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On the Relation between
Formal Markedness and Functional Specialization:
A Descriptive Analysis of
Peripheral Phenomena in English and Japanese

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Acknowledgements

Since this dissertation is a summary of my six-year linguistic experience as a graduate student at the University of Tsukuba, I would like to begin with self-examination. As is often the case with a green graduate student, I was a self-respecting person when I came to Tsukuba six years ago. Confusing “originality” with “self-righteousness,” I believed I could do something in linguistics in spite of having done nothing in the field. The baseless confidence prevented me from having frank discussion with people, which eventually prevented me from making academic progress.

Masao Okazaki, one of my teachers in my undergraduate days at Ibaraki University, quickly found out my shortcoming and advised me to undertake self-reform. He said firmly, “Discard all that is harmful for being a full-fledged linguist, or give up linguistics!” His rigorous attitude gave me a psychological breakthrough to which I owe what I am. He also taught me the importance of logical thinking and the difference between argument and rhetoric.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Aim

Not a few (generative) linguists, implicitly or explicitly, hold the view that the only phenomena worthy of serious grammatical analysis are those that are maximally general and natural. Against this widely held assumption, it has recently been claimed that peripheral or idiosyncratic phenomena often have a lot to do with the nature of our linguistic knowledge (Fillmore et al. (1988), Kay and Fillmore (1999), and Culicover and Jackendoff (1999) among others). Adopting this latter methodological standpoint, the present dissertation deals mainly with peripheral phenomena in English and Japanese. The phenomena to be dealt with are “peripheral” in the sense that they involve some language-specific grammatical quirks and have not been paid serious attention to in the linguistic literature.

The aim of this dissertation is to show that there holds a systematic form-meaning correspondence in the realm of (not only the core but also) the periphery. The systematic correspondence to be demonstrated is characterized in terms of “formal markedness” and “functional specialization” (in the sense to be clarified in the
chapters that follow) and is described as follows:

(1) Generalization about the Correlation between Formal Markedness and Functional Specialization
If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding unmarked form(s).

As will become clear, this simple generalization makes it possible to capture a number of seemingly unrelated idiosyncrasies as a natural class.

For a better understanding of the above perspective, it would be helpful to consider the relation between the form and function of articles for everyday use. Imagine a plain coffee cup and a demitasse coffee cup like the ones in (2):

(2) a. plain coffee cup

![Plain Coffee Cup]

b. demitasse coffee cup

![Demitasse Coffee Cup]

A plain coffee cup, being of moderate size, can serve various
functions; it can be used not only to drink coffee but also to drink milk, to gargle, to do the flowers (if one wishes), etc. A demitasse coffee cup can of course be used to drink coffee, too. But it is too small to serve the extra functions available with a plain coffee cup. This state of affairs can be restated as follows: a plain coffee cup has a usual or unmarked form and can serve more functions than a demitasse coffee cup. In contrast, a demitasse coffee cup has an unusual or marked form and can serve fewer functions than a plain coffee cup. Roughly speaking, the generalization in (1) states that the same kind of form-function correspondence holds for language.

1.2. Organization

This dissertation consists of eight chapters, organized into four parts to the exclusion of the present and the final chapters. Part I, which is composed of chapters 2 and 3, provides evidence for the generalization in (1) from synchronic perspectives by examining two idiosyncratic phenomena in English.

Chapter 2, which lays the basis of the present dissertation, concerns a simple case in which the regular plural *mouses* is exceptionally used for the plural of the noun *mouse*. It shows that *mice*, which is the conventional plural of *mouse*, is ambiguous and can refer to either small furry animals or small computer devices, while the unconventional plural *mouses* is specific and can denote the latter exclusively. Based on this observation, I will propose the generalization (1). The argument in chapter 2 demonstrates the
validity of the generalization in (1) at the lexical level.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the if you be construction, exemplified by sentences like If you be quiet, I’Il take you to the zoo. The chapter investigates its syntax and semantics closely and argues that it counts as an independent speech act construction which conventionally conveys a request in exchange for a reward. It also explores the relation between the form and function of the construction and reveals (i) that most of its syntactic properties are reducible to its communicative function, (ii) that its formal markedness is in proportion to its functional specialization, and (iii) that the protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis despite the former’s syntactic subordination to the latter. The second point constitutes a further argument for the generalization in (1). Moreover, it reveals that the generalization is valid not only lexically but also syntactically.

Part II, which contains only chapter 4, adduces evidence in favor of the generalization in (1) from a diachronic perspective. Chapter 4 deals with the present subjunctive construction. It mainly discusses how the present subjunctive construction is licensed in present-day English. Arguing that the issue is not syntactic but semantic/pragmatic in nature, it offers a functional condition for the present subjunctive construction in present-day English in terms of the deontic/epistemic opposition. The chapter also makes a comparison between the present subjunctive construction in present-day English and that in old English in terms of formal
markedness and functional specialization. The comparison constitutes another piece of evidence for the generalization in (1) and verifies its diachronic validity.

Part III, which comprises only chapter 5, offers another support for generalization (1) from a crosslinguistic perspective. Chapter 5 investigates the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction in Japanese, exemplified by sentences like \textit{Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu nda?} (‘Why do you talk rubbish?’). Giving a detailed description of the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction from both syntactic and semantic perspectives, it shows that the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction is an independent speech act construction which functions roughly as an accusation by the speaker. The chapter also examines the relation between the form and function of the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction and makes clear (i) that most of its syntactic properties are reducible to its communicative function, (ii) that its syntactic deviance is mitigated by its semantic coherence, and (iii) that its formal markedness is in proportion to its functional specialization. The final point exactly means that the generalization in (1) also holds in Japanese and is a crosslinguistically valid generalization.

Part IV, which consists of chapters 6 and 7, discusses two issues related to the generalization in (1). Chapter 6 compares the generalization in (1) with the notion of “the division of pragmatic labor” (Horn (1984), Levinson (2000)) and argues that the former is not reducible to the latter and hence should be regarded as an independent pragmatic principle.
Chapter 7, examining the semantics of the two “causative” verbs *prevent* and *prohibit*, demonstrates that the reverse of the generalization in (1) does not always hold; namely, the functional specialization of a grammatical form does not necessarily presuppose the formal markedness of that form. It also discusses from the perspectives of metaphor and metonymy why *prevent* and *prohibit* take *from V-ing* complements, complements of the same form.

Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a summary of the claims and an outlook for further research.
PART I
FROM SYNCHRONIC PERSPECTIVES
Chapter 2

Mouses

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is concerned with a case in which the regular plural mouses is exceptionally used for the plural of mouse. Comparing the functional range of mouses with that of mice, the present chapter shows that mice, which is the conventional plural of mouse, is ambiguous and can be used to refer to either small furry animals or computer pointing devices, while the unconventional plural mouses is specialized to denote the latter. Based on this observation, I propose a descriptive generalization in terms of “formal markedness” and “functional specialization” which says roughly that the formal markedness of a grammatical form is in proportion to its functional specialization and whose validity will be demonstrated throughout the dissertation.

2.2. Facts

The noun mouse, which mainly refers to a rodent, does not follow the productive plural formation rule in English, which attaches the suffix -(e)s to a noun stem to form its plural; the plural of mouse is formed through mutation and is pronounced as mice, not as mouses.
This lexical specification is conventionalized in English, as seen in the following dictionary definition of *mouse*:

(1) **plural mice**

a small furry animal with a pointed nose and a long tail that lives in people’s houses or in fields

(LDOCE⁴)

The following grammatical contrast offers another piece of evidence for the conventionality of the lexical specification in question:

(2) a. Mice are small furry animals with a long tail that live in people’s houses or in fields.

b. *Mouses are small furry animals with a long tail that live in people’s houses or in fields.

As indicated, we have to use *mice* for the plural of *mouse* ((2a)) and cannot use *mouses* for that purpose ((2b)). This appears to be a hard-and-fast rule at first sight.

There is, however, an exceptional case in which the regular plural *mouses* can be used. The word *mouse* acquired another usage around the mid of the 20th century in which it metaphorically refers to a small computer pointing device.¹ Interestingly, *mouses*, as well as *mice*, is commonly used for the plural of *mouse* in this extended
usage, which is seen in the following dictionary definitions of mouse as a device:

(3) a. pl. also **mouses**

a small device that is moved by hand across a surface to control the movement of the cursor on a computer screen

(OALD)

b. Inflected forms: pl. **mice** or **mouses**

*Computer Science*  A hand-held, button-activated input device that when rolled along a flat surface directs an indicator to move correspondingly about a computer screen, allowing the operator to move the indicator freely, as to select operations or manipulate text or graphics.

(AHDEL)

c. The plural **mouses** can be used for meaning 2.

2  A **mouse** is a device that is connected to a computer. By moving it over a flat surface and pressing its buttons, you can move the cursor around the screen and do things without using the keyboard.

(COBUILD)

The possibility of using **mouses** as well as **mice** for devices is also confirmed by the acceptability of the following examples:
(4)  a.  Mice are small objects connected to a computer by a wire, which you move with your hand to give commands to the computer.
   b.  Mouses are small objects connected to a computer by a wire, which you move with your hand to give commands to the computer.

Although *mice* is preferred to *mouses*, it is still possible to use the latter for devices, according to our informant. This makes a sharp contrast with what is the case with the use of *mouses* for animals. We repeat the relevant contrast below:

(5)  a.  *Mouses are small furry animals with a long tail that live in people’s houses or in fields.*
    (= (2b))
   b.  Mouses are small objects connected to a computer by a wire, which you move with your hand to give commands to the computer.
    (= (4b))

*Mouses* can be used for devices, but not for animals, while *mice* can be used for either animals or devices. What, then, does this fact tell us about the relation between the forms and functions of *mice* and *mouses*?
2.3. A Generalization in Terms of Formal Markedness and Functional Specialization

We first consider what formal characterization *mice* and *mouses* each receive. Here we introduce the notion of “formal markedness.” In this dissertation, we equate the notion of “formal markedness” with that of “formal normalcy” (see Levinson (2000) among others for a markedness-as-normalcy approach). More precisely, we take “formally marked” as “abnormal with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language,” and “formally unmarked” as “normal with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language.” A grammatical form is characterized as marked if it is in conflict with the corresponding unmarked form is in accord with.

As seen in 2.2, most if not all speakers of English know that the plural of *mouse* is *mice*. This stored knowledge constitutes a morphological or, more generally, grammatical convention of English. The plural *mice* is regarded as in accord with the convention and is characterized as an unmarked form. On the other hand, the plural *mouses* is characterized as deviant from the norm and counts as a marked form. Thus, in the case of *mouse*, the irregular plural *mice* is regarded as unmarked and the regular plural *mouses* as marked. This is what is generally called “markedness reversal” (see Battistella (1996) and references cited therein); namely, what is generally unmarked is contextually rendered marked and accordingly, what is generally marked unmarked.
Let us proceed to consider what functional characterization *mice* and *mouses* each receive. On the meaning side, *mice* is ambiguous and can refer to either animals or devices. We repeat the relevant examples here:

(6) a. Mice are small furry animals with a long tail that live in people’s houses or in fields. (= (2a))

   b. Mice are small objects connected to a computer by a wire, which you move with your hand to give commands to the computer. (= (4a))

By contrast, *mouses* refers exclusively to devices, not to animals. The relevant contrast is repeated below:

(7) a. Mouses are small objects connected to a computer by a wire, which you move with your hand to give commands to the computer. (= (4b))

   b. *Mouses are small furry animals with a long tail that live in people’s houses or in fields. (= (2b))

*Mice* is functionally more general than *mouses*, or, conversely, *mouses* is functionally more specific than *mice*.

To sum up, we can say that the formally marked *mouses* is functionally more specialized than the formally unmarked *mice*; the formal markedness of *mouses* is in proportion to its functional
specialization. This is schematized as follows:

(8) \[ \text{Mouses} \quad \underline{\text{DEVICE}} \quad \text{Mice} \]
\[ (*\text{irregularity}) \text{ANIMAL} \quad (\sqrt{\text{irregularity}}) \]

In our notation, words in italics represent grammatical forms, those in small capitals grammatical conventions, and those in capitals functions; stars and roots indicate the marked/unmarked status of a grammatical form with reference to a relevant convention; and solid lines indicate the functional range of an expression. As depicted in (8), the functional range of \textit{mouses}, which is marked, is narrower than that of \textit{mice}, which is unmarked.

This paradigm naturally leads us to propose the following descriptive generalization:

(9) \textit{Generalization about the Correlation between Formal Markedness and Functional Specialization}

If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding unmarked form(s).\textsuperscript{7, 8}

Henceforth, we will abbreviate this generalization simply as “FMFS.” Two caveats are in order here. The FMFS is consistent with the general view that “marked choices are all used with specific effects
(Battistella (1996: 134)),” but there is one important thing that differentiates the former from the latter. As the schema in (8) shows, the existence of the use of the marked *mouses* for devices does not “block” (Aronoff (1976)) or “preempt” (Clark and Clark (1979)) that of the unmarked *mice* for that same purpose, and vice versa. Thus, the *mice/mouses* opposition does not involve the so-called “division of pragmatic labor” (Horn (1984), Levinson (2000)), which derives from the interaction of two pragmatic principles: (i) unmarked forms receive unmarked interpretations and (ii) marked forms marked interpretations.9 It is this kind of marked/unmarked opposition without blocking effect that the FMFS is intended to capture.10 See chapter 6 for fuller discussion of this issue.

The other is that the reverse of the FMFS does not always hold; the functional specialization of a grammatical form does not necessarily presuppose the formal markedness of that form; it is not refuted by the existence of cases where an expression has a specialized function without anything formally marked. See chapter 7 for discussion of this issue.

2.4. Summary

In this chapter, we have been concerned with a simple but significant case in which the regular plural *mouses* is exceptionally used for the plural of *mouse* and argued that the functional range of *mouses*, which is formally marked, is narrower than that of *mice*, which is formally unmarked. Generalizing this observation, we have
proposed the FMFS. In the following three chapters, we will examine the (i) synchronic, (ii) diachronic, and (iii) cross-linguistic validity of the FMFS in turn.
Notes to Chapter 2

* This chapter is a slightly modified version of Konno (2004d). In the course of developing the idea to be presented, I have benefited greatly from discussions with Manabu Kusayama. I am also grateful to Yukio Hirose and Masao Okazaki for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Finally, my special thanks go to Eleanor Olds Batchelder for kindly acting as an informant.

1 The first citation of this usage in the OED is dated 1965.

2 In this relation, the following article by Mark Israel, ‘‘Mouses’’ vs ‘‘Mice,’’ is worth mentioning (the article is on the web at http://alt-usage-english.org/excerpts/fxmouses.html):

Wired Style: Principles of English Usage in the Digital Age (ed. Constance Hale, HardWired, 1996, ...) says: “What’s the plural of that small, rolling pointing device invented by Douglas Engelbart in 1964? We prefer mouses. Mice is just too suggestive of furry little creatures. But both terms are common, so take your pick. We actually emailed Engelbart to see what he’d say. His answer? ‘Haven’t given the matter much thought.’

‘In fact, Engelbart shared credit for the name with ‘a small group in my lab at SRI.’ Nobody among his colleagues seems to remember who first nicknamed the device, but all agree that the name was given because the cord (‘tail’) initially came out the ‘back’ of the device. ‘Very soon we realised that
the connecting wire should be brought out the “front” instead of the back,’ Engelbart notes, but by then the name had stuck.”

*The Microsoft(R) Manual of Style for Technical Publications* (ed. Amanda Clark, Microsoft Press, 1995 ...) says: “Avoid using the plural *mice*; if you need to refer to more than one mouse, use *mouse devices*.”

Markus Laker reports from the U.K.: “In the early eighties, a few people did selfconsciously say ‘mouses’, but the traditional plural ‘mice’ gained ground rapidly and is now more or less universal here.”

As is clear from the discussion so far and the above quote, either *mouses* or *mice* can be used to refer to pointing devices.


4 For lists of other advocates of this approach, see Battistella (1996: 10, 137, n.5) and Haspelmath (2003).

5 Throughout the discussion, we restrict ourselves to this criterion for evaluating the markedness of an expression. This is not to say that the notion of markedness corresponds to only that of normalcy. For other criteria, see Battistella (1996), Haspelmath (2003) and references cited therein.

6 Our informant’s preference for *mice* over *mouses* (recall the
discussion on the examples in (4)) can be attributed to this marked status of the latter.

7 In the course of developing this idea, I have benefited greatly from discussions with Manabu Kusayama.

8 Very recently, I became aware of the dissertation by Hilferty (2003), who independently makes essentially the same point (though in different terms). Observe the following remark:

"[C]ore-grammar constructions ... have a broader range of pragmatic uses than do constructions from the periphery (Hilferty (2003: 199))."

9 Although Horn's (1984) and Levinson's (2000) approaches are largely coextensive, there are also some differences between them, as Levinson himself points out (2000: 137). They are, however, irrelevant to our main concern here and we will not go into their details.

10 A factor which seems to be related to the lack of blocking effect is the relatively low conventionality of *mouses*. In fact, if a speaker conventionalizes the use of *mouses* in question highly, that knowledge seems to block the use of *mice*, as seen in the following specification:

(i) plural *mouses*

a small object connected to a computer by a wire, which you move with your hand to give instructions to the
For discussion on the correlation between conventionality and blocking, see Hirose (2000).
Chapter 3

The If You Be Construction*

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is concerned with an idiomatic and colloquial conditional construction in English which contains the sequence *if you be*. It is illustrated by sentences like the following:

(1) a. If you be good, I’ll get you a present. 
   (Ransom (1986: 66, fn. 15))

   b. If you be quiet, you can stay here.  (Davies (1986: 100))

We will call expressions of this kind the *if you be* construction. Perhaps because of its very idiomatic and colloquial nature, the *if you be* construction has never gone through an in-depth grammatical analysis. True, there are a few studies, such as Palmer (1974), Davies (1986), Ransom (1986), and Huddleston and Pullum (2002) that give examples of the construction, but they do not make its whole picture clear.

The present chapter is devoted to giving a full description of the nature of the *if you be* construction from both syntactic and semantic/pragmatic perspectives. Section 3.2 describes the surface
syntax of the *if you be* construction and shows that it is a partially fixed construction. Section 3.3 examines the semantics/pragmatics of the *if you be* construction and points out that it counts as a speech act construction and functions as a request in exchange for a reward. Section 3.4 compares the *if you be* construction with the present subjunctive construction and argues that the former is different from the latter and should be regarded as an independent construction. Section 3.5 investigates the relation between the form and function of the *if you be* construction and demonstrates that it is systematic in the following two respects: (i) most of its syntactic properties are reducible to its communicative function and (ii) its formal markedness is in proportion to its functional specialization. The latter point argues for the FMFS and shows that the FMFS holds true beyond the syntactic level. Section 3.6 examines the syntactic and semantic relations of the protasis and apodosis of the *if you be* construction and reveals that the protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis despite the former’s syntactic subordination to the latter. Section 3.7 is a short summary.

There is one thing that has to be noted before entering into the discussion. As is often the case with idiomatic and colloquial expressions, acceptability judgments of the *if you be* construction vary widely from speaker to speaker. There are even speakers who are dubious about the existence of the construction to start with (see also Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 114)). The argument in this chapter is based on judgments by our informant, who is a speaker of
Midwestern American English, in order to keep its consistency. See appendix A for a brief discussion of this issue.

3.2. The Syntax of the If You Be Construction

We will begin by describing the syntax of the if you be construction and show that the construction is partially fixed. In doing so, we will focus on the protasis, for it is the protasis, rather than the apodosis, that involves syntactic idiosyncrasies pertaining to the partially fixed status of the construction.

A first property concerns the conjunction which introduces the protasis. It is sometimes the case that if-clauses can be replaced with when-clauses, as in sentences like If/When there’s smoke, there’s fire (Quirk et al. (1985: 1086)), and idiomatic phrases like if/when it comes to the point (OALD\(^6\)). The alternation, however, is not possible in the if you be construction, and the protasis has to be introduced by if, as shown in (2b):

(2) a. If you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss.
   b. *When you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss.

Secondly, the subject of the protasis is restricted to you. Changing the person of the subject yields unacceptability:

(3) a. If you be a good girl, I’ll give you a piece of candy.
   b. *If John be a good boy at the kindergarten, I’ll take him to
As is generally the case with constructions other than imperatives, the protasis prohibits the absence of the subject:

(4)  *If be quiet, I’ll give you a big kiss.

Thirdly, as suggested by the occurrence of be, the main verb of the protasis lacks tense inflection. In this connection it is worth noting that, as is well-known, nonfinite be does not undergo auxiliary reduction and that the be in question does not, either, as seen in (5b):

(5)  a.  If you be quiet, I’ll take you to the zoo.
     b.  *If you’e quiet, I’ll take you to the zoo.

This contrasts with finite be. For instance, the are in (6a) may be reduced, as in (6b):

(6)  a.  If you are quiet, I’ll take you to the zoo.
     b.  If you’re quiet, I’ll take you to the zoo.

With respect to verbs other than be, we cannot tell whether they are in the present tense or in the bare stem form, because, as we have just seen, the subject of the protasis is restricted to you. We therefore
keep those verbs other than be out of discussion.

A fourth syntactic property has to do with negation. The protasis rejects negation with not:

(7)  a. *If you not be naughty, I’ll take you to the zoo.
    b. *If you not be a bad boy, I’ll give you many pieces of candy.

This contrasts with the present subjunctive construction, which is compatible with negation with not, as in The senate has decreed that such students not be exempted from college dues (Quirk et al. (1985: 156)). In addition, the situation does not improve even if supportive do is inserted:

(8)  a. *If you don’t be naughty, I’ll take you to the zoo.
    b. *If you don’t be a bad boy, I’ll give you many pieces of candy.

