

## Weighing the Fold

— Heidegger's Thought on Language — (1)

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*F: . . . für uns Heutige kann es zur Not werden, daß wir solche Gespräche vorbereiten, indem wir das Gesagte der früheren Denker eigens auslegen.*

*J: Was indessen leicht zur bloßen Beschäftigung herabsinken kann.*

*F: Dieser Gefahr begegnen wir, solange wir selbst bemüht sind, gesprächsweise zu denken.*

*J: Und dabei, wie man in Ihrer Sprache sagt, jedes Wort auf die Waagschale legen.*

*F: Vor allem aber prüfen, ob das Wort jeweils in seinem meist verborgenen vollen Gewicht ausgewogen wird.<sup>1</sup>*

The question of Being which underlies Heidegger's entire thought is approached in his later period through the question of language: the question of language constantly reappears in his thinking and becomes increasingly important. Heidegger writes in "The Turning," a lecture first given in 1949, "Language is the primal dimension within which man's essence is first able to correspond at all to

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<sup>1</sup> Inquirer : . . . for us today it may become a pressing need to prepare such conversations, by interpreting properly what earlier thinkers have said.

Japanese : Something that could easily degenerate into mere busywork.

I: That is a danger we stave off as long as we ourselves make an effort to think in dialogue.

J: And, as you say in your language, weigh each word.

I: But, above all, examine whether each word in each case is given its full-most often hidden weight.

Being and its claim, and, in corresponding, to belong to Being. *This primal corresponding*, expressly carried out, is *thinking* [*Dieses anfängliche Entsprechen*, eigens vollzogen, *ist das Denken*].<sup>2</sup> Indeed, as seen for example in the texts collected in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Heidegger's path of thinking turns into a repetitive movement which seeks to engage with the nature of language — with "the primal dimension" where the relation of man and Being is initially opened.

For Heidegger, the question of language is inseparable from that of Being. The question of language is not something that suddenly occurred to him in mid-career, but was already within his thinking from the beginning. For example, Heidegger says in "A Dialogue on Language" through the figure of the Inquirer that as early as 1915, the year in which he wrote his dissertation "Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Theory of Meaning," the question of Being and that of language in its relation to Being constituted the central theme of his thinking. Yet he adds that the fundamental theme, "Language and Being," stayed in the background in *Being and Time* which appeared in 1927. He says, "I only know one thing: reflection on language, and on Being, has determined my path of thinking from early on, therefore their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background."<sup>3</sup> He continues:

. . . it was all of twenty years after my doctoral dissertation that I dared discuss in a class the question of language [die Frage nach der Sprache zu erörtern]. It was at that same time that I, in class, made public my first interpretations of Hölderlin's hymns. In the summer semester of 1934, I offered a lecture series under the title, "Logic." In fact, however, it was a reflection on the *logos*, in which I was trying to find the nature of language [das Wesen der Sprache]. Yet it took nearly another ten years before I was able to say what I was thinking — the fitting word is still lacking even today. The prospect of the thinking that labors to answer [entsprechen]

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<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Die Technik und die Kehre*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1962, p. 40; *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Translated by W. Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, p. 93; *On the Way to Language*. Translated by P. Hertz and J. Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 7.

to the nature of language is still veiled, in all its vastness.<sup>4</sup>

Heidegger's path of thinking can be regarded as the movement of "the way to language." Language is here revealed as a secret which shows itself in concealing itself. Something constantly eludes his understanding and his speaking, as he says, ". . . the fitting word is still lacking today. The prospect of the thinking that labors to answer to the nature of language is still veiled, in all its vastness." But at the same time, precisely in its eluding movement, language induces and transforms Heidegger's thinking. It starts his thinking upon a way. Further, his words above indicate an almost insurmountable difficulty in "discussing the question of language," or in bringing forth a thinking which can correspond to "the nature of language" in all its vastness. And this difficulty is simultaneously the necessity, for his thought, of "discussing the question of language."

Now what does this difficulty in "discussing the question of language" or this necessity of discussing it point to? Why did the question of language appear as something unavoidable on the path of Heidegger's thinking?

If we think of the verb "discuss [erörtern]" in the phrase "discussing the question of language [die Frage nach der Sprache zu erörtern]," we see the meaning of this verb is linked to that of the site [Ort]. The meaning of the verb "discuss [erörtern]" is defined by Heidegger at the beginning of "Language in the Poem" as follows: it is "to point out the proper place or site [Ort] of something," "to heed that place or site," and to "ask for the location of the site." And "the site" here means "the gathering power." Heidegger says that the German word, "Ort" originally suggests "a place in which everything comes together, is concentrated": "The site, the gathering power, gathers in and preserves all it has gathered, not like an encapsulating shell but rather by penetrating with its light all it has gathered, and only thus releasing it into its own nature." Also "the site" means "the source of the movement-giving wave." It is also called "one single poetic statement." According to Heidegger, the measure of the greatness of the poet is found in the poet's relation to "the singleness" (i.e. "the site"): it is "the extent to which he becomes so committed to that singleness that he is able to

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 93; trans., p.8.

keep his poetic Saying wholly within it." Heidegger writes:

. . . every poem speaks from the whole of the one single statement [aus dem Ganzen des einen Gedichtes], and in each instance says that statement. From the site of the statement there rises the wave that in each instance moves his Saying as poetic saying [Dem Ort des Gedichtes entquillt die Woge, die jeweils das Sagen als ein dichtendes bewegt].

But that wave, far from leaving the site behind, in its rise causes all the movement of Saying to flow back to its ever more hidden source. The site of the poetic statement, source of the movement-giving wave, holds within it the hidden nature of what, from a metaphysical-aesthetic point of view, may at first appear to be rhythm.<sup>5</sup>

The site of "one single poetic statement" is the "source of the movement-giving wave." Like a single fabric, the wave folds and unfolds itself as the movement that originates from "one single poetic statement." So, for Heidegger, to "discuss the question of language [die Frage nach der Sprache zu erörtern]" means to "point out" the "site" of "one single poetic statement," the source of the movement-giving wave (i.e. the "gathering power" which resembles rhythm) and to "heed" it and "ask for the location of the site." In other words, to "discuss the question of language" is to "point out" the site of *Schwingung* (swinging, vacillation, oscillation, wave, vibration, leap), or rather the site as *Schwingung*, and to "heed" it and "ask for the location of the site"; in *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger defines language as *Schwingung*. And we could consider Heidegger's thought on language as an attempt to "discuss the question of language" understood in this sense.

My effort in this essay is to understand why "discussing the question of language" was necessary for Heidegger and how he tried to "discuss" it. In order to think of these questions, I try to pay attention to the essential link between the question of language and that of danger in Heidegger's later thinking and relate it to the importance of dialogue in his thinking.

The first part of the essay looks at Heidegger's reflection on language as well as the nature of his language itself.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 38; trans., p. 160.

In his reflection on language, Heidegger regards language as "the danger of all dangers." For he thinks that language (as *Schwingung*) reveals itself as the "event" of opening a history and, in the very movement of opening, conceals the "fact" that it opens a history. (That language opens a history does not simply mean that language, as the means to record a history that exists as a sequence of events, offers a historical presentation of the development of the world. For him, the opening of history means the opening of the history of Being, of the history of Western metaphysics or Western philosophy.) In other words, the reason why Heidegger thinks that language is "the danger of all dangers" is that language as *Schwingung* involves what he calls "destining [Geschick]" (which is the movement of the fold). Language "starts man upon a way" and simultaneously entraps or confines man in the determinate understanding of Being which moves in a predetermined "perspective." It "begins" the history of Being while concealing that very "beginning." Heidegger thinks that what took place at the "beginning" of the history of Western philosophy should be understood in terms of the "destining" of the fold, more precisely, what he calls "the decline of the *Zwiefalt*." In "Moira" Heidegger speaks of how at the "beginning" of Western thought, the unobserved decline of the *Zwiefalt* occurred, or the decline of the *Zwiefalt* imparted "a beginning" to the history of Western thought.

Thus, in Heidegger, understanding the nature of language is inseparable from understanding the history of Being, or the history of Western metaphysics. So when Heidegger says, "The prospect of the thinking that labors to answer to the nature of language is still veiled, in all its vastness," the "vastness" of the nature of language points to the vastness of the entire history of Western metaphysics. Heidegger's thought tries to fight with the entire history of Western thought while bearing and enduring the immeasurable "weight" of history which has continued for over two and a half millennia.

One could further say that Heidegger's thought on language is revealed in his language itself. His language performs the movement of *Schwingung*. It seeks to be the balance — the scene where the movement of *Schwingung* of the fold is staged, the scene where "the decline of the *Zwiefalt*" is disclosed. In other words, it becomes the scene where "as" is staged (danger *as* danger, language *as* language), that is, the "manner [Weise]" itself (i.e. the manner in which Being

unconceals itself) is staged.

The latter part of this essay presents a reading of Heidegger's text written in the form of a dialogue, "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer [Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden]." This work can be considered as a concrete realization of his thought which seeks to "show" danger hidden in language itself, that is, the movement of the *Schwingung* of the fold which is external to all representation.

All these aspects of Heidegger's thought seem to reveal his ceaseless fight with the enigma of the "weight." The "weight" here is that of the entire history of Western metaphysics. It is the "weight" of time, the "weight" of language, the "weight" of the relation, or the "weight" of the fold (the governance of moira). In a word, it is the "weight" of danger.

We could say that Heidegger fought with the enigma of the "weight" by trying to measure it in the balance that he tried to constitute with language (i.e. "Saying [Sage]"). This is inseparable from his attempt to "discuss the question of language" (pointing out the "site" of *Schwingung*); it is also inseparable from his attempt to "wait" for the "turning" of danger into "the saving power." It is only at the "site," in the *Schwingung* of the balance, that the enigma of the "weight" can be disclosed as the *Schwingung* of the fold. In other words, what is at stake in his thought is the possibility of "Saying [Sage]."

Heidegger's work, "A Dialogue on Language," can be read as the manifestation of his attempt to constitute language as the balance. With the dialogue, Heidegger tried to measure the enigma of the "weight," danger as such. That is to say, with language as the balance, he tried to measure the immeasurable, the "weight" of the fold. Or the *Schwingung* of the fold.

This dialogue hints at the necessity of constituting language as the balance. It is the necessity of refusing every measure, or the necessity of thinking at the point where all existing scales of measurement are refused. It is important to affirm this refusal which is essential to Heidegger's thought. But at the same time, we should be aware of the fact that this refusal contains within itself the possibility of danger. Heidegger's thought reveals the ironic possibility that a thought which seeks to avoid "danger" falls into another danger. In Heidegger's case, danger is found in his project for constituting language as the balance in

order to weigh the fold. Danger lies in his "pursuit of an occasion" to "build" language as the balance, in his pursuit of *Schwingung* as an occasion for the speaking of language.

### The Precinct of the Balance

In his reflection on language, we find Heidegger himself expressing the view that thinking is "building" a balance with language. The movement of "balance," for him, means the venture, the law, and weighing.

In *Identity and Difference*, Heidegger defines language as *Schwingung*. While depicting the event of appropriation [Er-eignis] as "that realm, vibrating within itself [der in sich schwingende Bereich], through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them," he speaks of the relation between thought and language and the relation between man and language as follows:

To think of appropriating as the event of appropriation means to build this self-vibrating realm [Das Ereignis als Er-eignis denken, heißt, am Bau dieses in sich schwingenden Bereiches bauen.] Thinking receives the tools [Bauzeug] for this self-suspended structure [Bau] from language. For language is the most delicate and thus the most susceptible vibration holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation [die Sprache ist die zarteste, aber auch die anfälligste, alles verhaltende Schwingung im schwebenden Bau des Ereignisses.] We dwell in the appropriation inasmuch as our active nature is given over to language.<sup>6</sup>

For Heidegger, thinking means building. But building here means not building a stable, securely-grounded structure, but building a self-vibrating or self-suspended structure. And language is *Bauzeug: Zeug* (material, cloth, tools) for building this self-suspended structure.<sup>7</sup> Language defined as *Bauzeug* is *Schwingung*: it is "the most delicate and thus the most susceptible vibration [*Schwingung*]"

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<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, p. 26; *Identity and Difference*. Translated by J. Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 38.

