

Causal efficacy and spatiotemporal restriction: An analytical study of the Sautrāntika philosophy*

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0. Introduction

Recent studies have revealed some of the early historical circumstances of the Sautrāntika tradition, including its relation to the earlier Dārṣṭāntika.¹ Under the hypothesis of a possible transmission of thought from Vasubandhu (5th cent.) downward² we may further include Dignāga (6th cent.), Dharmakīrti (7th cent.) and their successors in the Sautrāntika lineage. The present paper deals with the Sautrāntika philosophical system of these later masters, more specifically with their following two theories, according to which: (a) conditioned things (*saṃ-*

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The bold type in all citations is used to highlight the term *deśakālaniyama* and its synonyms.

¹ See Katō (1989: 68–92), Mimaki (1988: 227–230), Cox (1995) and, in particular, the articles introduced by Kritzer (2003) in the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 26/2, 2003, “*The Sautrāntikas*.”

² Regarding the theoretical influence of Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika positions on Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s ontology, epistemology and *apoha* theory, see, e.g., Frauwallner (1959), Katsura (1969), Hattori (1977ab), and Harada (1989). The sources of Dharmakīrti’s proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) can also be traced to Vasubandhu’s works, in addition to some texts of the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra traditions. See, e.g., Steinkellner (1968), von Rospatt (1995) and Yoshimizu (1999).

skṛta), being produced (*kṛta*) by their own cause, exist in reality, whereas unconditioned things (*asamskṛta*) such as space (*ākāśa*) are unreal; and (b) conditioned things are exclusively impermanent (*anitya*) and momentary (*kṣanika*).³

With Dharmakīrti, theory (a) came to involve a clear epistemological as well as ontological distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned in that it was connected with Dignāga's declaration that the two kinds of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), i.e., direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), take respectively the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) as their objects.⁴ Since conditioned things, in addition to being produced by causes, become condition (*samskāra*) and produce their own effect, Dharmakīrti and his successors asserted that (a') only things capable of producing an effect (*arthakriyāsamartha*) exist in reality. And since only the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) has such a causal efficacy, only the individual is real, in contrast with the universal (*sāmānya* or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which is merely imagined and causally inefficacious.⁵

Dharmakīrti further bound this definition of the real to theory (b), whereby in the course of the so-called *sattvānumāna*, i.e., the inference of momentari-

³ About the basic Sautrāntika tenets, see, e.g., Mimaki (1989: 233 *infra*). For Kritzer (2003: 206), in the AKBh the theory (a), according to which the unconditioned is unreal, is attributed to both the Dārṣṭāntika and the Sautrāntika traditions.

⁴ PSV *ad* PS I 2 (Hattori 1986: 79 n. 1.14): *na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti. svalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ hi pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ*. "For there is no other object of cognition apart from the individual and the universal, since we will prove that direct perception and inference have the individual and the universal as their [respective] objects."

⁵ See, e.g., PV I 166abc: *sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ*. "Only the thing which is capable of producing an effect is ultimately existent." PVSV 84,5f. *ad* I 166: *idam eva hi vastvavastunor lakṣaṇaṃ yad arthakriyāyogyatā'yogyatā ca*. "For the capability and the incapability to produce an effect are indeed the [respective] characteristics of the real entity and the unreal entity." PV III 3: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat samvṛtīsat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe //*. "That which is capable of producing an effect is here designated as ultimately existent. The other is designated as conventionally existent. They are [respectively] the individual and the universal." NB I 12–15: *tasya viśayaḥ svalakṣaṇam // yasyārthasya saṃnidhānāsamnidhānābhyām jñānapratibhāsabhedas tat svalakṣaṇam // tad eva paramārthasat // arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ //*. "The [perception] has the individual as its object. The thing which appears to a cognition differently according to whether it is placed near or far is the individual. This alone is ultimately existent, since the real entity is characterized as being capable of producing an effect."

ness from existence, he precluded permanent things from the domain of real entities, arguing that (b') a non-momentary thing does not exist in reality since it has no ability to produce an effect, so that whatever is existent (*sat*) is therefore exclusively momentary (*kṣaṇika*).⁶

A conditioned thing thus obtains a variety of qualifications in Dharmakīrti's system: Whatever is conditioned (*samskṛta*) is produced (*kṛtaka*), conditioning (*samskāra*), causally efficacious (*arthakriyāsamartha*), existent (*sat*), a real entity (*vastu*), an external object (*bahirartha*), an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), impermanent (*anitya*), and momentary (*kṣaṇika*). Later Tibetan thinkers grouped these qualities under the concept of "ultimate reality" (*paramārthasatya*, *don dam bden pa*).⁷ And indeed, these qualities can all apply to what the Sautrāntika called a real existent. But for Dharmakīrti, as theories (a') and (b') suggest, these qualities are equivalent not merely because they refer to the real, but because they all illustrate the fact that in order to be real a thing must have causal

⁶ See, e.g., PV I 269ab: *sattāmātrānubandhitvān nāśasyānityatā dhvaneḥ*. "Sound is impermanent, since the perishing occurs with the mere existence." HB 4*,6f.: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve 'rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇam vastutvaṃ hīyate*. "Whatever is existent is exclusively momentary since, if it were nonmomentary, it would be excluded from being a real entity because of its contradiction with causal efficacy, [for a real entity] is characterized by having this [causal efficacy]." For studies of the *sattvānumāna*, see, e.g., Steinkellner (1968), Oetke (1993), von Rospatt (1995: 5ff.), Halbfass (1997) and Yoshimizu (1999 and 2003b).

⁷ Cf. the classification in *Rigs gter rang 'grel* 19a2f. (176-2) cited in Dreyfus (1997: 77) and Yoshimizu (2003a: 364 n. 36): *rang gi mtshan nyid dang / gsal ba dang / dngos po dang / rdzas dang / log pa dang / don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun ma 'dres pa rgyu dang 'bras bu grub pa / skeyes bu thams cad kyi blang dor bya ba'i 'jug yul yin pas dngos po'i don du don gcig pa yin te ... / spyi dang gzhan sel dang / ldog pa dang / rnam gcod dang / 'dres pa dang / 'brel pa dang / kun rdzob ces bya ba sogs pa ni / don la mi gnas pa / dngos por ma grub pa / dbang po'i yul ma yin pa blos sgro btags pa / brtags pa'i chos dngos po la don byed mi nus pa / gzhan sel gyis 'brel pa dang / 'brel med dang / dgag pa dang bsgrub pa la sogs pa'i sgo nas / 'jug gi don byed mi nus par don mtshungs pa yin te /*. This is based on PV I 171c–172: *sa evārthas tasya vyāvṛttayo 'pare // tat kāryam* kāraṇam cokatam tat svalakṣaṇam iṣyate / tattyāgāptiphalāḥ sarvāḥ puruṣāṇām pravṛttayaḥ //*. *I prefer the reading *tat kāryam* to *tatkāryam*, in accordance with the edition of PVSVT 330,4. "This [i.e., the particular (*viśeṣa*)] alone is a real thing, and the others [i.e., the universals] are the exclusions with regard to this [i.e., the particular]. This [i.e., the particular] is called effect and cause. This is regarded as being the *svalakṣaṇa*. All the activities of human beings are carried out to abandon or obtain this [particular]." Compare the similar classification appearing in many dGe lugs pa treatises, as cited in Yoshimizu (1998: 58; 63 n. 9).

efficacy. Vasubandhu also seems to have held the view that the real existence of conditioned things is grounded on their causal ability, whereas causal relations are impossible in the case of unconditioned and permanent things.⁸

It should be noted, incidentally, that the Sautrāntika were not the only ones to resort to this view. Indeed, this was also the position of all Buddhists who were concerned with disproving the existence of an unconditioned permanent agent such as a God (*īśvara*) or a Self (*ātman*). Vasubandhu and some early Yogācāra masters, for example, attempted to refute the possibility of such a permanent existent by discrediting its causal ability, arguing that neither gradually (*krama*) nor simultaneously (*yaugapadya*) is it able to produce an effect.⁹ For them, permanent things can by no means function as a cause. Dharmakīrti subsequently used this argument both in his refutation of a permanent agent and his proof of momentariness. It is moreover on account of its causal efficacy that he included the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) among real entities, arguing, mainly from an epistemological point of view, that an individual can be inferred to exist in the external world as it appears to one's perception.¹⁰ In other words, the fact that a thing is individually cognized shows that it is capable of producing a cognition of its own image, in contrast to the universal, which is not cognized separately from an individual.¹¹

⁸ See, e.g., his refutation of the Self (*ātman*) as a cause of consciousnesses in the *Karmasiddhi*; I have discussed this refutation in Yoshimizu (1999: 235–245). See also AKBh 91,4f.: *saṃskṛtasyaiva dharmasya hetuphale bhavataḥ*. (II 55d) *nāsaṃskṛtasya te*. “Cause and effect occur solely to conditioned things, not to unconditioned [things].” AKBh 92,4f.: *sarvam evāsaṃskṛtam adravyam iti Sautrāntikāḥ. na hi tad rūpavedanādivat bhāvāntaram asti*. “The Sautrāntikas say that whatever is unconditioned is not a substance, for it is not a distinct entity like visual matter and sensation.”

⁹ See Yoshimizu (1999) and the studies cited therein.