Note also that the protasis is incompatible with emphatic do as well:

(9)  a. *If you do be nice, I’ll play with you in the yard.
    b. *If you do be a good girl, I’ll give you a piece of candy.

In this respect, the protasis is different from imperatives, which are compatible with either supportive or emphatic do, as seen in Don’t be
Fifth, it is possible for adverbs to intervene either between *if* and *you* or between *you* and *be*:

(10) If, on the other hand, you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss.

(11) a. If you never be naughty again, I’ll take you to the zoo.
    (cf. *If you be never naughty again, I’ll take you to the zoo.*)

    b. If you {always/just} be quiet, I’ll give you a big kiss.

In (10) the conjunctive adverb *on the other hand* intervenes between *if* and *you*, and in (11) the preverbal adverbs *never*, *always*, and *just* between *you* and *be*. Thus, though what makes the *if you be* construction morphosyntactically marked is the sequence *if you be*, it is not the case that it is completely frozen. The acceptability of (11a) also shows that the protasis can be negated with *never*, although it precludes negation with *not*, as we have seen in (7) and (8).

Sixth, a wide variety of syntactic categories can follow the sequence *if you be*:

(12) a. If you be [AP nice], Father will buy you a toy.

    b. If you be [NP a good girl], I’ll give you a piece of candy.
    
    (=3a)

    c. If you be [PP on time for class tomorrow], I’ll reward you.

    d. If you be [VP guided by what I say], I’ll give you whatever
you want.

As illustrated, either an AP, NP, PP, or VP can follow it. The protasis shows (partial) productivity mainly in this position.\(^4\)

Finally, the protasis, like adverbial clauses in general, can precede or follow the apodosis:

\[(13) \ a. \ \text{If you be quiet, I'll take you to the zoo.} \quad (= \ (5a))
\]
\[b. \ \text{I'll take you to the zoo, if you be quiet.} \]

From the observations made so far, the surface syntax of the if you be construction is schematized as follows:

\[(14) \quad [C(\text{clause})_1 \ \text{if} (\text{ADV}) \ \text{you} (\text{ADV}) \ \text{be} \ \text{XP}], \ C_2\]

The parentheses indicate optional materials. The “X” stands for either A, N, P or V. The comma indicates that the order of the two clauses is reversible. As the schema indicates, the if you be construction is syntactically fixed in that the protasis is subject to the three lexical specifications (i) that it be introduced by the conjunction if, (ii) that the subject be you, and (iii) that the (main) verb be the bare stem be. At the same time, the construction is syntactically flexible in that it allows variants as far as they are not in contradiction with the three specifications. Thus, the if you be construction is syntactically characterized as a partially fixed
construction. We will consider its function in the next section.

3.3. The Semantics/Pragmatics of the If You Be Construction

The *if you be* construction is a colloquial expression and its most appropriate context is one in which a parent tries to coax his/her child into doing something. In relation to this contextual property, it has four interrelated functional idiosyncrasies.

A first idiosyncrasy is concerned with the function of the protasis. Observe the following example:

(15) If you be quiet while the dentist examines you, I’ll buy you whatever you want.

(15) is paraphrased roughly as *Be quiet while the dentist examines you, and I’ll buy you whatever you want.* As the paraphrase of the protasis into an imperative suggests, the protasis describes what is requested by the speaker, which, as we will see shortly, is further confirmed by the existence of certain grammatical reflexes.

The protasis is compatible with preverbal *please*, as observed in the following:

(16) a. If you please be quiet, I’ll give you a big kiss.

(cf. *If you be please quiet, I’ll give you a big kiss.*)

b. If you please be a good girl, I’ll buy you whatever you
want.

(cf. *If you be please a good girl, I’ll buy you whatever you want.)

What then does this fact tell us about the nature of the protasis?

It is widely accepted that the distribution of please in preverbal position is restricted and that it is grammatical only in constructions which conventionally convey a request in the sense of Grice (1975) (cf. Sadock (1974), Morgan (1978), and Stefanowitsch (2003) among others). To illustrate the point, let us consider the following grammatical contrast pointed out by Sadock (1974: 104):

(17) a. Will you please close the door?

b. *When will you please close the door?

Sadock’s argument is summarized as follows: the compatibility with pre-verbal please in (17a) suggests that the interrogative sentence Will you close the door? is conventionally used as a request, and the incompatibility in (17b) that When will you close the door? only conversationally functions as a request.

With this in mind, let us return to the if you be construction. The grammaticality of the examples in (16) tells us that the protasis conventionally conveys a request and further that although the protasis is expressed as an adverbial clause, realization of the event described by it is requested by the speaker. Thus, the protasis

By contrast, the protases of the following indicative conditionals do not allow preverbal please, although they appear similar to that of the if you be construction, except that the verbs are inflected in the former:

(18) a. *If you {please are/are please} quiet, I’ll give you a big kiss.

b. *If you {please are/are please} a good girl, I’ll buy you whatever you want.

The unacceptability indicates that these protases do not conventionally convey a request, unlike that of the if you be construction.

Given that the protasis of the if you be construction conventionally expresses what is requested by the speaker, it is easily predicted that its predicate must describe controllable situations. This is in fact the case:

(19) a. *If you be 7 years old, I’ll take you abroad. (So be patient now.)

b. *If you be a genius, I’ll buy you whatever you want. (So read as many books as you can.)
Both of the predicates of the protases in (19) describe situations over which the subject cannot have control; one cannot control his age or intelligence. Hence (19a, b) are both unacceptable. Note also that even when a controllable act is inferred by the sentences in (19) as indicated by the parenthesized materials, their acceptability does not improve; the protasis must directly describe what is requested by the speaker.

In this connection, let us reconsider example (12d), *If you be guided by what I say, I'll give you whatever you want.* At first sight, the fact that it is acceptable might appear incompatible with what we have just said, since the subject of this clause might be considered to be a patient. But a little reflection shows that there is nothing problematic in (12d), for the predicate *be guided by what I say* means something like *follow what I say* and in fact it can be used as an imperative:

(20) Be guided by what I say. (Quirk et al. (1985: 827))

Thus, although the protasis of (12d) is in the passive voice, its subject still has control over the described situation. As expected, complete loss of control by the subject of the protasis results in unacceptability, as in (19):

(21) *If you be praised by your teacher, I'll tell your father to buy you that toy you want.*
In (21) it is the teacher, not the hearer, who is responsible for the realization of the state of affairs described by the protasis. The hearer, being a patient, has no control over the situation described. As we have seen, the protasis of the *if you be* construction conventionally expresses what the speaker requests the hearer to carry out.

A second idiosyncrasy involves the function of the apodosis, which is reflected in the following grammatical fact:

(22) a. *If you be good, sit down.
   b. *If you be a good boy, go to bed now.

As shown in (22), the apodosis cannot be an imperative. This, we argue, means that the speaker of the *if you be* construction offers to the hearer what the apodosis describes as a reward. A reward is supposed to be what (the giver, i.e. the speaker for our purposes, assumes) is desirable to the receiver, i.e. the hearer. The imperative construction generally conveys what is requested by the speaker and its content is what is desirable to the speaker, but not necessarily to the hearer. The imperative construction is therefore not considered to be a description of a reward, which is incompatible with the function of the apodosis. Hence the unacceptability of the sentences in (22). As easily predicted, the apodosis of conditionals other than the *if you be* construction readily occurs in the imperative mood:
(23) If you get to Berlin, please ring me up.

(Wunderlich (1977: 31))

A third characteristic has to do with the illocutionary force of the *if you be* construction as a whole. To understand this, it is useful to begin by reconsidering example (15). In (15), the protasis expresses the mother’s desire that her son be quiet and the apodosis her promise to meet that desire of her son for a present which is assumed by her. From the speaker’s viewpoint, the protasis, rather than the apodosis, describes what is most important to her, since it is the former that expresses what she herself wants. Recall here that the protasis of the *if you be* construction conventionally functions as a request and that the apodosis counts as a reward. Hence by uttering (15), she requests her son to keep quiet during the examination in exchange for a reward expressed as the promise that she will buy him whatever he wants. Most importantly, the *if you be* construction conventionalizes this illocutionary force or the speaker’s subjective stance, which has a certain grammatical ramification.

The performative expression *I hereby promise*, as its very form suggests, requires its complement as a whole to function as a (genuine) promise. The conditional sentence *If you are good, I’ll take you to the zoo*, which uncontroversially functions as a promise, readily occurs with it:

(24) I hereby promise that if you are good, I’ll take you to the
The promise expressed by the apodosis can be emphasized by the performative, which shows that the protasis does not have any serious effect on the illocutionary force of the whole sentence. In such cases, the apodosis is functionally more prominent than the protasis.

By contrast, if we embed the *if you be* construction into *I hereby promise*, it sounds less acceptable than (24):

(25) ?I hereby promise that if you be good, I'll take you to the zoo.

The difference in acceptability between (24) and (25) means that the protasis of the *if you be* construction, which conventionally conveys a request, is functionally more prominent than the apodosis. This functional prominence inherent in the protasis clashes with the function of the performative, which necessarily foregrounds the promise described by the apodosis. Hence the marginality of (25). Thus, the *if you be* construction is used to convey a request in exchange for a reward which is often expressed as a promise, although it appears to function as a promise in exchange for a request.

The fourth idiosyncrasy concerns the flexibility of the communicative function of the *if you be* construction. Akatsuka's (1998) analysis of conditionals helps to understand this point. Her claim can be summarized for our purposes as follows: in a conditional,
(i) if the protasis states what is desirable to the speaker, then the apodosis must be about what the speaker supposes to be desirable to the hearer (DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE (Akatsuka (1998: 15)), and (ii) if the former states what is undesirable to the speaker, then the latter must be about what the speaker supposes to be undesirable to the hearer (UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE (ibid.)). As she observes, conditionals in general and what Bolinger (1977) calls “conditional imperatives” can describe either of these two situations:

(26) a. If you eat your spinach, you'll be strong.
    b. If you don’t eat your spinach, I’ll spank you.

(Akatsuka (1998: 17))

(27) a. Come closer and I’ll give you five pounds.
    b. Come one step closer and I’ll shoot.

(Clark (1993: 79))

Our knowledge of the world tells us that the (a) sentences follow the DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE logic and hence they express the speaker’s attitude I-WANT-IT-TO-HAPPEN (Akatsuka (1998: 16)). Conversely, the (b) sentences follow the UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE logic and hence express the speaker’s attitude I-DON’T-WANT-IT-TO-HAPPEN (Akatsuka (1998: 16)). (cf. also Wunderlich (1977)) Note here that the
present subjunctive construction can express either desirable or undesirable situations, too:

(28) a. It is desirable that John leave. (Clark (1993: 84))
    b. It is undesirable that a male teacher make a personal visit to his female student even if it is for academic purposes.

Although the examples in (28) are not conditionals, we take them as relevant to our analysis. For they can also convey either of the two attitudes of the speaker I-WANT-IT-TO-HAPPEN and I-DON’T-WANT-IT-TO-HAPPEN.

Let us return now to the if you be construction. It does not have the functional flexibility shared by the three constructions mentioned above. Observe the following:

(29) a. If you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss. (= (2a))
    b. ?If you be naughty again, I’ll slap you.

(30) a. If you be a good girl, I’ll give you a piece of candy.
    (= (3a))
    b. ?If you be a bad boy again, I’ll give you a punch on the head.

As shown by the contrast between the (a) and (b) sentences, if we force the if you be construction to describe undesirable situations, it
sounds bookish, and thus clashes with its colloquial flavor. Hence the marginality of the (b) sentences in (29) and (30). Thus, the *if you be* construction can describe desirable situations but cannot describe undesirable ones, which, together with what we have seen in this section, shows that the construction can function as a request in exchange for a reward, but cannot express a prohibition with a threat. In this way, the communicative function of the *if you be* construction is fixed.

Why, then, does the *if you be* construction exhibit this tendency? The key to the question lies in the contextual specification pointed out at the very outset of this section. From this contextual specification, it may safely be inferred that parental love has something to do with the function of the construction; it urges parents to say what they hope for their children in a positive way.

All these observations naturally lead us to characterize the communicative function of the *if you be* construction as follows:

(31)  The *if you be* construction is conventionally used to request the hearer to bring about the state of affairs expressed in the protasis in exchange for a reward described by the apodosis.  

The *if you be* construction is thus best characterized as an instance of what Lakoff (1984: 473, 1987: 474) calls “speech act constructions, that is, constructions that are restricted in their use to expressing
certain illocutionary forces that are specified as part of the grammar of English” (cf. also Sadock and Zwicky (1985)).

Our discussion so far has clarified the syntax and semantics of the if you be construction. Here, two questions arise as to (i) whether the if you be construction is an instance of a more general construction, and (ii) what the relation between the syntax and semantics of the construction is. In the following two sections, we will consider these questions in turn.

3.4. Comparison of the If You Be Construction with the Present Subjunctive Construction

Is it possible to identify the if you be construction with any established construction? At first sight, (the protasis of) the if you be construction might appear to be an instance of the present subjunctive construction. Ransom (1986: 66, fn. 15), classifying example (1a) as a present subjunctive, in fact assimilates the two constructions in question. This view appears to gain empirical support, because in both constructions, the main verb occurs uninflected and do-support is prohibited, as (32) and (33) show, respectively:

(32) a. If you be good, I’ll get you a present. (= (1a))
   b. It was intended that you be the candidate.

(Quirk et al. (1986: 1014))

(33) a. *If you do be nice, I’ll play with you in the yard. (= (9a))
b. *It is important that Bill do be polite.

(Culicover (1976: 151))

However, the syntactic parallels in (32) and (33) only suggest the possibility that the two constructions are related; they do not entail that the two are identical at all. In fact, there is abundant syntactic and semantic/pragmatic evidence against the identification, as will be seen below.

3.4.1. Syntactic Differences

A first syntactic difference is observed in the following contrast:

(34) a. *If John be a good boy at the kindergarten, I’ll take him to the zoo.

    (= (3b))

    b. I am anxious that John be allowed to go.

(Chiba (1987: 6))

The subject of the if you be construction is restricted to you, as seen in section 3.2. In contrast, that of the present subjunctive construction is not.

Secondly, as shown in section 3.2, the protasis of the if you be construction rejects negation with not, while the present subjunctive construction requires it. We repeat the relevant examples here:

(35) a. *If you not be naughty, I’ll take you to the zoo.  (= (7a))
b. The senate has decreed that such students not be exempted from college dues.

In this way, the *if you be* construction is syntactically more constrained than the present subjunctive construction, which means that they are syntactically different.

### 3.4.2. Semantic/Pragmatic Differences

There are also semantic/pragmatic differences between the *if you be* and present subjunctive constructions. A first semantic difference is a contextual one. The *if you be* construction is a colloquial expression, as pointed out at the outset of section 3.3. By contrast, the use of the present subjunctive mood in an *if*-clause is by no means colloquial. Quirk et al. (1985: 1012), giving the example *If any person be found guilty, he shall have the right of appeal*, state that “the present subjunctive ... is used very occasionally in formal style in open conditional clauses” (see also James (1986: 5, 7)). This statement is empirically justified; the following examples are judged to be unacceptable or stylistically infelicitous because they sound unnecessarily bookish:

(36) a. *If it rain tomorrow, I won’t go to school.*

b. *Taro will not go on if his effort not be rewarded.*

Secondly, the *if you be* construction can describe only desirable
situations, while the present subjunctive construction can describe either desirable or undesirable situations, as observed in (29) and (28), repeated below as (37) and (38), respectively:

(37) a.  If you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss.
    b.  If you be naughty again, I’ll slap you.

(38) a.  It is desirable that John leave.
    b.  It is undesirable that a male teacher make a personal visit to his female student even if it is for academic purposes.

The final difference has to do with the kind of situations described by the two constructions. The protasis of the if you be construction cannot describe uncontrollable situations, as pointed out in section 3, while the present subjunctive construction can:

(39) a.  *If you be 7 years old, I’ll take you abroad.  (= (19a))
    b.  It is imperative that you understand this part of the book.

(Stockwell et al. (1973: 665))

(cf.  *Understand this part of the book.  (Stockwell et al. (1973: 664)))

It is now clear that the if you be construction is functionally more constrained than the present subjunctive construction, which means that they are semantically different, too.
These observations argue strongly against the identification of the *if you be* construction with the present subjunctive construction. Thus, the *if you be* construction should be seen as an independent construction.

3.5. The Relation between the Form and Function of the *If You Be* Construction

We will now consider the second question posed at the end of section 3.3: What is the relation between the form and function of the *if you be* construction? In view of the idiosyncratic nature of the construction observed so far, one might suppose that it is arbitrary. However, closer inspection reveals that the form and function of the construction are correlated systematically.

3.5.1. Functional Motivation for the Syntax

As made clear in section 3.3, the *if you be* construction has a fixed illocutionary force. Recall also that, as observed in section 3.2, (the protasis of) the construction is syntactically fixed as well. Thus, semantic specialization correlates with syntactic specialization in the *if you be* construction.

This is reminiscent of what is the case with performatives in general.\(^9\) Levinson (1983: 232) points out that among the four sentences in (40), only (40a), a first person indicative active sentence in the present tense, can be uttered performatively:
(40) a. I bet you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow.
b. I am betting you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow.
c. I betted you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow.
d. He bets you five pounds it’ll rain tomorrow.

As Levinson (1983: 231) notes, this is just as expected if we assume that “in uttering a performative the speaker is concurrently performing an action.” Thus, the communicative function of a construction is closely related to its syntax.

With the above discussion in mind, notice again that the *if/when* alternation is not possible in the *if you be* construction as seen in (2), repeated here as (41):

(41) a. If you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss.
b. *When you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss.

Quirk et al. (1985: 1086) point out the following: “[t]he meaning of several subordinators that express time, place, or condition may be neutralized in certain contexts to convey a more abstract notion of recurrent or habitual contingency.” The *if you be* construction, however, does not express such a contingency. Rather, the dependence relation between what the protasis and apodosis respectively describe holds only in the context of utterance, as is clear from the function described in (31). In this way, it does not fulfill the licensing condition for the alternation. Hence the impossibility
of the alternation in (41).

Next, recall that the subject of the protasis must refer to the hearer. We repeat the examples in (3) as (42) below:

(42) a. If you be a good girl, I’ll give you a piece of candy.
    b. *If John be a good boy at the kindergarten, I’ll take him to the zoo.

This subject specification is also reducible to the function of the construction. Since the construction tells the hearer to carry out what the predicate of the protasis describes, its subject must refer to that hearer, who is supposed to be responsible for the action.¹⁰

In this way, we can straightforwardly account for why the construction in question has the form it has by taking its function into consideration (cf. Hirose (1991)).

3.5.2. Formal Markedness and Functional Specialization

As for the third lexical specification, that the main verb of the protasis be be, we have no functional account of it. This syntactic fact, however, offers another important insight into the relation between the form and function of the if you be construction.

The first thing to be noticed is that the occurrence of the bare stem be is against the general tendency for the main verb of if-clauses (or finite clauses in general) to agree with the subject. In this sense, the if you be construction is considered to be syntactically unusual or
marked. In addition, as seen in section 3.3, the construction is functionally specialized to express a request in exchange for a reward. Thus, we can safely say that formal markedness is in proportion to functional specialization in the if you be construction.¹¹

A comparison of the if you be construction with ordinary or unmarked conditionals helps to understand this point well. Consider again the examples in (29) and (26), repeated here as (43) and (44), respectively:

(43) a. If you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss.
   b. ?If you be naughty again, I’ll slap you.

(44) a. If you eat your spinach, you’ll be strong.
   b. If you don’t eat your spinach, I’ll spank you.

To repeat our argument in section 3.3, the if you be construction can only describe desirable situations, while the ordinary conditional construction can describe either desirable or undesirable situations. This is summarized into the following schema:

(45)
\[
\text{The if you be} \quad \text{DESIRABLE} \quad \text{The ordinary conditional construction} \\
\text{construction} \quad \text{UNDESIRABLE} \quad \text{construction} \\
(*)\text{AGREEMENT} \quad (*)\text{AGREEMENT}
\]

As shown, the functional range of the if you be construction, which is
syntactically marked, is narrower than that of the ordinary conditional construction, which is syntactically unmarked. This conclusion is in accordance with the FMFS, which is repeated below for ease of reference:

(46) If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding unmarked form(s).

Another important consequence concerned with (45) is that the FMFS also holds at the clause level, which, together with our discussion in chapter 2, proves the validity of the FMFS beyond the syntactic level. Thus, we can say that the FMFS is a synchronically valid generalization.

To sum up, we can say that there are systematic correspondences between the form and function of the if you be construction despite its apparent idiosyncrasy.

3.6. The Syntactic and Semantic Relations between the Protasis and Apodosis of the If You Be Construction

We would finally like to consider the syntactic and semantic relations between the protasis and apodosis of the if you be construction. Recall here that the protasis is functionally more prominent than the apodosis, as seen in section 3.3. What, then,
does the functional prominence of the protasis over the apodosis mean? Its significance becomes clear when we investigate the syntactic and semantic relations between the two clauses in terms of superordination/subordination. We will first discuss their syntactic relation.

3.6.1. The Syntactic Relation

In sections 3.2 and 3.3, we observed that the if you be construction involves a lot of idiosyncrasies. In view of them, one might assume that there is something special about the relation between the protasis and apodosis, too. However, this is not the case syntactically and there is nothing unusual about the syntactic relation; the protasis is syntactically subordinate to the apodosis, as strongly suggested by the use of if, which is generally assumed to be a subordinating conjunction that introduces an adverbial clause. To illustrate this clearly, let us consider each of the following three logical possibilities in turn: (i) that the protasis and apodosis are syntactically coordinated, (ii) that the apodosis is syntactically subordinate to the protasis, and (iii) that the protasis is syntactically subordinate to the apodosis.\(^{12}\)

Let us first consider possibility (i). It says that the protasis and apodosis are syntactically coordinated.\(^{13}\) What has to be shown is therefore that the two clauses behave in the same way as coordinated conjuncts generally do. Quirk et al. (1985: 921) point out that “[c]lauses beginning with and, or and but are sequentially fixed in
relation to the previous clause, and therefore cannot be transported without producing unacceptable sentences.” This is illustrated by the following contrast:

(47) a. They are living in England, or they are spending a vacation there.

b. *Or they are spending a vacation there, they are living in England.

