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On *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa III*,  
section II and III

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## On *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* III

### Section II and III<sup>1</sup>

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#### II. *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* in the Madhyamaka systems

Since the SNSū had set forth the theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality (*triniḥsvabhāvatā*) as real meaning of the non-substantiality of all things taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra and declared itself to be a scripture teaching a definitive meaning (*ñes don, ñitārtha*), Madhyamaka masters felt themselves obliged to protect their own system and scripture against the Yogācāra tradition. At the same time, they had to decide to accept or not to accept the theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality of the SNSū as a definitive meaning. Bhāvaviveka<sup>2</sup> and Kamalaśīla accepted it, while

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<sup>1</sup> For Introduction and Section I of this paper see Yoshimizu 1993a.

<sup>2</sup> For the alternation of the names, Bhāvaviveka, Bhāviveka and Bhavya, retrieved or reconstructed from the Indian, Tibetan and Chinese sources, cf. Ejima 1990 and Seyfort Rugg 1990: 69 n. 1. Ejima has proposed that the individual should be called "Bhāviveka" according to the Chinese sources from the seventh century, which are older than the Indian and Tibetan ones, rather than "Bhāvaviveka", which appears as a variant reading in the manuscripts of the PPad

Candrakīrti did not. With an awareness of this historical development of the Indian Mahāyāna tradition and in accord with their treatment of the SNSū, Tsoñ kha pa draws a clear distinction between the ontological position of the Svātantrika and that of the Prāsaṅgika, of which theoretical grounds I would like to discuss here in this section.

### 1. Svātantrika's acceptance of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*

Tsoñ kha pa's arguments for Svātantrika's acceptance and Prāsaṅgika's rejection of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* of things on the conventional level seem to presuppose the logical connection of the non-substantiality and *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* given in the SNSū, namely, the latter is the reason for the former<sup>3</sup>: X is non-substantial because X is *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa* = Whatever is *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa* is non-substantial. Then one must say: Insofar as X is not non-substantial, X is *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*. What takes the place of X, i.e. the subject of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*, are, as seen in Section I, mostly self-existence (*rañ mtshan* or its synonyms such as *ño bo ñid*, *rañ gi ño bo*, *rañ bzin*) and their arising and cessation (*skye 'gag*) in accord with the teachings of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra: "all things are non-substantial (*ño bo ñid ma mchis pa*), neither produced nor destroyed (*ma skyes pa ma 'gags pa*)" as well as of the SNSū: "the Lord has taught the essential characteristic [i.e. self-existence] (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*) of aggregates, their characteristic of arising and cessation (*skye 'jig*)".<sup>4</sup> On this

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of Nepal origin (ibid.: 100). However, De Jong 1978 has reported no variant reading for La Vallée Poussin's reading "Bhāvaviveka" in PPad 36, 13; 38, 12; 196, 4; and 351, 15 from the manuscript discovered by Tucci (R in De Jong 1978), which seems superior to those used by La Vallée Poussin. As I am not in a position to decide his original name, I retain "Bhāvaviveka" in conformity to the first half of this paper.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. SNSū VII 4 (Lamotte 1935: 67, 32-68, 4); Yoshimizu 1993a: 109, 12-19 and n. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. SNSū VII 1 (Lamotte 1935: 65, 4ff.); Yoshimizu 1993a: 102ff. and 104 n. 20.

condition, Tsoñ kha pa maintains that the Svātantrika admits *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ mtshan* and *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye 'gag* on the conventional level. That is to say, the Svātantrika accepts on the conventional level the teaching of the SNSū that the dependent nature or characteristic (*paratantrasvabhāva* or *paratantralakṣaṇa*) is not non-substantial with regard to characteristic and arising on the strength of others. Furthermore, Tsoñ kha pa indicates that the Svātantrika makes the above-mentioned teaching of the non-substantiality of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra consistent with that of the SNSū by interpreting the former as concerning only ultimate reality and the latter as negating the conceptualized nature or characteristic (*parikalpitasvabhāva* or *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*) that is an incorrect superimposition of ultimate self-existence upon the dependent characteristic. In this sense, the Svātantrika asserts that the both sūtras teach the middle way (Madhyamaka). Thereby he avoids nihilism and denial of the Buddha's teaching in the SNSū. That means, for Tsoñ kha pa in turn, that the Svātantrika adopts the ontological idea from the Yogācāra that "whatever is non-substantial is non-existent, neither arises nor ceases" and has shifted the level of the substantial self-existence from the ultimate to the conventional. Hence the Svātantrika is also called "substantialist" from the viewpoint of the Prāsaṅgika who denies this ontology.

Tsoñ kha pa says in his LR:

In this regard,<sup>5</sup> the master Bhāvaviveka admits that (things such as) form etc. have self-existence conventionally that is established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo*). When he refutes the assertion of Cittamātravādin that the conceptualized (characteristic) is non-substantial with regard to characteristic (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa, lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāva*) since it has no self-existence that is

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<sup>5</sup> I.e. regarding the question of existence on the conventional level.



substantiality, [the Sūtra] has planted the exegesis of no other than a definitive meaning (*ñes don, ñitārtha*).<sup>10</sup> He admits that (the SNSū) teaches the meaning of the Madhyamaka since the superimposition of ultimate self-existence upon the dependent [is eliminated by teaching] the non-existence of the conceptualized, and since the denial (of existence) is eliminated by (teaching) the existence of [conventional] self-existence (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*) of the dependent. (Thus) this master too admits that the self-existence (*rañ gi mtshan ñid*) [of the dependent] exists conventionally.<sup>11</sup>

In short, it may be said that Tsoñ kha pa's characterization of the ontological idea of the Svātantrika is based on the following three arguments:

- a) The Svātantrika admits *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi grub pa'i rañ mtshan* and *skye 'gag* because he maintains that the dependent characteristic is not non-substantial with regard to characteristic and arising on the strength of others.
- b) He interprets the teaching of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra that "all things are non-substantial, neither produced nor destroyed" as concerning only ultimate reality.
- c) He interprets the teaching of the three kinds of non-substantiality of the SNSū as the middle way (Madhyamaka) and as a definitive meaning.

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<sup>10</sup> Citation from MĀ D150a2f., P162b4f.: *bcom ldan 'das kyi skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa don dam pa'i dbaṅ du mdzad pa kho nar brjod ciñ no bo ñid med pa nam pa gsum gyi dgoṅs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha' gñis dañ bral ba rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ñes don kho na gzuñ 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no //*

<sup>11</sup> LR 372a4-372b1 (Nagao 1954: 166, 12-167, 1): *mDo dgoṅs 'grel las kyañ de bžin du bśad nas chos thams cañ no bo ñid med pa dgoṅs pa can du gsuṅs pa la slob dpon Ka ma la št las ni mdo des no bo ñid med pa gsum gyi dgoṅs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha' gñis dañ bral ba rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ñes pa'i don kho na gzuñ 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no žes gžan dbaṅ la don dam par no bo ñid sgra btags pa kun brtags yin pas de med pa dañ tha sñad du gžan dbaṅ la rañ gi mtshan ñid yod pas des skur 'debs sel bas dbu ma'i don bstan par bžed de slob dpon 'di yañ tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid yod par bžed do //*

Regarding these three points, I will examine statements of Bhāvaviveka and Kamalaśīla respectively in accord with Tsoñ kha pa's discussions in the LÑ.

[1] Bhāvaviveka

In his LÑ, Tsoñ kha pa claims that Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamaka theory can be clarified through investigating his idea of the three kinds of characteristics:

It will become clear how Bhāvaviveka explains ultimate [reality, i.e.] the two kinds of selflessness (*don dam pa bdag med gñis*) when he elucidates the intention of the noble (Nāgārjuna), if one understands how this master (Bhāvaviveka) determines [the meaning of] the three characteristics (*mtshan ñid gsum*).<sup>12</sup>

In the twenty-fifth chapter of the PPra,<sup>13</sup> Bhāvaviveka extensively criticizes Yogācāra philosophy focusing upon the three kinds of nature or characteristic. There he objects to Yogācāra's negation of the conceptualized characteristic since he understands it in a different way from the Yogācāra: for the Yogācāra, the conceptualized refers to a mere designation or concept, which is distinguished from its basis, whereas for Bhāvaviveka, it is to be identified with its basis, i.e. the dependent characteristic or an entity (*vastu*). Bhāvaviveka insists that because both 1) subject and 2) object of conceptualization, viz. words and their referents, belong to the dependent characteristic, the Yogācāra theory of the non-substantiality of the conceptualized

<sup>12</sup> LÑ 50b5f. (Thurman 1984: 266, 6ff.): *Legs ldan 'byed kyis 'phags pa'i dgoñs pa bkral ba la don dam pa bdag med gñis ji ltar bśad pa ni slob dpon 'dis mtshan ñid gsum gtan la phab tshul ses na gsal te !*

<sup>13</sup> For the twenty-fifth chapter of the PPra together with Avalokitavratā's commentary (PPraT), we have Japanese translations (Yasui 1961; Kajiyama 1980) as well as English translation (Eckel 1985) to refer to. A parallel discussion is found in the fifth chapter of the MH and its commentary TJ of which Japanese translation from the Tibetan version has been presented by Yamaguchi 1941. Its Sanskrit manuscript is not accessible to me.

characteristic denies the dependent characteristic. This criticism has provided T̄soñ kha pa a clear evidence of Bhāvaviveka's recognition of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* on the conventional level.

Bhāvaviveka says:

- 1) In this respect,<sup>14</sup> if (the Yogācāra) asserts here that whatever has the conceptualized nature consisting of mental expressions (*yid la brjod pa*, \**manojalpa*) and verbal expressions (*tshig tu brjod pa*, \**vacanñjalpa*) such as [the concept or word] / α "form" is non-existent, it denies existence (*dños po*) since it denies mental and verbal expressions.<sup>15</sup> 2) If (he) says that any

<sup>14</sup> At the beginning of the twenty-fifth chapter Bhāvaviveka outlines Yogācāra's objection to the Mādhyamika as follows (PPra D242a1f., P303a6f.; Eckel 1985: 45, 11-16): *dmigs pa thams cad ñer źi źiñ // spros pa ñer źi źi ba ste // sañs rgyas kyis ni gañ du yañ // su la'añ chos 'ga' ma stan to // \* źes bya ba ni bden na de rtogs par bya ba'i thabs gźan gyi dbañ la skur 'debs pa de ni mi ruñ ste / \*MMK XXV 24: sarvopalambhopaśamañ prapañcopaśamañ śivañ / na kva cit kasyacit kaścīd dharmo buddhena deśitañ // < = If (Nāgārjuna's) statement that "it is blissful that all perception ceases and conceptual diversity ceases, the Buddha has taught no doctrine anywhere to anyone" is true, then it is not proper that [thus the Mādhyamika] denies a means by which [the cessation of perception and conceptual diversity] is to be realized, that is, the dependent [characteristic]. > Then Bhāvaviveka describes the theory of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*) as well as of non-substantiality of the conceptualized nature alone, which the Yogācāra has introduced in order to avoid such a "nihilistic" view as the Madhyamaka (cf. PPra D242a1-7, P303a7-303b5; Eckel 1985: 45-48). As we have seen in Section I (Yoshimizu 1993a: 117f.), the Yogācāra has thus criticized the Madhyamaka theory, regarding it as a denial of the dependent entity. Bhāvaviveka, in turn, refutes the Yogācāra by arguing that it is the Yogācāra himself to deny the dependent entity.*

<sup>15</sup> Avalokitavratā explains that both mental expressions and verbal expressions, i.e. conceptualization (*mam par rtog pa*, *vikalpa*) and designation (*tha sñad 'dogs pa*), belong to the consciousness-aggregate (*mam par śes pa'i phuñ po*, *vijñānaskandha*) and the conditioning-aggregate (*'du byed kyī phuñ po*, *saṃskāraskandha*) respectively. Namely, he says (PPraṬ D274a3ff., P325a8ff.; cited in LR 371b6ff.): *'dis mal 'byor spyod pa pa dag kun brtags pa'i ño bo ñid ni mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid kyis ño bo ñid med do źes zer ba de gal te gzugs źes bya bar ño bo ñid dañ khyad par du yid la brjod pa mam par rtog pa dañ / tshig tu brjod pa tha sñad 'dogs pa'i kun brtags pa'i ño bo ñid gañ yin pa de mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid kyis ño bo ñid med do źe na kun rdzob do gźan gyi dbañ gi ño bo la skur ba 'debs pa yin bas mi ruñ bar ston te / < = In this (statement Bhāvaviveka) indicates: Yogācārins say that the conceptualized*

object of these two (kinds of expression) that is conceptualized by someone<sup>16</sup> is non-existent just like a snake [wrongly cognized] with reference to a rope (*thag pa la sbrul*), [this example is not proper because] conceptualized [objects] are not non-existent. In this case, namely, the object (i.e. a snake) that is [wrongly] conceptualized through mind confused (*blo gros 'khrul pas*) by (its) similarity (to a rope) in outline does not exist, but if one says with reference to a (real) coiled snake that the snake is conventionally (*tha sñad du*) non-existent, it contradicts the common sense (*grags pa'i gnod pa*).<sup>17</sup>

In both cases, 1) and 2), Bhāvaviveka considers the idea of non-substantiality of the conceptualized as a denial of the dependent

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nature is non-substantial since it is non-substantial with regard to characteristic. If (they) say that whatever is of the nature of the conceptualized (that is comprised) of conceptualization (*nam par rtog pa*), (i.e.) mental expressions, and designation (*tha sñad 'dogs pa*), (i.e.) verbal expressions, with reference to essence and particularities (of things) such as "form" is non-substantial since it is non-substantial with regard to characteristic, it is not acceptable because it denies existence of the dependent on the conventional (level).> Bhāvaviveka himself also gives the explanation that names (*miñ, nāman*) [= *tshig tu brjod pa*] belong to the form[-aggregate] (*gzugs, rūpa*) and the conditioning[-aggregate] (*'du byed, saṃskāra*), and that conceptualization (*nam par rtog pa, vikalpa*) [= *yid la brjod pa*] belongs to the consciousness[-aggregate] (*nam par šes pa, vijñāna*) and the conditioning-aggregate (*'du byed kyi phuñ po, saṃskāraskandha*) (PPra D242b5, P304a6f.). Tsoñ kha pa identifies *tshig tu byed pa* and *yid la brjod pa* as words (*sgra*) and mind (*blo*) (LR 371b3) or as names (*miñ*) and conceptualization (*rtog pa*) (LÑ 51a1).

<sup>16</sup> Avalokitavratā as well as Tsoñ kha pa explain it as "by some fool" (*byis pa gañ yañ nuñ bas*) (PPraṬ D274b1, P325b7; LÑ 51b5).

<sup>17</sup> PPrā D242b7ff., P303b6ff. (Eckel 1985: 50, 3-14); cited in LÑ 50b6f., 51b4f., 52a3 (Thurman 1984: 266, 10-14 and 267, 32-268, 4) and in LR 371b4f. (see above): *de la 'dir gal te gzugs źes bya bar yid la brjod pa dañ / tshig tu brjod pa'i kun brtags pa no bo řid gañ yin pa de med do źe na ni dños po la skur 'debs yin te / yid la brjod pa dañ / tshig tu brjod pa la skur 'debs pa'i phyir ro // ci ste gañ yañ nuñ bas de gñis kyi\* don kun brtags pa gañ yin pa de med de / dper na thag pa la sbrul\*\* bžin no źe na ni / kun brtags med pa ma yin te / de la nam pa 'dra bas blo gros 'khrul pas kun brtags pa'i don med kyañ tha sñad du sbrul 'khyil pa la sbrul med do źe na ni\*\*\* / grags pa'i\*\*\*\* gnod par 'gyur ro // (\*kyis LÑ \*\*sbrul gyi blo LÑ \*\*\*de med ma yin pa'i phyir ro PPrā P, LÑ \*\*\*\*grags pas LÑ)*

characteristic. Based on this statement, Tsoñ kha pa confirms Bhāvaviveka's position as follows:

1) (Bhāvaviveka) explains that if the conceptualized (*kun brtags*) in the statement "the conceptualized is non-substantial with regard to characteristic" (*kun brtags la mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med do*) [in the SNSū] means conceptualization (*rtog pa*) and names (*miñ*) that designate (*'dogs pa*) essence (*ño bo*) and particularities (*khyad par*) (of things), [this statement] is denial [of the dependent since it is to conceive] that the dependent is non-substantial with regard to characteristic (*gžan dbaṅ la mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa*), for both (conceptualization and names) belong to the aggregates (*phuñ po*). Consequently, a) he admits the dependent as substantial with regard to characteristic (*gžan dbaṅ la mtshan ñid ño bo ñid yod pa*). Moreover, the SNSū expounds the non-substantiality of characteristic (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa*) [with regard to the conceptualized characteristic] for the reason that it is not established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pas*),<sup>18</sup> and they [i.e. the non-substantiality of characteristic and its reason] (*'di dag*) further determines [real] meaning (*don*) of this sūtra.<sup>19</sup> a) Therefore it is evident that (Bhāvaviveka) asserts that the dependent has self-existence that is established as intrinsically real (*gžan dbaṅ la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i*)

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. SNSū VII 4 (Yoshimizu 1993a: 106 n. 24).

