A Unified Approach to Pragmatically Licensed Constructions in English

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Our doubts are traitors, and make us lose the good we oft might win, by fearing to attempt.

William Shakespeare

“Measure for Measure,” Act 1 scene 4

The process of learning, of gaining knowledge, of bettering ourselves, is an ongoing, continuing journey. Before we embark on this journey, we must first overcome the fear of failure that haunts us all. My own personal struggle stemmed from a lack of confidence in myself. I came to Tsukuba five years ago without the linguistic background required to be a graduate student of linguistics. I was filled with angst and afraid to express myself about linguistics, a subject I was passionate about, and my own personal doubts prevented me from making academic progress. I am deeply indebted to the following people for all the help, wisdom, and support they have given me over the years, without which I could not have overcome my fears and striven to achieve my goal.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Aim

Faced with an ill-formed construction, we have two possible approaches for elucidating what is responsible for its ungrammaticality. One is an intrasentential analysis that ascribes the ungrammaticality of the construction to intrasentential properties. This approach assumes that a sentence is unacceptable when it cannot satisfy its licensing condition by intrasentential information, that is, when the lexical and semantic information of its constituents violates the condition. Constructions of this kind are often considered either syntactically or semantically ill-formed.

The other is an intersentential analysis that takes account of contextual information. This approach hypothesises that even though intrasentential information renders a construction unacceptable, contextual information overrides the constraint violation and licenses the construction pragmatically. That is, the construction alleged to be infelicitous on its own can be acceptable in context.

This dissertation adopts the latter approach and aims to show that the difference between sentence-level grammaticality and discourse-level grammaticality can be accounted for from a unified perspective. This approach is characterised by the following descriptive generalisation:

(1) *The Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement*
When a pragmatically motivated construction is licensed,
   a. it must have an entity which functions as a topic, and
   b. it must be supplied in context with enough information to make it consistent with the condition satisfied by the more general construction of which it is an instance.

As will become clear in what follows, this generalisation makes it possible to capture a number of pragmatically motivated constructions as a class.

1.2. Organisation

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 clarifies what topic is, since it is an important notion in the generalisation in (1). The present dissertation

basically follows Lambrecht (1994), who defines the notion of topic in terms of information structure. Put otherwise, we take the role of context into consideration to determine whether an entity functions as topic or not. If we adopt this standpoint, we can account for the topichood of an entity included in the kind of sentence which, in syntactic terms alone, would appear problematic for our purposes.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the *cause*-causative passive, exemplified by sentences like *Prices were caused to rise by the inflation,* and accounts for its passivisability. Previous studies point out that the *cause*-causative passive is unacceptable, but contrary to this view, the chapter claims that the construction is acceptable in context, and proposes a pragmatic licensing condition for it. It demonstrates that the *cause*-causative passive is infelicitous on its own, since it cannot satisfy the so-called affectedness constraint by its lexical information, but the sentence is acceptable when its subject is construed as the topic of the sentence and the constraint is fulfilled by contextual information. This chapter also argues that the *cause*-causative passive is a pragmatically motivated construction in that, whereas the construction is infelicitous (or hardly acceptable) on its own, it can be acceptable in a context which satisfies a certain pragmatic condition. Based on this analysis, we will

propose the generalisation in (1).

Chapter 4 investigates the peculiar passive, illustrated by sentences like *The city has been fought many battles over*, where the subject NP is passivised out of an adjunct PP. This is different from canonical passives, where the argument NP of the verb is passivised. By giving a detailed description of the peculiar passive, the chapter shows that the construction cannot meet the affectedness constraint on its own, but it can if supplied with adequate contextual information. Based on this observation, we propose a pragmatic licensing condition for the use of this construction, which is argued to be empirically more appropriate than those proposed by previous studies. We claim that the peculiar passive is a pragmatically motivated construction which constitutes another piece of evidence for the validity of generalisation in (1).

Chapters 3 and 4 adduce evidence in favour of the generalisation in (1) from the study of sentence-level constructions. The next two chapters offer further arguments for the generalisation from the analysis of phrase-level phenomena.

Chapter 5 deals with the prenominal possessive construction with a passive reading. This construction is exemplified by phrases like *the city's destruction,* where the possessor nominal is semantically interpreted as the

object of the deverbal noun (cf. *the city was destructed*.). The chapter surveys the findings of previous studies and points out that the construction is unacceptable if it does not meet the affectedness constraint (Anderson (1978), Taylor (1994, 1996)). It then shows that the ungrammaticality of the possessive is mitigated by contextual information. We claim that even ill-formed possessives can be pragmatically licensed, and propose a licensing condition for them. The validity of this claim means that the generalisation in (1) also holds for the NP-level phenomenon, which, together with the result shown in chapters 3 and 4, proves the validity of the generalisation irrespective of the syntactic level of the construction in question.

Chapter 6 further argues for the validity of the generalisation in (1) by considering the VP in the double object construction. The chapter examines the study by Bresnan and Nikitina (2003), which argues that manner of speaking verbs like *yell* and verbs of imparting of force like *carry* are not compatible with the double object construction, but many examples of the kinds alleged to be ungrammatical can be found on the web. Based on this argument, the chapter proposes a pragmatic licensing condition in terms of the topichood of the dative NP and the role of context surrounding the construction; it also

claims that the construction is not accepted when the lexical information of the verb is not compatible with the semantics of the construction but it is licensed when the constraint violation is overridden by contextual information. The analysis in this chapter establishes that the generalisation in (1) holds for the non-passive construction.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with a summary of the claims and an outlook for further research.

Chapter 2

On the Notion of Topic

2.1. Introduction

This chapter clarifies what topic is, because it is an important notion in the former part of the generalisation about pragmatically motivated constructions – the construction must have an entity which functions as its topic. Our discussion below will be confined to a sentence topic, not a discourse topic defined as "the topic of the paragraph" or "what the paragraph is about" (Dik (1989)).

Some previous studies (Halliday (1967), Fries (1983)) regard the notion of topic as the element which comes first in a sentence, and Givón (1983) uses the term *topic* to refer to any participant in a discourse. Various studies (Kuno (1972), Gundel (1976), Chomsky (1977), Dik (1978), Reinhart (1982), among others) define the topic of a sentence as the thing which the proposition expressed by the sentence is about.

Lambrecht (1994:120) argues that "it is sometimes not possible to determine the topic of a sentence on the basis of the syntactic structure of that sentence alone… [That is,] in order to determine whether an entity is a topic in

a sentence or not it is often necessary to take into account the discourse context in which the sentence is embedded." From this standpoint he defines the notion of topic in terms of information structure.

We basically follow Lambrecht (1994), and his definition of the topic is as follows:[1]

(1) A referent is interpreted as the topic of a proposition if in a given situation the proposition is construed as being about this referent, i.e. as expressing information which is relevant to and which increases the addressee's knowledge of this referent.

(Lambrecht (1994:131))

Contrary to the previous studies above, Lambrecht (1994) assumes that the subject is not always the topic and just because an entity is given in context does not mean that the entity is construed as the topic. It is important that an entity should have been introduced into the discourse beforehand and at the same time the sentence should denote a proposition about the given entity.

As Lambrecht states, we should take the role of context into consideration to determine whether an entity is the topic. In the discussion to follow, we shall explore how

the contextual information interacts with the grammaticality of the four constructions introduced in the preceding chapter. We, therefore, employ the notion of topic as defined by Lambrecht (1994). Let us briefly illustrate his definition with examples in the following sections.

2.2. Topic of a Sentence

The following discourse illustrates the definition in (1) succinctly:

(2) a. What did the children do next?
b. The children went to school.
(Lambrecht (1994:121))

The question in (2a) asks what the children did and the NP *the children* is introduced into the discourse. In the reply in (2b), the referent of the subject NP *the children* is what the sentence is about. The sentence constitutes a proposition construed as being about this referent. Hence the NP represents the topic of the sentence. This is an obvious illustration of the definition in (1).

The definition covers the case where the NP referent does not appear explicitly in the previous discourse. Consider the following example:

(3) A: You want to see every Woody Allen movie as soon as it comes out.

B: No, *Stardust Memory* I saw yesterday.

(Prince (1981:251), italics mine)

In example (3), there are no explicit words in A's utterance that correspond to the preposed NP of the topicalised sentence. *Stardust Memory* is not identical to *every Woody Allen movie*, but it is a movie in which Woody Allen appears. The preposed NP of the sentence in question is thus inferable from the word *Woody Allen* in the discourse, and the sentence describes what happened to its referent. Hence the acceptability of the topicalised sentence in (3).

Furthermore the definition of the topic in (1) holds for the case where even no direct trigger word for inference appears in the previous discourse. Look at the following:

(4) I graduated from high school as an average student. My initiative didn't carry me any further than average. *History* I found to be dry. *Math courses* I was never good at. I enjoyed sciences.

(Prince (1981:253), italics mine)

Note that the italicised NPs in (4), *history* and *math courses*,

are not already introduced entities, and their equivalents also do not appear beforehand. However, the topicalised sentences with these NPs are used and accepted. The NPs *history* and *math courses* are inferable from a discourse theme (e.g. talking about school life) that is not mentioned obviously but that is inferable from the NP *high school*. Our knowledge of the world ("frame" in the sense of Prince (1981)) associates *history* and *math courses* with *high school*.[2] So the topicalised sentences are impeccable in (4).

Lambrecht (1994) does not fully mention the cases in (3) and (4), but we can assume that his definition of the topic includes all three cases: the cases where a referent is already introduced into discourse, where a referent is inferable from a trigger word in the previous discourse, and where a referent is inferable from the discourse theme.

We should interpret the definition in (1) in this way, since the phenomenon observed in each construction needs a clear and detailed definition of topic.

2.3. Topic of a Phrase

Although Lambrecht (1994) restricts his discussion to sentence topics, we shall apply his definition to phrases. On the basis of the definition in (1), we argue that an entity in a phrase can also function as the topic. That is, when

an entity in a phrase is introduced into the discourse beforehand and the other entities in the phrase express a proposition about it, the given entity can be construed as the topic of the phrase.

The case of an NP we treat is illustrated by possessives:

(5) [...] West Germany's first concern is the gradual, well-disciplined reform of East German society, not *the country's destruction* and its absorption into West Germany.

(BNC A46, italics mine)

In (5), the possessor *the country's* corresponds to the NP *East German*, and so the possessor has been introduced into the preceding discourse. The deverbal noun *destruction* expresses what happened to the country, which is corroborated by the fact that the possessive has an object reading and can be paraphrased into the passive sentence, *the country is destroyed* (Taylor (1994)). Thus it can be assumed that the deverbal noun functions as a predicate of the possessor. Hence the possessor NP can be regarded as the topic of this phrase. The topichood of the possessor NP in pronominal possessives is discussed in Chapter 5.

An NP in a VP also functions as the topic, which is

observed in double object constructions. The dative NP in the VP can be construed as the topic of the phrase. Observe the italicised portion:

(6) When the noblewoman Dhuoda saw off her fifteen-year-old son William to join Charles the Bald's court in 841, *she gave him a book of advice*. Most of it was personal and spiritual.

(BNC HPT, italics mine)

In (6), the dative NP *him* in the VP *gave him a book of advice* is equivalent to the NP *William* in the preceding context. Furthermore, we assume that the entities except the dative NP in the VP express a proposition about the NP. Tsubomoto's (1981) analysis bears out this assumption. Tsubomoto claims that the dative NP semantically functions as the subject of the VP. This is illustrated by the following examples:

(7) a. Several mistakes taught John the secrets of Chinese cooking.

b. After several mistakes, John learned the secrets of Chinese cooking.

(Tsubomoto (1981:321f.))

According to Tsubomoto, sentence (7a) can be paraphrased as (7b), which shows that the dative NP is a semantic subject of the VP.[3] Consequently, there is a predication relation between the dative NP and the other elements in the VP. Hence the topichood of the dative NP in the double object construction in (6). This point is discussed in chapter 6.

As seen above, the phrases can be paraphrased into the sentences. This suggests that the definition of the sentence topic by Lambrecht (1994) is applicable to that of phrases.

2.4. Summary

When an NP in a sentence or phrase is construed as the topic, the following two factors are important: (i) the referent of the NP has already been introduced into discourse, or is inferable from the preceding context, and (ii) the sentence or phrase denotes a proposition about the given entity. In the discussion to follow, we use these two criteria for determining the topic of a sentence or phrase.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

[1] See Lambrecht (1994) for details.

[2] This kind of inference is also discussed by Clark and Haviland (1977) under the name of “bridging.” See Clark and Haviland (1977) for details.

[3] Tsubomoto (1981) states that the topichood of the dative NP induces its subjecthood, and that example (7) is one piece of evidence for the topichood of the dative NP. However, the paraphrase in (7) simply illustrates the fact that the dative NP serves as the subject of the VP, which does not mean the NP is construed as the topic of the VP. Chapter 6 will discuss this point further.

Chapter 3

Cause-Causative Passives*

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the passivisability of periphrastic causative sentences with the verb *cause*, which we will henceforth refer to as *cause*-causatives. Previous studies such as Mittwoch (1990) and Mair (1990) claim that *cause*-causatives cannot be passivised, as shown in (1):

(1) a. The inflation caused prices to rise.
b. * Prices were caused to rise (by the inflation).

(Mittwoch (1990:119))

The passive sentence of a *cause*-causative, henceforth referred to as a *cause*-causative passive, is alleged to be ungrammatical, as seen in (1b). However, there are certain contexts in which *cause*-causative passives can actually be used:

(2) The Negro came to the United States of America in 1619. [...] Before the Mayflower, [...] *hundreds of Negroes* [...] *were caused to perish in the middle of the sea*, simply because the mean and cruel task master, the white man, would walk down the aisle and stumble over Negroes chained to the ship and say, "We have too many on board. Dump them over into the sea."

(http://www.randomhouse.com/highschool/catalog/display.pperl?isbn=9780609609149&view=excerpt)

As the italicised part shows, the *cause*-causative passive is acceptable and actually used in (2).

Mittwoch (1990) and Mair (1990) merely point out the fact shown in (1) and do not provide any explanation. Furthermore, very few serious attempts have been made to account for the passivisability of *cause*-causatives and little is known about the behaviour of *cause*-causative passives. The purpose of this study is to clarify the nature of *cause*-causative passives, and to offer an explanation for why it is difficult to accept *cause*-causative passives on their own.

The organisation of this chapter is as follows. The next section examines data collected from the Internet and shows that *cause*-causative passives are hardly acceptable on their own, but can be used in a certain limited context. Based on this observation, the section proposes a condition for the use of *cause*-causative passives. Section 3.3 examines the plausibility of our condition. Section 3.4 argues that the condition can be extended to account for the passivisability of a similar construction to the *cause*-causative construction. Section 3.5 attempts to explain why the passive constructions we analyse require contextual support for their proper use. Based on the analysis of *cause*-causative passives, section 3.6 proposes a descriptive generalisation in terms of the pragmatic principle of topic requirement which says roughly that the pragmatically motivated constructions require an entity which functions as a topic in order to be licensed, and whose validity will be demonstrated throughout the dissertation. Finally, Section 3.7 makes our concluding remarks.

3.2. The Nature of the Facts

In this section we will examine four pieces of data collected from the Internet.[1] Intuitively, there seem to be two common features among the data: one is concerned with the subject of a *cause*-causative passive; the other

is concerned with the cause of the event expressed by a *cause*-causative passive.

3.2.1. Subjects of Cause-*Causative Passives*

This subsection deals with the first common feature, which is concerned with the subject of a *cause*-causative passive. Observe the following example with respect to the *cause*-causative passive in italics and the context surrounding it:

(3) The Negro came to the United States of America in 1619. [...] Before the Mayflower, [...] *hundreds of Negroes* [...] *were caused to perish in the middle of the sea*, simply because the mean and cruel task master, the white man, would walk down the aisle and stumble over Negroes chained to the ship and say, "We have too many on board. Dump them over into the sea." (= (2))

In (3), the subject of the *cause*-causative passive (*hundreds of*) *Negroes* appears in the preceding context as shown in the first. The passive sentence describes what happened to that subject. This accords with the notion of the topic defined by Lambrecht (1994).[2] As discussed in chapter 2,

we regard an entity as the topic of a sentence when it has been introduced into the preceding discourse and the sentence denotes a proposition about the given entity. As seen in (3), the subject of the *cause*-causative passive occurs beforehand and the sentence is construed as a proposition about the subject. We can then assume that the subject of a *cause*-causative passive functions as the topic of the sentence.

Let us confirm this point further:

(4) By controlling rotor speed in relation to wind speed, the aerodynamic power extracted by the blades from the wind was manipulated. Specifically, *the blades were caused to stall in high winds*. In low and moderate winds [...]

(http://www.nrel.gov/docs/legosti/fy98/24311.pdf)

In (4), the referent of the subject of the *cause*-causative passive *the blades* is already introduced into the preceding discourse and the *cause*-causative passive describes what happened to the subject. Thus, the subject represents the topic of the sentence.

The following examples are slightly different from the cases in (3) and (4):

(5) The singer Janet Jackson, it was proved during the Super Bowl programme last weekend, is possessed of a right breast. And when an American breast is exposed on peak-time television, can litigation be far behind? "As a direct and proximate result of the broadcast," a writ proclaims, *viewers "were caused to suffer outrage, anger, embarrassment and serious injury."*

(http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/story/0,,1144514,00.html)

(6) An earthquake of that magnitude would cause general alarm and things like vases could topple over [...] In 1984, a 5.4 magnitude tremor in north Wales caused chimney pots to fall off houses in Liverpool, 100 miles away, [...] *Weak walls could be caused to crumble* [...]

(http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,500045,00.html)

In (5) and (6), there are no explicit expressions that correspond to the subject of the *cause*-causative passive in the preceding context. It might appear that the subject does not function as the topic of the sentence. A closer look, however, reveals that the subject of a *cause*-causative passive does serve as the topic of the sentence.

