

**A Semantic and Pragmatic Analysis of *Will*:  
with Special Reference to the Characteristic Interpretation\***

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### 1. Introduction

The following simple present sentences convey the subject's characteristic each. The characteristics described include a habit, a tendency, characteristic behavior or characteristic properties, etc.

- (1) a. John smokes during busy time.
- b. My son catches a lot of colds at this time of year.
- c. He is blind to his own defects.
- (2) a. John is a smoker.
- b. He is blind.
- c. He knows French.

Krifka et al. (1995) call sentences like (1-2) "characterizing sentences." When the above characterizing sentences are accompanied by *will*, a difference of interpretation arises between (3-4).

- (3) a. John will smoke during busy time.
- b. My son will catch a lot of colds at this time of year.
- c. He will be blind to his own defects.
- (4) a. #John will be a smoker.<sup>1</sup>
- b. #He will be blind.
- c. #He will know French.

Each of (3a-c) has an effect of conveying a presently-held characteristic of the subject as its non-modal counterpart does, namely (1a-c). On the other hand, each of (4a-c) does not have such an effect; rather it has an effect of conveying a confident prediction of the speaker like "I am certain that the subject will acquire the characteristic." In other words, (3a-c) can be regarded as characterizing sentences as well as (1a-c); however, this does not apply to (4a-c). I call sentences with *will* such as (3) "modal characterizing sentences," while I call sentences such as (1) "non-modal characterizing sentences." The following dialogues make the difference between (3-4) more explicit.

- (5) A: Yesterday, I saw John smoking for the first time.
- B: He {smokes/will smoke} during busy time.
- (6) A: Yesterday, I saw John smoking for the first time.
- B: He {is/#will be} a smoker.

In (5), B, who knows that John has the characteristic described, can say (3a) instead of (1a) to inform John's characteristic. However, as shown in (6), B cannot say (4a)

instead of (2a) in the same context. In the same vein, (3b,c) can be also used in order to convey subject's presently-held characteristics, and (4b,c) cannot be used for such a purpose. I refer to the type of interpretation given to (3a-c) as "characteristic interpretation." On the other hand, I refer to the type of interpretation given to (4a-c) as "prediction interpretation" <sup>2,3</sup>

In this paper I have three main purposes. First, I will argue that sentences with *will* (henceforth, modal sentences) allowing a characteristic interpretation contain a certain type of stage-level predicate (cf. Carlson 1977); on the other hand, modal sentences allowing a prediction interpretation contain an individual-level predicate. Secondly, I will examine the following two problems which little attention has been paid to: how modal sentences like (3) convey a meaning similar to their non-modal counterparts; why modal sentences like (4) cannot convey such a meaning. To solve these problems, I will adopt the core meaning analysis by Klinge (1993). Thirdly, I will point out that there is a difference in the way of conveying characteristics between non-modal characterizing sentences like (1) and modal characterizing sentences like (3).

This paper is organized as follows: section 2 will be devoted to inquiring into semantic properties of the two types of modal sentences which are illustrated in (3) and (4). Section 3 will summarize Klinge's core meaning analysis of the interpretation of modal sentences. In section 4, I will solve the three problems: how modal sentences like (3) yield a characteristic interpretation; why modal sentences like (4) cannot yield a characteristic interpretation; and what makes non-modal and modal characterizing sentences different. Section 5 will make concluding remarks.

## 2. Semantic Properties of the Two Types of Modal Sentences

### 2.1. Declerck's (1991) Observation about the Use of Will for Characteristic Behavior

In this section, I will present Declerck's (1991) observation about the characteristic interpretation. Declerck observes that the use of *will/would* for "characteristic behavior" necessarily implies repetition, and therefore, the use is seldom found in sentences with *will* or *would* containing a stative verb. He offers the following examples as evidence.

- (7) a. #He would {like/know/need} the girl long before he proposed to her.  
 b. #He would live at the Savoy in those days.  
 c. He would live at the Savoy whenever he came back to England.<sup>4</sup>

(Declerck 1991:417)

The sentences in (7a,b) illustrate the incompatibility of stative predicates with the use of *would* for someone's characteristic behavior in the past. Since he only provides

sentences with *would* about this topic, I offer the following modal sentences as evidence of his observation about the use of *will*.