<sup>7</sup> We should note that, for Heidegger, language is not simply a tool. In "Hölderlin and the Essence

holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation." Language is understood as *Zeug* (the material, cloth, and tools for thinking). It is with this language as the *Schwingung* of the fold that one builds the self-vibrating, self-suspended structure. And this is called thinking in Heidegger.

We should note here that *Schwingung* is depicted as "alles verhaltende Schwingung." The verb "verhalten" means to hold, to keep, to hold back, to repress, check, etc. So we might think that *Schwingung* is the force that holds back destruction or dispersion, or keeps it in check. It is revealed as the ambiguity or tension between "slipping away of all beings" and "holding everything," between the opening of an abyss and founding the ground, or between "releasing" and "gathering." Thus *Schwingung* implies the paradoxical movement — the precarious balance or harmony produced and maintained by the force of destruction.

The view that language is the movement of *Schwingung* is essentially linked to the idea of "balance [Wage]" that Heidegger presents in "What Are Poets For?" (1946). In this text Heidegger holds that language is the precinct of the "balance." For example, he writes, "The element of the balance is the venture, the Being of beings. We have thought of language specifically as its precinct [Bezirk],<sup>8</sup> or "Language is the precinct (*templum*), that is, the house of

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of Poetry," Heidegger reads Hölderlin's line, "Therefore has language, most dangerous of possessions, been given to man . . . so that he may affirm what he is . . . [Darum ist der Güter Gefährlichstes, die Sprache dem Menschen gegeben . . . damit er zeuge, was er sei . . .]," and discusses the idea that language is the "most dangerous of possessions." Then he asks, "In what sense . . . is this most dangerous thing one of man's possessions?" According to him, the idea of "possession" does not mean that language is something that man owns as a tool and uses at his disposal. Heidegger writes, "Language is not a tool at his disposal [ein verfügbares Werkzeug], rather it is that event [Ereignis] which disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence." Language is the *Ereignis* that "disposes of" the supreme possibility of human existence. Heidegger also says, "Language is a possession [ein Gut] in a more fundamental sense. It is good for the fact that (i.e. it affords a guarantee that) man can exist historically." It is only by virtue of language at all that man affirms his historical existence. Martin Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1944, p. 40; *Existence and Being*. Translated by R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, Douglas Scott. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949, p. 300.

<sup>8</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950, p. 311; *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by A. Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 136.



Being,<sup>9</sup> Language, "the precinct of the balance," is exactly what Heidegger seeks to construct in his thinking. Now what is the nature of the balance that Heidegger tries to "build"?

In "What Are Poets For?" Heidegger presents the motif of the balance in his reflection on Being through a reading of Rilke's poem called "improvised verses." Heidegger pays attention to what Rilke calls "Nature" in the poem, and considers it as the ground of beings, that is, Being. Here Being is characterized as "the venture." Heidegger presents Being as that which releases all beings (man, plant, and animal) into risk and puts them at stake in the sense of *wager*. "Being lets beings loose into the daring venture. . . . Being is the venture pure and simple. It ventures us, us humans. It ventures the living beings."<sup>10</sup> And he sees Being (disclosed as "the venture") as the relation that releases the living beings into their own nature — "the relation of flinging loose." The motif of "the balance" appears in this context in which Being is thought of as "the venture" or as "the relation of flinging loose":

In the Middle Ages the word for balance, *die Wage*, still means about as much as hazard or risk [Gefahr]. This is the situation in which matters may turn out one way or the other. That is why the apparatus which moves by tipping one way or the other is called *die Wage*. It plays and balances out [Sie spielt und spielt sich ein]. The word *Wage*, in the sense of risk and as name of the apparatus, comes from *wägen*, *wegen*, to make a way, that is, to go, to be in motion. *Be-wägen* means to cause to be on the way and so to bring into motion: to shake or rock, *wiegen*. What rocks is said to do so because it is able to bring the balance, *Wage*, into the play of movement, this way or that. What rocks the balance weighs down; it has weight [Was wiegt, hat Gewicht]. To weigh or throw in the balance, as in the sense of *wager*, means to bring into the movement of the game, to throw into the scales, to release into risk [Wagen heißt: in den Gang des Spieles bringen, auf die Wage legen, in die Gefahr loslassen]. What is so ventured is, of course, unprotected; but because it

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 306; trans., p. 132.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 275-276; trans., pp.101-102.

hangs in the balance, it is retained in the venture. It is upheld. Its ground keeps it safely within it.<sup>11</sup>

Heidegger defines the word "Wage" in terms of risk/danger [Gefahr] and the play [Spiel]. And he associates this word "Wage" (balance) with such words as "wägen, wegen" (to make a way, that is, to go, to be in motion), "Be-wägen" (to cause to be on the way and so to bring into motion), and "wiegen" (to shake or rock). In this association, he suggests that the "balance" can be understood in the following three senses that are inseparable from each other. The "balance" is revealed as the "venture" (i.e. the "destining" or "the way-making movement" of the way); as "the gathering force of gravity"; as weighing and measuring.

First, the sense of risk/danger [Gefahr] in the word "balance" (i.e. "the situation in which matters may turn out one way or the other") is linked to the notion of "destining" or that of "the way-making movement" of the way which are important in his later thinking. The play of "the balance" designates the venture, the throw of a dice: it is releasing into danger, into unprotectedness, and at the same time, precisely because of this danger, being secure in the ground. And this releasing into the movement of play is also the movement of the way — "to cause to be on the way and so to bring into motion."

"The balance" is also characterized as the gathering force of gravity. Heidegger writes, "What rocks the balance weighs down; it has weight [Was wiegt, hat Gewicht]." Here "what rocks the balance" means Being. The "balance" is the manifestation of the gravity of Being. In the same text, Heidegger, quoting another poem by Rilke, "The Force of Gravity," depicts Being as the gathering force of gravity or as "the power that lends a weight" to beings. He presents "Being which holds all beings in the balance" as the force of the center which draws beings toward itself. This force of the center is at the same time that which withdraws from all beings and conceals itself in giving itself as the "gathering release." It is the all-mediating force of the venture which grounds beings by giving them a weight. It is "the unheard-of center of all daring." Heidegger writes, "The venture — the drawing and all-mediating center of beings — is the power that lends a weight, a gravity to the ventured beings." Also he

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 277; trans., p. 103.

says, "It is the ground as the 'medium' that holds one being to another in mediation and gathers everything in the play of the venture."<sup>12</sup>

This gathering force of the center as "the medium" corresponds to the idea of "the law," the *Ereignis*, presented in "The Way to Language." He says, "the *Ereignis*, though, is not law in the sense of a norm which hangs over our heads somewhere, it is not an ordinance which orders and regulates a course of events: the *Ereignis* is *the* law because it gathers mortals into the appropriateness of their nature and there holds them."<sup>13</sup> For Heidegger, "the balance" is "the law" not in the sense of a norm or regulation but in the sense of *Ereignis*, the appropriating event which gathers all beings by holding them in the balance. It is the gathering of "there is." It is the *Bezug*, an opening that makes the arrival of "something" possible, or the drawing force which secures the arrival of "something."<sup>14</sup> Thus "the balance" is the gathering force of the gravity, *the* law, the *Ereignis*, an opening that brings something from somewhere, secures it and makes it come.

The last sense of "the balance" is "to weigh or throw in the balance." "The balance" means the weighing or measuring movement of oscillation. Later in the text, Heidegger writes, "The balance is the manner in which Being ever and again weighs beings, that is, keeps them in the motion of weighing. [Die Wage ist die Weise, wie das Sein je und je das Seiende wiegt, d.h. in der Bewegung des Wagens hält]."<sup>15</sup> "The balance" is the "manner [Weise]"—the manner in which Being weighs and measures beings by shaking and rocking their ground. We might say that "weighing" in this sense implies weighing the immeasurable "weight" of the entire history of Western metaphysics which has continued for over two thousand years, the "weight" of the fold, the "weight" of time. And this

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 278; trans., pp. 104-105.

<sup>13</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 259; *On the Way to Language*, pp. 128-129.

<sup>14</sup> Heidegger writes, "To bring something from somewhere, to secure it, make it come—is the original meaning of the word *Bezug*, currently understood as meaning reference, or relation. The drawing which, as the venture, draws and touches all beings and keeps them drawing toward itself is the *Bezug*, the draft, pure and simple." Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*, pp. 278-279; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 105.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 309; trans., p. 134.

movement of measuring the "weight" of the history of Western metaphysics occurs only in shaking and rocking it, "deconstructing" it.

This movement of "the balance" (i.e. "the manner in which Being weighs and shakes beings") is a paradoxical movement in the sense that it measures the immeasurable — "the ontological difference between Being and beings." What is revealed in this measuring movement is the manner in which the abyss[Abgrund] discloses itself as the ground[Grund] of beings. What Heidegger calls "the fundamental attunement of anxiety" in "What is Metaphysics?" corresponds to the experience of "the balance" presented in "What Are Poets For?"<sup>16</sup> According to him, in anxiety the nothing unveils itself. The abyss unveils itself. And *Da-sein*, in hovering over the abyss, experiences the *Schwingung* (or the *Zwiefalt*) between the *Abgrund* and the *Grund*. Pure *Da-sein* exists as the "relation" to the "balance," if you will, the "balance" itself. In other words, in this experience of "the slipping away of beings," "beings as a whole" manifest themselves. Heidegger writes, "in anxiety the nothing is encountered at one with beings as a whole. What does this 'at one with' mean?" "At one with" is the movement of the *Zwiefalt*. What is encountered in *Unheimlichkeit* is the *Zwiefalt* of the nothing and beings as a whole (the *Zwiefalt* of Being and beings). The *Zwiefalt* is that which unfolds itself as the rift, or as no relation, no equality between the two. Yet at the same time, the two of the two-fold[Zwiefalt] are always one and the same. To put it in another way, the *Zwiefalt* is "the relation of the same with itself" or "the mediation within identity"

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<sup>16</sup> For Heidegger's discussion of the unsettling experience of "anxiety" in relation to the experience of *Unheimlichkeit*, see Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967, pp. 111-112; *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 88-89. In "In the Name of . . ." Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe holds that Heidegger's description of the experience of "anxiety" shows how *Unheimlichkeit* defines the "relation" to Being. Lacoue-Labarthe points out the paradoxical nature of the revelation of Being or of the nothing (i.e. of "the condition of possibility of the revelation of beings as such for the human *Dasein*"): "it is the revelation of the unrevealable, the presentation of the unrepresentable." He also discusses how the access to Being depropriates man absolutely: "The question of man is the *question* of the non-beingness of man." Further he observes that the revelation takes place there — "the pure *Da* of pure *Dasein* as it transcends beings or as it is 'outside' of beings," "the place without proper space, non-localisable as such." The *Da* signifies the finite transcendence of Being. We could say that the *Da* here corresponds to "the balance." Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *Retreating The Political*. Edited by Simon Sparks, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 64-66.

discussed in *Identity and Difference*.<sup>17</sup> So "the fundamental attunement of anxiety" is the experience of "at one with" as such (i.e. "the relation of the same with itself" or "the mediation within identity"), that is, the *Schwingung* of the balance. It is also the experience of "the essence of language," which in "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger describes as the experience in which one is deprived of speech. As Heidegger writes, "The sentence, "Language is language," leaves us to hover over an abyss as long as we endure what it says."<sup>18</sup>

