On Causative and Experiential *HAVE* constructions

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1. Introduction

As is well known, the verb *have* takes various types of clausal complements:

(1) a. I had my house collapse in the earthquake. \[\text{NP}_1 \text{ have} \text{ NP}_2 \text{ V} \]

b. John always has us all laughing. \[\text{NP}_1 \text{ have} \text{ NP}_2 \text{ V-ing} \]

c. They had their house painted. \[\text{NP}_1 \text{ have} \text{ NP}_2 \text{ V-en} \]

In this paper, I limit the discussion to the form \[\text{NP}_1 \text{ have} \text{ NP}_2 \text{ V-en} \], exemplified in (1c), where the verb of the complement clause is passivized and occurs in its past-participle form. I will call constructions of this type "*have* Constructions."

It is well known that *have* constructions receive two interpretations. One of them is exemplified by the following sentence:

(2) John had Mary's hair cut by a barber he trusts.

Example (2) denotes that the (main) subject, i.e. John, causes the event described by the complement clause, i.e. Mary's haircut: *have* constructions can denote causation. I will call this type of *have* construction the causative *have* construction.

The other interpretation is illustrated by the following example:

(3) John had his hair cut (too short) by a probationary barber.

In (3), the subject, i.e. John, is interpreted as an experiencer, not a causer. The sentence as a whole denotes that John is involved against his will in the event described by the complement clause and is affected physically or mentally. I will call this type of *have* construction the experiential *have* construction.

In examples (2) and (3), either of the two interpretations is preferred. There are, however, cases where the interpretation of the *have* construction is ambiguous between causation and experience, as has often been pointed out. This is observed when there holds a coreferential relation between the (main) subject and that of complement clause. It has also been pointed out that the ambiguity can be resolved only pragmatically.¹

¹ I am really indebted to the following teachers and colleagues for their helpful comments on my early versions of this paper: Minoru Nakau, Atsuro Tsubomoto, Yukio Hirose, Hiromitsu Akashi, Shoichi Yamada, Hiroaki Konno, Yuko Kobukata and Mina Kasai. I am also grateful to Kirk Hyde for suggesting stylistic improvements. Naturally, any errors are my own responsibility.

¹ In some examples, either of the two interpretations is often preferred:

(i) a. I had my hat blown off.

b. The pilot had his plane hijacked.

Both of the examples denote experience rather than causation. Here I simply point it out without...
(4) a. I had my hair cut.
   b. He had his shoes shined.
   c. The house had its roof ripped off by the gale.

Example (4a), for instance, can be paraphrased either as *I caused an event in which my hair was cut* or *I experienced an event in which my hair was cut*.

Here, an important question arises as to how to deal with the two different interpretations of the *have* construction:

(5) Why does the *have* construction have two interpretations, i.e. causation and experience?

The purpose of this study is to answer the question posed in (5) by examining the syntax and semantics of the *have* construction. Section 2 reviews some previous studies and points out their problems. Section 3 shows that the *have* construction should be classified into two types both from syntactic and semantic perspectives. Section 4 argues that the two types of *haves* constructions are closely related to, if not derived from, two types of *haves*; namely, the ambiguity of the construction is reduced to that of *have*.

2. Previous Studies

To answer the question posed in (5), the *have* in the *have* construction has been the subject of a great deal of discussion mainly within the generative paradigm. It is proposed that it expresses only an abstract relation between its subject and complement (cf. Bendix (1966), Bach (1967) and Cattell (1984) among others). This proposal seems to be based on the view that “it is impossible to account for all uses of *have* by assuming that its basic meaning is that of ‘possession’ (Costa (1974:22)).” In this section, we will review some previous studies which deal with the two interpretations of the *have* construction.


Ritter and Rosen focus only on the relation between the subject and complement of the verb *have* and claims that it is a functional and meaningless item. Furthermore, they (1997:295) argue that since the lexical representation of *have* has no independent semantic content, causative and experiential interpretation is each derived from the syntactic structure.

Washio (1997) shares a similar view with Ritter and Rosen (1997) in that the *have* in question has little meaning, though not meaningless; he (1997:57) claims that the *have* denotes only that there is an “affectedness” relation between the subject and

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further comment. For more detailed discussion of this topic, see Ohye (1983).
complement clause. More concretely, the verb break, for example, assigns agent and patient roles to its subject and complement, respectively, and in that case, the direction of affectedness relation is from the subject to the complement. By contrast, the have assigns no thematic role to either of its argument and hence the direction of the affectedness relation is underspecified. The abstract meaning of the have construction proposed by Washio can be schematized as follows:

(6) have construction : [subject (person)] — [complement (event)]

According to him, the have construction denotes causation when the direction of the affectedness relation is from the subject to the complement, and it denotes experience when the direction is from the complement to the subject. Importantly, the direction of the affectedness relation can be decided only pragmatically in the have construction.

