2021-09-29T01:19:49Zhttps://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/oaioai:tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp:000522442021-03-01T15:53:03ZReference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability澤, 亮治サワ, リョウジSAWA, RyojiWu, Jiabin© 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This paper investigates stochastic stability of noisy best response dynamics with reference-dependent preferences. We define a strategy as super-dominant in a 2×2 coordination game if it is the maximin strategy in terms of monetary returns and the state that all players play it constitutes an equilibrium which Pareto-dominates all other equilibria. If such a strategy exists, the corresponding equilibrium, which we call the super-dominant equilibrium, is uniquely stochastically stable for the BRM choice rule (the best response choice rule with uniform random errors) given any model of reference-dependent preferences. However, for any 2×2 coordination game with a super-dominant strategy, there exists a model of reference-dependent preferences with which the super-dominant equilibrium fails to be stochastically stable for the logit choice rule.Elsevier2018-10engjournal articlehttp://hdl.handle.net/2241/00157672https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/5224410.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.00203044068AA00252858Journal of mathematical economics7896104https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/52244/files/JME_78-96.pdfapplication/pdf378.7 kB2020-11-01