

## Two Types of Speech-Act Conditionals in Japanese\*

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### 1. Introduction

This article is concerned with what is referred to as *speech-act conditionals* (hereafter, SACs) in Japanese.<sup>1, 2</sup> Observe the following examples:<sup>3</sup>

- (1)           nanika    tabe-tai   nara, reizouko-ni   tabemono-ga   aru-wayo.  
 something eat-want   if   fridge-Loc   food-Nom   exist-Part  
 “If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.”
- (2)           kyoumi-ga   aru           nara iimasu   ga,   Ishida Junichi-no  
 interest-Nom   you-have   if   I tell you   but   Ishida Junichi-Gen  
 hommyou-wa   Ishida Taro   da.  
 real name-Top   Ishida Taro   Cop  
 “If you’re interested, I tell you Junichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.”

The sentences in (1) and (2) are examples of SACs in Japanese. These conditionals differ from “standard conditionals” in that the condition expressed is not a condition for the actualization of the action or state referred to in the main clause but a condition for the relevance of uttering the main clause. In other words, the *nara*-clauses do not show causal relations with the main clauses in the sense that the event or state described in the *nara*-clause does not cause the event or state described in the main clause. More specifically, the protasis (*nara*-clause) expresses the condition under which it is pragmatically relevant for the speaker to utter (and for the hearer to decode) the apodosis (main clause) (cf. Declerck and Reed (2001:320)).

A great number of studies have been concerned with Japanese conditionals.<sup>4</sup> However, almost all of them have not dealt with SACs as main topics. As a result, an interesting fact

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<sup>1</sup> The conditionals we refer to as SACs are called differently by different researchers: utterance conditionals (Declerck and Reed (2001), Haegeman (1984)), relevance-conditionals (Palmer (1974)), pseudo-conditionals (Sakahara (1985)), or speech-act conditionals (Dancygier (1998), Sweetser (1990)). I adopt Sweetser’s terminology as a cover term in this article.

<sup>2</sup> Although there are four kinds of conditional markers in Japanese (i.e. *nara*, *reba*, *tara*, and *to*), we focus our attention on *nara* except when the other markers are used in the previous studies quoted in this paper: as Tsunoda (2004, 2006) points out, *reba*, *tara*, and *to* are limited in their use as the indicator of speech-act conditionals.

<sup>3</sup> The abbreviations used in the glosses of examples are as follows: Acc=accusative case marker, Comp=complementizer, Cop=copula, Gen=genitive case marker, Hyp=hypothetical marker, Loc=locative case marker, Nom=nominative case marker, Part=sentence ending particle, Pol=politeness marker, Q=question morpheme, and Top=topic marker.

<sup>4</sup> For more details, see Arita (1993).

exemplified in (3) has been ignored:

- (3) \* kyoomi-ga aru nara, Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa IshidaTaro da.  
 “If you’re interested, Junichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.”

Example (3) is a counterpart of (2), where the verb *iimasu* ‘tell’ is omitted. The deletion of the verb makes the sentence ungrammatical. Sentence (1), on the other hand, is well-formed without the verb *iimasu*. Although a number of researchers (cf. Nakau (1994), Sakahara (1985), Tsubomoto (1993), and Tsunoda (2004)) recognize the discrepancy of the acceptability between (2) and (3), it has not been seriously dealt with.

The central purpose of this article is to shed light on the long-ignored phenomenon of speech-act conditionals in Japanese. In what follows, I will categorize SACs in Japanese into two types on the basis of the presence of verbs of communication such as *iu* or *iimasu*, and show that the phenomenon is relevant to a basic human cognitive ability and functions which the verbs of communication have.

This article is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews two representative previous studies relevant to SACs. Section 3 points out some problems with the previous studies mentioned in Section 2. Section 4 provides a solution based on a cognitive approach. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.

## 2. Representative Previous Studies

As mentioned above, a great number of researchers, including philosophers and logicians, have tackled various problems related to conditionals (Akatsuka (1985), Austin (1970), Comrie (1986), Dancygier (1998), Declerck and Reed (2001), Eilfort (1987), Haegeman (1984), Masuoka (ed.) (1993), Palmer (1974), Sakahara (1985), Sweetser (1990), and Tsunoda (2004), to name a few). However, to the best of my knowledge, many of them put their foci on the classification or typology of conditionals, and none of them points out the problem I lay out here.

In this section, I review Sweetser (1990) and Sakahara (1985); I take up the former as an introduction of the notion of speech act conditionals and the latter as a representative analysis of Japanese SACs.

