博士論文の要約／Summary of Doctoral Dissertation

Amnesty as a Counter-terrorism Strategy:

A Study on Nigeria's Operation Safe Corridor

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Abstract

The use of amnesty as a counterterrorism strategy has become a trend for many Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Kenya, and Somalia. However, the strategy has been bedeviled with many challenges which affect its performance. The main objective for this study is to evaluate the performance of Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), an amnesty program established by the Nigerian government for members of Boko Haram as a scheme to restore peace in the northeast part of the country. This dissertation raises two questions: How has the program performed as a strategy to counter Boko Haram and restore peace in the northeast and why has it performed the way it did? The main argument of this study is that the OSC has not performed well because of poor conceptualization of the program by the Nigerian government. The data for this study was collected through a triangulation method of combining primary and secondary sources. Evidence from the data shows that although the OSC has recorded some successes in the deradicalization and rehabilitation components, it has failed to achieve a similar feat in the reintegration component, which has affected the overall performance of the program. Further evidence suggests that the failure of the program is because of the inability of the Nigerian government to incorporate some key elements of peacebuilding such as transitional justice, restorative justice, and citizens' support. The absence of these key peacebuilding elements has led to rejection of the program by victims, affected communities, and the Nigerian citizenry, which often leads to recidivism, as well as other negative results. In conclusion, the study presents a compelling evaluation of the OSC and addresses policy and theoretical implications relevant to the use of amnesty for countering terrorism in Nigeria.

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List of Abbreviations

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
DA	Defensive Approach
DAA	Direct Action Approach
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRR	Deradicalization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DW	Deutsche Welle
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons.
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISWAP	Islamic State West African Province
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
OSC	Operation Safe Corridor
PAP	Presidential Amnesty Program
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. General Overview

Countering terrorism is herculean for any government. For example, the Sri Lanka government battled with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for nearly 26 years (Candela & Aldama, 2016), the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) campaign against the French Colonial regime lasted for eight years (Krause, 2019), while it took the Egyptian government about a decade to succeed over Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiya (Gerges, 2000). A look at how the above three conflicts ended shows a variation. The FLN achieved its objective, Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiya renounced violence and accepted a peace deal with the government, while the LTTE campaign ended in defeat. This shows that there is no single strategy to end a terrorism campaign.

In recent times, there has been an increasing understanding among scholars and policymakers that terrorism cannot be defeated by military action alone. Scholars like Kilcullen et al. (2009) and Rabasa et al. (2010) posit that the nature of terrorism and the factors that lead to it make defeating it through force alone an uphill task. This insight has led to a growing call for non-violent counterterrorism strategies as opposed to the war against terrorism mantra.

The call for non-violent counterterrorism strategies has ensured that non-kinetic strategies such as peaceful negotiation and amnesty programs are beginning to gain acceptability. For example, the US signed a negotiation deal with the Taliban, a group it considers a terrorist organization, in February 2020 (International Crisis Group, 2020), just as the Sahel countries of Mali and Burkina Faso have recently opened negotiations with Jihadist groups affiliated with both the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al-Qaeda, as a way of restoring lasting peace

to their countries (Bagayoko, 2021).[1] Similarly, countries like Kenya, Somalia, Cameroun, and Niger have favored the use of amnesty program, while Mozambique is exploring the possibility of adopting it in its fight against Ansar al-Sunna, an ISIS affiliated group (Felbab-Brown, 2018; Isilow, 2021).

The above-mentioned cases are testimonies that counterterrorism is not monolithic, as countries continuously explore different tactics to help end terrorism. However, Byman (2015) observes that strategies can intersect, or a government may adopt more than one strategy depending on mode of operation or capacity of the group involved, or a country's interpretation of the group it is dealing with. As a result, there are cases where countries have adopted a combination of kinetic (the use of military force to resolve a conflict) and non-kinetic strategies commonly referred to as "stick and carrot" approach (the use of non-military approach to conflict resolution) to combat terrorist groups, depending on distinct objective (Bier & Hausken, 2011; Zhang, 2016).

The Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy against Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah li-d-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad, a group infamously branded Boko Haram, is twofold: kinetic and non-kinetic approach. The kinetic approach is the war against terror christened Operation Lafiya Dole.[2] This study, however, focuses on the non-kinetic approach known as the Operation Safe Corridor (hereafter referred to as the OSC). It is an amnesty program established in September 2016 by the Nigerian government, targeting members of the group considered low risk (International Crisis Group, 2021).

The program, cast in the mold of an amnesty program, has three components: deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DRR), which encourages members of the group to defect to the government side, without subjecting them to any form of punishment for their

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[1] Some of the jihadist groups that operate in the Sahel are Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, Ansarul Islam, Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun. See Zimmerer (2019).

[2] Lafiya Dole came from two Hausa words which literally means Peace by Force.

activities while with the group (Ogunnubi & Aja, 2022). The rationale behind the OSC is the

realization by the Nigerian government that Boko Haram cannot be defeated only through a kinetic

approach (Weber, 2015; Hauschildt & Malik, 2014; Macquaid & Asfura-Heim, 2015; Ehiane &

Mngomezulu, 2018).

The main objective of the OSC is to restore peace in the restive northeast region of Nigerian,

as explained by President Muhammadu Buhari who was quoted by *Premium Times* (2018a) as

saying, "We are ready to rehabilitate and integrate such repentant members into the larger society.

This country has suffered enough of hostility." The government intends to use the program as a

strategy to defeat Boko Haram by creating an exit out of terrorism for those willing to embrace it.

According to Major General Bamidele Shafa, the first coordinator of the OSC program, "the

deradicalization and the subsequent acceptance of the returnees back into society would encourage

other insurgents to return to civil life" (DW, 2019).

1.2. Background of the Study

The introduction of the OSC by the government followed a trajectory. The Nigerian

government designated the Boko Haram a terrorist organization in 2013 citing its violent activities

such as kidnapping, mass shooting, and suicide bombing. The designation, taken in accordance

with the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 as amended (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official

Gazette, 2013), was passed by the National Assembly and signed into law by President Goodluck

Jonathan (Bhura, 2012).[3] The act empowered the government to use extreme force against the

group, and to seek regional and international collaboration against the group. It also intended to

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[3] The terrorism Prevention Act was amended in 2013 to accommodate the proscription of Boko
Haram because of its growing terrorist activities. See Bamidele (2015).

strip the group of any form of support as violation of the act regarding supporting the group would attract twenty years in prison.

Barely two years into Boko Haram's resort to violence, some of the group's violent activities garnered global attention such as the bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja in 2011, the kidnap and eventual murder of Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara, who were British and Italian respectively, in 2011, and the kidnap of nearly 300 in 2014 in Chibok, a town in Borno State which led to a global campaign known as "Bring Back Our Girls" (Mantzikos, 2014; Elden, 2014; Bloom & Matfess, 2016).[4] The group has claimed responsibility for many dangerous attacks that resulted in heavy fatalities such as the Mubi Mosque Bombing of May 2018 which claimed the lives of 86 people (Musa & Maigari, 2020), and Jos Bombing of 2014 which killed 118 people (Mantzikos, 2014), and Baga massacre of 2015 which claimed the lives of nearly 2000 people (Sreberny, 2016).

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI), in its publication of 2015, states that Boko Haram had become the second most deadly group, only behind ISIS which was at its peak at that time. The GTI notes that Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) were responsible for 51% of global terrorist attacks in 2014. It further stated that 7,512 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Nigeria just in 2014. In 2021, the United Nations (UN) estimated that the activities of Boko Haram had led to the death of nearly 350,000 (*Reuters*, 2021a).

As a result of the group's extremely violent activities which drew global attention, the US State Department designated it as a terrorist organization in November 2013, a move which was replicated by the European Union in May 2014, and the UN Security Council May 2014 (Oyewole,

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[4] Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara were construction workers kidnapped and later killed in Birnin Kebbi. Their killing helped drew global attention the Boko Haram. See *BBC* (2013c) and European Parliament (2012).

2016). The US even placed a bounty of $7 million on the leadership of Boko Haram (Mazen, 2013). Poling (2013) notes that the US action towards Boko Haram was motivated by the group's attacks on possible US interests, and the group's alliance with Al-Qaeda. Other countries that have designated the group as a terrorist organization include Malaysia, Bahrain, New Zealand, Canada, China, Iraq, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates. The United Nations on 22 May 2014 also designated the group as a terrorist organization**.**

Boko Haram, although more active in the Northeast of Nigeria, operates in many more states in the northern region, including Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. While there have been rumors of Boko Haram fighters infiltrating the Southern part of Nigeria as reported by the *BBC* (2015), there has never been a major attack carried by the group in the South. Figure 1.1 shows the map of Nigeria, with the states most affected by the group's terrorist activities in orange color.

Figure 1.1

Map of the 36 States of Nigeria

Source: Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopedia (2023, September 13). Boko Haram. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram.

Between 2009 and 2015, the Nigerian government engaged Boko Haram through violence only, which led to the death of its founder, Muhammed Yusuf, and thousands of its members. As the war against the group intensified, the group's terrorism increased as well. Adelaja et al. (2018) and Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2023) states that the group`s campaign has caused over 35,000 deaths, displaced more than two million three hundred thousand people, and has created a serious humanitarian crisis.

But after five years of war against the group, between 2010 and September 2015, the OSC program has been introduced by the Nigerian government as a strategy for countering Boko Haram's activities. The program helps members of the group who surrender to undergo deradicalization and rehabilitation, and finally get reintegrated into society, which will help restore peace in the northeast part of the country.

1.3. Study Objective, Gap, Research Question and Argument

The main objective of this study is to evaluate the performance of the OSC as a part of government strategy for countering Boko Haram and restoring peace in the affected region. The study is particularly interested in the program's ability to help former members of Boko Haram reintegrate effectively into society, its ability to foster peace between ex-members of Boko Haram and their communities and the country at large.

This study raises two important questions about the program: how has the OSC performed as a strategy to counter Boko Haram and restore peace in the northeast? Why has it performed the way it did? This first question helps to evaluate the performance of the program in relation to the objectives for which it was established, while the second question helps to identify the factors that have influenced such performance.

Regarding the first research question, some previous studies suggest that the OSC has performed well by relying on the number of former members of Boko Haram who have embraced the program and have graduated from it (International Crisis Group, 2021). Others argue that the program has not performed well by focusing on the operational challenges faced by the program (Onuoha, 2020; van Zyl, 2019; Onapanjo & Ozden, 2020; Abatan & Hoinathy, 2021). Existing studies evaluate the program from the lens of each of its components: deradicalization,

rehabilitation, and reintegration. However, there is a need to evaluate the program collectively to be able to ascertain its performance.

Regarding the second research question, some studies suggest that the program's poor performance emanates from wrong timing (Obaji Jr., 2022; Hassan & Routley, 2022), from wrong categorization of the participants, which results from poor screening (van Zyl, 2019; Nuhu, 2021; Akum Samuel, 2020), and from poor implementation which has generated negative attitude from the victims and affected communities (Felbab-Brown, 2018; Owonikoko, 2022; Odoh et al., 2023).[5]

However, there are three gaps identified in the existing studies. First, existing studies have not paid attention to how the conceptualization of the program has affected its performance.[6] Instead, the studies have focused on issues arising from how the program is implemented. Second, existing studies evaluated the program by focusing on each of the three components— deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration—distinctively and not collectively. Third, while existing studies highlighted some of the major problems affecting the performance of the OSC, particularly the negative attitude towards former Boko Haram members, the studies focused on victims and affected communities alone. But there is a need to extend the study beyond the victims and the affected communities.

The main argument of the study is that, although the OSC has scored some achievements in the deradicalization component by helping provide an escape route for those trapped with Boko Haram and deradicalizing those with extremist views, as well as in the rehabilitation component by

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[5] In this study, affected communities refer to communities that have been attacked by Boko Haram, or communities where inhabitants have had to flee for fear of Boko Haram's attack.

[6] In this study the term conceptualization follows the definition provided by Dictionary.com (n.d.), "the action or process of forming a concept or idea of something." Its closest synonym is "formulation."

tackling poverty and illiteracy, and providing skills and resources to discourage recidivism, the program suffers from major weaknesses in the reintegration component, which is concerned with reconciliation and justice aspects of peacebuilding. The reintegration component lacks transitional justice, which is concerned with addressing past violence, apportioning accountability, providing justice, and facilitating reconciliation; and restorative justice which focuses on repairing relationship between offenders and victims and affected communities.[7] It also lacks citizens' support, another important ingredient needed for the success of government policies. The conceptualization of the OSC has been much too focused on winning over members of the Boko Haram terrorist organization and has paid too little or much too delayed attention to the fears and concerns of communities victimized by Boko Haram and traumatized by its depredations, and those of the Nigerian citizenry.

The study therefore examines the conceptualization of the program, and how that has affected its performance. To be specific, the study investigates to what extent the OSC incorporates key elements of peacebuilding. As a program which encourages reintegration of people associated with a terrorist organization into the society, key instruments for peacebuilding which are sacrosanct to creating a welcoming environment must be factored in to ensure the objective of the program is achieved. This is because of the numerous evidence suggesting that a hostile environment is a major factor militating against effective reintegration of former terrorists (Koller, 2020; Morton & Silber, 2018; Hecker, 2021; Hwang, 2018).

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[7] See 1.5.1 for a detailed explanation of both transitional justice and restorative justice.