Thus, Heidegger holds that language revealed as *Schwingung* is the precinct of the "balance." The "balance" means the venture (i.e. the destining and the way-making movement); the law (i.e. the *Ereignis*, the gathering force of "the medium"); weighing (i.e. the manner in which Being weighs and measures beings in shaking and rocking their ground). That is to say, language is the topos (or *Da*) where the *Schwingung* of the "balance" (the venture, the law, the weighing) is maintained and preserved. What is important here is that the topos itself is found in the movement of *Schwingung*. The *Schwingung* is not mere oscillation between two things, between two opposites, but an opening of an abyss, that is, an opening of "there is" as such. And Heidegger's attempt in his thinking is to

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<sup>17</sup> In "The Principle of Identity," Heidegger shows a transformation of thinking that the meaning of the title "The Principle of Identity [Der Satz der Identität]" would have undergone. It is a transformation from the principle as a statement about identity, to the principle as a leap into the essential origin of identity. In other words, this transformation is a leap from the doctrine of Western metaphysics which represents identity as a fundamental characteristic of Being, of the ground of beings, to a thinking that is always on the way to "the abode of the essential origin of identity." And Heidegger holds that we need to think of identity in terms of "mediation within identity." He writes, "The more fitting formulation of the principle of identity 'A=A' would accordingly mean not only that every A is itself the same; but rather that every A is itself the same with itself. Sameness implies the relation of 'with,' that is, a mediation, a connection, a synthesis: the unification into a unity [die Beziehung des <mit>, also eine Vermittlung, eine Verbindung, eine Synthesis: die Einung in eine Einheit]. This is why throughout the history of Western thought identity appears as unity. But that unity is by no means the stale emptiness of that which, in itself without relation, persists in monotony. However, to get to the point where the relationship of the same with itself — which prevails in that identity which was already implicitly present very early — emerges as the mediation in a decisive and characteristic way, and where an abode is found for this radiant emergence, of mediation within identity [dieses Hervorscheinen der Vermittlung innerhalb der Identität], Western thought required more than two thousand years." Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*. p.11; *Identity and Difference*. pp. 24-25.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 13; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 191. Also see *Wegmarken*, pp. 111-112; *Pathmarks*, pp. 88-89.

construct the precinct of the balance, the topos of *Schwingung*, or "there is."

### Most Dangerous of Possessions

The enigma of the "weight" that Heidegger seeks to weigh is revealed as "the essence of language" that Heidegger tries to experience in his thinking and calls "the danger of all dangers." It is significant that, for him, the "weight" appears as the "weight" of language itself.

In his 1936 lecture "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," Heidegger discusses five sayings of Hölderlin whom he considers as "the poet of the poet" because he thinks that Hölderlin's poetry was borne on by the poetic vocation to write of the essence of poetry. In this text which could be regarded as a dialogue between the poet and the thinker, Heidegger calls poetry "an act of firm foundation," and says that it brings men into a firm relation to Being. Poetry is an act of establishing "the permanent" by the word and in the word; for him, "the permanent" here does not mean the state of being fixed at one place permanently. On the contrary, it is the transitory itself. It is established only in the realm of Between, the realm between gods and men which is determined by the time of the gods that have fled and of the god that is coming — the realm which is based on "a double lack and a double Not: the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming." In other words, Heidegger thinks that poetry is an act of *grounding in the groundless*, and that Hölderlin is the poet who "holds his ground in the Nothing of this night."

It is in the context of this thinking that Heidegger interprets Hölderlin's line, "Therefore has language, most dangerous of possessions, been given to man . . . so that he may affirm what he is . . . [Darum ist der Güter Gefährlichstes, die Sprache dem Menschen gegeben . . . damit er zeuge, was er sei . . .]" which is the second saying among the five sayings. He writes:

It [Language] is the danger of all dangers, because it creates initially the possibility of a danger. Danger is the threat to Being from being. But now it is only by virtue of language at all that man is exposed to something manifest, which, as being, afflicts and inflames man in his existence, and as non-being deceives and disappoints. It is language which first creates the manifest site for menace and confusion to Being, and thus the possibility of

the loss of Being, that is to say--danger. But language is not only the danger of dangers, but necessarily conceals in itself a continual danger for itself.<sup>19</sup>

Danger is defined as "the threat to Being from being" and also as "the possibility of the loss of Being." This means that danger, as a "threat to Being from being," reveals itself as the possibility of the loss of the ground on which man firmly relates himself to Being, the ground which is given by poetry and in poetry. In other words, it is the possibility of the loss of the ground for human historical existence which is established as "a gift" of poetry, in brief, "the oblivion of Being."

Along with this sense of danger, we should note two points that Heidegger tries to make in the quoted passage. First Heidegger presents danger as what essentially belongs to language itself. He calls language "the danger of all dangers"; he thinks that language first creates the site of danger — the site of the loss of the ground on which man maintains a firm relation to Being — by concealing and dissimulating Being, by giving "there is." In the sentence "it is only by virtue of language at all that man is exposed to something manifest, which, as being, afflicts and inflames man in his existence, and as non-being deceives and disappoints" [Italics mine], the preposition "as" recalls the apophantical function of language in the mode of assertion, explained in Section 33 of *Being and Time*.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, Heidegger points out that language "necessarily conceals in itself a continual danger for itself." Language conceals in itself a continual possibility that

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<sup>19</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*, pp. 38-39; *Existence and Being*, p. 298.

<sup>20</sup> In Section 33 "Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation" Heidegger accounts for the derivative nature of assertion by explaining how "the primordial 'as' of an interpretation" is modified into "the apophantical 'as' of the assertion" in the mode of assertion. In this mode something "ready-to-hand" turns into something "present-at-hand" about which an assertion can be made. Heidegger observes, "As regards its possibilities for Articulation reference-relations, it [the 'as'] has been cut off from that significance which, as such, constitutes environmentality. The 'as' gets pushed back into the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand. It dwindles to the structure of just letting one see what is present-at-hand, and letting one see it in a definite way. This levelling of the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the 'as' with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion." Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, p. 158; *Being and Time*. Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962, pp. 200-201.

language conceals Being, that is a continual possibility that it no longer maintains its essence of establishing "the permanent" in the relation between man and Being. Thus the sense of language as "most dangerous of possessions" is understood in terms of double concealment of Being: language initially creates the possibility of danger itself, the possibility of "the oblivion of Being" itself. And at the same time, it conceals in itself a continual danger for itself: it conceals its own concealment of Being.

The language regarded as "most dangerous of possessions" above is clearly linked to the language of Western metaphysics in Heidegger's thinking. Toward the end of "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics" Heidegger says that the language of metaphysics gives us difficulty in our attempt to be "on the way," in our attempt to think. But he adds that only through this difficulty can we achieve "the step back [Schritt zurück]" out of metaphysics into the forgotten essence of metaphysics. According to Heidegger, this difficulty involves the word "is" without which Western languages do not exist and on which "the whole destiny of Being [ganze Geschick des Seins]" in the onto-theo-logical tradition of Western thought is based.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, in "Letter on Humanism," commenting on the reason why the third division of the first part of *Being and Time*, "Time and Being," was held back in the publication of the book, Heidegger writes, "The section in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics."<sup>22</sup> These instances do not simply mean that the language of metaphysics is not capable of expressing his thought properly, but that it is in the language of metaphysics itself that the difficulty in thinking lies. The language of metaphysics initially creates the possibility of a danger, and conceals in itself a continual danger for itself.

Thus, the enigma of the "weight," danger as such, is found in the weight of language, of language of Western metaphysics, of the word "is." Danger also appears in other places in Heidegger's thinking. For example, in "What Are

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<sup>21</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, pp. 65-66; *Identity and Difference*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>22</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Über den Humanismus*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1949, p. 19; *Basic Writings*. Edited by David Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 208.



Poets For?" (1946) it appears as "the abyss of the world" or "the age of the world's night." In "The Question Concerning Technology" (1955), it is experienced as "the essence of technology," "Ge-stell."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> "What Are Poets For?" describes danger in terms of "the abyss of the world." It is in this abyss that "a destitute time," an age of the default of God, hangs: the default of God is no longer recognized as a default, and the abyss is no longer recognized as an abyss. Heidegger presents the poet as a mortal being who "reaches into the abyss" and experiences and endures "the marks that the abyss remarks" as "the traces of the fugitive gods," thus recognizing that the abyss of Being re-marks itself as an abyss: the poet notices danger as a danger, the default of God as a default, and the concealment of Being as a concealment.

One could also say that "the abyss of the world" concerns the danger of the world which is no longer capable of seeing what predetermines and guides its understanding of reality, what Heidegger calls "the line of sight," "perspective," or "the track of fore-sight [Vorblickbahn]" in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*;. See *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, pp. 89-90; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 117. Man is immersed in the predetermined track or the pre-established measurement and becomes issueless. And in this "Versunkenheit" he is almost deprived of the ability to "move back and forth, to slip and slide along this track." Heidegger points out the difficulty in bringing "the track of fore-sight [Vorblickbahn]" to light—in bringing to light the fact that there is "the track of fore-sight" which sustains and guides all our understanding of Being, which makes possible an opening of meaning of the world, things, or the event. Indeed this fact is precisely what Heidegger thinks the poet has to "experience [erfahren]" in the abyss by "reaching into the abyss." So when Heidegger says, "In the age of the world's night, the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured. But for this it is necessary that there be those who reach into the abyss," experiencing and enduring the abyss of the world corresponds to experiencing and enduring "the track of fore-sight [Vorblickbahn]" or the fact that there is "the track of fore-sight." We could say that danger in this text, "the abyss of the world," points to the issuelessness of the world, "die Versunkenheit" in which "the track of fore-sight" (as what sustains our understanding of Being) is no longer experienced as such. In other words, the poet has to "see [sehen]" and "point out [zeigen]" "the marks that the abyss remarks," danger as danger. In brief, the poet has to experience the "weight" of the fold / danger / language.

The danger as "the abyss of the world" (or "die Versunkenheit") appears as "the essence of technology" in "The Question Concerning Technology," a lecture given in 1955. In this lecture, he calls the danger concealed in the essence of technology "the supreme danger" or "danger in the highest sense." And he finds in this danger the possibility of "turning" of man's relation to Being. It is important to note that this lecture seeks to show the essence of technology not in terms of "the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology" where technology is "a means and a human activity" but in terms of the "manner [Weise]" in which Being unconceals itself. In another text "The Turning" (1949) Heidegger presents the essential ambiguity of danger which manifests itself in the essence of technology. One the one hand, Ge-stell endangers man's relation to the unconcealment of Being; danger entraps the truth of Being with oblivion. On the other hand, danger conceals in itself the possibility of the arrival of the saving power [das Rettende]. And he regards language as the primal site where this essential ambiguity of danger and the saving power is preserved.

### Fold (Geschick)

Another way of speaking of the enigma of the "weight" would be to say that it is the "weight" of the movement of the fold. It is the "weight" of *Geschick*, "the destiny of Being." In other words, it is the "weight" of the essence of history, the governance of moira.

Speaking of "The Way to Language," the text where Heidegger holds that language itself opens only in *Brauch* ("usage"), Christopher Fynsk writes, "We must think all human activity from the limit of language itself, or rather, from that limit-relation that is the site of co-belonging of *Brauch* and *Ereignis*." He points out that "the site of co-belonging of *Brauch* and *Ereignis*" is our relation to language which might be signaled as "*the*" relation.<sup>24</sup>

"The site of co-belonging of *Brauch* and *Ereignis*," or "the limit of language" might be thought of in terms of the notion of the fold in Heidegger. The notion of the fold is discussed in such texts as "Moira," "A Dialogue on Language," *What is Called Thinking?*, and *Identity and Difference*. He does not always bring this term into the foreground. But, since the fold is essentially "the ontological difference between Being and beings," one could say that Heidegger's whole work essentially concerns this notion.