### 2.1. Cognitive Domains and Conditionals

In this subsection, I take up Sweetser (1990).<sup>5</sup> She shows that ambiguity and semantic change of various expressions (verbs of perception, modals, and conjunctions) result from their

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<sup>5</sup> Note here that Sweetser puts her focus on English conditionals. However, this does not matter, because, as shown by Masuoka (ed.) (1993), her analysis can be applied to Japanese conditionals.

being interpreted in three cognitive domains: the content, epistemic, and speech-act domains.<sup>6</sup> She argues that the domains themselves are linked via a metaphor which motivates extensions of meaning from the physical into the mental and social domains (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980)). Bearing the three domains in mind, let us see the cases of conditionals in more detail below.

### 2.1.1. Content Domain Conditional

Let us begin the first domain: the content domain conditionals. The use of conditionals in the content domain is exemplified in (4):

- (4) If Mary goes, John will go. (Sweetser (1990:115))

As seen in (4), a conditional *if-then* conjunction indicates that the realization of the event or state of affairs described in the protasis is a sufficient condition for the realization of the event or the state of affairs described in the apodosis: the event of *Mary's going* will trigger the event of *John's going*. This type is a prototypical standard conditional in the sense that a causal relation is established or implied between the event (or state) described in the protasis and the one in the apodosis.

### 2.1.2. Epistemic Domain Conditional

Let us move on to the second domain: epistemic domain conditionals.

- (5) If she's divorced, (then) she's been married. (Sweetser (1990:116))

In the epistemic domain, a conditional *if-then* conjunction expresses the idea that knowledge of the hypothetical premise expressed in the protasis (i.e. *she's divorced*) would be a sufficient condition for the *conclusion* of the speaker expressed in the apodosis (i.e. *she's been married*). In this case, note that a causal link is not found between the events per se in that the event *she's divorced* does not cause the event *she's been married*; it is the speaker's knowledge of *her divorce* that draws the speaker's conclusion that *she's been married*. That is, a causal link is found at the epistemic level in that the speaker's knowledge enables him/her to draw a conclusion. In this sense, this type is a standard, not prototypical, conditional.

### 2.1.3. Speech-Act Domain Conditional (SAC)

Let us turn to the third domain: speech-act conditionals (SAC). Observe the following

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<sup>6</sup> Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) also present several domain levels similar to those of Sweetser's. Nakau presents three domains: D(iscourse)-modality, S(entence)-modality, and P(roposition) domain; Tsunoda, on the other hand, proposes five domains: phenomenal description, speaker's judgment, personal effect, basis of speaker's judgment, and premise to speech act. With regard to the details of their analyses, see Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) respectively.

example:<sup>7</sup>

- (6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them. (Sweetser (1990:119))

In this case, we cannot interpret that the state described in the *if*-clause (i.e. *you want them*) brings about the biscuits' existence on the sideboard. According to Sweetser, it should be interpreted as "If you want biscuits, then (let us consider that) *I inform* you that there are biscuits on the sideboard."<sup>8</sup> That is, what the protasis of this conditional denotes is not a condition for the actualization of the state described in the main clause (i.e. *there are biscuits on the sideboard*), but an introductory remark for the speaker's offer of the biscuits. Note here that the causal link between the protasis and the apodosis in (6) is established at a more abstract level: the conditional clause *if you want biscuits* justifies, not realizes, the speaker's offer of the biscuits on the sideboard.

It is worth noting that Sweetser recognizes that there are some variants of SACs. Observe the following examples:

- (7) a. If I may say so, that's a crazy idea. (Sweetser (1990:118))  
 b. If you went to the party, was John there? (Sweetser (1990:120))

According to Sweetser, sentence (7a) refers more overtly to the general felicity condition on the relevant class of speech acts, while (7b) refers implicitly to the general condition by referring overtly to some more specific felicity condition on the particular utterance (a sub-case of the general condition). Although she does not discuss this matter in detail, her comment is compatible with my view that there are subclasses in SACs.

## 2.2. Sakahara (1985): Pseudo-Conditionals

Let us turn our attention to our main topic, Japanese SACs. In this subsection, I take up Sakahara (1985), who deals comprehensively with various conditionals in Japanese. He refers to SACs as *pseudo-conditionals*, as mentioned in note 1. His definition of pseudo-conditionals can be summarized as follows:

- (8) A pseudo-conditional is a conditional which has the form '*if p then q*,' but does not have the logical structure ' $p \supset q$ ,' unlike standard conditionals.

Sakahara argues that what the main clause in pseudo-conditionals represents is not a conclusion drawn from the premise described in the protasis but an indicator to find out an implicit conclusion. By the term *indicator*, he refers to a kind of clues that lead us to the implicit conclusion. Consider the following example:

- (9) moshi onozomi-deshi tara, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga

<sup>7</sup> Example (6) is originally excerpted from Austin (1970).

<sup>8</sup> As we will see below, Sakahara (1985) gives a different interpretation to this example.