As we have seen, it is quite common to assume that the have in the have construction has no semantic content and the two interpretations are derived syntactically or pragmatically. In the following subsection, we will point out a crucial problem of such an account.

2.2. Syntactic Problem

Let us consider the following examples:

(7) a. John didn’t have Mary’s watch repaired there.
    b. * John hadn’t Mary’s watch repaired there.

(8) a. Johni didn’t have hisi watch repaired because hei refused.
    b. Johni hadn’t hisi watch repaired because hei refused.

Sentences in (7) and (8) are instances of causative and experiential have constructions, respectively. As shown, do-support is required when the causative have construction is negated, while it is not when the experiential have construction is negated. The grammatical contrast between them is very important, because it cannot be predicted by the previous studies. They claim that the have in the have construction has no or little semantic content and the two interpretations are derived syntactically or pragmatically, which seems to imply that causative and experiential have constructions are derived from one abstract construction. Therefore, there should not be any syntactic differences between them.

3. Two Types of haves Constructions

The grammatical contrast between (7) and (8) suggests that causative and experiential interpretations are derived not from one abstract construction but from two distinct constructions; that is, each of the causative and experiential have constructions counts as an independent construction. We will give syntactic and semantic evidence to verify this view in this section.
3.1. Phonological Difference

Little attention has been paid to the accent patterns of have constructions, and it has not been recognized that there is a crucial difference between the forms of causative and experiential have constructions. Let us consider the following pair of examples:

(9) a. John had the wall painted because he didn’t like the color.
    b. John had the wall painted by someone while being out.

Example (9a) is an instance of the causative have construction and example (9b) that of the experiential have construction. In the latter, the by-phrase forces us to interpret the event described as caused against John’s will. At first sight, there seems to be no syntactic difference between them, for they share the same surface form [NP₁ have NP₂ V-en]. This is only apparent, however. Observe the following:

(10) a. John₁ HAD the wall painted because he₁ didn’t like the color.
    b. John had the wall PAINTED by someone while being out.

As indicated by the capitalized words, they differ in pitch accent assignment; the pitch accent falls on the main verb have in (10a), while it falls on the past participle painted in (10b). Importantly, the observed patterns of pitch accent assignment are normally kept.

This fact clearly suggests that causative and experiential have constructions are not the same syntactically, if we take accent patterns as part of the syntax of a construction.

3.2. Dynamic and Stative Situations

Causative and experiential have constructions, as we have seen, differ syntactically. Furthermore, there is a semantic difference between them in what kinds of situations they described. Let us examine the following pair of examples:

(11) a. John had Mary’s car checked.
    b. John₁ had his₁ car checked against his₁ will.

Example (11a) must be interpreted as causation because of the lack of a coreferential relation between the subject and object, while (11b) is interpreted as experience because of the coreferential relation and the prepositional phrase. They differ in compatibility with the progressive aspect:

(12) a. John is having Mary’s car checked.
    b. *John₁ is having his₁ car checked against his₁ will.

Only the causative have construction is compatible with the progressive aspect as in (12a), while the experiential have construction is not as in (12b). As is well known, a progressive form, which has a function of coercing a dynamic situation into a stative one, cannot be used when a sentence describes a stative situation because of
redundancy. Accordingly, the grammatical contrast in (12) reveals that (11a) describes a stative situation, while (11b) a dynamic one, which is not homogeneous or continuous (cf. Lyons (1977)). In this way, causative and experiential have constructions differ in their eventuality.

This is also supported by the following examples:

(13) a. The dentist had John’s bad tooth **pulled out** little by little.
    b. John had Mary’s house destroyed little by little.

(14) a. ??I had my bad tooth pulled out **little by little** against my will.
    b. ??I had my house destroyed little by little in the earthquake.

Since a coreferential relation is not involved, examples (13a, b) must be interpreted as causation. As these examples show, the causative have construction can occur with the adverbial phrase little by little, which modifies a process of an action, because it describes the process of an action, i.e. a dynamic situation, rather than the resulting state of an action. By contrast, the examples in (14) qualify as the experiential have construction, since there is a coreferential relation between the subject and object and the prepositional phrase against my will and in the earthquake trigger an experiential reading. We should notice that the experiential have construction cannot occur with little by little unlike the causative have construction. This fact proves clearly that the experiential have construction does not describe the process of an action; the event described by the experiential have construction focuses on the resulting state rather than the process. Experiential have constructions describe stative situations.