(Quirk et al. (1985: 922))

If the protasis and apodosis are coordinated, it is expected that either of them is sequentially fixed in relation to the other. However, the protasis can be either preposed or postposed:

(48) a. If you be quiet, I’ll take you to the zoo.

b. I’ll take you to the zoo, if you be quiet.

(= (13))

The grammaticality of the examples in (48) shows clearly that the two clauses are not sequentially fixed, which is against what possibility (i) predicts.

There is still another problem with possibility (i). It is widely assumed that coordinated conjuncts must be of the same syntactic type (cf. Schachter (1977) among others), as the following contrast illustrates: \(^{14} \)
(49) a. *It’s odd for John to be busy and that Helen is idle now.
(Schachter (1977: 87))
b. It’s odd for John to be busy and for Helen to be idle now.
(Schachter (1977: 90))

Schachter argues that (49a) is ungrammatical because the infinitival and that-clauses are different in their surface syntax, while (49b) is grammatical because of the superficial similarity of the two clauses conjoined. Given this syntactic requirement, it is impossible to view the protasis and apodosis as syntactically coordinated. For they are superficially different in that the former involves the conjunction if, while the latter does not; the coordination approach wrongly denies the existence of the if you be construction to start with. Possibility (i) is thus rejected.

Let us turn to the second possibility, that the apodosis is syntactically subordinate to the protasis. This alternative connects the subordinator if not with the protasis, but with the apodosis, and syntactically parses If you be nice, I’ll give you a big kiss, for instance, as in the following:

(50) [If [you be nice], I’ll give you a big kiss]

With this structure in mind, observe the following example:
(51) *If, I'll give you a big kiss, you be good.

The grammaticality of (51) shows that it is impossible for the apodosis to immediately follow the conjunction. If the approach in question were tenable and structure (50) were correct, it would remain totally unclear why (51) is ungrammatical in spite of the adjacency between the subordinator and its direct complement, i.e. the apodosis. Possibility (ii) cannot be advocated, either.

The remaining possibility is thus the third one, that the protasis is syntactically subordinate to the apodosis. This is not only in accordance with the general tendency for the conjunction if to introduce a subordinate adverbial clause, but also gains empirical support. A first piece of evidence concerns the flexibility of the order of the two clauses. As Culicover and Jackendoff (1997: 200) point out, “a subordinate clause in English can appear either to the left or to the right of the main clause.” Recall here that, as we have seen in (48), the protasis can either precede or follow the apodosis. This fact suggests that the former is syntactically subordinate to the latter.

The second piece of evidence has to do with extraction. Culicover and Jackendoff (1997, 1999) argue that extraction serves as a litmus test for determining the syntactically subordinate status of a clause. This is because there is a strict ban on extraction from an adjunct, as has often been pointed out in the generative literature. Roughly, their logic is: if one clause of a sentence consisting of two clauses conjoined resists extraction and is improved by replacing the
trace with a resumptive pronoun, that clause is considered to be a syntactic adjunct and hence syntactically subordinate to the other clause. This is illustrated by the following grammatical contrasts pointed out by Culicover and Jackendoff (1997: 207):

\[(52)\]
\[
a. \text{This is the loot that if you identify } t(,) \text{ we will arrest the thief on the spot.}
\]
\[
b. \text{This is the loot that if you identify it, we will arrest the thief on the spot.}
\]

\[(53)\]
\[
a. \text{This is the senator when the Mafia pressured } t(,) \text{ the senate voted for health care reform.}
\]
\[
b. \text{This is the senator when the Mafia pressured him, the senate voted for health care reform.}
\]

Culicover and Jackendoff (1997: 207) observe that “by replacing the trace with a resumptive pronoun, ... if-clauses [and when-clauses] are if anything slightly improved.” This contrast leads them to conclude that the if- and when-clauses in (52) and (53) are syntactically subordinate to the other clauses.

The same holds true for extraction from the protasis of the if you be construction:

\[(54)\]
\[
a. \text{It is our dog, not our neighbor’s, that if you be good to } t, \text{ I’ll give you many pieces of candy.}
\]
\[
b. \text{It is our dog, not our neighbor’s, that if you be good to it,}
\]
I’ll give you many pieces of candy.

(55) a. ??This is the poor dog that if you be good to $t$, I’ll give you many pieces of candy.
   b. ?This is the poor dog that if you be good to it, I’ll give you many pieces of candy.

As the contrast shows, the examples with a resumptive pronoun sound slightly better than those with a trace in cases where an element of the protasis is extracted, although the latter are not totally ungrammatical. Thus, the parallelism between (52) and (53) on the one hand, and (54) and (55) on the other strongly argues for the syntactic adjunction of the protasis.

Culicover and Jackendoff further point out that extraction of an interrogative $wh$ from an $if$-clause is impossible:

(56) a. *Who did John say her father disinherits her if Mary goes out with $[t]$?
   b. *Who did John say(,) if Mary goes out with $[t](,)$ her father disinherits her?

(Culicover and Jackendoff (1997: 207))

Here again, the protasis of the $if$ you be construction behaves just in the same way as $if$-clauses in general do; it firmly resists extraction of an interrogative $wh$:
(57) a. *Who do you think if you be good to \( t \), I’ll buy a toy for you?
   b. *Who do you think I’ll buy a toy for you if you be good to \( t \)?

By contrast, the apodosis of the \( if \ you \ be \) construction does not resist extraction of an interrogative \( wh \):

(58) a. What do you think if you be good to the poor dog, I’ll buy \( t \) for you?
   b. What do you think I’ll buy \( t \) for you if you be good to the poor dog?

The asymmetry between (57) and (58) also indicates the subordinate status of the protasis.

All these considerations quite naturally lead us to the conclusion that the protasis is syntactically subordinate to the apodosis in the \( if \ you \ be \) construction, and the syntactic structure of the \( if \ you \ be \) construction is depicted roughly as follows:

(59) \[ s \ [ s' \ if \ you \ be \ quiet \] I’ll take you to the zoo \]

As indicated, the syntactic relation between the protasis and apodosis is a normal one.
3.6.2. The Semantic Relation

What, then, is the semantic relation between the protasis and apodosis? As with the syntactic relation discussed above, there are also three logical possibilities: (i) that the protasis and apodosis are semantically coordinated, (ii) that the protasis is semantically subordinate to the apodosis, and (iii) that the protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis. As pointed out in section 3.3, the *if you be* construction conveys a request (expressed by the protasis) in exchange for a reward (expressed by the apodosis) and the protasis is functionally more prominent than the apodosis, which favors the third possibility. In what follows, I will argue that this is in fact the case. It might, however, sound counterintuitive that the protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis, because the former is introduced by the subordinating conjunction *if*. We will therefore review each of the three possibilities in turn, as we did above.

If the first possibility is correct, it will follow that the protasis and apodosis are subject to semantic constraints which generally hold for coordination. It is generally assumed that coordinated conjuncts must have the same semantic function (cf. Schachter (1977) among others). This is illustrated by the following contrast:

(60) a. *John met Mary on a blind date and in 1968.*

(Schachter (1977: 91))

b. The ball flew over the fence and across the street.
Schachter argues that (60a) is impossible because it conjoins an expression of circumstance with an expression of time. By contrast, in (60b) both prepositional phrases describe a path, as Eguchi observes, and the sentence is impeccable.

Recall here example (3a), *If you be a good girl, I’ll give you a piece of candy.* As seen in section 3.3, the protasis conventionally functions as a request. Hence, in (3a) the protasis and apodosis describe a request and promise, respectively; the clauses conjoined are of different semantic types. Given the semantic requirement, possibility (i) wrongly predicts that (3a) would be ungrammatical, which is contrary to fact.

Possibility (i) involves still another difficulty. Observe the ungrammatical sentences in (22) again, repeated here as (61):

(61) a. *If you be good, sit down.
   b. *If you be a good boy, go to bed now.

Our argument in section 3.3 related this fact to the function of the apodosis, but it is also important in the discussion of the semantic relation between the two clauses. In (61) the protasis is conjoined with an imperative; both clauses express a request. If possibility (i) were tenable, it would be predicted that the examples in (61) would be grammatical, since the two clauses are of the same semantic type. This is again incompatible with what is the case. It is therefore
impossible to take the protasis and apodosis as semantically coordinated.

Next, let us consider possibility (ii). Take example (24), repeated here as (62):

\[(62)\quad \text{I hereby promise that if you are good, I'll take you to the zoo.}\]

As argued in section 3.3, the conditional sentence \textit{If you are good, I'll take you to the zoo} uncontroversially functions as a promise, and is readily compatible with the performative \textit{I hereby promise}. In such cases, it is clear that the protasis does not have any serious effect on the illocutionary force of the whole sentence. Here we assume the following:

\[(63)\quad \text{The illocutionary force of a sentence consisting of two (or more) clauses is determined by its semantically superordinate clause(s).}\]

Given this natural assumption, the acceptability of (62) means that the apodosis is semantically superordinate and hence the protasis is semantically subordinate.

With this in mind, let us look at example (25) again, repeated here as (64):

\[(64)\]
(64) I hereby promise that if you be good, I’ll take you to the zoo.

Unlike ordinary conditionals such as the one in (62), the *if you be* construction sounds less acceptable when embedded under *I hereby promise*. As we have seen, the protasis of the *if you be* construction is syntactically subordinate to the apodosis. In this respect, the protasis of the *if you be* construction has the same syntactic status as that of ordinary conditionals. Accordingly, there is nothing syntactically problematic in (64), since the apodosis, which conveys a promise by the speaker, is rightly regarded as the direct complement of *I hereby promise*. If the protasis is also semantically subordinate to the apodosis, it is wrongly predicted that (64) would be as acceptable as (62); possibility (ii) cannot accommodate the contrast between (62) and (64).

There is still another grammatical fact that casts doubt upon this possibility.

(65) So, if you are experiencing this problem, check for voltage leakage from every possible source. (BNC)

As (65) shows, *if*-clauses in general can occur with an imperative, which is a main clause phenomenon and always has to be semantically (and also syntactically) superordinate. If the protasis of the *if you be* construction were also a semantic adjunct like that of (65), nothing
would prevent it from occurring with an imperative. However, what is the case is just the opposite, as shown by the unacceptability of the examples in (61). Possibility (ii), though it might appear in accordance with what is generally the case, does not gain empirical support, either.

The only remaining possibility is the third one. It is a logically necessary conclusion and, moreover, accommodates both the ungrammaticality of the examples in (61) and the low(er) acceptability of (64). Syntactic imperatives always have to be semantically superordinate. According to possibility (iii), the protasis is semantically superordinate, too. Thus, in (61), although there is only one semantic prominence to be given, each clause “scrambles for” it. This conflict gives rise to the marginality.

Let us proceed to consider how possibility (iii) accounts for the low acceptability of (64). The apodosis of the if you be construction, being semantically subordinate to the protasis, cannot be semantically related to the performative. Instead, the protasis, being semantically superordinate, is connected to the performative, which is schematized roughly as follows:

(66) I hereby promise that if you be good, I’ll take you to the [I PROMISE [REQUEST [PROMISE]]]

As depicted in (66), there is a semantic incongruity, since the
performative requires its complement to express a promise and the protasis conventionally functions as a request as seen in section 3.3. This is, we argue, why (64) sounds less acceptable than (62).

A comparison with Japanese offers another support for possibility (iii). Recall here the fact that as pointed out in 3.3, the protasis is compatible with preverbal please:

(67) If you please be quiet, I’ll give you a big kiss. (= (16a))

When one translates (67) into Japanese, it is necessary to express the protasis as an imperative main clause and the apodosis as an adverbial subordinate clause ((68a)). The literal translation of (67) is unacceptable ((68b)).

(68) a. Kissu shite ageru kara, dooka shizukani shi-te.
   kiss  do  give as  please  quiet  do-Imp
   Lit. ‘As I’ll give you a big kiss, please be quiet.’

   b. *Dooka shizukani shite kure-tara, kissu shite age-ru.
   please  quiet  do  give-if  kiss  do  give-Pres
   ‘If you please be quiet, I’ll give you a big kiss.’

One might take this acceptability contrast as merely indicating the impossibility for Japanese to express what the if you be construction conveys. But we claim that it is not the case. Rather, the contrast is, though indirectly, related to the semantically superordinate status
of the protasis and, at the same time, the semantically subordinate status of the apodosis.

These considerations naturally lead us to the conclusion that the protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis in the *if you be* construction, which is in contrast with the syntactic relation (see (59)). The semantic structure of the *if you be* construction is represented roughly as follows:

(69)  \[[\text{REQUEST if you be quiet} \ [\text{PROMISE I’ll take you to the zoo}]]\]

In view of the general tendency for *if*-clauses to be semantically (and syntactically) subordinate, we can say that the semantic relation revealed here is not a normal one.

### 3.6.3. The *If You Be* Construction as a Case of Syntax/Semantics Mismatch

To recapitulate the discussion in this subsection, the correspondence of the syntax and semantics of the *if you be* construction is described as follows:

(70) a. Syntax:

\[s [s’ if you be quiet] I’ll take you to the zoo]\n
b. Semantics:

\[[\text{REQUEST if you be quiet} \ [\text{PROMISE I’ll take you to the zoo}]]\]
In the *if you be* construction, the protasis is syntactically subordinate to the apodosis ((70a)), while it is the latter that is semantically subordinate ((70b)); there is a mismatch between the syntax and semantics of the construction. This is summarized into the following table:

(71)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Syntax</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protasis</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>Superordinate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apodosis</td>
<td>Superordinate</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As table (71) shows, the syntactic and semantic relations between the protasis and apodosis are reversed in the *if you be* construction. A general conclusion drawn here is the following. Just because a clause is syntactically subordinate does not always mean that it is also semantically subordinate (or conversely, just because a clause is syntactically superordinate does not always mean that it is also semantically superordinate). There are cases in which the superordinate/subordinate relation is reversed between the syntactic and semantic levels, as exemplified by the *if you be* construction. Thus, cases in which syntactic subordination straightforwardly corresponds to semantic subordination are just general cases or defaults.

In fact, cases like the *if you be* construction are not rare. A first case has to do with Ross’s (1973: 161-163) observation about the performative-like expressions *I gather* and *I take it*. They occur
mainly in main clauses:

(72) a. I {gather/take it} that you had sampled those brownies.

b. *They realize that I {gather/take it} that you were sick.

(Ross (1973: 161))

They may, however, be used in adverbial clauses of concession or reason:

(73) {Although/Since} I {gather/take it} that you and Miss Pecan are acquainted, I will be happy. (Ross (1973: 162))

Hirose (1991: 31), following Ross’s observation, argues that the adverbial clauses in (73) “are asserted as if they were independent clauses.” This is parallel to what is the case with (the protasis of) the if you be construction in the sense that an adverbial clause semantically functions as a main clause.

Furthermore, there are cases where syntactic main verbs function as semantic adjuncts (cf. Levin and Rapoport (1988), Jackendoff (1990), and Jackendoff (1997) among others). They are illustrated by sentences like the following:

(74) a. Pauline smiled her thanks.

(Levin and Rapoport (1988: 277))

b. Bill belched his way out of the restaurant.
The verb phrases in (74) are interpreted as *expressed her thanks by smiling* (Levin and Rapoport (1988: 277)), *went out of the restaurant belching* (Jackendoff (1990: 213)), and *spent/wasted the afternoon sleeping* (Jackendoff (1997: 537)), respectively. As these paraphrases reveal, there is one thing that these three constructions have in common: the main verb, which is syntactically superordinate, is demoted to a semantic adjunct. This presents a remarkable parallel with what is the case with (the apodosis of) the *if you be* construction in the sense that a syntactically superordinate element functions as semantically subordinate.

The existence of these cases means that the *if you be* construction is not an isolated case of semantic superordination despite syntactic subordination or semantic subordination despite syntactic superordination, which, though indirectly, lends credence to our conclusion schematized in (71).

We have argued that in the *if you be* construction, the protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis despite the former’s syntactic subordination to the latter. To the extent that our analysis is on the right track, the *if you be* construction counts as a striking case of syntax/semantics mismatch, and constitutes another piece of evidence in favor of the view advocated by Jackendoff (1990), Culicover and Jackendoff (1997), and Yuasa and Sadock (2002) among others that the syntactic and semantic components of grammar
are, though related, independent of each other and their representations are not necessarily isomorphic.

3.7. Summary

Our close investigation of the syntax and semantics of the *if you be* construction has revealed that it is a partially fixed construction and counts as a speech act construction which conventionally conveys a request in exchange for a reward. The comparison of the *if you be* construction with the present subjunctive construction has made clear that the former is different from the latter and hence should be seen as an independent construction. We have further argued that the form and function of the *if you be* construction are systematically correlated in that most of the syntactic specifications are functionally motivated and that the formal markedness is in proportion to the functional specialization, which is in accordance with the FMFS and shows that it holds true beyond the syntactic level and further that it is a synchronically valid generalization. Finally, we have shown that the *if you be* construction involves a syntax/semantics mismatch in that the protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis despite the former’s syntactic subordination to the latter.

Appendix: Idiolectal Variation

Our argument above is based on judgments by our informant in order to maintain its coherence. It would be fair to note here that for unknown reasons judgments of the *if you be* construction vary among speakers. For one thing, there are speakers who accept the
negation of the protasis with don’t. (In what follows, the parenthesized examples indicate judgments by our informant.)

(75) a. If you don’t be quick, you’ll miss them.

(Palmer (1974: 153))

(cf. *?If you don’t be quick, you’ll miss them.)

b. If you don’t be quiet I’ll smack you! (Swan (1980: 95))

(cf. *?If you don’t be quiet I’ll smack you!)

c. If you don’t be quiet, I’ll send you away.

(Davies (1986: 101))

(cf. *?If you don’t be quiet, I’ll send you away.)

Of special note here is a comment by Swan, who points out that (75b) has “a similar meaning to imperative sentences.” (see also Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 114)) Note further that for these speakers, what we call the if you be construction can also describe undesirable situations, as shown by the examples in (75). It seems that for them, the if you be construction is syntactically and functionally more flexible than described above in the sense that it (also) allows negation with don’t and can describe undesirable situations in addition to desirable ones.

What is important in relation to our argument is, however, that even for these relatively “liberal” speakers, the protasis of the if you be construction seems to receive more functional prominence than the apodosis, given an appropriate context, which is reflected in the above comment by Swan.
To make matters more complicated, Palmer (1974: 153-154) and Davies (1986: 100-104) point out that the following sentences, whose protases involve a third person singular subject, are also possible:

(76) a. If he doesn’t be a good boy, I shan’t give him anything.

(Palmer (1974: 153))

(cf. *?If he doesn’t be a good boy, I shan’t give him anything.)

b. If she doesn’t be careful she’ll get into trouble.

(Davies (1986: 101))

(cf. *?If she doesn’t be careful she’ll get into trouble.)

Related to our argument is the fact that (76a, b) convey assertions and that the protases no longer function as performative subordinate clauses; they convey neither a request nor a prohibition.

The possibility of *do-support observed in (75) and (76) has led Palmer to posit a separate full verb *be, which accidentally lacks inflectional morphology (see also Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 114)). Davies, giving the following contrast, argues against Palmer’s approach:

(77) a. If he doesn’t be quick, he’ll miss the train.

b. *If he be quick, he’ll catch the train.

(Davies (1986: 102))
When the subject of the protasis is in the third person singular, the protasis has to be negated with *doesn’t*. The judgments in (77) reject Palmer’s hypothesis, since it would incorrectly predict that (77a, b) are equally acceptable.

Finally, even for these liberals, it is still necessary for the protasis to describe a controllable situation or, to follow Davies’s terminology, “a dynamic act of being”:

(78)  *If you don’t be happy here, we can leave.

(Davies (1986: 102))

Based on this fact, Davies (1986: 104) accounts for the tendency for the *be* to occur more freely when accompanied by *do*, indicated by the contrast in (77), as follows: “the use of *do* with *be* in *if- ... constructions is a means of expressing a semantic distinction, allowing the specification of a dynamic reading.” Note that this observation is compatible with the FMFS (see the discussion in section 3.5.2).

Davies’s observation suggests that speakers who accept (75)-(77a) have a conditional construction with the bare stem *be*, which follows only a functional specification that it describe dynamic eventualities and hence does not count as a speech act construction. Given this, what we call the *if you be* construction would be taken as a “construction token,” which is related to this more general “construction type.”
As argued in section 3.3, the *if you be* construction conventionalizes the speaker's subjective attitude. Hence, the conditional construction in question might be derived by “desubjectifying” the *if you be* construction, or conversely, the latter by “subjectifying” the former (cf. Traugott and Dasher (2002) among others).

We, however, do not have enough data to discuss this matter or to offer a satisfactory account for why these idiolectal variations should exist. Therefore, we simply mention the two possibilities here without further comment.
Notes to Chapter 3

* This chapter is a unified and revised version of a series of my papers, which appeared as Konno (2001, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b). I am very grateful to the following people for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this chapter: Minoru Nakau, Yukio Hirose, Masao Okazaki, Manabu Kusayama, Hiromitsu Akashi, and two anonymous *EL* reviewers. I would also like to thank Eleanor Olds Batchelder for kindly and patiently acting as an informant. Discussions with her via e-mail have given me many insights into the nature of the construction to be analyzed in this chapter.