Hyp      want-Pol      if,      sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuits-Nom  
 ari-masu-yo.  
 be-Pol-Part      (Sakahara (1985:139))


Sentence (9) is a Japanese counterpart of (6). Sakahara claims that the main clause in (9) denotes the reason for the implicit conclusion (i.e. *tana-no ue-no bisuketto-o tabetemo ii-desu-yo* ‘you may have biscuits on the sideboard’), and that (9) can be paraphrased into a standard conditional as follows:

(10)      syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru kara, onozomi-deshi tara,  
 sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuits-Nom be because want-Pol      if  
 tabetemo ii-desu-yo  
 eat      may-Pol-Part  
 “Because there are biscuits on the sideboard, you may have them if you want them.”  
 (Sakahara (1985: 140))

In (10), the reason clause corresponds to the main clause of (9) and the implicit conclusion (i.e. *tabetemo ii-desu-yo* ‘you may have them’) is explicitly stated. According to Sakahara, the relationship between the logical structure of pseudo-conditionals and that of standard ones can be illustrated as follows:

(11)      Standard conditional: *if p, because r, q*  $\Leftrightarrow$  Pseudo-conditional: *if p, r*<sup>9</sup>

On the basis of (11), Sakahara argues that pseudo-conditionals are generated when the addresser deems that (i) the reason *r* for the (implicit) conclusion *q* is not yet known to the addressee and (ii) it is possible for the hearer to draw the (implicit) conclusion from the explicit *if*-clause (*p*) and the main clause (*r*). In (9), for instance, the speaker deems that the hearer does not know that there are biscuits on the sideboard. He/she also deems that the hearer can understand his/her intention to offer the biscuits without explicitly stating it. The process can be schematically demonstrated as follows:



(Sakahara (1985:144))

Sakahara treats SACs as a variant of standard conditionals. I agree with him in this point. However, as we will see below, not all SACs can be analyzed on this line.

<sup>9</sup> The letters *p, q, r* represent *condition, conclusion* and *reason*, respectively

### 3. Problems

This section points out a few problems with the previous studies mentioned in the last section. First, Sweetser (1990) focuses only on English conditionals. It follows that she does not even notice the presence of the issue I lay out here (i.e. (3)), because this phenomenon cannot be observed in English SACs. Observe the following pair:

- (13) a. If you're interested, Dick's coming to the party, too.  
 b. If you're interested, *it is worth telling you that* Dick's coming to the party, too.

(Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) [italics are mine])

Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) state that (13a) and (13b) can be paraphrased with each other. This paraphrase seems to reflect native speakers' intuition and indicates that English SACs are not significantly subject to the presence or absence of the phrases containing verbs of communication. Thus, as long as we concentrate on English conditional clauses, we might never notice that the presence or absence of verbs of communication can affect the grammaticality of Japanese SACs.

Second, Sakahara (1985) deals with the problem at issue only intuitively. Other researchers dealing with Japanese conditionals such as Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) do not notice the problem, either. Observe the following examples:

- (14) a. Your slip is showing, in case you are not aware of it.  
 b. okizuki denakereba *moushiagemasu* ga, shitaginosuso-ga  
 be-aware in-case-not *I tell you* (honorific) but slip-Nom  
 mietemasu-yo.  
 showing-Part

(Nakau (1994:106) [italics are mine])

- (15) a. If you were at the party, how's Harry these days?  
 b. paatii-ni deteita nara (*kiku kedo*), Harii-wa saikin  
 party-Loc attended if (*I ask you but*), Harry-Top these-days  
 dou shiteru-no.  
 how doing-Q.

(Tsunoda (2004:59) [italics are mine])

- (16) a. We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don't know.  
 b. \* anata-ga shira nai nara ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni  
 you-Nom know not if now we-Top Kyoto Station-Loc  
 orimasu.  
 are (Pol)

- c. anata-ga shira nai nara *iimasu ga*, ima wareware-wa  
 you-Nom know not if *I tell you but* now we-Top  
 kyoto eki-ni orimasu.  
 Kyoto Station-Loc are (Pol)

(Sakahara (1985:153-54) [italics are mine])

In (14)-(16), the b/c-sentences are Japanese counterparts of the a-sentences. Nakau and Tsunoda *intuitively* add the verbs of communication *moushiagemasu* ‘tell’ and *kiku* ‘ask’ respectively, but they do not mention this matter at all (this is the reason that I use the word *intuitively*). Sakahara, on the other hand, remarks that (16c) is much more preferable than (16b) as a translation of (16a). However, he does not mention the reason for the “preferableness” at all, either.