- (8) a. #He will be blind.  
 b. #He will know French.
- (9) a. #He will know what I want to know.  
 b. He will often know what I want to know.

The difference in acceptability between (9a,b) is parallel with that between (7b,c). The contrast in (7b,c) indicates that although (7c) contains a stative verb, it can be interpreted as expressing the subject's characteristic, because it expresses repetition of a situation in virtue of the *whenever*-clause. We can see from (9a,b) that the insertion of the adverb of quantification *often*, which expresses repetition (cf. Declerck 1991:174), makes the sentence in (9a) acceptable under the characteristic interpretation.

I agree with Declerck that modal sentences allowing a characteristic interpretation should imply repetition of a situation.<sup>5</sup> However, his treatment of modal sentences containing a stative predicate is coarse in the following two points. First, he only observes that stative verbs are hardly found with the use of *will* in question and says nothing about acceptable examples with a stative verb such as (7c) and (9b); second, he does not examine modal sentences with a stative predicate like the following:

- (10) He will have his own way.

This modal sentence does not contain any adverbials evoking repetition, but can yield a characteristic interpretation.

In what follows, I will examine various examples and offer a more precise description of the two types of modal sentences, that is, those which can yield a characteristic interpretation and those which cannot. For this purpose, I will employ the notions "stage-level predicate" (henceforth, s-level predicate) and "individual-level predicate" (i-level predicate). Before proceeding into the examination, let me briefly review these two types of predicates.

## 2.2. *S-Level Predicates and I-Level Predicates*

As discussed in Carlson(1977), s-level predicates express transient properties. The following examples exemplify s-level predicates.

- (11) a. John work in his office.  
 b. John is dancing.  
 c. John is drunk.  
 d. John is on the roof.

It is not assumed that John is always working, dancing, drunk or staying on the roof. In this sense these predicates describe transient properties of John. On the other

hand, i-level predicates express a permanent or tendentially stable property like those in the following examples.

- (12) a. John knows Latin.
- b. John is intelligent.
- c. John is a smoker.

Regarding the difference between the two types of predicate, Chierchia (1995:177) notes as follows:

normally, if one is intelligent or tall, one clearly tends to retain these properties. Of course, accidents capable of altering such tendentially permanent states can occur. But this does not affect their being tendentially stable. Per contrast, a single state of, say, drunkenness lasts relatively little. If it doesn't pass, you are not just drunk - you are an alcoholic.

Several facts have been observed in connection with the properties of i-level predicates.<sup>6</sup> One of them, which is observed by Chierchia (1995:181), is the fact that sentences containing both an i-level predicate and *always* sound strange, as in (13a), whereas sentences containing both an s-level predicate and *always* are natural, as in (13b).<sup>7</sup>

- (13) a. ??John always knows French.
- b. John always speaks French. (Chierchia 1995:181)

This fact, serves as a test for discriminating between the two types of predicate in the next section. Now that we have come to understand the two types of predicates, let us turn to our examples in the next section.

### 2.3. *The Type of Predicate of the Two Types of Modal Sentences*

I will begin by comparing the modal sentences which can yield a characteristic interpretation in (14) with those which do not allow such an interpretation in (15).

- (14) a. He will smoke during busy time.
- b. He will speak French at work.
- c. He will stay near his mother.
- d. He will have his own way.
- e. He will be blind to his own defects.<sup>8</sup>

- (15) a. #He will be a smoker.
- b. #He will know French.
- c. #He will be blind.

The sentences in (14a,b) apparently contain an s-level predicate since all non-stative verbs are inherently s-level predicates. As for the stative predicates in (14c-e), we can regard them as s-level predicates, but not i-level predicates. This idea is confirmed by the fact that they can occur with *always* as illustrated in the following.

- (16) a. He always stays near his mother.

- b. He always has his own way.
- c. He is always blind to his own defects.