¹⁰ PV III 390d–391b (Tosaki 1985: 73f.): *hetubhedānumā bhavet // abhāvād akṣabud-dhīnām satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣu /*. “A different cause [of sense cognition from internal sense organs, etc.,] is to be inferred, because sense cognitions do not arise even if other causes exist.” PV III 391cd, on the other hand, is considered to propose the theory of cognition-only (*viññaptimātra*): *niyamaṃ yadi na brūyāt pratyayāt samanantarāt //*. “[The inference is established] insofar as the restriction [of the arising of sense cognition] is not said to rest on an immediate cause.”

¹¹ PV III 126 (Tosaki 1979: 207f.): *ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi kvacin nānyatra dṛśyate / na tasmād bhinnam asty anyat sāmānyam buddhyabhedataḥ //*. “The distinct thing (*bheda*, i.e., *svalakṣaṇa*) that is seen at one [place] is to be seen nowhere else. Nothing else exists as a universal separate from this, because there is no difference between the cognitions [of the *svalakṣaṇa* and the *sāmānya*].” In this verse, Dharmakīrti is demonstrating the non-existence of the universal on the grounds that it is not cognized separately

To sum up, what is conditioned is to be identified with the individual because both refer to a real entity, which is causally efficacious. The impermanent also proves to be real given that permanent things are unreal due to their causal inability. But why exactly are the conditioned and the impermanent causally efficacious? If it were completely self-evident that only conditioned things could take part in production as a conditioning factor,¹² one might well posit a certain essential concomitance between causal efficacy and the properties of being conditioned, being an individual and being impermanent. In other words, these properties could be supposed to lead to the causation of an effect.

But since the theory of causality is so much at the core of the Sautrāntika philosophy, I believe that it is worth reexamining the questions of *how* and *why* x) the conditioned, y) the individual and z) the impermanent *are causally efficacious*. A key to answering these questions is the notion of “spatiotemporal restriction” (*deśakālaniyama*), which figures in the process of causation and is paradigmatic of causal efficacy.

The present paper is therefore an attempt to resolve the complexity of the Sautrāntika philosophical system by shedding light on its notion of causal efficacy and the spatiotemporal restriction (*deśakālaniyama*) that characterizes how causality functions. Although the variety and number of sources to which I shall refer is limited, my analysis extends over the entire philosophical tradition related to the later Sautrāntika, that is, from Vasubandhu to subsequent Tibetan interpreters. In so doing, my special focus will be to clarify the Sautrāntika’s attribution of causal efficacy to the conditioned, the individual and the impermanent as a way to validate their reality.

from the individual. If it were a real existent, it would have to exist independently of the individual and be cognized separately. Cf. also PVI in I 16 (Vetter 1966: 56): *gcig tu mthong ba’i khyad par ni // gzhan ’ga’ zhig tu ma mthong phyir // de las spyi gzhan tha dad ni // yod min tha dad blo med phyir //*; PV III 50 (Tosaki 1979: 119): *jñānamātrārthakaraṇe ’py ayogyam ata eva tat | tad ayogyatayārūpaṃ tad dhy avastuṣu lakṣaṇam //*. “For this reason (i.e., because the universal does not appear to a cognition), the [universal] is unable to accomplish the aim of [producing] a mere cognition. It does not have a real form, owing to this inability, for this [inability] is a characteristic of unreal entities.” An object’s ability to produce a cognition is regarded as a minimum causal efficacy. See PVV 113,16 *ad* PV III 50 (mentioned in Tosaki 1979: 61 n. 11 and 119 n. 142): *antyā hīyaṃ bhāvānām arthakriyā yad uta svajñānanjananam*. “Indeed, it is a minimum causal efficacy for [real] things to produce a cognition of themselves.”

¹² Dharmakīrti’s explanation of how it is possible for an impermanent thing to gradually and simultaneously produce an effect appears in his HB. See Yoshimizu (2003b).

1. Vasubandhu on causal efficacy and spatiotemporal restriction

In accordance with the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), the Buddhists in general do not accept causeless production. Rather, whatever is produced (*kṛta*) or conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) is said to have its own cause, a cause that conditions (*saṃskāra*) its product to arise at a particular place and time. A seed, for instance, causes the arising of a sprout with the help of sunshine, earth and water. Together they condition where and when the sprout arises. Any product that comes into existence thus obtains its own spatiotemporal location. In other words, the conditioning entity produces an effect through determining its spatiotemporal location. Vasubandhu calls this causal procedure “spatiotemporal restriction” (*deśakālaniyama* or *deśakālapratīnyama*), not only in his AKBh, but also in his *Viṃśatikā*. To my reading, the meaning of the term is the same in both works, although they belong to different philosophical positions. Both texts present Vasubandhu’s view that spatiotemporal restriction exemplifies in the causal efficacy of a conditioning entity. Let us look at the details of how this notion is presented in the *Viṃśatikā* and AKBh.

The opening discussion of the *Viṃśatikā* addresses the criticism of the theory of cognition- or mind-only (*viññapti-* or *cittamātra*) expressed by those who insist on the real existence of external causes – among the functions of which we find spatiotemporal restriction. The entire objection reads as follows:

(v.2) If a cognition [occurs] without [depending on] an [external] object, then neither 1) spatiotemporal restriction (*deśakālaniyama*), nor 2) non-restriction with regard to the mental continuum [of the cognizer] (*santānāniyama*), nor 3) the production of an effect (*kṛtyakriyā*), are possible.

What is hereby asserted is as follows: If the cognition of visual matter (*gzugs,*rūpa*) and so on occurs without an [external] object such as [real] visual matter, then, since it is not caused by an external object such as [real] visual matter, 1) why does it occur at a particular place and not everywhere? Why does it occur at this place alone at a particular time, not always? 2) Why does it occur in the mental continua of all those who are staying at this place and time, and not in the [mental continuum] of only one [person], as is the case for the appearance of hair and the like which occur only in the mental continua of those who have an eye-disease [but] not in that of others? 3) Why is it that the hair, bees and so on that are seen by those who have an eye-disease do not produce the effect of hair and so on, whereas other things [i.e., the hair and so on that are seen by those who do not have an eye-disease] do produce it? Why is it that the food, drink, clothes, poison, weapons and so on [that are experienced] in a dream do not produce the effect of food and so on, whereas other things [i.e., real food, etc.] do produce it? Why is it that the city of the Gandharvas, being non-existent, does not produce the effect of a city, whereas other things [i.e., real cities] do produce it? Insofar as there is no external object, neither 1) spatiotemporal restriction, nor 2) non-restriction with regard to the mental

continuum [of the cognizer], nor 3) the production of an effect is therefore possible.¹³

In the above passage from the *Viṃśatikā*, the opponent argues that the following three problems would arise if we supposed that the cognition of an object could occur without any real external cause and appeared only as an objective part of the cognition (*viññapti*): (1) it would be impossible to restrict the cognized object to a particular place and time, (2) it would be impossible to make it perceptible to all those who are present there at that time, and (3) the object could not produce an effect, since it would be unreal.

But in the following lines of the *Viṃśatikā*, Vasubandhu rules out this objection by demonstrating that just as they do in a dream, these three functions still hold when considered from the point of view of cognition-only.¹⁴ Now what is

¹³ *Viṃśatikā* 3,7–16 ad 2: *na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na ca / na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā viññaptir yadi nārthataḥ // (v.2) *kim uktaṃ bhavati. yadi vinā rūpādyarthena rūpādiviññaptir utpadyate na rūpādyarthāt, kasmāt kvacid deśa utpadyate na sarvatra, tatraiva ca deśe kadācid utpadyate na sarvadā, taddeśakālapratiṣṭhitānāṃ sarveṣāṃ saṃtāna utpadyate na kevalam ekasya, yathā taimirikānāṃ saṃtāne keśādyābhāso nānyeṣāṃ, kasmād yat taimirikaiḥ keśabhramarādi dṛśyate tena keśādikriyā na kriyate, na ca tadanyair na kriyate, yad annapānavastraviṣāyudhādi svapne tenānnādikriyā na kriyate, na ca tadanyair na kriyate, gandharvanagareṇāsattvān nagarakriyā na kriyate, na ca tadanyair na kriyate, tasmād arthābhāve deśakāla*niyamaḥ saṃtānaniyamaḥ kṛtyakriyā ca na yujyate. I adopt v.2 from the manuscript (Vś A3a5f.). The Chinese reads it without the negation of *deśakālaniyama* (若識無實境則處時決定 74c3), which Lévi's reconstruction follows (*yadi viññaptir anarthā niyamo deśakālayoḥ*). *...* I cite the Sanskrit text of the *Viṃśatikāvṛtti* reconstructed by Lévi.*