In (5), the subject *viewers* does not appear in the preceding context, but we can easily infer the existence of viewers from the words *television* and *broadcast*. This makes the word *viewers* accessible from the context, and the *cause*-causative passive describes what happened to the viewers. Thus, the subject serves as the topic of the sentence. Similarly, in (6) the subject of a *cause*-causative passive does not occur in the preceding discourse. Instead, related NPs such as *chimney pots* and *houses* are introduced. These NPs, especially *houses*, remind us of walls which are part of houses. Moreover, things like vases will fall easily during a tremor. These fragile things may be associated with weak walls in this discourse. It is reasonable to consider, therefore, that weak walls already appear in the preceding context. The *cause*-causative passive in italics expresses what could happen to the subject. Consequently, the subject functions as the topic of the sentence in (6).

As shown in chapter 2, the case of topicalised sentences is an independent support for the account that the subjects in (5) and (6) are construed as the topics of the sentences. Consider again the following example:

(7) A: You want to see every Woody Allen movie as soon as it comes out.
B: No, *Stardust Memory* I saw yesterday.
(Prince (1981:251), italics mine)

In example (7), we can find no explicit words in the first utterance that is equivalent to the preposed NP of the topicalised sentence. *Stardust Memory* is not identical to every *Woody Allen movie*, but it is a movie where Woody Allen appears. The preposed NP in question is thus inferable from the word *Woody Allen* in the discourse, and the sentence describes what happened to its referent. Hence the acceptability of the topicalised sentence in (7).

Even though no equivalent to the topic entity is mentioned beforehand in discourse, as in (7), the inference from the trigger word makes it possible to regard the subject as the topic of the sentence. Consequently, the subjects in (5) and (6) successfully function as the topics.

The topichood of the subject seems to be more important in *cause*-causative passives than in other passive constructions such as canonical passives. The subject of a *cause*-causative passive must always serve as the topic of the sentence, whereas that of a canonical passive sentence does not need to. This is demonstrated by the use of a passive sentence as a presentational sentence, which as a whole represents new information and is topicless. Observe the following instances:

(8) a. What happened?
b. A dog was run over.
c. * Prices were caused to rise (by the inflation). (= (1b))

The question *What happened?* in (8a) asks what event occurred. An answer to the question is necessarily a presentational sentence which explains what event took place, and thus the sentence as a whole represents totally new information.[3] As an answer to the question in (8a), the canonical passive sentence in (8b) is appropriate, whereas the *cause*-causative passive in (8c) is not. This is because a canonical passive sentence does not need to contain any topic, while the subject of a *cause*-causative passive must always function as the topic of the sentence and hence it

cannot be used as a presentational sentence.

We can thus conclude that the subject of a *cause*-causative passive must function as the topic of the sentence.

3.2.2. Causes of Events

This subsection deals with the second common feature seen among the data, which is concerned with the cause of the event expressed by a *cause*-causative passive. Observe the following example, where for the sake of clarity the relevant parts are in italics:

(9) The Negro came to the United States of America in 1619. [...] Before the Mayflower, [...] hundreds of Negroes [...] were caused to perish in the middle of the sea, *simply because the mean and cruel task master, the white man, would walk down the aisle and stumble over Negroes chained to the ship and say "We have too many on board. Dump them over into the sea."* (= (2))

In (9), the reason why Negroes were caused to perish in the sea (*the command of the mean task master that they should be dumped into the sea*) is described in the context following

the *cause*-causative passive. This suggests that in cases where a *cause*-causative passive is used, the cause of the event denoted by the sentence is described in the context. Let us confirm this point with further examples:

(10) *The singer Janet Jackson*, it was proved during the Super Bowl programme last weekend, is possessed of a right breast. And when *an American breast is exposed on peak-time television*, can litigation be far behind? "As a direct and proximate result of the broadcast," a writ proclaims, viewers "were caused to suffer outrage, anger, embarrassment and serious injury."

(= (5))

In (10), the cause of the event that led viewers to suffer outrage and anger is that Janet Jackson exposed her right breast and they were forced to watch it. This is expressed in the context, as the italicised parts show. The same situation holds for the following instances:

(11) *By controlling rotor speed in relation to wind speed, the aerodynamic power extracted by the blades from the wind was manipulated*. Specifically, the blades were caused to stall in high winds. In low and moderate winds [...] (= (4))

(12) *An earthquake of that magnitude* would cause general alarm and things like vases could topple over [...] In 1984, *a 5.4 magnitude tremor* in north Wales caused chimney pots to fall off houses in Liverpool, 100 miles away, [...] Weak walls could be caused to crumble [...] (= (6))

Each of the italicised parts represents the cause of the event described by the passive sentence, and it is expressed in the context.

This also seems to be a characteristic unique to the use of *cause*-causative passives because the cause does not need to be expressed in the context when other passive constructions are used. In a canonical passive sentence, for example, the cause (i.e. the active subject) can be realised as a *by*-phrase.

(13) Body temperature is lowered by aspirin.
(Mittwoch (1990:119))

In (13), the cause of body temperature lowering is aspirin, and this is shown in the *by*-phrase of the sentence. So, the cause of a canonical passive sentence does not need to be expressed in the context.

3.2.3. Descriptive Generalisation

We have observed two characteristics common among *cause*-causative passives: one is that the subject of a *cause*-causative passive serves as the topic of the sentence, and the other is that the cause of the event a *cause*-causative passive denotes is described in the context. Based on these observations, we propose the following descriptive generalisation as a tentative condition for the *cause*-causative passives:

(14) In order for a *cause*-causative passive to be acceptable, the subject must function as the topic of the sentence, and the cause of the event expressed by the sentence must be described in the context.

This seems to be a prerequisite condition for the use of *cause*-causative passives. We will examine the plausibility of the generalisation in (14) in the following section.

3.3. A Pragmatic Condition for *Cause*-Causative Passives

We shall examine the validity of our condition for *cause*-causative passives and show that the condition must be satisfied when the construction is acceptable.

3.3.1. Subjects as Topics

First, the subject of a *cause*-causative passive must function as the topic of the sentence; this is confirmed by the following examples:

(15) When a patient has a headache, the doctor should prescribe aspirin. While aspirin relieves the patient's headache,

a. * his body temperature is also caused to drop.

b. it also causes his body temperature to drop.

In the preceding context given in (15), there is no expression which corresponds to the subject of the *cause*-causative passive, (*his*) *body temperature*. As we have seen, when *cause*-causative passives are acceptable,

the passive subject or related words appear in the preceding context, and the construction is a sentence that describes what happens/happened to the subject. In (15), however, the subject is not introduced into the discourse, and it cannot represent the topic of the sentence. Hence, *cause*-causative passives cannot be used in such a case, as seen in (15a), whereas the active counterpart is used, as in (15b).

In this way, we can illustrate the plausibility of the first condition: the subject of a *cause*-causative passive must serve as the topic of the sentence. To further confirm the validity of the condition, we shall consider the case where the example constitutes an apparent counterexample in the following.

3.3.1.1 Topichood of Indefinite Subjects

Takami (2009) also points out that *cause*-causative passives can be passivised, but he provides examples which at a glance seem to constitute counterexamples to the former part of condition (14) and claims that it is empirically inadequate.[4] He adduces the following counterexamples:

(16) *A 37-year-old mother of twins was caused to lose a massive amount of blood* and died after hospital staff failed to diagnose and treat internal haemorrhaging in a timely fashion after a caesarean section.
(Takami (2009:35))

(17) On one occasion, *an electrically-driven wheel chair was caused to move unintentionally* by the communication radio in a taxi. (Takami (2009:35))

In (16) and (17), the subjects of the *cause*-causative passives are indefinite NPs, and the *cause*-causative passives occur in the discourse initial position. Hence, Takami claims that the subject in question cannot be construed as the topic of the sentence here. It might appear that the subject does not be interpreted as the topic of the sentence. A closer investigation, however, reveals that the indefinite subjects in question evidently serve as the topics of the sentences.

Let us first review the notion of the topic here. Lambrecht's (1994) definition of topic, which we follow in this study, holds for the case where even no direct trigger word for inference appears in the previous discourse. Consider the following instance:

(18) I graduated from high school as an average student. My initiative didn't carry me any further than average. *History* I found to be dry. *Math courses* I was never good at. I enjoyed sciences.

(Prince (1981:253, italics mine))

Note that the italicised NPs in (18), *history* and *math courses*, are not already introduced entities, and their equivalents also do not appear beforehand. However, the topicalised sentences with these NPs are used and accepted. The NPs *history* and *math courses* are inferable from a discourse theme (e.g. talking about school life) that is not mentioned obviously but that is inferable from the NP *high school*. Our knowledge of the world associates *history* and *math course* with *high school*. Hence the impeccability of the topicalised sentences in (18).

It is this account that seems to be applicable to the *cause*-causative passives in (16) and (17). We can predict that even an indefinite NP in a *cause*-causative passive functions as the topic of the sentence. Let us consider whether or not it is really construed as the topic.

The examples in (16) and (17) are extracted from the following paragraphs:

(19) $4,500,000.00 medical malpractice settlement – *37 year old mother of twins was caused to lose a massive amount of blood* and died after hospital staff failed to diagnose and treat internal haemorrhaging in a timely fashion after a caesarean section.
(http://www.napil.com/DisplayListing.aspx)

(20) Mobile phones can interfere with medical equipment.
On one occasion, *an electrically-driven wheel chair was caused to move unintentionally* by the communication radio in a taxi [...]
(http://www.cherryclough.com/Downloads/Compendium%20of%20Banana%20Skins,%205%20March%2007.pdf)

Let us take account of the whole context where the *cause*-causative passives is embedded, especially the first line, i.e. the subheading of the article. The first phrase in (19) is a theme of this fragment. When we hear the NP *medical malpractice settlement,* we infer various sorts of information from it. For example, the NP implies the existence of perpetrators, victims, plaintiffs, and

defendants. These participants are already evoked by the first phrase of this context. A 37-year-old mother of twins is one of them, a victim. It is reasonable to consider, therefore, that the referent of subject NP is already introduced in the preceding context. The *cause*-causative passive describes what happened to its subject. Consequently, the subject is construed as the topic of the sentence in (19).[5]

Likewise, in (20), the NP *medical equipment* is associated with a pacemaker, an infusion pump, and maybe an electrically-driven wheel chair. Thus, the subject of the *cause*-causative passive is as good as when introduced beforehand, and the sentence denotes a proposition construed as being about its subject. Hence the indefinite subject represents the topic of the sentence.

Actually, the following test supports the supposition that the indefinite subjects in (16) and (17) function as the topics of the sentences:

(21) a. What happened?

b. ??A 37-year-old mother of twins was caused to lose a massive amount of blood (because of a medical malpractice).

(22) a. What happened?

b. ??An electrically-driven wheel chair was caused to move unintentionally by the communication radio in a taxi.

As seen in (7) above, an answer to the question *What happened?* is necessarily a presentational sentence, and thus the sentence as a whole represents totally new information and is topicless. As answers to the question, the *cause*-causative passives in (21b) and (22b) are not appropriate. This is because the subject of the *cause*-causative passive must be construed as the topic of the sentence, and the sentences in (21b) and (22b) cannot function as presentational sentences.

Moreover, that the indefinite subjects in (16) and (17) function as the topics of the sentences is independently supported by the case with topicalised sentences. Consider the following examples:

(23) I saw a film last night. A Fellini film it was. (Ward (1988:58))

According to Inage (1997), the NP *a Fellini film* in the topicalised sentence corresponds to *a film* in the first sentence: a Fellini film is a member of the class denoted

by the NP *a film* which is introduced beforehand. Therefore, the NP in the second sentence conveys some information related to the preceding discourse, and it does not express brand-new information. Even though an indefinite NP in topicalised sentences introduces a new referent in form, it is more informationally relevant to the preceding discourse in terms of information value (Ward and Prince (1991)).[6]

From the observation so far, it is probably safe to conclude that just because an indefinite NP is used does not mean the NP cannot be construed as the topic of the sentence. Takami (2009) states that the subject of *cause*-causative passives like (16) and (17) cannot function as the topic of the sentence simply because it is an indefinite NP. We have revealed, however, that even an indefinite NP can be construed as the topic in relation to the preceding context.

We cannot determine whether an NP is construed as the topic only by the surface syntactic information. Lambrecht (1994:120) says as follows: in order to determine whether an entity is a topic in a sentence or not, it is often necessary to take into account the discourse context in which the sentence is embedded. Why, then, is an indefinite NP used despite the fact that it is interpreted as the topic? A definite NP tends to be used in order to denote the topic

(Hawkins (1978), Brown and Yule (1983), Prince (1981)). What function does an indefinite subject serve? The next subsection addresses this issue.

3.3.1.2. Predicative Indefinite NPs

Let us observe example (19), repeated here as (24):

(24) $4,500,000.00 medical malpractice settlement – *37 year old mother of twins was caused to lose a massive amount of blood* and died after hospital staff failed to diagnose and treat internal haemorrhaging in a timely fashion after a caesarean section.

As mentioned above, though the NP *a victim* or its equivalent is not written clearly, the referent is implied by the first phrase and regarded as an already introduced entity. So, while the indefinite NP (*a*) *37-year-old mother of twins* seems to introduce a new referent on the surface in the discourse, she and the victim are identical. Furthermore, *a 37-year-old mother of twins* is a more detailed description of the victim. It is used to introduce a new aspect to the topic entity, which is unknown to the hearer yet. Indefinite NPs of this type correspond to what Nishida (2002) calls “reflexive indefinites,” which function as a

means to express a specific objective aspect to the topic person.[7]

Consequently, though the subject of the *cause*-causative passive is an indefinite NP, the referent introduced by the NP and the topic entity is coreferential, and the NP can be, though indirectly, identified as the topic of the sentence. This is illustrated by the following grammatical contrast.

(25) $4,500,000.00 medical malpractice settlement –

a. The victim is a 37-year-old mother of twins who was caused to lose a massive amount of blood.

b. {*A woman / A 37-year-old mother of twins} was caused to lose a massive amount of blood.

c. * The 37-year-old mother of twins was caused to lose a massive amount of blood.

In (25a), the implied referent *the victim* is expressed and is the subject of this sentence; the original subject in question serves as the predicate of the subject. The sentence in (25a) is impeccable and shows that an indefinite NP denotes a new aspect to the subject. When *a woman* is compared with *a 37-year-old mother of twins*, as in (25b),

the latter is more felicitous as the subject of the *cause*-causative passives here. This is because the latter gives more detailed information about a victim and can function as the predicate more sufficiently. Furthermore, as in (25c), if we change the NP in question from indefinite to definite, the sentence is infelicitous. This can be explained in terms of the nature of indefiniteness in English: an indefinite NP can express a property, but not a definite NP (e.g. *I am a student /*I am the student*).

When an indefinite NP is used as the subject of a *cause*-causative passive, the subject looks as if it could not be construed as the topic of the sentence, as Takami (2009) points out. Actually, however, it can function as the topic of the sentence in relation to the preceding discourse. As seen above, if we take account of the contextual information surrounding *cause*-causative passives, we should find that Takami's objection to the former part of condition (14) – that the subject must function as the topic of the sentence – is not valid. The examples provided by Takami turn out to be supporting evidence rather than counterexamples.

3.3.2. Enhancing Patienthood

Next, let us turn to the second point: the cause of the event expressed by a *cause*-causative passive must be described in the context. Consider the following:

(26) * Concerning his body temperature, it is also caused to drop.

Even though the sentence in (26) is arranged to make the subject the topic of the sentence, it is unacceptable. This is because there is no context in which the cause is described. Let us confirm this point further:

(27) He was running a high fever this morning, and he went to a doctor.

a. So the doctor's treatment caused his body temperature to drop.

b. * So his body temperature was caused to drop.

c. * So his body temperature was caused to drop by the doctor's treatment.

d. ??So by the doctor's treatment, his body temperature was caused to drop.

In (27), the NP *a high fever* appears in discourse. It corresponds to the subject of the passives in (27b-d), and

the passives express what happened to the subject. So the subject serves as the topic of the sentence. Nevertheless, sentence (27b) is unacceptable because the cause of the event denoted by the *cause*-causative passive is not expressed in the preceding context. In this case, a *cause*-causative such as that in (27a) can be appropriately used. Moreover, even if the cause is represented in the *by*-phrase, as in (27c), a *cause*-causative passive is not acceptable. From these, it follows that the cause must be expressed in the context surrounding *cause*-causative passives. Interestingly, the acceptability of sentence (27d) is barely increased when compared with (27c). In (27d), the *by*-phrase, which denotes the cause, is put before the matrix clause, in which the cause and the effect are arranged according to the natural order of the world.[8] Sentence (27d) is, however, still almost unacceptable, because the cause is expressed in the sentence itself, not in the discourse. Here it is also confirmed that the cause must be described in the context.

Contrary to the argument above, Takami (2009) adduces examples which illustrate the fact that the *by*-phrase in *cause*-causative passives describes the cause of the event. Let us observe Takami's (2009) instances:

(28) In a concert and sound installation, twenty mobile phones were suspended from a ceiling. These were caused to ring *by a live performer*, who dialled them up using another four phones below.

(Takami (2009:35))

(29) The requirement of §523 (a) (2) (b) are met if the existence of a written statement was caused to be prepared *by the defendant*.

(Takami (2009:35))

Our condition in (14) prescribes that the cause of the event expressed by *cause*-causative passives must be described in context, not with a *by*-phrase. The sentences in (28) and (29) do not conform to this condition. Where does the difference in grammaticality between the examples in (27c) and (28)-(29) come from? Let us consider this difference in terms of what is called the affectedness constraint. This constraint is proposed by Bolinger (1975) and is summarised as follows: a passive sentence needs a patient that is construed to be affected by the action of the verb.[9] We shall assume that the reason why *cause*-causative passives cannot be passivised on their own is that they do not contain a patient that is directly affected by the action of the verb. In other words, the NP in the complement clause to

cause-causative passives cannot be identified as a patient from the lexical information of the verb. So, *cause*-causative passives cannot fulfil the affectedness constraint on their own. The relation between the affectedness constraint and the passivisability of *cause*-causative passives will be discussed full in section 3.5.