1 I am indebted to two anonymous *English Linguistics (EL)* reviewers for their comments on this point.

2 I am grateful to Masao Okazaki for drawing my attention to this issue.

3 Fuller discussion will be presented in section 3.4 about the differences between the *if you be* and present subjunctive constructions.

4 Although these syntactic categories can follow the sequence “in principle,” it is AP that is the most unmarked category among them, according to my informant. It is, therefore, expected that there would be variation among speakers in their acceptability judgments of examples involving the other three categories.

5 This might sound unnatural, but there are some other cases in which an *if*-clause is used to convey a request. Observe the following examples, whose *if*-clauses contain modal auxiliaries:
(i)  
a.  I have not heard back from you since then, and I wondered if you could please confirm that you are still interested in receiving a copy of the tape?

b.  If you will please hold the line a moment I will see if Mr Wyatt is available.

c.  Now, if you would please excuse me.

(The British National Corpus (BNC))

As suggested by the occurrence of preverbal please, all of these if-clauses describe what is requested by the speaker. In (ia), the if-clause is used nominally and functions as the complement of the verb wonder. In (ib) it is used adverbially like that of the if you be construction. In (ic) it occurs independently as if it were a main clause. For an analysis of “independent” if-clauses like (ic), see Panther and Thornburg (2003).

6 For more comprehensive analyses of the latter construction, see Bolinger (1977), Davies (1986), and Clark (1993) among others.

7 This characterization receives indirect support from the following quote from an essay titled “If You Be Good...” (on the web at: http://www.cacdenver.org/Pastors/PWM/2000/IfYouBeGood.html):

My, who doesn’t remember the words, “If you be good”?
They always presaged a promise of something good in return.
From our earliest memories, our mothers, our Sunday School
teachers, and regular school teachers held out that olive branch allowing us to decide if we were to be rewarded or punished...

It was not only as children that privilege was given us; it’s just as viable for us today as adults: If you be good on the job you’ll get a merit raise in pay - or perhaps a promotion. If you be good on the streets and highways, you won’t receive a traffic ticket. Wives, if you be good, your husband may (should) bring you roses or candy occasionally. Husbands, if you be good... and the list goes on and on...

I am grateful to an anonymous EL reviewer for bringing the existence of this essay to my attention.

8 Bolinger (1977: 189, 195) points out some cases where do-support is possible in present subjunctives.

9 I am grateful to Masao Okazaki for bringing this parallelism to my attention.

10 As pointed out by an anonymous EL reviewer, it might be possible to argue that the function of the if you be construction only requires that what the protasis describes be controllable by the hearer; the subject of the protasis might not have to be you. We do not have enough data to consider this possibility, however. We will not pursue it any further here.

11 I am indebted to Manabu Kusayama for his inspiring suggestions, which have helped me to clarify this point.
Note that it is impossible for both the protasis and apodosis to be subordinated, for by definition a clause is regarded as subordinate only when there is a superordinate clause on which the former is dependent.

The approach in question would posit either that the conjunction *if* of the *if you be* construction syntactically functions as a coordinate conjunction, or that the construction syntactically involves a covert coordinate conjunction. It does not matter, however, which of the two structures one assumes. For, as we will see shortly, the coordination approach fails irrespective of whether one regards *if* as a coordinator or posits the presence of a null coordinator.

We ignore here a semantic requirement on coordination that coordinated conjuncts be of the same semantic type (cf. Schacter (1977) among others).

We ignore here the syntactic requirement on coordination.

The *if you be* construction involves still another mismatch in that the protasis, although it is an *if*-clause, conventionally functions as a request, as seen in section 3.2. This is parallel with the fact that the interrogative sentence *Will you close the window?* (Sadock (1974: 104)), for example, conventionally expresses a request. For cognitive accounts of indirect speech act constructions, see Panther and Thornburg (1998, 2003) and Stefanowitsch (2003) among others.

What, then, derives this reversal? As argued in section 3.3, expressing what the speaker him/herself desires, the protasis is
regarded as describing what is most important to him/her, and the construction conventionalizes the subjective stance of the speaker. This observation suggests that the reversal is derived via the conventionalization of the speaker’s attitude. We simply point out this possibility without further comment.

Levin and Rapoport (1988: 281) point out that French does not allow the demotion of a syntactic main verb into a semantic adjunct. Japanese is incompatible with the process in question, too:

(i) a. *Hanako-wa kansha-no kimochi-o waratta.
    Hanako-Top thanks-Gen feeling-Acc smiled
    ‘Hanako smiled her thanks.’

   b. Hanako-wa waratte kansha-no kimochi-o
    Hanako-Top smiling thanks-Gen feeling-Acc arawashita.
    expressed
    ‘Hanako expressed her thanks by smiling.’

The contrast in (i), together with that in (68), would indicate that Japanese is also less tolerant than English of semantic subordination despite syntactic superordination or semantic superordination despite syntactic subordination. Here we simply point out this tendency without further comment.

For other cases of syntax/semantics mismatch, see Hoeksema and Napoli (1993), Culicover and Jackendoff (1997, 1999), Asaka
PART II
FROM A DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE
Chapter 4

The Present Subjunctive Construction

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is concerned with clauses in the present subjunctive mood, illustrated by the following italicized materials:

(1) a. The colonel suggested that the bridge be destroyed immediately.
    b. Taro voiced the wish that the next century see more progress with linguistics.
    c. It is mandatory that the king be present at the meeting.

We will call clauses of this type the present subjunctive construction.

The aim of this chapter is two-fold. One is to explore the mechanism for licensing the present subjunctive construction in present-day English (abbreviated as “PDE”). The other is to demonstrate the diachronic validity of the FMFS by comparing the present subjunctive construction in PDE with that in old English (abbreviated as “OE”).

The present chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses how the PDE present subjunctive construction is licensed.
Arguing at length that the issue is not syntactic but semantic/pragmatic in nature, it proposes a functional licensing condition for the PDE present subjunctive construction in terms of the deontic/epistemic opposition. Section 4.3 deals briefly with the OE present subjunctive construction and shows that it had a wider distribution than the PDE counterpart. Section 4.4 compares the PDE and OE present subjunctive constructions in terms of formal markedness and functional specialization. It argues (i) that the former is formally marked, while the latter is formally unmarked and (ii) that the former is functionally more specialized than the latter. This point constitutes another piece of evidence for the FMFS and verifies its diachronic validity.

4.2. Licensing of the Present Subjunctive Construction in Present-Day English

4.2.1. The Nature of the Problem

The PDE present subjunctive construction, which is marked by the base form of the main verb, is usually introduced by an expression of demand, recommendation, proposal, intention and the like (cf. Quirk et al. (1985: 156)). What, then, is the mechanism for licensing the construction? To anticipate, we contend that the problem is semantic/pragmatic in nature. But before jumping to that conclusion, let us first venture the possibility of solving the problem in syntactic terms.

As shown by the acceptability of the examples in (1), suggest,
wish, and mandatory can each serve as a licenser for the construction:

(1) a. The colonel suggested that the bridge be destroyed immediately.
    b. Taro voiced the wish that the next century see more progress with linguistics.
    c. It is mandatory that the king be present at the meeting.

By contrast, verbs such as think and believe do not have the ability in question (cf. Weeda (1981) and Chiba (1987) among others), as shown by the following unacceptable examples:

(2) a. *I believe that the world be destroyed.
    (cf. I urge that the world be destroyed.)
    (Weeda (1981: 404))
    b. *I think that she take a nap.
    (cf. I suggest that she take a nap.)
    (Chiba (1987: 2))

What is characteristic of these prototypical examples is (i) that the licenser and the construction belong to the same sentence and (ii) that they stand in a certain local structural relation. In view of cases where the present subjunctive construction is licensed intrasententially, one might assume that the mechanism for licensing
the construction is explainable in syntactic terms.

A possible syntactic account would be to assume that the PDE present subjunctive construction has to be “governed” by its licenser.¹ Let us call this approach “the locality analysis.” For instance, in (1a) the head-complement relation between suggest and the construction appears to play a crucial role. The same line of reasoning seems to hold for (1b) and (1c), given that the noun wish and the adjective mandatory respectively inherit the argument structures of the verbs wish and mandate, either of which can take the construction as its complement, as seen in the following:

(3) a. We wished that we be freed.
     b. The legislation mandates that imported or factory-made goods be identified as such...

As far as these prototypical instances are concerned, the locality analysis seems to work well.

Some apparent counterexamples to the locality analysis can be found in Chiba (1991). Chiba observes that there are cases where the present subjunctive construction and its licenser are not in a (direct) head-complement relation. Thus:

(4) a. *We add that the selection procedure be psychologically plausible.
     b. We add to this requirement that the selection procedure
be psychologically plausible.

(Chiba (1991: 27))

In (4a), it is *add* that is in a head-complement relation with the present subjunctive construction. As shown by the unacceptability of (4a), *add* by itself cannot license the construction. Why, then, is (4b), which also involves a present subjunctive complement, possible? Chiba accounts for this fact as follows. (4b) is acceptable because the PP *to this requirement* provides an appropriate context. More specifically, the PP *to this requirement*, modifying *add*, “transfers” the licensing force of the noun *requirement* to *add*. That *requirement* can license the construction is confirmed by the acceptability of the following example:

(5) In theory, the police are controlled by the requirement that their suspicions about the future be reasonable, i.e. based on objective facts. (BNC)

The transfer in question is depicted as follows:

(6) We *add to this requirement* that the selection procedure be psychologically plausible

Thanks to the transfer, *add* inherits the licensing force of
requirement. Hence the acceptability of (4b). What is important in Chiba’s claim is that even if a head which governs the present subjunctive construction has no ability to license that kind of complement, other qualified elements such as adverbials can hand over their licensing force to that head when they are in the same sentence. As far as my understanding goes, this amounts to saying that the licensing of the present subjunctive construction can be dealt with intrasententially. Given Chiba’s account, which makes use of a kind of repair strategy, it is possible to maintain the locality analysis and to claim that (4b) is not a real but apparent counterexample.

Considered from a broader perspective, the cases that seem to be dealt with intrasententially prove to be only the tip of the iceberg; there do exist real counterexamples to the locality analysis, i.e. cases where the present subjunctive construction and its licenser do not occur in the same sentence. They include the following:

(7) I’m demanding something. It’s that you be there on time. (Jacobson (1992: 288))

(8) X: What’s written in Mr. Arai’s will? Y: That his wife be given all of his property.

(9) The entrance condition, which I would like to call the entrance “burden,” imposed by the university consists of two requirements. One is that every candidate turn in three papers by the end of January. The other is that the three papers be concerned with syntax, semantics
and phonology, respectively.

(10) We established requirements for the Ph.D. candidacy. Afterwards, we added that candidacy be limited to those students who have completed papers in all three of the main areas-syntax, semantics and phonology.

In (7) what is responsible for the use of the present subjunctive construction is demand, in (8) will, and in (9) and (10) requirement, as the following examples respectively illustrate:

(11) a. I demand that he resign immediately. (Chiba (1987: 2))

b. Indeed, he believed his skull to be so exceptional that he willed that after his death it be given to a doctor for examination, but nineteenth century sentiment and regulations prevented this from being carried out. (BNC)

c. In theory, the police are controlled by the requirement that their suspicions about the future be reasonable, i.e. based on objective facts. (= (5))

In none of the cases in (7)-(10) are the present subjunctive construction and its licenser included in the same sentence. Rather, the licenser occurs in the preceding discourse; the present subjunctive construction is licensed not intrasententially but intersententially. The locality analysis cannot predict the existence of these cases at all, since the subjunctive construction and the
trigger do not stand in any local structural relation in them. This means that the locality analysis fails to give a comprehensive account of the whole distribution of the present subjunctive construction. The only way to save the structural account would be to make a core/periphery distinction and keep examples like (7)-(10) out of consideration. In this way, the (whole) mechanism for licensing the PDE present subjunctive construction is not explainable in syntactic terms, which in turn suggests the necessity of a semantic/pragmatic analysis.\textsuperscript{3}

\subsection*{4.2.2. A Functional Licensing Condition for the Present Subjunctive Construction in Present-Day English}

What kind of semantic information, then, is necessary for the legitimate use of the PDE present subjunctive construction? To answer this question, let us reconsider the fact that verbs such as \textit{urge} can license the construction, while verbs such as \textit{believe} do not have that ability, as seen in section 4.2.1. One of the relevant contrasts is repeated below as (12):

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(12)a.] I urge that the world be destroyed.
\item[b.] *I believe that the world be destroyed.
\end{enumerate}

The significance of this contrast becomes clear when we consider the lexical semantics of the verbs \textit{urge} and \textit{believe} in terms of the deontic/epistemic distinction of modality (cf. Palmer (1986), Givón...
(1994) among others). Roughly speaking, deontic modality is concerned with the desirability of a proposition, while epistemic modality has to do with the certainty of a proposition. With this distinction in mind, observe the following dictionary definitions of the two verbs in question:

(13) a. If you urge someone to do something, you try hard to persuade them to do it.
   b. If you believe that something is true, you think that it is true, but you are not sure.

(COBUILD

As suggested by these descriptions, urge lexicalizes the deontic attitude of the subject toward the proposition denoted by the complement, while believe encodes the epistemic attitude of the subject toward the proposition expressed by the complement.

In this light, the acceptability contrast in (12) is restated as follows: the deontic verb urge can license the present subjunctive construction, while the epistemic verb believe cannot. This tells us that what is crucial for the licensing of the PDE present subjunctive construction is whether or not it successfully describes deontic situations. Based on this consideration, we propose the following functional licensing condition for the PDE present subjunctive construction:
(14) The PDE present subjunctive construction must describe deontic situations.\textsuperscript{5, 6}

This condition accounts for the grammaticality contrast in (13) as follows. In (13a) the present subjunctive construction successfully describes a deontic situation because it functions as the complement of the deontic verb *urge*. Hence the acceptability. In contrast, in (13b) the construction is forced to describe an epistemic situation due to the lexical specification of *believe*, which runs counter to what condition (14) specifies. Hence the ungrammaticality. Cases in which the present subjunctive construction is licensed via the lexical semantics of a head that syntactically governs the construction most prototypically fulfill condition (14).

Let us proceed to consider how condition (14) accounts for the grammatical contrast in (4), which is repeated below as (15):

(15) a. We add to this requirement that the selection procedure be psychologically plausible.

   b. *We add that the selection procedure be psychologically plausible.

In (15a) the present subjunctive construction expresses what is added to the requirement. In general, what is added to a requirement forms part of that requirement. Thus, (15a) is considered to be semantically equivalent to the following sentence, as Chiba (1991: 28)
correctly points out:

(16) We add to this requirement the requirement that the selection procedure be psychologically plausible.

As shown by the paraphrase, the present subjunctive construction in (15a) counts as a requirement and describes a deontic situation. Hence the acceptability. By contrast, in (15b) it remains unclear to what the content described by the construction is added; we cannot determine from the given information whether or not the construction describes a deontic situation. Hence the ungrammaticality. In this way, our approach gives a consistent explanation of the cases where the present subjunctive construction is licensed intrasententially.

Our functional condition, unlike the locality analysis, can easily account for the cases in which the present subjunctive construction is licensed intersententially, as well. Recall (7), repeated here as (17):

(17) I’m demanding something. It’s that you be there on time.

In this case, the preceding sentence sets up a context in which the speaker makes a demand. Thanks to this contextual information, the present subjunctive construction, representing the content of the demand by the speaker, successfully describes a deontic situation. Hence the acceptability.
Likewise, in (8), repeated below as (18), the first sentence provides grounds for the use of the present subjunctive construction:

(18) The entrance condition, which I would like to call the entrance ‘burden’, imposed by the university consists of two requirements. One is that every candidate turn in three papers by the end of January. The other is that the three papers be concerned with syntax, semantics and phonology, respectively.

When we go back to the first sentence, it is understood that one refers to one of the two requirements imposed by the university and the other to the other of the two requirements. Each of the present subjunctive constructions describes the content of the two requirements. Thus, they successfully express deontic situations, which is in accordance with condition (14).

In (9), repeated below as (19), there is no cue for the use of the present subjunctive construction in Y’s utterance:

(19) X: What’s written in Mr. Arai’s will?
    Y: That his wife be given all of his property.

The act of writing in one’s will is more than the mere act of writing, i.e. the act of willing. The difference is clearly shown by the following dictionary definition of the noun will:
To write in your will is to write in advance what you want your relatives to bring about after your death. Thus, the content of a will counts as a deontic situation. This encyclopedic knowledge, together with the contextual information provided by X’s utterance, makes it possible to recover the omitted main clause *It’s written in Mr. Arai’s will* in Y’s utterance and to realize that the present subjunctive construction describes a deontic situation. This is why the dialog in (19) is accepted.

Finally, let us reconsider (10), repeated below as (21):

(21) We established requirements for the Ph.D. candidacy. Afterwards, we added that candidacy be limited to those students who have completed papers in all three of the main areas-syntx, semantics and phonology.

In this case, too, the preceding sentence provides grounds for the use of the present subjunctive construction in the second sentence. Thanks to the information, it is understood that what is described by the present subjunctive construction was added to the requirements and subsumed into them. The adverb *afterwards*, signaling a
chronological relation of the events involved, i.e. the establishment of the requirements and the act of adding, also facilitates this interpretive process. Thus, what is described by the construction is regarded as another requirement and denoting a deontic situation. Hence the acceptability.

In addition to cases where the present subjunctive construction is licensed either intrasententially or intersententially, our functional condition also gives a straightforward account of cases where the construction is licensed without any linguistic cue. They include the following:

(22)a. God save the Queen.
    b. God bless America.

(BNC)

In these expressions, the present subjunctive construction occurs as a main clause and there is no linguistic cue for the use of the construction. The examples in (22) are instances of what Quirk et al. (1985: 157-158) call “the formulaic subjunctive.” What is characteristic of them is that they are conventionally used to offer a prayer to God for the occurrence of a certain event (cf. Takamasu (1999)) and count as speech act constructions. Because of this conventionalized function, the examples in (22) successfully describe deontic situations. Hence the acceptability. In this way, our functional condition in (14) can capture the whole distribution of the
PDE present subjunctive construction.

4.3. The Present Subjunctive Construction in Old English

In OE, which had a much richer inflectional system than PDE, the present subjunctive construction was marked through verbal inflection in agreement with the grammatical number of the subject. In addition to this morphological difference, the OE present subjunctive construction had a wider distribution than the PDE counterpart and was compatible with either deontic or epistemic contexts. The following example aptly illustrates the ambiguity in question: 7

(23) & forðon ic ðe bebiode ðæt ðu dó swæ
and therefore I you command that you do.pres.subj as
ic geliefe ðæt ðu wille, ...
I believe that you desire.pres.subj
‘And therefore I command that you do as I believe you desire, ...’

(CP 5, 1-2)

The first instance of the present subjunctive construction serves as the complement to the deontic verb bebeodan (‘command’) and the second one that to the epistemic verb gelyfan (‘believe’), which exactly means that the OE present subjunctive construction was used to describe either deontic or epistemic situations.
4.4. Formal Markedness and Functional Specialization

Let us compare the PDE and OE present subjunctive constructions from the perspectives of formal markedness and functional specialization. We first make a morphosyntactic comparison of them. Although PDE and OE differ in that the former has a poor inflectional system, while the latter has a rich one, they have in common the general tendency for the main verb of a finite clause to agree with its subject. The PDE present subjunctive construction, where the main verb appears in its base form, is in conflict with the tendency; it is characterized as formerly marked. By contrast, the OE present subjunctive construction, where the main verb occurs inflected, is in accord with the tendency; it is considered to be formally unmarked.

Let us proceed to compare the two constructions semantically. As seen in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the former can represent only deontic situations, while the latter can describe either deontic or epistemic situations. This is illustrated by the following examples:

(24)a. He commanded that roads be built to link castle across the land... (COBUILD4)

b. *The pope believed that God save the cruel world.

(25)a. ic ðe bebiode ðæt ðu dó

b. ic geliefe ðæt ðu wille

(= (23))
Thus, on the meaning side, the PDE present subjunctive construction is functionally more specialized than the OE present subjunctive construction.

From these considerations, we can say that the formally marked PDE present subjunctive construction is functionally more specialized than the formally unmarked OE present subjunctive construction; the formal markedness of the former is in proportion to its functional specialization. This state of affairs is schematized as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
(26) & \text{The PDE present} & \text{DEONTIC} \\
& \text{subjunctive} & \text{EPISTEMIC} \\
& \text{construction} & \text{subjunctive} \\
& (\text{*AGREEMENT}) & (\checkmark \text{AGREEMENT})
\end{array}
\]

As shown, the functional range of the PDE present subjunctive construction, which is formally marked, is narrower than that of the OE present subjunctive construction, which is formally unmarked. This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the FMFS, which is repeated below for ease of reference:

\[
(27) \quad \text{If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding unmarked form(s).}
\]
Another important consequence drawn from (26) is that the FMFS holds diachronically; if a grammatical construction which was once unmarked is rendered formally marked via diachronic language change, there is a concomitant functional specialization of that construction. Thus, we can say that the FMFS is valid not only synchronically but also diachronically.

4.5. Summary

We have mainly discussed how the present subjunctive construction is licensed in PDE. Showing that the issue is not syntactic but semantic/pragmatic in nature, we have proposed that the PDE present subjunctive construction must describe deontic situations. We have also made a comparison between the PDE and the OE present subjunctive constructions and argued that the formally marked PDE present subjunctive construction is functionally more specialized than the formally unmarked OE present subjunctive construction. The comparison has verified the diachronic validity of the FMFS.
Notes to Chapter 4

1 This chapter is a radically revised version of Konno (2002a).

1 Here, we will not try to give any exact formulation of the syntactic approach in question, which we will argue against below.

2 In the following, we represent the licensing force of requirement for the present subjunctive construction as [+present subjunctive].