Cf. D4057, 4a5–4b3 (tr. Frauwallner 1958: 366f.; Kajiyama 1976: 7ff.): *gal te rnam rig don min na // yul dang dus nges med cing // sems kyang nges med ma yin la // bya ba byed pa'ang mi rigs 'gyur // (v.2) ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na / gal te gzugs la sogs pa'i don med par gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ste gzugs la sogs pa'i don las ma yin na // ci'i phyir yul la lar 'byung la thams cad na ma yin / yul de nyid na yang res 'ga' 'byung la thams cad du ma yin / yul dang dus de na 'khod pa thams cad kyi sems la nges pa med pa 'byung la 'ga' tsam la ma yin / ji ltar rab rib can nyid kyi sems la skra la sogs pa snang gi / gzhan dag la ni ma yin // ci'i phyir gang rab rib can gyis mthong ba'i skra dang / sbrang bu la sogs pas skra la sogs pa'i bya ba mi byed la / de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed / rmi lam na mthong ba'i bza' ba dang btung ba dang bgo ba dang dug dang mtshon la sogs pas zas dang skom la sogs pa'i bya ba mi byed la / de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed / dri za'i grong khyer yod pa ma yin pas grong khyer gyi bya ba mi byed la / de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed / 'di dag don med par med du 'dra na yul dang dus nges pa dang / sems nges pa med pa dang / bya ba byed pa 'di dag kyang mi rung ngo zhe na /*

¹⁴ *Viṃśatikā* 3,16–4,9 ad 3–4ab (Vś A3a6, VśV B2a1–6): *na khalu na yujyate yasmāt*

especially interesting for us in the Yogācāra reply is that while Vasubandhu rejects the necessary existence of external objects and develops instead the tenet of cognition-only, he nonetheless retains the functions that the opponent reserved for external objects and that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti later attribute to the real individual existent. Recall Dignāga's definition of the *svalakṣaṇa* as the object of perception (*pratyakṣa*) and Dharmakīrti's definition of an ultimately real existent as being capable of producing an effect. These two definitions correspond respectively to functions 2 and 3 above. And Vasubandhu here adds to these the function of spatiotemporal restriction, which means that when a cause produces an effect, such as when a seed produces a sprout, the cause restricts its effect to a particular place and time. From a Yogācāra perspective, Vasubandhu therefore retains the restrictive function which, in the absence of a real external cause, the opponent claimed impossible, just as he claimed impossible the production itself.¹⁵

deśādīnīyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat ... pretavat punaḥ / samtānānīyamaḥ ... sarvaiḥ pūyanadyādīdarśane // ... svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā ... evaṃ tāvad anyānyair dṛṣṭāntair deśakālānīyamādicatuṣṭayaṃ siddham. “It is not proper [to say that they are] impossible, for as in a dream, spatio[temporal] restriction is established. Moreover, a non-restriction with regard to the mental continuum [of the cognizer is established], as in the case of the ghosts all seeing a river of pus and so on. [And] as in a wet dream, the production of an effect [is also established]. ... In this way, the fourfold [characteristics] are established through the respective examples.”

¹⁵ Interestingly, this argument is later used by Kumārila (6–7c.) in his critique of the Yogācāra theory of cognition-only. See the following verses from the *Śūnyavāda* of the ŚV 221–222: *tasmād deśādisadbhāvanimittaiḥ pratyayaiḥ pṛthak / vastvākārāḥ pratīyerann udbhavābhibhavātmakāḥ // yugapad grāhakāṇāṃ ca yo yadākāravācīnam / śabdamaṃ smarati tenāsāv ākāraḥ sampratīyate //*. “Therefore, the images of an entity, having the nature of arising and ceasing, can be perceived separately by the cognitions occasioned by [the entity] that is actually existent in space and so on. For grasping [cognitions, images arise] simultaneously [not based on an actual existent in space and so on]. The person who recalls the word denoting an image cognizes this image.” Cf. *Nyāyaratnākara* 237,3–10: *deśakālāpekṣayā vastvākārāṇām* udbhavābhibhavau, vipine hi sāyudhaṃ puruṣaṃ paśyato hīmsrarūpaṃ udbhūtaṃ pratibhāsate, grāmanagareṣu pālakarūpaṃ, tathā dīpaprabhāyāṃ naktan divaṃ rūpasparśayor udbhāvād grahaṇam, yugapad grāhakāṇāṃ tv ekasminn api deśe kāle ca śabdaviśeṣasmarāṇavaśād ākāravīśeṣopalabdhir iti.* *Emended: *ākāraṇam : ākāraṇam* C. “The arising and ceasing of the images of an entity [occur] depending on place and time. Namely, to the person who sees an armed man in a forest the image of someone threatening appears to have arisen, while the image of someone who protects [appears to the person who sees an armed man] in a village or a city. In the same manner, at night or during the day, [or] in the light of a lamp, the grasping [of objects] arises on the basis of visual matter[s] and tangible thing[s]. For grasping [cognitions], however, the perception of a particular

Vasubandhu expresses this same idea in the third chapter of his AKBh, but from a Sautrāntika point of view:

image [arises] simultaneously at one given place and time by virtue of the recollection of a particular word.”

ŚV 253–255: *deśakālanimittāni vyañjakāny arthavādinaḥ / śaktīnām kāraṇasthānām svakāryaniyamaṃ prati // śaktayo 'pi bhāvānām kāryārthāpattikalpitāḥ / prasiddhāḥ pāramārthikyāḥ pratikāryaṃ vyavasthitāḥ // bhavatas tu na vijñānād bhinnābhinnā nirūpyate / śaktiḥ saṃvṛtisadbhāvam utsṛjya paramārthataḥ //*. “For those who assert [the existence of] external objects, the manifestations of abilities consisting in causes are based on place and time in order to restrict [their] own effects. The abilities of things are conjectured to be ultimately established and fixed for each effect by means of an inference from [their] effect. For you, however, having dismissed it [as] existing conventionally, the ability is not ascertained to be separate from, or identical with, a cognition from the ultimate standpoint.” Cf. *Nyāyaratnākara* 243,21–31: *śaktimad api hi tantvādikāraṇaṃ na sarvadā kāryam ārabhate, kin tu śaktyabhivyañjakaṃ sahakāriṇam apekṣate, tac ca deśakālāditantuvāyādinimittam asmatpakṣe vidyate, yadvaśena kadācid kāryārambhaniyama iti. ...* “A cause such as thread does not always produce [its] effect, even though it has the ability [to do so]. The manifestation of an ability depends on cooperating causes. In our view, this is considered to be based on place, time and so on, as well as on thread, a weaver and so on, by virtue of which the production of an effect is restricted to a certain time.”

ŚV 256, 257ab: *vāsanaiva ca yuṣmābhiḥ śaktiśabdena gīyate / nimittaniyatatvaṃ ca vāsanāyā yad ucyate // tasyāś cāsambhavenaitad apārārthyāc ca durlabham /*. “Besides, you mean none other than a residue by the word ‘ability’ and [you] state that the residue has the restriction of a cause. This [statement] is untenable, since the [residue] is not destined for others because of [its] being incapable.” Cf. *Nyāyaratnākara* 244,8–11: *asmākaṃ hy ātmārthā vāsana, tad asāv ātmaprañidhānādyapekṣayā vilambata iti yuktaṃ, bhavatas tu yasminn asāv āhitā tasya kṣaṇikatvād ananyāpekṣatvāc ca na kiñcid vilambanimittam astīti sarvadaiva tantujñānāt paṭajñānaṃ syād iti*. “For us, the residue is destined for oneself. Hence, it is proper to say that this [residue] remains depending on one’s own use and so on. For you, however, there is no basis for saying where in [the cognition, i.e., *vijñāna*] this [residue] is deposited, since this [cognition] is momentary and independent of others. Consequently, it follows that the cognition of cloth would always occur from the cognition of thread.”

ŚV 257cd: *deśakālanimittādi na ca te 'sti niyāmakam //*. “Neither place, nor time, nor occasion and so on* exist for you.” *As for the performance of a sacrifice, the Mīmāṃsaka counts place, time, occasion, result (*phala*) and the object of purification (*saṃskārya*) as restricted factors. See *Nyāyaratnākara* 244,12ff.: *na ca deśakālādikam api bhavatām asti, yataḥ kadācid ārambhaḥ kadācid anārambha iti niyamaḥ sidhyed ity āha*. “For you, place, time and so on, on the basis of which the restriction should take place with regard to when [a cognition] occurs and when not, also do not exist. It is therefore said, ‘Neither place, nor time, ...’.”