<sup>19</sup> The meaning of this sentence is unclear. Presumably it suggests that Tsoñ kha pa considers the definition "*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa*" and the reason "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa*" as the most crucial and decisive teaching in the SNSū. Another possible reading would be: "[Bhāvaviveka] affirms them [i.e. this definition and the reason] as [real] meaning of this sūtra." Thurman's translation (1984: 266, 21f.): "Since these (Dogmatists) also determine the meaning of that scripture". He takes *'di dag* as "Dogmatists". However, it seems to be difficult to find out who is mentioned here as other "Svātantrika(s)" than Bhāvaviveka.

ño bo yod pa).<sup>20</sup>

2) Since "being existent (and) non-existent" (*yod med*) here mean "being substantial (and) non-substantial with regard to characteristic" (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid yod med*), [Bhāvaviveka] is saying that a) the objects designated as essence and particularities (*ño bo dañ khyad par du btags pa'i yul*) with reference to form etc. are conventionally not non-substantial with regard to characteristic (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa min*).<sup>21</sup>

In the next stage Bhāvaviveka claims that the non-substantiality of the conceptualized characteristic on the ultimate level is intended by Nāgārjuna.

If [the Yogācāra] ultimately (*don dam par*) negates (real) existence (*dños po*) [of the conceptualized object such as a snake referring to a coiled snake], then it is [just] a repetition of [the theory] of the Mādhyamika (*dbu ma pa'i tshul gyis*) since b) [we, Mādhyamikas, consider] that ultimately the snake is neither existent as substantial (existence) (*rdzas*), nor does arise (*skye ba*) by nature (*ño bo ñid las*) .... Those who want to show the non-existence of the conceptualized object (*kun brtags pa'i don*) should admit the very theory of the Mādhyamika with argumentation (*'thad pa dañ bcas pa*) taught by the master (Nāgārjuna). For [he teaches] that any operation of mental and

<sup>20</sup> LÑ 51a1ff. (Thurman 1984: 266, 14-23): *kun brtags la mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med do źes smra ba'i kun brtags de ño bo dañ khyad par du 'dogs pa'i rtogs pa dañ miñ la byed na de gñis phuñ por gtogs pas gźan dbañ la mtshan ñid ño bo med pa'i skur 'debs su bśad pas gźan dbañ la mtshan ñid ño bo ñid yod par bźed do // de yañ dGoñs 'grel las rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pas mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med par bśad ciñ 'di dag kyañ mdo\* de'i don gtan la 'bebs pa yin pas gźan dbañ la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ño bo yod par bźed par gsal lo // \*corrected according to P : mad*

<sup>21</sup> LÑ 52a2f. (Thurman 1984: 268, 14-17): *'dir yod med ni mtshan ñid ño bo ñid yod med yin pas gzugs sogs la ño bo dañ khyad par du btags pa'i yul tha sñad du mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa min źes so //*

verbal expressions on (their) objects ceases only through the negation of self-existence (*ño bo ñid*) of the [object] to be expressed.<sup>22</sup>

In this manner, Bhāvaviveka interprets the theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality of the SNSū as consistent with Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka insofar as it means the negation of substantial self-existence, its arising and cessation on the ultimate level. Tsoñ kha pa comments on this statement as follows:

This [above-mentioned statement of the PPrā] is not to say that the reasoning of the Madhyamaka (*dbu ma'i rigs pa*) [presented in MMK XVIII 7] is necessary in order to negate the ultimate establishment (*don dam par grub pa*) of an object [e.g. the concept "pot"] that is posited by means of the conventional agreement (*brdas*) [as applying] the designation "pot" to [anything that] has a round belly (*lto ldir ba*), for [Bhāvaviveka] explains in his rTog ge 'bar ba: "It is common to both Yogācāra and Mādhyamika [to understand] that whatever is posited by means of conventional agreement [as applying] a [certain] name [to a certain entity] (*miñ gi brdas b'zag pa*) has no relation (*mi*

<sup>22</sup> PPrā D242b2f., P304a1f. (Eckel 1985: 50, 14-17, 51, 5-10); paraphrased in LÑ 52a4f. (Thurman 1984: 268, 20-27): *ci ste don dam par ños po sel bar byed na ni / dbu ma pa'i tshul gyis rjes su smra ba yin te / don dam par sbrul rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ñan / ño bo ñid las skye ba med pa'i phyir ro // ... kun brtags pa'i don yod pa ma yin par ston par 'dod pas ni slob dpon gyis dbu ma pa'i tshul 'thad ñan bcas pa bka' stsal pa ñid 'dod par bya ste / brjod par bya ba'i ño bo ñid bkag pa kho nas yul de la yid ñan tshig gi brjod pa 'jug pa ldog pa'i phyir ro //* This teaching by Nāgārjuna is, as Avalokitavratā and Tsoñ kha pa point out, MMK XVIII 7: *nivṛttam abhidhātavyam nivṛttaś cittaḡocaraḡ / anuṡpanmaniruddhā hi nirvāṡam iva dharmatā //* < = That which is to be expressed has vanished. The sphere of activities of mind has vanished. For reality of things is neither produced nor destroyed like *nirvāṡa*. > The Tibetan translation cited in the PPad reads *pāda b* as condition or reason for *pāda a*: *brjod par bya ba b'fog pa ste // sems kyī spyod yul b'fog pas so // ma skyes pa ñan ma 'gags pa // chos ñid mya ñan 'das ñan mshuñs //* (cf. PPad 364 n. 1). Tsoñ kha pa follows this Tibetan version (LÑ 52a6). In the PPrāT both *pāda a* and *b* have *ldog pas* and Avalokitavratā reads *pāda a* as reason for cessation of *prapañca* and *pāda b* as reason for *pāda a* (PPrāT D276a4ff., P327a8ff.).

*gnas pa*) to reality of existence (*dños po'i de kho na ñid*), since even those who do not know (verbal) conventions (*brda*) such as the deaf and the dumb recognize objects such as a pot, and since even (animals) such as cows can distinguish their own calves from (those of) others through smell, form (or colour) (*gzugs*) etc.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the conceptual object (*žen yul*) of the designations such as "this is form[-aggregate]," "this is arising of the form[-aggregate]," [discussed in the PPra] is the object designated by these [expressions] (*des btags pa'i don*). a) And this [objekt] is not non-substantial with regard to characteristic (*mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa min pa*) since it is conventionally existent as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis yod pa*). c) Accordingly, [Bhāvaviveka] explains that the [real] intention (*don*) of the sūtra [i.e. the SNSū] is to teach the non-substantiality of characteristic [of the conceptual object] on the ultimate [level] (*don dam par mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa*) through negating its ultimate existence.<sup>24</sup>

Here Tson kha pa reveals that Bhāvaviveka holds the theory that on the conventional level things have self-existence (*ño bo ñid*, *svabhāva* or *rañ gi mtshan ñid*, *svalakṣaṇa*) as well as characteristics of arising and cessation (*skye 'gag*) that are established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*). In other words, Bhāvaviveka accepts Yogācāra's "substantialism" on the conventional level.

<sup>23</sup> Paraphrase of TJ D219b3f., P244a8f.

<sup>24</sup> LÑ 52a6-52b3 (Thurman 1984: 269, 1-15): *de yañ lto ldir ba la bum pa zes btags pa'i brdas bžag pa'i yul don dam par grub pa 'gog pa la dbu ma'i rigs pa dgos zes smra ba min te / rTog ge 'bar ba las / lkugs pa dañ 'on pa la sogs pa brda mi šes pas kyañ bum pa la sogs pa'i don šes šin / ba lañ la sogs pas kyañ dri dañ gzugs la sogs pa las rañ bžan gyi bu šes nus pas miñ gi brdas bžag pa dños po'i de kho na ñid du mi gnas pa mal 'byor spyod pa pa dañ dbu ma pa gñis ka la 'dra bar bšad pas so // des na 'di gzugs so 'di gzugs kyi skye ba'o zes sogs su 'dogs pa'i žen yul ni des btags pa'i don yin la / de yañ tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pas mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa min pa'i phyir don dam par yod pa 'gog pas don dam par mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med par ston pa mdo'i don du 'chad pa'o //*

For Bhāvaviveka, the conceptualized characteristic is not different from its basis, i.e. the dependent characteristic, as seen above. Let us think about the example of a snake again. Bhāvaviveka asserts that the conceptualized characteristic or conceptual object (*žen yul*), e.g. the concept "snake" that refers to a real snake, is not non-existent, whereby he means the existence of the real snake itself, not of the concept "snake". Namely, Bhāvaviveka does not make a distinction between an external real snake and the concept "snake" referring to the real snake.

Could we then understand that Bhāvaviveka considers conventional existence as the object of perception (*pratyakṣa*)? The answer is implied in the above-cited statement from the TJ. In this connection, he further criticizes the Cittamātravādin who negates the existence of external objects:

Because it is observed that most (kinds) of defilements such as lust, wrath and delusion occur for animals, wild beasts, birds and the like who can speak neither syllable, nor word for ascertainment, nor name nor sign, one should know that the external objects such as form etc., in dependence on which the defilements occur, are in fact existent.<sup>25</sup>

It is not correct that (the Cittamātravādin) says that form etc. are mere expression and that the form lacks (self-existence) (*ston pa nid, śūnyatā*) at any rate. That is because there exists the own-being (*bdag nid*) of the form, which is an object of activities of cognition, to which (the form) appears as an existence [and] from which any [appearance of] own-being that is non-form (i.e. sound, smell, taste and touchable) is excluded .... Such an inexpressible own-being of form appearing to

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<sup>25</sup> TJ D215a4f., P238b6ff. ad MH V 56: *yi ge dan nes pa'i tshig dan miñ dan brda smra ba mi šes pa'i dud 'gro ri dags dan bya la sogs pa dag la yañ 'dod chags dan / ze sdañs dan / gi mugs la sogs pa'i ñon moñs pa šas chen po skye ba mthoñ ba'i phyir / gañ dag la brten nas ñon moñs pa skye bar 'gyur ba'i gzugs la sogs pa'i phyi rol gyi yul dag yod pa kho nar šes par bya'o ||*

perception does conventionally exist.<sup>26</sup>

The own-being (*bdag ñid*) or self-existence (*rañ bñin*) that appears to perception of men as well as of animals is conventionally existent as it is cognized. It is known that Bhāvaviveka accepts Dignāga's epistemological definition that the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) are cognized by perception and inference (*anumāna*) respectively.<sup>27</sup> However, he does not accept Dignāga's *apoha* theory that the universal is mere concept from the viewpoint that the conceptualized object is not different from its basis. He says:

For the Mādhyamikas, the essential nature (*ño bo ñid, svabhāva*) of a cow [i.e. the cowness] that lacks [characteristics of] different species such as horse is accepted as universal .... It cannot be cognized, unless the basis that is a collection of (the characteristics of a cow) such as dewlap is cognized. In other words, it means nothing other than that it is to be cognized, insofar as the basis is cognized. That is because the universal such as cowness is to be cognized, insofar as the basis is cognized.

Accordingly, it is admitted that the existence called universal is an object of conceptualization since it is also an object of cognition, and that it is an object of expression too since a word operates on an existence that is firmly grasped by a cognition. The so-called cowness is not different from the dewlap etc., namely, it is not different from the own-being of

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<sup>26</sup> TJ D215b1-5, P239a4-239b2 ad MH V 58: *mñon par brjod pa tsam la gzugs zes bya žin / gzugs ni mam pa thams cad du stoñ pa ñid ces bya bar mi rigs te / ci'i phyir že na / gzugs ma yin pa'i bdag ñid mam par bcad pa'i dños por snañ ba'i blo'i spyod yul gyi gzugs kyi bdag ñid de yod pa'i phyir ro // .... de lta bu'i gzugs kyi bdag ñid mñon sum gyi blo la snañ ba brjod du med pa de kun rdzob tu yod de /*

<sup>27</sup> Cf. e. g. TJ D276a1f., P311b7f. ad MH IX 7 (indicated in Ejima 1980: 46, 11-16): *yañ na mñon sum ni dños po'i rañ gi miñhan ñid la dmigs pa'i phyir yul gcig gi don rtogs pa yin la / rjes su dpag pa ni spyi'i miñhan ñid kyi yul can yin pa'i phyir yul du ma'i don rtogs pa yin pa ....*

the existence.<sup>28</sup>

What Bhāvaviveka admits as conventional existence is the own-being of things to be cognized by perception, and it is nothing other than the dependent characteristic in terms of the SNSū and the self-existence established as intrinsically real (*rag gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bzin*) in terms of Tsoñ kha pa. The negation of this own-being on the ultimate level is, Bhāvaviveka asserts, the real intention of the SNSū as well as Nāgārjuna.

[2] Kamalaśīla

Tsoñ kha pa sums up the position of the so-called Yogācāra-Mādhyamika<sup>29</sup> as follows:

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<sup>28</sup> TJ D216b1-6, P240a8-240b8 ad MH V 62: *dbu ma pa la rta la sogs pa rigs mi mthun pa ston pa ñid kyi ba lañ gi ño bo ñid la spyir 'dod pa la ni / ... de ni lkog śal la sogs pa 'dus pa'i gzi ma gzuñ na gzuñ du med de / 'o na ji lta bu ze na / gzi gzuñ na gzuñ du yod pa kho na yin no zes bya ba'i tha tshig go // ci'i phyir ze na / gzi de gzuñ na ba lañ ñid la sogs pa'i spyi de yañ gzuñ du yod pa'i phyir ro // ... des na spyi zes bya ba'i dños po de ni blo'i yul yin pa'i phyir btag par bya ba yañ yin la / blos ñes par bzuñ ba'i dños po la tshig 'jug pa'i phyir de ñid brjod par bya ba yañ yin par 'dod kyi / ba lañ ñid ces bya ba de lkog śal la sogs pa dag las gzan pa ni ma yin te / 'o na ji lta bu ze na / dños po'i rañ gi ño bo ñid las tha mi dad pa yin no //*

<sup>29</sup> It is widely accepted in Tibet that Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla are Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas who conventionally concur with the Cittamātravādin in negating existence of external objects. Ye śes sde (9c.) and later Tibetan masters ascribe this interpretation of the conventional to MAI 91 and its self-commentary (cf. ITa ba'i khyad par P252a7ff.). Tsoñ kha pa too follows this traditional interpretation. Namely, he characterizes their theory of the conventional in two ways: They maintain that conventional things are 1) established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*) as well as 2) mind-only (*cittamātra*). However, I suppose that Tsoñ kha pa might take their acceptance of the *cittamātra* theory as less important than their acceptance of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*, for he explains 2) separately from 1) according to Ye śes sde and does not provide any significant remark (LN 55a3-57a2; Thurman 1984: 273, 22-277, 7).

The question still remains to be solved as to whether Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla really hold the view of mind-only with regard to the conventional existence, since Matsumoto has expressed the opinion that Śāntarakṣita is not a so-called Yogācāra-Mādhyamika who accepts the mind-only on the conventional level because MAI 91 and its commentary (MAIV) presents a pure Yogācāra

Because (Kamalaśīla) elucidates in (his) MĀ the meaning of the non-substantiality of characteristic and the non-substantiality of arising taught in the SNSū in the same manner as Bhāvaviveka does, and Śāntarakṣita admits (it) too,<sup>30</sup> a) (both masters) admit on the conventional level self-existence that is established as intrinsically real. This is also known by (the fact) that they admit the reasonings for establishing (the relation of) cause and effect<sup>31</sup> (taught) in the seven Treatises

position, but not Śāntarakṣita's own (1978: 125, 10-128, 6; 1984; 1986; 197-199). Yamaguchi basically agrees with Matsumoto (1991: 33, 48), while Ichigō (1982: 195) and Kajiyama (1982: 35ff., 54) follow Ye šes sde's traditional interpretation. I myself am inclined to share the opinion with Matsumoto and Yamaguchi, although I am not ready to give any conclusive statement on this matter, because neither Śāntarakṣita in his definition of the conventional in MAI 64 and its commentary (see below n. 68) nor Kamalaśīla in the MĀ where he extensively criticizes Yogācāra system affirm mind-only on the conventional level.