Third, there is a serious problem in Sakahara’s explanation: Sakahara’s mechanism presented in (12) does not always work properly. For example, none of the sentences in (14)-(16) can be generated, contrary to his expectation.<sup>10</sup> Observe the following:

- (17) \* anata-ga shira nai nara, ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu. (= (16b))  
 p: anata-ga shira nai nara ‘if you don’t know’  
 r: ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu ‘we are now at Kyoto Station’  
 q: ??

As stated in 2.2, Sakahara assumes that in the pseudo-conditional construction *p-nara, r* ‘if *p*, *r*,’ the main clause *r* is not a conclusion drawn from the condition *p*, but a reason (or a clue) for the implicit conclusion *q*. But, in this case, no matter how hard we may think, the statement *ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu* cannot be exploited as a clue to find the implicit conclusion *q*. What conclusion on earth does the statement lead us to?

It might be argued that the unacceptability of (17) can be accounted for by Sakahara’s mechanism. This is not the case, however: the problem cannot be resolved even if we complement the sentence with a phrase containing a verb of communication such as *iimasu ga*. Observe the following:

- (18) anata-ga shira nai nara *iimasu ga*, ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu.  
 (= (16c))  
 p: anata-ga shira nai nara ‘if you don’t know’  
 r: ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu ‘we are now at Kyoto Station’  
 q: *iimasu* ‘I tell you’

Apparently, the phrase *iimasu* is the implicit conclusion in that it is not realized in (17). In

<sup>10</sup> Although I take up Japanese examples (b/c-sentences in (14)-(16)) alone, the same is true of English examples (a-sentences).

addition, it is true that the state *anata-ga (ima iru basyo-o) shiranai* ‘you don’t know (where we are)’ causes the event *iimasu* ‘I tell you.’ Thus, it is possible to interpret the *q*-clause as an implicit conclusion drawn from the *p*-clause. Even so, however, the statement described in the *r*-clause cannot be interpreted as a reason for the implicit *q*:

- (19) \* *anata-ga shira nai nara, ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu kara, iimasu.*  
 “If you don’t know, *because we are now Kyoto Station*, I tell you.”

Rather, it is much better to interpret that *p* (*anata-ga shira nai*) is the reason for *q* (*iimasu*).

It is by now clear that Japanese SACs should be divided into two classes: one is the type that follows Sakahara’s mechanism and does not require verbs of communication, and the other is the type which does not follow the mechanism and obligatorily requires verbs of communication. Let us call them Type 1 SAC and Type 2 SAC respectively.

I admit that Sakahara’s mechanism works well in producing Type 1 SACs. However, it is not clear what motivates it. Put more specifically, his idea is plausible in that the main clause of Type 1 SACs is the manifestation of a reason for an implicit conclusion, but he does not clarify *why* the main clause *r* can serve as a clue to the implicit conclusion *q*. In addition, because Type 2 SACs, as well as Type 1 SACs, are treated as the pseudo-conditionals in his approach, it is not clear how they are produced and why they obligatorily require verbs of communication. In the next section, I will propose an alternative solution.

#### 4. Proposals


##### 4.1. Why Does the Apodosis of Type 1 SACs Function as a Clue?

In this subsection, I will clarify why the apodosis of Type 1 SACs can serve as a clue to find out an implicit conclusion. In other words, why can we properly interpret Type 1 SACs? I propose a solution based on a cognitive linguistic approach.

##### 4.1.1. Reference Points

To answer the question above, the notion of *reference point* (Langacker (1993)) should be introduced. The reference point is the cognitive ability to invoke the conception of one entity for purposes of establishing mental contact with another:

(20)



(Langacker (2008:84))



Figure (20) sketches essential aspects of the reference-point ability. The circled C represents the conceptualizer (i.e. language user), R is the reference point, and T the target (i.e. the entity that the conceptualizer uses the reference point to establish mental contact with). The dashed arrows indicate the mental path the conceptualizer follows in reaching the target. It should be noted that as the multiple dashed arrows from R show, a particular reference point affords potential access to many different targets. The ellipse labeled D is an abstract entity called dominion, which is defined as the conceptual region (or the set of entities) which a particular reference point directly accesses.

We can best appreciate this notion from a perceptual example. We often direct attention to a perceptually salient entity as a reference point to help find some other entity, which otherwise be hard to locate:

- (21) Do you see that boat out there in the lake? There's a duck swimming right next to it. (Langacker (2008:83))


In (21), the speaker wants to direct the hearer's attention to the duck, but from a distance the boat is easier to recognize. In this case, both the speaker and the hearer use the boat as a reference point to their real target (duck). This basic cognitive capacity can analogously be applied to the mechanism of the interpretation of Type 1 SACs.