1.4. History of Violent Groups in Nigeria

The History of violent groups in Nigeria predates the independence period. Scholars like Falola (2009) and Ikimẹ (1972) have argued that the coming of the British colonial regime led to the emergence of many violent groups from different parts of the country who opposed colonialism. The groups were products of the radical changes introduced in the sociopolitical and economic landscape of the country by the advent of colonialism.

One of the groups was the Ekumeku movement, a secret organization in the Anioma part of Igboland in the southern part of the country, that carried out insurgency against the colonial rule between 1883 and 1914 (Igbafe, 1971).[8] The group adopted the guerilla tactics, which led to the death of many British colonial officials including Mr. Crewe-Read, who was the District Commissioner for Agbor. However, due to the superior weapon of the British, the movement's struggle eventually ended in defeat, while some of its leaders were either jailed or killed (Ohadike, 1991; *The African Gourmet*, n.d). However, Ekumeku and other groups laid the foundation of violent resistance groups in the country.

The struggle for the independence of the country was not devoid of violent nationalism. The nationalists adopted some measures that were labelled terrorism by the colonial administration (Offiong, 1984; Adebiyi, 2008; Uwazuruike, 2007). An organization known as the Zikist Movement was at the forefront of such activities.[9] It was an anti-colonial group made up of young people who saw violence as an instrument for freedom. Obi-Ani and Obi-Ani (2010) refers to the group as a "collection of angry and embittered youths desirous of positive action and prepared to

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[8] Ekumeku is an Igbo word which literary means "death rather than slavery."

[9] It was a group formed by young, educated Nigerians who were attracted to the ideals of Nnamdi Azikiwe (ZIK) who led the struggle for Independence after the end of World War II. See Boele Van Hensbroek (1998).

ignite a revolution to end British policy of divide and rule." According to Olusanya (1966), a pamphlet shared by the group stated thus:

> You [members of the group] should revolt, you should hate every European this country, protest against Nigeria becoming a military and police state; don't fear to attack any European or African who stands in your way to freedom. (Olusanya, 1996, p.327)

Gbenenye (2016) states that assassination attempts by the group on the Colonial Chief Secretary, Mr. Hugh Foot, led to a massive crackdown on the group which led to the incarceration of most of its members. As a result of their attraction to use of violence to end colonialism, the group was proscribed. That led to the end of the group as those who were not jailed could not re-assemble to continue with their activities.

The post independent Nigeria has not been spared of the presence of violent movements. One of such groups was the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) formed by Isaac Adaka Boro in 1966. It was a militant group that led an insurgency against the Nigerian government with the objective of addressing the marginalization of the oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta of the Southern region (Osaghae, 1995; Orodare, 2020). Orodare (2020) states that Boro was arrested after just 12 days of fighting with the Nigeria soldiers, jailed, but was later granted amnesty almost one year later by the Nigerian government led by General Yakubu Gowon.

Another group was the Maitasine, a radical Islamic group that started its operation in 1980 in Northern Nigeria, until it was decimated by the military in1985 (Dash, 1982; Isichei, 1987; Hiskett, 1987).[10] The group, which carried out violent activities during the period it operated, is regarded as the forerunner of Boko Haram because of their ideological similarities and shared

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[10] Maitatsine comes from a Hausa word which literally means "one who is not afraid of speaking against evil." See Adesoji (2011).

motivation for establishing an Islamic caliphate to replace "man-made regimes" (Adesoji, 2011; Aghedo, 2014; Akinola, 2015). The group fizzled out when its founder, Muhammed Marwa, was killed by the Nigerian security forces, but the whole conflict led to the death of over four thousand people, and tens of thousands displaced (Isichei, 1987).

In the Southwest, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), formed in 1994 by Fredrick Fashanu, has led violent agitations against the Nigerian government for many political reasons ranging from restoration of the Late MKO Abiola's mandate, to self-determination, to vigilantism, among others (Adebanwi, 2005; Salami, 2005).[11] Although the OPC still operates to this day, Salami notes that it has evolved from a violent militant group to a mere security outfit.

Upon return to democracy in 1999, but particularly from 2004, militancy in the Niger-Delta Region resumed under decentralized groups, who are united by the marginalization of their region by the successive Nigerian government. Groups like Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDV), and Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) carried out incessant kidnapping of expatriate workers and pipeline vandalization. However, in 2009, an amnesty program, the Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP), was established as a strategy to restore peace in the Niger-Delta region (Adebayo & Matsilele, 2019; Agbiboa, 2013a; Ebienfa, 2011; Dele et al., 2017). The PAP was a product of an agreement between the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta militants in which the government would grant amnesty and a rehabilitation package for militants who drop their arms within a space of 60 days, between August 6, 2009, and October 4, 2009. The program is considered by many studies as a success

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[11] The Late MKO Abiola (an ethnic Yoruba) was the assumed winner of in the 1993 Presidential election which was annulled by President Ibrahim Babanginda. See Adefisoye & Oluwaleye (2018).

because it achieved its main objective which was ending the Niger Delta militancy (International Crisis Group, 2015; Ajibola, 2015; Ebo & George, 2022).

A cursory assessment indicates that the movements in the south are often triggered by agitation for resource control as in the case of Niger Delta militancy led by MEND (Ebienfa, 2011; Courson, 2011), and political motivations like the June 12 riot, or self-determination led by the OPC, Yoruba Nations agitation for an independence of Yoruba ethnic people, and MASSOB and IPOB which respectively agitate for the independence of the predominantly Igbo people of the Southeast region (Onwuegbuchulam & Mtshali, 2017). As such, all militant groups that have emerged in the south are devoid of any religious coloration, unlike in the north where violent groups are usually produced by the interaction between religion and other components of the region such as politics, minority issues, or social-economic issues (Esimai, 2006; Akinyemi & Isiugo-Abanihe, 2014; Okafor, 2018).

Considering how the activities of previous groups were handled by the government, one finds that Nigeria has adopted different strategies, both kinetic and non-kinetic, in the past to combat violent groups. This dynamism of implementing various strategies at different times places a burden on studies to ascertain what factors make the country adopt a particular strategy, and the role each has played in building peace thereafter.

1.5. Theoretical Consideration: Peacebuilding Theory

There appears to be a consensus among scholars that the word 'theory" is etymologically linked to the Greek word *theorin*, which translates to "to view" or "to assume." According to Walker and Avant (2019, p.6) it "is an internally consistent group of relational statements that presents a systematic view about a phenomenon and is useful for description, explanation, prediction, prescription and sometimes control the study of that phenomenon." A theory is an

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essential component of research in social sciences as it serves as a skeleton that helps to create understanding about the phenomenon being studied. It also serves as a guide towards making assumptions about the possible results of the study. As Abend (2008) notes, it is used to give explanations, as well as make predictions about an observable fact. It is also used to show the strength or weakness of an idea, a study, or a hypothesis. It is the link between the problem research seeks to solve and the gap it intends to fill. Kuada (2018) states:

> A theory provides the language, the concepts, and assumptions
>
> that help researchers to make sense of the phenomenon that they
>
> seek to investigate. It enables researchers to connect the issues they
>
> are investigating to the existing body of knowledge in the area.
>
> (Kuada, 2012, p. 64)

This study adopts peacebuilding theory as a theoretical framework because amnesty programs are usually implemented as strategies to build peace in the context of conflict resolution. Although the OSC serves as a strategy to counter Boko Haram's terrorist activities, its framing shows that it is meant to serve as a grand design to ensure that peace returns to the northeast. Therefore, the framing and objective of the OSC situates it within peacebuilding framework.

Paffenholz (2009) defines peacebuilding as the method of ensuring that peace is established, while Collins (2013, p.422) defines it as "actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures, aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of conflict." Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p.774) notes that "peacebuilding is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution." While there appears to be no single definition of peacebuilding, the definitions above view peacebuilding as possessing three core objectives: resolving a conflict, entrenching peace, and ensuring that the conflict does not spring up again.

Peacebuilding theory is credited to Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, who is widely considered the father of Peace Studies (Kaufman, 2015; Wuchold, 2019). In his seminal work, *Three Approaches to Peace*, Galtung (1969, p.298) notes that "the mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up." Galtung's position is that peace is not entropic but requires a methodical and strategic planning and implementation of measures necessary to ensure an end to conflict and institutionalization of peace, which will help in creating a long distance between peace and conflict. As such, the essence of peacebuilding is to achieve not only negative peace (to bring a conflict to an end), but also positive peace (to achieve a long-term peace).

Although Galtung's works laid the foundation for peacebuilding studies, many studies have provided various approaches to achieve peace. A study by Interpeace (2017) provides a Three Tracks approach to peacebuilding (see Figure 1.2). The first track focuses on the roles of policymakers and government officials, the second track focuses on institutions, experts, and organizations, while the third track focuses on the communities and citizens.

The three tracks show the parties who have roles to play in ensuring the success of a peacebuilding program. The government oversees the formulation of strategies and policies for the program, and the civil society helps in carrying it out by way of support, sensitization, and sometimes, implementation, while the community or the grassroot needs to co-operate with both the government and civil society to ensure its success. Figure 1.2 shows the flow of the three tracks.

Figure 1.2

The Three Tracks of Peacebuilding

Source: Interpeace (2017). Track 6: A strategy for Inclusive Peacebuilding.

Another important approach to peacebuilding is strategic peacebuilding. It posits that effective and sustainable peacebuilding requires calculated and holistic planning and implementation, geared towards conflict transformation as opposed to conflict management (Barnett et al., 2007; Lederach & Appleby, 2010). According to Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (n.d., para, 2) the central objective of strategic peacebuilding is not just to end a conflict, but "to build societies, institutions, policies, and relationships that are better able to sustain peace and justice." As such, the target of strategic building is not an immediate peace, but a sustainable one, so its engagement with conflict resolution and conflict transformation is simultaneous and not one after another.

Strategic peacebuilding has become an umbrella term with many frameworks. Barnett et al. (2007) provides the three dimensions framework to strategic peacebuilding (see Table 1.1). The

first dimension focuses on ensuring that fighters shun violence and return to live normal life as citizens. The emphasis of the first dimension is on demobilization and reintegration of fighters, but as strategic peacebuilding goes beyond just persuading combatants to stop acts of violence, the second dimension focuses on rebuilding infrastructure and institutions affected by the conflict which will ensure that citizens return to normal life in a peaceful society. Furthermore, the third dimension essentially focuses on the need to rebuild trust by creating a platform for victims and offenders to have a conversation about the past, and decide to move forward together, given certain conditions like apology or restitution through transitional and restorative justice. The third dimension also emphasizes the need for counselling and support for both the victims and offenders to guarantee a harmonious co-existence.

Table 1.1

The Three-dimensional Approach to Peacebuilding

First Dimension	Second Dimension	Third Dimension
Taking away weapons, re-integrating former combatants into civilian society.	Rebuilding basic facilities, transportation and communication networks, utilities, developing rule of law systems and public administration, building educational and health infrastructure, providing technical and capacity-building assistance for institutions creating legitimate (democratic, accountable) state institutions.	Trauma counseling, transitional justice and restoration, community dialogue, building bridges between different communities, increasing human rights, gender empowerment, raising environmental awareness, promoting economic development, developing a civil society and private sector that can represent diverse interests and challenge the state peacefully.

Source: Marshall, A. (2022). What is Peacebuilding?

Another framework for strategic peacebuilding is the three pathways framework by Lederach and Mansfield (2010). The first pathway is violence prevention, conflict response and transformation pathway, which focuses on dialogues and conflict resolution, non-violent social change, humanitarian actions, and government and multi-lateral efforts. The second pathway is structural and institutional change, which focuses on development, education, dealing with transnational and global threats and law, advocacy and solidarity. The third pathway is justice and healing, which focuses on trauma healing, transitional justice and restorative justice.

Figure 1.3

Pathways to Strategic Peacebuilding

Source: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (n.d).

Another framework for strategic peacebuilding is the Utstein Peacebuilding Palette proposed by Smith (2004), which he developed for the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). The framework also suggested that peacebuilding must be amenable to given situations as well as susceptible to adaptability. As such, a peacebuilding program should be able to adapt to realities that it is confronted with during the implementation phase.

The Utstein Peacebuilding Palette has four components: security, political framework, reconciliation and justice and socio-economic foundations. The composition of the four components highlights that they are intertwined and function in order of sequence of importance to ensure successful peacebuilding. The study likened the four components as those of a machine where co-operation and orderly function are needed to ensure effective results.

The security component encompasses Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), reformation of the security sector, stopping the inflow of arms, and humanitarian actions, while the socio-economic foundations component focuses on reconstruction of infrastructure, supporting those in the internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp to return, and ensuring food security. The political framework component focuses on ensuring democratic practices, good governance, and building institutions to help sustain peace, while reconciliation and justice component focuses on dialogue among actors in the conflict, bridge-building, truth and reconciliation, trauma management and healing.

Figure 1.4
Utstein Peacebuilding Palette

Security
*Humanitarian mine action
*Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
* Security sector reform
*Small arms and light weapons

Political Framework
*Democratisation (Parties, media, NGO, democratic culture)
* Good governance, (accountability, rule of law, justice system)
* Institutional building
* Human rights (monitoring law, justice system)

Socio-economic Foundation
*Pysical reconstruction
*Economic infrastructure
*Infrastructure of health and education
*Repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs
*Food security

Peacebuilding

Reconcilaition and Justice
*Dialogue between leaders of antagonistic groups
*Grass roots dialogue
*other bridge building activities
*Truth and reconciliation commissions
*Trauma therapy and healing

Source: Smith, D. (2004) Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: getting their act together.