If passives must satisfy the affectedness constraint in order to be licensed, then *cause*-causative passives necessarily meet the constraint even by contextual information, not by their intrasentential information. Put another way, when a *cause*-causative passive is accepted in context, the subject of the sentence is regarded as a patient from contextual information. Let us confirm this point by the examples, repeated below for ease of reference:

(30) He was running a high fever this morning, and he went to a doctor.
* So his body temperature was caused to drop by the doctor's treatment. (= (27c))

(31) When a patient has a headache and fever, the doctor should prescribe aspirin for the headache. While aspirin relieves the patient's headache, his body temperature is also caused to drop. (= (15a))

Comparing (30) with (31), we notice that *the doctor's treatment* in the *by*-phrase is too simple to explain the reason why his body temperature dropped. My informants have told me that they can neither infer the clear effect that the subject of the *cause*-causative passives underwent nor regard it as a patient from this phrase alone. On the other hand, they judge *cause*-causative passives as acceptable when the cause is described in the context, as in (31). Richer or more specific information tells them the effect which the subject undergoes. So, if we add more information on what happened to the subject, as in (32), the *cause*-causative passive becomes impeccable. This is because contextual information makes it possible to regard the subject as a patient. Observe the following example:

(32) He was running a high fever this morning, and he went to a doctor. So his body temperature was caused to drop by the doctor's treatment. Then, the fever has left him, and he is quite cool.

In (32), *the doctor's treatment* in the *by*-phrase is the cause of the event expressed by the *cause*-causative passive. The cause is described only by the phrase. But when we explain how the fever changes, as shown in the last line, the

cause-causative passive is acceptable.

Takami's (2009) examples are also explained from this point of view. Let us take (33) as an example:

(33) In a concert and sound installation, twenty mobile phones were suspended from a ceiling. *These were caused to ring by a live performer, who dialled them up using another four phones below.* (= (28))

In (33), the cause of the mobile phone ringing is a live performer's action, which is described with the *by*-phrase, not in the context. In this fragment, the mobile phones are one of the tools of art performance, and the way in which they are controlled is explained (i.e. *a live performer dialled them up using another four phones below*). Thus, the subject of the *cause*-causative passive, *these* (i.e. *twenty mobile phones*), can be construed as a patient. Actually, if we omit the relative clause, as in (34), the *cause*-causative passive is infelicitous:[10]

(34) In a concert and sound installation, twenty mobile phones were suspended from a ceiling.
* *These were caused to ring by a live performer.*

Example (34) illustrates that the cause described with the *by*-phrase is not sufficient to make the sentence acceptable. More information is needed which explains what impact the subject has. Richer information tells us that the subject is affected and the *cause*-causative passive is impeccable.

The same holds true for a case where the phrase *due to,* which introduces a reason, is used:

(35) Slip and Fall in Parking Garage, $350,000.00
The plaintiff parked her car in the Defendant's, Pro Park and City of New London, parking garage. While exiting the garage, *the plaintiff was caused to fall due to a hole in the floor of the garage*. As a result of this fall, the plaintiff severely injured her elbow [...].
(http://www.marianireck.com/areasofpractice.html)

In (35), the cause of the plaintiff falling is expressed with the phrase *due to,* but the *cause*-causative passive is used and acceptable. In this paragraph, the last line describes how the plaintiff was affected, which enables us to regard the subject of the *cause*-causative passive as a patient. This is confirmed by the oddity of the following

example:

(36) Slip and Fall in Parking Garage, $350,000.00
The plaintiff parked her car in the Defendant's, Pro Park and City of New London, parking garage. While exiting the garage, **the plaintiff was caused to fall due to a hole in the floor of the garage.*

When we omit the last line of the fragment, as in (36), the *cause*-causative passive is infelicitous. To make the *cause*-causative passive felicitous, one needs an explanation how the subject is affected, and it lacks in (36).

The fact seen above shows that it is how rich the contextual information is that makes *cause*-causative passives impeccable. Whether the cause is described in context or with the *by*-phrase (i.e. in a sentence) is not relevant to the acceptability of the sentence. Not only the cause, but the whole contextual information assigns the subject of the *cause*-causative passives a patient-like role and thus the affectedness constraint is satisfied, which in turn makes the *cause*-causative passives impeccable. In order to capture this fact precisely, we revise the descriptive generalisation in (14) and propose the

following licensing condition for *cause*-causative passives:

(37) *A Pragmatic Licensing Condition for* Cause-*Causative Passives*
A *cause*-causative passive requires a context where its subject can function as the topic of the sentence, and can also be regarded as a patient.

The facts seen above elucidate the validity of our condition in (37), and now we are in a position to predict the following:[11]

(38) Although *cause*-causative passives are not accepted on their own, they will be acceptable if they satisfy condition (37).

Let us examine whether this prediction is borne out. Again, the previous studies have claimed that the following instances are unacceptable:

(39) * Prices were caused to rise (by the inflation). (= (1b))

(40) * Body temperature is caused to drop by aspirin. (Mittwoch (1990:119))

As we have predicted, these sentences can be licensed under the well arranged context where the subject of a *cause*-causative passive serves as the topic of the sentence, and where the subject can be regarded as a patient. This is shown in (41) and (42):[12]

(41) The oil crisis caused a serious inflation in the 70's in Japan. Inflation lead to a general increase in prices and a fall in the purchasing value of money. Needless to say, *prices were caused to rise* in this country. (cf. the inflation caused prices to rise)

(42) When a patient has a headache and fever, the doctor should prescribe aspirin for the headache. While aspirin relieves the patient's headache, *his body temperature is also caused to drop.* Then, the fever has left him, and he is quite cool.
(cf. it also causes his body temperature to drop)

In (41), the *cause*-causative passive in italics, which is alleged to be unacceptable on its own, is used. Here the subject is introduced in the preceding discourse, and the sentence in question describes what happened to the subject. Thus, the subject serves as the topic of the sentence in (41). As for the patienthood of the subject, the context points to *inflation* as the cause of the event and tells us that inflation has a power of raising prices. Furthermore, most of us know that inflation is a rise in the general level of prices of goods and services in an economy over a period of time. Therefore, the subject of the passive *prices* can be regarded as a patient that gets some effect brought about by inflation, and the sentence is felicitous in (41).

Likewise, in (42), the *cause*-causative passive, which is difficult to accept on its own, is used. The subject, (*his*) *body temperature*, is accessible from the related word *fever* in the preceding context, and the *cause*-causative passive describes what happened to the subject. The subject, then, functions as the topic of the sentence in (42). It is also clear from the context how the fever changes, which makes it possible to construe the subject as a patient. Hence, the *cause*-causative passive in (42) is acceptable.

The examples in (41) and (42) illustrate our claim that even *cause*-causative passives assumed to be unacceptable on their own can be used in contexts which satisfy the condition in (37). This also points to the conclusion that *cause*-causative passives are not acceptable by themselves, but can be licensed in contexts where the subject serves as the topic of the sentence and where the subject can be regarded as a patient.

3.4. Applications

It should be clear by now that the condition for *cause*-causative passives in (37) and the prediction in (38) are plausible. Let us now apply our condition to a related construction; we shall show that the condition for the use of *cause*-causative passives not only applies to this construction, but can be extended to the passive of a causative sentence with the verb *make*, henceforth referred to as *make*-causative passives.

3.4.1. Unintentional Make-*Causative Passives*

It is well known that *cause*-causatives express unintentional causation. This is exemplified in (43):[13]

(43) a. * John deliberately caused Mary to do the dishes.

b. John accidentally/inadvertently caused Mary to drop her books.

(Givón (1975:61f.))

The examples in (43) show that *cause*-causatives are not compatible with adverbs like *deliberately* that denote the intentionality of the subject, whereas they are compatible with adverbs like *accidentally* and *inadvertently* that express the unintentionality of the subject. From this contrast, we can say that *cause*-causatives express unintentional causation.

In contrast, *make*-causatives, which are another type of periphrastic causative, generally express intentional causation, as shown in (44):

(44) a. John deliberately made Mary do the dishes.

b. * John accidentally/inadvertently made Mary drop her books.

(Givón (1975:62))

Make-causatives, as in (44a), occur with the adverb *deliberately*, but not with *accidentally* and *inadvertently*, as in (44b). *Make*-causatives thus denote intentional

causation.

It is, however, pointed out by Ohashi (1985) and Okuyama (1992) that *make*-causatives can also express unintentional causation:

(45) The confusion made me change my mind.
(Okuyama (1992:172))

(46) a. John intentionally made Mary drop her books.
b. John accidentally made Mary drop her books.
(Ohashi (1985:54))

Okuyama (1992), offering example (45), argues that a *make*-causative permits an inanimate subject. It goes without saying that inanimate subjects do not have any intention.[14] The grammaticality of (46) shows that *make*-causatives also express unintentional causation as well as intentional causation. The examples in (46) denote the (un)intentionality of the subject. Ohashi (1985) notes that *make*-causatives occur not only with *intentionally* but also with *accidentally*. The compatibility with *accidentally* also shows that *make*-causatives can express unintentional causation.

Here, we can recall that *cause*-causatives express unintentional causation, as seen in (43). Since *make*-causatives such as (45) and (46b) also express

unintentional causations, they are semantically similar to *cause*-causatives. Interestingly, the passive of a *make*-causative which expresses unintentional causation (hereafter "unintentional *make*-causative passive") is difficult to accept by itself, as is the case with a *cause*-causative passive. Observe the following: [15]

(47) a. The rain made the mushrooms come out.
b. ? The mushrooms were made to come out (by the rain).

(Mittwoch (1990:113))

In (47a), the *make*-causative occurs with an inanimate subject, and the sentence expresses unintentional causation. It is difficult to passivise the *make*-causative in (47a), as shown in (47b).

If we take into account the semantic similarity between *cause*-causatives and unintentional *make*-causatives, then we can predict that unintentional *make*-causative passives are also subject to the condition for *cause*-causative passives in (37). Actually, unintentional *make*-causative passives which are not acceptable on their own can be used in contexts where the passive subject functions as the topic of the sentence and the subject is regarded as a patient. Let us observe the following pair of examples:

(48) a. ? The mushrooms were made to come out (by the rain). (= (47b))

b. One kind of mushroom needs a lot of rain to grow and it usually comes out in June every year. But it rained enough for the mushrooms in May this year and so *they were made to come out* one month earlier than usual.

In (48b), the passive subject *they* (*mushrooms*) is mentioned beforehand, and the *make*-causative passive describes what happened to the subject. Thus, the passive subject represents the topic of the sentence. The context tells us that because of a lot of rain, mushrooms underwent a change to a new state, which makes it possible to regard the subject as a patient. Embedded in the context shown in (48b), the unacceptable sentence in (48a) is judged to be acceptable.

Our prediction is further verified by the following contrast:[16]

(49) a. ? I was made to change my mind by the confusion.

b. A coup d'état happened in my country which left the capital in confusion. Though I had decided to retire from politics, *I was made to change my mind* to support the prime minister.

Sentence (49a) is the passive counterpart of sentence (45), and it is difficult to accept out of context. This, however, can be licensed contextually, as in (49b). Here, the subject *I* is introduced in the preceding discourse and the *make*-causative passive denotes what happened to it. So, the passive subject serves as the topic of the sentence. Moreover, we can easily understand from the context that the coup d'état, or the confusion lead to the changing of the subject's thinking. So the subject can be construed as a patient here.

3.4.2. A Generalised Condition

As we have predicted, not only *cause*-causatives, but unintentional *make*-causatives can be passivised in a certain context. It follows then that the condition for *cause*-causative passives in (37) also holds true for unintentional *make*-causative passives. We then revise condition (37) as in (50). Henceforth, we will group

cause-causative passives and unintentional *make*-causative passives together, and refer to them as unintentional periphrastic causative passives for convenience:

(50) An unintentional periphrastic causative passive requires a context where its subject can function as the topic of the sentence, and can also be regarded as a patient.

In the next section, we shall attempt to account for the reason why unintentional periphrastic causative passives must obey this condition in order to be acceptable.

3.5. Contextual Support Required

As we have seen, unintentional periphrastic causatives cannot be passivised by themselves, but can be passivised in contexts which satisfy condition (50). In this section we will explain this fact in terms of the notion of "affectedness" proposed by Bolinger (1975).

Bolinger (1975:67) proposes the following hypothesis for the passive in English:

(51) The subject in a passive construction is conceived to be a true patient, i.e., to be genuinely affected by the action of the verb.

Bolinger (1975) uses this principle, i.e. affectedness, to account for the passive of a simple transitive construction and the pseudo-passive construction, and he does not deal with constructions with bare and *to*-infinitive complements. As will be argued, the notion of affectedness also has the possibility of being able to explain the passivisability of unintentional periphrastic causatives.

3.5.1. The Affectedness Constraint

To begin with, we shall briefly illustrate the hypothesis in (51) with some of the examples in Bolinger (1975:74):

(52) a. George left the city.
b. * The city was left by George.
c. The city was left by all the male inhabitants.

In (52a), George being merely an ordinary citizen, his leaving the city has no significant effect on that city;

the city is not affected by the action of the verb. Hence, sentence (52a) cannot be passivised, as in (52b). In contrast, sentence (52c) is acceptable, because all male inhabitants leaving the city is extraordinary, and it is easily assumed that the city was affected in some significant way; for instance, the sentence allows us to draw an inference that the described event caused the city not to fulfil its social function. The city is thus conceived to be the patient.

Consequently, as Bolinger (1975) claims, a passive sentence needs a patient who is construed to be affected by the action of the verb. Though Bolinger (1975) does not define the precise notion of affectedness, we assume on the basis of his analysis that whether or not the patient is affected depends on whether or not the patient undergoes a change to a new place or state (Ikegami (1991), Nishimura (1996), cf. Lakoff (1977)).[17, 18] The previous studies only assume that a patient undergoes a change into a new place or state. However we also include the case where the way of perception on the subject is changed. Take a look at the following examples:

(53) a. * The capital is often visited by me.

b. The capital is visited by many tourists every year.

(Bolinger (1975:73))

In (53a), one person's visiting has no significant effect on the capital, and the city is not affected. Thus, sentence (53a) is not acceptable. On the other hand, sentence (53b) is acceptable, even though the capital does not have a physical change into a new place or state. We recognise that the way of perception on the capital is changed. Because of the visiting of many tourists, the impression of the capital must be changed; for example, it becomes famous as a tourist spot. As with example (52c), in (53b), the subject is construed as a patient and the sentence satisfies the affectedness constraint.[19]

3.5.2. Absence of a Patient

With the above discussion in mind, let us consider the case of unintentional periphrastic causatives. We assume that unintentional periphrastic causatives contain no patient who is affected to change into a new state or perception. This is why they cannot be passivised on their own. Our assumption seems to be supported by the syntactic structure of unintentional periphrastic causatives (cf.

Mittwoch (1991), Fujimoto (1995)).

Mittwoch (1991) points out that the structure of the complement clause to the causative *make* which can be passivised is like that of a complement clause to object control verbs, whereas the complement clause to the unintentional causative *make* forms a constituent. This is illustrated by the following bracketed examples:

(54) a. She made [me] [clean the floor].
(cf. Mittwoch (1990:113))

b. I was made to clean the floor (by her).
(Mittwoch (1990:113))

(55) a. The rain made [the mushrooms come out].
(cf. (47a))

b. ? The mushrooms were made to come out (by the rain). (= (47b))

In the complement clause of (54a), the subject NP and the bare infinitival VP following are structurally independent and do not form a constituent. In this case, the sentence can be passivised, as in (54b). In the complement clause of (55a), the sequence [NP + VP] forms a constituent as a whole, and the sentence cannot be passivised on its own, as in (55b).

Fujimoto (1995) argues this contrast further. He

posits that the complement clause in *make*-causatives has two types of structures: one is the object control structure, and the other is the small clause structure (Iveland (1993)).[20] He shows the difference between their structures by considering the following two behaviours of *make*-causatives. The first one is concerned with the voice of the complement clause and the interpretation of the whole sentence; in a *make*-causative with an object control complement, changing the voice of the complement affects the logical meaning of the whole sentence. In contrast, if the infinitival complement has the small clause structure, changing the voice of the complement does not have any impact on the logical meaning of the whole sentence (Chomsky (1965), Gee (1977)). Observe the following:

(56) a. We made the doctor examine Mary.
b. We made Mary be examined by the doctor.
(Fujimoto (1995:170))

(57) a. The confusion made me change my mind.
(= (45))
b. The confusion made my mind be changed.

The sentences in (56) do not express the same meaning. In (56a), it is the doctor that we forced to examine Mary, while in (56b) it is Mary that we forced to undergo an examination

from the doctor. This is one of the characteristics seen among sentences with object control verbs. In contrast, the sentences in (57) express the same logical meaning. This is characteristic of sentences with verbs which take small clause complements.

The second test concerns the strandability of the subject NP, or the ommisibility of the VP, of the complement clause. When two sentences with an object control complement are coordinated, it is possible to omit the VP of the second complement, leaving its subject NP behind. This is not possible when sentences with small clause complements are coordinated (Iveland (1993)):

(58) a. Mary will make John leave, but I don't think she'll make Rex. (Iveland (1993:17))

b. ? The rain will make the mushrooms come out, but I don't think it will make the flowers.

In (58a), the subject NP of the second complement is stranded and the infinitival VP is omitted in the second conjunct. This is one of the features found in object control complements. On the other hand, in (58b), the second VP in the complement cannot be omitted in the second conjunct leaving its subject NP behind. This is characteristic of small clause complements.

Based on these observations, Fujimoto (1995) concludes that the complement clause in *make*-causatives has two types of structures, i.e. the object control structure and the small clause structure. He also points out that the *make*-causative with an object control complement can be passivised, whereas the *make*-causative with a small clause complement cannot be passivised.