<sup>30</sup> The fact is, however, that Śāntarakṣita gives no clear statement about this issue. Tsoñ kha pa himself mentions it as follows (LN 60a4f.; Thurman 1984: 281, 19-22): *slob dpon Źi ba 'tsho'i gzuñ 'gyur ba mams las mtshan ñid gsum gtan la 'bebs tshul snar bśad pa bñin gsal bar ma byuñ yañ slob dpon gnīs ka dgoñs pa gcig tu yod do //* <= Although any method of the above-mentioned determination of the three kinds of characteristic does not clearly appear in the treatises of the master Śāntarakṣita translated (into Tibetan), both masters (Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla) completely agree in their intention.>

<sup>31</sup> Cf. e.g. NBT (II) 107, 5f.: *kāryakāraṇabhāvo loke pratyakṣānupalambhanibandhanaḥ pratīta itī* <= The relation of cause and effect is established in the world on the ground of perception and non-perception.>; PV I 38: *anvayavyatirekād yo yasya dṛṣṭo 'nuvartakaḥ / svabhāvas tasya tad dhetur ato bhinnān na sambhavaḥ //* <= Insofar as it is seen through the positive and negative concomitance that X follows Y, X is intrinsically caused by Y. Accordingly, it does not arise from something deviating.>; PVSV 24, 3f.: *tasmāt sakṛd api darśanādarśanābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddher bhavati* <= Therefore, the relation of cause and effect is also once established through seeing and non-seeing.> Cf. further Kajiyama 1963: 1 and 12; 1966: 113 n. 305. In the MĀ, however, Kamalaśīla lastly refutes this reasoning on the ultimate level. Cf. e.g. MĀ D187b7f., P205b5ff.: *de lta bas na don dam par rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po 'grub par bya ba'i tshad ma cuñ zad kyañ med de / rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po kun rdzob pa kho na yin pa la slob dpon mams kyis rjes su 'gro ba dañ ldog pa'i sgo nas rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po ji ltar grags pa bñin du grub pa ñe bar brjod kyi / don dam par ni ma yin no žes bya bar gzuñ par bya'o //* <= Therefore, there is ultimately no valid cognition at all by which the relation of cause and effect is established. The relation of cause and effect is solely conventional. Although

on valid cognition<sup>32</sup> etc. to be common (to their own system).<sup>33</sup>

The MĀ consists of two parts, i.e. *pūrvapakṣa* from the viewpoint of Yogācāra and *uttarapakṣa* of Mādhyamika<sup>34</sup>. The Yogācāra criticizes the theory of non-substantiality of all things and regards the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra as a scripture teaching an indirect meaning, claiming that on the ultimate level things are not non-produced.<sup>35</sup>

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masters expound that the relation of cause and effect is established through the positive and negative concomitance (*anvayaavyatireka*) as it is known, one should understand that it is not the case in ultimate (reality).> Cf. Moriyama 1987: 25-27 and 29-34, especially 28 n. 25 and 29 n. 26.

<sup>32</sup> I.e. Dharmakīrti's seven works: the *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇavinīścaya*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Hetubindu*, *Samtānāntarasiddhi*, *Sambandhpariṅkā* and the *Vādanyāya*.

<sup>33</sup> LÑ 55a2f. (Thurman 1984: 273, 14-21): *mDo dgoñs 'grel las mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa dañ / skye ba ño bo ñid med par gsuñs pa'i don Legs ldan 'byed bžin du dBu ma snañ bar bkral ba Ži ba 'tsho'i yañ bžed pa yin pas tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bžin bžed do // Tshad ma sde bdun la sogs pa'i rgyu 'bras mam par 'jog pa'i rigs pa mams thun moñ bar bžed pas kyañ šes so //*

<sup>34</sup> For the survey of the contents of the MĀ cf. e.g. Ejima 1980: 228f. and Moriyama 1988.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. MĀ D134a2-7, P144a1-8: *mdo kha cig las chos thams cad ni ño bo ñid med pa ma skyes pa gzod ma nas ži ba / rañ bžin gyis yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa'o žes bya ba la sogs pa 'byuñ ba gañ yin pa de yañ drañ ba'i don ñid du rtogs par bya ste / bcom ldan 'das kyi bstan pa ni dgoñs pa sna tshogs kyi sgo nas 'jug pa'i phyir ro // de la ño bo ñid gsum po kun brtags pa dañ / gžan gyi dbañ dañ / yoñs su grub pa mams ni go rñms bžin du mtshan ñid dañ / skye ba dañ / don dam pa ño bo ñid med pa las dgoñs nas chos thams cad ño bo ñid med pa ñid du gsuñs te / de bas na ño bo ñid med pa'i phyir ma skyes pa'o // de'i phyir gzod ma nas ži ba'o // de'i phyir rañ bžin gyis yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa ste / de bžin du bcom ldan 'das ñid kyis 'Phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa la sogs pa las mdo'i don gyi dgoñs pa sbyar ba bstan pa yin no // gžan yañ gñis su snañ ba'i mam par šes pa kho nar chos thams cad skye ba la sogs pa bye brag 'byed kyi / rañ rig pa tsam gyis ni ma yin no // gñis su snañ ba yañ brdzun pa'i phyir des mam par gžag pa'i ño bo thams cad kyañ brdzun pa ñid yin no // de bas na kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid kyis chos thams cad skye ba med pa la sogs par gsuñs kyi / don dam par ma yin te / < = 'Some sūtra states: All things are non-substantial, not produced, originally calm and completely liberated by nature. This (teaching) is also to be understood as no other than an indirect meaning because the Lord has given (various) teachings with various intentions. In this case, he has taught that*

To refute this objection, Kamalaśīla brings about his own interpretation of the teachings of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra and the SNSū:

As for the meaning (of non-substantiality), b) the Lord teaches [in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] "[all things are] not produced" and so on with reference solely to ultimate reality. And, c) because he has well expounded [in the SNSū] the middle way that is free from the two extreme (views) by teaching his intended meaning, viz. the three kinds of non-substantiality, he has planted [in the SNSū] no other than an exegesis of a definitive meaning.<sup>36</sup>

Here Kamalaśīla actually interprets the teachings of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra and the SNSū in the same manner as Bhāvaviveka does. Arising and cessation that Kamalaśīla accepts on the conventional level is, therefore, to be identified with those of the dependent nature in terms of the SNSū. He interprets the dependent and the conceptualized as follows:

Here any existence that appears, insofar as not examined, as it

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all things are non-substantial, intending that the three kinds of nature, viz. the conceptualized, the dependent and the perfect, are non-substantial with regard to characteristic and arising and in ultimate sense respectively. Accordingly, (all things are) not produced since (they are) non-substantial. Therefore, (they are) originally calm. Therefore, (they are) completely liberated by nature. In this manner, the Lord has revealed his intention connected with the meaning of the [Prajñāpāramitā]sūtra through the Ārya-saṃdhinirmocanasūtra etc. Furthermore, although differentiation of all things' arising and so on consists in the consciousness-only (*mam par śes pa kho na*) with twofold appearance, it is not by the pure self-consciousness (*rañ rig pa tsam*). Because the twofold appearance is false and any nature posited by it is also false. Hence (the Lord) has taught that all things do not arise and so on with reference to the non-substantiality of characteristic of the conceptualized, not to ultimate reality.> This *pūrvapakṣa* reminds us of the very sentences of SNSū VII 8 (cf. Yoshimizu 1993a: 108).

<sup>36</sup> MĀ D150a2ff., P162b4ff.; cited in LÑ 57a3ff. (Thurman 1984: 277, 17-21): *de'i don du bcom ldan 'das kyis skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa don dam pa'i dbaṅ du mdzad pa kho nar brjod cin no bo nid med pa mam pa gsum gyi dgoṅs pa bstan pas dbu ma'i lam mtha' grūs dañ bral ba rab tu bstan pa'i phyir nes pa'i don kho na gzuñ 'dzugs par mdzad pa yin no //*

is acknowledged in the world and that has arisen in dependence (on others) like illusion, is the dependent nature. On the conventional level it arises like illusion on the strength of others [i.e.] causal conditions (*rkyen, pratyaya*), not by itself. Hence it is posited to be non-substantial with regard to arising.<sup>37</sup>

The superimposition of the ultimate self-nature such as eternity and transiency upon this dependent nature that is not different from illusion is the conceptualized nature. And such (self-nature) is not established as characteristic as it is conceptualized. Hence it is posited to be non-substantial with regard to characteristic.<sup>38</sup>

Kamalaśīla thus accepts the Yogācāra theory that the dependent nature is non-substantial with regard to arising. That implies his acceptance of the dependent nature as substantial with regard to characteristic as well, from which Tsoñ kha pa draws the following conclusion:

The SNSū teaches the non-substantiality of characteristic (of the conceptualized) because the conceptualized that is established as intrinsically real does not exist, (but) it does not teach that the other two natures are non-substantial with regard to characteristic in the sense of being not established as intrinsically real. That is to say, this school maintains that the

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<sup>37</sup> MĀ D150a4f., P162b6f. (paraphrased in LÑ57b2-5): *de la dños po ma brtags na grags pa ji ltar snañ ba sgyu ma bñin du brien nas byuñ ba gañ yin pa de ni gñan gyi dbañ gi ño bo ñid yin no // de yañ kun rdzob tu sgyu ma bñin du gñan gyi rkyen gyi dbañ gis skye'i / bdag ñid kho nas\* ni ma yin pas skye ba ño bo ñid med pa ñid du mam par gñag ste / \*corrected according to LÑ : bdag ñid kha na MĀ DP*

<sup>38</sup> MĀ D151a2f., P163b6ff. (paraphrased in LÑ 57b5f.): *gñan gyi dbañ gi ño bo ñid sgyu ma dañ khyad par med pa de ñid la rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa la sogs pa don dam pa pa'i rañ gi ño bor sgro dogs pa gañ yin pa de ni kun brtags pa'i ño bo ñid do // de yañ ji ltar kun brtags pa'i mtshan ñid du ma grub pa'i phyir mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa ñid du mam par gñag go //*

non-establishment of the other two natures on the ultimate level is taught in the statement that the conceptualized is non-substantial with regard to the characteristic that is established as intrinsically real. Accordingly, it is very evident that (this school admits the teaching of the sūtra) to be free of superimposition since the non-substantiality of characteristic means non-establishment as intrinsically real on the ultimate level as well as to be free of denial since there exists the self-existence of characteristic that is established as intrinsically real on the conventional level.<sup>39</sup>

To sum up, "(Kamalaśīla) extensively elucidates in his MĀ the method (*lam srol*) set forth by Bhāvaviveka of interpreting the meaning of the SNSū's teaching of the three kinds of characteristic in accord with the meaning of the middle way, not in accord with the meaning that Yogācārinś have explained."<sup>40</sup>

[3] Svāntarika's acceptance of "arising from an other" — the example of magician's illusion<sup>41</sup>

Thus, according to Tsoñ kha pa, the Svāntarika accepts things'

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<sup>39</sup> LÑ 58a2-5 (Thurman 1984: 278, 23-33): *dGoñs 'grel las kun brtags rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa med pas mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med par bśad ciñ ño bo ñid gźan gñis rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa'i mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med par ma gsuñs pa ni / ño bo ñid gźan gñis don dam par ma grub pa ñid kun brtags rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med par bśad pa'i don du 'di pa 'dod ciñ / don dam par rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa mtshan ñid ño bo ñid med pa'i don yin pas sgro 'dogs dañ bral la tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i mtshan ñid kyi ño bo ñid yod pas skur debs spoñ par řin tu gsal lo //*

<sup>40</sup> LÑ 60a5f. (Thurman 1984: 281, 23-26): *dGoñs 'grel las mtshan ñid gsum-gsuñs pa'i don mal 'byor spyod pa pa dag gis ji ltar bkral ba mdo'i don min par dbu ma'i don du 'grel ba'i lam srol 'di Legs ldan 'byed kyis phyed ba řib tu ni dBu ma sñañ ba las bśad de /*

<sup>41</sup> The following discussion is based on my paper read at Fagernes, Norway, on the occasion of the sixth International Conference of the International Association for Tibetan Studies in August 1992, under the title "An Illusory Horse and the Sprouting of a Seed: Tsoñ kha pa's Illustration of the Conventional Existence for the Rañ rgyud pa", which I have not published.

arising on the strength of others on the conventional level. This arising is established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan nid kyis grub pa*) and what arises and ceases is each self-existence established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan nid kyis grub pa'i rañ bzin* or *rañ mtshan*). If then self-existence X is always observed to arise from self-existence Y like smoke from fire, and the relation of cause Y and effect X is established,<sup>42</sup> it follows that self-existence X arises from an other self-existence Y. Could it not mean that the Svātantrika conventionally accepts "arising from an other", which is one of the four alternative originations negated in MMK I 1 by Nāgārjuna?<sup>43</sup> Tsoñ kha pa is of this opinion: when he elucidates Candrakīrti's refutation of "arising from an other" on both ultimate and conventional levels in the MABh, he regards the opponent as a Svātantrika.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, I assume, he also implies that in his LÑ by the example of magician's illusion subsequent to the exposition of Kamalaśīla's understanding of the SNSū that we have discussed above.

To be brief, the example is as follows: A magician conjures such things as a pebble or a stick into a horse or an elephant by means of a mantra etc. An illusory horse appears to the audience of the magic whose eyes have been affected by the mantra. The magician himself sees it, too, but he knows that it is not real, while the audience believes it to be real. The third person, who has come later and whose eyes have not been affected by the mantra, only sees a pebble

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<sup>42</sup> Remember Tsoñ kha pa's remark that Kamalaśīla accepts that the relation of cause and effect is conventionally established by perception and non-perception. Cf. n. 31.

<sup>43</sup> MMK I 1: *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṅ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jānu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana //* < = Things are never found anywhere at all produced from themselves, from others, from both themselves and others, or without cause. >

<sup>44</sup> See below 2.

lying on the ground.<sup>45</sup>

Using this example more extensively, Tsoñ kha pa illustrates in his GR the view attributed to the Svātantrika that conventional existence is posited on the strength of one's cognition (*blo'i dbaṅ gis* or *blo la snaṅ ba'i dbaṅ gis b'zag pa*), namely, a conventional thing is determined as existent and non-existent according to its appearance to and disappearance from one's cognition. The Svātantrika knows like the magician that these objective things are not real on the ultimate level, but he does posit on the conventional level in accord with his cognition that the things are existent as they are perceived in the same way that one can hypothetically say that an illusory horse is existent since it is actually perceived. Thus, the expression "*blo'i dbaṅ gis*" or "*blo la snaṅ ba'i dbaṅ gis*" shows a ground for Svātantrika's establishing conventional existence. This *blo* or cognition is said to be

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<sup>45</sup> This example itself, called *māyākāradṛṣṭānta*, has already been used by early Indian Buddhists. Yogācāra masters have illustrated with this example their theory of the three kinds of nature in the works such as the MSA and the TSN. See e.g. MSA XI 15-30 (Lévi 1907: 59, 2-62, 18); TSN 27-30 and 34 (La Vallée Poussin 1933: 156), Nagao 1978: 223-228 and 1991: 69-74. However, Tsoñ kha pa uses it here for his own purposes as will be seen. In the GR it is explained as follows (84a2-5): *sgyu ma'i liad mo ba mig bslad pa b'zin du sems can mams kyi phyi naṅ gi chos 'di mams bden par yod par snaṅ ba na / blo la snaṅ ba'i dbaṅ gis b'zag pa min par chos de mams kyi sdod lugs žig yod par 'dzin pa ni / thog ma med pa nas žugs pa'i lhan skeyes kyi bden 'dzin no // .... nam žig bden 'dzin des bzuṅ ba'i bden grub rigs pas khegs pa na sgyu ma mkhan b'zin du phyi naṅ gi chos mams la / naṅ gi blo'i dbaṅ gis ma b'zag pa'i sdod lugs yod par mi 'dzin par / blo'i dbaṅ gis b'zag pa'i yod pa tsam du šes par 'gyur ro //* [= The audience of the magic whose eyes have been affected by the mantra [believes the illusory horse to be real]. In the same manner, sentient beings, when internal and external objective things appear to them as [if they were] real (*bden par grub pa*), do not [understand] that [these things] are posited [as existent] on the strength of their appearance in [one's] cognition; they understand that there is an intrinsic existence (*sdod lugs*) of these things. This is an inherent [false] apprehension of reality (*bden 'dzin*), which functions from beginningless time. .... When this [false] establishment [of things] as real (*bden grub*) that is conceived through this [false] apprehension of reality (*bden 'dzin*) is refuted through a right reasoning (*rigs pa*), one comes to know like the magician that internal and external things have mere existence that is posited through [one's] cognition; he does not conceive that [these things] have an intrinsic existence (*sdod lugs*) that is not posited through [one's] cognition.>

either perception through self-consciousness (*rañ rig mñon sum*) in accordance with Yogācāra-Madhyamaka or perception through sense organs (*dbañ po'i mñon sum*) in accordance with Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka, which admits external objects.<sup>46</sup> Such a perception of an object subsequently arouses at the next moment in our mind an idea that the object is existent. In this way, for the Svātantrika, objective things cannot be established as existent independently of one's cognition.

Through analysing this illustration by Tsoñ kha pa as well as discussions by mKhas grub rje, lCañ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje and so on, Matsumoto and Lopez have investigated dGe lugs pas' understanding of this Svātantrika position together with this example.<sup>47</sup> In my opinion, however, Tsoñ kha pa might further suggest through this example that for the Svātantrika not only existence of things but also their arising are conventionally posited by means of one's cognition. The conventional existence to be posited by cognition is, namely, not only each self-existence but also the phenomenon "arising" and, moreover, "arising from an other". In this sense, it is theoretically linked to and consistent with Svātantrika's acceptance of Dharmakīrti's theory that the relation of cause and effect is established by means of perception and non-perception. Here I would like to prove this assumption with regard to the example of magician's illusion.