The efficacy (*sāmarthya*) of a seed, etc., in [producing] a sprout, etc., as well as [that] of fire, etc., in cooking [food], etc., are also seen through spatiotemporal restriction (*deśakālapratiniyama*). Hence, there is no origination without a cause (*nirhetuka*). The assertion that a permanent cause (*nityakāraṇa*) exists has also already been refuted.¹⁶

Now, although this is the only passage of the AKBh where the notion of *deśakālaniyama* appears, it is extremely important for our investigation because it suggests a definite link within the framework of the theory of causality between (1) causal efficacy, (2) spatiotemporal restriction and (3) impermanence (*anityatva*). Indeed, in his use of *deśakālapratiniyamāt*, which can be analyzed as *deśakālayoḥ pratiniyamāt*,¹⁷ it may be supposed that Vasubandhu considers a

¹⁶ AKBh 130,27 *ad* III (*Lokanirdeśa*) 19d: *dr̥ṣṭam ca aṅkurādiṣu bījādīnām sāmārthyam deśakālapratiniyamād agnyādīnām ca pākajādiṣv iti nāsti nirhetukaḥ prādurbhāvaḥ. nityakāraṇāstītvavādaś ca prāg eva paryudastaḥ*. The last part of this verse may refer to AKBh 101,6–102,19 *ad* AK II 64, where a permanent God (*īśvara*) is rejected as the single cause of the world. See the text cited below, as well as Katsura (2003: 112 *infra*). AKV III 284: *aṅkuranālakāṇḍapatrādiṣu bījāṅkuranālakāṇḍādīnām sāmārthyam utpādanāya. kasmāt. deśakālapratiniyamāt. deśakālayoḥ tu pratiniyamāt. tatra deśapratiniyamō bījādisambaddha eva deśa utpatteḥ, kālapratiniyamō bījānantaram utpatteḥ. agnyādīnām vā 'gniśītoṣṇābhighātacakṣurādīnām pākajādiṣu pākajasukhaduḥkhaśabdacakṣurvijñānādiṣu dr̥ṣṭam sāmārthyam deśakālapratiniyamāt. yadi hi nirhetukaḥ prādurbhāvaḥ syāt, bījādīnām aṅkurādiṣu agnyādīnām ca pākajādiṣu deśakālapratiniyamānotpattiṃ prati sāmārthyam na syāt. sarvaṃ sarvatra sarvadotpadyeta. na caivaṃ dr̥ṣṭam ity ato nāsti nirhetukaḥ prādurbhāvaḥ. nityakāraṇāstītvavādaḥ prāg eva paryudastaḥ. neśvarādeḥ kramādibhir iti vacanāt*. “With regard to sprout, stalk, branch, leaf, etc., seed, sprout, stalk, branch, etc., have a [causal] efficacy for producing [them]. Why? Through spatiotemporal restriction, that is, because [a seed, etc.] restrict [them] to a [particular] place and time. Of these [two kinds of restrictions], spatial restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a sprout] arises at the very place connected with a seed, etc. Temporal restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a sprout] arises immediately after a seed. Likewise, the [causal] efficacy of fire and suchlike, i.e., of fire, cold, heat, striking [a tone], an eye, etc., for cooking and suchlike, i.e., for cooking, pleasure, pain, sound, eye-cognition, etc., is seen through spatiotemporal restriction. If, however, there were an origination without a cause, the [causal] efficacy of a seed, etc., with regard to a sprout, etc., and the [causal efficacy] of fire, etc., with regard to cooking, etc., for [their] arising through spatiotemporal restriction would not exist. Everything would arise everywhere at every time. Yet such is not seen. Hence, there is no origination without a cause. The assertion that a permanent cause exists has indeed already been refuted by the statement [in AK II 64d] ‘From *īśvara*, etc., [things] do not [arise] by succession, etc.’”

¹⁷ See AKV cited above in n. 16.

seed to actually produce a sprout *through* determining its spatiotemporal location. Notably, Yaśomitra interprets this passage as follows:

Spatial restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a sprout] arises at the very place connected with a seed (etc.). Temporal restriction [occurs] on the grounds that [a sprout] arises immediately after a seed.¹⁸

Just as he did in the *Vimśatikā*, Vasubandhu moreover rejects, now from a Sautrāntika point of view, any production that lacks a real cause, for where there is no cause, there can be no spatiotemporal restriction, and without spatiotemporal restriction, as added by Yaśomitra, everything would arise everywhere at every time.¹⁹ Significant too is the last sentence of the above passage, where Vasubandhu rejects the possibility of a permanent cause; it is very likely that he is referring, albeit without explicit mention, to AKBh II 64d, in which the hypothesis that a permanent God (*īśvara*) is the unique cause of the world is rejected.²⁰ For indeed, although neither Vasubandhu nor the commentator Yaśomitra supplies any further explanation about the earlier refutation referred to here, it is obvious that the same absurdity would follow from a permanent cause as would from an uncaused production, i.e., everything would arise everywhere at every time due to a lack of spatiotemporal restriction, since a permanent cause is considered to exist everywhere at all times. In short, whatever lacks its own spatiotemporal location cannot determine the spatiotemporal location of an effect.

Vasubandhu thus provides a clarification that proves useful to our inquiry into the relation between the conditioned, the individual, the impermanent and the causally efficacious. According to him, (x') the conditioned (*samskṛta*) is causally efficacious for, insofar as it is itself produced by its own cause and thus restricted to a particular spatiotemporal location, it can produce an effect through restricting that effect to a particular place and time. (z') An impermanent thing, in turn, serves to cause an effect, since insofar as it has its own temporal location, the impermanent thing is capable of restricting its effect to the particular moment that comes immediately after it has perished.²¹ Finally, (y')

¹⁸ See AKV cited above in n. 16.

¹⁹ See AKV cited above in n. 16.

²⁰ See AKV cited above in n. 16.

²¹ One should note that this supposition suggests the preclusion of the possible existence of a produced and nevertheless permanent thing. Such an existence was not conceivable for early Buddhists. What is produced necessarily has a spatiotemporal restriction and therefore cannot be permanent. Dharmakīrti was the first to logically exclude the possible production of a permanent thing by introducing a *sattvānumāna*

the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), as interpreted by Dharmakīrti, can also be said to have causal efficacy, for it is perceived at a particular place and time, contrary to the universal, which is considered to pervade many places and times. The spatiotemporal individuality of an object thus serves to restrict a cognition to its own image at a particular place and time. Consequently, one must say that the unconditioned, the permanent and the universal, which all have no spatiotemporal restriction of their own, lack also causal efficacy since they are not in a position to provide any spatiotemporal restriction to any effect. For the truth of the matter is that all things in this world are observed to occupy a particular place and time.

2. Dharmakīrti on causal efficacy and spatiotemporal restriction

It quickly becomes evident upon reading Dharmakīrti that he shares the same view as his predecessor Vasubandhu on the question of causal efficacy. To illustrate this, I shall first quote a passage from his PVSV, where Dharmakīrti denies the possibility of a causeless production in the same way Vasubandhu had done before him. Demonstrating that the perishing (*nāśa*) of an object has no cause, he contrasts this with the production of an effect, which indispensably requires a cause:

It is also incorrect that objects' [having] restriction to [their respective] essential nature (*svabhāvanīyama*) is accidental (*ākasmika*), since spatiotemporal and substantial restriction (*deśakāladravyanīyama*) cannot occur to that which does not depend [on a cause].²²

To the restrictions of place and time advanced by Vasubandhu, here Dharmakīrti adds the restriction of “substance” (*dravya*), as indicated by the third member of the compound *deśakāladravyanīyama*. According to the commentator Śākyabuddhi (7th–8th cent.), the substance restriction is illustrated by the fact that a barley seed restricts its production to a barley sprout and will not produce, for example, a rice sprout. To my reading, all of these factors of restriction are subsumed under the concept of “essential nature” (*svabhāva*).

In his commentary, Śākyabuddhi further equates the word “accidental” (*ākasmika*) with the word “causeless” (*ahetuka*),²³ thereby precluding the possi-

accompanied by *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*. See, e.g., Steinkellner (1968), Yoshimizu (1999 and 2003b).

²² PVSV 99,12ff. *ad* 195: *na ca svabhāvanīyamo 'rthānām ākasmiko yuktaḥ. anapekṣasya deśakāladravyanīyamāyogāt.*

²³ PVT D224b7–225a2: *don rnam la ni zhes bya ba ni dngos po rnam la'o // blo bur du zhes bya ba ni rgyu med par ro // ci'i phyir rigs pa ma yin zhe na | bltos pa med pa*

bility of a causeless production. Dharmakīrti also expresses this view in the last section of PV I, where he writes:

Fire arises if fuel exists and it does not arise if fuel does not exist. Hence, it is not the case that fire has no fuel even if fuel is not seen, because [without fuel], its spatiotemporal restriction (*deśakālaniyama*) is impossible; if there were a [spatiotemporal] restriction [of fire without fuel], that [spatiotemporal] restriction itself would be fuel, since fuel is characterized as the material cause of fire. Likewise, the order

