2021-09-19T19:52:00Zhttps://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/oaioai:tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp:000228862021-03-02T07:42:11ZOn Non-Existence of Nash Equilibrium of an M Person Game with Pure Strategy for Energy SupplyTakahashi, KazukiSumita, UshioA competitive market model is considered with M suppliers and N customers, where each\nsupplier provides a homogeneous service such as energy supply and has to offer a uniform price upon\ndelivery to all customers. Given a price upper bound U, the model is formulated as an M person game\nwith pure strategy. It is shown that the M person game has the unique Nash equilibrium if and only if each\ncustomer can be serviced by at most one supplier. Furthermore, this unique Nash equilibrium is peculiar\nin that all suppliers adopt the same upper bound price U. In general, the M person game does not have\nany Nash equilibrium. For such a case it is demonstrated that the suppliers continue to exercise their price\nstrategies in a cyclic manner indefinitely.University of Tsukuba. Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering. Doctoral Program in Social Systems & Management2008-11engtechnical reporthttp://hdl.handle.net/2241/101197https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/22886Department of Social Systems and Management Discussion Paper Series ~ no.1219https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/22886/files/1219.pdfapplication/pdf205.8 kB2013-12-25