The three-dimensional framework, the pathway framework and Utstein Peacebuilding Palette show that peacebuilding processes are interconnected. Prioritizing one over others or vice versa can make peacebuilding efforts to be unsustainable. For example, if violence prevention is achieved, as well as structural and institutional change, but dialogue, reconciliation healing and

justice are ignored, it can lead to fresh violence from the victims against offenders in the form of revenge. In the same vein, if dialogue, reconciliation healing and justice are achieved without the two other pathways, it can lead to exploitation by offenders, who can continue to carry out their violent activities (Melin, 2021; Campbell, 2018).

One important point to note is that all the three peacebuilding frameworks provide similar valuable instruments for peacebuilding such as transitional justice, restorative justice, and reconciliation. While the pathway framework can be used for local, as well as international conflict because it possesses the transnational and global threat component, the three-dimensional framework and the Utstein Peacebuilding Palette thoroughly covers conflicts within a border or in a local context.

Since strategic peacebuilding has become an umbrella theory, this study leans towards the Utstein Peacebuilding Palette framework. The reason is that the framework's four components which are security, political framework, socio-economic foundations, and reconciliation and justice, encapsulate the three components of the OSC: deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration. The security and political framework components cover the deradicalization component of the OSC, the socio-economic foundation component covers the rehabilitation component of the OSC, while the reconciliation and justice component covers the reintegration component of the OSC.

1.5.1. Transitional Justice and Restorative Justice as Instruments for Peacebuilding

Since peacebuilding revolves around both victims and offenders, studies have suggested the need for transitional justice (Barsalou, 2005; Lederach, 1995; Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2018; Barnet et al. 2007). According to the United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014, para. 1), transitional justice is "the full range of processes

and mechanisms associated with a society's attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation."

Just as the name suggests, it is usually applied when a country is making a transition from a period of violent conflict to a period of stability. Boraine (2006) notes that it could follow a judicial process in form of a formal court or special tribunal proceedings, or non-judicial processes such as reparation programs, traditional or customary strategy distinct to a community, or special commissions. But as Wielenga (n.d.) highlights, the main concern should not be whether to follow judicial or non-judicial process, but to adopt one that can guarantee sustainable peacebuilding in the context of each community's experience.

A study by Webber (2012) posits that transitional justice has three main approaches: retrospectivity, which focuses on addressing past events, the prospectivity, which seeks a better future away from the past, and legal and political reforms to ensure sustainability. Similarly, the OHCHR (n.d.) outlined the four pillars of transitional justice as truth, justice, reparation, memorialization and guarantees of non-recurrence.[12] More so, a study by the United States Institute of Peace (2008) suggests that it has six main objectives: truth-telling, recognize grief of the victims, acceptance of accountability by offenders, compensation to victims, prevention of further violence, and promotion of healing.

A study by Boraine (2006) introduced the five pillars of transitional justice as accountability, truth recovery, institutional reform, reparation, and reconciliation. The study posits that for transitional justice to be effective as a peacebuilding strategy offenders must be held responsible for their violent acts, the society should know the truth about what happened, how it happened, why it happened, and when it happened. Strategies should be put in place to ensure non-

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[12] Memorialization can be in form of museum, parks, paintings, statues, Remembrance Day, or memorabilia. See Senie (2006).

recurrence of such violent activities, those affected should be recognized as victims and be compensated for their loss, and finally, effort should be made to encourage reconciliation between offenders and the victims and the society.

As such, transitional justice is an important instrument for peacebuilding as it grants a form of justice to victims and creates a pathway for reconciliation between victims and offenders. It also helps in achieving and sustaining rule of law, human rights, and peace in a community or state that hitherto engrossed in violence. Furthermore, it helps to strengthen institutions and agencies of the government to be able to function effectively.

Another instrument suggested by scholars of peacebuilding is restorative justice (Zehr, 2009; Llewellyn & Philpott, 2014). It argues that violent crimes affect both the targeted individual and the public where the offence has taken place. Because it acknowledges the public or a whole community as victims rather than only the affected individuals, its focus is to repair the harm and restore the community to where it was before the violent crime occurred. It suggests that peacebuilding should focus on restoring the relationship between offenders and victims and society.

Although restorative justice places no punishment on the offenders, it creates a platform for victims to meet face-to-face with the offenders for reconciliation. Webber (2012) states that the main objectives of restorative justice are to make offenders acknowledge their offence and the impact it has had on the victims, present them with a prospect of apologizing, and subsequently live freely in society. Robinson and Shapland (2008) suggests that it lessens the prospect of recidivism on the side of the offender who feels forgiven by the victim, and the community at large, and gives the right of forgiveness to the victims, rather than the state.

1.5.2. Reconciliation

As can be seen, both transitional justice and restorative justice embrace the idea that peacebuilding will not be achieved without reconciliation between the offender and the victim. Conciliation Resources (2021) recognizes the importance of reconciliation in peacebuilding and posits that it plays two important roles: rebuilding and transforming relationships shattered by conflict, without which it will be impossible to achieve sustainable peace, while Jeong (2000) suggests that it ushers healing for the victims and safety for the offenders.

According to Lederach (1997) for reconciliation to be effective, it must deal with three propositions: public narration of a painful experiences and the pursuit of a sustainable mutually dependent future, a cross-fertilization of truth and clemency, and addressing a sordid past as a prospect for creating and sustaining a peaceful post-conflict society. Lederach further provides a framework for reconciliation based on a sequence of importance: truth, justice, mercy, and peace (see Figure 1.5).

In sum, peacebuilding theory is important to this study because first, it encapsulates the three components of the OSC program: deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The deradicalizations component removes Boko Haram members from the path of violence, the rehabilitation component seeks to put measures in place to ensure they do not return to violence, while the third component, reintegration, seeks to return them to civil life. As such, the OSC does not just seek to stop the activities of Boko Haram, but to ensure that its former members can live peacefully within the society where they killed, raped, bombed, and kidnapped people.

Figure 1.5

Components of Reconciliation

Source: Lederach JP (1997). Building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies.

In addition, the OSC through the rehabilitation component provides former members of the Boko Haram with resources and skills to be able to navigate through life after returning to society, which is believed to help discourage recidivism. From the OSC perspective, empowering them will tackle issues of poverty and unemployment which helps fuel the activities of Boko Haram. More

so, the OSC through the reintegration component provides former Boko Haram members with an opportunity to return to civil life in society. However, how well the OSC is conceptualized and the opinion its implementation generates can affect its performance.

1.6. Methodology

This section deals with the method of inquiry adopted by the study. Dawson (2019) defines methodology as the main principle that guides research. Therefore, without an articulate methodology, the study will be out of shape. As such this study adopts a qualitative research approach to evaluate the performance of the OSC, as against quantitative method which many previous studies that used metric as evaluation approach adopted.

The reason for adopting the qualitative research method is because it details and describes the experiences, thoughts, and views of the population being studied, and affords the researcher the platform to interact with them in a more penetrating way, having built a strong background while reviewing already existing data. Barbour (2008) states that qualitative methods afford the researcher an opportunity to understand the interaction between people and ideas. Since the study focuses on the lived experience and behavior of former Boko Haram members, victims and affected communities and the perspective of citizens, qualitative method is well-positioned to produce the desired result. Kothari (2004) encapsulates it appropriately thus:

> Through such research [qualitative research] we can analyze the various
>
> factors which motivate people to behave in a particular manner or which
>
> make people like or dislike a particular thing. (Kothari, 2004, p.3)

This study leans towards phenomenological qualitative method, often trace to Edmund Husserl (Baron, 1983; Sokolowski,1988). It focuses on exploring and understanding human experiences, perceptions, and the meaning individuals attach to those experiences. It aims to

uncover the essence of a phenomenon, which is the underlying structure or core meaning that characterizes a particular experience (Lester, 1999; Bliss, 2016).

In the context of peace and conflict studies, phenomenological research can be a valuable methodology for gaining insight into the subjective experiences of individuals who have been directly or indirectly affected by conflict, violence, or efforts to promote peace. Therefore, as a study that draws from human experiences of people associated with Boko Haram, victims of Boko Haram, affected communities, and the citizens to evaluate the performance of the OSC, phenomenological approach is best suited for it.

1.6.1. Data Collection

This study adopts the triangulation method by combining both secondary and primary collection methods. Patton (1999, p.1) defined it as "the use of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena." Triangulation is not a sign of poor research ability, but evidence of understanding of good research. Noble and Heale (2019) suggests, it increases the reliability and validity of results of a study. It can also help reduce bias on the side of the researcher.

In this study, secondary data is collected from existing sources such as books, journals, newspaper articles, and websites, as well publications from government, local and international organizations or institutes that have published materials relevant to the study. Some of the newspaper sources used come from international news agencies such *Al Jazeera, BBC, DW.* Equally, sources such as Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, International Peace Institute, Global Terrorism Index, among others provided materials that provided invaluable data to the study.

As ten Have (2004, p.5) opines, "one does not have to wait for a phenomenon of interest to emerge naturally; one can work to have it created on the spot", this study also adopted primary

data by conducting semi-structured interviews. The choice of a semi-structured interview is because while it provides a guide by posing a takeoff question, it allows participants the liberty to express their thoughts in a free flow manner, which provides a deeper insight into their perspective about the subject of study. It also helps the interviewer to ask follow-up questions based on the response received, instead of sticking to just an outlined question. It equally helps the interviewer to stay on course and not be distracted by always returning to ask questions about the subject matter, instead of always focusing on the interviewees responses that may be distant to the study (Husband, 2020; Mashuri, 2022).

1.6.2. Participants

Some of the participants of this interview were contacted through social media platforms I belong to, and others were introduced to me by friends or acquaintances. A total of 84 people were contacted for interview, 15 people declined to participate, citing reasons like busy schedule, the sensitivity of the topic, and lack of internet data (internet constraint), while three people pulled out during the interview citing the sensitivity of the topic.

At the end, a total of 56 people, who were not paid and were not given any form of inducement, participated in the interview. The interview used open-ended questions and was conducted between May and December 2020. The participants were selected through a stratified random sampling representing age, religion, gender, ethnicity, and victims and non-victims. As Hayes (2020) notes, one of the advantages of stratified random sampling method is that it gives the researcher the opportunity of getting a sample population that ideally represents the whole population.

Thirty-five of those who participated in the interview were from the northern Nigeria, while twenty-one were from the southern Nigeria. More people from the north were deliberately

chosen for the interview because the region is the epic-center of Boko Haram activities. However, the inclusion of a sizable number of Christians from the north was to ascertain their position as some of the major attacks by Boko Haram were carried out against Christian communities and towns such as Chibok, Pemi, and Michika.[13]

The interview was conducted online using WhatsApp, Line, Facebook, Skype, and ZOOM. Although I wanted to conduct a face-to-face interview with the participants at the outset, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult to do so. However, that did not affect the quality of the data collected as the interviews were conducted without hitches.

Hereunder are snapshots of the research participants' information and background. The first table (1.2) covers information like age, gender, and education background, while the second table (1.3) covers ethnicity, religion, and status. By status, this study meant those who are either victims or non-victims of Boko Haram.

It is also important to note that victims in this study referred to those who have in one way, or the other been affected by their activities.[14] For example, one of the participants fled his village and has not been home for more than seven years. Others were either soldiers, or ex-soldiers, or had family members who were soldiers involved in the conflict, while another had his maternal uncle killed by the group. All of them consider themselves victims of terrorism.

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[13] Chibok and Pemi are in Borno State, while Michika is in Adamawa State.

[14] It is important to note that this study's use of the term is based on the expression of victimhood by some participants during the interview.

Table 1.2

Snapshot of the Research Participants Information (1)

Age			Gender		Education Background	
18-35	36-50	51-65	Male	Female	Elementary-High School	University
21	20	15	37	21	10	46

Source: Data collected and compiled by the author.

Table 1.3

Snapshot to Research Participants Information (2)

Ethnicity				Religion			Status	
Igbo	Hausa	Yoruba	Others	Islam	Christianity	Others	Victim	Non-victim
14	17	14	11	26	24	6	23	33

Source: Data collected and compiled by the author.

1.6.3. Data Analysis

Data analysis in qualitative studies often focuses on examining non-numerical data, such as text, audio, video, or images, unlike in quantitative data analysis. It detects patterns, themes, and perceptions. It is generally adopted by researchers in humanities and social sciences, where the objective of research is to understand the meaning, context, and fundamental concepts in the data.

This study adopts the thematic analysis approach. It begins with the organization of the data collected by listening to audio recordings of the interviews and transcribing it, which was helpful in gaining prior insight about the data. The next step taken was coding which helped to identify and assign tags to sections of the data that represent important themes such as (in)justice, fear, skepticism, rejection, regret, poor conceptualization, morality, trauma, among others.

After coding, I categorized the themes according to their relevance to the objective of the study, revised and merged categories that overlap, and interpreted the data as it relates to research questions. I also analyzed the meaning of the themes and how they are connected to the study, and to check the credibility of the themes, I checked through the interviews again.

1.6.4. Ethical Consideration

The study was conducted in line with integrity in focus. First, due to the sensitiveness of the topic under study, the researcher ensured that the participants read, understood, and gave their consents before the interview started. Necessary steps were taking to protect the interest and identity of the interviewer and the interviewee.[15] As such, during the presentation of the interview analysis, the names of the participants were changed to maintain anonymity and confidentiality.

Second, only the researcher and the supervisory committee involved in the dissertation will have access to the information of the interview. Moreover, the interview results will be used only for academic purposes like symposiums, conference presentation, research papers, and books. Under no circumstance will it be used for any non-academic purpose.

