2024-03-28T17:53:42Z
https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/oai
oai:tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp:00018298
2023-07-12T06:16:57Z
152:1225
152:504
2871:2872:774
3:62:5592:621
Learning Games
花木, 伸行
石川, 竜一郎
秋山, 英三
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Ishikawa, Ryuichiro
Akiyama, Eizo
© 2009ElsevierB.V.
application/pdf
This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little
knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not
only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The
model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma and coordination
games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at
learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy
higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one
player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others.
However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow
learners.
ElsevierB.V.
2009-10
eng
journal article
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/103811
https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/18298
10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.013
0165-1889
AA00257636
Journal of economic dynamics & control
33
10
1739
1756
https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/18298/files/JEDC_33-10.pdf
application/pdf
437.3 kB
2013-12-19