁷ LR 369b1-5: *slob dpon 'di ni 'chad par 'gyur pa ltar rañ gi ño bos grub pa 'am rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa ni tha sñad du 'arñ mi bžed pas dbarñ po'i šes pa de mams rañ mtshan la tshad mar ga la bžed / des na 'dir de dag tshad ma yin pa bkag pa ni de mams yul bha'i rañ gi mtshan ñid la tshad mar 'dod pa 'gog pa yin la / dbarñ šes mams la gzugs sgra la sogs yul bha pa de mams rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa gñin du rañ gi mtshan ñid du snañ bas na de dag rañ gi mtshan ñid la tshad ma ma yin žes pa ste /*

It is evident that if one stands on Mādhyamikas' ontological position, the non-erroneousness of perception that cognizes a substantial particular must categorically be denied, for the appearance (*snañ ba*) (of a substantial particular) deviates from the reality (i.e. non-existence of the substantial particular).⁶⁸ However, Tsoñ kha pa accepts in conformity with the world that perception is valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*) merely for a non-substantial conventional existence that has a capacity for efficacy.⁶⁹ He interprets that the

⁶⁸ As to the reason why the perception is not a valid cognition for a substantial particular, Tsoñ kha pa refers to the definition of valid cognition that non-deviating [cognition] (*mi slu ba, avisamvādin*) is valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*) (LR 369b4). This definition seems to have been widely accepted by dGe lugs pas in accord with Candrakīrti. Cf. CŚT XIII D197b5f., Tillemans 1990 I: 179, II: 67: *mi slu ba'i šes pa ni 'jig rten na tshad ma ñid du mthoñ na ...*

⁶⁹ Cf. e.g. his statement that "[We, Mādhyamikas] do not generally negate that conventional cognitions are valid cognitions since it is not necessary to negate its mere being valid cognition [for objective things] for the reason that [we] negate a valid cognition for a [substantial] particular." (LR 370aa5: *rañ mtshan la tshad ma yin pa bkag pas tshad ma tsam khegs mi dgos pas na tha sñad pa'i šes pa mams la tshad ma spyir 'gog pa ma yin no !*) Here Tsoñ kha pa refers to the above-mentioned Candrakīrti's statement (see n. 65) that "non-deviating cognition is recognized as valid cognition in the world" (LR 370a5f.). Matsumoto has discussed this matter in detail (Matsumoto 1990).

In this connection, it should be pointed out that Tsoñ kha pa might have accepted the theory of *sākāravāda* as his own Prāsaṅgika position. Based on his following statements I conjecture that his system of *sākāravāda* might concur with that of Sautrāntika except for the theory of self-consciousness:

1) GR 178a6, where the theory of self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) is criticized: *de yañ shon pos sño 'dzin la rañ 'dra'i mam pa gtad pa šar ba ñid kyis / shon po 'grub pa ni lugs gñan dañ yañ 'dra'o !* "In this regard, [our own interpretation of how a cognition occurs] is the same as other systems [i.e. the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika]: [The cognition of] blue is established only through it that a similar form (*ākāra*) [to the blue] that is caused by the blue has appeared to [one's cognizing part of cognition]."

2) LRchuñ 202b1, where Buddha's knowledge is discussed: *mam med du mkhyen pa 'di pa'i lugs min pas mam šar nas so !* "[A Buddha cognizes an external object] after [its] form has appeared [to his consciousness] since it is not the theory of this school [i.e. the Prāsaṅgika] that [one] cognizes [an external object] without [appearance of its] form."

3) GR 271b4-272a1, where the view that there is no cause of Buddha's

"logicians," on the other hand, assert the non-erroneousness of perception that cognizes a substantial particular because they think that only real *svalakṣaṇa* has a capacity for causing cognition:

In [contrast to] the [view of Candarkīrti], "substantialists" maintain that if form, sound, etc. have no self-existence established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bzin*), they are non-existence (*dños med*) that lacks a capacity for efficacy (*don byed pa'i nus pa*). For this reason, they assert that if perception (*mñon sum*) is not valid cognition for the [substantial] particular of the five kinds of object there would be no object (*sa*) for which [the perception] becomes valid cognition; if, to the contrary, [the perception] is valid cognition for the five kinds of objects, then it [must] be valid cognition for the [substantial] particular of these (objects)."⁷⁰