1.7. Organization of the Study

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The reason for dividing it into chapters is to ensure cohesion of thoughts, ideas, and compliance with the standard of writing doctoral dissertation. In chapter one, which is the introduction, I highlighted the background, motivation, arguments, and the theoretical consideration of the study. Chapter one also discusses the methodology adopted by the study. Overall, the chapter laid the foundation for the progress of the study.

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[15] See Appendix A (consent form).

Chapter two, which is the literature review, is an incursion into the existing studies on terrorism, counterterrorism strategies, and particularly, the Operation Safe Corridor in Nigeria. On terrorism, the study focused on the debates about terrorism, how it ends, why people join it, why people abandon it, and why those who abandon it return to it afterwards. On counterterrorism, the study focused on strategies countries adopt to end terrorism, why countries adopt each strategy, and how each strategy fares. It also reviewed on studies about the use of amnesty as a counterterrorism strategy against Jihadist groups in Kenya and Somalia. Finally, it reviews existing studies on operation Safe Corridor.

Chapter three presents an overview of Boko Haram as an organization. It highlights the historical evolution of the group from a band of radical preachers based in a city in northern Nigeria to a transnational terrorist organization. It underscores the groups ideology, grievances, method of operation and targets, and funding. The essence of this chapter is to provide an in-depth knowledge about Boko Haram and its operation in Nigeria.

Chapter four explores the transition of Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy from war against terror to amnesty. It highlights the various military campaigns by the Nigerian government against Boko Haram; and further examines why the war against the group has not been successful. It further presents an overview of the OSC program, showing the motivation behind its conceptualization, its components, and its implementation. It also presents the role of countries like Japan, the US, the EU, and Britain, and non-state actors like NGOs and United Nations agencies in the conflict, especially towards peacebuilding.

Chapters five and six provide answers to the research questions raised in the study. It provides the basis for the main argument of the dissertation that the OSC has not performed greatly as a strategy for restoring peace in the northeast part of the country, particularly with the

reintegration component of the program. Through provision of evidence the chapter presents the factors responsible for the poor performance of the program.

Chapter seven, which is the final chapter, provides a summary of the dissertation, and reinforces the argument of the study, as well as its contribution to the literature on OSC, and Peace and Conflict studies in general. It also reinforces the relevance of peacebuilding theory, as well as qualitative method of enquiry to the study. Finally, it provides a fertile ground for further studies about Boko Haram, the OSC Program, amnesty as a counterterrorism, and counterterrorism in general. It also comes up with some recommendations that can be helpful in improving the OSC program to become more effective in restoring and building last peace in the Northeast region.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the existing literature regarding the study. The literature was selected based on its relevance to this study and the need to identify gaps in the existing studies. The first section (Section 2.2) explores the popular debates on terrorism, chiefly about conceptualization and definition, motivation for joining and leaving terrorism, and why people return to terrorism after leaving it. It also explores studies on factors that lead to the rise of terrorism, and those that lead to its end.

The second section (Section 2.3) explores studies on counterterrorism. First, it provides the conceptual overview of counterterrorism, and how to evaluate its performance as a government policy towards extremist groups. It further reviews studies on several strategies that countries apply when confronted by terrorism and explores the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy.

The third section (2.4) is a consideration of the literature on amnesty in general and in the context of countering terrorism. It touches on studies about the use of amnesty for counterterrorism in Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt; and, on a previous amnesty established for the Niger Delta Militant groups in Nigeria. It also focuses on studies about OSC. It reviews particularly previous studies that have evaluated its performance, which helped to identify the gap in literature. The identification of the gap helped to set the study in motion.

2.2. Terrorism: Definitional and Conceptual Debates

The term terrorism has its root from the Latin word *terrere*, which means create an atmosphere of fear (Weimann & Winn, 1994). However, there appears to be a consensus among scholars that it was popularized during the French revolution by Maximilien Robespierre, the leader

of the Jacobins, who referred to the guillotines as a period when terror ruled (Linton, 2011). Its

origin is subject of debate among researchers who have traced it to different epochs. For example,

Chaliand and Blin (2007) and Taylor and Gautron (2015) trace it to the Zealots sect, also known as

the *Sicarii*, a group that adopted organized violence against the Roman colonial regime in the first-

century Palestine, while Lewis (1987) argues that the Assassins of the Ismail sect laid the

foundation of modern terrorism. However, Rapoport (2013) traces it to the anarchist movement in

Russia, which later spread across Europe. The variation of opinions regarding the origin of

terrorism further spills into its meaning, as there is no consensus among scholars about its definition.

Existing studies on terrorism have largely struggled with both conceptual and definitional

problems of the term. Neumann (2009) posits that the lack of conceptual difference regarding

terrorism is because violent actions are sometimes measured through intentions and goals of the

actors, rather than focusing on the violent acts themselves. However, many studies argue that the

objectives are not central to defining terrorism rather the act itself, irrespective of the group's

objective. Mitchell (2012, para. 5) states that the Defense Department defines it as "the unlawful

use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments." However, this attempt

to come up with a comprehensive definition of terrorism is complicated because it will be difficult

to establish when it is lawful to use violence, who should use it, and on whom it should be used.

Other studies have suggested that terrorism is the use of violence to influence government

policies (Mitchell, 2012; Chenoweth, 2006; Laqueur, 1987); however, evidence has shown that not

all terrorist activities target government or want government to change its policies. For example,

Issacharoff (2017) notes that the attack by the ISIS Sinai Province on November 29, 2017, at a

mosque, was not motivated by the need to influence government policies, but by their belief that

Sufi are not true Muslims.[1] Similarly, the attack on Coptic Christians in May 2017, according to the statement released by ISIS, was to cleanse Egypt of infidels (Gilbert, 2017). More so, the March 1995 Sarin Attack on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo owes much to the group's doomsday project and not to force the Japanese government to act in any manner (Metraux, 1995; Gregg, 2014).[2] This is an indication that terrorist groups do not always target the government. Terrorists sometimes make minority groups the object of their attack, or some carry out, in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, religious assignment.

Kaplan (2008, pp. 3-7) identifies three factors that constitute terrorism as "non-conventional tactics, indiscriminate violence that targets the innocent, and coercive intent." However, Cohan (2006) argues that for an act to be regarded as terrorism it must have a desired objective, be well-orchestrated, usually violent, have a target, with a justification, and seek publicity. The position taken by Kaplan lays credence to the notion that terrorism seeks to achieve an objective and is violent in nature but fails to establish some elements of justification by the perpetrators, who in some cases are victims of oppression. Cohan's position, on the other hand, appears comprehensive in conceptualizing most terrorist groups that operate around the world today because they justify their action on premises like freedom fighting, injustice against their group, or carrying out a religious or moral cause. They also enjoy publicity by using social media to showcase their activities.

The debate about terrorism shows that, while it can be seen as a political or social movement, it can also be seen as a religious obligation based on the motive of the organization. Furthermore, it

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[1] Sufi is a strand of Sunni Islam which believes in mysticism. Radical Islamists reject Sufi as a true Islamic sect. See Weismann (2011).

[2] Thirteen people died while more than six thousand people were injured. See Sugiyama et al. (2020).

shows that terrorism is not only the exclusive preserve of people who want to force their ideas on others through violent means but can also be used by those who perceive themselves as victims of an oppressive system such as colonial rule.

2.2.1. Effects of Terrorism

Although there is no consensus about the definition of terrorism, there appears to be a common understanding among scholars of the negative effects it can have on a nation and its people. Many studies have focused on the physical negative effects, such as damage to infrastructure, waste of human lives, damage of public and private institutions, and religious centers, and the economy by discouraging investors (Sandler & Enders, 2008; Shapouri, 2017; Michael, 2007).

However, many studies focus on the non-physical effects such as the creation of an atmosphere of fear, trauma, and insecurity (Siman-Tov et al., 2016; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Jackson, 2014; Schmid, 2023). Butler et al. (2003) argues that the non-physical effects transcend the direct victims because it affects almost everybody in the country. This entails that terrorism creates collective victimhood, rather than personalized victimhood. Another non-physical effect studies have highlighted is that it can create suspicion or tension along religious, ethnic, or racial lines. For example, the rise of populism in Europe and the USA has been attributed to the activities of ISIS and other jihadist groups (Taylor, 2016; Ross, 2022). In many countries in Europe, it has culminated into physical aggression from far-right groups against Muslim migrants for fear of infiltration of terrorists (Hamid, 2019; Kreko et al.,2019).

One important point from the effect of terrorism is that it affects the public, not just the direct victims. For example, the destruction of the economy affects the whole country, while insecurity creates fear for everybody in the country. As such, it should not be handled as a victim's

vs offender's case as it is in many other violent activities. Another point to note is that terrorism can trigger hate, aggression or even xenophobia against certain groups in a country.

2.2.2. Why People Join Terrorist Organizations

Just as there is no single reason responsible for the existence of terrorism, there is also no singular reason why people join terrorist organizations. Some studies have focused on the psychological and mental drivers that inspire individuals to embrace terrorism (Corner & Gill, 2016; Khoshnood, 2017), while others have focused on socioeconomic and political events that are present in a country at a given time as key drivers (Hudson & Majeska, 1999; Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). However, a study by Ross (1993) combines the psychological/mental drivers and socioeconomic/political drivers. Ross identifies three reasons why people join terrorist organizations: structural, psychological, and rational. The structural reasons are unemployment, poverty, ethnicity, race, political conditions, religion; the psychological reasons focus on the cognitive motivation like peer pressure, mental state, emotionally instability, and group dynamics, while rational factor focuses on people who join terrorism for personal gains. Ross posits that personal gain could be material (money or position), the search for freedom; or spiritual (self-fulfilling or paradise in the hereafter).

While the position of Ross (1993) provides some insights into why people become terrorists, it does not provide answers for forced conscription, a method adopted by Boko Haram and many other terrorist groups in sub-Sahara Africa (Anderson, 2016). Neither does it provide answer for people who join terrorist organizations because of family connection. For example, most of the members of the Young Cub in ISIS were children who moved alongside the jihadist parents (Darden, 2019).

Joining a terrorist organization is not an overnight decision (Borum 2004). It follows a trend called radicalization, defined as showing supporting a group during a period of disagreement or conflict because of a shift in views or adoption of an ideology (Moskalenko & McCauley 2020). For Williams (2016), it is "the process by which individuals or groups come to adopt extremist views, particularly sociopolitical or religious views." Neumann (2008) refers to the process as what precedes the bomb. Borum (2004) identified four stages of evolving thoughts process toward radicalization: "it is not right" (the potential radical begins to interpret hitherto normal situation as bad), "it is not fair" (the potential radical becomes disillusioned about the situation), "it is your fault" (the potential radical recognizes a potential target), and "you are evil" (the potential radical sees the target as one that should pay for his/her evil). Borum's position suggests that the underlying factor fueling radicalization is dissatisfaction with the existing status quo, apportioning blame, and the need to eliminate the assumed source of that dissatisfaction through radical means. This appears to focus on terrorist groups with political affiliation or with religious background.

Regarding strategic locations for radicalization, Moskalenko and McCauley (2020) states that there is no isolated place for it. It can take place at the comfort of people's home, through the media, in prison, or by associating with radicalized individuals. However, while William (2016) argued that radicalization scarcely takes place in the mosque, several studies have shown the contrary. A study by Birnbaum and Mekhennet (2017) shows that the Grand Mosque of Brussels serves as the hotspot for radicalization in Belgium, just as Leiken and Brooke (2007) who studied the radicalization process among young Muslims in London observe that the Finsbury Park Mosque headed by Abu Hamza al-Masri was a haven for radicalization.

In addition, many studies have found an intersection between Islamic schools and radicalization in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Sudan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Afghanistan (Bano, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2007; Ginges et al., 2008; Botha, & Abdile, 2019). Singam (2020) notes

that both ISIS and Al-Qaeda, at their peak, relied heavily on network of radical preachers who helped radicalize young Muslims in mosques and many Islamic centers that helped facilitate their movement to Syria and Iraq. However, in recent years, evidence from studies shows that many terrorist groups, particularly ISIS, rely heavily on social media platforms like the YouTube, Facebook, Telegram, and Twitter for recruitment (Bertram, 2016; Awan, 2017; Mitts et al., 2022). As such, radicalization is not restricted to location or format.

One important point to note from the studies regarding why people join terrorist organization is that it does not follow a unique trajectory. There are people who volunteered; people who fought for an expectant reward, whether material or divine; or people who went through the processes of radicalization before joining a terrorist organization. Another important point is that some members of a terrorist group may be considered victims of terrorism themselves because of the manner through which they joined the group, or because of their ages as can be seen from the case of the Young Cubs of ISIS.

2.2.3. How Terrorism Ends

In her book *How Terrorism Ends*, Cronin (2009) posits that there are six ways that can lead to the end of a terrorism campaign. The first is by "decapitation". In this regard, the arrest, incarceration, execution, or assassination of the leader leads to the demise of the group. Cronin notes that the arrest of Asahara Shoko after the Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack led to the gradual demise of the group, Aum Shinrikyo. Further example includes the capture and imprisonment of Abimael Guzmán, the leader of Sendero Luminoso, a communist group that operated in Peru between 1980 and 1992. However, the study notes that the effectiveness of decapitation is dependent on the organizational structure of the group and the cult-personality of the deceased leader. If the group`s decision-making system and the overall management do not rest on the whims

and caprices of the leader, his exit will not be the end of the group, as the next in rank steps in to fill the vacuum. This analysis is particularly important in the case of Boko Haram, as the group started waxing stronger after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, its founder.