My main argument lies in the next stage of the illustration where Tsoñ kha pa applies this example to sprouting:

It is posited on the strength of [one's] cognition that a sprout arises from a seed. It does not, however, contradict [the understanding] that a sprout arises intrinsically (*rañ gi ños nas*)

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<sup>46</sup> See GR 83b4L: *de ltar sgyu ma'i snañ ba ni mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa ltar na rañ rig mñon sum dañ / phyi rol khas len pa'i rañ rgyud pa ltar na sa phyogs sam bar snañ lta bu'i gzi 'dzin pa'i dbañ po'i mñon sum gyis 'grub la /*

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Matsumoto 1981a; Lopez 1987: 146-153 and 352-355.

from a seed, which is in the same manner that the basis of conjuring [e.g. a pebble] appears intrinsically as a horse or an elephant. Thus, all the conventional existence [in terms of the Svātantrika] is to be understood.<sup>48</sup>

The sprouting is also posited by one's cognition to which it appears as if a sprout arised from a seed. The expression "the sprout arises intrinsically from a seed" might suggest that this is an arising hypothetically established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i skye ba* or *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis skye ba*). The same discussion is found in the LÑ, where Tsoñ kha pa adduces the example of magician's illusion and sprouting for the purpose of elucidating "arising" for the Svātantrika:

If then someone asks what kind of establishment of arising is the establishment in (ultimate) reality, [the establishment of arising on the conventional level is to be explained at first]. When, for instance, a thing such as a stick or a clay, which is the basis for conjuring an illusory horse or an illusory elephant, appears as a horse or an elephant to those who have affected eyes, one cannot say that a thing such as a stick does not appear as such [a horse], although [in fact] it merely appears as such to the cognition of those [people]. In the same manner, when a sprout appears to be arising from a seed, it merely appears as such to [one's] cognition, but it is not proper to say [on the conventional level] that the [sprout] has not arised from the [seed].<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> GR 84a6f.: *sa bon las myu gu skye ba blo'i dbaḥ gis b'zag kyañ / myu gu rañ gi ños nas sa bon las skye ba yañ mi 'gal ba ni / sprul g'zi'i ños nas kyañ rta glaḥ du snañ ba dañ 'dra ste / des tha sñad du yod pa thams cad šes par bya'o //*

<sup>49</sup> LÑ 61b5-7 (Thurman 1984: 283, 37-284, 6): *dper na sgyu ma'i rta glaḥ du sprul pa'i g'zi šñ dañ boñ ba la sogs pa de mig bslad pa la rta glaḥ du snañ ba na de'i šes pa la der snañ ba tsam yin gyi šñ la sogs pa der mi snañ žes smra mi nus pa b'zin du / myu gu sa bon las skye bar snañ ba na šes pa la der snañ ba kho nar zad kyi de de las skyes pa min no žes byar mi nuñ ño //*

Here Tsoñ kha pa demonstrates that for the Svātantrika the sprouting is posited as a real occurrence on the conventional level according to its appearance to one's cognition. If, however, one compares the sprouting with an appearance of an illusory horse, one should see a big difference between them: there is no causal relation at all between a pebble and an illusory horse, whereas a seed is one of causes of sprouting. Furthermore, an illusory horse has no function, it does not run, but a seed and a sprout are real things, which have functions. What might then Tsoñ kha pa imply as common character to both the appearance of an illusory horse and the sprouting? Why did he illustrate the sprouting with the magician's illusion? One thing has already become clear: the arising of a sprout from a seed is posited by one's cognition in the same way as an illusory horse. Would it be not "arising from an other"? The sprout is a different entity from the seed in the same way that the illusory horse is different from the pebble. In this sense, one could say that the sprout arises from the seed as the illusory horse arises from the pebble.

It might be interpretable as follows: In reality it is impossible that a pebble appears as a horse since a pebble has no intrinsic nature of appearing as a horse. This suggests that the sprouting, i.e. an arising from an other, never occurs in ultimate reality. Nevertheless, one can hypothetically say that a pebble appears as a horse on the basis of the fact that it is cognized as such. In the same manner, according to one's cognition affected by nescience (*ma rig pa, avidyā*), one can posit that a sprout arises intrinsically from another entity, i.e. a seed. According to the Svātantrika position, Tsoñ kha pa holds, one should postulate on the conventional level entity X (a sprout) and entity Y (a seed) separately as self-existent; when entity Y disappears and entity X appears in its place, then one should posit that X arises from Y. This is in the same way that a pebble disappears and a horse appears instead. It appears as if a horse came out from a pebble, although they have no causal relation at all. As Nāgārjuna said, if

one accepts such an arising from an other, a sprout could arise even from a pot. The example of an illusory horse and a pebble may suggest such an absurd relation. And, I suppose, Tsoñ kha pa thereby might further imply that it is the very relation of cause and effect established by perception and non-perception in terms of Dharmakīrti.

## 2. Prāsaṅgika's refutation of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*

The ontological position of the Prāsaṅgika opposed to that of the Svātantrika becomes clear by examining his refutation of what the Svātantrika is considered to accept.

- 1) The SNSū is a sūtra teaching an indirect meaning.
- 2) The dependent characteristic is even conventionally non-substantial with regard to characteristic.
- 3) There is even conventionally no arising from an other.

In his LR, Tsoñ kha pa confirms 1) and 2) by adducing Candrakīrti's statement from the MABh ad MA VI 97:

Elucidating the statement "Even a scripture that does not explain a real meaning but teaches an indirect meaning should be understood and interpreted",<sup>50</sup> (Candrakīrti) says in the MABh: "Regarding a rope, [the existence of] a snake is the conceptualized (nature), while regarding a real snake, [it is] established as the perfect (nature). In the same manner, regarding the dependent (nature) that has a function of arising in dependence (*rten 'brel byas pa can*), the self-existence (*rañ bžin*) is also the conceptualized (nature), but (it is) posited as the perfect (nature) in the sphere of Buddha('s knowledge). One should know the intended meaning of the (SN)Sū, after having understood such an establishment of the three kinds of

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<sup>50</sup> MA VI 97bc (La Vallée Poussin 1911: 253, 22ff.); *de ltar luñ gi lo rgyus šes byas te // mdo gañ de ñid ma yin bšad don can // drañ don gsuris pa'añ rogs nas drañ bya žiñ // stoñ ñid don can nes don šes par gyis //*

nature.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, it is evident that 1) (Candrakīrti) takes the SNSū's establishment of the three kinds of nature as an indirect meaning. And he defines the conceptualized (nature) (in terms) of his own system as [the conception] that the dependent has self-existence. Therefore, 2) (he) does not even conventionally admit that the dependent nature has self-existence that is established as intrinsically real.<sup>52</sup>

Candrakīrti clearly states elsewhere too that the SNSū is a sūtra teaching an indirect meaning with regard to its theory of the mind-

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<sup>51</sup> Summary of MABh 201, 7-202, 2 (La Vallée Poussin 1911: 255, 2-22): *dper na sbrul ni thag pa bsdogs pa rten ciñ 'brel par byuñ ba la brtags pa yin te / de de la yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de sbrul dños la ni yoñs su grub pa yin te / de kun tu ma brtags pa'i phyir ro // de bñin du rañ bñin yañ gñan gyi dbañ byas pa can la ni kun tu brtags pa yin te / rañ bñin dag ni bcos min dañ // gñan la btos pa med pa yin // źes byuñ bas ño bo ñid ni byas pa can ma yin no // bzuñ bñin pa'i rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba byas pa can gzugs brñan dag 'dra ba la brtags pa gañ yin pa de ni sañs rgyas kyi spyod yul la ni dños yin te / kun tu ma brtags pa'i phyir te / dños po byas pa can la ma rig par rañ bñin 'ba' źig mñon sum du mdzad pas de ñid thugs su chud pa'i phyir sañs rgyas źes brjod do // de'i phyir de ltar brtags pa dañ gñan gyi dbañ dañ yoñs su grub pa źes bya ba ño bo ñid gsum mam par bñag pa rtogs par byas nas mdo'i dgoñs pa mam par bñad par bya'o //*

Candrakīrti is reinterpreting here the meaning of the three kinds of nature from the viewpoint of the Mādhyamika. In comparison with that of the Svātantrika, it could be understood as follows: The Svātantrika maintains that the conceptualized is the conception that the dependent has self-existence in ultimate reality; the Prāsaṅgika, on the other hand, maintains -- without distinguishing between ultimate and conventional levels -- that the conceptualized is the conception that the dependent has self-existence and that the perfect is reality of all things, which is the sphere of the Buddha's knowledge.

<sup>52</sup> LR 372b1-4 (Nagao 1954: 167, 2-11): *'Jug 'grel du ni dper na sbrul de thag pa la kun brtags yin la sbrul dños la yoñs grub tu 'gro ba dañ 'dra bar rañ bñin yañ rten 'brel byas pa can gyi gñan dbañ la kun brtags yin la sañs rgyas kyi yul du ni yoñs grub tu 'jog pa'i ño bo ñid gsum gyi mam gźag źes par byas nas mdo'i dgoñs pa bñad par bya'o źes / mdo gañ de ñid ma yin bñad don can // drañ don gsuñs pa'añ rtogs nas drañ bya źiñ / źes pa'i 'grel par gsuñs pas mdo dGoñs 'grel gyi ño bo ñid gsum gyi mam gźag drañ don du bñed par gsal la rañ lugs kyi kun brtags ni gñan dbañ la rañ bñin yod pa la mdzad pas gñan dbañ la tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bñin mi bñed pa yin no //*

only.<sup>53</sup>

As to 3), Tsoñ kha pa evidences it by taking Candrakīrti's opponent as a Svātantrika in his refutation of "arising from an other" on the conventional level in the MABh:

(Objection:) Although the arising from itself or an other is to be negated since there is no arising in ultimate reality, the self-existence (*rañ bžin, svabhāva*) of things such as form and sensation, which are cognized through perception and inference, undoubtedly arises from an other [self-existence on the conventional level]. If one does not accept it, why then are the two kinds of reality (*bden pa gñis, āvayaśatyā*) taught? There would be only one reality. Hence there must exist the arising from an other [on the conventional level].

It is to be answered: That [there is only one reality] is true. Yet the two kinds of reality do not ultimately exist because (the Buddha) has taught (as follows): "Oh, *bhikṣus*, this ultimate reality is unique. It is *nirvāṇa*, which is non-belying. All conditionings are false and belying by nature." Therefore, whatever is conventional reality is a means for entering the ultimate reality, so that (we) accept arising from itself or an other without investigation in accord with worldly conventions.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> MABh 195, 19-196, 12 (La Vallée Poussin 1911: 250, 11-17): *mam pa de lta bu'i mdo sde de gañ yin že na / ji skad du dGoñs pa nes par 'grel pa'i mdo las / brtags pa dañ gžan gyi dbaṅ dañ yoñs su grub pa žes bya bar rañ bžin gsum bstan pa las / brtags pa med pa ñid dañ / gžan gyi dbaṅ yod pa ñid dañ / de bžin du len pa'i mam par šes pa zab ciñ phra // sa bon thams cad chu bo'i rgyun ltar 'bab // bdag tu rtogs par gyur na mi ruñ žes // byis pa mams la ñas ni de ma bstan // žes bya ba la sogs pa ste 'di // ji ltar nad pa nad pa la // sman pas sman mams gtoñ ba ltar // sañs rgyas de bžin sems can la // sems tsam du yañ rab tu gsuñs // žes bya ba'i luñ 'dis drañ ba'i don ñid du gsal bar byed do //*

<sup>54</sup> MABh 119, 10-120, 4 (La Vallée Poussin 1910: 312, 25-313, 13; cited in LÑ 66a1f., GR 132a1ff. and 132a5f.): *don dam par skye ba med pas bdag dañ gžan las skye ba dgag la rag mod / gzugs dañ tshor ba la sogs pa gañ dag mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa dag gis dmigs pa de dag gi rañ bžin ni gdon mi za bar*

According to Jayānanda, this opponent is a Yogācārin,<sup>55</sup> because in the preceding passage an opponent who accepts the *paratantrasvabhāva* and the emptiness lacking subject and object (*grāhyagrāhaka*) is refuted.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, Tsoñ kha pa does assert the opponent as a Svātantrika.<sup>57</sup> His reason seems quite clear: if it were a Yogācārin, he would accept the arising not only on the conventional but also on the ultimate level. Quoting the same passage, Tsoñ kha pa claims in the LÑ as follows:

This [lack of an intrinsic arising (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis skye ba*) from an other in both ultimate and conventional reality] is proved [by Candrakīrti] to a Mādhyamika who asserts that there is conventionally an intrinsic arising [from an other] although there is no arising in ultimate reality; it is not [proved] to a substantialist (*dños por smra ba*) [i.e. either Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika or Yogācāra].<sup>58</sup>

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*gzan las skye bar 'gyur ro // ci ste de ltar mi 'dod na ni bden pa gñis ci ste brjod de / bden pa gcig kho nar 'gyur ro // de phyir gzan las skye ba yod pa ñid do // 'di la bśad par bya ste / 'di bden mod kyañ don dam par na bden pa gñis yod pa ma yin te / dge sloñ dag bden pa dam pa 'di ni gcig ste / 'di lta ste / mi bslu ba'i chos can mya ñan las 'das pa'o // 'du byed thams cad ni brdzun pa bslu ba'i chos can no źes 'byuñ ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir kun rāzob kyī bden pa gañ yin pa de ni don dam pa'i bden pa la 'jug par bya ba'i thabs yin pa'i phyir / bdag dañ bžan dag las skye ba ma dpyad par 'jig rten pa'i lugs kyis khas len par byed pa yin no //*

<sup>55</sup> See MAT D156a2.

<sup>56</sup> See MABh 118, 13-18 (La Vallée Poussin 1910: 312, 7-16): *gañ źig gzan gvis dbañ gi ño bo khas blañs nas de la brten pa'i stoñ pa ñid bzuñ ba dañ 'dzin pa med pa'i mtshan ñid can mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa ltar de ñid dañ bžan ñid du brjod par bya ba ma yin par sems pa de'i ltar na / stoñ pa ñid kho nas chos thams cad stoñ pa yin gyi / rañ bžin ñid kyis ni ma yin no źes bya bar gyur ro //*

<sup>57</sup> This interpretation is in fact not impossible, if one takes the opponent here to be different from that in the previous passage (see above n. 56). Although the main opponent in this course of discussion is a Yogācārin, the objection in question could be understood to be one of variant views derived from Yogācāra thought.

<sup>58</sup> LÑ 66a4f.: *'di ni dbu ma pa don dam par mi skye yañ tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis skye ba yod par 'dod pa la sgrub kyī dños por smra ba la min pas*

In the GR, too, he identifies this opponent as a dBu ma rañ rgyud pa.<sup>59</sup> The arising termed "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis skye ba*" is, thus, an arising of a substantial entity or self-existence from an other self-existence.

The next objection in the MABh is obviously concerned with the conventional reality:

Moreover, in the same way that someone who is attached to fortunes feels fear when he throws (his) all possessions away, someone who is attached to the conventional reality might think that some substantial own-being (*rdzas kyi bdag ñid 'ga' žig*) that is a cause of defilement and purification must arise, ...<sup>60</sup>

Candrakīrti answers:

In the same manner that arising from neither itself nor an other is ultimately acceptable by the (above-)explained argument, any arising is even conventionally not acceptable for the same [reason]. Therefore, how can you prove the arising of things? Consequently, even though [you] did not admit that 3) arising of self-existence (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis skye ba*)<sup>61</sup> occurs in neither ultimate nor conventional reality, it must undoubtedly be accepted. Some people consider that the master excellent Nāgārjuna denies solely the conceptualized nature, but not the dependent nature, by saying "not from itself" and so on (MMK I 1). Their assertion cannot be proved

<sup>59</sup> GR 132a3: *'di ltar rḡol ba ni don dam par skye ba med pa dañ / tha sñad du gzan skye 'dod par snañ bas dbu ma rañ rgyud pa 'ga' žig go //*

<sup>60</sup> MABh 122, 7-11 (La Vallée Poussin 1910: 315, 5-9; paraphrased in GR 134a3ff.): *ci ste yañ de ltar dños po la mñon par žen pa'i bdog pa thams cad kun nas bcod pa na bred ša thon pa tha sñad kyis bden pa la mñon par žen pa 'di gañ žig kun nas ñon moñs pa dañ mam par byañ pa'i rgyur gyur pa rdzas kyi bdag ñid 'ga' žig skye bar 'gyur bar bya dgos so žes smra na /*

<sup>61</sup> Tsoñ kha pa reads *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis skye ba*. I suppose that they are not different in meaning.

either (since) it lacks any (right) reason. Hence those who state (such an opinion) should just be pushed (to reply to inquiries; they will not be able to reply).<sup>62</sup>

Here it should be noted that through this refutation of the arising the establishment of causal relation by perception is also negated. If the arising of X from Y is not established, the relation of cause Y and effect X is not established either.