Mittwoch (1991) and Fujimoto (1995) merely point out the fact seen above. It is therefore necessary to consider further the relationship between the difference in the structure of the complement clause and the passivisability of *make*-causatives in terms of affectedness. Observe the following examples again:

(59) a. She made [me] [clean the floor].
b. I was made to clean the floor (by her).

(60) a. The rain made [the mushrooms come out].
b. ? The mushrooms were made to come out (by the rain).

In (59a), the sentence has an object control complement. As we have seen, in the complement clause, the subject NP is independent of the bare infinitival VP. We can then assume that only the NP can be affected by the action of the verb, and the NP can be construed as a patient.

Therefore, the passive counterpart of (59a) has the patient as its subject, and the sentence can be accepted, as in (59b).

On the other hand, in (60a), the unintentional *make*-causative has a small clause complement. In this complement structure, the sequence [NP + VP] is a constituent, and the NP is just part of it. In this case, it is impossible for the NP to be affected independently by the action of the verb, and the NP cannot be a patient. Thus, the subject of the passive counterpart of (60a) is not a patient, and the sentence cannot be accepted, as in (60b). Consequently, unintentional *make*-causatives do not contain an entity which can be independently a patient. This is why unintentional *make*-causatives cannot be passivised.

Let us now turn to *cause*-causatives. Since the complement clause to the verb *cause* contains the infinitival *to*, we cannot regard it as a small clause complement. If, however, we reveal that the sequence [NP + *to*-infinitival VP] is a constituent, the same account that applies to unintentional *make*-causatives holds true for *cause*-causatives as well. Let us consider whether *cause*-causatives behave similarly to unintentional *make*-causatives with respect to Fujimoto's two criteria. First, as we have seen in (57), in unintentional

make-causatives, changing the voice of the complement clause does not affect the logical meaning of the whole sentence. Likewise, in *cause*-causatives, Huddleston and Pullum (2002) note that sentences (61a) and (61b) are semantically equivalent:

(61) a. This caused both of us to overlook the inconsistency.

b. This caused the inconsistency to be overlooked by both of us.

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1235))

So, though the complement of (61a) is active and that of (61b) is passive, the logical meaning of each sentence is the same. We can then say that unintentional *make*-causatives and *cause*-causatives display the same behaviour in this respect.

Next, in unintentional *make*-causatives, as in (58b), when two sentences are coordinated, it is impossible to omit the VP of the second complement leaving its subject NP behind. Similarly, in *cause*-causatives, as in (62), the second VP in the second conjunct cannot be omitted leaving its subject NP behind:

(62) ? The inflation will cause prices to rise, but I don’t think it will cause the purchasing value of money.

From this, it also follows that unintentional *make*-causatives and *cause*-causatives behave in the same way.

Furthermore, both unintentional *make*-causatives and *cause*-causatives allow a sentential idiom in their complements. This is one of the characteristics of verbs whose complement clause as a whole is a constituent:

(63) a. All hell breaks loose.
b. Hurricane Katrina made all hell break loose in the USA.
c. Hurricane Katrina caused all hell to break loose in the USA.

The sentential idiom in (63a) denotes the meaning of *the beginning of chaos*. The sentences in (63b) and (63c) show that unintentional *make*-causatives and *cause*-causatives naturally allow this sentential idiom to occur in their complement clauses; sentences (63b) and (63c) both mean that Hurricane Katrina brought chaos to the USA.

The behaviours shown above lead us to conclude that

unintentional *make*-causatives and *cause*-causatives have similar complement clauses; the sequence [NP (*to*) VP] constitutes a constituent. Therefore, *cause*-causatives are unpassivisable for the same reason as for unintentional *make*-causatives. Consider the following examples:

(64) a. The inflation caused [prices to rise].
b. * Prices were caused to rise by the inflation. (= (1b))

In (64a), the whole complement clause is a constituent. In this structure, the subject NP is part of the complement and not independent of it. It is therefore not possible for the NP to be affected independently by the action of the verb, and the NP cannot be a patient. The subject of the passive counterpart of (64) therefore is not a patient, and the sentence cannot be accepted, as in (64b). Consequently, *cause*-causatives do not contain an entity which can be independently the patient. This is why *cause*-causatives cannot be passivised.

The argument thus far leads to the conclusion that the reason why unintentional periphrastic causatives cannot be passivised at the sentence level is that they do not contain a patient affected to undergo a change to a new state. In other words, the NP in the complement clause of

unintentional periphrastic causatives cannot be identified as a patient from the lexical information of the verb.

As we have seen, however, unintentional periphrastic causative passives can be accepted in certain contexts. It is therefore predicted that contexts which satisfy the condition in (50) give the NP in the complement clause a patient-like role, which in turn makes unintentional periphrastic causative passives acceptable.

3.5.3. Affectedness Constraint Satisfied Contextually

As argued by Bolinger, the subject must be a patient in a passive sentence. Thus, when unintentional periphrastic causative passives are acceptable, their subject should also be a patient. To be qualified as a patient, the subject must be affected to undergo a change to a new state or perception. We argue that this is ensured by contexts which satisfy condition (50). For ease of reference, we repeat the condition below:

(65) An unintentional periphrastic causative passive requires a context where its subject can function as the topic of the sentence, and can also be regarded as a patient.

Specifically, we propose the following hypothesis:

(66) If the condition in (50) is satisfied, the subject can be construed as a patient – i.e., the affectedness constraint is fulfilled – and unintentional periphrastic causative passives can be accepted.

Here, we consider a case where *cause*-causative passives are acceptable:

(67) a. * Body temperature is caused to drop by aspirin. (= (40))

b. When a patient has a headache and fever, the doctor should prescribe aspirin for the headache. While aspirin relieves the patient's headache, *his body temperature is also caused to drop.* Then, the fever has left him, and he is quite cool. (= (42))

For ease of explanation, let us first consider the active form of the *cause*-causatives. As seen in 3.5.2, the NP in the complement clause cannot be independent of the clause. Body temperature is just a participant in the event brought about by the event (or action) of taking aspirin. So the NP *body temperature* cannot be extracted from the clause to

be the subject.

In (67b), we understand from the context that it is inevitable that some changes in headache and fever (i.e. body temperature) take place. Thus, either of them has the possibility of being a patient. If the impact from taking aspirin hit fever, it is natural for the sentence to describe what happened to fever: fever is construed as the topic of the sentence here.

Once the NP *fever* is construed as the topic, the discourse develops in relation to the topic. Further information as the topic is described in the discourse. For example, in (67b), the *cause*-causative passive expresses what happened to his body temperature, and the following context tells us how it changed. It is adequate information in context that shows that *his body temperature* is a patient that is inevitably affected in some way. So the context around the sentence certifies the topic entity as a patient. In this way, the context which satisfies condition (50) gives the subject of *cause*-causative passives a patient-like role; that is, the affectedness constraint is satisfied. In other words, when the affectedness constraint is fulfilled contextually, the subject of a *cause*-causative passive is successfully construed as a patient, and the sentence is felicitous. Note that the two parts of the condition must be fulfilled together, as seen

in 3.3. The relation between the parts is addressed in the following section.

3.6. The Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement

Thus far we have explored the passivisability of *cause*-causative passives in relation to the role of context. Based on this observation, we have proposed a pragmatic licensing condition for *cause*-causative passives, and argued that this condition can be applicable to a similar construction, namely unintentional *make*-causative passives. Their behaviour shows that the two constructions constitute a class in the following respect: the ungrammaticality of the construction is mitigated by contextual information. Specifically, whereas the construction is infelicitous (or hardly acceptable) on its own, it can be acceptable in a context which satisfies a certain condition. This is a pragmatically motivated construction.

We now propose a descriptive generalisation about the pragmatically motivated constructions as follows:

(68) *The Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement*

When a pragmatically motivated construction is licensed,

a. it must have an entity which functions as a topic, and

b. it must be supplied in context with enough information to make it consistent with the condition satisfied by the more general construction of which it is an instance.

Henceforth, we will abbreviate this generalisation simply as “PPTR.” Let us illustrate the PPTR with *cause*-causative passives. As to the former part of the PPTR, the subject of a *cause*-causative passive must function as the topic of the sentence. In the case of a sentence, the subject generally serves as the topic. The other is that the affectedness constraint must be satisfied by contextual information in the case of *cause*-causative passives. If we posit the premise that passives must satisfy the affectedness constraint in order to be licensed, then *cause*-causative passives necessarily fulfil the constraint by contextual information, since their lexical information cannot identify their subjects as patients and the constraint is not satisfied.

The relation between the first and the second condition in the PPTR is important: the fulfilment of the first condition induces the second condition to be satisfied. That is, first of all, an entity in the construction can be construed as a topic, and as a result of it, the required condition is fulfilled because of contextual information. When an entity is construed as the topic, the discourse develops in relation to the topic, which means that further information as the topic is described in the discourse. For example, in *cause*-causative passives, once the subject is regarded as the topic of the sentence, the context tells us what happened to the topic and at the same time the patienthood of the topic entity. The intrasentential information may not be enough to regard the subject as a patient, but if context gives us relevant information for that purpose, then the affectedness constraint is fulfilled and the sentence is licensed.

3.7. Summary

In this chapter, we have concerned ourselves with the passivisability of unintentional periphrastic causatives. Unintentional periphrastic causative passives are not acceptable on their own, but can be licensed in contexts where the subject can function as the topic of the sentence and can be regarded as a patient. Because unintentional

periphrastic causative passives do not contain a patient who is affected and undergoes a change to a new state or perception, they cannot be accepted. However, in a context which satisfies a certain condition, the subject of an unintentional periphrastic causative passive can be construed as a patient, and unintentional periphrastic causative passives are accepted. By generalising this observation, we have proposed the Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement. In the following three chapters, we will examine the validity of this principle with three constructions in turn.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

[*] This chapter is a unified and revised version of a series of my papers, which appeared as Osawa (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009c).

[1] I have found 20 examples on the web, but I only use four out of them for the sake of convenience in this study. The data was chosen upon the condition that the texts should be written by native speakers of English, and should be found in newspapers (e.g. Guardian Unlimited), academic papers, and web sites which seem to contain the official use of English.

[2] See Lambrecht (1994) and chapter 2 of this dissertation for further details.

[3] Lambrecht (1994) calls sentences like (8b) event-reporting sentences. Presentational sentences function as event-reporting sentences which contrast informationally with topic-comment sentences. He notes that the communicative function of event-reporting sentences is to announce an event involving a new discourse referent. In an event-reporting sentence, the domain of the new information extends over the proposition.

[4] Takami (2009) refers to Osawa (2008b).

[5] Utsugi (1999) points out that although the subject

of a passive is indefinite in form, it is semantically related to previous mentions (cf. Corblin (1990)). This argument supports our assumption that even an indefinite subject of a *cause*-causative passive functions as the topic.

[6] For detailed discussion, see Inage (1997).

[7] Nishida states that by using a reflexive indefinite, the speaker can communicate to the hearer not only the unique identifiability of a topic person, but also a generalisation about the class which includes the topic person as a member. The latter function does not suit the case of an indefinite NP in the *cause*-causative passive, which may be ascribed to the nature of this construction. So we are not concerned with this function. On reflexive indefinites, see Nishida (2002).

[8] Generally speaking, causes precede effects in the natural world, as our encyclopaedic knowledge tells us. Therefore, it seems that sentence (27d) is slightly better than sentence (27c). This might be explained in terms of Haiman's iconicity (1983). See Haiman (1983) for a detailed discussion.

By the way, in example (2) the cause is described after the event described by the *cause*-causative passive and the example is impeccable. Actually, in most of the data taken from the web, the discourse goes from causes to effects.

Nevertheless, cases such as (2) are actually used, which may be because of other factors besides iconicity, such as information structure and so on. In this paper, we shall not go into a detailed discussion, because it is not relevant to the present discussion.

[9] The definition of a patient and the affectedness constraint will be discussed in section 3.5.

[10] Unlike (34), example (29) is accepted despite the fact that the cause is described with the *by*-phase which denotes only the agent and does not explain who he is or what he has done. In the original text, however, the context describes who the agent is and how the subject of the *cause*-causative passive is affected. Since the original text is too long to summarise, we do not treat it here. The example is found at [http://civics.com/COGIS/note-kaspar9.htm].

[11] Takami (2009:36) adduces the following examples:

(i) Prices in Japan were caused to rise in recent months by a number of interrelated factors.

(ii) Body temperature is caused to drop by medications which decrease the sedimentation rate in the blood.

In these examples, the *by*-phrases have rich information which tells us how the subjects change and allows us to regard the subjects as patients. Apparently, they might be counterexamples to our condition since they appear acceptable on their own. However, the sentences in (i) and (ii) are compatible with our condition, in that the information contained in the *by*-phrases is relevant enough to make it possible to construe the subjects as patients and make the sentences impeccable. This goes along with our claim that the subject must be regarded as a patient by the (contextual) information.

Recall that, as we have defined, the topic of the sentence is determined in relation to the discourse context where the sentence is embedded. According to Takami, the sentences in (i) and (ii) are acceptable even in an out-of-the-blue context. This fact, together with our characterisation of the notion of topic, might lead one to assume that the subject of a *cause*-causative passive is not necessarily a topic. It is unclear, however, whether the subjects of the sentences in (i) and (ii) are not construed as topics. Observe the following examples:

(iii) a. What happened?

b. ??Prices in Japan were caused to rise in recent months by a number of interrelated factors.

(iv) a. What happened?

b. ??Body temperature was caused to drop by medications which decrease the sedimentation rate in the blood.

If the subjects in question do not function as topics, then it is predicted that the sentences can function as event-reporting sentences. This prediction is, however, not borne out, as (iii) and (iv) show. These represent that the *cause*-causative passives in question cannot function as event-reporting sentences which do not contain any topic entities. Therefore, if the sentences in (i) and (ii) are acceptable on their own, that does not mean that their subjects do not function as topics.

In light of these conflicting facts, we suppose that when the sentences in question are acceptable, the speaker is likely to set up the kind of discourse where the subjects are construed as topics. However, it is undeniable that this supposition is a circular argument. We have no idea if the sentences are embedded in context or not when they are judged as acceptable. We will leave this problem for

future research, for we cannot at present provide any arguments which elucidate the topichood of the subjects in (i) and (ii).

[12] In (41) and (42), the active counterpart of a *cause*-causative passive can be used, because it is acceptable either with or without an appropriate context. Therefore, it is safe to say that a *cause*-causative passive can be used as well as its active counterpart in contexts.

[13] Takami (2009) points out that the adverb *deliberately* can be used in a *cause*-causative sentence, as illustrated by the following sentences:

(i) a. John deliberately caused the car to crash.
[intentional causation]
b. John accidentally caused the car to crash.
[unintentional causation]
(Takami (2009:33))

He also adduces the examples found in the corpora:

(ii) a. It could be argued that God deliberately caused humans to evolve from lower animals.

b. Microsoft intentionally caused Burt's products to be incompatible with Windows software.

(Takami (2009:33))

However, it is also true that he adds the proviso that *cause*-causative sentences typically have inanimate subjects and express unintentional causation. We shall not go further into the fact that a *cause*-causative sentence can sometimes be compatible with intentional adverbs *deliberately* and *intentionally*, and following Givón (1975), we assume here that a *cause*-causative express unintentional causation.

[14] The inanimate subject in (45) is not interpreted as an animate entity, even metaphorically.

[15] Mittwoch (1990) remarks without explanation that a *make*-causative passive is less natural to use than its active counterpart, as in (47).

[16] An informant has pointed out to me that sentence (49a) may not be strictly ungrammatical but it is too far from natural to be easily acceptable.

[17] See Ikegami (1991) and Nishimura (1996) for details.

[18] Lakoff (1977:244) defines the notion of patient as follows: "a patient, [...] undergoes a change to a new

state” in terms of transitivity (see also Taylor (1989)).

[19] Takami (1992, 1995) proposes “the Characterization Condition” in order to explain the case where the way of perception on the subject is changed. He says that in such a case, the subject is not affected, but is characterised. We, however, reckon what Takami regards as characterised as a patient.

[20] Fujimoto (1995) takes a complement clause without tense and copula as a small clause. A small clause complement is illustrated by the complement of the ECM verb *believe*:

(i) John believes Mary proud of herself.

(Fujimoto (1995:168))

Note that the complement above lacks the sequence *to be*.

Chapter 4

Peculiar Passives*

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is concerned with passives of the type exemplified in (1b), where the subject NP is passivised out of an adjunct PP:

(1) a. The two countries have [$_{VP}$ fought many battles] [$_{PP}$ over the city].
b. The city has been fought many battles over.
(Kageyama and Ura (2002:183))

The sentence in (1a) has the sequence of a VP and an adjunct PP. In (1b), the NP in the adjunct PP is passivised and serves as the subject of the sentence. This is different from canonical passives, where the argument NP of a verb is passivised. Kageyama and Ura (2002) (henceforth, K & U) call passives like sentence (1b) "peculiar passives," and we employ this term for passives like in (1b).

The passivisation of an NP out of an adjunct PP has been attested in idiomatic expressions (Visser (1963, 1967), Bresnan (1972), Labov (1972), Wasow (1977), Lightfoot

(1979)), and such passives have been analysed as consisting of a complex verbal unit with the prepositional object functioning as a direct object: a kind of pseudo-passives. Bolinger (1975), however, argues that peculiar passives are not restricted to lexicalised combinations (Ziv (1981)).

Some previous studies, such as Davison (1980), Takami (1992, 1995), Cureton (1979), and K & U (2002), deal with peculiar passives and propose semantic or pragmatic licensing conditions. However, there are few analyses which are entirely satisfactory.

The purpose of the present chapter is to clarify how peculiar passives are licensed and to propose a pragmatic condition for them. Section 4.2 presents the definition of peculiar passives on the basis of K & U. Section 4.3 surveys three major previous studies and points out their problems. Section 4.4 proposes an alternative condition which can solve the problems with the previous studies; it also shows that the proposed condition can account adequately for the behaviour of peculiar passives. Section 4.5 demonstrates that our theory is applicable to a related construction. Section 4.6 shows that the Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement (the PPTR) holds true for peculiar passives as well. Section 4.7 is a short summary.