#### 4.1.2. The Main Clause of a Type 1 SAC as a Reference Point

If we apply the notion of reference point to Type 1 SACs, we can expect that the main clause of a Type 1 SAC functions as a reference-point: we can access an implicit conclusion via the reference point. Consider the following:

- (22) *moshi onozomi-deshi tara, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga ari-masu-yo.* (=9)

As indicated in (10), (22) can be interpreted as "Because there are biscuits on the sideboard, you may have them if you want them." The relationship among the protasis (*p*), the apodosis (*r*) (explicitly stated reason), and the implicit conclusion (*q*) can be illustrated in (23):

- (23)
- |                                                                   |                                                                                                                    |                                                                          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>p</i> ( <i>moshi onozomideshi tara</i> )<br>"if you want them" |                                 | <i>q</i> ( <i>bisuketto-o tabetemo iidesuyo</i> )<br>"you may have them" |
|                                                                   | <i>r</i> ( <i>syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru (kara)</i> )<br>"(because) there are biscuits on the sideboard" |                                                                          |


In Figure (23), the bold arrow indicates the formation of standard conditionals: the conclusion *q* is directly drawn from the premise described in the protasis *p*. If this relation is manifested as a conditional construction, the output is like the following:

- (24) *moshi onozomi-deshi tara, bisuketto-o tabetemo iidesuyo.*

“If you want biscuits, you may have them.”

The arrow down to *r* indicates the formation of (22), and the dashed arrow denotes the mental access to the implicit conclusion *q*: the explicitly stated *r* is exploited to access the implicit conclusion of the reasoning process. In this case, the statement *r* serves as a reference point and the implicit conclusion *q* is a target:

(25)



As shown in (25), the conceptualizer *C* (addressee, in this case) understands or accesses the implicit conclusion, using the main clause as a reference point.

Note here that as mentioned above, a particular reference point may potentially access many different targets. In the case of (22), for example, the phrase *syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru* ‘there are biscuits on the sideboard’ does not always lead the addressee to the intended conclusion *bisuketto-o tabetemo iiddesu-yo* ‘you may have the biscuits’: in some cases, the addressee might infer that the addresser intends to ask the addressee to fetch the biscuits for other people, or that the addresser intends to show the addressee the package of the biscuits because its design is rare, etc. What is selected as a target largely depends on contexts and the concreteness of the statement in the protasis. We can say that contexts and the statement in the protasis help addressees limit the number of potential targets. For instance, the statement *onaka-ga suiteiru nara* ‘if you are hungry’ is more directly relevant to food than *moshi onozomi-deshi tara* ‘if you want’, and the former makes it easier for a hearer to evoke the eating act. If the addressee selects a false conclusion (from the addresser’s viewpoint) as a target, this communication will break down. This kind of breakdown is not unusual in our daily communication. In this sense, Type 1 SACs are founded on the common understanding between the addresser and the addressee.

We are now in a position to answer the question why we can properly interpret Type 1 SACs. The answer is summarized as follows:

(26) In Type 1 SACs, apodoses work as reference points to access implicit conclusions.

#### 4.2. *The Nature of Type 2 SACs in Japanese*

In this subsection, I will clarify the nature of Type 2 SACs. The case of Type 2 SACs is not as simple as that of Type 1 SACs in a sense. In what follows, I will develop my argument on the basis of the assumption that the mechanism that produces Type 2 SACs is the same as that of standard conditionals. As alluded to above, the main clause in Type 2 SACs does not work as a reference point of an implicit conclusion, and the state or event described in the protasis causes the speech act denoted by the communication verbs. In this sense, Type 2 SACs are closer to standard conditionals than to Type 1 SACs.

What differentiates Type 2 from standard conditionals is the fact that the main clause of Type 2 SACs is the reported clause of verbs of communication. In the following subsections, I will show that (i) Type 2 SACs behave like standard (i.e. content domain) conditionals in some respects, (ii) Japanese Type 2 SACs are syntactically divided into two conjuncts, and (iii) the apodosis of Type 2 SACs is *superficial* in that the real apodosis is a verb of communication.

##### 4.2.1. *Similarity of Type 2 SACs and Standard Conditionals*

In this subsection, I show that Type 2 SACs are similar to standard conditionals in the sense that they behave like standard conditionals in some respects. To clarify the nature of Type 2 SACs as standard conditionals, it is worth referring to some characteristics of standard conditionals here. First, as already mentioned, standard conditionals are “standard” in that certain causal relations can be grasped between the events or states described in their protases and the ones in their apodoses. For example:

(27)       oojisin-ga                   okiru   to   ie-ga           kowareru.  
big earthquake-Nom happen if houses-Nom break down  
“If a big earthquake happens, houses break down.”

(28)       Taro-ga    mainichi yorokonde kayotteiru nara, yojjuku           ni  
Taro-Nom everyday with joy go-to if good cram school Cop  
chigainai  
must  
“If Taro goes to the cram school with joy everyday, it must be good.”