3 Jacobson (1992) reaches the same conclusion on the basis of the acceptability of (7).

4 Chiba (1987: 5) proposes a similar analysis on the basis of the following description by Onions (1965: 114):

The Subjunctive is a Mood of Will; in its simplest uses, it expresses desire, and all its uses can be traced to this primary meaning, which may be denoted by shall or should. Thus the Subjunctive is closely allied in meaning to the Imperative.

5 Deontic and epistemic modality, though distinct, are closely related to each other. Givón (1994) proposes the notion of “irrealis,” which subsumes both deontic and epistemic modality and claims that the subjunctive construction in general represents irrealis modality (see also James (1986) for a similar analysis to Givón’s). Sweetser (1990) also relates the two modal categories in terms of metaphor. The close relationship between the two modal categories, however, does not matter as far as the PDE present subjunctive construction is
concerned. For, as we argue, the PDE present subjunctive construction is specialized to express deontic modality.

6 One might object that the PDE present subjunctive construction can also describe epistemic situations by pointing out the fact that there are cases where an if-clause contains the present subjunctive construction. The use of the present subjunctive construction in an if-clause is, however, by no means productive. Quirk et al. (1985: 1012), giving the example *If any person be found guilty, he shall have the right of appeal*, state that “the present subjunctive ... is used very occasionally in formal style in open conditional clauses” (see also James (1986: 5, 7)). This statement is empirically justified; the following examples are judged to be unacceptable or stylistically infelicitous because they sound unnecessarily bookish:

(i) a. *If it rain tomorrow, I won’t go to school.

   b. *Taro will not go on if his effort not be rewarded.

Thus, it seems unlikely that these stylistic instances have much to do with the licensing of the PDE present subjunctive construction. For this reason, we exclude cases in which the present subjunctive construction is licensed stylistically out of consideration.

7 See also Kondo and Fujiwara (1993: 133, 136).

8 In the generative literature, this property is accounted for by assuming that the PDE present subjunctive construction contains a
PART III
FROM A CROSSLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE
Chapter 5

The Nani-o X-o Construction*

5.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with a colloquial and idiomatic interrogative expression in Japanese that characteristically contains two accusative-marked phrases in a single clause. It is illustrated by sentences like the following:¹

(1) Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yunda?
what-Acc rubbish-Acc say Q
‘Why do you talk rubbish?’

We will call expressions of this kind the nani-o X-o construction.

The aim of the present chapter is to offer a detailed analysis of the nani-o X-o construction from both syntactic and semantic perspectives. Section 5.2 describes the syntax of the nani-o X-o construction and shows that it is a partially fixed construction in conflict with a certain morphosyntactic constraint in Japanese. Section 5.3 examines the semantics/pragmatics of the nani-o X-o construction and points out that it counts as a speech act construction and functions roughly as an accusation by the speaker. Section 5.4
compares the *nani-o X-o* construction with the *naze* ('why') construction and argues that the former is different from the latter and should be regarded as an independent construction. Section 5.5 investigates the relation between the form and function of the *nani-o X-o* construction and reveals that it is systematic in the following three respects: (i) most of its syntactic properties are reducible to its communicative function; (ii) its syntactic deviance is mitigated by its semantic coherence; and (iii) its formal markedness is in proportion to its functional specialization. The final point exactly means that the FMFS also holds in Japanese. Section 5.6 is a brief summary.

5.2. The Syntax of the *Nani-o X-o* Construction

We will begin by describing the syntax of the *nani-o X-o* construction. It will be shown that the construction involves several syntactic idiosyncrasies and that it is a partially fixed construction.

First, as will be seen in the examples throughout the chapter, the *nani-o X-o* construction consists of a single clause that contains two accusative-marked phrases. One of them is the accusative-marked *wh*-adjunct *nani-o* ('what-Acc'), which, according to Kurafuji (1997), is interpreted as *naze* ('why'), and the other is the accusative-marked object of a transitive verb.

As Kurafuji (1997: 257) correctly points out, the simultaneous occurrence of *nani-o* and *X-o* in the *nani-o X-o* construction is in conflict with the Double-O Constraint in Japanese (Harada (1973, 1977), Shibatani (1978)), the gist of which is summarized in the
following quote from Saito and Hoshi (2000: 271):

(2) *The Double-O Constraint*

A simple sentence cannot contain more than one *o*-marked phrase.⁴

Henceforth, we will abbreviate this constraint as “DOC”. The violation has led Kurafuji (1997), Ochi (2002) and Hiraiwa (2002) to judge the construction marginal. Kurafuji (1997: 257), giving the example in (4), makes the following remark:

(3) Japanese has a surface phonological constraint which rejects the double accusative sequence (…XP- *o* YP- *o*…), and the sentence in [(4)] violates this constraint.

(4) ??Jon-wa nani-*o* henna uta-*o* utatte-i-ru no?
John-Top what-Acc strange song-Acc sing-be-Pres Q
‘Why is John singing a funny song?’

In view of this fact, one might be tempted to claim that the *nani-* *o* X-*o* construction does not exist in Japanese to start with, or that even if it exists, it is a mere slip-of-the-tongue that is not worthy of any serious grammatical investigation. However, this is a hasty conclusion; exceptional cases do exist. For instance, as extensively discussed in the literature, there are cases in which the (normally) intransitive verb *sleep* is exceptionally used transitively. One such
case is illustrated by the following sentence:

(5) He slept the night away. (Jackendoff (1997: 534))

How to deal with cases like (5) is of course a matter of debate (see Jackendoff (1997)). But what is important for our purposes here is that just because an expression is in conflict with a given grammatical convention does not necessarily entail that it can never be used.

Exactly the same can be said of the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction. In fact, it is not difficult to find instances of the construction in both transcribed and written texts:

(6) a. Nani-o sonnani aimaina koto-o osharun desuka.

\begin{center}
\text{what-Acc such ambiguous thing-Acc say Q.Polite}
\end{center}

‘Why do you make such an ambiguous remark?’

b. Amerika-wa kita choosen-ga jyunshu shite-i-nai

\begin{center}
\text{the US-Top North Korea-Nom observe do-be-Neg to itte-i-ru jyanai desuka. Nani-o sonnna}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\text{Quot say-be-Pres Assert.Polite what-Acc such}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\text{inchiki-o itte-i-ru ndesuka. nonsense-Acc say-be-Pres Q.Polite}
\end{center}

‘The US insists that North Korea doesn’t observe the agreement, doesn’t it? Why are you talking such nonsense?’

(KKKS)
(7) a. Nani-o yomaigoto-o iiyagaru.
   what-Acc rubbish-Acc say
   ‘Why do you talk rubbish?’

b. O, oi, Yuuki-dono, Sakyoo-dono, nani-o jyooodan-o
   hey Yuki-Mr. Sakyo-Mr. what-Acc joke-Acc
   yuu noda
   say Q
   ‘H, hey, Mr. Yuki and Mr. Sakyo, why do you joke?’

c. “Nani-o tawaketakoto-o mosu”
   what-Acc nonsense-Acc say
   ‘Why do you talk nonsense?’

d. Omae-wa nani-o soo kurushisoono kao-o
   you-Top what-Acc so distressful face-Acc
   shite-i-ru noda.
   do-be-Pres Q
   ‘Why do you look so distressful?’

e. Nani-o yakamashii koto-o yuu nda.
   what-Acc fussy thing-Acc say Q
   Oogon-no kan-wa chant o omae-no te-ni
   gold-Gen crown-Top properly you-Gen hand-Dat
   kaette-i-ru jyanaika.
   return-be-Pres Assert
   ‘Why do you make such a fuss? The golden crown has
   already returned to you, hasn’t it?’

   (AB)
The existence of these attested cases clearly suggests that although it violates the DOC, the *nani-o X-o* construction does exist.

The observation by Kurafuji (1997), Ochi (2002) and Hiraiwa (2002) is undoubtedly the case and we agree with them that the *nani-o X-o* construction violates the DOC. However, this is not to say that the construction does not exist. The correct characterization seems to be the following:

(8) The *nani-o X-o* construction exists despite its violation of the DOC.  

This characterization correctly captures the fact that acceptability judgments of the construction vary from speaker to speaker; some reject it for the DOC violation (cf. (4)), while others accept it despite the violation (cf. (1), (6) and (7)).

Having confirmed the existence of the *nani-o X-o* construction, let us proceed to observe a second syntactic property of the construction. The order of the two accusative phrases *nani-o* and X-o is fixed in the *nani-o X-o* construction:

(9) a. Nani-o yomaigoto-o iiyagaru.  
    b. *Yomaigoto-o nani-o iiyagaru.  

(10) a. Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu nda?  
     b. *Bakagetakoto-o nani-o yuu nda?
Na ni-o has to precede X-o in the construction and switching their order directly affects grammaticality, as shown by the contrasts in (9) and (10). The irreversibility cannot be predicted on general grounds, since, as is well-known, scrambling is generally allowed in Japanese:

(11) a. Nani-o Taro-ni tsutaeta nda?
what-Acc Taro-Dat told Q
‘What did you tell Taro?’

b. Taro-ni nani-o tsutaeta nda?
Taro-Dat what-Acc told Q
‘What did you tell Taro?’

Thirdly, the tense and aspect of the nani-o X-o construction is restricted. The construction can occur in the present tense, but not in the past tense:

(12) a. Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu nda?
what-Acc rubbish-Acc say Q
‘Why do you talk rubbish?’

b. *Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itta nda?
what-Acc rubbish-Acc said Q
‘Why did you talk rubbish?’

Furthermore, it can be expressed in the progressive aspect, but not in the perfective or prospective aspect:
Fourthly, the \textit{nani-o} X-o construction has to occur as a main clause and cannot be subordinated:

(13) a. Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itte-i-ru nda?  
\hspace{1cm} \text{what-Acc rubbish-Acc say-be-Pres Q}  
\hspace{1cm} `Why are you talking rubbish?`  
b. *Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itte-shimat-ta nda?  
\hspace{1cm} \text{what-Acc rubbish-Acc say-Perf-Past Q}  
\hspace{1cm} `(Lit.) Why have you talked rubbish?`  
c. *Nani-o bakagetakoto-o ii-soo nanda?  
\hspace{1cm} \text{what-Acc rubbish-Acc say-about.to Q}  
\hspace{1cm} `(Lit) Why are you about to talk rubbish?`  

Thus, the construction counts as an instance of main clause phenomena.

By contrast, if a sentence does not contain the sequence \textit{nani-o}
X-o, it can be embedded. For example, (15a), which only contains the accusative *wh*-adjunct *nani-o*, can be embedded as in (15b) (see also Kurafuji (1997: 262) and Ochi (2002: 14) for similar examples):

(15) a. Nani-o sawaide-i-ru no?
    what-Acc make.noise-be-Pres Q
    ‘Why are you making noise?’

    b. [Watashi-wa [kimi-ga nani-o sawaide-i-ru
    I-Top you-Nom what-Acc make.noise-be-Pres
    noka] wakara-nai].
    C understand-Neg
    ‘I don’t understand why you are making noise.’

Fifthly, as is generally the case with clauses other than imperatives, the person of the subject of the *nani-o X-o* construction is not restricted:

(16) {Ore/Omae/Taroo}-wa nani-o bakagetakoto-o
    I You Taro -Top what-Acc rubbish-Acc
    itte-i-ru nda?
    say-be-Pres Q
    ‘Why {am I/are you/is Taro} talking rubbish?’

As shown, the construction can occur with first, second and third person subjects.
Sixthly, the main verb of the *nani-o* X-o construction allows variation:

(17) a. Nani-o bakagetakoto-o kangaete-i-ru nda?
    what.Acc rubbish.Acc think-be-Pres Q
    ‘Why are you thinking rubbish?’

b. Nani-o hon-o yonde-i-ru nda? (Moo
    what.Acc book.Acc reading-be-Pres Q already
    shuppatsu-suru zikan da zo.)
    depart-do time Cop I.tell.you
    ‘Why are you reading a book? It’s time to leave.’

Typical examples of the construction contain either *yuu* (‘say’) or *suru* (‘do’) as the main verb, but the construction is also compatible with such transitive verbs as *kangaeru* (‘think’) and *yomu* (‘read’), as seen in (17).

Seventhly, it is possible for some element to intervene between *nani-o* and X-o:

(18) a. Omae-wa nani-o bakagetakoto-o itte-i-ru nda? (= (16))

b. Nani-o omae-wa bakagetakoto-o itte-i-ru nda?

As shown, the topicalized subject *omae-wa*, for instance, may intervene between *nani-o* and X-o. Thus, though what makes the *nani-o* X-o construction morphosyntactically marked is the sequence
nani-o X-o, it is not the case that it is completely frozen.

Finally, it is possible to omit everything but nani-o and X-o in the nani-o X-o construction:

(19) Nani-o bakanakoto-o. Niisan-ga rikutsu-ga
what-Acc rubbish-Acc elder.brother-Nom argument-Nom
i-e-n katte sonana bakana koto-o shite.
say-can-Neg because such foolish thing-Acc do
‘(Lit.) Why foolish things? You are doing such a foolish
thing because your brother cannot argue, aren't you?’

(AB)

From the observations so far, the surface syntax of the nani-o X-o construction is schematized as follows:

(20) \([s[*scr/mc/*past/*perf/*pros] (...) \textit{nani-o} (...) \textit{X-o} (...)]\)

In our notation, the subscripts “*scr”, “mc”, “*past”, “*perf”, and “*pros” respectively represent the five syntactic specifications (i) that nani-o precede X-o, (ii) that the construction occur as a main clause, (iii) that it not be expressed in the past tense, (iv) that it not be expressed in the perfective aspect, and (v) that it not be expressed in the prospective aspect; and the parentheses indicate optional materials. As the schema indicates, the nani-o X-o construction is syntactically fixed in that it is subject to the five specifications. At
the same time, the construction is syntactically flexible in that it allows variants as far as they are not in contradiction with those specifications. Thus, the *nani-o X-o* construction is syntactically characterized as a partially fixed construction. We will consider its function in the next section.

5.3. **The Semantics/Pragmatics of the *Nani-o X-o* Construction**

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the *nani-o X-o* construction is a colloquial and idiomatic interrogative expression. Its most appropriate context is demonstrated by the following attested example:

(21) “Nani-o, kimi, bakana koto-o itte-ru nda!”
what-Acc you foolish thing-Acc say-be.Pres Q
Chuui-wa, haradatashigeni tsuyaku-ni itta.
lieutenant-Top angrily interpreter-Dat said
“Why are you talking rubbish?” the lieutenant said to
the interpreter angrily.’

(AB)

As indicated by the use of *haradatashigeni* (‘angrily’) in the quoting part, (21) describes a situation in which the lieutenant expressed anger and accused the interpreter of talking rubbish; the *nani-o X-o* construction is used to accuse someone of doing something.
In this relation, observe the following example:

(22) Kyoojyu-wa “Nani-o sonna kasetsu-o
professor-Top what-Acc such hypothesis-Acc
 teeanshite-i-ru nda?” to insee-o hinanshita.
propose-be-Pres Q Quot graduate-Acc accused
‘(Lit.) The professor accused the graduate student, “Why
are you proposing such a hypothesis?”’

In (22) the nani-o X-o construction functions as the quoted part of a
sentence with hinansuru (‘accuse’) as the quoting verb. What, then,
does this fact tell us about the function of the construction?

According to Yamanashi (2002), quotation serves as a
grammatical test to see what illocutionary force a given expression
conventionalizes. If an expression conventionalizes a certain
illocutionary force in the sense of Grice (1975), that force can be
(directly) reflected in the quoting part of a sentence with the
expression in question as the quoted part. By contrast, if an
expression conversationally conveys a certain illocutionary force, that
force cannot be reflected in the quoting part. To illustrate the point,
let us consider the following acceptability contrast pointed out by
Yamanashi (2002: 229, 231):

(23) a. “Hey, Walt, how about you all leaving me your record
player?” requested Duke.
b. ?“It’s hot in here,” requested John.

As the acceptability contrast in (23) shows, the interrogative sentence *How about you all leaving me your record player?* can function as the quoted part of a sentence with *request* as the quoting verb, while the affirmative one *It’s hot in here* cannot. This indicates that the former is conventionally used as a request, while the latter is only conversationally used as a request, according to Yamanashi.

Given this, we can now understand the significance of the grammaticality of (22); it means that the *nani-o X-o* construction conventionalizes the illocutionary force of an accusation.

The fact that the *nani-o X-o* construction conventionally conveys an accusation has an important effect upon the flexibility of its communicative function, which is illustrated by the following contrast:

(24) a. *Taro-wa “Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu no?” to Taro-Top what-Acc rubbish-Acc say Q Quot Hanako-ni tazuneta. Hanako-Dat asked
‘Taro asked Hanako, “Why do you talk rubbish?”’
b. *Taro-wa “Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu no?” to Taro-Top what-Acc rubbish-Acc say Q Quot Hanako-o hinanshita. Hanako-Acc accused
'(Lit.) Taro accused Hanako, “Why do you talk rubbish?”'

Example (24a), where the nani-o X-o construction occurs as the quoted part of a sentence with tazuneru (‘ask’) as the quoting verb, sounds unacceptable, while example (24b), where the construction occurs as the quoted part of a sentence with hinansuru (‘accuse’) as the quoting verb, is impeccable (cf. also (22)). The unacceptability of (24a) means that the construction cannot express a (genuine) question. Thus, although it involves the wh-word nani-o and appears as if it were a question, the construction cannot literally express a question; it is a rhetorical question that conventionally and exclusively expresses an accusation.

Given that the nani-o X-o construction conventionally and exclusively conveys an accusation, it is easily predicted that it cannot express, for example, a praise. This is in fact the case. Observe the following:

(25) *Kyoojyu-wa  “Nani-o sonna kasetsu-o
professor-Top what-Acc such hypothesis-Acc
teeanshite-i-ru nda?” to insee-o hometa.
propose-be-Pres Q Quot graduate-Acc praised
‘(Lit.) The professor praised the graduate student, “Why
are you proposing such a hypothesis?”'

The construction cannot serve as the quoted part of a sentence with
homaru (‘praise’) as the quoting verb, as seen in (25) (contrast (25) with (22), which is acceptable). This is because the act of accusation contrasts with that of praise in that when we accuse someone of doing something, we negatively evaluate what he/she does, while when we praise someone for doing something, we positively evaluate what he/she does (cf. Fillmore (1971)).

Thus, in (25) the illocutionary force of an accusation inherent in the nani-o X-o construction clashes with that of a praise reflected in the quoting verb homaru (‘praise’), which results in the unacceptability.

Similarly, some speakers judge the nani-o X-o construction unacceptable when X-o is modified by adjectives such as subarashii (‘brilliant’):

(26) (*)Nani-o subarashii kasetu-o teanshite-i-ru
what-Acc brilliant hypothesis-Acc propose-be-Pres
nda?
Q
‘(Lit.) Why are you proposing a brilliant hypothesis?’

The adjective subarashii (‘brilliant’) usually functions as a marker of the speaker’s positive subjective attitude. Modifying X-o with it therefore contradicts with using the nani-o X-o construction, which, as argued above, expresses an accusation and entails the speaker’s negative subjective attitude. Hence the unacceptability of (26).

There are also speakers who accept (26). It sounds acceptable
when, for example, the speaker sarcastically evaluates the hypothesis proposed as “brilliant.” In this case, (26) functions as an irony and conveys the speaker’s accusation of the hearer’s proposing an absurd hypothesis. Note that even in this coerced situation, the construction still expresses an accusation. The existence of these two types of judgments tells us that whether or not the nani-o X-o construction is accepted depends heavily on whether or not it successfully functions as an accusation; the construction is accepted as far as contextual factors do not prevent it from expressing an accusation. To sum up so far, the nani-o X-o construction is (i) conventionally and (ii) exclusively used to accuse someone of doing something.

The functional specification has a direct bearing upon the simultaneous occurrence of the accusative wh-adjunct nani-o and the accusative object X-o in the nani-o X-o construction. In fact, if nani-o is omitted from the example in (12a), the sentence no longer serves as an accusation, as seen in (27b):

(27) a. Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itte-i-ru nda? (= (12a))
   b. #Bakagetakoto-o itte-i-ru nda.
      rubbish-Acc say-be-Pres Assert
      ‘(Ah,) I’m talking rubbish.’

(27b) is interpreted as the recognition of what the speaker him/herself is doing, for example, and cannot function as an
accusation. Thus, \textit{nani-o} plays an important role in the semantics of the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction.

In view of this fact, one might suppose that the semantic properties of the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction observed above actually derive from those of \textit{nani-o}. However, the presence of \textit{nani-o} alone is not sufficient for the sentence to function exclusively as an accusation. Sentences that contain \textit{nani-o} but not \textit{X-o} are ambiguous between an accusation and a question. For example, observe (28):

(28) a. Taro-wa “Nani-o sawaide-i-ru no?” to
Taro-Top what-Acc make.noise-be-Pres Q Quot
Hanako-o hinanshita.
Hanako-Acc accused
‘(Lit.) Taro accused Hanako, “Why are you making noise?”’

b. Taro-wa “Nani-o sawaide-i-ru no?” to
Taro-Top what-Acc make.noise-be-Pres Q Quot
Hanako-ni tazuneta.
Hanako-Dat asked
‘Taro asked Hanako, “Why are you making noise?”’