4.2. Definition of Peculiar Passives

4.2.1. Pseudo-Passives vs. Peculiar Passives

Prepositional passives, passives in which the object of the preposition in a V-PP combination serves as the subject, are generally known as pseudo-passives, and they have received uniform treatment (Bolinger (1975), Davison (1980), Rice (1987), Takami (1992, 1995)). K & U (2002), however, sort prepositional passives syntactically into two types: pseudo-passives and peculiar passives.

According to K & U (2002:184), "pseudo-passives" are those "which are formed by V-P Reanalysis and are accepted without any special context." Pseudo-passives involve sentences like the following:

(2) a. Fred was laughed at (by Sue).
b. That bed was slept in (by the sumo wrestler).
(K & U (2002:182))

In (2), the reanalysed V-P combinations ***laugh at*** and ***sleep in*** function as single verbs. This is demonstrated through the so-called conjunction test provided by Chomsky (1975). Observe the following:

(3) a. Mary [$_{VP}$ [laughed at] and [mocked] Fred].

b. The *sumo* wrestler [$_{VP}$ [slept in] and [ruined] the bed].

(K & U (2002:182))

The V-P combinations *laugh at* and *sleep in* can be conjoined with the simple transitive verbs *mock* and *ruin*, as shown in (3). This proves that *laugh at* and *sleep in* are reanalysed as transitive verbs.

This kind of coordination is disallowed when the PP involved is an adjunct and the V-P combination does not undergo reanalysis, as shown in (4):

(4) a. * Mary [$_{VP}$ [played near] and [mocked] Fred].

b. * The *sumo* wrestler [$_{VP}$ [talked on] and [ruined] the phone].

(K & U (2002:183))

The V-P sequences *play near* and *talk on* are not reanalysed, and resist passivisation as shown in the following:

(5) a. * Fred was played near (by Mary).

b. * This phone was talked on (by the *sumo* wrestler).

(K & U (2002:183))

There are, nevertheless, cases where passive sentences are accepted without V-P reanalysis, as K & U point out. Let us consider the following:

(6) a. This spoon has been eaten with.
b. The city has been fought many battles over.
c. This pub hasn't been smoked hash in before.
d. This violin has never been played any sonatas on.
e. This hall has been signed peace treaties in.

(K & U (2002:183))

The passives in (6) are acceptable in spite of the fact that the V-P combinations are not reanalysed, which is shown by the failure of the conjunction test:

(7) a. * John [$_{VP}$ [ate with] and [polished] this spoon].
b. * The two countries [$_{VP}$ [fought many battles over] and [ruined] this city].
c. * The jazz singer [$_{VP}$ [smoked hash in] and [praised] the pub].
d. * Bill [$_{VP}$ [played sonatas on] and [damaged] this violin].

e. * The ministers [$_{VP}$ [signed peace treaties in] and [glorified] this hall].

(K & U (2002:184))

K & U differentiate passives such as those in (6) from pseudo-passives like those in (2) and call the former "peculiar passives." According to them, peculiar passives are defined as those in which the object in an adjunct PP becomes the subject by passivisation.[1]

We follow K & U's distinction between pseudo-passives and peculiar passives. Put another way, we regard the PP in peculiar passives as an adjunct. Actually, the conjunction test used by K & U is not absolute; there are cases where it does not adequately prove whether V-P combinations are reanalysed or not.[2] The PP in peculiar passives, however, behaves as an adjunct with respect to *wh*-movement and *do-so* substitution. First, *wh*-movement is not possible out of an adjunct:

(8) a. * Which have the two countries fought many battles over *t*?

b. * Which has Bill played sonatas on *t*?

The ungrammaticality of the examples in (8) shows that the PPs in the sentences are adjuncts.

Second, if a phrase need not be included as part of the sequence being replaced by ***do so***, then it is an adjunct:

(9) a. Bill has played sonatas on this violin, and Mary ***has done so*** on the piano.

b. The ministers have signed peace treaties in the hall, and ambassadors ***have done so*** in the embassy.

In (9), since the PPs in the first sentences (***on this violin***/***in the hall***) are not included in the sequence of ***do so***, the PPs in the second sentences can be changed into other words. Therefore, the PPs in the sentences are adjuncts.

Besides the result of the conjunction test in (7), the facts in (8) and (9) lead us to regard the PP in peculiar passives as an adjunct.

4.2.2. Peculiarity of Peculiar Passives

This subsection investigates what is so "peculiar" about peculiar passives, a point not fully discussed by K & U. We will argue that peculiar passives are basically unacceptable by themselves, because they do not meet the affectedness constraint (Bolinger (1975)).

Bolinger (1975:67) proposes the following hypothesis for the passive in English:

(10) The subject in a passive construction is conceived to be a true patient, i.e., to be genuinely affected by the action of the verb.

Though we saw in chapter 3 what the constraint is like, let us review again how canonical passives satisfy the constraint for ease of comparing with peculiar passives:

(11) a. George left the city.
b. * The city was left by George.
c. The city was left by all the male inhabitants.

(Bolinger (1975:74))

In (11a), the verb ***leave*** takes ***the city*** as the object. Since ***the city*** is the object of the verb, it is a potential patient. However, since George is merely an ordinary citizen, his leaving the city has no significant effect on that city; the city is not affected by the action of the verb. Hence, sentence (11a) cannot be passivised, as in (11b). In contrast, sentence (11c) is acceptable, because all male inhabitants leaving the city would be extraordinary, and it is easily assumed that the city was affected in some significant way; for instance, the sentence allows us to

draw an inference that the described event caused the city not to fulfil its social function. The city is thus conceived to be a patient. In a simple transitive sentence, because the object of a verb can potentially be a patient that is affected by the action of the verb, the sentence can be passivised as long as the object is construed to be a patient and the sentence meets the affectedness constraint.

The same holds true for pseudo-passives:

(12) a. The dog walked under the bridge.
b. The dog [walked under] and [licked] the bridge.

In sentence (12a), ***walk*** and ***under*** are reanalysed and they function as a single verb. This is confirmed by the fact that ***walk under*** can be coordinated with the simple transitive verb ***lick***, as in (12b). The NP ***the bridge*** then is regarded as the object of the reanalysed verb ***walk under***. Therefore, sentence (12a) is assumed to be a simple transitive verb sentence. So, the object ***the bridge*** can be potentially a patient. And in fact, it is a patient when it is affected by the action of the verb, and becomes the subject of a passive sentence, as in (13a).

(13) a. This bridge was walked under by generations of lovers.

b. * This bridge was walked under by the dog.

(Bolinger (1975:69))

Sentence (13a) describes the customary actions of generations of lovers' walking under the bridge, by which the bridge can be affected. For instance, the bridge becomes famous and a tourist spot, and the way of perception on the bridge changed. The bridge is then construed to be a patient and the passive sentence is accepted. In (13b), on the other hand, a dog just walks under the bridge; the bridge merely represents a location where the dog walks. The bridge is not assumed to be affected at all, and is not construed as a patient. Hence the unacceptability of (13b).

Let us proceed to consider cases of peculiar passives. As we have seen, peculiar passives are different from canonical passives; the subject NP is passivised out of an adjunct PP. It is this type of passivisation that makes peculiar passives strange. Observe the examples in (1), repeated below as (14):

(14) a. The two countries have [$_{VP}$ fought many battles] [$_{PP}$ over the city].

b. The city has been fought many battles over.

In the active counterpart of the peculiar passives in (14a), the verb ***fight*** takes ***many battles*** as the object, and ***the city*** is included in the adjunct PP. So, what should be affected by the action of the verb is ***many battles,*** though it is difficult to interpret the NP ***many battles*** as being affected. The adjunct PP is outside the scope of the action of a verb, and ***the city*** cannot be identified as a patient from the lexical information of the verb.

The NP in the adjunct PP, however, can be passivised, as shown in (14b). Peculiar passives are acceptable notwithstanding the fact that their intrasentential information does not satisfy the affectedness constraint.[3] How, then, are peculiar passives licensed? In the next section we will consider certain licensing conditions for peculiar passives proposed by previous studies.

4.3. Previous Studies and Their Problems

We differentiate peculiar passives from pseudo-passives, as argued in section 4.2. However, not all previous studies share this distinction; there are two types of approaches: those that do not distinguish between the two types of passives and those which do. Let us first consider the former type.

4.3.1. Uniform Approach

Davison (1980), Takami (1992, 1995), Cureton (1979), and Fukawa (1990) do not distinguish peculiar passives from pseudo-passives, and propose pragmatic conditions for passives in which the object of the preposition in a V-PP combination becomes the subject ("prepositional passives" in general)[4, 5]. The following are some of their examples; example (15a) is a pseudo-passive and example (15b) is a peculiar passive in our distinction:

(15) a. That bed has been slept in today.
b. This plate has been eaten off of.

(Davison (1980:44f.))

Davison (1980) groups all of the instances together, referring to them as peculiar passives, and proposes a pragmatic condition, which is summarised by Menuzzi (2005) as follows:

(16) [U]nlike normal passives, peculiar passives [i.e. prepositional passives] require the subject to be a topic.

(Menuzzi (2005:10))

Davison (1980) gives the following contrast and shows the validity of the condition:

(17) a. ??John was on my right, and the sofa in the corner was sat on by Fred.

b. John was on my right, and Fred sat on the sofa in the corner.

(Davison (1980:56))

She says that sentence (17a) is "quite strange because the topic does not match." The first clause gives a description of *John;* the new subject of the second clause *the sofa* cannot function as the topic in this context. The active counterpart in (17b) is perfectly well-formed.

Takami (1992, 1995) groups pseudo-passives and peculiar passives together and refers to them as pseudo-passives. On this basis, he proposes "the Characterization Condition for Pseudo-Passives" which is stated as follows:

(18) A pseudo-passive [i.e. a prepositional passive] sentence is acceptable if the subject is characterized by the rest of the sentence; namely, if the sentence as a whole serves as a characterization of the subject. Otherwise, it is found unacceptable, or marginal at best.

(Takami (1992:126))

Take the following examples from Takami (1992:127) to illustrate the condition:

(19) a. * The office was worked in.
b. This office has never been worked in before.

According to Takami, in (19a), the fact that someone worked in an office does not suffice to characterise the office at all. It is for this reason that sentence (19a) fails to fulfil the condition and is not acceptable. On the other hand, in (19b), the fact that no one has ever worked in an office can serve as a characterisation of that office; sentence (19b) tells us that the office is brand-new. Hence the acceptability of sentence (19b).

Recapitulating Takami (1992, 1995), Kobukata and Konno (2002:135) point out the following: Takami's condition

seems essentially synonymous with an informational requirement that the subject function as the topic of the sentence and the rest of the sentence be a comment on the topic. Their observation suggests that pseudo-passives are topic-comment sentences, and the subject must serve as the topic of the sentence. If this understanding is on the right track, we can say that Takami's Characterization Condition and Davison's condition in (16) are substantially the same. Consequently, their conditions can be generalised as follows:

(20) All passives in which the original object of the preposition in a V-PP combination functions as the subject are topic-comment sentences.

This condition leads us to the following generalisation, because topic-comment sentences contrast informationally with event-reporting sentences (Lambrecht (1994)):[6]

(21) Passives in which the original object of the preposition in a V-PP combination functions as the subject cannot be interpreted as event-reporting sentences.

A closer look reveals, however, that there are pseudo-passives (in our terms) that are interpreted as event-reporting sentences:

(22) a. Rain was prayed for, but no avail.
(Couper-Kuhlen (1979:58))

b. A chair was stumbled over.
(Couper-Kuhlen (1979:109))

In these sentences, the V-P combinations can be conjoined with a simple transitive verb, as shown in (23). Thus, they are pseudo-passives.

(23) a. People [prayed for] and [got] rain.

b. John [stumbled over] and [damaged] the chair.

These pseudo-passives can be used as presentational sentences. Observe the following instances:

(24) a. What happened?

b. Rain was prayed for.

c. A chair was stumbled over.

The question ***What happened?*** in (24a) asks what event occurred. An answer to the question is necessarily a presentational sentence which explains what event took place; i.e., it must be an event-reporting sentence. As answers to the question in (24a), the pseudo-passives in (24b, c) are felicitous, which proves that they are event-reporting sentences.

Note that peculiar passives do not provide appropriate replies to ***What happened?***:

(25) a. What happened?

b. # The hall has been signed peace treaties in.
(= (6e))

c. * A hall was signed peace treaties in.

The passive in (25b) cannot be used as an answer to the question in (25a). Even if we changed the definiteness of the subject NP and the tense and the aspect of the sentence, as in (25c), the passive is still infelicitous in this context.

Consequently, Davison's and Takami's conditions may hold true for peculiar passives, but not for pseudo-passives. They fail to capture the fact that a pseudo-passive can function not only as a topic-comment sentence, but as an event-reporting sentence. This means that, contrary to

Davison (1980) and Takami (1992, 1995), a clear distinction must be made between peculiar passives and pseudo-passives.

We will review an approach which distinguishes between peculiar and pseudo-passives in the next subsection.

4.3.2. Dual Approach

K & U (2002) differentiate peculiar passives from pseudo-passives. Their condition for peculiar passives is stated as follows:

(26) Peculiar passives are allowed only if the predicate concerned is interpreted as individual-level.

(K & U (2002:191))

Following Diesing (1992) and Kratzer (1995), they argue for the validity of this condition on the basis of three behaviours of the passive. The first is that peculiar passives are accompanied with the perfect aspect and incompatible with temporal adverbials. Individual-level predicates, expressing a permanent property of the subject, are incompatible with punctual adverbials such as ***at that moment***.

(27) a. * This spoon has been eaten with at that moment.
b. * This city has been fought a battle over at that moment.
c. * This hall has been signed peace treaties in at that moment.

(K & U (2002:186f.))

According to K & U, the peculiar passives in (27) are in the perfect aspect and are not compatible with ***at that moment***, which shows that peculiar passives have individual-level predicates.[7] When the perfect aspect involved in peculiar passives is changed into a simple past, as shown in (29), the sentences are not acceptable. Compare them with the sentences in (6), repeated here as (28):

(28) a. This spoon has been eaten with.
b. The city has been fought many battles over.
c. This hall has been signed peace treaties in.

(29) a. * This spoon was being eaten with.
b. * The city was fought many battles over.
c. * The hall was singed peace treaties in

(K & U (2002:185))

The unacceptability of the sentences in (29) also demonstrates that the predicate involved in peculiar passives must be individual-level. The active counterparts of the sentences in (29) can be modified by punctual adverbials. Look at the following:

(30) a. Fred ate with this spoon at that moment.
b. They fought many battles over the city at that moment.

(K & U (2002:187))

Since the sentences in (29) are initially ill-formed regardless of the attachment of an adverbial, we cannot distinguish whether the predicates in (29) are stage- or individual-level. The sentences in (30) are grammatical, and K & U conclude that the passive counterparts also contain stage-level predicates. Consequently, peculiar passives must have individual-level predicates.

The second test concerns the interpretation of the absolute construction. When put in the absolute construction, a stage-level predicate allows not only a presuppositional reading, but also a conditional interpretation, whereas an individual-level predicate has only a presuppositional interpretation (Kratzer (1995)).

(31) a. Having been eaten with, this spoon can be cleaned.

b. ≠ If this spoon has been eaten with, it can be cleaned.

(K & U (2002:190))

(32) a. Having never been played any sonatas on, this violin may be difficult to play.

b. ≠ If this violin has never been played any sonatas on, it may be difficult to play.

(K & U (2002:190))

The absolute construction in (31a) does not have the conditional reading shown in the corresponding sentence in (31b). The sentence in (31a) is interpreted only in the presuppositional reading (*Because this spoon has been ...*). Similarly, the sentence in (32a) does not have the conditional interpretation in (32b). This observation suggests that the predicates of peculiar passives are identified as individual-level.

The third test is concerned with a restriction in the perception verb construction. Only stage-level predicates can be embedded in complements to perception verbs like *see*. K & U observe that peculiar passives cannot be embedded in complements to the verb *see*:

(33) a. * I saw the spoon eaten with (by Fred).

b. * I saw the hall signed peace treaties in (by the ministers).

(K & U (2002:191))

The sentences in (33) are not acceptable, and peculiar passives like ***The spoon*** (***has been***) ***eaten with***, or ***The hall*** (***has been***) ***signed peace treaties in*** are not appropriate complements to the verb ***see***.

Based on these observations, K & U (2002) conclude that the predicates of peculiar passives are individual-level. If their condition (26) is correct, then the following generalisation manifests itself:

(34) Peculiar passives which contain stage-level predicates are not acceptable.

We can, however, find some instances of peculiar passives where the predicate involved is stage-level. Observe the following examples:

(35) There are many traditions and anecdotes associated with the Stanley Cup. [...] The Cup has also been mistreated, misplaced, or otherwise misused on numerous occasions. [...] In 2003, ***the cup was eaten out of*** at the local movie theater by Martin Brodeur, and had butter stains and salt damage for the next 8 days before Jamie Langenbrunner cleaned it.

(http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Traditions-and-anecdotes-associated-with-the-Stanley-Cup)

(36) Here is my Vauxhall Omega Elite [...]. Full Leather interior, heated seats, cd player, climate control, air con. This car has been used on a daily basis and is an excellent runner. The bad bits are: [...] ***The car was smoked in by the previous owner***.

(http://www.pistonheads.co.uk/sales/330236.htm)

These two fragments are quoted from web sites and the relevant parts are italicised for the sake of clarity.[8] The

V-P combinations of the passives cannot be conjoined with a transitive verb, as shown in (37):

(37) a. * Martin [ate out of] and [broke] the cup.
b. ?? John [smoked in] and [drove] the car.

These sentences are unacceptable or unnatural at best, and the V-P combinations do not seem to be reanalysed. Therefore, we can regard the italicised passives in (35) and (36) as peculiar passives.

Let us confirm that the peculiar passives in (35) and (36) involve stage-level predicates using the tests seen above. First, these peculiar passives are compatible with the punctual adverbial ***at that moment***:

(38) a. The cup was eaten out of ***at that moment***.
b. The car was smoked in ***at that moment***.