Thus, for the Prāsaṅgika, the teaching "things are non-substantial, neither produced nor destroyed" is to be accepted on the conventional level too. In this connection, the epistemological system of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*, *tshad ma*) of substantialists including the Svātantrika that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is valid cognition for the self-existence or substantial particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) is also negated, insofar as it is based on the ontological view of self-existence established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bzin* or *rañ mtshan*).<sup>63</sup>

### III. Tsoñ kha pa's own position of the Prāsaṅgika

The fundamental and special doctrine of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika is declared by Tsoñ kha pa as follows: 1. There does not

<sup>62</sup> MABh 122, 18-123, 8 (La Vallée Poussin 1910: 315, 15-27; paraphrased in GR 134a5ff.): *ji ltar don dam pa'i skabs su ji skad bñad pa'i rigs pas bdag dañ gzan las skye ba mi nuñ ba de bzin du tha sñad du yañ / de ñid kyis skye bar mi rigs pas khyod kyis dños po mams kyì skye ba gañ gis 'grub par 'gyur / de'i phyir rañ gi mtshan ñid kyì skye ba ni bden pa gñis char du yañ yod pa ma yin no zes mi 'dod pa bzin du yañ gdon mi za bar khas blañ bar bya'o // gañ dag bdag las ma yin zes bya ba la sogs pas ni slob dpon lku sgrub kyì žal sñas nas kyis brtags pa'i ño bo ñid kho na bkag pa yin gyi / gzan gyi dbañ gi ño bo ni ma yin no sñam du sems pa de dag gi 'dod pa 'di yañ gtan tshigs med par mi 'grub pas / de skad du smra pa de dag ni brgal žiñ brtag par bya ba kho na yin no //*

<sup>63</sup> Cf. e.g. LR 369b1-370a5 discussed in Yoshimizu 1993a: 136-139.

exist even a single thing that is established as intrinsically real, 2. but yet all [kinds of] act [consisting of agent, action and object of action] can be postulated.<sup>64</sup> Thereby the Prāsaṅgika eliminates substantialism as well as nihilism; in other words, he establishes non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvata*) of all things as well as their origination in dependence (*pratīyasamutpāda*) or capacity for efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*) in terms of Tsoñ kha pa.<sup>65</sup> In this section, I would like to discuss the meaning of these two theories. As lCañ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje suggests, supplementing Tsoñ kha pa's statement,<sup>66</sup>

1. things are existent as mere designations and under this condition
2. all [kinds of] act [consisting of agent, action and object of action] can be postulated. Let us begin with theory 1, which teaches the existence as a designation of conventional things.

#### 1. The conventional as existence as a designation (*btags yod, prajñaptisat*)

We have seen in Section I of this paper that Tsoñ kha pa introduces the Yogācāra view taught in the BBh that any designation such as "person" is possible insofar as there exists a real entity (*vastu*) that is the basis of the designation (Yoshimizu 1993a: 114ff.). For the Yogācāra, the existence as a mere designation (*prajñaptimātra*) that is postulated by means of names and conventions is neither substantial nor existent, from the viewpoint of which the BBh criticizes the Mādhyamika who denies the real existence by claiming that things are mere designations (ibid: 117f.). Entering the presentation of the Prāsaṅgika philosophy in his LN, Tsoñ kha pa in rejoinder explicitly demonstrates that things are existent merely as designations and that the basis of a designation is by no means

<sup>64</sup> Cf. GR 139a1f. (see below n. 67).

<sup>65</sup> Cf. e. g. CŚT XIV D220b4ff., P250b3; LR 357b7-358a3 (both are cited and translated in Yoshimizu 1993a: 132f.).

<sup>66</sup> lCañ skya Grub mtha' (Thal 'gyur ba) 51a2f. (see below n. 67).

established as intrinsically real. He sets forth the quite large section entitled "Confirmation of the object to be negated (i.e. of the self-existence established as intrinsically real [*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i rañ bzin*]) and exposition of the mode of (its) non-existence" (*dgag bya de ños bzuñ nas ji ltar med pa bstan pa* [LÑ 69a6-75b4; Thurman 1984: 291, 6-306, 11]) and devotes the first part thereof to this theme, which is named "Exposition of the mode of grasping (the self-existence established as intrinsically real) through conceptual and intrinsic superimposition [of substantiality] and exposition of its non-existence" (*kun brtags dañ lhan skyes kyi sgro 'dogs kyis bzuñ tshul bstan nas de med par bstan pa* [LÑ 69b1-71a4; Thurman 1984: 291, 7-299, 16]).<sup>67</sup> Referring to this discussion of his own together with its

<sup>67</sup> The second part of this section (LÑ 71a4-75b4; Thurman 1984: 299, 17-306, 11) deals with the Prāsaṅgika's interpretation that the selflessness of things is also taught in Hīnayāna treatises, under the title "Elucidation of the meaning [of the statements by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti] that according also to Hīnayāna treatises the two kinds of selflessness are taught" (*ñāñ thos kyi sde snod la brien nas kyañ bdag med gñis gsuñs pa'i don bñad pa*). This is one of the eight special doctrines of the Prāsaṅgika enumerated by Tsoñ kha pa himself and widely accepted by later dGe lugs pas. They could be understood, as Matsumoto has indicated (1981a: 196, 198-200, 210 n. 28), as derivative doctrines from the fundamental position that there does not exist even a single thing that is established as intrinsically real, but yet [all kinds of] act [consisting of agent, action and object of action] can be postulated by means of names. Cf. e.g. GR T39a1-5: *phags pa'i gñun 'grel tshul la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa rdul tsam med kyañ / bya byed thams cad bzag pas chog pa'i 'grel tshul gyi lugs thun moñ ma yin pa 'di la brien nas / mam par dag pa'i grub mtha' 'grel byed gñan dañ thun moñ ma yin pa mañ du yod de / de gañ ze na re 'zig gtso bo mams brjod na / tshogs drug las ño bo tha dad pa'i kun gzi mam šes dañ / rañ rig 'gog lugs thun moñ ma yin pa dañ / rañ rgyud kyi sbyor bas phyir rgoi gyi rgyud la de kho na ñid kyi lta ba skyed pa khas mi len pa gsum dañ / šes pa khas len pa bzin du phyi rol gyi don yañ khas blañ dgos pa dañ / ñan rañ la dños po rañ bzin med par rtogs pa yod pa dañ / chos kyi bdag 'dzin ñon moñs su 'jog pa dañ / 'zig pa dños po yin pa dañ / de'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus gsum gyi 'jog tshul thun moñ ma yin pa sogs yin no* // <= As for the method of interpreting the works of the noble (Nāgārjuna), the interpretation in the way that there does not exist even a single (thing) that is established as intrinsically real and that yet all [kinds of] act [consisting of agent, action and object of action] can be postulated is specific (to the Prāsaṅgika). On the ground thereof, there are many methods of interpreting the pure [Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka] system that are not in common with other (systems). Namely, some important ones are (as follows): the methods of negating 1)

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support, i.e. Candrakīrti's PPad, I would like to analyse the idea of existence as a designation (*btags yod, prajñaptisat*), which represents Prāsaṅgika's ontology in contrast to that of substantialists.

To begin with, Tsoñ kha pa answers the question of what sort of grasping is the grasping of (things) to be established as intrinsically real (*ji 'dra zig tu gzuñ na rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par bzuñ ba yin*) (LÑ 66b1) and confirms that for substantialists the postulation of an existence is exclusively concerned with the basis of designation that is perceived by valid perception (*pratyakṣa*)<sup>68</sup>:

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*ālayavijñāna* that is essentially distinct from the six kinds of cognition (i.e. the five sensory cognitions and the mental cognition) and 2) the self-consciousness are not in common (with other systems); 3) it is not accepted that one causes in an opponent an understanding of reality in his (mind-)continuum by applying an autonomous reasoning (*svatantra*); 4) [the existence of] external objects must be accepted as [the existence of] cognitions (is accepted); 5) Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas can realize the non-substantiality of things; 6) the grasping of the self of things is defined as a defilement; 7) cessation is a thing; 8) for the reason [that cessation is a thing], the method of postulating the three kinds of time is specific (to this system).>; lCañ skya Grub mtha' (Thal 'gyur ba) 51a2ff.: *dbu ma thal 'gyur pas mdo dañ 'phags pa'i dgoñs pa 'grel pa 'grel tshul thun moñ ma yin pa'i gts'o bo ni rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa rdul tsam yañ med pa dañ miñ gis btags tsam la bya byed thams cad gva ma ñams par bžag pas chog pa 'di gñis yin par 'dug la l de la brten nas mam par dag pa'i grub mtha' 'grel byed gžan dañ thun moñ ma yin pa mañ du yod pa las gts'o bo ni dka' ba'i gnas brgyad du bsdus nas 'chad par rañ re'i mkhas pa rñams la grags so ll <= As for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's special method of interpreting the meaning [of teachings of] scriptures and the noble (Nāgārjuna), the main (point) consists in the (following) two (theories): There does not exist even a single (thing) that is established as intrinsically real and yet all [kinds of] act [consisting of agent, action and object of action] can completely (*gva ma ñams par*) be postulated insofar as [they are] merely designated by means of names. On the ground thereof, there are many methods of interpreting the pure [Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamaka] system that are not in common with other (systems). It is known to scholars of our (school, i.e. dGe lugs pa) that among them some important ones are summarized and explained as the eight difficult points.>*

<sup>68</sup> Among Svātantrikas, Bhāvaviveka admits the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) such as "cowness" to be existent for the reason that it is not distinct from its basis, i.e. the own-being perceived and named "cow". Although neither Śāntarākṣita nor Kamalaśīla accepts this idea, they are regarded as agreeing with Bhāvaviveka in maintaining that only the basis of designation is conventionally existent. See above Section II 1: [1]. For their rejection of the universal as conventional existence cf. MA/IV ad MA/ 8 D58a2f., P54a1f.

Here [I] will at first introduce the idea of those who set forth their philosophical systems<sup>69</sup>. As for the expressions (*tha sñad btags pa*) such as "this person has done this work, enjoyed this effect", they seek the referent of the designation "person" by (inquiring) whether the "person" [refers to] the aggregates of his own or something distinct from them. If they discover whichever direction, (the "person" is) either the same (as his aggregates) or distinct (from them) etc., whereby a basis for postulating [the existence of] the person is given, they can [further] postulate that [the person is] the accumulator of the

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(indicated by Yamaguchi 1991: 5f.): *don byed nus pa ma yin la // de dod brtags pas ci žig bya // ma niñ gzugs bzañ mi bzañ žes // 'dod ldan mams kyis brtags ci phan // (MAI 8) de bas na mkhas pa mams kyis\* ni don byed nus pa la dños po'i mtshan ñid ces smra 'o // (\*kyis omitted in P) < =* What is the use of seeking and considering something that lacks a capacity for efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*)? (It is of no use.) What is the use of lustful people's analyse of a neuter person (whether) it is beautiful or not beautiful? (It is of no use.) Therefore, scholars say that (only) things that have a capacity for efficacy have the characteristic of existence.>; MAI/V ad MAI 64 D70b7f., P68b3f.: *kun rdzob ni sgra'i tha sñad tsam gyi\* bdag ñid ma yin gyi / mthoñ ba dañ 'dod pa'i dños po rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba mams ni brtag mi bzod pas yañ dag pa'i kun rdzob ste / (\*gyis D) < =* The conventional is not of the nature of mere verbal conventions. Things that are cognized, desired and produced in dependence are the conventional, which is right insofar as not examined [by a right reasoning].>; MAI/P ad MAI 64 D115a3f., P121a2f.: *sgra'i tha sñad ni spyi tsam gyi spyod yul can\* yin pa'i phyir rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba'i dños po'i mtshan ñid kyi yul can ma yin no // spyi de yañ kun tu brtags pa'i ño bo yin pa'i phyir dños po med pa yin na de'i ño bo ñid du khas len pas\*\* dños po mams kyi don bya byed pa šin tu grags pa la skur par 'gyur te / spyi ni don byed mi bzod pa'i phyir ro // (\*spyi tsam spyod yul P \*\*pa P) < =* The verbal conventions do not refer to the characteristic of existence arising in dependence since they refer to the universal only. Furthermore, the universal is non-existent since it is the conceptualized nature. Therefore, [if] one admits that [the conventional] is of the nature of the [universal], it would deny the capacity for efficacy of existing things, which is well known [to ordinary people up to a cowherd], since the universal does not bear any efficacy.>

<sup>69</sup> Presumably *grub mtha' smra ba* refers to the four Buddhist systems of which advocates are considered to be substantialists, i.e. Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.

work (*las gsog pa po*) and so forth<sup>70</sup>; but if they do not discover (anything to which the "person" refers), they cannot postulate [the person as existent]. Hence, if they postulate [the existence of the person], after having investigated and sought how the basis of the designation is, to which the designation ("person") (*de'i tha sñad*) is applied, without being content with merely designating "person", (such a way of postulation) is the postulation of the person as established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*).

All the Buddhists, from Vaibhāṣika to Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, accept [the postulation of the existence of person] in this way. Similarly, it holds [in the case of postulating] the conditioned things such as form and sensation and the unconditioned things up to the ether established in [the sense of] the absolute negation (*med dgag*) (i.e.) mere exclusion of impenetrable (and) touchable (things) (*thogs pa'i reg bya*) by the Sautrāntika. That is, in the case of postulating any existence that is admitted to be established by valid cognition (*tshad ma*), they seek how the referent is established that is the basis of a (verbal) operation (*\*jug gzi*) on which each verbal convention (*min gi tha sñad*)<sup>71</sup> operates; if no object is

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<sup>70</sup> Cf. LR 449b6 (Nagao 1954: 322, 12ff.): *dka' sa ni rañ gi ño bos grub pa'i rañ bñin ma lus par khegs pa dañ rañ bñin med pa'i gañ zag la sogs pa de ñid las gsog pa po dañ 'bras bu myoñ ba po la sogs par 'jog pa la ñes pa gñiñ nas 'droñs te / ... <=* (One should) perfectly draw a definite understanding of the difficult point (of the Prāsaṅgika doctrine) that the self-existence [of a person etc.] is completely rejected and (yet) the same non-substantial person etc. are postulated as accumulator of the work, (the person who) enjoys the effect and so on ... >

<sup>71</sup> This expression *min gi tha sñad* should be understood to mean the conventional agreements on the usage of verbal expressions as Matsumoto has proposed (1981a: 209 n. 20). In general, the worldly conventions (*tha sñad, vyavahāra*) consist in both verbal and mental operations including the act of perception. Cf. e.g. PPad 429, 12: *atha vā saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo lokavyavahāra ity arthaḥ. sa cābhidhānābhidheyajñānājñeyādīlakṣaṇaḥ*. Presumably the *min gi tha sñad* refers to the conventions on *abhidhānābhidheya* alone. Svātantrika masters such as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in turn claim that the

discovered through this (investigation), they cannot postulate it as existent. In the opposite (case that the object is discovered), they postulate it as existent.<sup>72</sup>

Candrakīrti, on the contrary, maintains that it is no use examining the basis of a designation since the conventional existence is defined as mere designation independently of its basis. Tson kha pa explains this idea of *prajñaptisat* in accord with PPad 58, 14-69, 12, where Candrakīrti extensively criticizes Dignāga's theory that the valid cognition are perception and inference (since) the object to be cognized has (only) two aspects (i.e. the particular and the universal).<sup>73</sup> Candrakīrti tries at first to refute that the valid cognition are those two *lakṣaṇas* by indicating the possible existence of the third cognizable object, because insofar as there is a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) there must be something characterized (*lakṣya*) by this characteristic.<sup>74</sup> Then an objection comes out: The

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conventional is not of the nature of mere verbal conventions (*sgra'i tha sñad*) (cf. Matsumoto *loc. cit* and above n. 68).