Examples (27) and (28) are standard conditionals: the former is a content domain conditional and the latter is an epistemic domain conditional. They are standard in that they can be interpreted as “X causes Y”:

- (29) a. A big earthquake will cause houses to break down.  
b. The knowledge that Taro goes to the cram school every day with joy causes me to conclude that the cram school must be good.

(29a) is a counterpart of (27); in this case, a causal link is established between the event described in the protasis and the event described in the apodosis. On the other hand, in (29b), a counterpart of (28), a causal link is established at the epistemic level; that is, between the speaker's knowledge expressed in the protasis and his/her conclusion in the apodosis. In both cases, certain causal links can be found with relative ease.

A second characteristic of standard conditionals is that a phenomenon referred to as invited inference (cf. Geis and Zwicky (1971)) is observed. Invited inference is the phenomenon in which the conditional *if p then q* invites the converse inference *if not p then not q*. It is generally acknowledged that this phenomenon is observed in standard conditionals (cf. Sakahara (1985)). For example, the content domain conditional *if it rains, the road will be wet* invites the converse inference *if it does not rain, the road will not be wet*, and the epistemic domain conditional *if the road is wet, it rained yesterday* invites the converse inference *if the road is not wet, it did not rain yesterday*.

Now let us analyze Type 2 SACs in terms of the two characteristics mentioned above. Observe the following example:

(30)            *anata-ga shira nai nara iimasuga, ima wareware-wa kyoto eki-ni orimasu.*

(=(16c))

It should be noted that sentence (30) is ambiguous: it can be interpreted as both a content domain conditional and a speech-act domain conditional, depending on contexts. If the addresser is sure that the addressee does not know where they are, then (30) can be interpreted as a SAC. In this case, the protasis *anata-ga shira nai nara* 'if you don't know' completely loses its function as a condition, because the truth value of the statement is already assigned. That is, regardless of the realization of the state in the protasis, the speech act of giving information is carried out. On the other hand, if the addresser does not know whether or not the addressee knows where they are, and the addresser is in the habit of informing strangers of the place, then (30) can be interpreted as a content domain conditional.<sup>11</sup> In this case, the protasis can be construed as a condition for the event of addresser's giving information to the addressee: the addressee's ignorance *causes* the addresser to give the information. This is compatible with the first characteristic of standard conditionals in that Type 2 SACs can be represented in "X causes Y."

Furthermore, Type 2 SACs are in parallel with standard conditionals in that a phenomenon similar to the invited inference can be observed.<sup>12</sup> In the case of (30), it can be analogously

<sup>11</sup> A quite similar discussion is developed by Sakahara (1985:153), although he does not pay special attention to Type 2 SACs.

<sup>12</sup> As Sakahara (1985:140) points out, Type 1 SACs do not invite a converse inference. Observe the

inferred that the speaker gives the information if the hearer seems to want the information, whereas he/she does not give the information if the hearer does not (seem to) want the information: the converse inference *anata-ga shitte-iru nara iwa-nai* ‘if you know, I will not tell’ is obtained.<sup>13</sup> Note here that the invited inference in this case is established not between the *nara*-clause and the main clause, but between the *nara*-clause and the verb of communication. To put it more precisely, this phenomenon indicates that the true apodosis of Type 2 is not the main clause, but the communication verb *iimasu*, as will be shown in the next subsection.

To sum up, Japanese Type 2 SACs are similar to standard conditionals in terms of causality and invited inference. This nature of Type 2 SACs should be attributed to the presence of verbs of communication. In the next subsection, I will investigate the relationships among protases, verbs of communication, and apodoses in Type 2 SACs, and show why verbs of communication are obligatorily required.

#### 4.2.2. *Superficial Apodosis*

In this subsection, I will show that Japanese Type 2 SACs are syntactically divided into two conjuncts. It will also be shown that their true apodoses are not the main clauses but the verbs of communication, as alluded to in the last subsection. Let us observe the following pair:

- (31) a. \* *kyoomi-ga aru nara, Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa IshidaTaro da.* (= (3))  
 b. \* *kyoomi-ga aru nara, Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa*  
*interest-Nom you-have if Ishida Junichi-Gen real name-Top*  
*Ishida Taro da to ii-masu.*  
*Ishida Taro Cop Comp I tell you-Pol*

“If you’re interested, I tell you Junichi Ishida’s real name is Taro Ishida.”

(31a) is not acceptable because of the absence of a verb of communication such as *iimasu*, as repeatedly pointed out. Interestingly enough, (31b) is also unacceptable, although a verb

following pair:

- (i) *onozomi-deshi tara, syokkidana-no ueni bisuketto-ga ari-masu.*  
 (ii) \* *onozomide-nai nara, syokkidana-no ueni bisuketto-wa ari-masen.*  
 “There are not biscuits on the sideboard, if you don’t want them.”