Also we could say that, in Heidegger, language essentially belongs to the movement of the fold: the *Schwingung* of "the balance," "an opening of meaning,"

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<sup>24</sup> Christopher Fynsk, "The Question of the Human (Geschlecht 1 bis)," forthcoming in a publication of the proceedings of the colloquium "Futures for Jacques Derrida" (ed. Richard Rand; Johns Hopkins University Press). For a discussion of "the limit of language" and "the site of co-belonging of *Brauch* and *Ereignis*," see "Free Use of the Proper" in *Language and Relation* where a rigorous reading of "The Way to Language" is presented with the discussion of the problematic of *Brauch*. Fynsk stresses that the problematic of *Brauch* is the problematic of freedom, and the problematic of human finitude: "The problematic of *Brauch*. . . is the problematic of freedom, but it starts from the 'fact' that language needs human speech as *Verlautbarung* (in the way that truth needs its setting-up through the earth). It is the problematic of finitude of the 'almost unthinkable' fact that truth cannot come about apart from human intervention: the daring, even exorbitant gesture of tracing a limit" (131). He also speaks of how "at the *limit* of language, thought as the relation between humankind and language—the *Brauch*—in and by which language is set under way in the movement of the *Wegformel*, Heidegger inscribes the body"; "Language does not come to language (*Die Sprache als die Sprache zur Sprache bringen*) except via the countering bodying of human speaking" (98). Christopher Fynsk, *Language and Relation: . . . that there is language*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 86-131.

or "the gathering force of the medium" belongs to the movement of the fold.<sup>25</sup> So to "discuss the question of language" means "to point out" the site of the fold or the site as the fold, to "heed" it and "ask for the location of the site."

The notion of the fold might be thought of in light of two fundamental notions of Heidegger's thought: destining [Geschick] and *Brauch*. "Moirai," the text which is devoted to the discussion of the fold, shows how the notion of the fold is inseparable from that of destining and that of *Brauch*.

In "Moirai," Heidegger presents his understanding of the fold by reading Parmenides' saying: "For thinking and Being are the same." This text begins by explaining how Western metaphysics has failed to experience Parmenides' saying "properly," in its original essence. He stresses the need for the "proper inquiry." According to the text, the "proper inquiry" involves not "advancing beyond the thought of Parmenides," but "reaching back into what must be thought more primordially." "What must be thought more primordially" here is the *Zwiefalt* of Being and beings. To be more precise, it is "the decline of the *Zwiefalt*" that occurred at the beginning of Western thought, that imparted "a beginning" to the history of Western thought.

Heidegger approaches Parmenides' notion of "moira" (which is inseparable from the unfolding of the fold) in terms of "the destining of Being."<sup>26</sup> In Section

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<sup>25</sup> Derrida also speaks of the fold as the medium, in discussing the fold in Mallarmé, but this medium is not linked to the gathering force of the center. He attends to the idea of "the medium of the hymen" which "outwits and undoes all ontologies, all philosophemes, all manner of dialectics" "at the edge of being." He writes, for example, "the hymen, the confusion between the present and the nonpresent. . . produces the effect of a medium . . . It is an operation that *both* sows confusion *between* opposites *and* stands *between* the opposites 'at once.' What counts here is the between, the in-between-ness of the hymen. The hymen 'takes place' in the 'inter-', in the spacing between desire and fulfillment, between perpetration and its recollection. But this medium of the *entre* has nothing to do with a center" (212). Jacques Derrida, "The Double Session" in *Dissemination*. Translated by Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981, pp. 173-286.

<sup>26</sup> In Heidegger the notion of "destining" is essentially linked to that of "danger." In "The Question Concerning Technology" "destining" is presented as danger — danger revealed as the essence of technology [Technik], "Ge-stell." Heidegger asserts that "The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such." The phrase "danger as such" shows that "destining" does not imply any particular danger that we can easily identify. In this text, "destining" is discussed in terms of the movement of "sending" or "starting upon a way"; it is defined as "sending-that-gathers which first starts man upon a way of revealing." See Martin Heidegger, *Die Technik und die Kehre*, p. 24;

VI of "Moira" Heidegger discusses the notion of "moira" as "the destining of "Being" in the sense of eon." Here he offers his reading of Parmenides' subordinate clause ( ". . . since Moira bound it (being) to be a whole and immovable" VIII, 37ff.):

Parmenides speaks of *έόν*, of the presencing (of what is present), and of *Zwiefalt*, and in no sense of "beings." He names the "*Μοίρα*, the apportionment [Zuteilung], which allots by bestowing and so unfolds the *Zwiefalt*. The apportionment dispenses [beschickt], (provides and presents) through the *Zwiefalt*. Apportionment is the dispensation of presencing, as the presencing of what is present, which is gathered in itself and therefore unfolds of itself. "*Μοίρα*" is the destining of "Being" [das Geschick des <Seins>], in the sense of *έόν*. Moira has dispensed the destiny of Being, *τό γε*, into the *Zwiefalt*, and thus has bound it to totality and immobility, from which and in which the presencing of what is present comes to pass.<sup>27</sup>

Heidegger thinks of moira (i.e. "the destining of 'Being'") as "the apportionment, which allots by bestowing and so unfolds the *Zwiefalt*." The apportionment means "the dispensation of presencing, as the presencing of what is present." We could understand moira as the unfolding movement of the *Zwiefalt* which, in the very unfolding, conceals its own duality and its unfolding. In this unfolding movement, moira has unfolded Being and bound it to totality and immobility,

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*The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, p. 24. We should also note that "The Questioning Concerning Technology" points out the link between "destining" and history as well as the link between "destining" and freedom. Heidegger asserts that "destining" determines "the essence of all history [das Wesen aller Geschichte]." He says that the representation of history is only made possible through "destining": "it is only the destining into objectifying representation that makes the historical accessible as an object for historiography, i.e. for science, and on this basis makes possible the current equating of the historical with that which is chronicled." *Ibid.*, p. 24; trans., p. 24.

<sup>27</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1954, pp. 243-244; *Early Greek Thinking*. Translated by David Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p. 97. Each section of "Moira" describes the fold as follows: I. the decline of the *Zwiefalt* which occurred at the beginning of Western thought, II. the fold as what is thought-worthy, what calls for thinking, III. the fold as the essence of language, "Saying," IV. the fold as the enigmatic reign of "the Same," V. the fold as *Brauch*, VI. the fold as moira, history, the destining of Being, VII. the fold as danger, the governance of moira.

while at the same time concealing this very unfolding, i.e. concealing the *Zwiefalt* of Being and beings, of presencing and what is present. The *Zwiefalt* always occurs as the self-concealing movement, and that unfolding always occurs as folding.

Then Heidegger holds that the question of "history" (in the context of thinking of "the history of Being") can be approached with adequate thoughtfulness only through "the destining of the *Zwiefalt*" or the unfolding of the *Zwiefalt* (i.e. "presencing of what is present: *Zwiefalt*"). Indeed he writes, "History is the destining of the *Zwiefalt*. It is the revealing, unfolding bestowal of luminous presencing in which what is present appears. The history of Being is never a sequence of events which Being traverses for itself."<sup>28</sup> Thus, in Heidegger, the notion of moira is inseparable from the notion of "history": they are both "the destining of the *Zwiefalt*." We should also note that the notion of "destining" is essentially linked to what he describes as "the line of sight" or "the track of fore-sight [Vorblickbahn]" in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*.<sup>29</sup>

In "Moira" Heidegger speaks of how at the beginning of Western thought, the unobserved decline of the *Zwiefalt* occurred, or the decline of the *Zwiefalt* imparted "a beginning" to the history of Western thought. In regard to Heidegger's thought concerning "the track of fore-sight," we could say that the decline of the *Zwiefalt* laid down "the track of foresight" in which "the determinate understanding of Being moves." This view fits the history of Western thought on language, which Heidegger sees as continuous over two and a half millennia. The essential hiddenness of the decline of the *Zwiefalt* has reined in Western thought on language.<sup>30</sup>

And this decline of the *Zwiefalt* is inseparable from the dispensation of

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 244; trans., p. 98.

<sup>29</sup> For a discussion of "the line of sight" or "the track of fore-sight [Vorblickbahn]," see Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 89; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 117.

<sup>30</sup> For instance, in "Language" Heidegger writes, "the idea of language in grammar and logic, philosophy of language and linguistics, has remained the same for two and a half millennia, although knowledge about language has progressively increased and changed." Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 15; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 193. According to him, what has remained common to varied perspectives on language can be summed up in the following three ideas: First, language is the expression of something internal. It is "audible utterance of inner emotions." Secondly,

"destining" of the *Zwiefalt*, that is to say, "moira." The "destining" here involves what Heidegger calls "danger," the oblivion of Being.

The last section of "Moira" speaks of the fold as danger, the governance of moira. It discusses how "the destining" abandons "what is unfolded in the *Zwiefalt*" to the "ordinary perception" of mortals. "It [ordinary perception] never perceives place [Ort], topos, as an abode, as what the *Zwiefalt* offers as a home to the presencing of what is present." We can regard "place, topos," and "abode" here as the movement of the fold as such. Heidegger says of moira that "the destining of the disclosure of the *Zwiefalt* yields what is present to the everyday perception of mortals." Then, calling it "a bold thought," he suggests that what he calls "this fateful yielding [dieses geschicklich Überlassen]" occurs because the

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language is human activity. We think that man speaks; we cannot say "language speaks." Finally, it is "a representation by image and by concept." According to Heidegger, these ideas about language, which are rooted in beginning of Western metaphysics, have remained the same in the development of Western thought and have dominated various theories about language. Yet Heidegger asserts that they ignore the speaking of language as such: ". . . despite their antiquity and despite their comprehensibility, they never bring us to language as language." *Ibid.*, p. 16; trans., p. 193.

In "The Nature of Language" Heidegger makes the same point in a different manner. He shows how the view of language represented by the sentence "Language is the tongue" (Heidegger also calls this view "the metaphysical-technological explanation" or "the physiological-physical explanation" of language) prevents us from experiencing the "physical" element of language—"the real nature of the sounds and the tones of speech." He thinks that in the Western tradition language has been grasped in terms of "something that is present" which is produced by "the activation of the organs of speech." See *Ibid.*, p. 203: *On The Way to Language*, p. 96. According to Heidegger, this understanding of language as the phonetic phenomenon of speech is derived from the Greek understanding of language, especially from Aristotle (the sign relation found in *On Interpretation*), which precedes the Biblical idea of language (found in the Acts of the Apostles, for example).

In the same text, he asserts the importance of experiencing "the physical element of language," "the real nature of the sounds and tones of speech" in light of melody and rhythm in language, or in light of "the kinship between song and speech" (not in physiological, technological, calculating terms). He writes, "It is just as much a property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, to hover and to tremble, as it is for the spoken words of language to carry a meaning [Daß die Sprache lautet und klingt und schwingt, schwebt und bebzt, ist ihr im selben Maße eigentümlich, wie daß ihr Gesprochenes einen Sinn hat.]" *Ibid.*, p. 205; trans., 98. Then Heidegger considers the sound of language, the sounding of the voice in terms of "its earthiness which is held with the harmony that attunes the regions of the world's structure." For example, speaking of Hölderlin's hymn "Germania," he says, "Language is the flower of the mouth. In language the earth blossoms toward the bloom of the sky." *Ibid.*, p. 206; trans., 99. Heidegger does not regard the mouth as merely an organ of the body, but as "part of the earth's flow and growth in which we mortals flourish, and from which we receive the soundness of our roots."

self-concealment "reigns [waltet]" at the heart of the disclosure of Being. What Heidegger tries to suggest here concerns the nature of the governance of moira (the destining of the disclosure of Being). The movement of the fold is essentially a self-concealing movement. It is a double concealment: it conceals its own concealment. It is danger. The nature of the governance of moira does not mean that the ordinary perception of mortals pays no attention to, or forgets the movement of the fold due to man's forgetfulness. Rather it means that the movement of the fold itself is the movement of double concealment. Danger does not reside in man's forgetfulness. Danger belongs to the unfolding movement of the fold itself.