In (38), both sentences are impeccable.

Second, the peculiar passives concerned have both a presuppositional and a conditional interpretation when they occur in the absolute construction.

(39) a. Eaten out of by Martin Brodeur, the cup could be dirty.

b. {Because/If} the cup was eaten out of by Martin, it could be dirty.

(40) a. Smoked in by the driver, the car could be dirty.

b. {Because/If} the car was smoked in by the driver, it could be dirty.

The absolute construction in (39a) can be interpreted either presuppositionally or conditionally, as in (39b). Likewise, sentence (40a) has two readings shown in (40b).

Finally, these peculiar passives can be embedded in the complement to the perception verb *see*:

(41) a. I saw the cup eaten out of by Martin.

b. I saw the car smoked in by the driver.

The above observations show that the peculiar passives in (35) and (36) have stage-level predicates, and they do not meet the generalisation in (34). Since K & U's condition predicts that peculiar passives involving stage-level predicates are unacceptable, it cannot capture the fact that peculiar passives can have either stage- or individual-level predicates.

Thus far, we have observed three previous studies dealing with the pragmatic and semantic conditions for peculiar passives, and made it clear that they are inadequate for empirical reasons. It is therefore necessary to propose a more precise condition which can solve the problems and account for the behaviours of peculiar passives. An alternative pragmatic condition will be proposed in the next section.

4.4. A Pragmatic Licensing Condition for Peculiar Passives

4.4.1. Subject as Topic and Patient

To solve the problems pointed out above, we propose the following pragmatic licensing condition for peculiar passives:

(42) A peculiar passive requires a context where its subject can function as the topic of the sentence, and can also be regarded as a patient.

If peculiar passives are distinguished from pseudo-passives and the condition is imposed, the phenomena that are not adequately accounted for in the previous studies can be explained sufficiently.

Let us examine the first problem which is as follows: the Davison-Takami generalisation that all pseudo-passives are topic-comment sentences is not sufficient to capture the fact that pseudo-passives function not only as topic-comment sentences but as event-reporting sentences. If we differentiate peculiar passives from pseudo-passives, no special conditions except for the affectedness constraint are necessary for pseudo-passives to be acceptable. In pseudo-passives, reanalysed V-P combinations function as transitive verbs; in other words, we can assume that pseudo-passives show the same behaviours as passive sentences with simple transitive verbs. Therefore, it is natural that pseudo-passives function as either event-reporting or topic-comment sentences in the same way as canonical passives. Hence, pseudo-passives do not require any special conditions except the affectedness constraint.

The second problem lies in K & U's condition: peculiar passives are allowed only if the predicate concerned is interpreted as individual-level. This condition fails to account for the fact that the predicates of peculiar passives can be either stage- or individual-level. Our condition in (42), however, explains this fact sufficiently. An individual-level predicate expresses a permanent property of the subject, and a sentence which involves an

individual-level predicate is always a topic-comment sentence. Hence, the subject of the sentence is inevitably its topic. Consequently, peculiar passives with individual-level predicates automatically satisfy the first part of the condition, namely that the subject must function as the topic of the sentence.

Note that there are two types of sentences involving stage-level predicates: event-reporting sentences and topic-comment sentences. Compare the following:

(43) a. What happened?
b. A car ran over a dog at that moment.
(44) a. What happened to the car?
b. The car broke down at that moment.

Both sentences in (43b) and (44b) have stage-level predicates because they are compatible with *at that moment*. Sentence (43b) is an event-reporting sentence since it serves as an answer to the question *What happened?*. On the other hand, sentence (44b) is a topic-comment sentence since the question *What happened to the car?* asks what occurred to *the car*. The referent of *the car* is established beforehand, and sentence (44b) is about that car. It is in this sense that *the car* is the topic of the sentence. Even when peculiar passives have stage-level predicates,

predicates expressing temporary properties of the subject, they can meet the former part of our condition as long as the subject is the topic of the sentence.

Let us now consider the latter part of the condition. The peculiar passives K & U provide are alleged to be acceptable at the sentence level without sufficient contextual information, but they should be infelicitous essentially. [9] Peculiar passives cannot fulfil the affectedness constraint at the sentence level, as seen in section 4.2.2. If passives must satisfy the affectedness constraint in order to be licensed, then peculiar passives necessarily meet the constraint even by contextual information, not by their intrasentential information. So, the subject of peculiar passives must be regarded as a patient exactly in context.

We are now in a position to examine the validity of our condition and show that the condition must be satisfied when peculiar passives are acceptable. First, the subject must function as the topic of the sentence; this is confirmed by the following examples:

(45) a. * India and Pakistan have gone to war for their own national interests, and ***a city has been fought many battles over***.

b. The conflict over Kashmir was triggered by the breaking away of India and Pakistan from the UK in 1947. Both countries claim that Kashmir is a part of their territory. So, ***the region has been fought many battles over*** and been in confusion.

As discussed in chapter 2, we regard an entity as the topic of the sentence when the entity is already introduced in the preceding discourse and the sentence denotes a proposition about the given entity. In the part prior to the italicised sentence in (45a), there is no expression which corresponds to the subject of the peculiar passive, ***a city***. Therefore, ***a city*** cannot function as the topic of the sentence in terms of information structure, and the peculiar passive cannot be used. On the other hand, in (45b), the subject of the peculiar passive, i.e. ***the region***, refers to Kashmir, which is explicitly mentioned in the preceding context, and the passive describes what happened to Kashmir. In this context, the subject of the peculiar passive serves as the topic of the sentence and the peculiar passive is thus acceptable.

Next, let us turn to the second point: the subject must be regarded as a patient in context. Consider the following:

(46) There is an old hall in the countryside of Italy. The hall was going to be closed because of its outdated equipment.

a. The old hall has been sung songs in by {*George/??Pavarotti}.

b. But because the old hall has been sung songs in by Pavarotti, it is now very famous.

In (46), even if George – who is an ordinary person and has a mediocre singing voice – sings songs in the hall, the hall does not become famous and is not affected by the action of George's singing. So the italicised passive is not acceptable with ***George***. If we change ***George*** to ***Pavarotti***, the discourse tells us that Luciano Pavarotti, a world-famous singer, sang songs in the hall. Our knowledge of the world tells us that Pavarotti's singing may cause the old halls to be famous, which affects the acceptability of the sentence. The sentence, however, is not yet impeccable. If the context describes how the impression of the hall has changed, as in (46b), the subject can be fully regarded as a patient, and then the peculiar passive

is felicitous.

The facts illustrated in (45) and (46) show the validity of our condition. We can conclude that peculiar passives are acceptable in a context which satisfies the condition in (42). Even though K & U provide well-formed peculiar passives without any preceding context, as seen in (6), we assume that they are basically infelicitous or hardly acceptable. Because of the definite subject and the perfect aspect, it may be easy to infer contexts in which the subjects of peculiar passives in (6) are topics. But such syntactic information cannot represent the subject as a patient. So we assume that whenever peculiar passives are accepted, a context is automatically set up which satisfies the condition in (42).

Recall here the sentences in (29b, c), repeated below as (47):

(47) a. * The city was fought many battles over.
b. * This violin was not being played any sonatas on.

According to K & U, these examples are unacceptable because they contain stage-level predicates. With respect to these examples, our condition predicts the following: although a peculiar passive which involves a stage-level predicate

is not acceptable on its own, it becomes acceptable if it satisfies condition (42).

Let us see if our prediction is borne out. Take (47a) as an example:

(48) * The city was fought many battles over.

This type of sentence can be licensed under a well arranged context where the subject of the peculiar passive serves as the topic of the sentence, and where the subject is regarded as a patient. Observe the following:

(49) The formation of the Republic of Kosovo is a result of the turmoil from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in particular from the Kosovo War of 1996 to 1999. Albania claimed to be independent of Kosovo, but the Republic of Serbia refused to recognize this claim and war broke out. ***The region was fought many battles over*** until the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. After this, the territory came under the interim administration of the UNMIK.

In (49), the italicised peculiar passive, which is alleged to be unacceptable at the sentence level, is used and accepted. Here the referent of the subject is already introduced in the preceding context and the sentence concerned describes what happened to that referent. Thus, the subject functions as the topic of the sentence. Furthermore, the discourse tells us that after the war, Kosovo came under the interim administration and it started to gain independence. The region is thus conceived to be a patient and the affectedness constraint is fulfilled.

The example in (49) shows that generally, peculiar passives with stage-level predicates, which are assumed to be unacceptable at the sentence level, can be acceptable in appropriate contexts. This also means that the peculiar passives in (48) are alleged to be unacceptable because they occur without sufficient contextual information.

To sum up, we have demonstrated that peculiar passives require contexts where the subject functions as the topic of the sentence, and at the same time the sentence fulfils the affectedness constraint.

4.4.2. Non-specific Object

As we have seen, it is true that the constraint for peculiar passives in (42) can solve the problems with the previous analyses. But this is not sufficient and cannot

account for the difference in acceptability between the (a) and (b) sentences in (50) and (51):

(50) a. That plate has been eaten off of.

b. * That plate has been eaten spaghetti off of.

(Davison (1980:44))

(51) a. This white hall has been signed peace treaties in before.

b. ??This white hall has just been signed the treaty in.

(Ziv (1981:12))

According to Ziv (1981), the nature of the direct object is crucial in determining the acceptability of peculiar passives, that is, the direct object in peculiar passives is restricted in occurrence. When the object is definite, or specific in reference, the sentence sounds unacceptable. Look at the following examples:

(52) a. * This city has been fought the battle over.

b.??? This pub has not been smoked your hash in.

(Ziv (1981:12))

c. * This violin has never been played Violin Sonata No.5 on.

d. * This hall has been singed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in.

The sentences in (52) contain specific direct objects, and they are unacceptable.[10]

Furthermore, Ziv (1981) points out that the direct object should be predictable from the meaning of the verb:

(53) a. This violin has never been played any sonatas on.
[play: music or musical instrument/a game]

b. Halls like these should be singed peace treaties in.
[sign: a document, or one's name on a document]

c. This pub hasn't been smoked hash in ever before.
[smoke: tobacco products and the like]

(Ziv (1981:10))

The objects in peculiar passives are generally predicted from the meaning of the verb. The preference for using generic NPs as direct objects in peculiar passives seems to derive from the requirement that the direct object not be used referentially. The examples in (52) and (53) tell

us that the direct object in peculiar passives cannot have a specific referent.

In consideration of the facts seen above, the following condition must be imposed on peculiar passives:

(54) The direct object in peculiar passives must be non-specific.

In a sentence with a transitive verb and adjunct, when its object is passivised, it is supposed to be affected by the action of the verb. The object can potentially be a patient, since the NP in the adjunct PP is basically outside the scope of the action of the verb. However, if the object is non-specific, it cannot be affected.

Moreover, when an entity is specific, its referent is identified and it is easy for the entity to function as a topic: a topic has a referent. If the direct object has its referent, it can serve as a topic, and the NP in an adjunct cannot play the role of topic. In order for the NP in the adjunct to function as the topic of the sentence and as a patient, no other element should have a higher specificity. The following contrast provides supportive evidence for this point:[11]

(55) a. The city has been fought many battles over.

b. This violin has been played many sonatas on.

(56) a. ??Cities have been fought many battles over.

b. ??Violins have been played many sonatas on.

In (55), the object NPs are non-specific, whereas the NPs in the adjunct PPs are definite and specific. In this case, as mentioned above, more specific NPs can be a topic and a patient, and the sentences in (55) are acceptable. On the other hand, in (56), both the object NPs and the NPs in the adjuncts are non-specific. They are equivalent in specificity, in which case the sentences are unacceptable. This is because, other things being equal, the NP in an adjunct PP is less salient than the object NP, and thus less likely to be construed as affected.

In peculiar passives, it is not the object NP, but the NP in an adjunct PP, that is passivised. So, the NP in an adjunct PP must have a higher specificity than the object NP which is a potentially passivisable element. In order for the object NP to lack its qualification for being passivised, it must be non-specific, or, at least, have a lower specificity. When the object NP is specific, its referent is identified and it is easy for the object to function as the topic, and in this case, the NP in an adjunct cannot play the role of topic. In order for the NP in the

adjunct to function as the topic of the sentence, no other element should play the role of topic in the sentence. There must not be any potential topic element in the comment part of the sentence. That is why the direct object must be non-specific.

4.4.3. Revised Condition

In order to account for the fact seen in the preceding subsection, the condition in (42) should be revised as follows:

(57) A peculiar passive requires a context where its subject can function as the topic of the sentence and can be regarded as a patient, and also requires that no potential topic element be included in the comment part of the sentence.

The previous studies seen in section 4.3 can hardly provide an adequate account for the acceptability differences in (50) and (51), whereas our analysis can.

4.5. Related Issue

It should be clear by now how peculiar passives are licensed. We defined peculiar passives as sentences whose subject NP is passivised out of an adjunct PP. In this definition, the sentence in (58a) falls into peculiar passives:[12]

(58) a. * Fred was played near. (= (5a))

b. * Mary [$_{VP}$ [played near] and [mocked] Fred]. (= (4a))

In sentence (58a), the subject is passivised out of an adjunct PP, where the V-P combination cannot be conjoined with a simple transitive verb, as shown in (58b). Furthermore, the intransitive verb does not take its object. There is no potential topic element in the comment part in (58a). Thus it is possible that the example in (58a) behaves in the same way as peculiar passives, and we can predict as follows:

(59) Although a prepositional passive with an intransitive verb and a preposition is not acceptable on its own, it becomes acceptable if it satisfies condition (57).

Let us see if the prediction is borne out.

(60) Mary wanted to play with her brother, Fred. Fred had to study hard for an examination the next day, so he didn't want to be bothered. He told Mary to play alone in her own room. But Mary didn't listen and Fred was played near, and he couldn't concentrate on his studies. Consequently, he got a terrible score on the exam.

In (60), the passive subject ***Fred*** appears in the preceding context and the passive sentence describes what happened to Fred. Thus, the subject functions as the topic of the sentence. The context tells us that Fred was affected by Mary's playing near him; he could not study enough and got a terrible score.

The prepositional passives which are alleged to be unacceptable on their own can be felicitous and used in an adequate context. This suggests that this kind of construction is subject to the same principle that applies to peculiar passives.[13]

4.6. The Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement

We have clarified how peculiar passives are licensed, and through this analysis, we find that a peculiar passive is a pragmatically motivated construction. That is, a peculiar passive is difficult to accept on its own but it can be acceptable in the context which fulfils a certain condition. This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the PPTR, which is repeated below for ease of reference:

(61) When a pragmatically motivated construction is licensed,
   a. it must have an entity which functions as a topic, and
   b. it must be supplied in context with enough information to make it consistent with the condition satisfied by the more general construction of which it is an instance.

As we have seen, a peculiar passive is used and acceptable in a certain context where its subject is regarded as the topic of the sentence, and is construed as a patient, namely, the affectedness constraint is fulfilled.

4.7. Summary

This chapter has been concerned with how peculiar passives are licensed. We have shown that the conditions proposed by the previous studies have some problems and do not capture the following facts: pseudo-passives can serve as either topic-comment or event-reporting sentence, and peculiar passives have not only individual-level predicates but stage-level predicates. To solve the problems, we have proposed a pragmatic licensing condition for peculiar passives. Peculiar passives are not acceptable at the sentence level, but can be licensed in contexts where the subject can function as the topic of the sentence and the affectedness constraint is satisfied. This characteristic of peculiar passives is just as predicted by the PPTR.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

[*] This chapter is a radically revised version of Osawa (2009a, 2009b).

[1] The definition of peculiar passives seems not to be sufficient to distinguish them from passives in (5), where the object in an adjunct PP becomes the subject, too. This type of passives is considered in more detail in 4.5.

[2] Chomsky (1975:562) notes that "conjunction is indecisive" with respect to sentences like (ia) and (ib).

(i) a. John thought of a good answer.
b. The staff went over the list.

Chomsky remarks that the sentences in (i) can be passivised despite the fact that the coordination between the V-P combination (i.e. *think of*, *go over*) and transitive verbs is disallowed. Because of the failure of the conjunction test, we can predict that the sentences in (i) are not passivised. However, we have passive sentences like those in (ii):

(ii) a. An answer was thought of (by John)
b. The list was gone over (by the staff)

(Chomsky (1975:563))

Consequently, we cannot fully confirm by the conjunction test whether or not the V-P combinations can be reanalysed.

Furthermore, Baker (1988) determines whether reanalysis (incorporation) occurs or not without recourse to the conjunction test. According to him, if a sentence involving V-P combination is passivised, the V-P combination is reanalysed; the acceptability of passivization proves the reanalysis of V-P combinations. However, this is a circular definition.

[3] Although K & U (2002) judge peculiar passives as acceptable without any context, we predict that they are basically infelicitous on their own because the NP in the adjunct PP cannot be a patient. We will discuss this point in section 4.4.

[4] Cureton (1979) and Fukawa (1990) deal with "passivization of oblique objects out of V-NP-PP sequences" which corresponds to what we call peculiar passives here, but they regard such passives as a type of pseudo-passive.

[5] Fukawa (1990:56-7, fn.7) himself notes that Cureton's "Implied Quality Predication Hypothesis" (1974:42) and his own condition for prepositional passives are substantially the same as the condition proposed by Takami (1992, 1995). We thus take up only Takami here. See Cureton (1974) and Fukawa (1990) for details.

[6] Lambrecht (1994:14) notes that the communicative

function of event-reporting sentences is to announce an event involving a new discourse referent. In event-reporting sentences, the domain of the new information extends over the proposition.

[7] The temporal adverbial ***at that moment*** is incompatible with the present perfect aspect by its nature (Comrie (1976), Bennet and Partee (1978)), which induces the ungrammaticality of the example in (27). K & U claim that the present perfect is a necessary condition for the well-formedness of peculiar passives, and that this fact indicates that they are identified as individual-level.