The ill-formed example in (ii) is intended to be the converse inference of (i). The reason for the ill-formedness of (ii) is that there are still biscuits on the sideboard, even if the addressee does not want them. This indicates that, unlike standard conditionals and Type 2 SACs, the causal relation in Type 1 SACs is not realized on the surface level. Then, how is the causal relation in Type 1 SACs implied? As discussed in 4.1, the apodoses in Type 1 SACs serve as reference points, which allows “a chain of inference” (Declerck and Reed (2001:320)): the hearer of (i) infers, based on the statement in the apodosis, that he/she can have the biscuits. That is to say, we start our inference from the premise described in the protasis, passing through the apodosis as an intermediate step, and reach the implicit conclusion. In other words, in Type 1 SACs, the chain of inference indirectly guarantees a causal relation between the event or state in the protasis and the implicit conclusion.

<sup>13</sup> In this case, the speech act of giving information is cancelled.

denoting a speech act (i.e. *iimasu* ‘tell,’ an honorific form of *iu*) occurs in the unmarked (i.e. head-final) word order. Compare (31b) with (2), repeated here as (32):

(32)            *kyoumi-ga aru nara iimasu ga, Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa Ishida Taro da.*

The meanings conveyed by (31b) and (32) are identical, but (32) alone is a well-formed expression. It is clear that the difference in their acceptability is attributed to their syntactic forms, as illustrated below:

(33)            \* *kyoumi-ga aru nara, [VP[S' [S [Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa Ishida Taro da] to] iimasu].*

(34)            *kyoumi-ga aru nara [iimasu] ga, [S [Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa Ishida Taro da].*

As indicated in (33), the reported clause S of sentence (31b) is embedded in the VP. In (32), on the other hand, the reported clause S is syntactically independent from the verb *iimasu* in the *nara*-clause, as shown in (34). Note also that in sentence (32), the conjunction *ga* ‘but’ occurs. Conjunctions such as *ga* or *kedo* (see the gross in (15b)) are generally categorized as coordinate conjunctions and used to combine two independent clauses. Thus, the reported clause can be regarded as an independent clause rather than a subordinate clause. Given this, we can say that Type 2 SACs in Japanese are composed of three clauses like the following:<sup>14</sup>

(35)            [CS[<sub>CLAUSE-1</sub>kyoumi-ga aru nara] [<sub>CLAUSE-2</sub>iimasu]]-ga, [<sub>CLAUSE-3</sub>Ishida Junnichi-no hommyou-wa Ishida Taro da]

As illustrated in (35), the conditional sentence (CS) is completed at the verb *iimasu*, and the conjunction *ga* introduces the independent clause 3: it follows that the true apodosis of the *nara*-clause is not <sub>CLAUSE-3</sub>, but <sub>CLAUSE-2</sub>. Let us call such a fake main clause *superficial apodosis*.

If this is the case, it follows that what is directly related to the *nara*-clause is not the superficial apodosis, but the verb of communication *iimasu*. In fact, the following examples indicate that the presence of communication verbs is a crucial factor in the licensing of Type 2 SACs:

(36) a. \* *kyoumi-ga aru nara \_ (ga), Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa Ishida Taro da.*  
(→*iimasu* is eliminated)


b. *kyoumi-ga aru nara iimasu \_ . Ishida Junichi-no hommyou-wa Ishida Taro da.*  
(→*ga* is eliminated)

My claim that the superficial apodosis is an independent clause is corroborated by example (36b): in (36b), a pause (indicated by the period) is inserted between *iimasu* and its subsequent

<sup>14</sup> Here, I regard *iimasu* as a clause in which a subject and an object is omitted.

clause. In this case, the conjunction *ga* can be omitted. Comparing (36a) and (36b), we can conclude that in Type 2 SACs, verbs of communication are much more important than coordinate conjunctions such as *ga* or *kedo* to connect the *nara*-clause and the superficial apodosis.

The reason is that the superficial apodosis is the argument of the communication verb *iimasu*, and their relation is still strong, even if they are syntactically separated. The relation among a *nara*-clause, a verb of communication and a superficial apodosis can be illustrated as follows:



In (37), the phrase containing a verb of communication is referred to as *connector*, because it functions as a “bridge” which semantically connects the *nara*-clause and the superficial apodosis Y. As mentioned earlier, a causal link in Type 2 SACs is guaranteed by the *nara*-clause and the connector, while the semantic relation between the protasis and the superficial apodosis is established by the predicate-argument relationship between the connector and the superficial apodosis. Furthermore, the presence of the connector indicates that the subsequent clause is an indirect speech act (i.e. giving information to addressees). If the connector is omitted, no causal relation could be expressed, and no relation can be established between the protasis and the superficial apodosis, especially in the addressee’s mind: because the statement in the superficial apodosis is construed to be the effect or product of the speech act denoted by the communication verb, there is no direct relationship between the *nara*-clause and the superficial apodosis in the first place.