"Moira" as "the destining of Being" (i.e. "the apportionment" which unfolds the *Zwiefalt*) corresponds to the "most dangerous possessions" of man that Heidegger discusses in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry." Language is the movement of the fold, which is to say, it is "the danger of all dangers": for the fold

In the first lecture of "The Way to Language," Heidegger repeats his description of Aristotle's theory of signs and briefly explains its transformation in Hellenistic times (the Stoa). While Aristotle determines the function of the sign in terms of "showing," bringing something to light, the Stoa considers the sign as "the instrument for a manner of designation by which man's mind is reset and directed from one object to another object." As in other texts, Heidegger holds that since the Classical Age language has been represented in terms of what is present, the articulated sounds of speech, and speaking has been considered as human activity. This view of language "remained basic and predominant through all the centuries of Western European thinking." According to Heidegger, this view reaches its peak in Wilhelm von Humboldt's reflections on language, in particular, in his treatise entitled "On the Diversity of the Structure of Human Language and its Influence on the Intellectual Development of Mankind." Heidegger thinks this treatise has influenced "the course of all subsequent philology and philosophy of language." Humboldt regards language as an activity (*energeia*) of the human subject: the word *energeia* is understood "in a wholly un-Greek sense — the sense of Leibniz's monadology as the activity of the subject." An activity of the human subject, of man, here means an intellectual effort, "an endeavor to offer a historical presentation of man's whole historical-spiritual development in its totality and yet also in its given individuality," that is, an endeavor to offer "a world." "A world" here indicates "that which the power of the subject develops by its labor and sets between itself and the objects." Thus language is conceived in light of its "formative power" which lies in human subjectivity — the power that forms a world view or a historical presentation of a world at any given time. After describing Humboldt's view of language, Heidegger claims that Humboldt's view, which is turned in the direction of man, does not reflect on language qua language: it does not reflect on "the manner in which language has being, that is, abides, that is, remains gathered in what language grants to itself, to its own idiom, as language [Die Weise, nach der die Sprache als die Sprache west, d.h. währt, d.h. in dem versammelt bleibt, was die Sprache in ihr Eigenes als die Sprache zu ihr selbst gewährt.]" Ibid., pp. 249-250; trans., p. 119.

is the movement of "the presencing of what is present," in other words, the opening of "there is" as such. But at the same time this movement of "presencing of what is present" is something that always conceals itself or withholds itself. It is the enigma. The "weight" of the fold.

### Fold (*legein*)

Then how does Heidegger fight with the "weight" of the fold ?

One possible response to this question is that he does so by "showing [*zeigen*]" it. The idea of "showing" here is linked to the sense of the fold as *legein*, that is to say, the notion of "Saying [*die Sage*]."

In Section III of "Moirā" Heidegger tries to understand Parmenides' saying, "thinking, which as something uttered is in being," and presents the fold as *legein* ("letting-lie-before [*das Vorliegenlassen*]"). When Heidegger speaks of "letting-lie-before" or "showing," it does not mean "showing" something present or something representable, but it means "showing" or "letting-lie-before" something unrepresentable or inconspicuous, something that always withdraws itself or conceals itself. In this sense, we could say that the notion of Saying as "showing" is based on the impossibility of "showing." We could also think that what is at stake in Heidegger's thought is the possibility of *legein* or Saying in thought, and that the possibility at stake is precisely what links "the question of Being" to "the question of language," both of which have determined his path of thinking from the beginning. Saying as "showing" here corresponds to "discussing the question of language," that is, "pointing out" the site of *Schwingung* (the site as *Schwingung*) and "heeding" it and "asking for the location of the site."

We can say that something unrepresentable or inconspicuous that *legein* "shows" is the movement of *Geschick* which appears as the *Schwingung* of the fold or the boundary of language. For example, "Moirā" presents the *Zwiefalt* in terms of the inconspicuous light — "the still light of the lighting that emanates from the *Zwiefalt*." Referring to what Parmenides says about "moira" in "his inconspicuous subordinate clause," Heidegger writes, "the play of the calling, brightening, expanding light is not actually visible. It shines imperceptibly [*Es scheint so unscheinbar*], like morning light upon the quiet splendor of lilies in a field or



roses in a garden.<sup>31</sup> The inconspicuous light is the light in which the presencing of what is present comes to pass. It is the light of the unfolding of the *Zwiefalt*. "The Way to Language" describes the *Ereignis* as "the most inconspicuous of inconspicuous phenomena": "The *Ereignis* assembles the design of Saying and unfolds it into the structure of manifold Showing. It is itself the most inconspicuous of inconspicuous phenomena [das Unscheinbarste des Unscheinbaren], the simplest of simplicities, the nearest of the near, and the farthest of the far in which we mortals spend our lives."<sup>32</sup> "Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking" characterizes "the occasion," "the course of the conversation" as inconspicuous. The figure of Scholar says in the conversation, "the occasion [der Anlaß] is as inconspicuous as the silent course of a conversation [der lautlose Gang eines Gespräches] that moves us."<sup>33</sup> Thus Heidegger repeats the word "inconspicuous" in various different manners in his writing. But he is pointing to the same thing, which is, the fold as *Geschick* — the withholding movement of the fold, the *Schwingung* of the fold (i.e. "the Same"). Further he suggests that if the movement of the fold can be "shown," it occurs only in an inconspicuous manner. Yet at the same time, it occurs in a manner that is excessively powerful.<sup>34</sup> The inconspicuous manner always strikes us as the excessively powerful manner in Heidegger.

The notion of the fold understood as *legein* ("letting-lie-before") is very important in Heidegger, for he thinks that the fold as *legein* is the site where thinking rests. In Section III of "Moirai," he approaches the saying ("thinking, which as something uttered is in being") by asking, "where does thinking (*noein*) belong?" and writes, "Noeiv, taking-heed-of, and what it takes up, are something said, something brought forward into view. But where?" Heidegger

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<sup>31</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, pp. 243-245; *Early Greek Thinking*, pp. 96-98.

<sup>32</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 259; *On the Way to Language*, p. 128.

<sup>33</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, p. 44; *Discourse on Thinking*. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row, 1966, p. 70.

<sup>34</sup> For example, Heidegger writes, "where the Being of beings appears, most early and most authentically in Western thought — with Parmenides — there speaks to auto, that which is identical, in a way that is almost too powerful." Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, p. 14; *Identity and Difference*, p. 27.

thinks that it is "in the *Zwiefalt* of presencing and what is present." He thinks that "the *Zwiefalt* of presencing and what is present" is the topos of thinking, of *noein*. Here Heidegger distinguishes his understanding of Parmenides' saying from a view that considers thinking merely as something expressed in an utterance, in an utterance which is found in spoken conversation or in written characters, in some sort of sensibly perceptible entities. Heidegger then asks, "To what extent can and must "voeiv, thinking, come to light in the *Zwiefalt*?" He says, "To the extent that the unfolding in the *Zwiefalt* of presencing and present beings invokes "λέγειν, letting-lie-before, and with the released letting-lie of what lies before us, grants "voeiv" something it can take heed of and thus preserve." The unfolding in the *Zwiefalt* invokes *legein*, i.e. Saying, "letting-lie-before" and "bringing-forward-into-view."

Thus *legein* is presented as the site where thinking rests: "Noeiv . . . is grounded in and comes to presence from λέγειν." Also we could say that *legein*, Saying, is regarded as the movement in which "letting-lie-before" of "the unfolding in the *Zwiefalt* of presencing and what is present" (i.e. "letting-lie-before" of what is present in its presencing) occurs. In other words, *legein* is the site where the movement of the fold as *Geschick* is disclosed, or "the decline of the *Zwiefalt*" is disclosed.

Heidegger's later work on language (e.g. "Language," "The Nature of Language," and "The Way to Language") could be approached from this point of view. In his later work on language, Heidegger repetitively returns to what underlies various thoughts on language in Western metaphysics. One might be able to see this gesture as an attempt to "show" the movement of the fold as *Geschick*, or to "point out" "the decline of the *Zwiefalt*." It might look as if the underlying effort in his later work on language were to present a comparison between the traditional view of language which still persists and a new view of language, that is, a comparison between language understood as the activation of the organs of speech and language "experienced" as Saying. However, I would like to suggest that Heidegger's fundamental concern is not to give a contrast or comparison, but to "show" that what look like two separate views on language are both, in fact, the unfolding of the fold and belong to "the destining [Geschick] of the *Zwiefalt*."

Heidegger also shows how the fold as *legein*, Saying as "showing" exists as the relation of *Brauch* in which the speaking of language "requires" or "makes use of" human speaking. For instance, in "The Way to Language," he discusses how Saying is the movement that makes a way for language ("the peculiar property of language" or the "monologue" character of language) to reach human speaking. Heidegger begins the text by listening to "the mystery of language." He listens to some words of Novalis from a text entitled *Monologue*; Heidegger thinks that the title points to "the mystery of language": "language speaks solely with itself alone. [Sie spricht einzig und einsam mit sich selber.]" Novalis's words that Heidegger cites are: "The peculiar property of language, namely that language is concerned exclusively with itself — precisely that is known to no one. [Gerade das Eigentümliche der Sprache, daß sie sich bloß um sich selbst bekümmert, weiß keiner.]" At the end of the text, Heidegger returns to these words of Novalis, and criticizes Novalis's view by saying that "Novalis understands that peculiarity in the meaning of the particularity which distinguishes language." Novalis's understanding of the monologue character of language is determined dialectically, in terms of subjectivity. And it is based on the absolute idealism. Heidegger argues that "the peculiar property of language" or its monologue character needs to be grasped in light of the *Ereignis*, owning and appropriating. And he adds that "The monologue character of the nature of language finds its structure in the disclosing design of Saying. [Der monologische Charakter des Sprachwesens hat sein Gefüge in dem Aufriß der Sage]."<sup>35</sup> Thus contrasting his understanding of "monologue" with that of Novalis, he continues:

But language *is* monologue. This now says two things: it is language *alone* [allein] which speaks authentically; and language speaks *lonesomely* [einsam]. Yet only he can be lonesome who is not alone, if "not alone" means not apart, singular, without any rapports. But it is precisely the absence in the lonesome of something in common which persists as the most binding bond *with* it. The "some" in lonesome is the Gothic *sama*,

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<sup>35</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 265; *On the Way to Language*, p. 134. Concerning "the design [Aufriß]," see *Ibid.*, p. 252; trans., p. 121. For a description of "Saying [die Sage]," see *Ibid.*, p. 257; trans., p. 126.

the Greek *hama*, and the English *same*. "Lonesome" means: the same in what unites that which belongs together. Saying that shows makes the way for language to reach human speaking [Die zeigende Sage be-wägt die Sprache zum Sprechen des Menschen]. Saying is in need of being voiced in the word [Die Sage braucht das Verlauten im Wort]. But man is capable of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to Saying, listens to Saying, so that in resaying it he may be able to say a word. That needed usage and this resaying [Nachsagen] lie in that absence of something in common which is neither a mere defect nor indeed anything negative at all.<sup>36</sup>

Saying is revealed as the way itself: "Saying that shows makes the way for language to reach human speaking. Saying is in need of being voiced in the word. [Die zeigende Sage be-wägt die Sprache zum Sprechen des Menschen. Die Sage braucht das Verlauten im Wort.]" It is the way-making movement which makes the way for "the monologue character of the nature of language" (i.e. "the peculiar property of language," "the peal of stillness") to reach human speaking (i.e. to be voiced in the word). The "way-making" here does not mean "to move something up or down a path that is already there." It means "to bring the way . . . forth first of all, and thus to be the way." In other words, Saying is the mediation, the *Gefüge* between the two while at the same time "the absence of something in common"; as Heidegger says, "it is precisely the absence in the lonesome of something in common which persists as the most binding bond *with* it." We could say that Saying, the way, is the movement of the fold as *legen*, especially in this context, the *Zwiefalt* of the speaking of language and man's speaking or resaying [Nachsagen]. Saying is the *Zwiefalt*— one in two, monologue *and* dialogue, the relation of "the same" with itself, "the between," the binding bond and the sheer separation.