[8] I have found ten examples on the web, but I only use two of them in this study for the sake of convenience. The data is chosen upon the condition that the text should be written by native English speakers. All of the data were judged as acceptable and natural by my informants.

[9] In fact, my informants say that the peculiar passives without contextual information in (6) are less acceptable than the passives in context, and point out that it is more natural to express the same meaning of the peculiar passive in (ia), using the non-causative ***have*** sentences, as in (ib):

(i) a. The city has been fought many battles over.
b. The city has had two countries fight many battles over it.

Furthermore, the informants said that native speakers of English seldom use peculiar passives, but they normally use the *have* sentences instead. Actually, we can find few examples of peculiar passives on the Internet. Why then do peculiar passives exist? Davison (1980) points out that the subject of a peculiar passive has some perceptible property connected to the event described and should be affected. For example, in (ia), the city must have been ruined or destroyed because of the battles. On the other hand, in the *have* sentence in (ib), the city does not need to have perceptible damage or to be destroyed. Peculiar passives have implications that *have* sentences do not. Therefore, if one wants to express those implications, one should use peculiar passives instead of *have* sentences. We simply mention this tendency here without further comment.

[10] The sentence in (i) is acceptable, although it contains a proper noun as a direct object. Generally speaking, proper nouns have not been characterised as non-specific (Jackendoff (1972)):

(i) My children have already been read *War and Peace* to twice. (Ziv (1981:13))

As Ziv (1981) observes, however, the NP *War and Peace* here obviously refers to the type and not to any unique token.

Thus, the direct object in such examples involves no specific entity to be affected.

[11] Though sentences (55) and (56) are provided out of context, they are embedded in the contexts which satisfy condition (42) when my informants judge their acceptability.

[12] The passive in (58a) contains an intransitive verb and a preposition, and this is different from peculiar passives which take transitive verbs, their objects, and prepositions. We leave out of consideration here the question whether the passive in (58a) is grouped into pseudo-passives or peculiar passives.

[13] In example (58a), *Fred* is a person and is easy to regard as a patient. But in examples like *The phone was talked over*, the subject *the phone* is inanimate and is hardly recognised as a patient even in an well-arranged context. Though the same principle applying to peculiar passives holds for passives with intransitive verbs, there should be some individual constraint on each construction. This issue lies outside our scope here.

Chapter 5

Prenominal Possessives

5.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with the possessive construction that has an "objective reading" in the sense of Taylor (1994, 1996). It is illustrated by phrases like the following:

(1) a. the city's destruction
b. the boy's removal
c. the picture's defacement
(Bresnan (2005:1))

We will refer to phrases of this kind as the prenominal possessive (construction) or simply the possessive.[1] In this construction, the possessor nominal is semantically interpreted as the object of the deverbal noun (e.g. *The enemy destroyed the city*).

Previous studies point out that not all prenominal possessives are accepted. Observe the following:

(2) a. * the event's recollection
b. * the problem's perception

c. * the picture’s observation

d. * the novel’s understanding

e. * the film’s enjoyment

(Taylor (1996:223))

Anderson (1978), Fiengo (1980), Rappaport (1983), Giorgi and Longobardi (1991), and Taylor (1994, 1996) account for the acceptability of the construction, and propose a number of constraints on it.

On the other hand, Bresnan (2005:2) draws attention to the data where the possessive alleged to be unacceptable is actually used (Taylor (1994, 1996)):

(3) a. * the presentation’s recollection.

b. * the event’s observation

(4) a. Certainly, between the presentation of information to the senses and *its recollection*, various cognitive processes take place.

b. But the standard idea that an event is inseparable from *its observation* is just scientific silliness.

The purpose of this present chapter is to investigate how the ill-formed prenominal possessive is licensed in

context, and to propose a licensing condition. Section 5.2 clarifies how the prenominal possessive is licensed and surveys previous studies. Section 5.3 observes the attested data where allegedly unacceptable possessives are actually used, and proposes a pragmatic licensing condition for them. Section 5.4 shows that the PPTR (the Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement) holds true for the prenominal possessive as well. Section 5.5 is a brief summary.

5.2. The Affectedness Constraint

We will begin by surveying the findings of two previous studies in terms of the so-called affectedness constraint. Anderson (1978) proposes the constraint and explains how the prenominal possessive is licensed.[2] That is, "an objective reading is possible only if the possessor entity is 'affected' by the activity denoted by the head noun" (Taylor (1994:204)). The constraint can explain the grammatical contrast between the following instances:

(5) a. the city's destruction (= (1a))
b. * the cliff's avoidance

(Anderson (1978:14))

In (5a), the deverbal noun *destruction* represents an action which affects the referent of the possessive nominal *the city's*: the action of destruction changes in the physical condition of the city. Hence the acceptability of the possessive in (5a). On the other hand, in (5b), though the cliff is the object of the avoidance, it is not directly affected by the avoidance, that is, it does not change at all. It is for this reason that (5b) is unacceptable.

Although the affectedness constraint seems to be able to account for the distribution of prenominal possessives, Taylor (1994, 1996) states that the notion of affectedness is fuzzy, and the constraint needs to be derived from more general principles of a semantic nature. He argues that possessor nominals have to be topical and informative relative to the possessee. Here, "topical" is equivalent to the notion of topic characterised in chapter 2: an entity is a topic when it is already introduced into the preceding discourse and further information on it is added. According to Taylor, the prenominal possessive is judged ungrammatical due to the low topicality of the possessor. When embedded in a context which enhances the possessor's topicality, the construction achieves a high degree of acceptability. Observe the following:

(6) a. * the event's recollection

b. Concerning those events, their recollection still frightens me.

(Taylor (1996:223))

The expression in (6a) violates the affectedness constraint, since the activity of recollection does not affect the event at all. On the other hand, the construction is acceptable when sentence (6b) is arranged to make the possessor the topic.

Taylor also argues for a further requirement that the possessor nominal must be informative. Broadly speaking, the notion of informativity in the possessive is summarised as follows: the activity denoted by the deverbal noun is identified by the possessor nominal, and in this respect the possessor nominal is informative (see Taylor (1994, 1996)).[3] For example, in *the city's destruction*, *the city('s)* helps identify whether the destruction has been actually done or not. So, the possessor *the city's* is informative, and the construction is impeccable. On the other hand, in **the cliff's avoidance*, there is no point in examining the cliff to see whether it had been avoided. As Taylor (1996:247) notes, "a cliff that has been avoided looks no different from a cliff that has not been avoided." Hence the unacceptability of this possessive.

Taylor (1994:231) notes that the notion of informativity enables us to "arrive at essentially the same results as those predicted by the affectedness constraint, [and] the informativity requirement falls out from the very semantics of the possessive construction. [That is,] the affectedness constraint turns out to be reflex of the construction's semantics."

Based on his arguments, we assume that it is the affectedness constraint that is imposed on the prenominal possessive. The construction is acceptable if it satisfies the constraint. Note that we assume that the affectedness constraint for the prenominal possessive is compatible with the affectedness constraint for passives proposed by Bolinger (1975): a passive sentence needs a patient that is construed to be affected by the action of the verb. This is because the possessive has a passive interpretation:

(7) a. the city's destruction by the enemy
b. The city was destroyed by the enemy.

As seen above, the possessor nominal is semantically interpreted as the object of the deverbal noun, and the interpretation of the possessive in (7a) is expressed by the passive sentence in (7b). In both constructions, the city is affected by the action of destruction and is

construed as a patient.

The observation so far concludes that the prenominal possessive is acceptable if it satisfies the affectedness constraint by lexical information, and it is not acceptable when failing to satisfy it.

Recall here that Taylor states that an ill-formed possessive can be acceptable when the possessor is topical in context. Observe the example in (6), repeated below as (8):

(8) a. * the event's recollection
b. Concerning those events, their recollection still frightens me.

Furthermore, Bresnan (2005) provides examples where the possessor nominal is contextualised to maximise topicality:

(9) a. * the event's observation (= (3b))
b. But the standard idea that an event is inseparable from *its observation* is just scientific silliness. (= (4b))

The possessives in (8a) and (9a) are accepted in contexts like (8b) and (9b), respectively, despite the fact that their possessor nominals are not affected. The contexts

in (8b) and (9b) ensure only the topicality of the possessor. Here, a question arises whether it is the topicality requirement of the possessor alone that licenses the construction. In other words, what exactly is the relation between context and the affectedness constraint? In the following section, we will consider this question.

5.3. A Pragmatic Licensing Condition for Prenominal Possessives

This subsection investigates how prenominal possessives alleged to be unacceptable on their own are licensed in context.

5.3.1. The Fact

Let us observe some examples found on the web besides those provided by Bresnan (2005). We take up the following three examples here:

(10) Certainly, between the presentation of information to the senses and *its recollection*, various cognitive processes take place. (= (4a))

(11) [...] the National Park Service [’s] [...] main mandates are to preserve the land's wilderness quality and its wildlife

habitats, and as much as possible to allow for *its enjoyment by people*.

(USA by Campbell et al.)

(12) In this essay, I'm going to introduce to the reader a topic not touched a lot because of its complexity and *its avoidance by conservative adults*. This topic is, of course, Rock Music.

(http://www.essaygalaxy.com/papers/43/189000.htm)

In these examples, the possessor nominals are construed as topics. The definite pronouns corefer with the immediately preceding phrases: in (10), *its* corresponds to *information*, to *the land* in (11), and to *a topic* in (12). Thus, the referents of the possessor nominals have been introduced into the discourse. Furthermore, the deverbal nouns express what happened to the possessors. This is confirmed by the fact that the possessor can be paraphrased into the passive sentence (see example (7)).

Do the possessives have only to fulfil the topicality requirement? Recall that the possessives in (10)-(12) are infelicitous on their own because they cannot satisfy the affectedness constraint by lexical information. If the prenominal possessive must satisfy the affectedness

constraint in order to be licensed, then the possessive alleged to be unacceptable necessarily meet the constraint by contextual information, not by its intraphrasal information. Thus, the possessor nominal must be regarded as a patient exactly in context.

Actually, closer inspection reveals that the contextual information tells us how the possessor nominals are affected. In (10), the context tells us that information (from emotion and the colours seen) is processed by one's recollecting.[4] Information changes into a target which should be processed. In (11), the discourse shows that a part of land in the USA can be used effectively if people enjoy it. The land is preserved and made best use of. We can find that the possessor nominal is affected and construed as a patient from contextual information. Likewise in (12), the context tells us that a topic (Rock Music) is recognised as a kind of anathema, and the impression on the topic is affected by people avoiding it. Here, the possessor nominal is regarded as a patient. In these examples, the way we perceive the possessor nominals is changed. So, we can infer that they are construed as patients.

As seen above, when an ill-formed possessive is accepted in context, the possessor nominal is construed as a topic and at the same time as a patient. The observation so far

naturally leads us to propose the following licensing condition:

(13) An allegedly ill-formed prenominal possessive requires a context where its possessor nominal can function as the topic of the phrase, and can also be regarded as a patient.

We are now in a position to examine the validity of our condition and show that the condition must be satisfied when allegedly unacceptable prenominal possessives become acceptable. The following subsection addresses this issue.

5.3.2. Verification

The possessive in (14) is normally unacceptable on its own:

(14) * the problem’s perception (= (2b))

It is still unacceptable even when embedded in a context like the following:

(15) * In the meeting yesterday, *a problem's perception* occurred.

In (15), the referent of the possessor nominal is not previously established in the discourse, and it cannot function as topic. Furthermore, the context only says that one might perceive a problem, which is not sufficient to guarantee that the problem is affected. In this context, the possessive cannot satisfy the condition in (13) and infelicitous.

On the other hand, the phrase in (14) shows a high degree of acceptability when it fulfils the proposed condition. Observe the following:

(16) ? In the meeting yesterday, I found that I was facing a serious problem. When I could see the problem's perception, it led me to seek a solution, and I will be able to solve it by next meeting.

In (16), the referent of the possessor nominal *problem* has been introduced into the discourse and the possessive describes what happened to the possessor. Thus, the possessor is construed as the topic of the phrase. The context tells us that the problem is going to be solved and

it is not a trouble any more. The quality of the problem is changed. So the possessor can be regarded as a patient.

The facts illustrated in (14)-(16) show the validity of our condition. We can conclude that even an ill-formed prenominal possessive will be acceptable in a context which satisfies the condition in (13).

If the proposed condition successfully captures the behaviour of the allegedly unacceptable possessives, it is predicted that although an ill-formed prenominal possessive is not acceptable on its own, it becomes acceptable in a context which satisfies the condition. This prediction is borne out, as shown by the following examples:

(17) a. * the cliff’s avoidance

b. John Smith, a famous European climber, has overcome some of the world's most notoriously difficult climbs. Both cliffs and mountains have been scaled by this real-life "Spiderman". However, there is one cliff in the far North of Scotland that has defeated him time and time again, and finally he gave up swearing he would never return. *The cliff's avoidance* by the climber has brought it fame, and climbers from around the world have flocked to the

cliff and attempted to scale what John Smith could not. So far, none have succeeded.

The possessive in (17a) is said to be unacceptable because it cannot satisfy the affectedness constraint, but it is actually used and accepted in (17b). Here the referent of the possessor nominal has been introduced into the discourse and the phrase in question describes what happened to that referent. Therefore the possessor nominal serves as the topic of the phrase. Furthermore, it is clear from the context how the impression of the cliff has changed: that is, it has become famous because a famous climber avoided the cliff. So the possessor nominal can be fully regarded as a patient, and then the phrase is felicitous.

The example illustrates that even prenominal possessives assumed to be unacceptable on their own can be used in contexts which satisfy the condition in (13).

5.4. The Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement

We have argued that an ill-formed prenominal possessive can be licensed in a context where the possessor nominal is construed as the topic and is also regarded as a patient. Possessives like *the cliff's avoidance* are not accepted since they cannot meet the affectedness constraint from intraphrasal information. However, once the possessor

nominal is construed as the topic, the discourse should develop in relation to the topic, and further information as to the topic will be given in the discourse. Put otherwise, the topic entity acquires various sorts of information about itself and becomes "informative."[5] Such interphrasal information enables us to regard the topic entity as a patient. The intraphrasal information may not be enough to regard the possessor nominal as a patient, but if context conveys relevant information for that purpose, then the affectedness constraint is fulfilled and the possessive is licensed.

Consequently, an ill-formed prenominal possessive is impeccable in a context which fulfils the condition in (13), and thus this kind of possessive is a pragmatically motivated construction. This conclusion is in accordance with the PPTR, which is repeated below for ease of reference:

(18) When a pragmatically motivated construction is licensed,

a. it must have an entity which functions as a topic, and

b. it must be supplied in context with enough information to make it consistent with the condition satisfied by the more general construction of which it is an instance.

Another important consequence is that the PPTR also holds at the phrasal level, which, together with our conclusion of chapters 3 and 4, proves that the PPTR is valid irrespective of the syntactic level of the construction in question. The *cause*-causative passive discussed in chapter 3 and the peculiar passive considered in chapter 4 are sentences, and the prenominal possessive is a phrase. Although their forms are different, they all express passive meaning. So it is natural and reasonable that the same generalisation holds for these three constructions.

5.5. Summary

This chapter has shown that even an ill-formed prenominal possessive can be licensed in a context where the possessor nominal can function as the topic of the phrase and the affectedness constraint is fulfilled. We have maintained that the construction is not accepted when it cannot satisfy the affectedness constraint by lexical information but it is licensed when the constraint violation is overridden by contextual information. We have further argued that the prenominal possessive is a pragmatically motivated construction, which is in accordance with the PPTR and shows that is holds true irrespective of the syntactic level of the construction in question.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

[1] We are not concerned with prenominal possessives with "subject readings," as in (i) and possessive constructions in general, as in (ii):

(i) the enemy's destruction (of the city)
(cf. The enemy destructed the city.)

(ii) a. John's wife
b. John's book

[2] Rappaport (1983) proposes the "Experiencer Constraint." According to Taylor (1994, 1996), this constraint is broadly compatible with the affectedness constraint. Therefore, we do not treat the former constraint here. For detailed discussion about the constraint, see Rappaport (1983) and Taylor (1994, 1996).

[3] The notion of informativity is characterised as follows:

(i) An entity E is informative with respect to a relation R in proportion to the number, and specificity, of inferences that may be drawn with respect to E, given a characterisation of R. (Taylor (1996:247))

[4] The example in (10) is extracted from a scientific article available at [http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/2004_rusinek01.shtml]. In the original text, enough contextual information helps us to construe the possessor nominal as a patient.

[5] Taylor (1994, 1996) claims that the possessor nominal must be topical and informative in order for the possessive to be licensed. Even though not filled by lexical information, the requirement – especially, the informativity – can be achieved by contextual information.

Chapter 6

Double Object Constructions

6.1. Introduction

It is said that “verbs of continuous imparting of force in some manner causing accompanied motion” (Pinker (1989)) and “verbs of manner of speaking” cannot occur in the double object construction (Green (1974), Oehrle (1976), Gropen et al. (1989), Pinker (1989), Goldberg (1992, 1995), Krifka (2001), among others). We will refer to the former as “*carry*-type verbs” and the latter as “*shout*-type verbs” for the sake of simplicity. Typical members of *carry*-type and *shout*-type verbs are listed in (1) and (2), respectively:

(1) carry, pull, push, schlep, lift, lower, haul

(2) shout, whisper, yell, mumble, bark, mutter

Both types of verbs are not compatible with the double object construction:[1]

(3) * I {carried / pulled / pushed / schlepped / lifted / lowered / hauled} John the box.
(Pinker (1989:111))

(4) * John {shouted / screamed / murmured / whispered / shrieked / yodelled / yelled / bellowed / grunted / barked} Bill the news.

(Pinker (1989:112))

However, Bresnan and Nikitina (2003) (henceforth, B & N) provide examples where *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs appear in the double object construction and the sentences are acceptable:

(5) As *Player A pushed him the chips*, all hell broke loose at the table.

(B & N (2003:6))

(6) “Hi baby.” Wade says as he stretches. *You just mumble him an answer*. You were comfy on that soft leather couch.