The idea ascribed to "substantialists" here is that (1) whatever is non-substantial has neither existence nor capacity for causing cognition; (2) therefore that for which perception is valid cognition is none

knowledge of reality is criticized: *de ltar na phyogs sñā ma smra ba pos* (A) *blo la de kho na ñid kyī mam pa 'char rgyu med pa dañ /* (B) *yul de'i mam pa ma śar na blo yul la mi 'jug pa dañ /* (C) *ma žugs na yul de mi śes pa dañ /* (D) *ma śes na yul can de śes par 'gal lo žes smra ba'i yul gyī mam pa ma śar na blo mi 'jug pa la sogs pa mams rañ yañ de ltar 'dod pas /* "In this way, the opponent maintains [with regard to Buddha's knowledge of reality] that (A) there is no cause that a form (*ākāra*) of reality appears to [his] consciousness; (B) if its form has not appeared, no cognition can occur; (C) if [the cognition] has not occurred, the object cannot be known; (D) If [the object] has not been known, this [non-existent cognition] that has such an [unknown] object (*yul can*) contradicts [being] knowledge. Among these [arguments], we [Prāsaṅgikas] also accept [the process (B)-(D)] that if its form has not appeared no cognition can occur and so on as it is." I have discussed this passage in Yoshimizu 1991: 241 and 244, n. 11.

⁷⁰ LR 369b6ff.: *'di la dños por smra bas ni gzugs sgra sogs la rañ gi mtshan ñid du grub pa'i rañ bzin med na de dag don byed pa'i nus pa thams cad kyis ston pa'i dños med du 'dod pas yul lha'i rañ mtshan la mñon sum tshad mar ma soñ na yul lha la tshad mar 'gro sa med la yul lha la tshad mar soñ na 'a'i de'i rañ gi mtshan ñid la tshad mar 'gro bar 'dod do //*

other than a substantial particular.

In this way, identifying the concept of *svalakṣaṇa* as substantial existence in terms of the Pramāṇa school with that of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* in terms of the Yogācāra,⁷¹ Tsoñ kha pa refutes their ontological as well as epistemological theories that [substantial] particular is cognized by perception and that the perception that

⁷¹ Thus it is obvious that Tsoñ kha pa has differentiated the *svalakṣaṇa* of the Pramāṇa school from that of Abhidharma in the sense of "essential nature" and linked it to the early Yogācāra ontology. I am not able to say anything about the question whether any internal theoretical connection between Yogācāra's *paratantrasvabhāva* and Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's *svalakṣaṇa* can be seen or not. C. Lindtner and G. Dreyfus have presented their interpretation in the conclusion of their article that the ideas of *paratantrasvabhāva* and *parikalpitasvabhāva* of the Yogācāra developed into the ideas of *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* respectively (Dreyfus & Lindtner 1989: 50). Focussing upon the theory of result of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*), they have discussed that Yogācāra idealism was a basis of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's epistemology: "These observations permit us to assume with a high degree of certainty that Dignāga developed his epistemology - the theory of two *pramāṇas*, etc. - on the basis of the Yogācāra doctrine of three natures. His purpose was simply to 'prove' the *Samdhinirmocanaśāstra*'s teaching of *vijñaptimātra* in a more convincing way than Vasubandhu had done in his 'Nirākāravāda philosophy'" (ibid.: 50). In their arguments, that which is called "Yogācāra philosophy" or "Yogācāra system" seems to refer exclusively to the theory of *vijñaptimātra* or idealism. In the SNSū, however, the theory of the three kinds of nature is not yet directly related to the theory of *vijñaptimātra* as we have seen. In this respect, it is interesting that Tsoñ kha pa has not considered the idealism to be most essential in Yogācāra ontology. T. Vetter, who is of the opinion that one must neither label Dharmakīrti as a Yogācārin, a Sautrāntika or a Mādhyamika, nor believe, without considering their historical and theoretical development, that there exists a fixed Yogācāra and Dharmakīrti system respectively, suggests: "If he (i.e. Dharmakīrti) had wanted to show some indebtedness, he would have been obliged to mention early Yogācāra, the *vastumātra* section in *Bodhisattvabhūmi* I. 4 being the basis for his ontological thought in PV I, as much as late, idealistic Yogācāra" (Vetter 1992: 330, n. 8). It may be true that there are some apparent similarities between the idea of *paratantrasvabhāva* or *vastumātra* in the early Yogācāra tradition and that of *svalakṣaṇa* in PV I; they are characterized as ultimate existence (*paramārthasat*) that is conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and perceivable, as discussed above.

cognizes a [substantial] particular is non-erroneous.⁷²

(To be continued)

Abbreviations

<General>

BHSD: *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Vol. II. Dictionary.* Ed. by F. Edgerton. Newhaven 1953.