Saying as "showing," the fold as *legen*, is indistinguishable from the relation of *Brauch*. The paradoxical nature of *Brauch* between truth and man is described in "A Conversation on a Country Path": truth is independent of man, yet at the same time it needs man. Truth can be independently via the human that has a relation

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266; trans., p. 134.

to it. We see the same manner of belonging-together here. Language is independent of man's speaking ("it is language *alone* which speaks authentically"), and yet it needs man's speaking ("language speaks *lonely*. . . 'Lonesome' means: the same in what unites that which belongs together."). Language's independence from human speech is possible by way of human speech, man's responding to the speaking of language, man's "resaying"; language *needs* to be voiced in the word. That is to say, language *needs* the site where it *alone* speaks "authentically,"—the *scene* where it "shows" itself in the most inconspicuous manner.

### The Scene of Violence

The fold as *legein*, language as the balance that Heidegger's thought "requires," appears as "the scene of violence." It is the rift, the breach, the "between." This "scene of violence" is always what withdraws itself. It shows itself only in an inconspicuous manner. As Heidegger writes, "With its saying, thinking lays inconspicuous furrows in language. They are still more inconspicuous than the furrows that the farmer, slow of step, draws through the field."<sup>37</sup>

In Heidegger Saying as "showing" is often associated with the notions of "Riß" and "Aufriß."<sup>38</sup> "Showing" is tearing up, cutting a trace, or opening up the inside in order to let appear something hidden, something external to all representation. It is also concerned with "cutting a furrow into the soil to open it to seed and growth." "Riß" or "Aufriß" shows the temporality of a leap. "Riß" or "Aufriß," an inconspicuous furrow cut into the soil, already contains what is to come inside it.

The notion of Saying as "showing" (i.e. tearing up, cutting a furrow) involves that of violence. Violence here has nothing to do with our customary idea of violence or mere brutality. We can think of violence in terms of the reciprocal confrontation between *dikē* and *technē* discussed in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*;

<sup>37</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Über den Humanismus*, p. 54; *Basic Writings*, p. 242.

<sup>38</sup> For a discussion of *Aufriß*, see Jacques Derrida, "Le retrait de la métaphore," *PO&SIE*, no 7, 1978, pp. 121-126; "The Retrait of Metaphor," trans. F.Gasdnier et al., *Enclitic*, 2, no. 2, 1978, pp. 27-33. Derrida holds that the performative of writing by which Heidegger names *Aufriß*, the trenchant decision to call *Aufriß* what was in a certain way still unnamed or unknown under its name is already in itself an incision, *Aufriß*.

in this text, Heidegger shows how the essence of being human appears as the scene of violence. Heidegger defines the essence of man in terms of violence: man is understood as the scene of violence, of the reciprocal confrontation between *dikē* and *technē*. The scene of violence here indicates the *polis*, the event of the *Zwischen-fall*, or the scene of the breach in which history opens up. Man discloses himself as the scene where the unfolding of the *Zwiefalt* is disclosed.<sup>39</sup> We could say that Saying as "showing" concerns the same sense of violence. In fact, it is possible to read Heidegger's remarks about the essence of man with the word "man" substituted for "Saying."

As discussed earlier, the notion of Saying as "showing," as the scene of violence, is inseparable from the notion of *Brauch* in Heidegger. In the relation of *Brauch* (the relation in which, to put it simply, Being needs *Da*), man is essentially *Da-sein*, *Da*, the scene where the overpowering power of Being is disclosed.

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<sup>39</sup> In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger discusses the *Unheimlich* essence of human nature through the ambiguity of the Greek word *deinon*. See *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, pp. 114-115; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 149-150. According to him, on the one hand, *deinon* means "the terrible" in the sense of overpowering power [Waltens]. On the other hand, it means "the powerful" in the sense of the violent one who uses power: he is violent "insofar as the use of power is the basic trait of not only of his action but also of his *Dasein*." The first sense of *deinon*, overpowering power, compels "panic fear," and "silent awe that vibrates with its own rhythm" (this sense of *deinon* is inseparable from the notion of *Schwingung* of Being). Heidegger writes, "Where it irrupts, it *can* hold its overpowering power in check. Yet this does not make it more innocuous, but *still* more terrible and remote." Holding the overpowering power in check makes the power still more terrible and remote. We can note here that holding the power in check indicates the extreme tension between stillness and violence, and that this tension itself is the overpowering power. To put it another way, the overpowering power is the simultaneity of its irruption *and* its holding itself in check. It is the silent force of *Schwingung*. It is the terrible.

Heidegger depicts the conflict between two senses of the *deinon* (i.e. *dikē* and *technē*) as the conflict in which the essence of man, the *deinotaton* of the *deinon*, the strangest of the strange, discloses itself. The Greek word *dikē*, the overpowering, means "Fug" in respect to its domination; "Fug" is not "justice" taken in a juridical, moral sense. "Fug" first signifies "joint and framework [Fuge und Gefüge]," then "decree, dispensation, a directive that the overpowering imposes on its reign," finally "the governing structure [das fùgende Gefùge] which compels adaptation [Einfügung] and compliance [Sichfügen]. The Greek word *technē*, the violent, means "knowledge," which is described as "the initial and persistent looking out beyond what is given at any time," and also "the ability to put into work the Being of any particular being." In this sense, the work of art was called *technē* by the Greeks. Art is "what most immediately brings Being (i.e. the appearing that stands there in itself) to stand, stabilizes it in something present (the work)." A work of art "brings about

In Section V of "Moirā," Heidegger talks about the notion of *Brauch* in terms of the relation between the *Zwiefalt* and thinking — the relation in which the *Zwiefalt* requires thinking. He writes:

In one respect thinking is outside the *Zwiefalt* toward which it makes its way, required by and responding to it. In another respect, this very "making its way toward . . ." remains within the *Zwiefalt*, which is never simply an indifferently represented distinction between Being and beings, but rather comes to presence from the revealing unfolding. It is this unfolding that, as Ἀλήθεια, bestows on every presencing the light in which something present can appear. But disclosure, while it bestows the lighting of presencing, at the same time needs a letting-lie-before and a taking-up-into-perception [ein vorliegen-Lassen und Vernehmen braucht]

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[er-wirkt] Being in a being; it brings about the phenomenon in which the emerging power, *physis*, comes to shine [scheinen]." In brief, *technē* is "the ability, pure and simple, to accomplish, to put-into-the-work [ins-Werk-setzen]," or "a manifesting realization [Erwirken] of Being in being." Heidegger writes, "This superior, realizing opening and keeping open is knowledge. The passion of knowledge is inquiry. Art is knowledge and therefore *technē*." Thus *technē* is essentially linked to violence [Gewalt-tätigkeit], "the use of power [Gewalt-brauchen] against the overpowering [Über-wältigende]" — the violence that "wrests Being from concealment into the manifest as the being." Heidegger believes that it is in the very confrontation between *dikē* and *technē*, i.e. between two senses of *deinon*, that the essence of man, *das Unheimlichste*, is actualized and is present as history. See *Ibid.*, p. 123; trans., pp. 160-161.

We could say that this reciprocal confrontation [wechselweise Gegenüber] between *dikē* and *technē* belongs to the movement of the *Zwiefalt*: *dikē* and *technē* are not two separate beings. (Indeed Heidegger later writes, speaking of the reciprocal relation between *dikē* and *technē*, "we now maintain that the bond between *noein* [apprehension] and *einai* [Being] stated in the maxim of Parmenides is nothing other than this relation." As we have seen in "Moirā," the bond between *noein* and *einai* found in Parmenides' maxim is the *Zwiefalt*). Thus, man is the scene of this confrontation between *dikē* and *technē*. The scene of violence. He is the *Zwiefalt* between the two senses of *deinon*. Also he is the bond between *noein* and *einai*.

The scene of violence also appears as *polis*, as "the place and scene of history." Man is "to be posited as the breach." "To be historical" means to be posited as the breach, the rift, the *Zwiefalt*, where the confrontation between *dikē* (the overpowering emerging power of Being) and *technē* occurs and history opens up. Man is forced into a violent *Dasein*, the site where violence shatters against Being. See *Ibid.*, p. 124; trans. pp., 162-163.

Being requires [braucht] "a place, a scene of disclosure." And man is used by this need, or responds to "the necessity of disaster." He becomes "a place, a scene of disclosure" of Being. Man is posited as "the breach into which the preponderant power of Being bursts in its appearing." Only insofar as man remains as the scene of disclosure of Being in being posited as the breach, does he reveal himself as "the *Dasein* of historical man." See *Ibid.*, p. 125; trans., p. 164.

if what is present is to appear, and by this need binds thinking to its belonging-together with the *Zwiefalt*. Therefore by no means is there somewhere and somehow something present outside the *Zwiefalt*.<sup>40</sup>

The passage shows the relation of *Brauch* in which the *Zwiefalt* needs and makes use of Saying (a letting-lie-before) and thinking (a taking-up-into-perception). It is the relation in which the *Zwiefalt* requires the scene of its disclosure. This relation can be compared to Heidegger's understanding of the *Zwiefalt* and *Brauch* in other texts such as "A Dialogue on Language" and "Conversation on a Country Path."

In "A Dialogue on Language," a text presented in the form of a dialogue between an "inquirer" and a "Japanese," we find a passage in which the *Zwiefalt* appears as "the sway of *Brauch*" between the two speakers:

I: . . . it is only the *Zwiefalt* itself which unfolds the clarity, that is, the clearing in which present beings as such, and presence, can be discerned by man . . .

J: . . . by man who by nature stands in relation to, that is, is being used by, the *Zwiefalt* [für den Menschen, der seinem Wesen nach im Bezug, d.h. im Brauch der *Zwiefalt* steht].

I: This is also why we may no longer say: relation to the *Zwiefalt*, for the *Zwiefalt* is not an object of mental representation, but is the sway of usage [kein Gegenstand des Vorstellens sondern das Walten des Brauches].

J: Which we never experience directly, however, as long as we think of the *Zwiefalt* only as the difference which becomes apparent in a comparison that tries to contrast present beings and their presence.<sup>41</sup>

The *Zwiefalt* is presented as "the sway of usage." And it is stressed that the *Zwiefalt* is not "an object of mental representation," not something that we can represent [vorstellen] as "the difference." The fact that the *Zwiefalt* is "the sway of usage" involves the essence of man, in the sense that man "by nature stands in relation to, that is, is being used by, the *Zwiefalt*." Just before the quoted passage, the two speakers say to each other that "Man is really as man when

<sup>40</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, pp. 242-243; *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 96.

<sup>41</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 126; *On the Way to Language*, p. 33.



needed and used by . . . what calls on man to preserve [verwahren] the *Zwiefalt* . . ."<sup>42</sup> Thus the relation of *Brauch* means that man is needed and used by the *Zwiefalt*, which is to say, man is called on to "preserve" the *Zwiefalt*.