Consequently, the examples in (14) all contain an s-level predicate. In contrast to them, the sentences in (15) contain an i-level predicate. It should be noted that the predicate *be blind* in (15c) cannot occur with *always* in contrast to the one *be blind to his own defects* in (14e). Generalizing these facts, I assume for a first approximation that modal sentences which can yield a characteristic interpretation contain an s-level predicate.<sup>10</sup>

This generalization is deficient, however: there is an example which contains an s-level predicate but marginally yields a characteristic interpretation. Consider the following:

- (17) ?He will be near his mother.

The predicate *be near his mother* is similar in meaning to the predicate *stay near his mother* in (14c); however, only (14c) is fully acceptable. If the above generalization were correct, the predicate would not be an s-level one. In fact, it can count as an s-level predicate, though it lacks an important property that all the s-level predicates in (14) possess: the predicate involves great difficulty in expressing repeated situations with difficulty. In what follows I will argue for this idea.

Quirk et al. (1985:529) say that *whenever*-clauses realize indefinite frequency. Therefore, *whenever*-clauses express repetition. The predicate *be near his mother* has difficulty in occurring with a *whenever*-clause like *whenever one is in front of strangers*. On the other hand the predicate *stay near his mother* can occur with it. This is supported by the following sentences.

- (18) a. ?He is near his mother (whenever he is) in front of strangers.  
 b. He stays near his mother (whenever he is) in front of strangers.

On this ground, I argue that the predicate *be near his mother* is the type of s-level predicate which is incompatible with repetition, whereas *stay near his mother* is the type of s-level predicate which can express repeated situations.

We should note that the predicate *be near his mother* is incompatible with *always* in sentences with a subject referring to an individual.

- (19) ?He is always near his mother.

In this respect I claim that the test in question is not a test for discriminating between i-level predicates and s-level predicates; rather it is the one for discriminating between predicates which are compatible with repetition and those which are incompatible with repetition. The s-level predicates in (14), which can occur with *always*, belong to the former type. On the other hand, the s-level predicate *be near his mother* and i-level predicates, which are incompatible with *always*, belong to the latter type. The reason why i-level predicates cannot express repetition is that, as I said above, they

express a property held by individuals at any time and we can hardly think that one repeatedly has such a property (ex. being blind.)

In the light of these facts, I claim that modal sentences allowing a characteristic interpretation like (14) have the following two properties: (a) they contain an s-level predicate which can express repeated situations (this predicate can be either stative or non-stative); (b) they as a whole express repeated situations. I will refer to such predicates as "habitual predicates" along the lines of Krifka et al. (1995:36). It should be noted that this term is the one directed to the sentence level, whereas the term "s-level predicate" is the one directed to the predicate level. As for modal sentences which do not allow a characteristic interpretation like (15), I claim that they contain an i-level predicate. Unlike "s-level predicate", the term "i-level predicate" is directed either to the predicate level or to the sentence level. In what follows I will use this term as the one directed to the sentence level.

#### 2.4. *The Difference between Habitual Predicates and I-Level Predicates*

Here I would like to discuss a difference between situations evoked from habitual predicates and those from i-level predicates. This difference offers the key to several problems to be solved in section 4. For discussing such a difference, I will employ the two predicates in (20a,b) as representatives of a habitual predicate and an i-level predicate.

- (20) a. He smokes during busy time.  
b. He is blind.

(It is not relevant to our discussion whether these sentences are accompanied by *will*, since I am not concerned with the speaker's mental attitude here.)

Leech (1987:9) observes that sentences like (20a) express a series of individual events which as a whole make up a state stretching back into the past and forward into the future. He explains that a "state" is lacking in defined limits, whereas an "event" has a beginning and an ending. It should be noted that stative predicates like *stay near his mother* also express an event and implicate beginning and ending points. This observation suggests that the habitual predicate in (20a) can evoke the following two ideas: one corresponds to a state like "John has a characteristic of smoking during busy time"; the other corresponds to repetition of an event in which he is busy and smoking. These repeated events cover from the past ones to the future ones. On the other hand, the i-level predicate in (20b) only evokes the idea which corresponds to a state like "John has a characteristic of being blind."