<sup>72</sup> LÑ 66b1-67a1 (Thurman 1984: 291, 11-293,3): 'di la thog mar grub mtha' smra ba'i lugs brjod par bya ste / gañ zag 'dis las 'di byas so // 'bras bu 'di myoñ ño zes pa'i tha sñad btags pa la rañ gi phuñ po 'di ñid gañ zag yin nam 'on te de dag las don gzan zes gañ zag gi tha sñad btags pa de'i don btsal te / don gcig pa'i don tha dad la sogs pa'i phyogs gañ ruñ zig rñed nas gañ zag de 'jog sa byuñ ba las gsog pa po la sogs par 'jog nus la / ma rñed na 'jog mi nus pas gañ zag gi tha sñad btags pa tsam gyis mi tshim par de'i tha sñad gañ la btags pa'i btags gzi de ji ltar yin dpyad ciñ btsal nas 'jog na gañ zag rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par 'jog pa yin te / rañ sde bya brag ta smra ba nas dbu ma rañ rgyud pa'i bar thams cad kyis de bzin du 'dod do // de bzin du gzugs dañ tshor ba la sogs pa'i chos 'dus byas dañ / 'dus ma byas kyis chos tha na mdo sde pas thogs pa'i reg bya mam par bcad tsam gyi med dgag la nam mkhar bzag pa yan chad kyañ ruñ ste / tshad mas grub par 'dod pa thams cad yod par 'jog pa na rañ rañ gi miñ gi tha sñad 'jug pa'i 'jug gzi'i don de ji 'dra zig tu grub pa btsal ba na des rñed pa'i don med na yod par 'jog mi nus pas de las bzlog pa la yod par 'jog go //

<sup>73</sup> PS I 2ab: *pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇadvayaṃ.*

<sup>74</sup> Cf. PPad 59, 7ff.: *kiṃ ca yadi svasāmānyalakṣaṇadvayānurodhena pramāṇadvayaṃ uktam, yasya tal lakṣaṇadvayaṃ kiṃ tal \*lakṣyam asti atha nāsti. yady asti tadā tadaparam prameyam astīti katham pramāṇadvaya. atha nāsti lakṣyam tadā lakṣaṇam api nirāśrayam nāstīti katham pramāṇadvaya.*  
\*supplemented according to R (De Jong 1978: 34).

word *lakṣaṇa* should be understood as meaning the characterized since the *lyuṭ*-affix *ana* can mean "object of action" (*karman*). (Answer:) It is impossible that something is characterized by itself.<sup>75</sup> In the course of this discussion, it is argued by the opponent that the relation of the qualifier and the qualified [i.e. the characteristic and the characterized] is indicated figuratively by the genitive case in the expression "the particular of the earth" (*prthivyāḥ svalakṣaṇam*), although there is no earth distinct from the particular in reality, in the same way as in the expressions "the body of a statue" (*śilāputrakasya śarīram*)<sup>76</sup> and "the head of Rāhu" (*rāhoḥ śiraḥ*).<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Cf. PPad 60, 1ff.: *atha syān na lakṣyate 'neneti lakṣaṇa, kiṃ tarhi kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam iti karmanī lyuṣaṇ kṛtvā lakṣyate tad iti lakṣaṇam. evam api tenaiṅva tasya\* lakṣyamāṇatvāsaṃbhavād yena tal\* lakṣyate tasya karaṇasya karmaṇo 'rīhāntaratvāt sa eva doṣaḥ. \**corrected according to R (De Jong 1978: 34) : *tenaitasya ... yenaītal* PPad

<sup>76</sup> I render *śilāputraka* by "statue" following Stcherbatsky 1927: 158, 7. The *Sanskrit Wörterbuch* by Böhtlingk and Roth gives the translations "eine Figur", "eine Statue von Stein" for *śilāputraka* and "Reibstein" for *śilāputra*. The sources introduced there suggest the aim of using this example: In the Śaṅkarabhāṣya of the Bṛh-Ār-Up, it appears in the following discussion (40, 6-41, 2): *atha ghaṭasya prāgabdhāva iti ghaṭasya yat svarūpaṃ tad evocyata. ghaṭasyeti vyapadeśānupapattiḥ. atha kalpayitvā vyapadiṣyeta śilāputrakasya śarīram iti yadvat. tathāpi ghaṭasya prāgabdhāva iti kalpitasyaivābhāvasya ghaṭena vyapadeśo na ghaṭasvarūpasyaiva.* < = Therefore (if you) say about the antecedent non-existence of a pot [i.e. a pot does not exist before it is made, it follows that you] say about the own-being of the pot itself [i.e. you must admit the existence of the pot, or if you do not admit it, you] cannot employ the (genitive) expression "of a pot". (Objection:) One could say so [figuratively], having imagined [a not yet existing pot], like [the expression] "the body of a statue". (Answer:) Even in that case, (if you say about) the antecedent non-existence of a pot, the non-existence of an just imagined (pot) is expressed by (the word) "pot", not of the own-being of a pot itself.>; SSūV 261, 5-10 ad SSū VI 4: *śilāputrakasya śarīram ity abhede 'pi śaṣṭīśruter na bheda ity atrāha. na śilāputravād dharmigrāhakaṃānābādhat (k. 4). na, tatra pratyakṣeṇaivābhedapraftiḥ śaṣṭī bādhiteti gauṇaḥ prayogaḥ. mukhasambhavād gauṇo 'tra nāsti.* < = (Objection to the doctrine that the self [*ātman*] is distinct from the body:) (The self and the body in the expression "my body" are) not distinct from each other since the genitive case is employed for (connecting two) non-distinct things in the same way as (in the expression) "the body of a statue". (Answer:) It is not like the case of the statue because [the difference of the statue from the body] is negated by a valid means of cognition that cognizes the qualified thing [i.e. the body] (k. 4). This (objection) is not right: For in the case

Candrakīrti rejects this objection on account of the improper use of the example: For Candrakīrti the relation of the qualifier and the qualified in the expressions "the body of a statue" and "the head of Rāhu" is established since he argues that the statue and Rāhu are distinct existences from the body and the head respectively, whereas for Dignāga the earth and the particular are entirely identical. Namely, he says:

Moreover, the "statue" that is the appropriator (*upādātṛ*) of the body that is the appropriated (*upādāna*), does exist (as) a part of the worldly conventions, (as) the qualifier (of the body) and (as) established without being examined like designations such as "person"; the "Rāhu" that is the appropriator of the head that is the appropriated, does exist as well. Therefore this example is not proper [for a figurative expression of the qualifier and the qualified]. / 1

(Objection:) This example is properly established, for no other object than the body and the head is established (to be existent) since only they are perceived. (Answer:) It is not so, for such an examination does not occur in the worldly conventions and further, the worldly things [in the sense of the meaning of each word] (*padārtha*) are existent without being

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(of the body of a statue), the (primary sense) of the genitive case is negated, since the non-difference is apprehended by perception, so that it is used in a figurative sense. > Namely, "the body of a statue" is an example for a figurative use of the genitive case, i.e. for the case that the qualifier and the qualified are not different existence, or one of them is non-existent. Some scholars including me have rendered *śilāputraka* in the PPad by "Torso" (e.g. Tanji 1988: 58, 13; Yoshimizu 1992: 633ff.). It would be not impossible if one takes "body" in a narrow sense, i.e. "trunk". I do not think, however, that here it is necessary to conceive a body or statue without head or limbs. Thurman's translation with "pestle" influenced by the Tibetan translation "*mchi gu*" (Thurman 1984: 292 n. 12) seems less appropriate since, although it is employed in the same sense as "Torso", it is less associated with the concept "body".

<sup>77</sup> PPad 66, 1ff.: *yathā śilāputrakasya śarīraṃ rāhoḥ śira iti śarīraśirovyatirikta viśeṣaṇāśambhava 'pi viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'sti, evaṃ pṛthivyāḥ svalakṣaṇam iti svalakṣaṇavyatirikta pṛthivyāśambhava 'pi bhaviṣyati.*

examined. That is to say, the "self" (*ātman*) does not exist as something distinct from the form etc. (i.e. the aggregates) if examined, yet it does exist dependently on the aggregates according to the worldly conventions. In the very same manner, the "statue" and "Rāhu" (exist). Hence the example is not established.<sup>78</sup>

Here obviously two different theories cross: the opponent, Dignāga, is claiming that in both expressions, "the particular of the earth" and "the body of a statue", the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is figuratively indicated by the genitive case, since the qualifier and the qualified in each case have one common object that is a phenomenal entity and since in reality no other than this entity, which is the basis of these designations, is perceived. For Dignāga, what is existent is solely this entity perceived by a non-conceptual cognition. [That is a self-existence established as intrinsically real in terms of *Tsoñ kha pa*.] Candrakīrti retains the idea of the identity of the qualifier and the qualified in the case of "the particular of the earth", but as to the examples, he insists on the existence of the "statue" and "Rāhu" as the qualifiers separately from the body and the head as the qualified for the reason that they are accepted as they are designated in the world. He adduces as an example the designation of the "self" dependent on the aggregates.

The idea that the "self" or "person" (*pudgala*) designated with

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<sup>78</sup> PPad 67, 3-10 (cited in LN 67a3f., 67a6; Thurman 1984: 292, 13-18, 293, 24-29, 294, 8-11): *api ca pudgalādīprajñaptivat saśartropādānasya\* śīlāputrakasy[o]pādātur laukikavyavahārāṅgabhūtasya viśeṣaṇasyāvīcārasiddhasya sadbhāvāt,\*\* śīraupādānasya ca rāhor upādātuḥ sadbhāvād ayukitam etan nīdarśanaṃ. śarīraśirovyatiriktasyārthāntarasyāsiddhes tanmātrasyopalambhāt siddham eva nīdarśanam iti cet, naitad evam. laukike vyavahāra itthaṃvīcārāpravṛtter avīcārataś ca laukikapadārthānām astivāt. yathaiva hi rūpādīvyatirekeṇa vicāryamāna ātmā na sambhavati, api ca lokasaṃvṛtyā skandhān upādāyāstyāstitvam\*\*\* evaṃ rāhuśīlāputrakayor apiti nāsti nīdarśanasiddhiḥ. \*sa° [or *sva°* cf. PPad 67 n. 3 lacks in the Tibetan version and does not seem necessary; \*\*corrected according to R (De Jong 1978: 34) : *prasiddhasya sadbhāvāt* PPad; \*\*\*corrected : *skandhānapuādāya°* PPad*

reference to the aggregates is well known to old Buddhists and may be traced back to Pāli literature,<sup>79</sup> and has developed in the Abhidharma, Yogācāra and Madhyamaka systems. All these Buddhists share the ideas that the "existence as a designation" (*prajñaptisat*) is synonymous with the "non-substantial existence" and opposite to the "existence as a substance" (*dravyasat*) or the "ultimate existence" (*paramārthasat*), and that that the "person" is a mere designation means the selflessness of the person (*puḍgalanairātmya*). Candrakīrti, however, opposes himself to the Abhidharma and Yogācāra by rejecting the ultimate existence of the basis of a designation.<sup>80</sup> In this consequence, also the bases of the designations

<sup>79</sup> E.g. the famous verse in SN I (V. 10. 6): 135, 20f: *yathā hi aṅgasambhārā // hoti saḍḍo ratho itī // evaṃ khandhesu santesu // hotī satto ti sammutī //*

<sup>80</sup> In the Abhidharma, the substantial and fundamental *dharmas* such as form etc. are real and exist ultimately. Cf. AK VI 4: *yatra bhīnne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhīyā ca tat / ghaṣṭārthavat sarvṛtīsāt paramārthasāt anyathā //* < = (The thing) such as a pot of which cognition does not occur when it is destroyed or when (other things such as form) are eliminated by an (analysing) cognition is the conventional existence. (The thing established) in another way is the ultimate existence.> The Yogācāra considers an inexpressible and perceivable entity ( *vastu*) as ultimate existence. For *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat* in the Yogācāra system cf. e.g. YBhV D199a7-200a1, P207b6-208a8: *gañ ci yañ ruñ ste de las gžan pa dag la mi ltos śiñ de las gžan pa dag la mi brten par rañ gi mtshan ñid 'dogs par byed pa de ni mdor na rdzas su yod pa yin par rig par bya'o // gañ ci yañ ruñ ste / de las gžan pa dag la bltos śiñ de las gžan pa dag la brten nas rañ gi mtshan ñid 'dogs par byed pa de ni mdor na brtags pa'i yod par rig par bya'i / rdzas su yod pa ni ma yin te / 'di lta sté / gzugs la sogs pa'i phuñ po'i miñ can gyi dños po la brten ciñ bltos te / gnas nas bdag ces bya ba'am / sems can žes bya bar rgya cher ñe bar 'dogs par byed pa'o // de la gzugs la sogs pa'i phuñ po'i miñ can gyi dños po ni rdzas su yod pa yin pa'o // sems can dañ srog dag skye ba po rdzas su med pa ni btags pa'i yod pa žes bya'o // gzugs la sogs pa'i phuñ po'i miñ can gyi dños po la\* bdag la sogs pa ñe bar 'dogs pa bžin du / gzugs la sogs pa'i miñ can gyi dños po kho na la phuñ po la sogs pa'i ñes par 'dogs pa dañ / gzugs dañ dri dañ ro dañ rig pa dag la bza' ba dañ / btuñ dañ / bžon pa dañ / gos dañ / rgyan dañ / khañ khriñ dañ / dmag dañ / nags tshal la sogs pa ñe bar 'dogs pa dañ / 'dus byas kyi miñ can gyi dños po la skye ba dañ / rga ba dañ / gnas pa dañ / mi rtag pa dañ / ... ñe bar 'dogs pa dañ / ... de dañ 'dra'o // \*P : las D < = One should know that (the thing) of which self-existence (*svalakṣaṇa*) (can) be designated without relying on other (things) and independently of other (things) is, to sum up, the existence as a substance (*dravyasat*). One should know that (the thing) of which self-existence is designated relying on other (things) and dependently on other*

"statue" and "Rāhu", i.e. the body and the head, must be non-substantial and mere designations in the same way as the "statue" and "Rāhu". This is confirmed by the next passage from the PPad:

rely  
 For the words "body" and "head" are employed relating to another thing associated [i.e. the possessor of the body and the head] that has consciousness, hands and so forth. Then, [the person who] has merely the words "body" and "head" as object [i.e. who just hear these words] [and to whom] an apprehension (of them) occurs necessarily becomes to expect [to know about] another thing associated, (namely) whose body it is and whose head it is. Also the other [i.e. the speaker] who wishes to eliminate the connection (of the body and the head) with any other [qualifier than a statue and Rāhu] dispels the expectation of the hearer by means of the sounds of the qualifier "statue" and "Rāhu" following the worldly agreement. This is reasonable.<sup>81</sup>

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(things) is, to sum up, the existence as a designation (*prajñaptisat*). It is not the existence as a substance. For instance, the "self" or "sentient being" is comprehensively designated in dependence and relying on, namely leaning on the entity (*\*vastu*) that has a name of an aggregate such as "form". In this case, the entity that has a name of an aggregate such as "form" is the existence as a substance. (And) the "sentient being", "animate (being)" and "living (being)" that do not exist as a substance are the existence as a designation. In the same manner as the "self" etc. are designated (in dependence) on the entity that has a name of an aggregate such as "form", the "aggregates" etc. are designated (in dependence) solely on the entity that has a name "form" etc. "Food", "drink", "vehicle", "cloth", "pot", "ornament", "cell", "army", "forest" etc. are designated (in dependence) on [the entities that have names] "form", "smell", "taste" and "touchable"; "arising", "old", "remaining", "transient", ... are designated (in dependence) on the entities that have names "the conditioned" (*samskṛta*) ... > I owe much to Mukai 1973 for this information. Although Mukai has considered the *dravyasat* to be conceptual and distinguished from the inexpressible *paramārthasat* (ibid: 364), I am tentatively inclined to suppose that they might be the same in referring a perceivable entity insofar as I have read this passage and interpreted the Tibetan word *dhos po* as a translation of *vastu*.

<sup>81</sup> PPad 66, 3-7 (paraphrased in LÑ 67a6; Thurman 1984: 292, 25-293, 9): *śartraśiraḥ śabdāyor hi buddhyādipānyādīmat\*śahabhāvīpadārthāntarasāpekṣatā pravṛttāu śartraśiraḥ śabdāmātrāḷambano buddhyupajānanāḥ*

The person who has heard the words "body" and "head" understands their possessors or qualifiers by further hearing the words "a statue" and "Rāhu" together with the genitive case "of". Therefore, Candrakīrti says that "Rāhu" is existent in dependence on the "head". In this case, the phenomenal entity called "the head" or "Rāhu" never comes into question.<sup>82</sup>

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*sahacāripadārthāntarasākāñkṣa eva vartate, kasya śarīraṃ kasya sira iti. itaro 'pi viśeṣāñāntara\*\*saṃbandhanirācīkṛṣayā śīlāputrakarāhuviśeṣaṇadhvaninā laukikasamketānuvidhāyina pratipattuḥ\*\*\* kāñkṣām upahantī\*\*\*\* yuktam. (\*corrected according to Mss. : pāryādivat PPaḍ; \*\*corrected according to R : anāntara PPaḍ; \*\*\*corrected according to R : pratikartuḥ PPaḍ; \*\*\*\*corrected according to R : apahantī PPaḍ. Cf. De Jong 1978: 34.)*

<sup>82</sup> In this respect, there is an interesting discussion in the last portion of the exposition of the selflessness of things in the MABh. The following objection to MA VI 13 and Candrakīrti's answer present the same idea of *prajñaptisat* (MABh 224, 1-6): *ci ste gal te dgags pa'i rten sa dañ chu dañ me dañ rluñ dañ / zgugs dañ dri dañ ro dañ reg bya la sogs pa mams yod pa de'i phyir bu par btags pa ni rgyu dañ bcas pa žes bya bar rigs na / gañ gi ltar na chos thams cad btags pa tsam kho na yin gyi / btags pa'i rten rdzas ci yañ med pa de la ni mo gśam kyī bu dañ 'dra bar thañ ba bzlog pa med pa ñid do sñam na / <= (Objection:) The designation of "pot" must have a cause since the basis of a designation such as earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste and touchable does exist (as a substance). Supposing it is so, (you) cannot eliminate [the wrong consequences] that it is like a son of a barren woman that all things are mere designations and that any substance that is a basis of designation does not exist at all.> Candrakīrti refutes this objection simply because any basis of a designation cannot be established as substantial (MABh 224, 6f.).*

It should be noted that this idea of the opponent corresponds to that of AK II 22a: When a *dharmā* that is a form (*rūpa*) arises, the eight substances (*dravya*) consisting of the four elements (i.e. earth, water, fire and wind) and the four matters comprised of the four elements (i.e. form, smell, taste and touchable) arise together (cf. Pradhan 1975: 52, 21-53, 1: *rūpāñāṃ tu dharmāñām ayaṃ niyamah. (22a) kārṇe 'śadravyako 'śabdaḥ paramāñur anindriyaḥ / sarvasūkṣmo hi rūpasamdhātāḥ paramāñur ity ucyate. yato nānyataro vijñāyeta. sa kāmadhātāv aśabdako 'nindriyaś cāśadravyaka utpadyate nānyatamena hīnaḥ. aṣtau dravyāni catvāri mahābhūṭāni catvāri copādāryarūpāni rūpagandharasaspraśavyāni.*). Such a substance is, furthermore, regarded as ultimate existence (*paramārthasat*) and such a *dharmā* as conventional existence (*saṃvṛtisat*) in AK VI 4 (see above n. 80). Tsoñ kha pa adduces AK VI 4 and its commentary in his discussion on the same subject in GR 209a5-209b3.