Other ways that can lead to the end of a terrorism campaign, according to Cronin (2009), are: transition toward a legitimate political process, achieving the group`s objective, imploding, provoking a backlash, or becoming marginalized or defeated. Similarly, in the study of what led to the collapse of Al-Qaeda, Bayman (2017) notes that the use of force played a major role in the defeat. He states that the group lost 80% of its members by the end of 2001.

Much as the analysis by Bayman (2017) appears to be true, evidence buttresses that many of ISIS fighters were members of Al-Qaeda who melted into the newly emerged group. For example, the former leader of ISIS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was an Al-Qaeda Emir in Iraq until an internal schism made him pull out and formed the Islamic State (Kamolnick, 2017). Further examples can be found in cases involving terrorist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa such as ISWAP which draws membership largely from weakened jihadist groups in the region.

2.2.4. Quitting Terrorism and Recidivism

The reason people quit terrorism has become an object of focus among researchers. A study by Hwang (2018), who conducted field research in Indonesia, observes the role of family as a reason why terrorists quit. According to the study, the roles family plays come in threefold: Quitting because of family need, family support while on the verge of quitting, and support from family after quitting. However, Jacobson (2008) who studied why many Al-Qaeda fighters quit noted that a sense of dissatisfaction with how the group operated led many to quit the group. Citing the case of Abbas, one of the leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Al-Qaeda affiliate, the study stated:

JI commander Abbas began to turn on his organization and to

cooperate with Indonesian counter-terrorism authorities after JI

adopted a Bin Ladin fatwa that called for attacks on civilians.

Abbas believed that jihad was only to be fought on the battlefield

in the defense of Islam. (Jacobson, 2008, p.1)

The study by Jacobson (2008), much as it creates an insight into the role of personal emotion or self-realization in influencing terrorists to quit, focuses only on why they renounce membership of a group and not on why people renounce terrorism. This is an indication that one might quit a jihadist group but has not abandoned radical or jihadist ideas. This can be understood from the study of Speckhard & Ellenberg (2020) who interviewed ISIS defectors and found that most of them became disillusioned because the ISIS propaganda that attracted them was in contrast with the reality they witnessed while with the group. This indicates that there is a propensity for those with expectations of joining the group to quit when the expectations are not achieved. But it does not suggest that they have abandoned radical or jihadist beliefs. Furthermore, a study by Speckhard et al. (2018) shows that many ISIS defectors did not abandon extremism but were averse to a certain strategic approach of the group. The study portrays the experience of one of the defectors, Fitim Lladrovci, from Kosovo, thus:

Nowhere in his interview did Lladrovci express concern for the homes that

were taken from Shia to house ISIS cadres, nor for looting homes, the

genocidal killings and enslavement of Sunnis, Shia, and Yazidis, rapes

of Yazidi women, or ISIS beheadings. Nevertheless, he did feel bad for

ISIS widows who were not paid their widow's pensions and were forced to

remarry in order to survive, and for this boy whom ISIS mistreated. Thus, he

decide to risk everything and defect from the group. (Speckhard et al., 2018,

p.13)

Regarding recidivism, See (2018, p.11) defines it as "the process where a disengaged terrorist either reengages with the terrorist organization or becomes re-radicalized." Many scholars have argued that recidivism does not only take place when the disengaged terrorist returns to terrorism, but also when he/she begins to harbor terrorist ideology again (Speckhard et al., 2018; Altier et al., 2019). The cliché, "once a terrorist, always a terrorist," is premised on evidence of recidivism among many former terrorists. One notable example was that of Usman, a British member of Al-Qaeda, who stabbed two people in Cambridge on November 29, 2019, after his release from prison one year before the incident (*The Guardian*, 2019).[3] Speckhard et al. (2018) note that out of forty-five ISIS defectors who participated in their study, and who had expressed their hatred for ISIS, nine returned to rejoin the group, and many more might have returned. A study by Gardner (2008) observed that almost 70% of people who participate in deradicalization programs in Yemen return to terrorism.

Just as with the case of "why people join" and "why people leave" terrorist organizations, there is no generally acceptable reason people return to terrorism after leaving. This puzzle has led to several studies about the phenomenon. Many studies focused on social factors like social prejudice and stigmatization. These often come in form of family rejection, inability to get a job, inability to make new friends, or inability to severe link with former terrorist comrades (Koller, 2020; Morton & Silber, 2018; Hecker, 2012; Hwang, 2018). Other studies focused on psychological factors like deep attachment to jihadist ideology, mental condition, or depression (Copeland & Marsden, 2020; Hakim & Mujahidah, 2020). As Pluchinsky (2008) states, religious terrorists have more chances of returning to terrorism than those driven by other ideologies.

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[3] Usman had served seven years in prison for trying to set up a terrorist training camp in Pakistan but was release on parole before he carried out the stabbing attack. See *The Guardian* (2019).

2.3. Counterterrorism: A Conceptual Overview

According to Masferrer and Walker (2013), the origin of counterterrorism is traceable to the establishment of the Special Irish Branch in the United Kingdom in 1883 by the then British Home Secretary, Sir William Harcourt. The Special Irish Branch served as a team that helped in the fight against the Fenian Brotherhood and the Irish Republican Brotherhood who were then considered terrorists by the British Government (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004; Majothi, 2015). However, Spencer (2006, p.1) argues that counterterrorism is "as old as terrorism itself," noting that states have always devised strategies for combating terrorism.

Counterterrorism has been conceptualized in many ways. Pillar (2008) posits that it involves discouraging membership in terrorist organizations, preventing groups from embracing terrorism, reducing the strength of terrorist organizations, while Spencer (2006, p.2) defines it as various "policies, operations and programs applied by the government to tackle terrorism." For Pratt (2010), it involves measures or tactics designed to mitigate incapacitate, and dismantle terrorist organizations. For Stigall et al. (2019), it is a strategy adopted by the government to eliminate terrorism and ensure that groups that subscribe to it lack the capacity to operate effectively, while Pillar (2008) states that countries sometimes push for sociopolitical changes as a way of curbing the root causes of terrorism.

Corbin (2017) notes that it can be a direct-action approach (DAA) if carried out to destroy terrorist havens, retaliate against state sponsorship, gather intelligence, or target the assets of an organization. Or it can be defensive approach (DA) when carried out to prevent a terrorist organization from gaining advantage through securitization (making people or places objects of security concern and monitoring their activities to ensure public safety), strict border control and bomb detecting at the airport (Krishnaswamy, 2012).

The studies by Stigall et al. (2019), Pillar (2008), and Corbin (2017) indicate that counterterrorism strategy could be an action, a policy, or a plan, and that it is not only targeted towards terminating a terrorism campaign but can also be used either to discourage terrorist activities or dissuade its membership. However, all the studies agree that the essence of counterterrorism is to ensure that terrorists are not able to carry out their activities.

Studies have argued that counterterrorism is a social construct (Katzenstein, 2003; Huysmans & Tsoukala, 2008; Krishnaswamy, 2012). According to Krishnaswamy (2012), counterterrorism is often constructed based on a government's interpretation of a group or an event. Similarly, Katzenstein (2003) argues that the US government's interpretation of the 9/11 attack by Al Qaeda, infamously known as 9/11, as a war against the West by radical Islam led to its adoption of "War Against Terror", while the Japanese government's interpretation of the same incident as humanitarian crisis made this strong ally of the US to join as a non-combatant partner in the war against terror but would later adopt securitization of the Muslim population. While a publication by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2010) claims that the discovery by the Japanese government that the country was included as a target by Al-Qaeda led to securitization, scholars like Takahashi (2018) and Yamagata (2019) have argued that it is not because of any existential threat but because of Islamophobia, a phenomenon both studies attributed to media representation of Islam as a religion associated with violence. Although the discovery of Lionel Dumont, an Al-Qaeda agent who lived in Japan between 2002 and 2004 appears to indicate that the securitization was justifiable, there is insufficient evidence that Dumont was facilitating an attack against Japan (Talmadge, 2004). This shows that counterterrorism strategy has many factors that influence it.

However, many studies have argued that counterterrorism strategies of governments are influenced by the extent of threat of terrorism governments are confronted with (Sinai, 2015; Brady, 2016; Hoffman & Ware, 2022). For example, in the United Kingdom, Counter-terrorism strategy

(CONTEST) was established in 2003 to mitigate the rise of global jihadism (Brady, 2016).[4] The Netherlands, Germany, and many other European countries have established strategies for countering terrorism since 9/11 as they are confronted with threats from jihadist groups (Gadinger, 2008; Monar, 2006; Rineheart, 2010).

However, there are some studies that argue that what influences a country's counterterrorism policies and strategies may not necessarily be the extent of threat of terrorism it is confronted with, but a reaction to growing trends. After the attack the 9/11 attack, many countries, including those not directly affected by it, started formulating policies to counter terrorism (Bloch-Elkon, 2007). Zarete (2016) observes that countries can perceive themselves as a potential target of terrorism because of their close alliance with a country already at war with terrorism. Many studies suggest that any country with close security alliance with the USA considers itself a potential target of Islamic terrorism which influences their policies (Zarete, 2016; Endoh, 2019).

Another factor, studies have identified, that affects counterterrorism strategies is the ever-evolving strategies adopted by terrorist organizations. Just as terrorist organizations are susceptible to evolution in tactics, strategies to combat their activities are also subject to evolutionary process. Dickson (2015) notes that the lone wolf terrorism inspired by ISIS, which thrives by using social media, has led countries to place surveillance on internet communications.[5] Similarly, Israel adopted "house demolition" as a counterterrorism strategy in Gaza to prevent terrorists from using them as safe havens for carrying out attacks and serve as a punishment for families whose members belong of terrorist organizations (Carrol, 1990; Benmelech et al., 2015).

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[4] It is a counterterrorism strategy established by the UK government to prevent terrorism by targeting radical Islamic groups in the country. See Brady (2016).

[5] It is a form of terrorism carried out by an individual who does not belong to a known terrorist organization but acts alone. See Phillips (2011).

2.3.1. War and Diplomacy as Counterterrorism Strategies

War against terrorism, otherwise known as the war on terror, has become rampant since the event of Al-Qaeda attack on the US. While counterterrorism policies and strategies have always been a common feature of many countries before 9/11, the event magnified it, and created a perspective in the understanding of security where a declaration of war on terrorism by the US became necessary (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). It has not only come to define the US counterterrorism strategy since then but has influenced global perception of terrorism and counterterrorism (Ramdeen, 2017).

Some studies posit that the US war on terror, codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom, was not only a war of revenge against Al-Qaeda and its supporters over 9/11, but also a strategy to dismantle the structure set up by terrorist groups and regimes that support the group and to weaken the group's capacity to replicate an attack of 9/11 magnitude (Dunn, 2005; Larson & Savych, 2007; Holloway, 2008; Crawford, 2003). However, while the war led to the killing of prominent Al-Qaeda leaders, including its founder Osama Bin Laden, it has attracted a lot of criticism. Hoffman (2019) posits that although Bin Laden has been killed, the ideology he espoused has continued to influence many groups around the world. More so, the war resulted in regime change in Iraq and in Afghanistan which created political instability in both countries.

The emergence of ISIS has been largely attributed to the US policy of regime change in Iraq occasioned by the war on terror (Russell, 2007; Cockburn, 2014). Many scholars also argue that the huge material cost of the war was a dent on the exercise. It gulped about $4 trillion, while more than 7,000 American military employees have been killed (Kameel, 2015; Hoffman, 2021). Another important criticism is that it negates the concept of human rights, the very ideal that the US and its Western allies hold dear. Hoffman (2004) notes that just as the war against communism

provided the US and its allies with the justification to emasculate human rights and abuse sovereignty of other countries, the war on terror has recreated the same scenario.

The war on terror, although coined by the US, has become a global mantra in confronting terrorism. For example, China and Russia claims that their clashes with the Uyghur and Chechen minorities respectively are wars against terrorism (Denyer, 2014). That term, however, is not only exclusive to great powers but also used by countries confronted with terrorism, especially by groups associated with radical views like Jihad. In Africa, there is a raging war on terror led by states confronted with terrorism like Nigeria, Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Somalia, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, regional organizations such as the African Union, France, and US (Brands, 2021; Makanda, 2019; Oriola, 2021; Bukarti & Bryson, 2019). However, the war on terror drains the countries' resources, impacted heavily on human lives, infrastructure, stability, and other important components and institutions of the state, hence there has been a growing call for rethinking the strategy for combating terror in the continent.

Another method countries have adopted as a strategy to counter terrorism is diplomacy. Roberts (2006) notes that diplomacy is traceable to a Greek word *diplomatie*, but later found its way into the French Lexicon to mean "bargaining on behalf of a country." Ruey (2017) traces its history to the ancient Greek, Italian, Roman and French diplomatic traditions. Opeoluwa (2017) defined it as the method that allows states to achieve their objectives through a peaceful process. Cornago (2008, p. 574) defines it "as the conduct of international relations by negotiation and dialogue or by any other means to promote peaceful relations among states." The above two definitions prove that diplomacy is devoid of violence.

Although the post 9/11 counterterrorism has been characterized mainly by war against terror, which has seen the US and its allies take on groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al Shabab, and the Taliban, diplomacy has equally emerged as a veritable counterterrorism strategy. Pillar (2008)

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observes that the growing need for countries to cooperate is a result of the vast network created by terrorist organizations. Countries not only cooperate in information sharing, but also in financial and material support from other countries. Japan, for example shares security information with the US, but also extends financial support to countries in the Middle East for non-military counterterrorism activities (Nadim, 2017).