So far I have made a descriptive generalization about the semantic properties of the two types of modal sentences. In conclusion, the type of modal sentences like (3) contain a habitual predicate, which can evoke both a state and repeated events; on the other hand, the other type of modal sentences like (4) contain an i-level predicate,

which can evoke only a state. The next problem to be discussed is how these properties lead to the two types of interpretation, that is, the characteristic interpretation and the predication interpretation. The core meaning analysis by Klinge (1993) sheds light on this problem. In the next section I will review his idea.

### 3. Klinge's Core Meaning Analysis of Modal Sentences

In this section, I will summarize the analysis of interpretation of modal sentences made by Klinge (1993). He studies the five modal auxiliaries *can*, *may*, *must*, *shall* and *will*, and offers a unified analysis of the interpretation of sentences with one of the five modal auxiliaries. As for sentences with *will*, he discusses how the meanings "prediction", "order" and "volition", are yielded in those sentences. In what follows I give a summary of his idea. In doing so, I take some sentences with *will* to explain the process of their expressing the three meanings above. Only in this section we will use the term "modal sentences" to refer not only to sentences with *will* but to any sentence with a modal auxiliary.

It is often said that the interpretation of modal sentences varies according to the context. For example, Klinge takes the sentence in (21) to show this point: it is ambiguous between the reading that "it is obvious that you are very careless" and the reading that "you are obliged to be very careful."

(21) You must be very careless. (Klinge 1993:317)

He takes the view that each of the five modal auxiliaries has a single meaning (which he calls "core meaning") and modal sentences are partial input to various interpretations.<sup>10</sup> On the basis of this idea he examines the problem of how the addressee arrives at a specific interpretation of a modal sentence intended by a speaker in a given context.

Klinge considers that a modal sentence consists of two types of semantic information, that is, the meaning carried by a modal auxiliary *per se* and that of "propositional content". He postulates that each modal sentence has a schematic structure given in (22) (where "MODAL" stands for any modal auxiliary.)

(22) MODAL [ PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT ]

For example, the modal sentence in (23a) has the structure in (23b).

(23) a. John will be there.

b. WILL [ JOHN BE THERE ]

According to him, the addressee of a modal sentence entertains a situation in her mind on the basis of propositional content. He calls such mental representations "situation representations" (henceforth, SRs.) On the other hand, he refers to actual situations which correspond to SRs as "world situations" (henceforth, WSs). It is important to note that propositional contents often lack some information which is necessary for

the hearer to entertain a SR. For example, the propositional content in (23b) does not encode the time when the WS in question occurs. From the propositional content, the addressee can entertain either a SR corresponding to a future WS or a SR corresponding to a present WS. With this respect, Klinge claims that hearing such a sentence, the addressee can inferentially work out the WS the speaker intends, judging from the context.

Klinge argues that all the five modal auxiliaries share the meaning of potentiality to the effect that the SR is not verified to be the case. He proposes five core meanings, which all contain the notion "the SR turns out to be a true description of a WS."<sup>11</sup> The core meaning of *will* is given in (24):

- (24) The situation representation turns out to be a true description of a world situation. (Klinge 1993:345)

He also explains that any modal auxiliary signals a potential correspondence between the SR and a WS.

Klinge claims that this potential correspondence can be verified in either of the two ways: first, it turns out that the SR is a true description of a WS; second, it turns out that the SR is not a true description of a WS. Notice that as shown in (24), the core meaning of *will* only includes the former way, which concerns the case where the SR turns out to be true. On the other hand, the core meanings of *can*, *may* and *shall* include the latter way as well, which concerns the case where the SR is turned out not to be true, in other words, it turns out to be false.<sup>12</sup> In this way, *will* implicates a high potential of the truth or realization of the SR.

Klinge says that there is a fundamental difference in the addressee's assumption about the SR between the following two cases: the case where she takes a modal sentence to describe a past or present WS and the case where she takes it to describe a future WS. In the former case, she no longer expects that the SR corresponding to such a WS is verified in the way that the WS will be realized in this world. As to a SR like this, the addressee just understands that the SR is unverified in the sense that the speaker does not assert its truth because of his lack of information about the WS. However, it is still the case that the speaker can convey a strong belief by modal sentences. Let us consider the following examples.

- (25) a. They will have arrived two hours ago.