In the quoted parts of the examples in (28), \textit{nani-o} occurs with the intransitive verb \textit{sawagu} (‘make noise’). As the acceptability shows, the sentence \textit{Nani-o sawaide-i-ru no?}, which involves \textit{nani-o} but not
X-o, can function as the quoted part of a sentence with either *hinansuru* (‘accuse’) or *tazuneru* (‘ask’) as the quoting verb; it can function as either an accusation or question.\textsuperscript{13} The presence of the sequence *nani-o X-o* is therefore crucial for the construction to function exclusively as an accusation.\textsuperscript{14} 

There is a further subtle aspect to the semantics of the *nani-o X-o* construction. To see this, observe the following example:

\begin{quote}
\textit{(29) Gitaroo: (Fumanna kao-o shite) Konpira-no kamisan Gitaro dissatisfied face-Acc doing Konpira-Gen god iute, omae oota koto-ga aru-ke? say you met thing-Nom is-Q Miko: (Nirande) Nani-o sitsureena koto-o yuu medium glaring what-Acc rude thing-Acc say noja, kamisama-no osugata-ga me-ni mi-eru mon ka. Q God-Gen figure-Nom eye-Dat see-can thing Q ‘Gitaro: (With a dissatisfied look) You speak of the god of Konpira. But have you ever seen him? The medium: (Glaring at him) Why do you make such rude remarks? Never can we see the figure of gods!’}
\end{quote}

In (29) the medium, replying to the immediately preceding remark by Gitaro, expresses her accusatory attitude toward him, which is also confirmed by the occurrence of the circumstantial description
nirande ('glaring') and the adjective sitsureena ('rude'). As suggested by the dialogue, the nani-o X-o construction represents the speaker's reaction to the described situation unfolding right in front of his/her very eyes, which has a certain grammatical ramification.

Recall here that the nani-o X-o construction can occur in the present tense, as shown in section 2. As is well-known, sentences in the simple present tense often receive a habitual (or generic) interpretation:

(30) Mizu-wa hyakudo-de futtoo suru.
    water-Top 100°C-at boil does
    ‘Water boils at 100°C.’

This, however, is not the case with the nani-o X-o construction. Because of the functional property just discussed, nani-o X-o sentences in the simple present tense always receive an instantaneous reading and cannot have a habitual one. Accordingly, the construction is incompatible with the frequency adverb yoku ('often'), for instance:

(31) a. Nani-o bakanakoto-o yuu nda?
    what-Acc rubbish-Acc say Q
    ‘Why do you talk rubbish?’

b. ??Nani-o yoku bakanakoto-o yuu nda?
    what-Acc often rubbish-Acc say Q
'Why do you often talk rubbish?'

(31b) has to be interpreted as habitual due to the lexical property of *yoku* ('often'), which clashes with the instantaneous connotation of the construction. Hence its marginality.

The observations so far lead us to characterize the communicative function of the *nani-o X-o* construction as follows:

(32) The *nani-o X-o* construction is conventionally and exclusively used to accuse someone (typically, the hearer) of doing something right in front of the speaker’s very eyes.

The *nani-o X-o* construction is thus best characterized as an instance of speech act constructions.

Our discussion so far has clarified the syntax and semantics of the *nani-o X-o* construction. Here, two questions arise as to (i) whether the idiosyncracies of the construction observed so far are attributable to any established construction, and (ii) what the relation between the syntax and semantics of the construction is. In the following two sections, we will consider these questions in turn.

5.4. Comparison of the *Nani-o X-o* Construction with the *Naze Construction*

Are the syntactic and semantic/pragmatic idiosyncrasies observed
in sections 5.2 and 5.3 unique to the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction? As briefly mentioned in section 5.2, Kurafuji (1997) points out that the \textit{wh}-accusative adjunct \textit{nani-o} in Japanese is interpreted as \textit{naze} ('why'), which is illustrated by the fact that (33a) is paraphrased as (33b):

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(33) a.] Kare-wa nani-o sawaide-i-ru no?
\item[(33) b.] Kare-wa naze sawaide-i-ru no?
\end{enumerate}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
he-Top & \text{what-Acc make.noise-be-Pres Q} \\
he-Top & \text{why make.noise-be-Pres Q} \\
\end{tabular}

`Why is he making noise?'

(Kurafuji (1997: 253))

As predicted by Kurafuji’s observation, \textit{nani-o} can be replaced with \textit{naze} ('why') in the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction, too (see also note 3). The example in (1) can be paraphrased as (34b):

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(34) a.] Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu nda?  
\item[(34) b.] Naze bakagetakoto-o yuu nda? 
\end{enumerate}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
why & \text{rubbish.Acc say Q} \\
\end{tabular}

(= (1))

We will call sentences with \textit{naze} ('why') the \textit{naze} construction for convenience. The paraphrase relation might lead one to suppose that the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction shares its idiosyncrasies with the \textit{naze} construction. However, this is not the case; the paraphrase
relation merely suggests that the function of the *nani-o X-o* construction partially overlaps with that of the *naze* construction. In fact, most of the idiosyncrasies are the former's own and cannot be attributed to the latter, as will be seen below.

5.4.1. Syntactic Differences

We first compare the *nani-o X-o* construction with the *naze* construction from syntactic perspectives. First, scrambling the *wh*-word and the object yields ungrammaticality in the *nani-o X-o* construction, as seen in (9), repeated below as (35), while it does not in the *naze* construction, as in (36):

(35) a. Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu nda?
   b. *Bakagetakoto-o nani-o yuu nda?

(36) a. Naze bakagetakoto-o yuu nda?
   why   rubbish-Acc   say   Q
   b. Bakagetakoto-o naze yuu nda?
   rubbish-Acc  why   say   Q
   'Why do you talk rubbish?'

Secondly, the *nani-o X-o* construction cannot be expressed in the past tense, as observed in (10), repeated below as (37a), while the *naze* construction can, as shown in (37b):

(37) a. *Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itta nda?
b. Naz e ba kag etak oto-o itta nda?
   why rubbish-Acc   said Q
   ‘Why did you talk rubbish?’

Finally, the *nani-o X-o* construction cannot be embedded, as seen in (14b), repeated below as (38a), while the *naze* construction can, as illustrated by (38b):

(38) a. *[Watashi-wa [kimi-ga nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu noka] wakara-nai].

b. [Watashi-wa [kimi-ga  naze bakagetakoto-o yuu noka]
   I-Top      you-Nom why rubbish-Acc say C
   wakara-nai].
   understand-Neg
   ‘I don’t understand why you talk rubbish.’

In this way, the *nani-o X-o* construction is syntactically more constrained than the *naze* construction, which means that they are syntactically different.

5.4.2. Semantic/Pragmatic Differences

The *nani-o X-o* construction does not share its semantic/pragmatic characteristics with the *naze* construction, either. First, let us compare the functional range of the two constructions. The *nani-o X-o* construction is used exclusively as an accusation and
cannot function as a question, as pointed out in section 5.3. We repeat the relevant examples here:

(39) a. Taroo-wa “Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu no?” to Hanako-o hinanshita.


(= (24))

By contrast, the naze construction functions either as an accusation or question, and can occur in the quoted part of a sentence with either hinansuru (‘accuse’) or tazuneru (‘ask’) as the quoting verb, unlike the nani-o X-o construction:

(40) a. Taroo-wa “Naze bakagetakoto-o yuu no?” to
    Taro-Top why rubbish-Acc say Q Quot
    Hanako o hinanshita.
    Hanako-Acc accused
    ‘(Lit.) Taro accused Hanako, “Why do you talk rubbish?”’

b. Taroo-wa “Naze bakagetakoto-o yuu no?” to
    Taro-Top why rubbish-Acc say Q Quot
    Hanako-ni tazuneta.
    Hanako-Dat asked
    ‘Taro asked Hanako, “Why do you talk rubbish?”’
Next, the *nani-o X-o* construction cannot have a habitual reading, which is reflected in its incompatibility with the frequency adverb *yoku* (‘often’), as seen in section 5.3. By contrast, the *naze* construction can receive a habitual interpretation and is compatible with that adverb. This is illustrated by the following contrast:

(41) a. ?? *Nani-o yoku bakanakoto-o yuu nda?* (= (31b))

b.  *Naze yoku bakanakoto-o yuu nda?*

   *why  often rubbish-Acc  say Q*

   ‘Why do you often talk rubbish?’

The *nani-o X-o* construction is functionally more constrained than the *naze* construction, which means that they are semantically distinct, too.

From these observations, it is now clear that although there holds a paraphrase relation between them in principle, the *nani-o X-o* construction does not share its idiosyncrasies with the *naze* construction. It should be seen as an independent construction.

### 5.5. The Relation between the Form and Function of the *Nani-o X-o* Construction

We will now consider the second question posed at the end of section 5.3: What is the relation between the form and function of the *nani-o X-o* construction? In view of the idiosyncratic nature of the construction observed so far, one might suppose that it is
arbitrary. However, on closer inspection it turns out that the form and function of the construction are correlated systematically.

5.5.1. Functional Motivation for the Syntax

As argued in chapter 3, it is often the case that the communicative function of a construction is closely related to its syntax. The *nani*-o X-o construction is no exception in this respect. First, notice again that the order of *nani*-o and X-o is fixed and the former has to precede the latter, as seen in (9), repeated below as (42):

(42) a. *Nani-o yomaigoto-o iiyagaru?
   b. Yomaigoto-o nani-o iiyagaru?

At first sight, this fact appears to be purely syntactic in nature. But further reflection reveals that it is functionally motivated.

The analysis suggested here is based on Nakau’s (1992, 1994) Hierarchical Semantics Model, which postulates that the semantic structure of a sentence consists of the modal component and the propositional component and further that the former governs the latter.\textsuperscript{15}

The dominance relation between the modal and the propositional components is syntactically reflected in the ordering of sentence adverbs, for example. According to Jackendoff (1972: 89), speaker-oriented adverbs have to precede subject-oriented adverbs:
(43) a. Happily, Max carefully was climbing the walls of the garden.
b. *Carefully, Max happily was climbing the walls of the garden.

As Endo (2004: 243) demonstrates, this constraint is also at work in Japanese:

(44) a. Fushiginakoto-ni Jyon-wa mazime-ni-mo
    strange-fact-Dat John-Top serious-Dat-also
    benkyooshita.
    studied

b. *Majime-ni-mo fushiginakoto-ni Jyon-wa
    serious-Dat-also strange-fact-Dat John-Top
    benkyooshita.
    studied
    ‘(Lit.) Strangely, John studied seriously.’

In terms of Nakau’s modal-propositional bistructure thesis, speaker-oriented adverbs such as happily and fushiginakotoni (‘strangely’), “relating the speaker’s attitude toward the event expressed by the sentence (Jackendoff (1972: 56)),” belong to the modal component. By contrast, subject-oriented adverbs such as carefully and mazimenimo (‘seriously’), “commenting on the subject of the sentence (Jackendoff (1972: 56)),” are included in the
propositional component. Accordingly, speaker-oriented adverbs take semantic scope over subject-oriented adverbs. The ordering of adverbs in (43a) and (44a) is in accordance with the semantic dominance relation, while that in (43b) and (44b) is not. Hence the ungrammaticality of the latter (cf. Jackendoff (1972: ch. 3)).

With the above discussion in mind, let us examine to which component the two accusative phrases *nani*-o and X-o in the *nani*-o X-o construction are each related. In this connection, recall that the construction functions as an accusation and that the presence of *nani*-o is closely related to the accusatory attitude of the speaker expressed, as shown in section 5.3. This is reflected in the fact that if *nani*-o is omitted from the construction, the sentence no longer serves as an accusation. We repeat the relevant contrast here:

(45) a. Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itte-i-ru nda?
   b. # Bakagetakoto-o itte-i-ru nda.

(= (27))

We can say from this contrast that *nani*-o counts as an expression of modality in the *nani*-o X-o construction.

This analysis is supported, though indirectly, by the fact that *nani*-o by itself can express the speaker’s accusatory attitude:

(46) Taroo: Omae-wa hontooni baka da naa.

Taro you-Top really foolish Cop Excl
Jiroo: Nani-o?!

Jiro what-Acc

‘Taro: You are a real fool.

Jiro: What?!’

In (46), Jiro expresses his accusatory attitude toward (the preceding remark by) Taro by uttering nani-o.16

The other accusative phrase X-o is semantically in sharp contrast with nani-o. For it functions as the object of the verb and constitutes part of the propositional content to which the speaker’s accusatory attitude is directed. Thus, X-o is regarded as propositional, unlike nani-o, which, together with our argument above, means that nani-o semantically governs X-o in the nani-o X-o construction. The relevant part of the semantic structure of the construction is represented as follows:

(47) \[ \text{[MOD(ALITY) nani-o [PROP(OSITION) X-o]]} \]

The hierarchical semantic structure in (47) gives a straightforward account of why nani-o has to precede X-o in the nani-o X-o construction; the former takes semantic scope over the latter, just as speaker-oriented adverbs governs subject-oriented adverbs, which corresponds to the linear sequence nani-o X-o. Reversing their order conflicts with their semantic dominance relationship. Hence the ungrammaticality of (42b). As has been shown, the restriction in
question is considered to be a direct reflex of the semantic structure of the construction.

Secondly, recall the restriction on the tense and aspect of the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction. The construction cannot be expressed in the past tense, the perfective aspect, or the prospective aspect, as seen in section 5.2. We repeat the relevant examples below:

\begin{verbatim}
(48) a. *Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itta nda? (= (12b))
b. *Nani-o bakagetakoto-o itte-shimat-ta nda? (= (13b))
c. *Nani-o bakagetakoto-o ii-soo nanda? (= (13c))
\end{verbatim}

Irrelevant details aside, there is one thing that these three modes of expression have in common: they locate the event described by the sentence remote from the time of utterance. The temporal remoteness is in conflict with one of the functional specifications in the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction observed in section 5.3: that the construction represent the speaker’s reaction to the described situation unfolding right in front of his/her very eyes. Hence the ungrammaticality in (48).

Finally, the \textit{nani-o X-o} construction cannot be embedded, as pointed out in (14b), repeated here as (49):

\begin{verbatim}
(49) *[Watashi-wa [kimi-ga nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu noka] wakara-nai].
\end{verbatim}
This syntactic property is also functionally explainable. Notice that the main verb of (49) is *wakaru* ('understand') and, further, that the complement clause, which the *nani-o X-o* construction forms part of, is introduced by the interrogative complementizer *noka* due to the subcategorization requirement of the verb. Accordingly, the complement clause as a whole has to function as a question, which contradicts with the accusatory implication encoded in the construction. Hence the ungrammaticality of (49).

In this way, we can straightforwardly account for why the *nani-o X-o* construction has the form it has by taking its function into consideration.

### 5.5.2. Syntactic Deviance and Semantic Coherence

We saw in section 5.2 that the *nani-o X-o* construction violates the DOC. This is because the construction, consisting of a single clause, contains the two *o*-marked phrases *nani-o* and *X-o* in the same syntactic domain. In this connection, the semantic structure in (47) has an important consequence.

Its significance becomes clear if we assume that the DOC has to be satisfied at the level of semantics, too; namely, that more than one *o*-marked phrase cannot belong to a single semantic domain. With this assumption in mind, let us consider whether the *nani-o X-o* construction (also) violates the DOC semantically.

As represented in (47), *nani-o* belongs to the modal component of the semantic structure of the *nani-o X-o* construction, while *X-o*
belongs to the propositional component. That is, the two \( o \)-marked phrases are included in two different semantic domains. We can then say that the construction satisfies the DOC semantically.

The syntactic and semantic structures of the \( nani-o \ X-o \) construction are not isomorphic in that the former violates the DOC and is deviant, while the latter satisfies the constraint and is coherent.\(^\text{17} \)

The contrast is represented roughly as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(50) \text{a. Syntax: } [S \ nani-o \ X-o ] & \quad (= (20)) \\
\text{b. Semantics: } [\text{MOD} \ nani-o \ [\text{PROP} \ X-o]] & \quad (= (47))
\end{align*}
\]

Assuming this mismatch enables us to give a principled account of why, as seen in section 5.2, some speakers reject the construction for the DOC violation, while others accept it in spite of the violation. In the former case, the syntactic deviance takes precedence over the semantic coherence. By contrast, in the latter, it is the semantic coherence that takes precedence and, consequently, it “mitigates” the syntactic deviance.

The \( nani-o \ X-o \) construction is not an isolated case of semantic mitigation. As has frequently been pointed out in the literature, verbs of Latinate origin cannot enter into the ditransitive construction (see Pinker (1989) and references cited therein). Let us call this constraint the Latinate Constraint (abbreviated as “LC”). The LC is illustrated by the following contrast:
John {gave/*donated} the museum a painting.

(Pinker (1989: 45))

Donate, for example, is a Latinate verb and cannot enter into the ditransitive construction due to the LC.

In this relation, Takami (2003) makes an interesting observation. He points out that there are speakers who allow ditransitive sentences with donate:

(52)   ... we donated them a few dollars each month ...

(Takami (2003: 39))

Takami accounts for the grammaticality of (52) as follows: donate is semantically similar to give, which is one of the prototypical verbs used in the ditransitive construction, and hence is qualified as dativizable.

Donate is semantically compatible with the ditransitive construction because of its semantic affinity with give, as noted by Takami, while it is morphophonologically incompatible with the construction due to the LC. Given this characterization, the variation in judgment observed in (51) and (52) can be accounted for in our terms as follows. If the LC violation takes precedence and is not mitigated by the semantic compatibility, ditransitive sentences with donate are not accepted, as in (51). In contrast, if the semantic compatibility takes precedence and mitigates the LC violation,
ditransitive sentences with *donate* are accepted, as in (52). This exactly parallels what is the case with the *nani-o X-o* construction.

As a final remark in this subsection, let us discuss two possible objections to our argument. It might be objected that the *nani-o X-o* construction does not involve the DOC violation to start with. Advocates of approaches along these lines would posit an abstract syntactic structure in which *nani-o* and *X-o* each belong to different syntactic domains, which parallels the semantic structure in (47). Notice, however, that it amounts to claiming that there is nothing syntactically problematic in the construction (too) and, consequently, fails to capture the fact that some speakers accept the construction, while others do not.

The other possible objection concerns the following well-known fact: path phrases in Japanese can be marked with the accusative case marker *-o* and occur with the *o*-marked object of a transitive verb in the same sentence without causing the DOC violation (Shibatani (1978)):

(53) Taroo-wa kyuuna saka-o zitensya-o isshookenmee
Taro-Top steep slope-Acc bicycle-Acc hard
oshita.
pushed
‘Taro pushed the bicycle hard up the steep slope.’

(Shibatani (1978: 262))
On the basis of this fact, one might assume that the *nani-o* in the *nani-o* X-o construction denotes a (metaphorical) path and that the construction does not violate the DOC. Notice, however, that this alternative, just like the one ventured above, amounts to claiming that the *nani-o* X-o construction involves neither syntactic nor semantic anomaly. As a result, it fails to give a principled account of why the variation in judgment should exist, too. By contrast, our approach, assuming the DOC violation at the syntactic level and its satisfaction at the semantic level, accommodates the duality easily, as argued above. Thus, the objections should be dismissed.

### 5.5.3. Formal Markedness and Functional Specialization

We would finally like to discuss the relation between the form and function of the *nani-o* X-o construction in terms of formal markedness and functional specialization. As argued in sections 5.2 and 5.5.2, the construction (syntactically) violates the DOC, which is one of the grammatical conventions in Japanese. It is therefore characterized as formally marked.

On the meaning side, the construction functions exclusively as an accusation, not as a question, as observed in section 5.3. We repeat the relevant examples here:

(54) a. Taroo-wa “Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu no?” to Hanako-o hinanshita.

b. *Taroo-wa “Nani-o bakagetakoto-o yuu no?” to Hanako-ni
The *nani*-o X-o construction is therefore characterized as functionally specialized. In this way, the formal markedness of the *nani*-o X-o construction is in proportion to its functional specialization.

A comparison of the *nani*-o X-o construction with the *naze* construction, which does not violate the DOC and hence is formally unmarked, helps to understand this point well. In contrast to the former, the latter functions either as an accusation or a question, as pointed out in section 5.4.2. We repeat the examples in (40) as (55) below:

(55) a. Taroo-wa “Naze bakageta-koto-o yuu no?” to Hanako-o hinanshita.
       b. Taroo-wa “Naze bakageta-koto-o yuu no?” to Hanako-ni tazuneta.

From these observations, we can say that the formally marked *nani*-o X-o construction is functionally more specialized than the formally unmarked *naze* construction. This is schematized as follows:
As depicted in (56), the functional range of the *nani-o X-o* construction, which is marked, is narrower than that of the *naze* construction, which is unmarked. This conclusion is consistent with the FMFS, repeated below for ease of reference:

(57) If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding unmarked form(s).

Another important consequence concerned with (56) is that the FMFS holds not only in English, as seen in chapters 2-4, but also in Japanese, which demonstrates its validity across languages. This, together with our conclusions in chapters 2-4, means that the FMFS is a (i) synchronically, (ii) diachronically and (iii) crosslinguistically valid generalization.

To recapitulate, there hold systematic correspondences between the form and function of the *nani-o X-o* construction despite its apparent idiosyncrasy.
5.6. Summary

Our close investigation of the form and function of the *nani-o X-o* construction has revealed that it is a partially fixed speech act construction which is conventionally and exclusively used to accuse someone of doing something right in front of the speaker's very eyes.\(^{18}\) The comparison of the *nani-o X-o* construction with the *naze* construction has made clear that the former is both syntactically and semantically more restricted than the latter and hence should be regarded as an independent construction. We have further argued that the form and function of the *nani-o X-o* construction are systematically related in that the syntactic specifications are functionally motivated, that the syntactic deviance is mitigated by the semantic coherence, and that the formal markedness is in proportion to the functional specialization. The final point not only argues for the FMFS but also shows its crosslinguistic validity.
Notes to Chapter 5

* A few years ago one of my fellow students at the University of Tsukuba introduced Maynard (2000) at a class. After the presentation, I, giving an instance of the construction to be analyzed in this chapter, commented that *nani*-o in Japanese could be used with a saturated transitive verb to express an accusation and added that the sentence, however, might be unacceptable because it violated a certain constraint in Japanese. Yukio Hirose, replying my comments, said that my sentence sounded to him not as bad as I had expected, which gave me a cue to think about the construction seriously. My thanks to him are therefore immeasurable. My special thanks also go to Hiromitsu Akashi, Manabu Kusayama, and Masao Okazaki for not only acting as informants but also frankly discussing the nature of the construction with me. Finally, I would like to thank Katsuo Ichinohe, Nobuhiro Kaga, Ken-ichi Kitahara, Momoko Kodaira, Toshinobu Mogi, Joe Morita, Minoru Nakau, and Toshihiro Tamura for helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. This chapter is a slightly modified version of Konno (2004c).