ni zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / rgyu la bltos pa med pa ni yul 'ga' zhig kho na la yin gyi thams cad la ma yin zhing / dus 'ga' zhig tu yin gyi thams cad kyi tshe ma yin la / nas kyi sa bon la sogs pa rdzas 'ga' zhig la yin gyi thams cad la ma yin pa de lta bu / gang 'di yul dang dus dang rdzas nges pa de la mi rung ba'i phyir ro // nges pa yang de'i phyir yul la sogs pa la bltos nas yod pa ni rgyu dang ldan pa zhes bya bar rtogs so //; Sakai (2003: 7,9–14), where Sakai's reconstruction is in square brackets, and Inami *et. al* (1992: 41): *arthānām padārthānām svabhāvaniyama iti pravibhaktasvabhāvatvam. ākasmika ity ahetukaḥ. kasmān na yukta ity āha – anapekṣasyetyādi. hetunirapekṣasya kvacid eva deśe na sarvatra kvacit kāle na sarvadā kvacid dravye yavabījādaḥ na sarvatreti yo 'yaṃ <deśakāladravanyamāsa tasyāyogāt. niyamo 'pi tasm>ād deśādikam apekṣya bhavan hetumān iti gamyate.* “The ‘restriction of objects, i.e., entities, to [their] essential nature’ means that their essential nature is distinguished. ‘Accidental’ means causeless. Why is this incorrect? [The reason] is explained by ‘independent’ and so on. ‘Since spatiotemporal and substantial restriction’ means that [a thing] occurs at a particular place, not everywhere, at a particular time, not at every time, and in a certain substance like a barley seed, not in every [substance], [all that] is impossible with regard to that which is independent of cause. Therefore, it is known that the restriction also has a cause insofar as it occurs depending on place and so on.” Cf. also PVṬ D225b7f.: *yod pa nyid la yang bltos par mi rigs te / rtag pa dag ni gzhan gyis yod pa nyid du khas blangs pa nyid kyi phyir ro // de ni yod pa ma yin te / byas pa ma yin pa la yod pa nyid mi rung ba'i phyir ro // yod pa nyid thams cad ni yul dang dus ngos po la nges pa yin na rgyu med pa can nyid ni de la nges par mi rung ba'i phyir ro //; Sakai (2003: 9*,10–13) and Inami *et. al* (1992: 42): *<sattvam apy apekṣā na yujyate, nityānām pareṇa sat>tvenābhyupagatatvāt. naitad asti, akṛtakasya sattvāyogāt. sarvaṃ hi sattvaṃ deśakālavastupratiniyatam, ahetutve tanniyamāyogāt.* “It is not proper [to assert the impermanence of things] by resorting to the very nature of being existent, for the opponent admits that permanent things are existent. This is [however] not the case, because that which is not produced cannot have the nature of being existent, for every existent is determined in space, time and entity, whereas this restriction is impossible with regard to a causeless thing.”; HBT 77,1ff.: *akṛtakalakṣaṇaṃ tu sattvaṃ na sambhavaty eva, niyāmakaṃ hetum antareṇa deśakālasvabhāvaniyamāyogāt.* “However, an existence that has the characteristic of being unproduced never occurs, because a restriction of space, time and nature is impossible without a determining cause.”**

of letters (*varṇānukrama*) should manifest by itself without any basis if it did not depend on a person's conception.²⁴

This passage of PVSV is representative of the way in which Dharmakīrti repeatedly demonstrates the impossibility of causeless production by pointing to the lack of spatiotemporal restriction. In this last section of PV I, his central aim, it is true, is to disprove the Mīmāṃsaka's affirmation of pervasive, permanent and unproduced (i.e., non-artificial [*apauruṣeya*]) Vedic words consisting of letters (*varṇa*), sounds (*dhvani*), words (*śabda*), sentences (*vākya*), mantras and so on. In the end, however, Dharmakīrti seeks to establish the impermanence of all things, including Vedic scriptures.²⁵ And to do so, he negates the possibility of a permanent cause (*nityakāraṇa*) on account of its lack of spatiotemporal restriction, much in the way of Vasubandhu.

Still on the question of the order of letters, Dharmakīrti makes elsewhere (PV I 260ab) the following comment:

There is no [such thing as an] order [of letters depending on] place and time (*deśa-kālakrama*), since [the opponent] asserts [letters] to be pervasive and permanent (*vyāptinīyatva*).

Either the order of letters is made in terms of place, like [the order] in a row of ants, or it is made in terms of time, like [the order] between seeds and sprouts, etc. [But] these two kinds [of order] do not occur among [pervasive and permanent] letters.²⁶

Here, although the word "restriction" (*niyama*) does not occur, the passage strongly suggests that letters compose a word only if they are arranged in a certain order, which in spelling consists in being restricted to a specific place, while in speech it consists in being pronounced at a specific time. But if letters were pervasive and permanent, they would occur everywhere at every time, and thus it would be impossible for them to adopt the proper order required to make a word. This argument of course anticipates the two directions of the conclusion, namely that (1) a pervasive and permanent thing is causally inefficacious, and (2) the Vedic words are impermanent because they indeed consist of letters arranged in the proper order.

²⁴ PVSV 161,23–162,2 *ad* 307: *satīndhane dāhavr̥tter asaty abhāvād adṛṣṭendhano 'pi dahano nānīndhanas tasya deśakālanīyamāyogāt. nīyame ca tasyaivendhanatvād dahanopādānalakṣaṇatvād indhanasya. tathāyam api varṇānukramah puruṣavikalpaṃ yadi nāpekṣeta nirālambanaḥ svayaṃ prakāśeta.*

²⁵ See Yoshimizu (1999: 246 *infra*).

²⁶ PV I 260ab and PVSV 135,21ff.: *deśakālakramābhāvo vyāptinīyatvavarṇanāt / sā ceyam ānupūrvī varṇanām deśakṛtā vā syāt. yathā pipīlikānām paṅktau. kālakṛtā vā yathā bījāṅkurādīnām. sā dvividhāpi varṇeṣu na saṃbhavati.*

If one connects the above two conclusions with Dharmakīrti's definition of the real as being causally efficacious, one can easily establish the theory of impermanence or momentariness, according to which all existents are exclusively impermanent since a permanent thing, which lacks causal efficacy, does not exist in reality. This argument, though more refined, is similar to the one advanced by Vasubandhu to disprove the possibility of a permanent agent, although Dharmakīrti, in his proof of momentariness, in the end resorts to a refutation of gradual and simultaneous (*kramayaugapadya*) production.²⁷

3. Later interpreters on causal efficacy and spatiotemporal restriction

It is interesting to find that both Jñānaśrīmitra and his disciple, Ratnakīrti, who were active from the tenth to the eleventh centuries, also invoke the lack of spatiotemporal restriction to criticize the theistic position that a permanent God (*īśvara*) is the unique cause of the world. Their argument, it is true, takes on a new character in that it consists in a logical refutation of the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the property of being an effect (*kāryatva*) by the property of depending on a God who both exerts Himself and is intelligent. Yet, both authors clearly share Vasubandhu's position according to which (a) causal efficacy is exemplified by spatiotemporal restriction and (b) a permanent cause is unable to impose that restriction. The following discussion from Jñānaśrīmitra's *ĪV*, for instance, presupposes these ideas. Spatiotemporal restriction is presented here as a property pervading that of being an effect, so that whatever is an effect has spatiotemporal restriction:

[Objection:] A cause necessarily, and in every case, consists in a complex (*kalāpa*), and this [complex] is not in a confused state. [Now] if that which is united were to exist without a being who exerted himself (*prayatnavat*), it would be so permanently. The same can also be said about place. Accordingly, the same [absurd] consequence (*prasaṅga*) would follow that there would be no spatiotemporal restriction (*deśakālānīyama*). [Properties] such as being an effect cannot occur unless there is dependence on a consciousness (*caitanya*), i.e., [they cannot occur] when the [property] pervading (*vyāpaka*) [that of] being an effect of a causal complex (*kalāpakāryatva*) is absent; [these properties] are pervaded by [the property of] being dependent on a being who exerts himself.

[Reply:] If this being who exerts himself, too, were actually momentary and localized, every complex [capable of producing] an effect would [occupy] the very same moment and place [as he does]. Hence, a permanent being (*sanātana*) alone is to be acknowledged as pervading (*vyāpin*). Accordingly, the same [absurd consequence]

²⁷ See, e.g., Yoshimizu (1999).

that there is no spatiotemporal restriction (*deśakālāniyama*) now still holds. What [can be gained] from assuming this [being who exerts himself]?²⁸

At the end, Jñānaśrīmitra points out the inability of a permanent cause to restrict the arising of an effect to a particular place and time.

In his *ĪSD*, Ratnakīrti in turn adds a third factor of restriction (*niyama*) to place and time (*deśakāla*), namely, “essential nature” (*svabhāva*). Moreover, he identifies three properties as pervading that of being an effect: (1) having a restriction to a particular place, time and essential nature (*deśakālasvabhāvaniyama*), (2) having causes that are brought together on specific occasions (*kādā-citkakāraṇasannidhi*) and (3) arising from a causal complex (*sāmagrī*). His opponent, however, asserts that the existence of an intelligent cause further pervades these properties:

[Opponent:] How then can this unconscious being (*acetana*) properly bring [the causes] together? For us, indeed, [things] that are found in specific places such as a stick, etc., without the effort of a potter, are brought together only by virtue of a type of invisible entity. Alternatively, things occur as brought together in order to [produce] an effect. Therefore, it is established that there is a pervasion (*vyāpti*) by an intelligent being (*buddhimat*) of [the three properties, viz.,] spatiotemporal and essential restrictions (*deśakālasvabhāvaniyama*), causes being brought together on

²⁸ *ĪV* 279,16–22: *nanu kāraṇaṃ nāma sarvatra kalāpa eva, sa ca na vyagrāvasthāyām. tatsamḥitaś ca prayatnavantam antareṇa yadi syāt, nityam eva syāt. evaṃ deśe 'pi vāc-yam. tataś ca sa eva deśakālāniyamaprasaṅga** iti, caitanyanirapekṣatvena kalāpa-kāryatvasya vyāpakasyābhāvena kāryatvādayo 'sambhavantañ prayatnavadapekṣatvena vyāpyanta iti cet. evaṃ tarhi so 'pi prayatnavān yadi kṣaṇikaḥ prādeśikaś ca tatkṣaṇai-kadeśatvam eva sarvakāryagrāmasya syād iti sanātana evāṅgīkartavyo vyāpī ca. tataś ca sa eva deśakālāniyamo adyāpi prasakta iti kim asyopagamena. ** Emended in accordance with 279,12 and 21 : *deśakālāniyamaprasaṅga*. Cf. also *ĪV* 279,10–15 *ad PV* II 10*: *na hi prayatnopayogam antareṇāpi kāryajanmani sambhāvyaṃ bādha-kaṃ kiñcid ālocaṃ maḥ. tat kutas tatra niyamaḥ kāryādeḥ. atha kāladeśādyaniyama-prasaṅgo bādhaḥ. tad ayuktam, [yataḥ] pratiniyataśakter asarvakālabhāvinaḥ sva-kāraṇāyattasannidheḥ kāraṇadaśāviśeṣasya vyatireke 'pi vyatirekaḥ kāryasya sambha-van na prayatnavannāntariyakatvam upakalpayitum kalpate. sarvathā hetvanapekṣā-yāṃ tadbādhakam upapadyamānaṃ kāryasya hetumātरेṇa vyāptim sādhayet. na tu hetuviśeṣeṇa prayatnavatā.**