If our analysis in terms of dynamic and stative situations is on the right track, we can predict interpretations of the following examples:

(15) a. Sue had her sewing machine used and used and used.
    b. When we saw the poor guy he had his arm caught in the giant electric fan.

(Costa (1974:61,62))

Since, as I mentioned before, each example contains a coreferential relation, it should be possible to be interpreted as both causation and experience. Costa (1974), however, claims that the interpretations of these examples incline to either causation or experience. Example (15a) is interpreted as the causative have construction because the situation, in which the action of using the sewing machine is repeated, is dynamic. Example (15b) is interpreted as the experiential have construction because the subordinate clause eliminates the process from the course of the action that the poor guy’s arm gets caught in the electric fan and hence forces us to interpret the situation as the resulting state, i.e. the stative situation.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that causative *have* constructions describe dynamic situations, while experiential *have* constructions describe stative situations. In the next subsection, we focus on the complement clause of causative and experiential *have* constructions.

### 3.3. The Complement Clause and the Dynamic/stative Opposition

In the preceding subsection, we examined the eventuality of causative and experiential *have* constructions as a whole. Here, we will take a look at the internal structure of the *have* construction, i.e. its complement clause, and show that the complement of the causative *have* construction describes dynamic situations, while that of the experiential *have* construction stative ones.

The verb of the complement clause, as I said at the outset of this paper, is passivized and it is clear that the complement has something to do with the passive construction. According to Nakau (1994), the passive construction can be semantically classified into two types:

(16) a. My arm was so badly burned that I could hardly move it.

   b. My arm was (badly) burned as soon as I reached into the fire.

   (Nakau (1994:377))

Example (16a) uncontroversially describes a stative situation. Example (16b) describes a dynamic situation because the adverbial clause, which is introduced by *as soon as*, focuses not only on the resulting state but also the process of burning the arm. Nakau refers the former as *statal passive* and the latter as *processual passive*.

Nakau also gives the following examples:

(17) a. The metal is completely flattened.

   b. *The metal is completely hammered.

   (Nakau (1994:377))

The verb *flatten*, exemplified in (17a), focuses on the resulting state of an action and the verb *hammer*, exemplified in (17b), focuses on the process of an action. However, the adverb *completely*, which modifies a resulting state, forces us to interpret the situation as not dynamic (or processual) but stative; it is compatible only with the statal passive. This is the reason why the verbs such as *hammer* are not compatible with *completely*, as in (17b). As is clear from the semantic difference in the examples (16a, b) and the grammatical contrast in (17), there are two types of passives, i.e. the statal and processual passives.

With this in mind, let us return to the investigation of the complement clause of the *have* construction. Take examples with the verbs *flatten* and *hammer*:
(18) a. \( I \) had my metal flattened because \( I \) didn’t like the shape.
   b. \( I \) had my metal flattened against my will.

(19) a. \( I \) had my metal hammered because \( I \) didn’t like the shape.
   b. \( I \) had my metal hammered against my will.

The subordinate clauses urge us to interpret the (a) and (b) sentences as causation and experience, respectively. Since flatten focuses on the resulting state, the acceptability contrast in (18) reveals that the complement clause of the experiential have construction can describe the resulting state (18b), while that of the causative have construction cannot (18a). Since hammer focuses on the process of an action, the acceptability contrast in (19) means that the complement clause of the causative have construction can describe the process of an action, while that of the experiential have construction cannot. To sum up, the complement clause of the causative have construction counts as the processual passive, while that of the experiential have construction the statal passive.

3.4. Summary

We have seen two phonological and semantic differences between the causative and experiential have constructions: (i) the pitch accent falls on the main verb have in the causative have construction, while in the experiential have construction it falls on the past-participle in the complement clause, (ii) causative have constructions describe dynamic eventualities, while experiential have constructions stative ones. Both the causative have construction as a whole and its complement clause describe dynamic eventualities, while both the experiential have construction as a whole and its complement clause stative ones. Judging from these facts, we can say that each of the causative and experiential have constructions counts as an independent construction, which is summarized as follows (the elements in boldface are stressed):

(20) a. The causative have construction:
   
   \[ \text{NP}_1 \text{ HAVE } [\text{processual passive clause } \text{NP}_2 \text{ V-en}] \] / dynamic situation

b. The experiential have construction:

\[ \text{NP}_1 \text{ have } [\text{statal passive clause } \text{NP}_2 \text{ V-EN}] \] / stative situation

4. Dynamic Have and Stative Have

4.1. Two types of haves

In the preceding subsection, I proposed that the have construction is classified into two types, i.e. causative and experiential have constructions, each of which counts as an independent construction. The next task is to investigate where the division stems from and answer the question posed in (5). In this subsection, I will examine constructions of the form [NP_1 have NP_2]. Let us take some examples:
(21) a. He has a red car.
   b. I have no idea.
   c. We have a party tonight.
   d. I'll have a game of tennis.