1 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses of examples: Acc = accusative case marker, Assert = assertive morpheme, C = complementizer, Cop = copula, Dat = dative case marker, Excl = exclamative morpheme, Gen = genitive case marker, Neg = negative morpheme, Nom = nominative case marker, Past = past tense morpheme, Perf = perfective morpheme, Polite = polite.
form, Pres = present tense morpheme, Q = question marker, Quot = quotative particle, Top = topic marker.

2 The sentence-final form *nda is a contraction of *no da, where *no is a sentential nominalizer and *da is a copula. It performs a variety of pragmatic functions. Thus, when used in a *wh-interrogative like (1), it serves as an emphatic question marker (hence *Q); when used in a declarative sentence like (27b) below in the text, it serves as an assertion marker (hence Assert).

3 The *nani-o in the *nani-o X-o construction can basically be replaced with *naze (*why*), and the example in (1) is paraphrased as:

(i) Naze bakagetakoto-o yuu nda?
why rubbish-Acc say Q
‘Why do you talk rubbish?’

However, there are many syntactic and semantic differences between these two constructions. See section 5.5.4 for discussion of this issue.

4 The DOC is illustrated by the following examples:

(i) a. *Hanako-wa Taro-o mune-o sashita.
Hanako-Top Taro-Acc chest-Acc stabbed
‘Hanako stabbed Taro in the chest.’

(Harada (1977: 94))

Taro-Nom that street-Acc car-Acc drove
‘Taro drove a car along the street.’

(Homma (2001: 755))

Each example in (i) involves two o-marked phrases in a single clause and violates the DOC. Hence the ungrammaticality.

5 There are even speakers who readily accept (4).

6 The data sources used are Kokkai Kaigiroku Kensaku Shisutemmu (abbreviated as “KKKS”) and Aozora Bunko (“AB”). The former is available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/KENSAKU/swk_startup.html and the latter at http://www.aozora.gr.jp/.

7 The violation has certain implications, for which see section 5.5.

8 See section 5.5.2 for an account of why speakers of the latter type should exist.

9 A Google search for the sequence nani-o yomaigoto-o gave 29 hits when I did it on January 15, 2004, while the search for the inverted counterpart yomaigoto-o nani-o gave no hits. Similarly, a search for nani-o bakagetakoto-o gave as many as 52 hits, but one and only one hit for bakagetakoto-o nani-o. These facts give further credence to our observation in (9) and (10).

10 For a detailed analysis of expressions with how about, see Eilfort (1989) among others.

11 I am grateful to Yukio Hirose for bringing Fillmore’s paper to my attention.
12 The parenthesized asterisk indicates that some speakers accept (26), while others do not.

13 There are cases in which a sentence which contains nani-o but not X-o functions exclusively as an accusation. Some informants have pointed out to me that the following examples sound accusatory, not interrogatory.

(i) a. Nani-o hasitte-i-ru nda?
    what-Acc run-be-Pres Q
    ‘Why are you running?’

   b. Nani-o sonnnani asette-ru nda?
    what-Acc such panic-be.Pres Q
    ‘Why are you in such a panic?’

The functional specification in (i) seems to be due to some contextual factors irrelevant to our discussion. For the nani-o X-o construction functions exclusively as an accusation without exception, while as shown in (28), sentences that contain nani-o but not X-o are in principle ambiguous between an accusation and a question. We will not go into details of this issue.

14 See section 5.5.1 for further discussion on the semantic roles played by nani-o and X-o.

15 Here, we follow Nakau’s (1992, 1994) theory of modality, which defines modality as follows:
MODALITY is defined, prototypically, as (i) a mental attitude (ii) on the part of the speaker (iii) only accessible at the time of utterance, where the time of utterance is further characterized as the instantaneous present (as opposed to particularly to the durational present and the past).

See Nakau (1992, 1994) for independent evidence for the definition.

16 Maynard (2000) argues that the non-interrogative nan(i) in Japanese is an expression of modality. Though she does not deal with the nani-o X-o construction, her conclusion adds further credence to the analysis suggested here.

17 I am grateful to Hiromistu Akashi for his suggestions on this point.

18 An attentive reader might notice that the nani-o X-o construction is very similar to what Kay and Fillmore (1999) calls the WXDY construction in English, illustrated by What are they doing resuscitating constructions? (Kay and Fillmore (1999: 1)). Interestingly, its function seems to be fixed to express “the pragmatic force of attributing ... INCONGRUITY to the scene or proposition for which the explanation is required” (Kay and Fillmore (1999: 4)). Furthermore, it is in conflict with the Double -ing Constraint (Ross (1972), Milsark (1972)), as Bolinger (1979: 52) notes. It therefore appears possible to take the WXDY construction as another case for the FMFS. Here, we simply mention this possibility without further
comment and leave the comparison of the *nani-o* X-o construction with the WXDY construction for future research.
PART IV
RELATED ISSUES
Chapter 6

The FMFS as an Independent Pragmatic Principle

6.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, we demonstrated the synchronic, diachronic and crosslinguistic validity of the FMFS. In this chapter, we discuss whether the FMFS has to be postulated as an independent pragmatic principle by comparing it with the prevalent notion of “the division of pragmatic labor” (Horn (1984), Levinson (2000)). It will be demonstrated that our paradigms observed so far cannot be accommodated by the latter, which proves the independent status of the former.

6.2. A Comparison of the FMFS with the Division of Pragmatic Labor

As briefly mentioned in chapter 2, the FMFS, which we repeat below for ease of reference, is consistent with the general view that “marked choices are all used with specific effects (Battistella (1996: 134)).”

(1) If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the
grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding unmarked form(s).

Also consistent with the view is the so-called “division of pragmatic labor” (Horn (1984), Levinson (2000)), which says roughly that unmarked forms receive unmarked interpretations and, accordingly, marked forms receive marked interpretations. Since the FMFS and the division of pragmatic labor both employ the notion of markedness,¹ one might suppose that either of them is reducible to the other. The most likely assumption would be that the FMFS derives from the widely acknowledged notion of the division of pragmatic labor. However, this is not the case; in fact, there are three important things that differentiate the former from the latter.

Recall here our paradigms observed so far, which we repeat below for ease of reference:

(2)  \( \textit{Mouses} \quad \text{DEVICE} \quad \textit{Mice} \)

\(\text{(*irregularity)} \quad \text{ANIMAL} \quad (\sqrt{\text{irregularity}})\)

(3)  The \(\textit{if you be} \quad \text{DESIRABLE} \quad \text{The ordinary conditional construction} \quad \text{UNDESIRABLE} \quad \text{construction} \)

\(\text{(*agreement)} \quad (\sqrt{\text{agreement}})\)
As far as these oppositions are concerned, the existence of the use of a marked expression for a certain purpose does not “block” (Aronoff (1976)) or “preempt” (Clark and Clark (1979)) that of an unmarked expression for that same purpose, and vice versa. Thus, our marked/unmarked oppositions do not involve the division of pragmatic labor. It is this kind of marked/unmarked oppositions without blocking effect that the FMFS is intended to capture.\footnote{2}

A second difference concerns the way the two generalizations employ the notion of markedness. The FMFS employs that notion only formally, while the division of pragmatic labor employs it both formally and functionally; that is, the FMFS is more flexible than the division of pragmatic labor in the sense that the former does not specify the direction of functional specialization, while the latter does.

For a better understanding of this point, let us take the paradigm in (3) for example. It is widely assumed that in a positive/negative
opposition, the positive counterpart is semantically unmarked and the negative counterpart semantically marked (Horn (1989)). Accordingly, desirable situations are considered to be semantically unmarked, while undesirable ones are viewed as semantically marked. Given this semantic contrast, the division of pragmatic labor would predict that the formally unmarked ordinary conditional construction will describe desirable situations by default, while the formally marked if you be construction will be specialized to express undesirable ones. As extensively discussed in chapter 3, this is not the case; the ordinary conditional construction can readily describe either desirable or undesirable situations and the if you be construction only desirable ones. The division of pragmatic labor cannot capture the relevant contrast correctly, while the FMFS accommodates it well, as argued in chapter 3.

Finally, recall that one of the principles that derive the division of pragmatic labor requires that marked messages represent marked situations. Thus, if one wishes to capture our paradigms in terms of the division of pragmatic labor, one has to claim that the semantic markedness of devices ((2)), desirable situations ((3)), deontic situations ((4)), and accusation ((5)) are higher than that of animals, undesirable situations, epistemic situations, and question, respectively. Notice, however, that it remains totally unclear on what grounds the former concepts can be regarded as more marked than the latter.

As we have seen, the FMFS can capture our four paradigms as a
natural class, while the division of pragmatic labor cannot. From this follows the conclusion that the explanatory targets of the FMFS are different from those of the division of pragmatic labor. That is to say, neither one is reducible to the other. In this way, the FMFS is different from the division of pragmatic labor and should be postulated as an independent principle governing linguistic use.

6.3. Summary

Our comparison of the FMFS with the division of pragmatic labor has revealed that the former is not reducible to the latter and hence should be regarded as an independent pragmatic principle.
Notes to Chapter 6

1 Note in passing that the FMFS employs the notion of markedness more narrowly than the division of pragmatic labor. On this point, see the discussion in chapter 2 and Levinson (2000: 137).

2 Our argument here might be off the point with respect to the paradigm in (4). For the two versions of the present subjunctive construction each belong to different historical periods; there can be no blocking relation between them to start with.
Chapter 7

Functional Specialization without Formal Markedness*

7.1. Introduction

This chapter makes a brief comparison between the two “causative” verbs *prevent* and *prohibit* in terms of formal markedness and functional specialization and demonstrates that the reverse of the FMFS does not always hold; namely, the functional specialization of a grammatical form does not necessarily presuppose the formal markedness of that form. It also discusses from the perspectives of metaphor and metonymy why *prevent* and *prohibit* take from *V-ing* complements, complements of the same form.

7.2. *Prevent* vs. *Prohibit*

As is clear from our discussion in the preceding chapters, the FMFS, repeated below for ease of reference, is a unidirectional generalization.

(1) If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the
Accordingly, as noted in chapter 2, its reverse does not always hold; namely, the functional specialization of a grammatical form does not necessarily presuppose the formal markedness of that form. Let us demonstrate this point by comparing the two “causative” verbs *prevent* and *prohibit*, which constitute a syntactic class in that they take complements of the form [NP from V-ing] (hereafter “from V-ing complements”):

(2) a. He prevented her from rising, placing firm strong hands over her upper arms.

b. The first order prohibited the father from having any contact with the children and prohibited the mother from allowing the father to have contact with the children.

(BNC)

From the perspective of formal markedness, there is no difference between them. For instance, they are both polysyllabic verbs of Latinate origin; if one of them is regarded as formally marked/unmarked, then the other should be viewed likewise. Thus, the formal markedness of *prevent* is equal to that of *prohibit*.

Let us proceed to consider whether they are differentiated in terms of functional specialization. Observe the following minimal
(3) a. *Jack prevented Nancy from ever working for his company again, but she appealed over his head to the managing director, who reinstated her.

b. Jack prohibited Nancy from ever working for his company again, but she appealed over his head to the managing director, who reinstated her.

As shown, sentences with *prevent* entail that the event described in the *from V-ing* complement does/did not happen, while those with *prohibit* do not. This state of affairs is summarized into the following diagram:

(4) \[
\text{Prevent} \quad \text{SUCCESSFUL CAUSATION} \quad \text{Prohibit} \quad \text{UNSUCCESSFUL CAUSATION}
\]

As shown, *prevent* can only describe successful causation, while *prohibit* can describe either successful or unsuccessful causation. Thus, without being differentiated in terms of formal markedness, *prevent* and *prohibit* differ from the perspective of functional specialization; the former is functionally more specialized than the latter. In this way, the *prohibit/prevent* opposition proves that the functional specialization of a grammatical form does not necessarily presuppose the formal markedness of that form; hence, the
unidirectionality of the FMFS.

7.3. **From V-ing Complementation**

As seen above, *prevent* and *prohibit* constitute a syntactic class in that they take *from V-ing* complements, complements of the same form. In addition to the two verbs, *bar, dissuade* and *forbid* can also take *from V-ing* complements:

(5) a. RUSSIA seized Mikhail Gorbachev’s passport yesterday and barred him from leaving the country.

b. But none of these horrors had dissuaded Godolphin from travelling in the Reconciled Dominions.

c. His parents, who were strictly religious and puritanical, saw any kind of pleasure as the road towards hellfire and damnation and forbade Robert from going to parties, wearing bright clothes, or drinking alcohol.

For want of a better term, I shall call them “f-verbs.” Why, then, can these verbs take complements of the same form? Does this syntactic fact have any semantic motivation? The rest of this chapter addresses this issue.

7.3.1. **Causative Verbs Lexicalizing Negation**

F-verbs such as *prevent* and *dissuade* have been studied by many
scholars including Lakoff (1970), Karttunen (1971), Givón (1973, 1975), Dowty (1979), Ota (1980), Wierzbicka (1988), Jackendoff (1990), Koenig and Davis (2001), and Rudanko (2002). These previous studies agree that prevent and dissuade are causative verbs ("causatives" for short) which imply negation; they entail that the event described in the from V-ing complement does/did not happen and belong to what Karttunen (1971) calls "negative implicatives." This amounts to the claim that prevent and dissuade share the following semantic structure in terms of lexical decomposition, where irrelevant details are omitted (cf. Lakoff (1970: 97), Dowty (1979: 291) and Jackendoff (1990: 131) among others):\(^5\)

\[(6) \quad \{\text{CAUSE [NOT ...]}\}\]

Verbs with the CAUSE function count as causatives, and among them, those with the NOT function imply negation and belong to what is called "inherent negatives" (Klima (1964)) or "adversative predicates" (Linebarger (1987)). Thus, verbs with the structure in (6) count as causatives lexicalizing negation.

If the analysis of prevent and dissuade by the previous studies is extended to the other f-verbs, the following descriptive generalization about from V-ing complementation suggests itself:

\[(7) \quad \text{In order for a verb to take a from V-ing complement, it must have the semantic structure [CAUSE [NOT ...]].}\]
Let us examine whether generalization (7) is empirically adequate. We first consider whether f-verbs in fact lexicalize negation. There are three pieces of evidence in favor of their characterization as inherent negatives. A first piece of evidence comes from dictionary definitions of f-verbs:

(8) a. prevent: to prevent someone from doing something means to make it impossible for them to do it.  
(COBUILD³)

b. dissuade: to persuade some[ome]body not to do some[ome]thing  
(OALD⁶)

Note that the definitions in (8) include negatives such as not and impossible. As is clear from the definitions, speakers of English take f-verbs as verbs which imply negation.

A second piece of evidence lies in the fact that f-verbs include verbs to which the negative prefix dis- is attached:

(9) John dissuaded Harry from leaving.  (Lakoff (1970: 96))
(cf. He persuaded her to record a version of the song... (BNC))

The affixation of dis-, which changes the polarity of a verb from positive to negative, causes the verb to take a from V-ning complement.
The final piece of evidence in this context comes from the licensing of negative polarity items (abbreviated as “NPIs”) by f-verbs (cf. Lakoff (1970)).

(10) a. *I think I could ever trust you.
    b. I don’t think I could ever trust you.

(Hoeksema (2000: 115))

(11) a. *Mary gave John a red cent.
    b. Mary didn’t give John a red cent.

(12) a. *Mary budged an inch.
    b. Mary didn’t budge an inch.

Examples (10)-(12) show that the adverb ever, the NP a red cent and the VP budge an inch must be in the scope of negation; namely, they function as NPIs. If f-verbs in fact lexicalize negation as generalization (7) claims, it is predicted that they allow these NPIs in their complements. This prediction is borne out, as the following examples show:

(13) a. The teacher’s stern scowl dissuaded Nancy from ever asking such a silly question.
    b. The doctor prevented Tom from donating a red cent to the hospital.
    c. The teacher prevented the student from budging an inch.
As is clear from the acceptability of all the sentences in (13), f-verbs allow NPIs in their complements. Therefore, it seems highly likely that f-verbs lexicalize negation.

As for the characterization of f-verbs as causatives, there is also strong empirical evidence for it. Jackendoff (1990: 131) points out that *Harry prevented Sam from going away entails that the event described in the from V-ing complement, i.e. Sam’s leaving, did not happen and inserting the adverb unsuccessfully, which cancels that entailment, results in contradiction:

\[(14) \quad \text{*Harry unsuccessfully prevented Sam from leaving.} \]

(Jackendoff (1990: 131))

The following are also in support of the characterization, showing that prevent and dissuade entail that the event described in the from V-ing complement does/did not happen (cf. Givón (1973) and Rudanko (2002)):

\[(15) \quad \text{a *Jack prevented Nancy from ever working for his company again, but she appealed over his head to the managing director, who reinstated her.} \quad (= (3a)) \]

\[\text{b *The teacher dissuaded the student from budging an inch, so when he moved anyway, he was sent out of the room.} \]

In these examples the clauses introduced by but and when assert that
the events described in the *from V-ing* complements, i.e. her speaking aloud and the student’s moving, respectively, did occur, which is in contradiction with the lexical entailment of *prevent* and *dissuade*. Hence the unacceptability of the sentences in (15). These cases argue for the claim that f-verbs are causatives.

To recapitulate, the observations so far appear to be in support of the analysis by the previous studies and hence generalization (7) that f-verbs are causatives incorporating negation.

### 7.3.2. Deontic Verbs Lexicalizing Negation

In so far as f-verbs like *prevent* and *dissuade* are concerned, the generalization in (7) appears to be correct. But the case is not as simple as that; a closer look reveals another class of f-verbs, which generalization (7) does not accommodate.

There are f-verbs which do not entail that the event described in the *from V-ing* complement does/did not happen (cf. Givón (1975) and Rudanko (2002)). They include *forbid*, *prohibit* and *bar*. Interestingly, these f-verbs only implicate, not entail, that the event described in the *from V-ing* complement does/did not happen and the implicature is readily defeasible:

(16) a. The teacher {prohibited/forbade} the student from budging an inch, so when he moved anyway, he was sent out of the room.7

b. Jack {prohibited/barred} Nancy from ever working for
his company again, but she appealed over his head to the managing director, who reinstated her. (= (3b))

(cf. *The teacher succeeded in prohibiting the student from budging an inch, so when he moved anyway, he was severely called down.)

In (16) the clauses introduced by when and who assert that the events described in the from V-ing complement, i.e. the student’s moving and Nancy’s working for Jack’s company again, respectively, did occur. If generalization (7) were correct, all the cases in (16) would sound contradictory. The examples in (16) are, however, without any contradiction and readily acceptable. Thus, these cases strongly argue against the generalization in (7).

In view of the truth-conditional difference between f-verbs like prevent and those like prohibit, one might modify generalization (7) and claim that f-verbs are divided into (i) causatives lexicalizing negation which entail that the event described in the from V-ing complement does/did not happen, and (ii) those which are unmarked with respect to the outcome of causation and only implicate that the event described in the from V-ing complement does/did not happen (cf. Jackendoff (1990: 130ff.)). F-verbs like prevent would belong to the former class and those like prohibit to the latter class. This dichotomy would correctly capture the fact that f-verbs like prohibit do not entail that the event described in the from V-ing complement does/did not happen ((16)), while those like prevent do ((14, 15)).
I, however, agree with approaches along these lines only in considering f-verbs to be inherent negatives and such f-verbs as prevent and dissuade to be causatives lexicalizing negation. I disagree that all f-verbs are causatives and their difference lies only in whether or not they entail that the subject succeeds/succeeded in causing the event described in the from V-ing complement not to happen. For it seems to me that approaches of this kind are problematic, both on conceptual and empirical grounds. First, they merely “encode” the difference among f-verbs with respect to the entailment and do not “explain” what derives the difference. Second, as will be shown below, there is a semantic gulf between f-verbs like prevent on the one hand, and those like prohibit on the other, which has a lot of grammatical ramifications besides what has been observed in (14)-(16) and cannot be accounted for by merely taking all f-verbs as causatives lexicalizing negation.

I conclude from these considerations that any approaches along these lines are untenable and that f-verbs like prohibit are not causatives lexicalizing negation.

If f-verbs such as prohibit are not causatives lexicalizing negation, then to what semantic category do they belong? In order to get a clue to this important question, it is convenient to observe how English dictionaries define them. Let us first look at the following dictionary definitions of forbid:

(17) a. forbid: if you forbid someone to do something, or if you
forbid an activity, you order that it must not be done.