**PV* II 10: *sthitvāpravṛttisamsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādiṣu / iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte samśayo 'thavā //*. “With regard to [the logical reasons set forth by the opponents], such as an activity after a rest, having a particular configuration, and the accomplishment of a purpose, [the logical fault is obtained that they are] proving what is already established [by us], or [that the probandum] is not established in the example, or [that] doubt [remains about the logical reasons].” For an interpretation of this verse, see, e.g., Kanō (1991: 119ff.), Krasser (1999: 216ff.), and Krasser (2002: 33–40).

specific occasions (*kādācitkakāraṇasannidhi*), and there being causal complexes (*sāmagrī*). If these pervading [properties] are lacking when an intelligent being is absent, [the property of] being an effect [would also] be lacking. [Hence the property of being an effect] is pervaded by there being an anterior intelligent being (*buddhimatpūrvakatva*). That is to say, three [kinds of] non-cognition of a pervading [property] are set forth in order to establish the relation [between the pervading properties and those to be pervaded].

Likewise, it is not possible to suppose that one could dispense with an intelligent being and thus that an effect could have no cause (*ahetuka*) at all, for then it [would] follow that there would be no spatiotemporal and essential restrictions (*deśakālasvabhāvanīyamābhāva*), [i.e., there would be no effect]. Nor should it be suspected that [an effect] might occur solely from something other than an intelligent being, for it [would] follow [absurdly] that there would be no simultaneous arising [of various effects] either. And nor can it be the case that [an effect] occurs from another thing as well as from this [intelligent being], since it [would] follow that there would be no cause if the cause were not restricted, [i.e., determined].²⁹

Here, in order to demonstrate his general principle that every effect is caused by a conscious being,³⁰ i.e., that the property of having a conscious being as a cause pervades that of being an effect, the opponent appeals to the non-cognition of pervading properties of being an effect (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), thus relying upon a valid cognition which refutes that the logical reason inheres in a locus that lacks the property to be proven (viz., *sādhyaviparyayādhakapramāṇa*).³¹ His point is that the opposite of the property to be proven (*sādhyavipar-*

²⁹ ĪSD 40,32–41,8: *nanv ayam acetanaḥ katham yathāvat sannidhāpayet. no khalu kvacidavasthāni daṇḍādīni vinā kumbhakāraprayatnam adṛṣṭaviśeṣavaśād eva parasparam sannidhīyante. sannihitāni vā kāryāya prabhavantīti buddhimatā deśakālasvabhāvanīyamasya kādācitkakāraṇasannidheḥ sāmagryāś ca vyāptisiddhiḥ. buddhimadabhāve caiśāṃ vyāpakānāṃ nivr̥ttau nīvartamānaṃ kāryatvaṃ buddhimatpūrvakatvena vyāpyata iti pratibandhasiddhaye vyāpakānupalambhatrayam upanyastam. tathā ca na kāryaṃ buddhimatparityāgāt ahetukam eva bhavatīti sambhāvyam, deśakālasvabhāvanīyamābhāvaprasaṅgāt. nāpi buddhimato 'nyasmād eva bhavatīti śaṅkanīyam, sakṛd apy utpādābhāvaprasaṅgāt. na cānyasmād asmād api bhavatīti sambhāvyam, aniyatahetutve 'hetutvaprasaṅgāt.*

³⁰ See the logical proof found in ĪSD 32,16–20: *vivādādhyāsitam buddhimaddhetukam, kāryatvāt. yat kāryaṃ tad buddhimaddhetukam, yathā ghaṭaḥ. kāryaṃ cedam. tasmād buddhimaddhetukam iti.* “That which is under discussion has an intelligent being as [its] cause, because it is an effect. Whatever is an effect has an intelligent being as [its] cause, like a pot. That [which is under discussion] is also an effect. Therefore, it has an intelligent being as [its] cause.” On the various Naiyāyika logical proofs of the existence of God, see Kanō (1991).

³¹ Cf. ĪSD 40,25–30: *nanu bādhakapramāṇābhāvo 'siddhaḥ. tathā hīdaṃ kāryatvaṃ*

yaya), i.e., an unconscious cause, produces no effects, for it cannot make anything acquire the three properties that pervade every effect, i.e., spatiotemporal and essential restrictions, etc. Given this incapacity of unconscious causes, then on account of the non-cognition of the three pervading properties, it is ascertained that the property constituting the logical reason, i.e., being an effect, does not occur without a conscious cause. Moreover, the opponent also precludes the possibility of the causeless origination of an effect, invoking the same absurdity that there would again be no spatiotemporal or essential restrictions.

In his rejoinder, Ratnakīrti in turn focuses on rejecting the opponent's claim that the three properties of an effect presuppose a conscious cause like an intelligent being. Although he does not ascribe the inability to produce restrictions to the permanence of the intelligent being, nonetheless for him, too, it is true that the property of being an effect is pervaded by these three properties.³²

In this manner, Dharmakīrti's successors also retain the traditional theory of causality according to which the production of an effect takes place through spatiotemporal restriction.

yathā buddhimatā vyāptam iṣyate tathā deśakālasvabhāvanīyatatvenāpi, kādācitkakāraṇasannidhimattayāpi, sāmagrikāryatvenāpi vyāptam upalabdham. sa ca deśakālādīnīyamah kādācitkakāraṇasannidhiḥ sāmagrī vā buddhimatpūrvakā siddhā. yadi punar acetanāni cetanānadhiṣṭhitāni kāryaṃ kuryuḥ tato yatra kvacanāvasthitāni janayeyur iti na deśakālasvabhāvanīyataprasavaṃ kāryam upalabhyeta.

³² Cf. ĪSD 41,12–17: *sidhyaty evedaṃ manorājyaṃ yadi deśakālasvabhāvanīyamasya kādācitkakāraṇasannidheḥ sāmagryās ca buddhimatpūrvakatvena vyāptiḥ sidhyati. kevalam etad eva durāpam. buddhimadabhāve 'pi hi svahetubalasanmutpannasannidhe[h] pratīnīyatadeśakālasaktinā 'cetanenāpi sāmagrīlakṣaṇakāraṇaviśeṣeṇa kriyamānāni deśakālasvabhāvanīyamakādācitkakāraṇasannidhisāmagrikāryatvāni yujyanta iti sandigdhasiddhā vyāpakānupalabdhyah. 41,18–26: buddhimadabhāve samavadhānam eva kuta iti cet. tad api cetanānadhiṣṭhitayathoktācetanāsāmagrīviśeṣād eva. so 'pi tādrīśād ity anādyacetanasāmagrīparamparāto 'pi deśādīnīyamasambhāvanāyāṃ nāvāśyaṃ buddhimadapekṣā. ghaṭāder deśakālasvabhāvanīyamah kādācitkakāraṇasannidhiś ca, sāmagrī ca buddhimatpūrvakā dṛṣṭā ity aparō 'pi deśakālasvabhāvanīyamādis tathāveti cet. yady evaṃ ghaṭādikam api kāryaṃ bahuśo buddhimatpūrvakam upalabdham iti sarvam eva kāryaṃ tathāstu, kim anena vyāpakānu[pa]lambhopyāsadurvyasanena. ghaṭāder bahuśo buddhimatpūrvakatvadarsane 'pi na sarvatra kāryamātrasya tathābhāvanīścayaś cet. deśādīnīyamādīnām apīdam samānām iti katham atrāpi śaṅkāvyudāsaḥ.*

4. The individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) as being spatiotemporally restricted (*deśakālānīyata*)

Apart from the discussion of causation and causal efficacy, the concept of spatiotemporal restriction came to be assigned another function in the later tradition: the concept would later serve to define what constituted individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*). Indeed, while Ratnakīrti, for instance, spoke of such restrictions in the context of his critique of permanent causes, Mokṣākaragupta (12th cent.)³³ defined *svalakṣaṇa* as that which was restricted to a particular place, time and form. He wrote in his *Tarkabhāṣā*:

The [perception] has the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its object. The four types of perception (viz., *indriya-*, *manas-*, *svasaṃvedana-* and *yogiprayakṣa*) are to be understood as having individuals as their objects. The individual is the real entity's own nature [or the real entity itself] (*vastusvarūpa*) that is unique (*asādhāraṇa*) and restricted to a [particular] place, time and form [or appearance] (*deśakālākāranīyata*).³⁴

In addition to defining *svalakṣaṇa* in terms of spatiotemporal restriction, Mokṣākaragupta also introduced a third member to the compound *deśakālākāranīyata*, namely, *ākāra*, a term that refers to a defining feature which distinguishes one thing from all other things. This was typical of later Indian writers, who used a variety of terms to express the addition of a third (and fourth, etc.) restriction to those of place and time in their description of *svalakṣaṇa*.³⁵

Much later in Tibet, Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge (1429–1489), a great figure of the Sa skya pa sect, reiterated the same definition while commenting on PV III 2a. He wrote in his *bDe bdun rab gsal*:

By the statement “because of being similar and dissimilar” (*sadr̥śāsadr̥śa*) [found in PV III 2a,³⁶ Dharmakīrti] teaches the specific meaning-exclusion (i.e., meaning it-

³³ About his dates, see Kajiyama (1966: 6–11).