- b. There will only be one explanation. (Klinge 1993:344f)

The addressee of (25a,b) entertains a SR corresponding to a past time WS and a SR corresponding to a present time WS from their propositional contents **THEY ARRIVED TWO HOURS AGO** or **THERE ONLY BE ONE EXPLANATION**. Each of the addressees would automatically understand that the SR is unverified in the sense that the speaker strongly believes the truth of the SR. In other words, each of them



does not add to her knowledge the information that there has been or is a WS corresponding to the SR. In this way prediction interpretations arise from these sentences.

Let us turn to the latter case, that is, the case where the addressee takes a modal sentence to describe a future WS. Klinge says that in this case, she automatically takes the speaker to convey that the SR is unverified, because its corresponding WS is a future event. Furthermore, he claims that she expects that the SR will be verified in the following two ways; first, the course of the world determines the occurrence of a WS; second, someone intentionally produces the relevant activity. He claims that when the addressee entertains SRs about future WSs, she distinguishes inferentially between WSs which merely happen and those which only happen if an agent chooses to bring about them.<sup>13</sup> He calls the former future WSs "world-events" and the latter future WSs "agent-events". Let us consider the following sentences with *will*, for instance.

(26) a. Private Jones will report at 08.00 hrs. (Klinge 1993:346)

b. I will help you. (Klinge 1993:344)

Both of the addressees entertain a SR about a future WS from the propositional contents PRIVATE JONES REPORT AT 08.00 HRS and I HELP YOU. They would automatically take a SR to be unverified, or unrealized, but they understand that there is a high potential that the WS would occur and verify the truth of the SR, in virtue of the core meaning of *will*. In what follows, let us consider some differences in the process of interpretation between the two.

With respect to (26a), Klinge says that it has two possible interpretations and offers the following two contexts. One is the context in which a colonel utters it toward his man, namely Private Jones. Private Jones takes the WS to be an agent-event that is not motivated by himself, but by the colonel. This is because he had no such intention at the utterance time and the speaker is his superior. Under the circumstance he takes the utterance to convey an order in virtue of *will*, which signals the high potential of the realization of the SR. In this way, an order interpretation arises.

The other context is the one in which a colonel utters it toward his secretary at his office as in (27).

(27) Private Jones will report at 08.00 hrs. Please show him in when he arrives.  
(Klinge 1993:347)

The secretary takes the WS to be a world-event because Private Jones' reporting is beyond her control. By virtue of the *will* and pragmatic information, she understands that the speaker wants to inform her of the day's schedule. As a result, a prediction interpretation arises from this sentence.

As for (26b), which naturally yields a volition interpretation, Klinge says that the addressee takes the WS to be an agent-event, similarly to the case of the order interpretation; in this case, however, the agent-event is understood to be motivated by the agent himself.

In this section, I have summarized Klinge's core meaning analysis of interpretation of modal sentences, focusing on sentences with *will*. I shall sum up two important points in his claim. One point is that from any sentence with *will*, the addressee understands that the speaker does not know the truth or the realization of the SR, although she could understand that there is a high potential of the truth or the realization. The other point is that meanings, such as prediction, volition, and order, are not semantic meanings of *will*; rather they are derived by the addressee from both pragmatic and semantic information. This semantic information consists of propositional content and the core meaning of *will*.

#### 4. Analysis

##### 4.1. *The (In)Compatibility of Two Types of Predicate with the Characteristic Interpretation*

In this section I will solve the two problems: how modal sentences with a habitual predicate such as (28a) can yield a characteristic interpretation; why those with an i-level predicate such as (28b) cannot yield the interpretation.

- (28) a. John will smoke during busy time.  
 b. #John will be a smoker.

First, I would like to solve the second problem by explaining the derivation of a interpretation from (28b) on the basis of Klinge's idea. The propositional content JOHN BE A SMOKER includes an i-level predicate. From such an propositional content, the addressee entertains a state (WS) like John has a characteristic of being a smoker as a SR. Remember that an i-level predicate can evoke only a state, as I discussed in section 2.4. This restriction on the SR is the very reason of the inability of (28b) to yield a characteristic interpretation. That is to say, since the addressee takes any SR to be unverified, once she entertains such a state as a SR, she no longer understands that the speaker knows for a fact that John is a smoker.