Then Candrakīrti explains that the basis of a designation is a mere designation too (MABh 225, 8-15): *de'i phyir de ltar dper na btags par yod bžin la sogs pa'i tshogs pa la brten nas me loñ la zgugs brñan btags pa tsam dmigs pa dañ*

The difference between theories of Dignāga and Candrakīrti might be illustrated as follows:

[Dignāga]	[Candrakīrti]
X ( <i>vastu</i> ) —	
┌—— concept A (body)	
└—— concept B (statue)	concept A (body), concept B (statue), ...
X ( <i>vastu</i> ) —	
┌—— concept A (head)	
└—— concept B (Rāhu)	concept A (head), concept B (Rāhu),...
X ( <i>vastu</i> ) —	
┌—— concept A (hardness)	
└—— concept B (earth)	concept A (aggregates), concept B (self), ...

X is the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) in terms of the Pramāṇa school, which is a phenomenal and perceivable entity. There occur many concepts A, B, C, ... that refer to this X. For the substantialists what is existent is nothing but this X, while for the Prāsaṅgika A, B, C, ... are existent on the conventional level. Although concept A can be a basis of concept B, C, ..., its ontological state is not different from

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*/ btags par yod pa ka ba la sogs pa la brten nas khyim du btags pa nañ / de bzin du śiñ gi rten can nags btags pa dañ ji ltar rmi lam na ma skyes pa'i rañ bzin can gyi sa bon las ma skyes pa'i rañ bzin can kyi myu gu skye bar drnigs pa de bzin du / dños po btags par yod pa thams cad kyi btags pa yañ dños po btags par yod pa'i rten can du rigs te / <= Therefore, for instance, one cognizes in a mirror a reflection that is merely designated in dependence on the collection of a face and so on that exist as mere designations; one designates "house" in dependence on pillars and so on that exist as designations; likewise, one designates "forest" based on trees and one cognizes in a dream a sprout that is not produced by nature arising from a seed that is not produced by nature. In the same manner, designations of all things that exist as mere designations should be understood to be dependent on the things that exist also as designations.>*

that of others. Thus, Candrakīrti maintains that the basis of designation (*btags gzi*) is a mere designation too. Therefore the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is established between concepts A and B. Tsoñ kha pa explains this idea in his own words:

Regarding also to the expressions "Devadatta's body" and "Devadatta's mind", if one examines how the basis of these designations [that is called] "Devadatta", his "body" and "mind" is established, one cannot discover Devadatta (since) neither these things (i.e. the body and mind) are Devadatta, nor [Devadatta is] something distinct from them. Hence (Candrakīrti) says "although there is no self", [meaning] that there is no basis of postulating Devadatta, which is an object that one should discover, after having examined and sought. This means that "Devadatta" is not established as intrinsically real, (but) does not (mean) that "Devadatta" is non-existent, so that "Devadatta" is conventionally existent in dependence on his "aggregates". In this (way), Candrakīrti determines (the meaning of) the two examples too.<sup>83</sup>

Concepts "body" and "mind" are constituents of a person called "Devadatta". "Devadatta" is neither identical with nor distinct from his "body" and "mind" if examined, so that "Devadatta" is non-substantial but conventionally existent as a designation. From this argument, Tsoñ kha pa seems to confirm the Prāsaṅgika's fundamental ontology that whatever is non-substantial or not established as intrinsically real is existent as a designation on the conventional level.

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<sup>83</sup> LÑ 68a4ff. (Thurman 1984: 294, 12-20): *lhas byin gyi gzugs lhas byin gyi sems zes brjod pa la yañ tha sñad de gañ btags pa'i gzi lhas byin dañ de'i gzugs dañ sems ji ltar grub dpyad pa na chos de dag kyañ lhas byin min la de'i gzugs sems sogs las don gzan du yañ lhas byin mi rñed pas dpyad ciñ btsal nas rñed pa'i don la lhas byin 'jog sa med pa ni bdag med mod kyi zes pa'o || de ni lha byin rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa yin gyi lhas byin med pa min pas phuñ po la brten nas kun rdzob tu yod pa bzin du dpe gñis kyañ 'jog ces pa'o ||*

Then, they (i.e. Candrakīrti and Tsoñ kha pa) jump to the final conclusion that the conventional things are established as mere designations in mutual dependence (*phan tshun ltos pa, parasparāpekṣā*). Candrakīrti says:

Thus, if examined there is neither (anything) characterized other than the "hardness" [i.e. the "particular"] nor characteristic (since) there is nothing to be characterized on the basis of which (it is designated) with regard to the earth. Yet just superficially, the masters [i.e. Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva] have determined its establishment in the sense of establishment in mutual dependence.<sup>84</sup>

I suppose that this conclusion is based on the above-discussed theory that any basis of a designation is a designation as well, but in my understanding they are logically not directly linked with each other, because one can neither say that the "aggregates" are designated in dependence on the "person", nor that the "earth" and the "hardness" are designated in mutual dependence. To enable their establishment in mutual dependence, one must replace them by other concepts that are established in correlation as Tsoñ kha pa actually does in the following commentary:

Also in postulating the earth and the hardness as the characteristic and the characterized, for instance, if one (will) postulate something as such that one has discovered after having sought in the above-mentioned way the basis of (verbal) operation (*'jug gzi*) on which the designations "characteristic" and "(something) characterized" operate, one cannot postulate these two; but yet one (can) postulate them as existent from

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<sup>84</sup> PPad 67, 10ff. (cited in LN 68b1f.; Thurman 1984: 294, 22-27); *evaṃ prthivyādināṃ yady api kāṣṭhyādīvyatirīktaṃ vicāryamānaṃ lakṣyaṃ nāsti lakṣyavyatirekeṇa ca lakṣaṇaṃ nirāśrayaṃ tathāpi saṃvṛtir eṣeti\** *parasparāpekṣamātrayā siddhyā\*\* siddhiṃ vyavasthāpayāṃ babhūvur ācāryāḥ.* (\*corrected according to R : *eveti* PPad; \*\*corrected according to De Jong's proposal : *parasparāpekṣayā tayoh siddhyā* PPad. Cf. De Jong 1978: 35.)

(the viewpoint of) mutual dependence.<sup>85</sup>

Here it should be remarked that Tsoñ kha pa is explaining the postulation of the concepts "characteristic" and "(something) characterized" in mutual dependence, but not the concepts "earth" and "hardness".

For more exact understanding of this point, I shall refer to the elucidation of the selflessness of the person with the example of a vehicle in MA VI 151-165. As the "vehicle" is an existence merely designated dependently on the collection of its members if examined through the seven theses,<sup>86</sup> the "person" is nothing other than a mere designation dependent on the collection of the aggregates if examined, but yet conventionally accepted to be existent. Accordingly, even if various names are applied to one thing, each designation is to be accepted as conventional existence independently of its basis.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> LN 68b2f. (Thurman 1984: 295, 1-5): *sa dañ sra ba sogs mtshan mtshon du 'jog pa la yañ mtshan mtshon gyi tha sñad 'jug pa'i 'jug gzi de sñar ltar btsal nas rñed pa'i don la 'jog na de gñis 'jog mi nus kyañ phan tshun ltos pa'i sgo nas de dag yod par 'jog go ||*

<sup>86</sup> MABh 271, 18-272, 7 (La Vallée Poussin 1911: 316, 10-17): *ñin na rañ yan lag las gzan 'dod min || gzan min ma yin de ldan yañ min žin || yan lag la min yan lag dag der min || dus pa tsam min dbyibs min ji bzin no || (151) 'dir de ñid kyi phyogs dañ gzan ñid kyi phyogs dañ / rten gyi phyogs dañ brten gyi phyogs dañ / de dañ ldan pa'i phyogs de phyogs lha po dag ni sñar bstan zin pa ñid do || tshogs pa'i phyogs dañ dbyibs pa'i phyogs gñis ni bsgrub par bya dgos pas de dag ston pa bñam par bya ste / <= It is not accepted that a vehicle is distinct from its own members; (it) is neither non-distinct (from the members), nor possessing them, nor (supported by) the members, nor supporting the members, nor mere a collection (of the members) nor a shape (of the members). In this respect, I have already explained the five theses, i.e. 1) the thesis that (a vehicle is) identical (with the members), 2) the thesis that it is distinct (from them), 3) the thesis that it is supported (by the members), 4) the thesis that it is a support (of them) and 5) the thesis that it possesses them. Still both the thesis that it is a collection (of them) and the thesis that it is a (special) shape (of them) should be investigated. Therefore I will explain them.>*

<sup>87</sup> Cf. MABh 277, 18-278, 9 (La Vallée Poussin 1911: 320, 22-321, 5); GR 238a2-5; LR 439a1-5 (Nagao 1954: 300, 4-14), where other designations for a "vehicle" such as "whole" (*yan lag can, añgin*), "whole" (*cha śas can, avayavin*),

This theory is also valid for "things" (*dharmas*). Candrakīrti demonstrates it in MA VI 166 and 167:

(166:) Things such as "pot", "cloth", "mat", "army", "forest", "chain", "paradise/ tree", "house", "small vehicle", "cell" and those which people have named from a certain aspect are to be understood [to be existent], since the mighty one (i.e. the Buddha) does not make any dispute with the world.

(167:) Things such as "attribute", "part", "desire", "characteristic", "burning wood" etc. and "substance", "whole", "(something) desired", "(something) characterized", "fire" etc. are non-existent (ultimately) and existent (conventionally) through worldly acknowledgement apart from the (examination) of the seven modes in accord with the examination of a vehicle.<sup>88</sup>

These two verses apparently bring different ideas, namely the designation of a thing dependent on the collection of its constituents (166), which reminds us of the example of the YBhV (see above n. 80), and the designation of a couple of correlative concepts in mutual dependence (167). To jump from the idea of 166 to that of 167, the subjects have to be changed. Candrakīrti himself does it in his commentary on the verse 167: The "pot" is replaced by "substance", "whole" and "(something) characterized"; "blue" by "attribute";

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"agent" (*byed pa po, karṭṛ*) and "appropriator" (*ñe bar len pa po, upādāṭṛ*) dependent on "members" (*yan lag, aṅga*), "parts" (*cha śas, avayava*), "work" (*bya ba, kārya*) and "(something) appropriated" (*ñe bar len pa, upādāna*) respectively are admitted to be existent in conformity with the world.

<sup>88</sup> MA VI 166 and 167 (Tauscher 1981: 51f.): *bum pa snam bu re lde dmaḡ dañ nag tshal phreñ ba ljon śiñ dañ // khañ khyim śiñ rta phran dañ 'gron gnas la sogs dños mams gañ dag dañ // de bžin gañ dag sgo nas skye 'dis bñad pa de mams rtogs ste // gañ phyir thub dbañ de ni 'jig ren lhan cig rtsod mi mdzad phyir ro // yon tan yan lag 'dod chags mtshan ñid dañ ni bud śiñ la sogs dañ // yon tan can yan lag can chags dañ mtshan gži me la sogs don dag // de mams śiñ rta'i mam dpyad byas pas mam bdun yod pa ma yin žiñ // de las gžan du gyur par 'jig ren grags pa'i sgo nas yod pa yin // Cf. GR 242a4-243a3; LR 453b4-454b6 (Nagao 1954: 332, 6-335, 3)*

"pothards" by "parts"; and "having a round belly" by "characteristic".<sup>89</sup> He continues:

In the case [of the pot], it corresponds to the example of a vehicle, because the "whole" is designated on the basis of the "members" and the "members" are designated in dependence on the "whole". (It holds up to the case that) the "fire" is dependent on the "burning wood" and the "burning wood" is dependent on (the "fire").<sup>90</sup> These are the worldly (verbal) conventions and remain without being examined. Not only the "members" etc. are established in mutual dependence, but also both "cause" and "effect" are explained to be mutually dependent.<sup>91</sup>

In this manner, the Prāsaṅgika has developed the interpretation of "origination in mutual dependence" in accord with his ontological position that all things are mere designations.

## 2. Postulation of the capacity for efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*)

Candrakīrti opposes the idea of mutual dependence of things in the sense of mutual dependence of concepts to the intrinsic or substantial origination or establishment of things.<sup>92</sup> He explains

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<sup>89</sup> Cf. MABh 289, 9-16 (Tauscher 1981: 52, 11-20).

<sup>90</sup> For the example of fire and a burning wood see MMK X. The mutual dependence of fire and a burning wood is not conceptual, but consists in reality. Tsoñ kha pa, however, explains, citing MMK X lab and 15 in LR 445a1f. and 445b1f., that the fire and a burning wood represent the concepts "object of an action" (*karmaṇ*) and "agent" (i.e. subject of an action) (*kartṛ* or *kāraṅka*) which are established in mutual dependence.

<sup>91</sup> MABh 289, 16-290, 3 (Tauscher 1981: 52, 21-32): *de la yan lag rgyur byas nas yan lag can du 'dogs la yan lag can la bltos nas yan lag 'dogs pas śiñ ria'i dpe dañ mtshuñs te / bud śiñ la bltos nas me yin la de la bltos nas bud śiñ yin pa'i bar du'o // 'di ni 'jig rten gyi tha sñad yin gyi 'di la dpyad pa mi bžug go\* / yan lag la sogs pa mams phan tshun bltos pa'i grub pa yin la 'ba' žig tu ma zad kyi / rgyu dañ 'bras bu gñis kyañ phan tshun bltos pa yin no žes bśad pa / \*read as bžugs so*

<sup>92</sup> Cf. e.g. PPad 75, 10f.: *tāni ca parasparāpekṣayā siddhyanti, satsu pramāṅeṣu prameyārthāḥ, satsu prameyeṣv artheṣu pramāṅāni. no tu khalu svābhāviki*

every kind of dependent origination as origination in mutual dependence by reducing subjects to a couple of correlative concepts. The idea of *pratīyasamutpāda* appearing in his works are, in my opinion, classified into the following three types<sup>93</sup>:

*pramāṇaprameyayoḥ siddhir ...* ; 189, 14f.: *tayoś copādeyopādātroḥ parasparāpekṣayoḥ karmakāravād eva siddhir na svābhāvika.*; 253, 12f.: *yata eva hi parasparāpekṣikī bhāvanām anyatvasiddhir ata evānyad ity ucyate laukike vyavahāre sthitvā, vastutas tu parīkṣyamānam anyatvaṃ na sambhavatīti bhrūmah.*

<sup>93</sup> Tsoñ kha pa himself divides it into two kinds in LRchun 187a6: *nten 'byuñ gi gtan tshigs kyi mam gzag gnīs so // brten nas skyes pa dañ brten nas btags pa yin na /*; lCañ skye Rol pa'i rdo rje, on the other hand, distinguishes three kinds, which corresponds to Candrakīrti's explanation of *prati* in the word *pratīyasamutpāda* as *prāpya*, *apekṣya* and *pratīya* (cf. PPad 9, 3f.; Ejima 1985: 147ff.). He says in lCañ skya Grub mtha' (Thal 'gyur ba) 31a2-31b4 (Hopkins 1987: 413, 29-414, 28): *de ltar rten cin 'brel bar 'byuñ ba'i don 'phrad pa dañ ltos pa dañ brten pa la bśad du yod par grub pa'i rgyu mtshan ni 'di ltar yin te / spyir 'phrad ltos rten gsum mam grañs par yañ gsuñs mod kyañ go ba chags sla ba'i phyir phral nas brjod na / 'phrad pa źes bya bas ni gtan tshigs kyi don dños po rañ gi rgyus bskyed pa'i rten 'brel 'dzin pa yin la / 'di ni grub pa'i mtha' 'og ma dañ yañ thun moñs pa'o // .... ltos pa źes bya bas ni 'du byas dañ 'du ma byas kyi chos mams rañ rañ gi cha śas la ltos nas rañ gi bdag ñid rñed pa'i gtan tshigs bstan pa ste sa mu dpā da grub pa la 'chad pa'i dbañ du byas pa'o // 'di ni śña ma las khyab che žiñ dños bstan gyi don tsam dbu ma pa gźan dañ yañ thun moñs pa'o // brten pa źes bya bas ni chos thams cad brten nas btags pa'i gtan tshigs kyi don bstan pa ste / rañ rañ gi gdags gźi la brten nas btags pa tsam du grub pa'o // 'di ni lugs mchog tu gyur pa'i 'di kho na'i khyad chos yin te / rañ rgyud pa man chad dañ thun moñs ma yin pa'o // < =* The reason for proving that the meaning of the origination in dependence (*pratīyasamutpāda*) is to be explained as above, (namely) as reaching (*prad pa*, *prāpya*), relying (*ltos pa*, *apekṣya*) and depending (*brten pa*, *pratīya* or *upādāya*), is as follows: Although the three (words) "reach", "rely" and "depend" are in general said to be synonyms, I will explain (them) separately for the purpose of faliciate understanding: 1) From (the aspect of) "reaching", the logical reason (for non-substantiality of things i.e. the origination in dependence) bears as its meaning the origination in dependence in the sense of things' production from their own causes. This is (the interpretation) in common also with the lower systems. .... 2) From (the aspect of) relying, the logical reason in the sense that conditioned and non-conditioned things obtain their own-beings relying on their own parts is indicated. This is in regard to explaining (the word) *samutpāda* as (meaning) "established". This (interpretation) covers more than the former and is in common with also other Mādhyanikas. 3) From (the aspect of) depending, the meaning of the logical reason that all things are designated dependently (on others) is indicated. They are established merely as designated dependently on their own basis of designation. This (interpretation) is a specific teaching solely to this supreme system and not in common with the

[1] Phenomenal arising: e.g. sprouting (arising of a sprout dependent on a seed etc.)