D: sDe dge edition.

P: Peking edition.

<Indian Sources>

AK: *Abhidharmakoṣa*(kārikā). See AKBh.

⁷² The definition that "perception is non-conceptual cognition" is also not accepted by Candrakīrti (see e.g. PPad 74, 5f.). Tson kha pa expounds in his GR 178a2-182b4 Candrakīrti's own epistemological system mainly based on PPad (55-75, where Candrakīrti criticizes Dignāga's system). I will summarize some distinctive features of the Prāsaṅgika interpretation of *pramāṇa*:

1) The four kinds of valid cognition, i.e. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama* and *upamāna*, and their objects (*prameya*) are conventionally established in mutual dependence (Cf. PPad 75, 10f.: *tāni ca parasparāpekṣyā sidhyanti, ... no tu khalu svābhāvikā pramāṇaprameyayoh siddhir*).

2) A cognition is termed "*pratyakṣa*" if it has a directly perceivable (*aparokṣa*) appearance of its object (cf. PPad 75, 2f: *loke yadi lakṣyaṃ yadi vā svalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā sarvaṃ eva sāksād upalabhyamānavād aparokṣam. ataḥ pratyakṣaṃ vyavasthāpyate tadviṣayena jñānena saha*. "Whatever [object], such as something to be characterized, a particular and an universal, is [existent]* in the world is perceivable since it is directly perceived. Therefore this [object] is defined as '*pratyakṣa*' together with its cognition." [*supplied following the Tibetan translation], see also GR 181a2f., 185b2f.)

3) Perception includes conceptual cognition.

4) Self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) is not acceptable.

The later dGe lugs pa masters such as Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546) and 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje (1648-1722) have developed this *pramāṇa* theory of Prāsaṅgika and presented it very systematically in their dBu ma'i spyi don and Tshig gsal ston thun respectively. I am preparing the latter's annotated German translation for my dissertation in Vienna. For conceptual *mānasapratyakṣa* in terms of the dGe lugs pa, see Tillemans 1989.

- AKBh: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Ed. by P. Pradhan. Patna 1975.
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, Chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa. Ed. by Y. Ejima. Tokyo 1989.
- AS: *Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga*. Ed. by P. Pradhan. Santiniketan 1950.
- ASBh: *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam*. Ed. by N. Tatia. Patna 1976.
- CŚ: *Catuhśataka(kārikā) by Āryadeva*. D3846, P5246.
- CŚT: *Catuhśatakaṭikā by Candrakīrti*. D3865, P5266.
- TJ: *Madhyamakahdayavṛtti-Tarkajvāla by Bhāvaviveka*. D3856, P5256.
- NB: *Nyāyabindu by Dharmakīrti*. See NBT.
- NBT: *[Nyāyabinduṭikā] Pañḍita Dirveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*. Ed. by D. Malvania. Patna 1955.
- PPad: *[Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti] MŪLAMADHYAMAKAKĀRIKĀS de Nāgārjuna avec la PRASANNAPADĀ*. Publ. per L. de La Vallée Poussin. St. Pétersbourg 1903-1913.
- PPra: *Prajñāpradīpa by Bhāvaviveka*. D3853, P5253.
- PPraT: *Prajñāpradīpaṭikā by Avalokitavṛata*. D3859, P5259.
- PV III: *Pramāṇavārttika by Dharmakīrti*. Pratyakṣa Chapter. See Tosaki 1979.
- PVin I: *Pramāṇaviniścaya by Dharmakīrti*. Pratyakṣa Chapter. See Veiter 1966.
- PS: *Pramāṇasamuccaya by Dignāga*. See Hattori 1968 and Kitagawa 1973.
- PSV: *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti by Dignāga*. See Hattori 1968 and Kitagawa 1973.
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