The SR can be either a present state or a future one according to the context. When she entertains a SR corresponding to a present state, she understands that the speaker just highly believes that John is a smoker. On the other hand, when she entertains a SR corresponding to a future state, she understands that John does not have the characteristic yet, although there is a high potential that he will acquire it. In these ways, (28b) only allows prediction interpretations.<sup>14</sup>

Next, let us consider the derivation of a characteristic interpretation from (28a). The propositional content JOHN SMOKE DURING BUSY TIME includes a habitual

predicate. As I said above, when one hears a modal sentence, he always takes the SR as unverified and understands that the speaker does not know the truth or the realization of the SR. In this case, the addressee entertains a SR which corresponds to repeated events but not a state unlike the case of individual predicates. Remember that a habitual predicate can evoke repeated events besides a state. This is the very reason why the hearer can interpret a modal sentence as expressing subject's characteristics. She can assume that repeated events are highly potential on one hand and on the other hand, she can also assume that a state is factual, that is, the speaker knows for a fact that the subject has the characteristic described.<sup>15</sup>

The addressee takes the SR to be unverified because she assumes that anyone can hardly hold the conviction that John has factually smoked whenever he is busy, let alone the conviction concerning the future events. The *will* just signals that there is a high potential that those events have occurred or will occur. Under the circumstance, she understands that the speaker knows for a fact that John has a characteristic of smoking during busy time. This is the derivation of a characteristic interpretation from (28a). Since this idea is also conveyed by its non-modal counterpart, it can be paraphrased by the non-modal sentence.

#### 4.2. *The Difference between Modal Characterizing Sentences and Non-Modal Characterizing Sentences*

Here, I will point out a difference between non-modal characterizing sentences like (29a) and modal characterizing sentences like (29b).

(29) a. He smokes during busy time.

b. He will smoke during busy time.

In section 1, I said that one can employ both (29a,b) in order to convey the subject's present characteristic. In fact, this holds for the context in (5), where the two interlocutors are talking in the subject's (namely, John's) absence. However, in the context where they actually see John smoking, the speaker cannot utter (29a) for such a purpose. For example, let us suppose another context as follows: one goes to the house of John's wife. He does not know that John has a habit of smoking. He happens to see John smoking there. In the context, John's wife can say (29a) to him, but cannot say (29b). There is a difference like this in possibility of use between the two types of characterizing sentences.

I speculate that the two types of characterizing sentences are different in the way of conveying the subject's characteristic. Non-modal ones can evoke a state such that "John has a characteristic of smoking during busy time" and convey the subject's characteristic to the addressee directly. On the other hand, modal ones convey such a meaning indirectly. They first evoke us highly potential repeated events and then make us infer the meaning that the subject has some characteristic. When the two interlocutors actually see the relevant event happening, as in the context above, there is no room for the hearer to infer such a meaning; therefore,

(29b) cannot be used to convey the subject's characteristic in the context.

## 5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have dealt with the characteristic interpretation of modal sentences. Regarding the restriction on this interpretation, Declerck (1991) observes that this interpretation is seldom found with stative verbs. I have pointed out that several stative verbs which can express repeated situations are found in modal sentences yielding a characteristic interpretation. From my examples, I have made a descriptive generalization that modal sentences which can yield a characteristic interpretation contain a habitual predicate, while those which contain an i-level predicate cannot allow the interpretation. I have observed that a habitual predicate can evoke two ideas, that is, repeated situations and a state such that the subject has the characteristic described. Having accepted an essential part of Klinge's core meaning analysis, I have argued that the reason why the addressee can give a characteristic interpretation to modal sentences with a habitual predicate is that she can entertain the SR which corresponds to repeated events other than a state. On the other hand, the reason why she cannot give such an interpretation to modal sentences with an i-level predicate is that she can entertain nothing but a state as a SR. I have also claimed that non-modal characterizing sentences convey subject's characteristics more directly than modal characterizing sentences, which convey them through the addressee's inference.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> In this paper, by the double cross, I just mean that the sentence in question cannot yield a characteristic interpretation; therefore, I do not intend to exclude the possibility of another type of interpretation from the sentence.