³⁴ TBh 21,8ff. (tr. Kajiyama 1966: 56): *tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam / tasya caturvidhasya pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇam viṣayo boddhavyaḥ / svalakṣaṇam ity asādhāraṇam vastusvarūpaṃ deśakālākāranīyatam /*. Cf. also TBh 13,15, where, in the same manner, *deśakālākāranīyata* is identified with *vastusvarūpa*.

³⁵ Within the framework of the theory of causality, words such as *svabhāva*, *dravya* or *vastu*, which all refer to the substantial existence of a produced effect, appear as the third member of the compound *deśakāla*^o, whereas in later discussions of the *svalakṣaṇa*, words expressing the uniqueness of its various attributes are preferred (e.g., *ākāra*, *vyakti*, *pratibhāsa*, *śakti*).

³⁶ PV III 1–2 (Tosaki 1979: 58f.): *mānaṃ dvividhaṃ viṣayadvaividhyāc chaktyaśakti-taḥ / arthakriyāyāṃ keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ // sadr̥śāsadr̥śatvāc ca viṣayā-*

self) of the individual (*rang mtshan*, *svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*spyi*, *sāmānya*), respectively. Hence, the definitions of these two are respectively [given as follows]: A “thing that does not share place, time and essential nature [with other things]” is the definition of an individual (*rang mtshan*) (*yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres pa*). A “superimposed [thing] that appears to share place, time and essential nature [with other things]” is the definition of a universal].³⁷

Go ram pa’s definition of *rang mtshan* (Skt. *svalakṣaṇa*) also seems to have been accepted by earlier Tibetans. In fact, the expression *yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres pa* is so well established among Tibetan scholars that one can hardly find a different formulation in their definitions of *rang mtshan*, despite the fact that there is no equivalent among Indian authors for the words *ma 'dres pa*, which mean “do not share” or “do not mix up.” Tracing the original source of this new formulation is a difficult task. PV III 2 aside, Dharmakīrti himself, it is true, often uses the expression “not mixed up” (*miś* or *saṃ-sṛj* for “mixed up”) to describe the essential uniqueness of the individual, but never in the sense of sharing or not sharing place and time. Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182–1251), in his auto-commentary to the *Rigs gter*, also speaks of the nature of individuals as being substances that do not mutually mix (*rdzas phan tshun ma 'dres pa*), but he does not also mention spatiotemporal location.³⁸

Although it is very unlikely that Mokṣākaragupta invented the definition of the *svalakṣaṇa* as *deśakālākāranīyata*, clear earlier sources have so far been untraceable. There is only one passage in the *apoha* section of PV I in which Dharmakīrti suggests that the *svalakṣaṇa* is restricted to a particular place, time and appearance:

viṣayatvataḥ / śabdasyānyanimitānām bhāve dhīśadasattvataḥ //. “There are two kinds of cognition, since objects are [divided into] two kinds according to whether they are capable or incapable of producing an effect. Hairs [appearing in a diseased eye-cognition] and the like are not objects [of cognition], since one fallaciously trusts them to be [real] objects. [The object is further divided into two kinds] according to whether it is similar or dissimilar [to others], whether it is the object of words or not, or whether its knowledge arises when there exist other causes and does not arise [unless there exist other causes, or its knowledge exists independently from other causes].”

³⁷ *sDe bdun rab gsal* 18a2: *'dra dang mi 'dra nyid phyir dang //* (PV III 2a) *zhes pas rang spyi gnyis kyi thun mong ma yin pa'i don ldog ston pas de gnyis kyi mtshan nyid rim bzhin / yul dus rang bzhin ma 'dres par gnas pa'i dngos po dang / yul dus rang bzhin thun mong par snang ba'i sgro btags so //*

³⁸ *Rigs gter rang 'grel ad Rigs gter* III 1: *rang gi mtshan nyid dang / gsal ba dang / dngos po dang / rdzas dang / log pa dang / don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun ma 'dres pa rgyu dang 'bras bur grub pa /*

It is also incorrect [to say] that the word that was earlier connected [with an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*)] can be applied later, because this [individual] does not pervade different places, times and individual appearances (*deśakālavaktibhedānāskandana*). Therefore, there is no verbal agreement with regard to the individual.³⁹

Here the word *vyakti* (individual appearance) is used as the third member of the compound *deśakāla*^o. The word *āskandana*, which is a derivative of the verb *āskand*, meaning “to invade” or “attack,” is to be interpreted as indicating a pervasion. So while Dharmakīrti is not directly defining the *svalakṣaṇa* as a thing which is restricted to a particular place and time, he is however claiming in this passage that the *svalakṣaṇa*, which is defined as the object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), cannot be the object of words, since a word refers to various things at the same time. In his HB, he similarly ascribes to the object of direct perception the property of being restricted to a particular place, time, essential nature and state (*deśakālasvabhāvāvasthāniyata*), although he does not explicitly use the word *svalakṣaṇa*.⁴⁰ Finally, the phrase *deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṣta*, which could be translated as “being distant or inaccessible with regard to place, time and essential nature,” is often used in PV I and NB II, albeit to refer to imperceptible entities.⁴¹

³⁹ PVSV 45,26–29 *ad* PV I 92: *na ca prākṛtasambandhasyaikatra svalakṣaṇe śabdasya paścād prayogo yuktaḥ. tasya deśakālavaktibhedānāskandanāt. tasmān na svalakṣaṇe samayaḥ.*

⁴⁰ HB 26*,12ff. (tr. Steinkellner 1967: 66f.): *taṃ ca deśakālasvabhāvāvasthāniyatam tadātmanopalabhamānā buddhis tathātvapracyutim asya vyavacchinatti. (yul dang dus dang ngo bo nyid dang gnas skabs su nges pa de blos de'i bdag nyid du dmigs pa na di'i de kho na nyid med pa rnam par gcod do //)* “Moreover, perceiving the [object] which is determined on a [particular] place, time, nature and state as having such a nature, the cognition excludes this [object's] losing [that] nature.”

⁴¹ PVSV 165,13–16 *ad* PV I 312–313: *atha kutaścid atīśayād buddhīndriyādīnām sa eva veti nāparaḥ. tasya kuto 'yam atīndriyajñānātiśayaḥ. tathānyo 'pi dṛṣṭā deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṣtānām arthānām kim asambhavī dṛṣṭaḥ.* “If [you say] for some reason that he (i.e., a Jaimini of the Mīmāṃsā school) alone, and nobody else, knows [the true meaning of the Veda] because of the superiority of [his] cognition, sense organs and so on, [then we ask] why does he have the superior ability to know the transcendental [meaning of the Veda]? Likewise, why do [you] consider that there can be no other person capable of seeing those objects that are remote (i.e., inaccessible) in terms of place, time and nature?” Cf. NB II 27: *anyathā cānupalabdihlakṣaṇaprāpteṣu deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṣteṣv artheṣv ātmapratyakṣanivṛtter abhāvaniścayābhāvāt //.* “For otherwise, in the case of things that are remote (i.e. inaccessible) in terms of space, time and nature, there [can be] no certainty about [their] absence when the characteristic of non-cognition applies, since the perception of [the things] themselves has ceased.” Cf. further PVin II 16*,12f.: *yul dang dus dang rang bzhin gyis bskal bas na*

Other possible sources of inspiration for the later definition of *svalakṣaṇa* may also be found in Śāntarakṣita's (8th cent.) *Tattvasaṃgraha* and Kamalaśīla's (8th cent.) commentary thereon, where both authors explain the uniqueness of individual things on the basis of their having different locations and features:

(TS 872) These essentially individual things (*vyaktyātman*) do not distribute [over each other] because of [their] mutually different forms due to differences of place, time, activity, ability, appearance, and so on (*deśakālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhedā*).⁴²

(TSP *ad* TS 42) In the same manner that iron bars are not mutually connected, these individuals (*vyakti*), like sound, do not distribute [over each other] since, being established in their own respective essential nature (*svasvabhāvavyavasthita*), they are different [from each other] with regard to place, time, ability, appearance and so on (*deśakālasaktipratibhāsādi*).⁴³

Here the list of characteristics that can be used to differentiate individuals from one another amounts to more than five, although these are all finally subsumed under each individual's essential nature (*svabhāva*). The concept of being established in one's own essential nature (*svasvabhāvavyavasthita*) can further be traced back to Dharmakīrti's PV I 40, which says:

Since all things by nature consist in their respective essential nature (*svasvabhāvavyavasthita*), they are distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous [things].⁴⁴

bskal ba ni nram pa gsum ste / de dag la ni mi dmigs pa'i go bar byed pa ma yin no //

⁴² TS 872 (*Śabdārthaparīkṣā*): *vyaktyātmāno 'nuyanty ete na paraspararūpataḥ / deśakālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhedataḥ //*

⁴³ TSP 48,14f. *ad* TS 42 (*Prakṛtiparīkṣā*): *yathā hy ayomayaḥ śalākāḥ parasparam asaṅgatās tadvad imāḥ śabdādivyaktayaḥ svasvabhāvavyavasthitatayā deśakālasaktipratibhāsādibhedān na parasparam anvāviśanti*. Cf. TS 42: *ayaḥśalākākalpā hi kramasaṅgamūrttayaḥ / dṛśyante vyaktayaḥ sarvā kalpanāmiśrītātmikā //*. “Like iron bars, all individuals are known to have a form connected with [temporal] phases and to have an essence intermingled with conception.”; and TSP 48,18ff.: *kathaṃ tarhi sat sad ityādi naikena rūpeṇa tathā 'sa evāyam' iti ca sthiraṇa svabhavenānugatā vyavasīyante bhāvāḥ, ity āha, kalpanāmiśrītātmikā iti*. “How then, on account of a single feature like ‘being existent,’ are things determined to follow an unchangeable nature in the way [advanced by the Sāṃkhya when they] say, ‘this is nothing but that’? [Answering this question] it is said: ‘having an essence intermingled with conception’.”