(B & N (2003:7))

There has been a good deal of discussion in the literature as to the syntax and semantics of the double object construction, and also as to the dative alternation, in terms of verb semantics and information structure (Halliday (1970), Green (1974), Oehrle (1976), Smyth et al. (1979), Erteshik-Shir (1979), Givón (1984), Pinker (1989), Thompson (1990, 1995), Levin (1993), Marantz (1993),

Hawkins (1994), Collins (1995), Goldberg (1995), Arnold et al. (2000), Akashi (2006), among others). In this chapter, without going into the details of such discussion, we shall concentrate on investigating the fact that allegedly unacceptable double object constructions are actually used in a certain context. Based on the study by B & N (2003), we propose a descriptive generalisation of the use of the double object construction with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs. We further argue for the validity of the generalisation about the pragmatically motivated construction, the PPTR (the Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement).

6.2. The Semantic Compatibility between Verbs and the Double Object Construction

On the basis of previous studies, this section examines the reason why *carry*-type verbs and *shout*-type verbs cannot occur in the double object construction.

It is generally observed that the prepositional-dative construction and the double object construction alternate with each other. Observe the following:

(7) a. I threw the box to John.
b. I threw John the box.

(8) a. John told a story to Mary.
b. John told Mary a story.

However, not all the verbs are allowed to occur in both versions of the alternation. For example, *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs cannot appear in the double object construction, while they are accepted in the prepositional-dative one:

(9) a. * I {carried / pulled / pushed / schlepped / lifted / lowered / hauled} John the box.
(= (3))

b. I {carried / pulled / pushed / schlepped / lifted / lowered / hauled} the box to John.
(B & N (2003:6))

(10) a. * John {shouted / screamed / murmured / whispered / shrieked / yodelled / yelled / bellowed / grunted / barked} Bill the news.
(= (4))

b. Susan {whispered / yelled / mumbled / barked / muttered} the news to Rachel.
(B & N (2003:7))

Previous studies explain the fact that the dativisability is different verb by verb in terms of the semantic compatibility between verbs and constructions. That is, a verb cannot occur in a construction when its lexical meaning is not compatible with the semantics of the

construction. The semantic compatibility between verbs and constructions brings three possible occurrence patterns of verbs like the following: (i) the verb can occur in both the prepositional-dative and the double object construction; (ii) the verb can occur in only the prepositional-dative construction; and (iii) the verb can occur in only the double object construction. The present chapter considers the second case alone: the case of *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs.

It has been held in the literature that the argument structure of the prepositional-dative construction, [NP_1 V NP_3 to NP_2], and that of the double object construction, [NP_1 V NP_2 NP_3], are associated with the following semantic structures, respectively:

(11) X CAUSES Z TO GO TO/BE AT Y (B & N (2003:3))

(12) X CAUSES Y TO HAVE Z (Pinker (1989:73))

In these structures, variables X, Y, and Z stand for the participants in the event and are linked to the subject, the indirect object, and the direct object respectively. As shown by the structures in (11) and (12), the syntax of the prepositional-dative construction is associated with the allative meaning, while that of the double object construction is associated with the possessive meaning.

The core meaning of the double object construction is "successful transfer": the subject referent (an Actor) acts to cause transfer of an object to the indirect object referent (a Recipient), and the Recipient actually receives it (Goldberg (1995:32)). The reason why *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs cannot occur in the double object construction is that their meaning is incompatible with the possessive meaning. According to Pinker (1989:65), *carry*-type verbs can be construed only as meaning "cause to go," and they are not construed as having a meaning of transfer of possession. Therefore, their meaning does not suit the possessive meaning, and thus they cannot appear in the double object construction. As for *shout*-type verbs, they usually describe noncommunicative activities. Verbs of this type do not involve communication: they do not express transfers of the possession of information.[2] So, *shout*-type verbs are also incompatible with the double object construction.

The discussion so far concludes that *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs resist occurring in the double object construction, since their meanings are not compatible with the core meaning of the construction. Put otherwise, in order for verbs to occur in the double object construction, their lexical meaning must meet the semantics of the construction. Verbs have such a compatibility constraint

on their occurrence. The next section investigates the relation between the compatibility constraint and the context where the double object construction with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs is used.

6.3. The Double Object Construction in Context

We have assumed that double object constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs are not acceptable because the verbs cannot satisfy the compatibility constraint. As mentioned in 6.1, however, B & N point out that despite the reported ungrammaticality of the constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs, we can find the allegedly unacceptable constructions are actually used and accepted. Observe the following examples:

(13) a. Karen spoke with Gretchen about the procedure for registering a complaint, and *hand-carried her a form*, but Gretchen never completed it. (B & N (2003:6))

b. As *Player A pushed him the chips*, all hell broke loose at the table. (= (5))

c. Therefore, when he got to purgatory, *Buddha lowered him the silver thread of a spider* as his last chance for salvation. (B & N (2003:6))

d. Nothing like heart burn food. “I have the tums.” Nick joked. *He pulled himself a steaming piece of the pie*. “Thanks for being here.” (B & N (2003:6))

(14) a. Shooting the Urasian a surprised look, *she muttered him a hurried apology* as well before skirting down the hall.

(B & N (2003:7))

b. “Hi baby.” Wade says as he stretches. *You just mumble him an answer*. You were comfy on that soft leather couch. (= (6))

c. The shepherd-dogs, guardians of the flocks, *barked him a welcome*, and the sheep bleated and the lambs pattered round him.

(B & N (2003:8))

d. I still can’t forget their mockery and laughter when they heard my question. Finally a kind few (three to be exact) came forward and *whispered me the answer*.

(B & N (2003:8))

These examples suggest that although double object constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs are not accepted when the lexical information of the verb is not compatible with the semantics of the construction, yet they

are licensed when the constraint violation is overridden by contextual information. In light of this, we propose the following hypothesis:

(15) When allegedly unacceptable double object constructions are accepted in context, contextual information ensures successful transfers of possessions.

If verbs must satisfy the compatibility constraint in order to occur in the double object construction, then *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs in the construction are necessarily construed as having an implication of the transfer of possession by contextual information, not by its lexical information. That is, the dative NP must be regarded as a possessor in context. We shall examine the hypothesis below.

When we observe the data carefully, we can find two common features there: one is concerned with the dative NP; the other is concerned with the role of context. Let us take examples (13c) and (14d), repeated here in (16):

(16) a. Therefore, when he got to purgatory, *Buddha lowered him the silver thread of a spider* as his last chance for salvation.

b. I still can't forget their mockery and laughter when they heard my question. Finally a kind few (three to be exact) came forward and *whispered me the answer*.

In (16a), the dative NP *him* corresponds to the underscored NP *he* in the preceding sentence, and thus the referent of the dative NP is already introduced into the discourse. Furthermore, we assume that the entities except the dative NP in the VP express a proposition about the NP, since the VP can be paraphrased as *he had the silver thread lowered*. Likewise in (16b), the dative NP *me* corefers with the underscored NP *I* in the first sentence, and the VP in the double object construction describes what happened to the dative NP. As discussed in chapter 2, we regard an entity as the topic of the phrase when it is already introduced in the preceding discourse and the phrase denotes a proposition about it. Therefore, we can assume that the dative NP is construed as the topic of the phrase. Tsubomoto's (1981) analysis bears out this assumption. Tsubomoto claims that the dative NP semantically functions as a kind of "subject" for the VP. This is illustrated by the following examples:

(17) a. Several mistakes taught John the secrets of Chinese cooking.

b. After several mistakes, John learned the secrets of Chinese cooking.

(Tsubomoto (1981:321f.))

According to Tsubomoto, sentence (17a) can be paraphrased as (17b), which shows that the dative NP is a semantic subject of the VP. Consequently, there is a predication relation between the dative NP and the other elements in the VP. As seen above, the referents of the dative NPs in (16) are already introduced into the discourse. Hence they are considered topics there. The same holds true for the other examples in (13) and (14).

Our argument is further supported by the following examples:

(18) a. ?*John, Mary taught linguistics.

b. * John is tough to give a present.

(Tsubomoto (1981:234))

Generally, the dative NP cannot be preposed, as shown in (18). According to Tsubomoto, since the dative NP is already construed as the topic of the VP phrase, it need no longer be moved out of the VP into the topic position.

The argument thus far leads to the conclusion that the dative NP in the double object construction with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs in context functions as the topic of the phrase.[3]

Next, as to the role of context, B & N (2003:6) note that in the examples in (13) and (14), the verbs in the double object construction are "construable as depicting changes of possession." Let us consider example (13b), repeated here as (19):

(19) As *Player A pushed him the chips*, all hell broke loose at the table.

According to B & N, the context of (19) describes a tournament poker game. Our background knowledge about poker games makes it possible to construe the verb *push* as having a meaning of transfer of possession. That is, in poker games, the poker chips are usually pushed across the table to the winner. Given this knowledge, we can easily understand that the referent of the dative NP received the chips. Hence, the sentence is acceptable. Although the same line of argument seems to apply to the other examples in (13) and (14), it is difficult to figure out their contexts due to the lack of information. Unfortunately, most of the examples provided by B & N do not exist on the

web any more, and we cannot fully inspect the contexts. So, we provide other relevant examples from the web and observe them:

(20) When Thornton finished his argument *the deputy carried him the paper*. Thornton read it, his face flushed a little and leaning forward, and he penned an answer.
(http://www.nevadaobserver.com/Reading%20Room%20Documents/harry_i_thornton%20(1913).htm)

(21) Therefore, when he got to purgatory, *Buddha lowered him the silver thread of a spider* as his last chance for salvation. He grabbed hold of the thread and climbed up it: but halfway up he made a mistake.
(cf.13b)(http://www.leaderu.com/humanities/fujimura-ImofGr.html)

(22) "I have the tums." Nick joked. *He pulled himself a piece of the pie*. "Thanks for being here." [...] Nick smirked. A string of cheese dangled from his chin nearly sending Brain into hysterics. (cf.13d)
(http://www.angelfire.com/music5/backstreet_myway/hosted/Snow2/Snow2ch5)

(23) *Max's dad mumbled him a few words* in Romanian, and Max nodded.

(http://www.wattpad.com/180542)

(24) Since his action is really conflicting with my personal beliefs, *I muttered him a question*, "Sir, why did you look so confident [...]" He gently answered me with an inspiring tone, [...].

(http://a07bessays.blogspot.com/2008/01/restoration-of-faith-in-human-race_8224.html)

In these examples, we can find that the referents of the dative NPs are possessors from the linguistic cues. The underscored expressions tell us that the referent of the dative NP has received the object in question. For example, in (20), because Thornton received the paper, he was able to read it. In (21), because he (Jean Val Jean) reached the thread, he was able to grab it. In (24), he (Mr. Kumar) perceived what she (the referent of *I*) asked in a mutter, and thus he answered her.[4] These obvious expressions enable us to recognise that the referent of the dative NP receives the object and is construed as a possessor.

We conclude that when an allegedly unacceptable double

object construction is acceptable, the dative NP is construed as a possessor from contextual information. Hence the validity of our hypothesis in (15).

The argument above naturally leads us to propose the following descriptive generalisation about the acceptability of double object constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs:

(25) Double object constructions with *carry*-type verbs and *shout*-type verbs require a context where the referent of the dative NP can be construed as the topic of the VP, and can also be regarded as a possessor.

We have argued that the double object construction in question cannot be acceptable in an out-of-the-blue context, whereas it can be licensed in a context where the referent of the dative NP is construed as the topic and is also regarded as a possessor. Constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs like *Max carried John a box* are not accepted because the semantics of the verbs and the construction is not compatible. The lexical information of the verbs cannot suit the semantics of the construction. However, once the referent of the dative NP is construed as the topic, the discourse should develop in relation to the topic. In

other words, the topic entity acquires various sorts of information about itself. Such contextual information enables us to regard the topic entity as a possessor. While the lexical information may not be enough to regard the referent of the dative NP as a possessor, if context conveys relevant information for that purpose, then the double object construction in question is acceptable.

6.4. The Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement

We have clarified how double object constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs are licensed. Through this analysis, we find that double object constructions of this kind are pragmatically motivated constructions. That is, they are not accepted by themselves but can be licensed in the context which fulfils a certain requirement. This conclusion accords with the PPTR:

(26) When a pragmatically motivated construction is licensed,
  a. it must have an entity which functions as a topic, and
  b. it must be supplied in context with enough information to make it consistent with the condition satisfied by the more general construction of which it is an instance.

The double object construction does not express a passive meaning, a point which is different from the constructions discussed in previous three chapters. However, we can assume that the notion of possessor involved in the construction is a kind of patient. A referent who owns nothing comes to hold something by the action of the verb, and the referent becomes a possessor. That is, a possessor undergoes a change of state from having nothing to possessing something. A patient is also a referent who undergoes a change of state. Therefore, a possessor role and a patient role share a common feature.[5] This means that when double object constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs are acceptable, the topic entity must be regarded as a patient. In this respect, the double object construction in question parallels the constructions shown in chapters 3 to 5, and it is natural that the same generalisation holds for them all.

6.5. Summary

In this chapter, we have mainly discussed how double object constructions with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs are licensed in context. Examining the findings of previous studies, we have proposed a descriptive generalisation about the acceptability of the construction. We have also argued that the construction in question is a pragmatically

motivated construction, which establishes that the PPTR holds for non-passive constructions.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

[1] We refer to sentences like (i) as the double object construction, and sentences like (ii) as the prepositional-dative construction:

(i) Mary gave John a book.

(ii) Mary gave a book to John.

Also, we call the indirect object in the double object construction (i.e. *John* in (i)) the dative NP.

[2] According to Zwicky (1971:225f.), *shout*-type verbs "describe the physical characteristics of a sound" rather than "an intended act of communication by speech."

[3] Tsubomoto (1981) claims that the dative NPs in double object constructions must always function as the topics of the VPs. Our assumption that when the allegedly unacceptable double object construction can actually be acceptable, the dative NP is construed as the topic of the phrase accords with the topicality requirement proposed by Tsubomoto.

[4] Kogusuri (2009) claims that contextual supports make it possible for manner of speaking complements [i.e. complements to *shout*-type verbs] to approximate

syntactically and semantically to complements of verbs of saying. Roughly speaking, in an adequate context, *shout*-type verbs can behave like the verbs of saying which express the successful transfer of possession of information. Though this argument is supporting evidence for our hypothesis, we do not provide a clear argument as to whether the meaning of *shout*-type verbs in the well-formed double object changes from the “cause to go” to “cause to have” (cf. B & N (2003)). We only assume that the dative NP is construed as a possessor from contextual information.

[5] Kaga (2007) claims that both possessor and patient are classified into the macro-role of LOCATION syntactically.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

In concluding this dissertation, let us first retrace our steps so far. In chapter 2, we have clarified what topic is, because it is an important notion for our generalisation about pragmatically motivated constructions. On the basis of the definition by Lambrecht (1994), we have characterised the notion of topic as follows. When an NP in a sentence or phrase is construed as the topic, the following two factors are important: (i) the referent of the NP has already been introduced into discourse, or is inferable from the preceding context, and (ii) the sentence or phrase denotes a proposition about the given entity.

In chapter 3, we have concerned ourselves with the passivisability of unintentional periphrastic causatives. Unintentional periphrastic causative passives are not acceptable on their own, but can be licensed in contexts where the subject can function as the topic of the sentence and can be regarded as a patient. Because unintentional periphrastic causative passives do not contain a patient who is affected and undergoes a change to a new state or perception, they cannot be accepted. However, in a context

which satisfies a certain condition, the subject of an unintentional periphrastic causative passive can be construed as a patient, and unintentional periphrastic causative passives are accepted. By generalising this observation, we have proposed the Pragmatic Principle of Topic Requirement (the PPTR).

In chapter 4, we have dealt with how peculiar passives are licensed. We have shown that the conditions proposed by the previous studies have some problems and do not capture the following facts: pseudo-passives can serve as either topic-comment or event-reporting sentences, and peculiar passives allow not only individual-level predicates but stage-level predicates. To solve the problems, we have proposed a pragmatic licensing condition for peculiar passives. Peculiar passives are not acceptable at the sentence level, but can be licensed in contexts where the subject can function as the topic of the sentence and the affectedness constraint is satisfied. This characteristic of peculiar passives is just as predicted by the PPTR.

In chapter 5, we have shown that an ill-formed prenominal possessive as well can be licensed in a context where the possessor nominal can function as the topic of the phrase and the affectedness constraint is fulfilled. We have maintained that the construction is not accepted when it cannot satisfy the affectedness constraint by

lexical information, but it is licensed when the constraint violation is overridden by contextual information. We have further argued that the prenominal possessive is a pragmatically motivated construction which is in accordance with the PPTR, thereby demonstrating that the PPTR holds true irrespective of the syntactic level of the construction in question.

In chapter 6, we have mainly discussed how the double object construction with *carry*- and *shout*-type verbs is licensed in context. Examining the findings of previous studies, we have proposed a descriptive generalisation about the use of the construction. We have also argued that the construction in question is a pragmatically motivated construction, which establishes that the PPTR holds for non-passive constructions.

All of the constructions we have examined throughout this dissertation constitute a natural class in that they are not accepted on their own but they can be used with enough contextual information. This does not mean, however, that a given construction in context requires a different licensing condition from the condition for the more general construction of which it is an instance. For example, the *cause*-causative passive is a kind of passive construction, and hence it must satisfy the affectedness constraint; in this respect the *cause*-causative passive is parallel with

normal passives. The difference between them lies in the fact that the former must satisfy the affectedness constraint contextually while the latter must fulfil it lexically.

As has been argued, it is important that when a given construction satisfies the condition contextually, an entity in the construction must be construed as topic. That is, first of all, the entity is construed as topic, and as a result of it, the required condition is fulfilled because of contextual information. Further empirical research is required to examine whether the notion of topic is crucially relevant in other, if any, pragmatically licensed constructions, and if so, to what extent our proposed generalisation, the PPTR, is applicable to them.

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