However, diplomacy as a counterterrorism strategy does not only embody positive support to help countries fight terrorism, either bilaterally or multilaterally, but also comes in the form of sanctions on countries supporting or sponsoring terrorism. As Hufbauer et al. (2001) notes that economic sanction has become a strategy to counter terrorism since 9/11, especially against states that are perceived to be sympathetic to terrorist organizations. However, the use of sanction does not target states alone, but also individuals or organizations that are suspected of having ties with terrorist organizations. Ortblad (2008) notes that the bid to curb financial flow for terrorist organizations has led to freezing assets of many individuals and organizations.

2.3.2. Amnesty as a Strategy for Peacebuilding and Countering Terrorism

The term amnesty has its root in the Greek word *amnestia* or *amnesis*, which means oblivion, forgetfulness, or lack of memory (Weisman, 1972). The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2009, p.5) defines it as "barring criminal prosecution and, in some cases, civil actions against certain individuals or categories of individuals in respect of specified criminal conduct committed before the amnesty's adoption." For Childress (1973), it is a general overlooking or pardon of past offenses by the ruling authority. This definition, however, does not capture the core component of amnesty. As Mandozai and Zadran (2023) posits, amnesty goes beyond mere pardon which can be revoked. Mandozai and Zadran argues that the fundamental

component of amnesty is that it serves as a peacebuilding strategy either to end a conflict or bring reconciliation at the end of a conflict.

There are debates among scholars about the use of amnesty as a peacebuilding strategy. Proponents argue that it has proven effective in countries such as Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa (Akpome, 2013; Leebaw, 2003; Lenta, 2018; Arnould, 2006). These studies focus on the role of amnesty in ending a conflict. Freeman (2009) refers to it as a "necessary evil" for countries making a transition from conflict to stability, and further outlines six conditions necessary for wholesome implementation of amnesty: follow democratic norms, avoid legal rigidity, have genuine intention, reject outright clemency, be conditional, and be feasible. But Reiter (2011) notes that countries have implemented amnesty programs even when the six conditions outlined by Freeman have not been met because countries assume that the conditions are not feasible in their own contexts. Therefore, from the position of Freeman and Reiter amnesty does have the capacity to end a conflict depending on some conditions or the reality of a country's context.

On the other hand, other studies have argued that peacebuilding transcends ending a conflict but encompasses conflict transformation. Väyrynen (1991) argues that beyond bringing a conflict to an end, there are four conditions necessary for peacebuilding: actor transformation, issue transformation, rule transformation, and structural transformation. Actor transformation posits that both the offender and the victim need to change their attitude and approach. For example, while the offender needs to accept responsibility, the victim should not be driven by vengeance.

Similarly, issue transformation emphasizes the need to build a positive narrative about the conflict as negative narrative may lead to escalation. Rule transformation emphasizes the need to provide a guide for further relationship between victims and offenders, while structural transformation emphasizes the need to build institutions and agencies that will help facilitate interactions for both parties as well as handle issues that will emanate from such interactions. As

such, Väyrynen's position is that amnesty programs should not only be used as a strategy to end a conflict but must incorporate strategies to ensure sustainable peace.

Nevertheless, opponents of amnesty program argue that it does not provide justice to victims, is opposed to rule of law, promotes impunity, does not provide accountability, and negates the International Criminal Law (Gibson, 2002; Pensky, 2008; Thoms et al., 2008; Skaar et al., 2016). Criticism of absence of justice is always premised on the account that the offences committed by the recipients were crimes against humanity for which the international law and convention do not approve amnesty for. In the seminal work, *Neighbors again? Intercommunity Relations After Ethnic Cleansing*, Corkalo et al. (2004) notes that the main demand of victims of mass violence is justice. This indicates that although amnesty programs strive to build peace, it does not provide sustainable peace, especially when the victims still have a feeling of injustice.

Many studies have suggested that granting amnesty to offenders should go hand in hand with compensation or reparation to victims as a way of providing justice to the victims (McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012; Carranza, 2009; Mamdani, 2002; Abrahamsen & Van der Merwe, 2005; Sherwin, 2003). The studies posit that the essence of providing compensation to victims is premised on its effectiveness for discouraging revenge, increasing the chances of forgiveness, and tackling the issue of morality. Similarly, a study by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (2018) argues that without a balance between granting amnesty to offenders and ensuring justice for the victims, reconciliation will not be effectuated. However, while reparation and compensation appear laudable, there are some victims whose losses cannot be compensated, particularly those who lost their loved ones or those who suffered abuse.

Furthermore, while studies have identified the need for justice for the victims as a condition necessary for the success of amnesty as a peacebuilding strategy, there appears to be no consensus about what kind of justice is ideal for it. Many studies have suggested that transitional justice comes

handy for amnesty to function effectively as a peacebuilding strategy because it makes offenders take responsibility for their crimes, provides reparation to the victims, and puts measures in place to prevent recurrence of the same or similar crime (Bell, 2009; Freeman & Orozco, 2020; Mihr, 2018).

Yet, other studies posit that restorative justice is ideal because its main objective is to restore relationship by creating a prospect for dialogue between offenders and victims to share their individual experiences and work out modalities for reconciliation (Braithwaite et al.,2010; Miller, 2011; Wallis, 2014). But both transitional justice and restorative justice are vital because, while victims need to be compensated, have their dignity restored, and have measures put in place to checkmate a relapse, there is also a need to understand that re-establishment of trust is critical for peacebuilding and its sustainability in a post-conflict setting (Sida, 2020).

But considering that many crimes that require amnesty are crimes against humanity, some studies have argued that when granting amnesty to offenders, the need for justice should not be limited to victims but extended to the public, who are considered indirect victims (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2018). As such, the perspective of the citizens, both victims and non-victims, be recognized while formulating and implementing the amnesty program. The position of the Tahrir Institute of Middle East Policy is particularly noteworthy because, while emphasizing the need for reconciliation between victims and offenders, it recognizes citizens who are non-victims as key stakeholders in peacebuilding programs in a post-conflict society.

Regarding the use of amnesty as a counterterrorism strategy, although a common principle is that countries do not engage in dialogue with terrorist organizations, many countries, particularly in Africa, have on different occasions offered amnesty to groups considered terrorist organizations as a way of bringing their campaign to an end. However, the use of amnesty as a counterterrorism

strategy is arduous because of the distinctiveness of terrorism from other forms of conflict. As such, many studies have emphasized the challenges countries face when implementing it.

A study by Gjelsvik (2019) posits that the amnesty programs for Al-Shabaab in both Kenya and Somalia have not proven successful and identified three major factors responsible for its poor performance. The first factor is that it has led to infiltration of the program by terrorists who pretend to have repented; the second factor is that Al-Shabab has introduced a mechanism that makes it stringent for members to exit the group; while the third factor is the unwelcoming attitude of the affected communities towards Al-Shabab members who embrace the amnesty program.[6] Similarly, Downie (2018) notes that the amnesty program of Kenya for Al Shabab fighters lacks transparency, not clearly developed, poorly implemented, and with reported cases of maltreatment and extra-judicial killing of some surrendered terrorists. Yusuf (2016) narrates the story of Musa Rashid and his cousin who surrendered to the Kenya government but were later declared missing. The family suspects they have been secretly executed by government forces.

The studies about Kenya and Somalia present evidence that the use of amnesty as strategy to counter terrorism is often confronted with numerous challenges. While the studies highlighted the factors that have led to poor performance of the programs, those factors may be manifestations of how poorly the program was conceptualized, rather than evidence that an amnesty program cannot be used to effectively counter terrorism.

In Egypt, studies have emphasized the role of granting amnesty to members of Al-jama'a al-Islamiya, a group considered by the government as a terrorist organization, as an effective counterterrorism strategy, as it made the group abandon terrorism after many decades of its violent campaign in the country (Ashour, 2007; Gerges, 2000; Drevon, 2015). However, a study by

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[6] Al-Shabab created a special secret police known as Amniyat, which spies on members, and then reports their activities to the leadership. See *BBC* (2019).

Hamzawy and Grebowski (2010) suggests that the group was already weakened by the government forces, which made its leaders reach out to the government for reconciliation, while Matesan (2020) argues the condemnation the group received from the public after the Luxor terrorist attack led the group to seek a peaceful settlement with the government.[7] Although the reason why the group pushed for or accepted amnesty as offered by the government continues to generate debate, there appears to be a consensus about the role the amnesty played in ensuring peace in the country.

Besides Egypt, another often cited successful example is the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, an amnesty program established in 2006 by the Algerian government for al-Jabhah al-Islāmiyah lil-Inqādh, a group it considered terrorist organization.[8] The program led to a peaceful transition from a period characterized by incessant attacks from the group to a period of peace in the country (Hearne & Laiq, 2010; Zeraoulia, 2023; Mundy, 2014). Tlemçani (2008) argues that the success of the Algerian Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation rests on its conceptualization, which factored in citizens` support through a referendum, limited the scope of the program to terrorist who willingly surrendered their arms but excluded those accused of mass-killing or carrying out bomb-attacks, and offered compensation for those considered victims of terrorism.

The experiences of Egypt and Algeria indicate that using amnesty as a strategy to end terrorism and build peace can record success if it is well-conceptualized. First, the Egyptian experience shows that an agreement between the group involved and the government makes it easier for the program to succeed, while the Algerian experience shows that an involvement with

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[7] It was a terrorist attack by the al-jamā'ah al-islāmīyah on 17 November 1997, in which 62 people were killed, mainly tourists. See Matesan (2020).

[8] The group was popularly known by its English name, Islamic Salvation Front. See Dalacoura, (2011).

the citizens in the process through referendum can produce good result. Another lesson from the Algerian experience is that an effective amnesty for offenders should go hand in hand with compensation for victims.

2.3.3. Evaluating the Performance of Counterterrorism Strategy

Counterterrorism strategies are measures taken by the government to overcome terrorism. Hence evaluating the performance of such strategies requires paying attention to a lot of factors. Many studies use metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. Dongen (2009) posits that there are four indicators that prove that a strategy has been effective in combating terrorism: the number of terrorist attacks, the number of victims, material damage, and the number of terrorists arrested or removed after the counterterrorism program has been established. Although Dongen's argument appears plausible, especially with regards to "number of terrorists removed," a study by International Peace Institute (2010) posits that while the number of terrorists removed because of a counterterrorism strategy is important, attention should also be paid to recidivism as it would be misleading to count the number of those who left terrorism without counting those who have returned to it afterwards.

Similarly, a decline of the number of attacks does not necessarily indicate the success of a counterterrorism but could be an indication that the group is planning something monumental. Rabasa et al. (2006) notes that it took Al-Qaeda many years to plan and execute the 9/11 attack because of the need to raise fund, recruit attackers, and provision of training and logistics. More so, relying on the number of victims has some demerits because terrorists often consider the impact of their attack rather than the number. For example, an attack that kills a president is likely to send shockwaves across the country more than the killing of 10 ordinary citizens.

There are also studies that argue that the killing of a top leader of a terrorist organization is an indication that a counterterrorism strategy is effective. Gomis (2018) notes that the US policymakers consider the killing of top members of terrorist groups as a breakthrough, and this indicates the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategy. However, Klein (2022) argues that it is rather counter-productive as it leads to further radicalization of the group as members often elevate the killing to martyrdom. Also, evidence has shown that many groups, including Al-Qaeda, have had a system that makes succession less difficult. As such relying on targeted killing of the leadership as an indication of the success of a strategy is faulty.

A common observation about the above positions of Rabasa et al., Gomis, and Klein is that they view counterterrorism from the prism of war against terror alone, when measures like amnesty and diplomacy also serve as counterterrorism measures. Since governments have various objectives for establishing counterterrorism programs, such as preventing radicalization, preventing the movement of suspected terrorists into their territory, preventing terrorist attacks, defeating a terrorist group and restoring peace to a region controlled by the group, Goepner (2016) argues that the appropriate indicator to be used to measure the performance of a strategy should be to focus on how it has performed in relation to the objective it seeks to achieve. Goepner's position is noteworthy because while adopting a counterterrorism strategy, governments often have target objectives.

2.4. Studies on the OSC

The introduction of the OSC by the Nigerian government has opened a floodgate of studies about the program. Some studies have focused on its relevance to achieving peace in the northeast and the challenges that have confronted its implementation. Some others have engaged on comparative analysis of the program vis-à-vis other amnesty or DDR programs in Nigeria, Kenya,

Somalia, Cameroun, and Chad. Many studies have also focused on evaluating the performance of the program; however, as evidence suggests, there is no consensus among scholars on that note.

Some studies argue that the OSC has performed well, however, the reasons for such positions are at variation. Some studies base their arguments on the number of former members of Boko Haram who have embraced the program (International Crisis Group 2021) and argue that it is proof that it has performed well. But International Peace Institute (2010) argues that while the number of terrorists removed because of a counterterrorism strategy is important, attention should also be paid to recidivism as it would be misleading to count the number of those who left the terrorist organization without counting those who have returned to it afterwards. More so, Prager and Adamu (2019) suggests that it would be wrong to use such metrics because most of the participants of the program were not actually members of Boko Haram, but victims who lived under the group's occupation and were forced to participate in the program. Nevertheless, the use of such criteria to evaluate the performance of the OSC does not pay attention to the reintegration component of the program but focuses only on its deradicalization and rehabilitation components, which are concerned with efforts to win over members of Boko Haram to the government side.