⁴⁴ PV I 40: *sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṃ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāgiṇaḥ //*

It is interesting to note that such dGe lugs pa scholars as rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po (1385–1438) included both the ideas of “not sharing characteristics” and “being established in one’s own essential nature” in their own definitions of the *svalakṣaṇa*, or *rang mtshan*, thus distinguishing themselves from their contemporary Sa skya pa colleague, Go ram pa.⁴⁵ According to mKhas grub, for example, *rang mtshan* is defined as follows:

In the [Sautrāntika’s] own system, the definition of *rang mtshan* is the thing (*ngos po*) which consists, without being conceptually imposed, but rather from its own side (*rang ngos nas*) [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature (*rang bzhin du gnas pa*, **svabhāvasthita*) uncommon [to other things] (*thun mong ma yin pa*, **asādhāraṇa*).⁴⁶

For mKhas grub and the dGe lugs pas in general, the fact of not sharing place, time and essential nature (*yul dus rang bzhin ma ’dres pa*) was therefore considered insufficient to define the *svalakṣaṇa*, for it did not point to its specific reality. Consequently, mKhas grub added the fact of “without being conceptually imposed, but rather from its own side” to the description, in order to indicate that rather than being virtual, the individual existence of the *svalakṣaṇa* is intrinsically established.⁴⁷

But while most dGe lugs pas did not focus on the restriction of place, time and essential nature in their definition of *rang mtshan*, they did devote several pages to explain this notion. mKhas grub, for example, elucidates the restriction to a particular place, time and nature as follows:

A pillar which [exists] in the morning does not exist in the afternoon. This is the meaning of “not sharing time” (*dus ma ’dres pa*). [...] A substance which touches [the earth to the] east does not touch [the earth to the] west. Such is the meaning of “not sharing place” (*yul ma ’dres pa*). [...] The nature which exists in a spotted cow

⁴⁵ The *sDe bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel*, ascribed to Tsong kha pa, gives, for instance, the same definition of the *svalakṣaṇa* as Go ram pa (3b6, see Yoshimizu 2000: 24). But this may be one of those cases where the tradition that was handed down ascribed an idea to Tsong kha pa that he did not truly hold, for this treatise is a collection of terms supposed to have been compiled for educational purposes. Dreyfus (1997: 116–117) has discussed the dGe lugs pa’s and Sa skya pa’s respective definitions of the *svalakṣaṇa*. Cf. also Yoshimizu 2004.

⁴⁶ *Yid kyi mun sel* 21b2f.: *rang lugs la / rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid rtog pas btags pa min par rang ngos nas thun mong ma yin pa’i rang bzhin du gnas pa’i ngos po’o //*. Other dGe lugs pas give a similar definition. Cf. Yoshimizu 2004: n. 9.

⁴⁷ For the details of the dGe lugs pa definition of *rang mtshan*, see Yoshimizu 2004.

does not exist in a brown cow. Such is the meaning of “not sharing nature” (*rang bzhin ma 'dres pa*).⁴⁸

As far as the restrictions of place and nature are concerned, we could say that mKhas grub's explanation coincides with our common sense, for it is well established that one and the same thing cannot exist at the same time in different places. It also cannot be the case that two things totally share their natures. A brown cow, for example, shares with other brown cows the nature of being a cow and of being brown, but its body has a different size, the tone of its voice is different, etc. The impossibility of sharing time, however, requires some further explanation. In my opinion, this is to be understood in accordance with the Sautrāntika theory of momentariness that whatever is existent is exclusively momentary. For indeed, if it is agreed that every existent arises and ceases at every single moment, one and the same thing cannot last for more than one moment. In the strictest sense, mKhas grub's example would therefore be inaccurate since we cannot speak of two different moments of a single pillar. But his example is understandable in a dGe lugs pa context, since, curiously enough, the dGe lugs pas accepted that moments had extension, construing them to be units of time like mornings and afternoons, or days and nights.⁴⁹ Another possible interpretation of mKhas grub's example could therefore be that a pillar in the morning refers to one unit of its continuum (*saṃtāna*), which is differentiated from that in the afternoon.

In this manner, all these later adoptions of the idea that an object's existence is restricted in terms of place, time and essential nature are aimed at giving the specific details of its individuality.

Dreyfus (1997) has previously drawn our attention to this definition of the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) by making the stimulating remark that Dharmakīrti considered the *svalakṣaṇa* to be real because it is an individual in the sense that it exists at a particular place and particular time, and that it has a determinate essence (*deśakālākāranīyata*).⁵⁰ As I have argued in my review article of his

⁴⁸ *Yid kyi mun sel* 33a1f.: *snga dro'i ka ba phyi dro med pa dus ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi / ... shar la reg pa'i rdzas des nub la ma reg pa lta bu / yul ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi / ... khra bo la yod pa'i rang bzhin de ser skya la med pa sogs / rang bzhin ma 'dres pa'i don yin gyi /*. Cf. also a parallel explanation in rGyal tshab's *Thar lam gsal byed* 45a1–4.

⁴⁹ Cf., e.g. *Yid kyi mun sel* 34b5ff., cited in Yoshimizu (2000: 18 n. 22), and the discussions in Tillemans (1995: 884) and Dreyfus (1997: 109–114).

⁵⁰ Dreyfus 1997: 69f.

book,⁵¹ for Dharmakīrti, the *svalakṣaṇa*'s restricted existence may account for its individuality in contrast with the pervading and permanent nature of the universal, but it guarantees its reality only under the condition that the individual is causally efficacious. And our investigation of the historical development of the notion of spatiotemporal restriction (*deśakālaniyama*) now enables us to explain how, because of its causal efficacy, the individual came to be identified with the real. In brief, we have: y') insofar as the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) itself is restricted by its cause to a particular place, time and essential nature, the individual has the causal efficacy to produce an effect through restricting that effect to a particular place, time and essential nature. Although later Tibetan interpreters scarcely pay attention in their discussion of causality to the Indian commitments to the idea of spatiotemporal restriction, this idea is originally not to be separated from that of causal efficacy.

5. Concluding analysis

I would conclude this study by proposing the following analysis of the Sautrāntika philosophical system. Given the theory of causality, the idea of spatiotemporal restriction then serves to positively establish the entire Sautrāntika system:

- 1) Whatever exists, occupying space and time, is produced (*kṛtaka*) or conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) by a cause, because spatiotemporal restriction is impossible without a cause.
- 2) A conditioned, individual and impermanent thing is able to produce an effect through restricting the effect to a particular place and time (*deśakālaniyama*) in accordance with its own spatiotemporal location. [=x', y' and z']
- 3) A pervasive and permanent thing, if it existed, could not produce an effect because it would be unable to restrict the effect to a particular place and time; this is because it would have no spatiotemporal location of its own.

From this theory of causality, one can derive the ontological distinction between the individual and the universal, and thus the theory of momentariness, in the following way:

- 1) Only the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) is causally efficacious (*arthakriyāsamartha*) and therefore ultimately real (*paramārthasat*). A pervasive and perma-

⁵¹ Yoshimizu 2003a.

ment thing such as the universal (*sāmānya*) is causally inefficacious and therefore not existent in reality (*asat*).

- 2) Because a pervasive and permanent or non-momentary thing does not exist in reality due to its lack of causal efficacy, all existents are exclusively impermanent (*anitya*) or momentary (*kṣaṇika*).

Abbreviations and Bibliography

- AK Vasubandhu. *Abhidharmakośa*. See AKBh.
- AKBh Vasubandhu. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Ed. P. Pradhan. Patna 1975 (Second edition).
- AKV Yaśomitra. *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. Ed. Wogihara Unrai. Tokyo 1932–1936.
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- ĪV Jñānaśrīmitra. *Īśvaravādādādhikāre vārttikasaptaślokīvyākhyāna in Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ*. Ed. A. Thakur. Patna 1987.
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- PVṬ Śākyabuddhi. *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*. D5718. See Inami *et al.* 1992 and Sakai 2003.
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