[2] Designation of a thing dependent on a collection of its constituents: e.g. designation of "person" dependent on a collection of aggregates

[3] Designation of a thing dependent on a correlative concept, i.e. designation of things in mutual dependence: e.g. designation of "cause" dependent on the concept "effect"

Mutuality or relativity is actually established only in the case of [3]. Originally in [1] what arises is a concrete thing that is perceivable as a phenomenon and in [2] the basis of the designation is a collection of substances or of constituents that are also concrete things or units of existence. Yet in the same way that [2] is interpreted in the sense of [3] as relativity of "parts" and "whole" or "(something) appropriated" and "appropriator", so [1] is to be included in [3] through reduction of the relation of a seed and a sprout to the conceptual relation of "cause" and "effect" like that of "short" and "long". Candrakīrti actually often parallels the examples of "short" and "long" and of a seed and a sprout.<sup>94</sup> That may be known, moreover, from his adducing RĀ I 48 and MMK VIII 12 and 13, which he thinks represent the idea of mutual dependence,<sup>95</sup> when he explains *idampratyayatā*, although it originally means the dependence of X on

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Svātantrika and the lower (systems).> I think that 2) is to be included in 3) from the viewpoint of the Prāsaṅgika since the own-being is nothing other than a designation after all.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. e.g. PPad 252, 11f.: *yasmād yatprattīya yad bhavati tasmāt tadanyan na bhavati, sāpekṣatvād bijāñkuravat hrasvadīrghavac ceti*; 458, 13f.: *iha yadi śubham nāma kiñcīt syān niyataṃ tad aśubham apekṣya bhavet, pārāvāravat bijāñkuravat hrasvadīrghādivad vā*.

<sup>95</sup> RĀ I 48 (Tucci 1934: 318, tr. 319; Hahn 1982: 20): *asmin satīdam bhavati dīrghē hrasvaṃ yathā sati / asyotpādād udeīdam dipotpādād yathā prabhā //* (pādas ab are cited also in PPad 10, 7); MMK VIII 12 and 13: *prattīya kārakaḥ karma taṃ prattīya ca kārakaṃ / karma pravartate nānyat paśyāmāḥ siddhikāraṇam // evaṃ vidyād upādānaṃ vyutsargād iti karmaṇaḥ / kartuś ca karmakartṛbhyāṃ śeṣān bhāvān vibhāvayet //*

Y, but never the dependence of Y on X.<sup>96</sup> In short, one can assume the following jump in ideas from [1] and [2] to [3]:

- [1] concept A (seed)——concept B (sprout)  
 -----[3] concept A (cause)——concept B (effect)
- [2] concept A (aggregates)——concept B (person)  
     concept A (members of a vehicle)——concept B (vehicle)  
     concept A (pillars)——concept B (house)  
     concept A (trees)——concept B (forest)  
     concept A (eight materials)——concept B (pot)  
 -----[3] concept A (parts)——concept B (whole)
- [3] concept A (long)——concept B (short)  
     concept A (one)——concept B (many)<sup>97</sup>  
     concept A (agent)——concept B (work)

Thus considered, the idea of capacity for efficacy (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*), which Tson kha pa emphasizes, must be interpreted as established in the sense that the correlative concepts such as "work" (*bya ba, kārya*) or "object of work" (*las, karman*) and "agent" or "subject of work" (*byed pa po, kartṛ* or *kāraṅka*) are established in mutual dependence. This is, in my opinion, exactly the postulation of all kinds of act consisting of agent, action and object of action expressed in his theory 2. Candrakīrti often mentions in the PPad their mutual dependence presumably on the basis of the

<sup>96</sup> MABh 226, 14-18 (La Vallée Poussin 1911: 277, 3ff.): 'di la brten nas 'di 'byuñ ba žig ste / de tsam žig la 'jig rten gyi tha sñad ma bcañ pa'i don du brten to // ži skad du bcom ldan 'das kyis de la chos kyi brda ni 'di yin te / 'di lta ste / 'di yod na 'di 'byuñ / 'di skyes pas 'di skye ste / gañ 'di ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed mams žes bya ba la sogs pa gsuñs so //

<sup>97</sup> Cf. ŚS 7: gcig med par ni mañ po dañ // mañ po med par gcig mi 'jug // de pbyir nen cñ 'brel 'byuñ ba'i // dños po mtshan ma med pa yin //

statement of MMK VIII 12 and 13 (see above n. 95).<sup>98</sup> In this sense, the capacity for efficacy of things is not negated and *can be* postulated. Regarding the act of cognizing an object, it is also defined that "valid cognition" (*pramāṇa*) and its "object" (*prameya*) are conceptually established in mutual dependence as "subject" and "object" of cognition.<sup>99</sup> Consequently, one should understand the postulation of the capacity for efficacy in the Prāsaṅgika as follows:

concept A: agent; B: action, work; C: object of the action

(A) The person (B) accumulates (C) works; (A) The vehicle (B) carries (C) people; (A) The pot (B) holds (C) milk; (A) The valid cognition (B) cognizes (C) an object; (A) The seed (B) produces (C) a sprout.

(A) and (C) are universals that represent a species etc. Thus, the Prāsaṅgika handles solely concepts as things, never taking phenomenal entity X into consideration, and explains the idea of origination in dependence or capacity for efficacy as relation between concepts. I would like to point out, however, that this interpretation of the capacity for efficacy contradicts Tsoñ kha pa's own words accepting the "logicians' idea of *arthakriyāsāmarthya*" which is concerned exclusively with the particular.<sup>100</sup> Besides, his acceptance of the *sākāravāda*<sup>101</sup> might lose its sense insofar as the valid cognition and its object are mere designations established in mutual

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<sup>98</sup> Cf. e.g. PPad 189, 9f.: *yathā ca karmakāraḥ paraspārāpekṣikā siddhiḥ, evam aryeṣāṃ api bhāvanām ity atidiśann āha ...*; 189, 14f. (see n. 92); 190, 6ff.: *tathāvayavāvayaviḥṣaṇaḥpramāṇaprameyādiyo niravaśeṣā bhāvās teṣāṃ kartṛkarmavicāreṇa svabhāvato 'stivam pratiṣṭhīya paraspārāpekṣikām eva siddhiṃ ...*; 213, 11f.: *tasmāt karmakāravād evātmopādānayoḥ paraspārāpekṣikā siddhir iti sthītam.*

<sup>99</sup> PPad 75, 10f. (see above n. 92). Tsoñ kha pa calls their relation "origination in dependence" (*rten 'brel*) (LR 370b2).

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Yoshimizu 1993a: 128f.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Yoshimizu 1993a: 137 n. 69.

dependence. I think that these contradictory results reflect a theoretical inconsistency of the Prāsaṅgika's ontology with the logico-epistemological system of the Pramāṇa school, although the dGe lugs pas have made a great effort to integrate them.<sup>102</sup>

### 3. Conclusion

Let us go back to the starting point of Tsoñ kha pa's long discussion in the LÑ as well as of this paper. With regard to the teaching of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra that all things are non-substantial, neither produced nor destroyed, the Yogācāra has presented the objection that the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), which arises in dependence on others, is existent, whereas the conceptualized nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is non-substantial since it is merely postulated by means of names and conventions and not established as intrinsically real (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis mam par gnas pa ma yin pa*). The Svāntrika accepts this theory on the conventional level, but the Prāsaṅgika does not. The state of *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* is a ground of substantiality and opposed to the state of existence as a designation (*prajñaptisat*) that is postulated by means of names and conventions (*miñ dañ brdas mam par b'zag pa*). Tsoñ kha pa bases his ontological interpretation of the three Mahāyāna systems on this thought presented by the SNSū.

[SNSū]

1) *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* — substantiality (*svabhāvata*)  
 --- *miñ dañ brdas mam par b'zag pa, prajñaptisat* — non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvata*)

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<sup>102</sup> This contradiction is indicated in Yamaguchi 1993: 83. I will discuss this issue in detail focusing upon the epistemological problem in my dissertation at the University of Vienna.

[Yogācāra]

[Prāsaṅgika]

the dependent nature X

1)= *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*

= substantial

2)= existent

= arising on the strength of others

the conceptualized nature

all things A, B, C, ...

A, B, C, ...

1)= *rañ gi mtshan ñid*

*kyis ma grub pa*

= *miñ dañ brdas mam*

*par b'zag pa*

= non-substantial

2)= non-existent

= neither produced

nor destroyed

= Whatever non-substantial

is non-existent,

neither arises nor ceases

1)= *rañ gi mtshan ñid*

*kyis ma grub pa*

= *miñ gi dbaṅ gis*

*mam par b'zag pa*<sup>103</sup>

= non-substantial

2)= existent as designation

= postulated as

produced and destroyed

= Whatever non-substantial

is existent, arises and ceases

The essential difference between the two schools' ontology lies in 2), namely the link of non-substantiality to existence or non-existence. Tsoñ kha pa, thus, differentiates them in 2) the second stage of his ontological analysis on the same theoretical basis 1). In consequence of rejecting any examination of X, the Prāsaṅgika supplies the non-substantiality of designations A, B, C, ... for that of X, whereby he

<sup>103</sup> I think that this is not different in meaning from the expression "*miñ dañ brdas mam par b'zag pa*". Tsoñ kha pa claims in LÑ 71a3f. that in the Yogācāra treatises *btags pa* or *miñ tsam* means the non-existence of the external object that appears to a cognition with the twofold appearances, therefore it is not the same as that of the Prāsaṅgika. This interpretation of the conceptualized nature is, however, not applicable to the teaching in SNSū VII.

asserts the non-substantiality of the dependent nature. In other words, that the designations have no corresponding self-existence is the non-substantiality of the dependent nature.<sup>104</sup> In conclusion, it may be said that Tsoñ kha pa answers the SNSū's objection to the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra in the following way: All things are non-substantial, neither produced nor destroyed since they are mere designations, but yet they are not non-existent on the conventional level since they are designated in mutual dependence. Therefore, we fall neither in substantialism nor in nihilism.<sup>105</sup>

At last, I would like to note the possible influence of the MĀ, especially of its structure and motivation, on Tsoñ kha pa's LÑ. It is evident that Kamalaśīla composed the MĀ aiming to re-establish the Madhyakama theory of non-substantiality and to determine which scripture teaches which meaning, a definitive meaning or an indirect meaning, through repulsing the SNSū's criticism of the

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<sup>104</sup> Strictly speaking, that the designations have no corresponding self-existence means only the non-substantiality of the conceptualized nature in terms of the Yogācāra, not that of the dependent nature. In this sense, I do not think that the Prāsaṅgika can logically defeat the Yogācāra theory that the dependent is not non-substantial with regard to characteristic. Neither Candrakīrti nor Bhāvaviveka seems to distinguish so strictly a phenomenal entity from a conceptual existence as the Yogācāra and the Pramāṇa school do. Candrakīrti reduces phenomenal things to concepts, while Bhāvaviveka identifies the universal with its basis (see n. 68). Yamaguchi 1991a has discussed Candrakīrti's confusion of an external entity with a concept and the difference between the origination in dependence taught in the MMK and Candrakīrti's idea of the origination in mutual dependence.

<sup>105</sup> The problem may arise from this theory that the Prāsaṅgika cannot make distinctions between the concept such as "horns of a hare" that has no corresponding entity in reality and the concept such as "hare" that refers to something perceived. This is the same as the objection seen in n. 82 that all things would not be different from a son of a barren woman since the latter is also existent as a mere designation. Although Candrakīrti does not throughout refute this objection there, he is supposed to maintain that such a distinction is made only in accord with the world in the same manner that he distinguishes between right and false objects only according to the world (*lokata eva*) in MA VI 25 (cf. Yoshimizu 1992a).

Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, which he introduces at the beginning of the MĀ.<sup>106</sup> This method has been transmitted and also employed by Tibetans such as dBÿ pa blo gsal whose Grub mtha' has a similar construction to that of the MĀ.<sup>107</sup> I suppose that Tsoñ kha pa as well might have been very aware of and motivated by that. One could say, to sum up, that the LÑ is Tsoñ kha pa's own attempt to re-establish the same theory but according to the Prāsaṅgika tradition and to clarify the theoretical difference between substantialists and the Prāsaṅgika on the ground of analysing their interpretation of the SNSū's theory of the three kinds of non-substantiality.

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For abbreviations used in this paper, see the list of abbreviations in Yoshimizu 1993a: 140-147. The new sources referred to in Section II and III are as follows:

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|----------------------|--|
| ANSū                 | Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra. P842.  |
| ICañ skya Grub mtha' | ICañ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje. Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bṣag pa'i thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan. Peking Edition. Reproduced by Lokesh Chandra. Śata-Pitaka-Series 223. New Delhi 1977.   |
| Ejima 1985           | Ejima Yasunori. "Chūron' Chūshakusho ni okeru 'Engi' no Gōgi-kaishaku" (The Meaning of the Term Pratītyasamutpāda in the <i>Mādhyamika</i> Commentaries). In: <i>Bukkyō-shisō no Shomondai (Various Problem in Buddhist Thought). A Collection of Articles in Honor of Professor Akira Hirakawa's Seventieth Birthday</i> . Tokyo. |
| — 1990               | "Bhāvaviveka / Bhavya / Bhāviveka." <i>IBK</i> 38-2, (98)-(106).   |
| Hahn 1982            | See RĀ.  |
| Ichigō 1982          | Ichigō Masamichi. "Yugagyō-Chūganha" [ <i>Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas</i> ]. <i>Kōza Daijō-Bukkyō</i> 7, 175-215. Tokyo.  |
| Kajiyama 1963        | Kajiyama Yūichi. "Trikaṇḍakacacintā, Development of the Buddhist Theory on the Determination of Causality." <i>Indogaku-Shironshū</i> Nos. 4-5, 1-15. Kyoto University.  |
| — 1966               | "An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy." <i>Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters. Kyoto University</i> 10.   |
| — 1980               | "Chie no Tomoshihi Dai Nijū-go shō [Zendan no Shiyaku]"  |

<sup>106</sup> See above n. 35.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Yoshimizu 1993a: 99 n. 13.

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- 1981e "Chibetto no Bukkyō-gaku ni tsuite" [On Tibetan Buddhist Studies]. *Tōyōgaku jutsukenkyū* 20-1, 137-155.
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- PV I Dharmakīrti. *Pramāṇānavārttika*, Chapter I (Svārthānumāna): R. Gnoli. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Roma 1960.
- PVSV Dharmakīrti. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*: see PV I.
- RĀ Nāgārjuna. *Ratnāvalī*: G. Tucci. "The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna (Chapter I). *JRAS* 1934, 307-325; M. Hahn. *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī, Vol. 1, the basic texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese)*. Indica et Tibetica 1. Bonn 1982.
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- SN I *The Saṃyutta-Nikāya of the Sutta-Piṭaka, Part I. Sagāthavagga*. Ed. M. Léon Feer. The Pali Text Society. London 1973.
- ŚS Nāgārjuna. Śūnyatāsaptati: D3827, P5227.
- SSūV *The Sāṃkhya Sūtra Vṛtti or Aniruddha's Commentary and Vedāntin Mahādeva's Commentary to the Sāṃkhya Sūtras edited with Indices*. Richard Garbe. Calcutta 1888.
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- ITa ba'i khyad par Ye śes sde. ITa ba'i khyad par: D4360, P5847.
- TSN Vasubandhu. Trisvabhāvanirdeśa; see La Vallée Poussin 1933; D4058, P5559.
- Tucci 1934 See RĀ.
- Yamaguchi 1941 Yamaguchi Susumu. *Bukkyō ni okeru Mu to U no Tairon [Controversy on Existence and Non-existence in Buddhism]*. Tokyo.
- Yamaguchi 1991 Yamaguchi Zuihō. "Englishō no Fukuken" (Śāntarakṣita's final interpretation of *pratīyasamutpāda*). *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies* 14, 1-57.
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- Yasui 1961 Yasui Kōsai. *Chūganshisō no Kenkyū [Study of Madhyamaka Philosophy]*.
- YBhV Yogācārabhūmi-Viniścayasamgrahaṇi: D4038, P5539.
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