<sup>2</sup> Declerck (1986) also applies the term "characteristic interpretation" to simple-present sentences. However, I will apply this term only to sentences with *will* here.

<sup>3</sup> Modal sentences which can yield a characteristic interpretation include those with a subject NP referring to a kind like the following:

- (i) a. Accidents will happen.
- b. Oil will float on water.

c. Babies will know their mothers.

In this paper I will limit the discussion to modal sentences with a subject NP referring to an individual. In Sugiyama (1997) I deal with both types of modal sentences and analyze the characteristic interpretation on the basis of the core meaning analysis by Klinge (1993).

<sup>4</sup> Regarding (7c), similar sentences below indicate that the verb *live* may be inappropriate for describing repeated situations.

- (i) He would {?live/stay} in that house whenever he came.
- (ii) He will {?live/stay} in that house whenever he comes.

<sup>5</sup> I will use the term "situation" to refer to what a sentence can express, which is either a state or dynamic situation.

<sup>6</sup> Chierchia (1995:177-181) lists five facts which have been observed by Carlson (1977), Kratzer (1995), etc. Two of the facts concern the restrictions on the occurrence of i-level predicates with temporal adverbials and locatives, which are shown in (i) and (ii), respectively.

- (i) a. John was drunk {yesterday/last month/a year ago}.
- b. ??John was tall {yesterday/last month/a year ago}. (Chierchia 1995:177)
- (ii) a. John works in his office.
- b. ??John knows Latin in his office. (Chierchia 1995:178)

<sup>7</sup> As Chierchia says, if we replace the subject referring to an individual in (13a) with an indefinite NP or a bare plural NP, the sentence becomes grammatical like the following.

- (i) a. A Moroccan always knows French.
- b. Moroccans always know French.

<sup>8</sup> The characteristic interpretation of (14e) is like the following: he does not notice his own defects, deliberately. The addressee necessarily finds the meaning "deliberately" in the modal sentence under the interpretation, while she does not always do so in the case of its non-modal counterpart. I will not discuss this point in this paper. We should only notice that (14c) can convey the subject's presently-held characteristic.

<sup>9</sup> In contrast to (14a,b), the parallel sentences without modifiers in (ia,b) are not fully acceptable as modal characterizing sentences, although they apparently contain the same s-level predicates as (14a,b).

- (i) a. ?He will smoke.
- b. ?He will speak French.

Regarding this fact, I just say in this paper that the degradation in acceptability in (ia,b) is attributable to the fact that their parallel non-modal characterizing sentences in (iia,b) can be approximately paraphrased as (iiia,b), which contain an i-level predicate.

- (ii) a. He smokes.

b. He speaks French.

(iii) a. He is a smoker. (cf. (15a))

b. He knows French. (cf. (15b))

10 This idea is based on the Relevance Theory (see Sperber and Wilson 1986 ).

11 Only the core meaning of *must* contains a slight different notion from the notion in question like the following:

(i) The situation representation turns out not to be a true description of a world situation. (Klinge 1993:351)

12 As space is limited, I will show only the core meanings of *may* out of the three modal auxiliaries.

(i) The situation representation turns out to be a true description of a world situation or the situation representation turns out not to be a true description of a world situation. (Klinge 1993:336)

13 To support this idea, Klinge gives the following quotation from Moya (1990:7): "one of the fundamental distinctions in our world-view is the one we draw between what we do and what happens to us, between actions and mere happenings."

14 In fact the interpretation concerning a present state is hardly accepted as a possible interpretation of (28b). This also holds for modal sentences with the i-level predicates *be blind* and *know French* in (4b,c). The reason of this difficulty is beyond my knowledge.

15 It is possible that modal sentences which can yield a characteristic interpretation yield other type of interpretation. For example, (i) can be interpreted as expressing either a prediction about a specific future event or a present habit of the subject.

(i) He will sit there watching the sea.

In the prediction interpretation the hearer does not take the predicate as a habitual one and entertains a SR corresponding to a future event rather than repeated events.

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