To sum up, a verb of communication serves as a connector relating a *nara*-clause with its superficial apodosis. In Type 2 SACs, causal links are established between verbs of communication and *nara*-clauses, while superficial apodoses establish themselves as indirect speech acts in terms of their predicate-argument relationships to the verbs. The presence of verbs of communication as connectors guarantees the relevance between *nara*-clauses and their main clauses.

#### 4.3. Why Do Type 2 SACs Not Allow the Unmarked Word Order?

There remains a problem to be solved: why should verbs of communication occur not after but before superficial apodoses? Unfortunately, we are not in a position to give any clear answer to this question. However, Shizawa (2008) analyzes such verbs as markers of *addressee-oriented expressions*, and claims that they must occur before superficial apodoses in

order to indicate that the superficial apodoses are *public expressions* (speech acts given to addressees).<sup>15</sup> Without them, the superficial apodoses are likely to be interpreted as *speaker-oriented expressions* (*private expressions*), which is not compatible with the addressee-oriented characteristics of SACs.

This view is quite compatible with Dancygier's (1998:91) comment that the protases of speech-act conditionals are stylistic devices meant to ensure appropriateness of what is communicated in their apodoses, often, not exclusively, by making them more polite. Furthermore, Tsubomoto (1993:122) states that in many cases, SACs are used as rhetorical expressions which represent the speaker's (or writer's) consideration for the hearer (or reader). In fact, the form *X-galkedo* 'X, but' is often used as an addressee-oriented expression, as in *sumimasen ga* 'Excuse me, but', *zannen desu ga* 'I regret to say', *kokodake no hanashi dakedo* 'between you and me', etc. Given this, it is expected that the *nara*-clause in Type 2 SACs has become a fixed, grammaticalized expression. However, I have to leave this matter for a future research, because there remain many aspects to be clarified.

#### 4.4. Summary

This section has chiefly tackled the following questions:

- (38) a. Why can apodosis of Type 1 SACs function as a clue to the implicit conclusion?  
 b. Why are verbs of communication required obligatorily in Type 2 SACs?

The respective answers to these questions are as follows:

- (39) a. The reference point ability enables us to use the apodosis as a reference point to access the implicit conclusion.  
 b. Verbs of communication have two functions: one is to guarantee the causal relations implied in Type 2 SACs; the other is to connect a *nara*-clause with its superficial apodosis to show clearly that the statement in the superficial apodosis is an indirect speech act (i.e. public expression).

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<sup>15</sup> The terms *addressee-oriented expression*, *public expression*, and *private expression* are excerpted from Hirose (1995). According to Hirose (1995:226), an addressee-oriented expression is defined as a linguistic expression that semantically presupposes the existence of an addressee; the concepts 'public expression' and 'private expression' refer to two different levels of linguistic expression which correspond to two different functions of language. The former is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the communicative function of language, whereas the latter is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language.



## 5. Conclusion

I have argued that speech-act conditionals (SACs) in Japanese must be classified into two types, Type 1 SACs and Type 2 SACs, on the basis of the presence of verbs of communication. It has been shown that in Type 1 SACs, which do not require verbs of communication, their apodoses serve as reference points to access implicit conclusions. On the other hand, Type 2 SACs obligatorily require verbs of communication to indicate that the statements in the main clauses (i.e. superficial apodoses) are indirect speech acts (i.e. public expression acts), and to relate the superficial apodoses to the protases.

One further remark is appropriate in closing. It is widely acknowledged that Japanese and Korean are similar in many respects. In fact, Korean counterparts of Type 2 SACs also obligatorily require verbs of communication. Observe the following examples in Korean:

- (40) a \* 혹시 알고 싶다면, 그의 본명은 킹이야.  
 hoksi algo siptamyeon, geue bonmyeongeun kingiya.  
 “If you want to know, his real name is King.”
- b 혹시 알고 싶다면 가르쳐 주겠는데, 그의  
 hoksi algo siptamyeon gareuchyeo zugeonneunde, geue  
 본명은 킹이야.  
 bonmyeongeun kingiya.  
 “If you want to know, I tell you his real name is King.”

Like Japanese Type 2 SACs, the phrase containing the verb of communication *gareuchyeo zugeonneunde* ‘I tell you, but’ must be added in the case of Korean Type 2 SACs. This fact alludes to the possibility that this phenomenon serves as a point of reference for linguistic typology.

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