Some studies have argued that the OSC has not performed well by focusing on numbers as well. Campbell (2019) and Allen (2019) argue that the program has not achieved its objective by relying on the rising cases of recidivism. Both studies posit that Boko Haram has taken advantage of the program by sending moles and informants to infiltrate the program, which has contributed to an increase in Boko Haram's attacks. Although this argument appears plausible, attributing the cases of recidivism to Boko Haram's strategy negates evidence that many cases of recidivism of terrorists are by-product of failure of successful reintegration into the society. Hwang (2018) who studied recidivism among former members of Jamaah Islamiyah in Indonesia found that rejection by family, friend or community as the major instigator. As evidence from studies on Boko Haram

and OSC has continue to show that former members of Boko Haram suffer rejection from family and community, there is a need to examine how that has contributed to recidivism.

There are other studies that suggest that the program has failed by arguing that the timing of the program is the main problem. The studies argue that as Boko Haram continues to carry on attacks on villages and communities, effective reintegration of deradicalized members will always generate backlash from villages and communities (Obaji Jr., 2022; Hassan & Routley, 2022). The studies recommend that the group be defeated first before the introduction of amnesty, which will come as a post-conflict peace effort, rather than a strategy to weaken Boko Haram and restore peace in the northeast. However, these studies belong to school of thought that continues to assume that the only way to defeat terrorism is through kinetic approach, a claim that has been refuted by evidence from in Afghanistan, Algeria, among others.

Some studies argue that the poor categorization of the participants, which results from poor screening, has allowed many members of Boko Haram who are out of the original scope of the OSC to participate in the program (Abatan, & Hoinathy; van Zyl, 2019; Nuhu, 2021; Akum & Samuel, 2021). The studies posit that although the government states that only those who are considered low risk-members of Boko Haram can join the program, the incorporation of many high-profile members of the group into the program has attracted resistance from the affected communities that question genuineness of their deradicalization. But as evidence suggests, many communities reject anybody who has passed through the OSC, irrespective of their level of involvement with Boko Haram.

Many studies have argued in favor of the OSC by relying on factors other than adopting a quantitative approach. A study by Bukarti & Bryson (2019) argues that the success of the program is proven by its ability to use counter-jihadist narratives during deradicalization exercise. The study described the program as a model for deradicalization of religious extremists all over the world.

However, the study's position is equally one-sided, because it focused on the deradicalization component of the program, while ignoring the reintegration component which concerns all the parties to the conflict, including the former Boko Haram members, victims, affected communities, and the public. It also appears to overlook the objective of the OSC which is to restore peace in the affected region.

As Goepner (2006) argues, while the appropriate method to evaluate the performance of a counterterrorism strategy should be on how the strategy has performed vis-à-vis the reason why it is established, some studies have focused on how the OSC has performed vis-à-vis the reason for establishing it. On that note, some studies have focused on community rejection of the program as evidence that the program has failed. Ugwueze et al. (2022) argues the neglect of the affected communities in the operation of the OSC has led to poor performance of the program. Hassan (2017) argues that the inability of the government to consult with the affected communities before reintegrating former Boko Haram members has led to that rejection. The positions of Ugwueze et al. and Hasan have been supported by evidence from many other studies including Tar and Banu (2023), Felbab-Brown (2018), Ike et al. (2020) and Owonikoko (2022) who argues that the major failure of the OSC is the community rejection of former Boko Haram members. However, these studies focus on the reintegration component of the program alone.

Existing studies, while focusing on the failure of the OSC to achieve its main objective, suggested that the reason for such performance is mainly how it is implemented. Moreso, while the studies highlighted some of the major problems affecting the performance of the OSC, particularly the rejection that former Boko Haram members suffer upon exiting the program, the studies were focused on victims and affected communities. But as studies have shown that the impact of terrorism transcends the affected victims and communities alone (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-

Guede, 2006; Jackson, 2014; Schmid, 2023), there is a need to ascertain the position of the Nigerian citizenry.

2.4.1. Gaps in the Existing Studies

The first gap identified in the existing studies is that they appear to evaluate the OSC from the lens of each of its constituting components–deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration–rather than collectively. This has produced a one-sided evaluation of the program. As such, there is a need to evaluate the three components at the same time to be able to ascertain how the OSC has performed.

The second gap is that existing studies have focused on how the program is implemented, but have not paid attention to its conceptualization, which did not factor in key elements of peacebuilding to enable effective reintegration. Tahrir Institute for Middle East (2018) suggests that the conceptualization of an amnesty program is critical to its performance. The challenges that have confronted the program, particularly the reintegration component, are not the main problems of the OSC, but evidence of how poorly the program is conceptualized. Therefore, there is a need to examine the conceptualization of the program by focusing on key elements of peacebuilding that are factored into it and the ones that are missing.

The third gap identified by this chapter is that previous studies' evaluation of lack of support for the OSC has been limited to victims and affected communities. But considering that many crimes that require amnesty are crimes against humanity, some studies have suggested that while granting amnesty to offenders, the government should seek the support of the public, rather than limiting such gesture to the victims and affected communities (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2018). In addition, peacebuilding efforts should be all-inclusive, encompassing members of society, particularly in the case of terrorism which affects every facet of society. As evidence from

the successful experience of Algeria`s Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation suggests, a sustainable use of amnesty in the context of a counterterrorism project should not be victim-centered or offender-centered, but holistic, involving those who are not directly affected. Since OSC involves the reintegration of former terrorists into the society to live with both victims and non-victims, there is the need to ascertain citizens' perspective towards the program.

2.5. Summary

This chapter explored the literature on terrorism, counterterrorism, amnesty as a strategy for countering terrorism, and evaluation of the OSC. It began with a discussion on terrorism in general by analyzing literature relevant to the study about the debates in the field, reason why people join terrorism, recidivism, effect of terrorism, and reason why terrorism ends. This first segment prepared the ground for general knowledge about Boko Haram.

The chapter moved further into the discussion of counterterrorism by introducing a conceptual overview of the term and exploring major counterterrorism strategies such as war on terror, diplomacy, and amnesty. It highlighted the operational strengths and weaknesses of each, and how each works contextually. More so, it reviewed works about how to evaluate the performance of counterterrorism strategies or programs.

On amnesty, which is seen as a feasible conflict resolution strategy in Africa with successes in post-genocide Rwanda, post-civil war Liberia and Sierra Leone, and post-apartheid South Africa, and a strategy for ending insurgency with success in Niger-Delta region of Nigeria, it appears to fumble when applied in the context of terrorism as evidence from Kenya and Somalia suggest. However, the case of Algeria, which recorded huge success shows that amnesty can be an effective strategy for terrorism too, but based on how it is conceptualized.

This chapter also reviewed major works on the performance of the OSC program. It focused on works that argued for and those that argued against the performance, identifying the crux for their positions. The study was able to identify three gaps in the existing literature as focusing on the conceptualization of the OSC, evaluating the three components—deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration—collectively, and extending the study beyond the victims and the affected communities to the citizenry.

博士論文の要約／Summary of Doctoral Dissertation

Chapter 3

This chapter provides an insight into the evolution of Boko Haram, particularly its transition from an organization engaged in proselytization to a group that operates with violence. First, it traces the origin of the group to pre-colonial movements that operated in northern Nigeria and the radical groups that started in the post-colonial era, especially the Maitasine and the Izala Movement. It assesses the connecting factors between Boko Haram and its predecessors.

Second, for easy comprehension of Boko Haram, the study divides group's years of operation into three periods: confrontational, revolutionary, and transnational periods. This periodization is based on the group's ideological and operational transition since its formation. It also evaluates the factors responsible for the group's metamorphosis over the years, and highlights its method of operation, targets, leadership, and sphere of operation in each period.

Third, it touches on the major debates regarding the group's emergence, the grievances of the group. It also focuses on the group's recruitment strategies and methods of revenue generation. It further highlights some major attacks the group has carried out in Nigeria.

博士論文の要約／Summary of Doctoral Dissertation

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Name: Nweke Ikenna Steve

学 位 論 文 題 目

Title: Amnesty as a Counter-terrorism Strategy: A Study on Nigeria's Operation Safe Corridor

Chapter 4

This chapter is divided into two broad parts to cover the two strategies adopted by the Nigerian government to restore peace in the Northeast. They are the war on terror known as Operation Lafia Dole and the amnesty program christened Operation Safe Corridor (OSC). The first part explores the plethora of military campaigns Nigeria has adopted to overcome Boko Haram. It highlights the scope of the war, and various alliances and external support Nigeria has embraced to defeat Boko Haram. It further investigates why the war has lasted more than a decade, and yet the possibility of victory over the group is not in sight.

The second part of the chapter explores the Operation Safe Corridor program (OSC). It traces the history and motivation for establishing it. The chapter also presents an overview of the program, and its three core phases: de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration.

博士論文の要約／Summary of Doctoral Dissertation

Chapter 5

Providing a platform to facilitate transition from terrorism to civil life has become a veritable counterterrorism strategy for many African countries such as Kenya, Somalia, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria. Although this strategy has helped many people trapped with terrorist organizations return to civil life, it has suffered many setbacks that sometimes affect its performance vis-à-vis its objectives. This study focuses on the Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), one of such programs that targets members of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

This chapter provides an answer to the first questions raised in this dissertation: how has the OSC performed as a strategy to counter Boko Haram and build restore peace in the northeast? The question is concerned with whether the OSC has functioned effectively as a strategy to defeat Boko Haram and restore peace in the affected region, which is the main objective of the program.

Thus, the evaluation of its performance focuses on how the program has fared with peacebuilding in the northeast by using the peacebuilding theory.

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博士論文の要約／Summary of Doctoral Dissertation

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Chapter 6

This chapter identifies the main factor responsible for the poor performance of the OSC. It also identifies three other factors, connected to the main factor, that have influenced the performance of the program. The program appears to focus on wining over members of Boko Haram to the government side but has not prepared enough ground for their reintegration to be effective. The key elements of peacebuilding that are missing in the conceptualization of the program are transitional justice, restorative justice, and citizens' support. The absence of transitional justice in the OSC ensures that there is no accountability on the side of former Boko Haram members and no reparation on the side of the victims and affected communities. This situation generates tension and makes the program unable to achieve its objectives. Regarding restorative justice, its absence amplifies the trauma of the victims because of lack of apology from former Boko Haram members. It also denies the victims the right to extend forgiveness, and the offenders the benefit of receiving forgiveness. This situation makes reconciliation, a prerequisite for peace, difficult to achieve.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

The growing understanding by many governments that war against terror is not the only way to counter terrorism has led governments to start exploring other strategies such as negotiation and amnesty programs. This has become common particularly in the continent of Africa where Kenya, Somalia, Mozambique, Niger, Algeria, and Chad have all adopted it. The main subject of this dissertation is the evaluation of the performance of an amnesty program when it is used as a strategy to counter terrorism and restore peace.

The study however focuses on the Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), a program established by the Nigerian government to help counter Boko Haram and restore peace in the northeast region of the country after nearly five years of war against terror. The need to assess the performance of the program was the main motivation for this study.

In this dissertation, two research questions were raised in chapter one. The first question is how has the OSC performed as a strategy to counter Boko Haram and restore peace in the northeast? And the second question is, why has it performed the way it did? The two questions served as guides for the dissertation.

The answer provided by the study regarding the first question is that the program has not performed well vis-a-vis the objective for which it was established. As a program initiated for the purpose of building peace through its three components—deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration—the OSC has suffered setbacks, particularly with the reintegration component. The success it has recorded with the deradicalization and rehabilitation components, which has witnessed tens of thousands of former Boko haram members pass through it, gaining skills, basic

education, and resources to start life afresh, is often weakened by the program's inability to provide effective reintegration.

Evidence of the failure of the program is shown by its inability to restore peace in the northeast, exemplified by rejection of former Boko Haram members by communities and failure to grant justice to the victims. The rejection of the program by the affected communities, victims, and even non-victims, often leads to violence, recidivism, and regret on the side of former members of Boko Haram. More so, the program has not placed any accountability on former members of Boko Haram, and does not allow citizens any participatory role, which has led to the program's lack of support from the citizens. Overall, the program has not produced a platform for reconciliation between offenders and victims, which has made peacebuilding efforts not sustainable.

The answer provided by the study regarding the second question is that the inability of the OSC to achieve its main objective is due to poor conceptualization of the program, which focused mainly on winning over members of Boko Haram to the government side, without commensurate effort to provide justice to the victims and provide a platform for proper reconciliation and healing. The poor conceptualization of the program is demonstrated by its inability to incorporate some key instruments of peacebuilding such as transitional justice and restorative justice, and support from the citizens. The absence of these important instruments has shaped the performance of the program as it led to rejection by the affected communities, victims, and instigated lack of support from the citizens.

The study adopted the qualitative method and leaned towards phenomenological approach by exploring human experiences and perceptions of victims of Boko Haram, affected communities, and citizens, and the meaning they attach to such experiences and perceptions. The method helped in providing insight to subjective experiences and perceptions.

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The study adopted triangulation method by using both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through newspaper reports and interviews, while secondary data was collected from published materials such as books, newspaper articles, among others. The newspapers included both local and international newspapers that have reported on the activities of Boko Haram, stories about victims and affected communities, and activities surrounding the OSC, while the sample size for the interview, which was semi-structured, was 56. The participants were selected using stratified random sampling to accommodate age, sex, religion and ethnic diversity. Moreover, because of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the interview was conducted online using Facebook, Skype, WhatsApp, Line, and ZOOM.