This relation of *Brauch* exists as a paradoxical relation. And this paradox is shown, for example, in a passage in "Conversation on a Country Path," another text which has the form of a conversation, this time, a conversation among three figures, Scientist, Teacher, and Scholar. Scientist says:

Scientist: . . . We have just characterized that-which-regions [die Gegnet] as the hidden nature of truth. If to be brief we say truth in place of that-which-regions, then the statement of the relation of human nature to that-which-regions is this: human nature is given over to truth, because truth needs man [weil die Wahrheit den Menschen braucht]. Yet now the distinguishing characteristic of truth — particularly in its relation to man -- is, is it not, to be what it is independent of man?<sup>43</sup>

The paradox of *Brauch* is that while truth (i.e. "that-which-regions," Being) needs man, it is at the same time independent of man. In other words, truth's independence from man is a relation to man. Teacher says, "Evidently truth's independence *from* man is a relation *to* human nature, a relation which rests on the regioning [Vergegnis] of human nature into that-which-regions [Gegnet]."<sup>44</sup> Yet this is so only because man is used by truth. To borrow Blanchot's words, the relation of *Brauch* can be considered as "a relation without relation." The independence or the solitude of truth reveals itself only in the secret of *Brauch*, in the secret of the relation in which man is needed and used by truth.

If we return to the passage cited from "Moirá" which depicts the relation between thinking and the *Zwiefalt*, the sentence "thinking is outside the *Zwiefalt*. . ." corresponds to truth's independence from man. And another sentence ". . . this very 'making its way toward . . .' remains within the *Zwiefalt*. . ." corresponds to belonging-together of man and truth (man essentially belongs to truth, man is used by truth). Thinking (i.e. the way-making movement toward

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 126; trans., p. 32.

<sup>43</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, pp. 62-63; *Discourse on Thinking*, pp. 83-84.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 64; trans., p. 84.

the *Zwiefalt*) is outside the *Zwiefalt* and inside the *Zwiefalt*. Man is outside the *Zwiefalt* and inside the *Zwiefalt*. We see that this relation between thinking and the *Zwiefalt* turns thinking itself, or man himself, into the *Zwiefalt*.

Also, we find that the sense of "undergoing an experience with something" that Heidegger stresses in his texts on language (where he seeks to "undergo an experience with" language) is relevant here. For example, he writes:

To undergo an experience with something — be it a thing, a person, or a god [Mit etwas, sei es ein Ding, ein Mensch, ein Gott, eine Erfahrung machen] — means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us. When we talk of "undergoing" an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it [machen heißt hier: durchmachen, erleiden, das uns Treffende empfangen, insofern wir uns ihm fügen]. It is this something that itself comes about, comes to pass, happens [Es macht sich etwas, es schickt sich, es fügt sich].

To undergo an experience with language, then, means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language by entering into and submitting to it [Mit der Sprache eine Erfahrung machen heißt dann: uns vom Anspruch der Sprache eigens angehen lassen, indem wir auf ihn eingehen, uns ihm fügen].<sup>45</sup>

He also says, "To undergo an experience with something means that this something, which we reach along the way in order to attain it, itself pertains to us, meets and makes its appeal to us, in that it transforms us into itself."<sup>46</sup> These remarks lead us to think that in the relation of *Brauch*, man "endures," "suffers," "enters into [eingehen]" and "submits to [sich fügen]" the *Zwiefalt*. This relation is not based on man's own decision or will. To put it another way, man himself is transformed into the *Zwiefalt*. Or we might be able to say, man "follows [folgen]" the *Zwiefalt*: Heidegger shows how man "follows [folgen]" the

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<sup>45</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 159; *On the Way to Language*, p. 57.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177; trans., pp. 73-74.

*logos* in his discussion of Heraclitus in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*.<sup>47</sup> Thus we find in Heidegger different manners of describing the relation of *Brauch*. Man is man only insofar as he "preserves," "enters into," "submits to," "is transformed into," or "follows" the *Zwiefalt*.<sup>48</sup> In other words, man is the "scene" of the disclosure of the *Zwiefalt*. "Man is a sign."<sup>49</sup>

And this relation of *Brauch* is an excess itself. Heidegger thinks that "the essence of man" is to respond to Being and that this essence is an excess itself: "Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this. This "only" does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess . . . ."<sup>50</sup>

Likewise, Saying as "showing" is based on the relation of *Brauch*, the relation of an excess. Saying is the scene of violence, that is to say, it is the breach. It "submits to [sich fügen]" the need compelled by Being which requires a scene of its disclosure. Saying "follows" the *Zwiefalt*. To return to Heidegger's definition of language as the balance which appears as the movement of *Schwingung*, we could say that Saying as "showing," the scene of violence, comes to pass in and as the *Schwingung* of the balance. The "inconspicuous furrows in language" that

<sup>47</sup> See Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 99; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 129.

<sup>48</sup> The motif of "following" the fold is also important for Deleuze's understanding of the fold in Leibniz and the Baroque presented in *Le pli*. He thinks that the operative concept of the Baroque is the fold --"fold after fold [pli selon pli]." He writes, for example, "a Baroque line would move exactly according to the fold [selon le pli], and that would bring together architects, painters, musicians, poets, and philosophers." Gilles Deleuze, *Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque*. Paris: Minuit, 1988, p. 48; *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. Translated by Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 34. Speaking of the Leibnizian monad, he says, "The monad expresses the world 'according to' [«suivant»] its body, according to the organs of its body, according to the action of the other bodies upon itself." Ibid., p. 132; trans. p. 99. In Deleuze, this motif is linked to the idea of mannerism found in the Stoics and Leibniz which substitutes for the essentialism of Aristotle and that of Descartes: "for the verb 'to be' they [the Stoics] substitute 'to follow,' and they put manner in the place of essence [au verbe être ils substituaient <s'ensuire>, et à l'essence, la manière]." Ibid., p. 72; trans., p. 53.

<sup>49</sup> Referring to Hölderlin's line from Mnemosyne, "We are a sign that is meaningless [Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos]," Heidegger writes, "As he draws toward what withdraws, man is a sign. But since this sign points toward what draws away, it points, not so much at what draws away as into the withdrawal. The sign stays without interpretation. [Das Zeichen bleibt ohne Deutung.]" We might say that the movement of withdrawal that man points into is the withdrawing movement of the *Zwiefalt*. Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?* Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954, p.6; *What Is Called Thinking?* Translated by F. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968, pp. 9-10.

<sup>50</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, p. 18; *Identity and Difference*, p. 31.

thinking lays with its saying are inseparable from this understanding of Saying. The *Schwingung* of the balance is nothing but the secret of *Brauch*.

### Turning to Stone

Heidegger's thought about language should not be understood merely as an attempt to speak about language as the balance by using language, but as an attempt to present his language itself as Saying, an attempt to constitute language as the balance. In other words, Heidegger's language itself should be regarded as what performs the movement of *Schwingung*. It seeks to be the scene of violence where the movement of the *Schwingung* of the fold is staged, the scene where "the decline of the *Zwiefalt*" is disclosed. It tries to be the scene where "as" is staged (danger *as* danger, language *as* language), that is, the "manner [Weise]" itself (i.e. the manner in which Being unconceals itself) is staged. Paying attention to this performative aspect of his language is essential to our understanding of Heidegger's project.

In "Difference and Self-Affirmation" in *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*, Fynsk presents his understanding of the work of art in Heidegger, and writes that "the work must bear the trace of man's finitude as a kind of pointer that signals an unmastered, abyssal depth: the opening of the finitude that conditions his creative activity."<sup>51</sup> We may be able to understand Fynsk's sentence above and say that the work of art bears the trace of man's "submission to" the *Zwiefalt* as a kind of pointer that signals "the withholding of the *Zwiefalt*."<sup>52</sup> We could even say that the

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<sup>51</sup> Christopher Fynsk, *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 124. In "The Work of Art and the Question of Man," Fynsk also says that the work of art in Heidegger is "an allegory of human finitude"; the work is an allegory in that it shows something other than itself. According to him, that the work is an allegory of human finitude means that the work preserves the ontological difference which is disclosed as the self-refusal of human finitude which is uncannily excessive; the human finitude refuses "any formal definition," "any structure (*Gefüge*)." See *Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>52</sup> In "Möira" Heidegger writes that "withholding of the *Zwiefalt*" (or "the Same") is what is thought-worthy: "Parmenides would not have been a thinker at the earliest dawn of that thinking . . . if he had not thought within the area of the riddle which is silently contained in the enigmatic key word, τὸ αὐτὸ, the Same. Herein is concealed what is thought-worthy. . . : as the relation of thinking to Being, as the truth of Being in the sense of the disclosure of the *Zwiefalt*, and as withholding of the *Zwiefalt* [als Vorenthalt der *Zwiefalt*] (μὴ εἶν)." Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und*

work of art itself is realized as what "submits to" the *Zwiefalt*, or as a kind of pointer that signals "the withholding of the *Zwiefalt*." Heidegger's language (or his writing) itself can be regarded as what seeks to be the work of art understood in this sense. It seeks to offer itself as the scene of the disclosure of "the withholding of the *Zwiefalt*." Or to borrow Fynsk's words, it seeks to "remark the fact that there is language" or "remark the figurality": in ". . . qu'il y a le langage: Heidegger, Derrida," Fynsk speaks of the proximity between Heidegger and Derrida in terms of their "respective gestures by which each of them, in answering to the movement in which language gives or opens itself, remarks the fact that there is language." Fynsk finds something outrageous about their texts, saying that "they are excessively presumptuous." He shows how their gestures of remarking of the fact of language are marked by performativity and historicity.<sup>53</sup>

The performative nature of Heidegger's language could be approached in terms of the motif of stone which appears in Heidegger's later work (e.g. "Language in the Poem," and "Language"). For one could say that Heidegger's writing tries to perform "the turning to stone." It tries to erect a kind of stone monument, language as the balance.

In Heidegger's reading of Trakl, or in Heidegger's dialogue with Trakl's poetry, a stone very often appears as what is thought-worthy. The stone is presented as what provokes thinking: the repetitive appearance of the stone in Trakl's poetry induces Heidegger's thinking. In "Language in the Poem," Heidegger actually counts the number of times it appears: "Again the "stone"

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*Aufsätze*, p. 248; *Early Greek Thinking*, p.100.

<sup>53</sup> In ". . . qu'il y a le langage: Heidegger, Derrida," Fynsk writes, "If the re-marking of the fact of language is an event, the event of the opening or the re-opening of the thought of Being, we must not forget that such an event is fundamentally historical in character." This gesture of remarking the fact of language is inseparable from that of remarking figurality. Fynsk points out that Derrida's writing, "a writing that performs the *retrait du retrait*, the remarking of the *retrait*," is the remarking of "the figurality by which Being gives itself in its withdrawal." This means that it designates "the very emergence or opening of meaning in and as the language of metaphysics." To remark figurality means to remark "the figural movement that opens in and with the withdrawal of Being," that is, to remark "Being's giving as in and by its withdrawal the very opening or emergence of meaning." Christopher Fynsk, ". . . qu'il y a le langage: Heidegger, Derrida." Paper presented at the meeting of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Perugia, July 1987.

appears which, if calculation were permitted here, could be counted in more than thirty places in Trakl's poetry." This gesture of Heidegger can be understood not as a gesture of mere calculative thinking, but as a gesture that affirms the repetition of the Same itself, or remarks "pathmarks" which only appear in the repetitive movement of the path. In the preface to *Pathmarks [Wegmarken]*, Heidegger writes that the volume seeks to "bring to attention something of the path that shows itself to thinking only on the way: shows itself and withdraws." It is suggested that this "something of the path" is "what the word "Being [Sein]" once revealed as something to be thought, what it may once perhaps conceal as something thought." We might be able to think that "something of the path" reveals itself as the stone which appears in repetition. It is as if the stone were a "pathmark" on the way of Heidegger's thinking.