(COBUILD³)

b. forbid: to order s[ome]b[ody] not to do s[ome]t[hing]

(OALD⁶)

Note here that the definitions of forbid in (17) include order. Order belongs to deontic speech act verbs (hereafter “deontics” for short), which express the will or desire of the subject (cf. Palmer (1986)). It may, therefore, safely be inferred from the fact that the definitions of forbid in (17) include order and not that speakers of English regard forbid as a deontic lexicalizing negation (cf. Wierzbicka (1987, 1988)). The following are f-verbs regarded as semantically similar to forbid:

(18) a. prohibit: if a law or someone in authority prohibits something, they forbid it or make it illegal. (COBUILD³)

b. bar: if someone is barred from a place or from doing something, they are officially forbidden to go there or to do it. (COBUILD³)

As indicated by the paraphrases of prohibit and bar into forbid in (18), speakers of English seem to take them as deontics lexicalizing negation, too. Here, I introduce the function ORDER in order to represent the deontic aspect of f-verbs like forbid and prohibit and propose that irrelevant details omitted, they have the following semantic structure (cf. Givón (1975)):
Recall here that f-verbs which count as deontics lexicalizing negation do not entail that the event described in the _from V-ing_ complement does/did not happen, as shown by the examples in (16). The approach ventured in the preceding subsection merely encodes the property with the stipulation that they are causatives lexicalizing negation that do not have the entailment, which does not give any satisfactory account for the fact in question. By contrast, it is possible to offer a principled account for why they do not have the entailment if they are regarded as deontics lexicalizing negation. The point is that they focus on the desire of the subject that the event described in the _from V-ing_ complement not occur, not on the result of the action they denote; therefore, as far as those f-verbs which count as deontics lexicalizing negation are concerned, it does not matter whether the subject actually causes/caused the nonoccurrence of the event described in the _from V-ing_ complement. This is the reason why the sentences in (16) are without any contradiction and readily acceptable. As for the question why deontic f-verbs have the implicature, it will be considered in section 7.4.

Let us proceed to consider whether the characterization of _forbid, prohibit_ and _bar_ as inherent negatives has any empirical support. The f-verbs in question allow such NPIs as _ever, a red cent_ and _budge an inch_ in their complements:
(20) a. His parents forbade Robert from ever going to parties.
   b. The doctor prohibited Tom from donating a red cent to the hospital.
   c. The penalty barred me from budging an inch.

These cases, together with the dictionary definitions in (17) and (18), argue for our characterization of them as inherent negatives. Note also that the f-verbs in question share this property with prevent and dissuade.

The characterization of f-verbs like prohibit as deontics is also empirically supported. A first piece of evidence is concerned with the licensing of the present subjunctive construction. In chapter 4, we argued that the PDE present subjunctive construction must describe deontic situations. If f-verbs like prohibit count as deontics, it is naturally predicted that they take present subjunctive complements. This is in fact the case:

(21) God {prohibit/forbid} that any of us - because of the sometimes hard admonitions of the Bible, admonitions that are meant to lead us to life - be offended because of them and like the "disciples" in John chapter 6, withdraw from the Truth, and walk no longer in it. 

The fact that forbid and prohibit take present subjunctive complements in (21) strongly argues for our proposal that they are
not causatives but deontics.

As easily predicted, f-verbs that count as causatives do not take present subjunctive complements:

(22) *God {prevent/dissuade} that any of us - because of the sometimes hard admonitions of the Bible, admonitions that are meant to lead us to life - be offended because of them and like the “disciples” in John chapter 6, withdraw from the Truth, and walk no longer in it.

The approach I am advocating here gives an elegant account for this fact, too. As argued in 7.3.1, prevent and dissuade count as causatives, not deontics. Accordingly, they fail to fulfill the licensing condition for the PDE present subjunctive construction to start with.

The second argument has to do with the fact that the deontic verb order can be used performatively, while the causative verb cause cannot:

(23) a. I hereby order you to help me.

b. *I hereby cause you to help me.

If f-verbs like prohibit are deontics, it is predicted that they can also be used performatively, which is in fact the case:
(24) I hereby {prohibit/bar} you from gambling.

As easily predicted, causative f-verbs cannot be used performatively:

(25) I hereby {?prevent/*bar} you from gambling.

As has been shown, our characterization of prohibit, forbid, and bar as deontics lexicalizing negation receives enough empirical support.

7.3.3. More on the Difference between Causative and Deontic F-verbs

If the dichotomy of f-verbs in terms of the semantic structures [CAUSE [NOT ...]] and [ORDER [NOT ...]] is on the right track, it is predicted that the two types of f-verbs behave differently with respect to intentionality. For causative f-verbs do not focus on the intention of the subject, while deontic f-verbs directly focus on it (cf. Givón (1975)). It is therefore predicted that the former are compatible with adverbs which assert the absence of will on the part of the subject (e.g. accidentally, unintentionally), while the latter are incompatible with them. This prediction is borne out as the following examples show:

(26) a. The teacher {accidentally/unintentionally} prevented Harry from keeping his appointment.

b. *The teacher {accidentally/unintentionally}
{prohibited/barred} Harry from leaving.

In this connection, it is also predicted that causative f-verbs readily accept inanimate subjects, while deontic f-verbs do not. For inanimate objects lack will. This is in fact the case, too, as shown in the following: \(^9, 10\)

(27) a. A huge trailer truck prevented Tom from seeing what was happening across the road.

b. A huge trailer truck {*prohibited/?barred} Tom from seeing what was happening across the road.

According to our analysis, *prevent and *dissuade are both causatives, while prohibit and bar are both deontics. Therefore, it is predicted that both coordination of a sentence with prevent and that with dissuade and coordination of a sentence with prohibit and that with bar sounds redundant, which is in fact the case:

(28) a. *The teacher dissuaded Harry from moving, and then prevented him from doing so.

b. *The teacher prohibited Harry from moving, and then barred him from doing so.

Our analysis also predicts that it is possible to coordinate a sentence with prohibit and one with prevent, because the two verbs belong to
different semantic categories. This is also borne out:

(29) The teacher prohibited Harry from moving, and then physically prevented him from doing so.

These observations give us further justification for the dichotomy of f-verbs in terms of the semantic structures [CAUSE [NOT ...]] and [ORDER [NOT ...]]. From the discussion so far, it is probably safe to conclude that f-verbs are divided into two lexical semantic classes: those with the semantic structure [CAUSE [NOT ...]], i.e. causatives lexicalizing negation, and those with the semantic structure [ORDER [NOT ...]], i.e. deontics lexicalizing negation.

Taking this into consideration, it is possible to refine generalization (5) as follows:

(30) In order for a verb to take a from V-ing complement, it must have either of the semantic structures [CAUSE [NOT ...]] and [ORDER [NOT ...]].

Now I am in a position to answer the question raised at the outset of section 7.3: Do f-verbs constitute a semantic class? From the perspective of lexical semantics, my answer to this is an unambiguous no.

Before proceeding further, it should be pointed out that generalization (30) correctly predicts not only what verbs take from
V-ing complements but also what verbs do not. Take the verbs *allow* and *deny* for example. They do not count as f-verbs as shown below:

(31) a. *The teacher allowed the student from dancing.
    b. *Nancy denied Tom from being smart enough to get out of the trouble.

Let us first consider why *allow* does not take a *from V-ing* complement. According to generalization (30), all f-verbs are inherent negatives. With this in mind, observe the following:

    b. *The doctor allowed Nancy to donate a red cent to the hospital.
    c. *The teacher allowed the student to budge an inch.

The fact that *allow* does not allow such NPIs as *ever*, *a red cent* and *budge an inch* in its complement shows that it does not lexicalize negation; it does not qualify as an f-verb. Hence the ungrammaticality of (31a).

Let us turn to the reason why *deny* does not take a *from V-ing* complement. As the following example shows, *deny* allows NPIs in its complement and therefore counts as an inherent negative:

(33) Fred denied ever having had an affair with Edna.
In view of this fact, it might first appear that *deny* qualifies as an f-verb. What is of relevance here is, however, that *deny* counts as an epistemic verb in that to *deny* something is to state that it is not true, i.e., it expresses the subject’s opinion about the truth of a proposition (cf. Ota (1980)). Thus, to *deny* something has nothing to do with to cause or order that something not to occur; *deny* counts as neither a causative lexicalizing negation nor a deontic lexicalizing negation. Hence the ungrammaticality of (31b).

In this way, the dichotomy of f-verbs in terms of the semantic structures [CAUSE [NOT ...]] and [ORDER [NOT ...]] accommodates all the cases observed so far and hence generalization (30) seems to be descriptively adequate.

### 7.4. Two Cognitive Relations between Causative and Deontic F-verbs

In the preceding section, I argued that f-verbs are divided into two types and hence do not constitute a semantic class. The analysis, though it answers the question whether f-verbs constitute a semantic class, does not as yet provide any answer to the question why it is that f-verbs take *from V-ing* complements, complements of the same form. The next task is therefore to investigate what causes the two independent classes of verbs to take complements of the same form.
7.4.1. The Metaphorical Relation

In the cognitive literature, it is generally assumed that there holds a metaphorical relation between physical and psychosocial phenomena (cf. Talmy (1985, 1988), Sweetser (1990), and Kövesces (2002) among others). According to Kövesces (2002: 217), this is because our knowledge of the world contains the metaphor THE SOCIAL WORLD IS THE PHYSICAL WORLD, which conceptualizes the less physical in terms of the more physical.

With this in mind, let us return to the relation between the two classes of f-verbs. Causative f-verbs describe events in the physical world, while deontic f-verbs describe events in the psychosocial world. Thus, it is possible to assume that there also holds a metaphorical relation between them. Specifically, we propose that the two concepts [CAUSE [NOT ...]] and [ORDER [NOT ...]], which causative and deontic f-verbs respectively encode, are related via the metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION.

An argument in support of the claim that causative and deontic f-verbs are metaphorically related comes from Talmy’s (1985, 1988) observation about the verbs prevent and forbid. Based on the notion of force dynamics, “a mode of construing the world in terms of entities interacting with respect to force (Talmy (1988: 49)),” Talmy claims that the two verbs share the following force dynamic information: the subject, being a barrier, exerts a force against the object’s and the force of the former is stronger than that of the latter. What is especially of note here is that prevent belongs to causative
f-verbs and \textit{forbid} to deontic f-verbs. It therefore seems reasonable to apply Talmy’s analysis to the two classes of f-verbs as a whole and assume that they also share the above force dynamic information; they constitute a force dynamic class.\textsuperscript{12}

As Talmy (1985: 293) himself claims, “[the force dynamic system] incorporates schematic conceptual models of physical phenomena, which, by analogy, it extends to psychological and social phenomena.” Therefore, it is possible to take the sharing of the force dynamic information as a consequence of metaphorical extension: the force dynamic information of physical phenomena is metaphorically mapped onto psychosocial phenomena, which results in the similarity between the two classes of f-verbs in terms of force dynamics. This gives us justification for positing the metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION.

Recall here the fact pointed out in Section 7.3 that deontic f-verbs implicate that the event described in the \textit{from V-ing} complement does/did not happen:\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{equation}
\text{(34) The teacher \{prohibited/forbade\} the student from budging an inch, so when he moved anyway, he was sent out of the room. (= (16a))}
\end{equation}

The metaphorical linkage enables us to account for this fact: because of the metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION, prohibition is regarded as similar to (but not the same as) causation. Because of
this assimilation, deontic f-verbs (do not entail but) implicate that
the event described in the from V-ing complement does/did not
happen.

7.4.2. The Metonymic Relation

Where, then, does the metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION
come from? We argue that the metaphor has an experiential or
metonymic basis; namely, the two concepts [CAUSE [NOT ...]] and
[ORDER [NOT ...]] are related via the metonymy PROHIBITION FOR
PREVENTION. The adjacency of the two concepts is demonstrated
by several grammatical phenomena. First, (successful) prohibition
leads to prevention:

(35) The teacher prohibited Harry from moving, and then
physically prevented him from doing so. (= (29))

Second, when we prohibit something, we always intend to prevent
that something. The following sentence, which is in conflict with
this encyclopedic knowledge, does not make sense:

(36) *I {prohibited/barred/forbade} my son from going to
parties, but I didn’t mean to prevent him from doing so.

Third, prohibition can serve as a means for prevention:
The first, and most obvious, is the desire to prevent the unjust enrichment of criminals by prohibiting them from exploiting their crimes. (BNC)

Finally, for some speakers, prohibit can be used as prevent. In such cases, it is compatible even with inanimate subjects (cf. (27)).

(38) a. to forbid (something), esp. by law, or to prevent (a particular activity) by making it impossible
   b. The loudness of the music prohibits serious conversation in most nightclubs.
   (CIDE)

(39) a. to make sth impossible to do (Synonymous with PREVENT)
   b. The high cost of equipment prohibits many people from taking up this sport.
   (OALD)

These cases strongly argue for the adjacency between prevention and prohibition, i.e. the metonymy PROHIBITION FOR PREVENTION.

The metonymy PROHIBITION FOR PREVENTION also makes it possible to account for the fact that deontic f-verbs implicate that the event described in the from V-ing complement does/did not happen (cf. (34)). Because prohibition normally leads to prevention, the former metonymically implicates the nonoccurrence of the event.
described in the *from V-ing* complement.

We have argued that causative and deontic f-verbs are cognitively related via the metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION, which is motivated by the metonymy PROHIBITION FOR PREVENTION. Thus, the metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION is an instance of what Radden (2000) calls “metonymy-based metaphors” (see also Taylor (1995) and Barcelona (2000) among others). Now, I am in a position to answer the question why it is that both classes of f-verbs take *from V-ing* complements. Our semantic knowledge distinguishes f-verbs into two classes, which has a lot of grammatical ramifications as observed in section 7.3. But human cognition reconciles the difference between the two and causes them to take complements of the same form. Thus, in one sense, the two classes of f-verbs are different, but, in another sense, they are the same.\(^{14}\)

Our conclusion has two implications. One is theoretical. As far as *from V-ing* complementation is concerned, semantics does not correspond straightforwardly to cognition or vice versa in the sense that the two semantic classes of f-verbs constitute a single cognitive class; there is a mismatch between semantics and cognition.\(^{15}\)

The other implication is methodological. In order for any approach to *from V-ing* complementation to be successful and to accommodate all the grammatical facts pointed out above, the following three machineries must be available: (i) lexical decomposition, which owes its origin to generative grammar, nicely distinguishes the two classes of f-verbs and accounts for the various
grammatical facts observed in section 7.3; (ii) metaphor and (iii) metonymy, both of which take their origins from cognitive grammar, integrate the two differentiated classes and give an explanation for why both of the classes participate in from V-ing complementation. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the generative and cognitive constructs are not incompatible as oil and water. Rather, they have their own advantages and complement each other (cf. Nakau (1994) and Newmeyer (1998) among others). This is against the general assumption that generative grammar and cognitive grammar, and therefore the constructs of the two are mutually exclusive because “cognitive grammar is offered as an alternative to the generative tradition (Langacker (1987: 4f.))” (cf. also Lakoff (1987) and Yamanashi (2000)).

7.5. Summary

In this chapter, making a comparison of prevent and prohibit, we have demonstrated the unidirectionality of the FMFS. We have also argued through a detailed examination of the semantics of f-verbs that the reason why prevent and prohibit both take from V-ing complements is because they, though with different lexical semantics, constitute a cognitive class via the metonymy-based metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION.
Notes to Chapter 7

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1 The term “unsuccessful causation” might sound contradictory, but we use it for want of a better term.

2 As will be seen below, this difference is lexical semantic in nature. See also note 13.

3 In what follows we will restrict ourselves to the discussion of the five verbs listed and keep out of consideration other transitive verbs such as deter, disallow, discourage, inhibit, keep, refrain, restrain, and stop and intransitive verbs such as refrain.

4 Forbid usually takes a to-infinitive complement and whether it participates in from V-ing complementation or not seems to be subject to idiolectal or dialectal variation (cf. GENIUS3). However, I take it as a verb which takes a from V-ing complement in the light of the fact that there are speakers who readily accept examples like (5c).

5 Wierzbicka (1988) does not make use of the CAUSE function.
She (1988: 35) instead claims that a factor related to from V-ing complementation is “[t]he image of an intention being ‘removed from’ a person’s mind.” As is clear from her use of the verb remove, she also takes dissuade and prevent as causatives.

Some f-verbs (marginally) allow NPIs in object position while others do not:

(i)  
   a. ?The teacher prohibited anyone from interrupting his class.
   b. *John dissuaded anyone from seeing Harry.
   
   (b from Lakoff (1970: 96))

Since this fact is irrelevant to the main subject of this paper, I will not pay any further attention to it.

Wierzbicka (1988: 41) also points out that forbid does not have the entailment although she does not take it as an f-verb.

Note that the main clauses are also in the present subjunctive mood in (21) because of the deontic function of the construction, i.e. to offer a prayer to God for the occurrence of a certain event (cf. chapter 4).

Note that merely taking all f-verbs as causatives lexicalizing negation cannot accommodate these facts at all. For it overlooks the difference between the two classes of f-verbs in intentionality.

It might be objected that there are cases in which deontic f-verbs allow inanimate subjects:
(i)  a. The law prohibits people under 20 from drinking.
    b. Regulations bar attorneys from socializing with clients.

Note, however, that in the examples in (i) the subject NPs metonymically evoke the existence of some humans which deliberately framed the law or regulations. Thus, the subject NPs in (i) are not truly inanimate. I owe this observation to Eleanor Olds Batchelder (personal communication).

11 Talmy takes forbid not as an f-verb but as a verb which takes a to-infinitive complement.

12 The force dynamic information of f-verbs has a certain interpretive reflex. As pointed out by Chomsky (1972), Wierzbicka (1988), Horn (1989) and others, dissuade, for example, “presupposes some sort of intention on the part of the person dissuaded (Chomsky (1972: 143)).” As pointed out above, not only the subject but also the object of f-verbs have force. Therefore, it is possible to consider the intention of the object of dissuade to be a manifestation of the force of that object.

13 One might regard this implicature as a constructional effect of the form \([S \text{ NP}_1 \ V_1 \ \text{NP}_2 \ \text{from} \ V_2-\text{ing}]\) in the sense of Goldberg (1995). But the implicature obtains even when deontic f-verbs do not occur in the above syntactic frame. Observe:

(i) The teacher prohibited his attendance at the course, so when he was there anyway, he was sent out of the room.
(cf. *The teacher prevented his attendance at the course, so when he was there anyway, he was sent out of the room.)

Thus, the issue is lexical semantic, not constructional, in nature.

If my account is on the right track, the following generalization might obtain: the more cognitively related given verbs are, the more likely it is that they take complements of the same form. This, however, calls for further consideration.

I am grateful to Manabu Kusayama for his insightful comments, which have helped me clarify the point.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

Before finishing our journey to the realm of the periphery, let us retrace our steps so far. In chapter 2, we have been concerned with a simple but significant case in which the regular plural *mouses* is exceptionally used for the plural of *mouse* and argued that the functional range of *mouses*, which is formally marked, is narrower than that of *mice*, which is formally unmarked. Generalizing this observation, we have proposed the FMFS.

In chapter 3, we have investigated the syntax and semantics of the *if you be* construction and revealed that it is a partially fixed construction and counts as a speech act construction which conventionally conveys a request in exchange for a reward. The comparison of the *if you be* construction with the present subjunctive construction has made clear that the former is different from the latter and hence should be seen as an independent construction. We have further argued that the form and function of the *if you be* construction are systematically correlated in that most of the syntactic specifications are functionally motivated and that the formal markedness is in proportion to the functional specialization, which is in accordance with the FMFS and shows that it holds true.
beyond the syntactic level and further that it is a synchronically valid
generalization. Finally, we have shown that the *if you be*
construction involves a syntax/semantics mismatch in that the
protasis is semantically superordinate to the apodosis despite the
former’s syntactic subordination to the latter.

In chapter 4, we have dealt with the present subjunctive
construction. We have mainly discussed how the present
subjunctive construction is licensed in PDE and argued that the PDE
present subjunctive construction must describe deontic situations.
We have also made a comparison between the PDE and OE present
subjunctive constructions in terms of formal markedness and
functional specialization. The comparison has verified the
diachronic validity of the FMFS.

In chapter 5, we have explored the form and function of the
*nani-o X-o* construction in Japanese and revealed that it is a partially
fixed speech act construction which is conventionally and exclusively
used to accuse someone of doing something right in front of the
speaker’s very eyes. The comparison of the *nani-o X-o* construction
with the *naze* construction has made clear that the former is both
syntactically and semantically more restricted than the latter and
hence should be regarded as an independent construction. We have
further argued that the form and function of the *nani-o X-o*
construction are systematically related in (i) that the syntactic
specifications are functionally motivated, (ii) that the syntactic
deviance is mitigated by the semantic coherence, and (iii) that the

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formal markedness is in proportion to the functional specialization. The final point not only argues for the FMFS but also shows its crosslinguistic validity.

In chapter 6, we have compared the FMFS with the notion of the division of pragmatic labor. Based on the comparison, we have argued that the former is not reducible to the latter and hence should be regarded as an independent pragmatic principle.

In chapter 7, examining the semantics of *prevent* and *prohibit*, we have demonstrated that the reverse of the FMFS does not always hold; the functional specialization of a grammatical form does not necessarily presuppose the formal markedness of that form. We have also argued that the reason why *prevent* and *prohibit* both take *from V-ing* complements, complements of the same form, is because they, though with different lexical semantics, constitute a cognitive class via the metonymy-based metaphor PROHIBITION IS PREVENTION.

Each of the four peripheral phenomena observed in chapters 2-5 involves its own idiosyncrasy.¹ They might therefore appear completely unrelated at first sight. But, as we have argued, a deeper reflection reveals a simple and systematic property they have in common, i.e., the FMFS. Put otherwise, the FMFS enables us to handle the four seemingly unrelated irregularities as a natural class. Thus, the proposed perspective has the possibility of shedding light on a number of other peripheral phenomena apt to escape linguistic attention.
The synchronic, diachronic and crosslinguistic validity of the FMFS indicates that the generalization is a universal in the realm of the periphery. In this light, we can say that just because a given phenomenon is peripheral does not mean that it is unworthy of serious grammatical investigation; peripheral phenomena do have a lot to do with the nature of our linguistic knowledge.
Note to Chapter 8

The *if you be* construction and the present subjunctive construction (happen to) share the occurrence of the main verb in its bare stem form. This syntactic parallel might lead one to suspect the two constructions to be identical. But they should be viewed as independent of each other for the reasons discussed in chapter 3.
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