Regarding analysis of the data, the study adopted thematic analysis. The data was first transcribed, coded, before themes were assigned based on patterns. The themes were later categorized based on their relevance to the objective of the study, and revised; after which overlapping themes were merged, followed by thorough check to ensure credibility.

In addition, as the main objective of the OSC is to serve as a strategy to restore peace in the northeast, the program adopted peacebuilding theory. However, since peacebuilding has become an umbrella term, the study leaned towards the study leaned towards the utstein peacebuilding palette espoused by smith (2004). The framework was employed because of its suitability for evaluating the OSC.

7.2. Summary of Findings

Regarding the findings of the study, evidence suggests that the poor conceptualization of the OSC, which did not factor in transitional justice, restorative justice, and citizens' support, has had a negative effect on its performance. For example, the inability of the program to incorporate transitional justice has denied justice to victims, because of the lack of accountability for former

members of Boko Haram. It has also denied the victims the right to know who the real offenders are and their level of involvement because of the infusion of those who merely lived under Boko Haram occupation into the program. It also led to the rejection of former members of Boko Haram by victims, communities, and ensured lack of support for the program by the citizens.

Similarly, evidence suggests that the absence of restorative justice has had a negative effect on the performance of the program. It has failed to rebuild personal relationships or restore peace between former members of Boko Haram and victims or affected communities, which has created a hostile environment for the participants of the OSC. The hostile environment often leads to regret which manifests in the form of violence, recidivism, or stigmatization. This creates a form of reverse effect by making the program counterproductive.

Regarding lack of support from the citizens, the exclusion of the citizens in the conceptualization has helped in shaping a negative perspective about the program. It has helped to create fear, encourage skepticism, and challenged the morality of the program. Evidence demonstrates that fear plays a considerable role in their perspective of the OSC program. Citizens expressed skepticism about the genuineness of repentance claim and total withdrawal from violence by those who passed through the program. Even in cases where they believe that some of the ex-Boko Haram members have become deradicalized and are willing to welcome them back into the society, citizens harbor innate fear about attacks by Boko Haram who would come in search of those repented terrorists. Citizens also questioned the morality of the program by drawing comparison between the good condition of former Boko Haram members who are well taken care of by the government, and that of the victims who are not getting similar attention from the government. More so, citizens questioned the rationale behind punishing minor offenders, while terrorists who have committed even bigger atrocities are pampered. This perspective held by

citizens is demonstrated through their hostile attitude towards former members of Boko Haram, which fuels recidivism.

7.3. Contribution to the Literature

The dissertation focuses on a comparatively contemporary topic relevant to Counterterrorism Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies. First, existing studies about evaluation of the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies have always relied on metrics (Dongen, 2009; Perl, 2007; Gomis, 2018; International Peace Institute, 2010). For example, Dongen (2009) argues that there are four indicators of an effective counterterrorism: the number of terrorist attacks, number of victims, material damage, and number of terrorists arrested or removed after the program has been established. The implication of Dongen's argument is that it assumes that the whole essence of counterterrorism revolves around numbers. However, as Goepner (2006) suggests, a government's counterterrorism strategy should revolve around a well-defined objective, which in many cases transcends metrics. On that note, this study adds to the body of existing studies that have suggested that numbers alone should not be used to evaluate the performance of a strategy.

Second, existing studies, while focusing on the failure of the OSC to achieve its main objective, suggested that the reason for such performance is primarily due to how it is implemented, but this study suggested that the poor performance is rather because of how it was conceptualized. The studies also view the three components of the program—deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration—separately and not collectively (Felbab-Brown, 2018; Ike et al., 2020; Owonikoko, 2022; Tar & Banu, 2023; Hassan, 2016; Ugwueze et al., 2022). This has led them to evaluate the program from the lens of one component and not from the three. However, this study evaluates the OSC by focusing on the three components, acknowledging that it has performed well in its first and second components, but has not performed well in the third.

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More so, while studies highlighted some of the major problems affecting the performance of the OSC, particularly the rejection that former Boko Haram members suffer upon exiting the program, the studies focused on victims and affected communities. But as studies have shown that the impact of terrorism transcends the affected victims and communities alone (Abam, 2022; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Jackson, 2014; Schmid, 2023; Butler et al., 2003), there is a need to ascertain the position of the Nigerian citizenry. As such, this study, being the first to extend the study of perspective beyond victims and affected communities, has contributed significantly to the study on the OSC.

7.4. Future Research

There are many issues pertaining to the OSC that could be further studied based on the arguments presented in this dissertation. For example, what factors are responsible for the poor conceptualization of the OSC? Could that be political, social, religious, cultural, or economic? Understanding the reason behind it will be pivotal in solving the attendant problems.

Another interesting point about the OSC program that requires attention is about gender. Since the study focused on a program that predominantly affected males, there is a need to also cover programs that affect females. Although Boko Haram is male-dominated, women have also played noticeable roles as female domestic staff, wives, recruiters, indoctrinators, and suicide bombers (Ola, 2020).

Finally, since amnesty is becoming a trending counterterrorism strategy in Africa (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Kenya, Somalia, Mozambique, among others) a comparative study to ascertain the similarities that exist in those countries' approach will make an interesting study.

7.5. Recommendations

As evidence from this dissertation demonstrates, the poor performance of the OSC program is because of its conceptualization which excludes key components of peacebuilding: transitional justice and restorative justice, and citizens' support. Based on the findings and discussions, the study makes the following recommendations, in anticipation that if effectively applied can help the OSC produce a better result.

First, the government should recognize the victims, affected communities, and the citizens as major parties in the Boko Haram crisis, whose role in its resolution is significant. As such, a committee should be set up to institute transitional justice and restorative justice programs in the affected communities before the reintegration of the graduates of the OSC into the society. This will help apportion responsibility, bring reconciliation, and cement sustainable peace. It will also reduce recidivism as the returnees will not be greeted with hostility or be forced to leave the community by pressure from family and friends.

Second, the government should try to improve the condition of the victims in the IDPs. Since the poor living condition of the victims in the IDPs camp affect citizens' perspective of the program negatively as demonstrated in the study, an improvement in the status quo will have a positive impact on citizens' perspective.

Third, the government should organize a sensitization campaign targeting the citizens to ensure it wins citizens support regarding the OSC. The example of Algeria, which carried a referendum to seek citizens' support, should serve as a template for the Nigerian government. However, a referendum may not be feasible at this stage because the program OSC is already in effect, the government can explore other possibilities such as the use of social media, radio and television broadcast, as well as the print media to sensitize the citizens about the importance of the OSC. The government should regularly present its progress report regarding the success stories of

former Boko Haram, as well as its efforts towards helping the victims through those platforms. The sensitization campaign can help win support from the citizens who are eager to see the conflict end to be able to enjoy peace once again.

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Appendix A.

Consent Form for the interview

Call to Participate in a Research Project

Research Title: Extension of the Olive Branch: Evaluating Government Amnesty to Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Name of the Researcher: Ikenna Steve Nweke

Address: Humanities and Social Sciences Building A502, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Japan.

Affiliation: Doctoral Program in International and Advanced Japanese Studies, University of Tsukuba, Japan.

Date Range: May 1st to December 30th, 2020.

Dear Research Participant,

You are cordially invited to take part in a research project conducted by Ikenna Steve Nweke, a Ph.D. student at the University of Tsukuba, Japan. I am currently undertaking my doctoral studies in the International and Advanced Japanese Studies, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Japan. As part of this degree, I am conducting research on "The Perspectives of Nigerian Citizens on the Amnesty Program Granted to Boko Haram by the Government".

You are being asked to take part in this research project to express your views about the amnesty program granted by the Nigerian government to Boko Haram members because of your Nigerian citizenship.

If you consent to take part in this research, you will be interviewed, and it will take between 30 and 60 minutes, depending on the conversation. The interview questions will be about your opinion about Boko Haram and the amnesty to Boko Haram by the Nigerian government.

Please read the information below and decide whether to participate in the interview.

• I voluntarily consent to take part in this research.

• I fully understand that my consent to the interview can be withdrawn at any time, and that I can decline to respond to any question without any implication or explanation whatsoever.

• I fully understand that I can withdraw my consent to use the whole data or any part of it within three weeks after the interview, in which case the material will be deleted.

• I affirm that the form and objectives of the study have been explained to me in writing, and I that I was also allowed to ask questions about the study where I needed much clarification

• I fully understand that my participation involves responding to questions about Boko Haram which is a very sensitive topic.

• I fully understand that there is neither financial nor any form of material inducement for participating in this research.

• I consent for the interview to be audio-recorded.

• I fully understand that my interview with the researcher will be given utmost confidentiality.

• I fully understand that in using the information I supplied for this research my identity and that of people I will mention will be anonymous. That the researcher will conceal all details of my interview which may divulge my identity or that of the people I will mention.

• I fully understand that the concealed extracts from my interview may be quoted in dissertation,

conference presentations, published papers, monographs, and books.

• I fully understand that if I or someone I have mentioned is at risk of harm because of the

information I provided, that the researcher may have to report that to the relevant authorities by

discussing it with me first, but does not require my permission to do so.

• I fully understand that the signed consent form and the original audio recordings of the interview

will be kept safe in computer files, USB, and an audio-recorder, which can be accessed by the

researcher alone, until the successful defense of the dissertation.

• I fully understand that I am entitled to access the information I have provided at any time while

it is in storage as specified above.

• I fully understand that I can contact the researcher when it is necessary with regard to the interview

I granted.

If you have read, understood, and agreed to the information provided above, please kindly fill in

the gap below. Alternatively, you can give verbal consent if you believe it is the best for you.

Full Name: _____

Signature: _____

Email _____

Date: _____

If you have any further questions, requests, or suggestions you can contact me by email, Skype or mobile phone:

Email: ikysteve2012@gmail.com

Skype ID: _ikysteve_

Mobile phone: +818095302665.

Appendix B.

Interview questions for Nigerian citizens

This is the first segment of the series of interviews for my research. In this segment, the population will be ordinary Nigerian citizens who are neither government officials nor work with NGOs in-charge of the victims of Boko Haram. Victims of Boko Haram, who either live in IDPs camps or elsewhere, will not participate in this segment. That will be done when I embark on fieldwork in Nigeria. I intend to interview 110 Nigerian who will be selected through Stratified Random Sampling. Age, gender, ethnicity, religion, academic qualification, place of residence, and occupation will be represented.

The interviews will be done through Skype and face-to-face for Nigerian citizens who live in Japan.

Main Research Questions

How has the program fared since it was started?

What are the arguments for or against the program?

Background information

Biodata of the interviewee (Age, sex, ethnic group, religion, academic background, occupation, place of residence), witnessed, directly or indirectly affected in any way by the activities of Boko Haram

Questions about Boko Haram

What do you know about Boko Haram?

Why do you think Boko Haram started in Nigeria?

Who are the major targets of the group and why?

Why do you think people join the group?

Do you consider its activities political, religious, or ethnic, or a combination of several factors?

Do you think the government has done well in the fight against Boko Haram?

How would you rate the current government's handling of Boko Haram with that of the previous government?

Why has the Boko Haram campaign lasted for more than a decade?

Questions about Amnesty to Boko Haram

What is your opinion about the amnesty granted to Boko Haram by the Nigerian government?

Why do you think the government established the program?

How would you rate the amnesty program so far?

Do you consider the program necessary and why?

Under what conditions would you support the amnesty program?

How would you like the government to treat low ranking members who volunteered to surrender?

How would you like the government to treat high ranking members who volunteered to surrender?

How would you like the government to treat both low- and high-ranking members who were arrested while fighting?

How would you like the government to treat wives and children of Boko Haram members who may have been radicalized?

If not amnesty, what other measures should the government have taken?

How do you think the government should provide justice to the victims of Boko Haram?

How would you like the government to treat people who were forced to join Boko Haram?

Do consider the amnesty program a success or a failure?

Do you think some members of Boko Haram need amnesty?

Appendix C.

List of non-English terms used in the study.

Kafir   an unbeliever

Takfir   An Apostate; one who abandons Islamic faith.

Jihad   A form of war to defeat the enemies of Islam

Igbo   One of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria

Yoruba   One of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria

Hausa   One of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria

Sharia   the Islamic legal code

Boko Haram   Western education is forbidden.

Appendix D.

A malnourished mother and child at the IDPs camp for people displaced by Boko Haram, Bama, Borno State.

Source: Nsude & Nwanchor (2017). Reporting nutrition and the right of Nigerian child: focus on internally displaced children in boko haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Appendix E.

Former Boko Haram members eating in their cafeteria at the Malam Sidi Camp.

Source: Pulse Nigeria (2020). https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/repentant-boko-haram-members-to-get-free-foreign-education/kmt2njf

Appendix F.

An IDPs camp in Maiduguri, Borno State.

Source: *Premium Time* (2022). https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/503523-boko-haram-why-were-closing-idp-camps-resettling-displaced-persons-zulum.html

Appendix G.

Former Boko Haram members undergoing the OSC training watching at the Malam Sidi Camp

Source: Repentant Boko Haram: A look at Operation Safe Corridor deradicalization and rehabilitation camp (Bamas, 2020). https://www.icirnigeria.org/repentant-boko-haram-a-look-at-operation-safe-corridor-deradicalisation-and-rehabilitation-camp/

Appendix H.

The outside view of the Malam Sidi Camp

Source: *Daily Trust* (2020) https://dailytrust.com/mallam-sidi-inside-the-rehab-of-repentant-

boko-haram-members