It is possible to note at least three senses of the stone found in Heidegger's reading of Trakl. First, the stone implies "conservation [Verwahrung]." The stone with its impenetrable hardness *preserves* "pain" (the *Riß*, the joining of the rift, or the dif-ference itself), "a "time" which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the open region for every measure."<sup>54</sup> Secondly, the stone shows itself as the

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<sup>54</sup> In "Language in the Poem," reading the last stanza of "Bright Spring" by Trakl, Heidegger speaks of how "pain" is concealed and kept in the impenetrable stone. He thinks that pain here is inseparable from the primal early "beginning" which shines forth from "the silent glow of the first dawn." He also depicts "pain" in terms of "the onefold simplicity of its converse nature." He says, "The onefold simplicity of its converse nature determines all becoming out of concealed primal earliness, and attunes it to the bright serenity of the great soul. [Die Einfalt seines gegenwendigen Wesens bestimmt das Werden aus der verborgenen frühesten Frühe und stimmt es in die Heiterkeit der großen Seele.]" The *Einfalt* of "pain" here corresponds to the notion of "the Same." "Moira," for example, presents "the Same" as the enigmatic keyword in which what-is-to-be thought is named, and defines "the Same" as that which "reigns as the unfolding of the *Zwiefalt* — an unfolding in the sense of disclosure." So the *Einfalt* involves the unfolding or the destining of Being. It determines all becoming. Moreover, "pain" has "the converse nature [das gegenwendige Wesen]." Heidegger writes, "its sweep carries us truly onward only as it sweeps us back [er als zurückreichender Riß erst eigentlich fortreibt]." This suggests that thinking goes forward only when it reaches back into what is thought-worthy more primordially than the beginning itself, or reaches back into the prior beginning. We should also note that "the converse nature of pain" is the movement of the *Riß* (tear, rift, or rupture) which goes forward only in going back, turns ahead only in turning behind, or unfolds itself only in folding back into itself. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 63-64; *On the Way to Language*, pp. 182-183. Heidegger speaks of "a 'time' which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the open region for every measure" in "On the Essence of Truth." Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, p. 190; *Pathmarks*, p. 145.

movement of turning to stone, "coming to stand." It is the movement of "the limit, *peras*," itself. Lastly, the stone means what persists and endures. It *remains* standing as the repetition of "the beginning," as the enigma of pure origin.<sup>55</sup> These characteristics of the stone are in fact inseparable from each other. The stone is the site of the disclosure of "the withholding of the *Zwiefalt*." The *Zwiefalt* opens and unfolds itself only in giving itself as the stone, as form.

We could focus on the second sense of the stone here — the stone as the movement of petrification ("turning to stone"), or as the movement of "coming to stand [zum Stand kommen]." This sense of the stone cannot be grasped through the image of a stone which is congealed or fixed. The movement of "coming to stand" corresponds to the movement of the limit, not as a fixed limit, but the movement of "achieving a limit for itself" or "emerging placing-itself-in-the limit."

In his essay on Trakl's poetry, "Language," Heidegger again speaks of the stone and pain in reading a poem called "A Winter Evening." Paying attention to a line in the third stanza, "Pain has turned the threshold to stone [Schmerz

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<sup>55</sup> In the passage concerning "the limit" in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, he regards "the limit" not only as "coming up [coming to stand] [zum Stand kommen]" but also as "enduring [remaining in standing] [im Stand bleiben]." The stone *remains* in standing. See Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 46; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 60.

If we look at Heidegger's comments on a line from "A Winter Evening" (by Trakl) in "Language," "Pain has turned the threshold to stone [Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle]" (which we will discuss later), we notice the importance of the idea of persistence. He points out that only in the persistence of the stone, in "remaining in standing" of the stone, can the threshold presence itself.

For Heidegger, "remaining in standing" means the repetition of "the beginning." Here we recall that in "A Dialogue on Language," Heidegger cites a line from Hölderlin's poem, "Der Rhein"—". . . For as you began, so you will remain. . . ." The flow of the Rhine is understood as the force of the beginning that never ceases to be an enigma of pure origin. Exactly like the flow of the Rhine, the stone remains as the repetition of the beginning. "A beginning can never directly preserve its full momentum; the only possible way to preserve its force is to repeat, to draw once again more deeply than ever from its source. And it is only by repetitive thinking that we can deal appropriately with the beginning and the breakdown of the truth." Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 146; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 191.

The repetition or "repetitive thinking" here does not mean to repeat with some improvement within the framework of the old methods which have continued up to now. It is to repeat more primordially or more radically than ever. It is a leap. "A genuine beginning, as a leap, is always a head start, in which everything to come is already leaped over, even if as something disguised. The beginning already contains the end latent within itself." Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*, p. 62; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 76.

versteinerte die Schwelle]," he writes:

This verse speaks all by itself in what is spoken in the whole poem. It names pain . . . "Turned . . . to stone" [ $\langle \dots \text{versteinerte} \dots \rangle$ ]<sup>56</sup>—these are the only words in the poem that speak in the past tense. Even so, they do not name something gone by, something no longer present. They name something that persists and that has already persisted. It is only turning to stone that the threshold presences at all [Im Gewese des Versteinerns west allererst die Schwelle].<sup>56</sup>

"It is only in turning to stone that the threshold presences at all." This remark suggests that the stone means the movement of turning to stone [versteinern], and that this movement itself is the site of the disclosure of the threshold. Also it points to the solitude of language itself (we find a discussion of this motif, for example, in "The Way to Language"). The threshold disclosed here is characterized by what Heidegger calls "the dependability of the middle." He holds that while the threshold sustains the middle—"the middle in which the two, the outside and the inside, penetrate each other," and "bears [trägt]" the between as the joining of the outside and the inside, the threshold does not yield either way. "What goes out and goes in, in the between, is joined in the between's dependability. The dependability of the middle must never yield either way. [In seine Verlässlichkeit fügt sich, was im Zwischen aus- und ein-geht. Das Verlässliche der Mitte darf nirgend hin nachgeben.]"<sup>57</sup> This leads us to reflect that such a manner of not settling on either way creates extreme tension in the threshold, or that the threshold exists as this very tension. So when Heidegger says, "The threshold . . . is hard because pain has petrified it," this hardness does not mean the congealment of pain. It rather points to the unceasing tension of pain: "the pain that became appropriated to stone did not harden into the threshold in order to congeal there. The pain presences unflagging in the

<sup>56</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 26; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. 203-204.

<sup>57</sup> This nature of the threshold reminds us of Beckett's lines from "Neither," although his writing is very different from Heidegger's. "to and fro in shadow from inner to outershadow/ from impenetrable self to impenetrable unself by way of neither . . . / unspeakable home" Samuel Beckett, *As the Story was Told*, London: John Calder, 1990, pp. 108-109.



threshold, as pain.<sup>58</sup> Thus the threshold is disclosed as "the dependability of the middle" (i.e. the manner of not deciding on either way, the movement of vacillation). In other words, the threshold is revealed as pain, the joining of the rift, the difference itself.<sup>59</sup> And it is only in the movement of turning to stone, in the movement of petrification that the disclosure of pain, the disclosure of the threshold, takes place.

This movement of turning to stone echoes the notion of "the limit," more precisely the notion of *peras*, presented in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Heidegger writes:

But this erect standing-there, coming up [coming to stand] and enduring [remaining in standing] is what the Greeks understood by Being. Yet what thus comes up and becomes intrinsically stable encounters, freely and spontaneously, the necessity of its limit, *peras*. This limit is not something that comes to being from outside. Still less is it a deficiency in the sense of a harmful restriction. No, the hold that governs itself from out of the limit, the having-itself, wherein the enduring holds itself, is Being of being; it is what first makes the being into a being as differentiated from a nonbeing. Coming to stand accordingly means: to achieve a limit for itself, to limit itself. Consequently a fundamental characteristic of the being is *to telos*, which means not aim or purpose but end. Here "end" is not meant in a negative sense, as though there were something about it that did not continue, that failed or ceased. End is ending in the sense of fulfillment. Limit and end are that wherewith the being begins to *be*. It is on this basis that we must understand the supreme term that Aristotle used for Being, *entelecheia* — the holding (preserving) -itself-in-the-ending (limit). What later philosophy, not to mention biology, made of the term "entelechy" (cf. Leibniz) shows the full extent of the degeneration from Greek thought. That which places itself in its limit, completing it, and so stands, has form, *morphē*. Form as the

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<sup>58</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 26-27; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 204.

<sup>59</sup> For Heidegger's discussion of "pain," see Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 27; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 204.

Greeks understood it derives its essence from an emerging placing-itself-in-the-limit.<sup>60</sup>

The limit means the movement of the limit, the differentiating movement which is at the same time the movement of being differentiated—"what first makes the being into a being as differentiated from a nonbeing." It is the movement of "coming to stand [zum Stand kommen]," "achieving a limit for itself, limiting itself." Or it is "the holding (preserving) -itself-in-the-ending (limit) [das Sich-in-der-Endung (Grenze)-halten (wahren).]" It is the movement of "form [Gestalt], *morphē*,"—"an emerging placing-itself-in-the-limit [Sich-in-die-Grenzeherstellen]." The limit is the site where "the being begins to *be*"—the site of differentiation of Being and beings, of the initial unfolding of the *Zwiefalt*. So it is coming to stand as "the beginning," or placing itself in "the beginning." In this sense, the limit cannot be understood as a fixed line drawn in a particular time and space. We could say that the stone shows itself precisely as this movement of the limit, of "form [Gestalt], *morphē*," in Heidegger.

The stones that *remain* standing (as the repetition of the beginning, as the repetition of a leap, as the repetition of an historical event) can be looked upon as "pathmarks [Wegmarken]"—pathmarks which essentially belong to the movement of the path. Moreover, the stone can be considered as the tombstone. The tombstone that mediates the two temporal horizons which cannot be mediated—"no longer" and "not yet." The tombstone as the *Gefüge*, the joining of the rift, the settling of the between, the translation of the untranslatable. It is the meeting place of the inside of history and the outside of history where the torsion of the two is preserved. The tombstone *stands* as the question of history itself in that it *remains* as "a crucial form of history."

Heidegger's writing tries to perform the turning to stone, the stone that repetitively appears as what provokes thought or pathmarks on the way; indeed we could say that his work has provoked and induced many important paths in the history of Twentieth Century thought. In other words, it tries to become the stone which occurs as the site of "transfiguration." We recall here Heidegger's interpretation of Sophocles' lines which depict man's departure for the placeless

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<sup>60</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 46; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 60.

waves of the sea.<sup>61</sup> Heidegger points out that Sophocles' word, *chōrei*, "stands like a pillar" at the point where the meter shifts when man suddenly confronts the force of the sea, the *Abgrund*. Heidegger observes that language, by suddenly turning to stone and standing like a pillar, folds (unfolds) the abrupt shift of measure and preserves it. We might be able to say that it is precisely this abrupt folding (unfolding) of the *Abgrund* in turning to stone that Heidegger's language performs. What Heidegger's language seeks to remark in performance is the event in which "the essence of language" unconceals itself as the *Schwingung* of the fold (i.e. the *Geschick* of the fold). This performative gesture of Heidegger's writing is closely linked to what Fynsk depicts as the "presumptuous" gesture of "the remarking of the fact that there is language" or the remarking of figurality.

Also this gesture shows how Heidegger tries to fight with the enigma of the "weight" (the immeasurable "weight" of the entire history of Western metaphysics) by "bearing [tragen]" it in the balance that he tries to constitute with his own language. By trying to weigh the fold / danger in language.

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp. 117-118; trans., p. 153.