These basic uses of *have*, as is well known, are classified into two types:

(22) a. *He is having a red car.
   b. *I am having no idea.
   c. We are having a party.
   d. I am having a think / a break / a sleep.²

Examples (21a, b) describe possession, which is a stative situation, and are not compatible with the progressive aspect, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (22a, b).³

As for examples (21c) and (21d), on the other hand, they are compatible with the progressive aspect since they describe an action, which is dynamic, not stative. There is good evidence for this view:

(23) a. What John has is a book / an idea.
   b. *What John has is a party / a meeting / a game of tennis.

(24) a. *What John does is have a book / an idea.
   b. What John does is have a party / a meeting / a game of tennis.

Verb phrases such as *have a book* and *have an idea* describe possession, i.e. stative situation. Hence the grammaticality of (23a) and the ungrammaticality of (24a). By contrast, verb phrases such as *have a party*, *have a meeting* and *have a game of tennis* denote action, not possession, i.e. dynamic situation. Hence the ungrammaticality of (23b) and the grammaticality of (24b). Accordingly, the verb *have* can be classified into two types: one is stative, which describes stative situations like possession, and the other is dynamic, which describes dynamic situations like an action.

According to Kaga (1985), the dynamic and stative *have* are syntactically different. The former functions as a main verb, while the latter as an auxiliary verb, as schematized in the following:

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² For detailed discussion of the *have a V* construction, see Wierzbicka (1988:273-255) and Amagawa (1998).
³ We conceptualize abstract objects such as *idea* as physical objects through metaphors like "IDEAS ARE OBJECT (Lakoff and Johnson (1980:10))", as shown by the following examples:
   (i) a. I gave you that idea.
      b. That's idea just won't sell.
      c. We've use up all our ideas.

Similarly, event nominals such as *party* can be regarded as physical objects by the metaphor "EVENTS ARE OBJECTS (Kövecses (2002))."
(25) a. dynamic have : \( [\text{NP}_1 [\text{VP have NP}_2]] \)

b. stative have : \( [\text{NP}_1 [\text{AUX have}] \text{NP}_2] \)

The difference in syntactic category is grammatically reflected in negation and interrogative, as the following examples show:

(26) a. I didn’t have \{a book / an idea\}.

b. I hadn’t \{a book / an idea\}.

(27) a. We didn’t have \{a party / a meeting / a game of tennis\}.

b. * We hadn’t \{a party / a meeting / a game of tennis\}.

(28) a. Do you have \{a book / an idea\}?

b. Have you \{a book / an idea\}.

(29) a. Do you have \{a party / a meeting / a game of tennis\}.

b. * Have you \{a party / a meeting / a game of tennis\}.

While the negation and interrogative involving the dynamic have always require do-support, as in (27) and (29), those involving the stative have do not, as in (26) and (28).  

Our discussion is summarized into the following diagram:

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  dynamic have  (main verb)
     have
  stative have  (auxiliary)
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As indicated, the dynamic and stative havens differ both semantically and syntactically.

4.2. The Have in Have Constructions

The question to ask here is which type of have, i.e. the stative or dynamic have, is used in causative and experiential have constructions. As has been pointed out, the dynamic have is compatible with the progressive aspect, but the stative have is not. We repeat here the relevant examples as (31):

(31) a. * I am having \{a book / an idea\}.  

b. I am having \{a party / a meeting / a game of tennis\}.  

Recall also that the causative and experiential have constructions differ with respect to their compatibility with the progressive aspect, as seen in (12), repeated here as (32):

(32) a. * John\textsubscript{i} is having his\textsubscript{i} car checked against his\textsubscript{i} will.

b. John is having Mary’s car checked.  

As is clear from the parallelisms between (31a) and (32a) on the one hand, and

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4 A comment is necessary with regard to the stative have. The fact that it does not require do-support is observed especially in British English. Kaga (1985) explains that the choice whether do-support is required or not is subject to dialectal variation, in the dialect requiring do-support, the have functions not as an auxiliary but as a main verb.
between (31b) and (32b) on the other, the experiential *have* construction contains the stative *have*, while the causative *have* construction the dynamic *have*.

Our claim that causative and experiential *have* constructions differ in the type of *have* receives another empirical support. According to Kimball (1973), only the stative *have* can be replaced with *have got*.\(^5\) Observe the following:

(33) a. John has {a book / an idea}.  
     b. John's got {a book / an idea}.

(34) a. John has {a party / a meeting / a game of tennis}.  
     b. *John's got {a party / a meeting / a game of tennis}.

The stative *have*, as Kimball points out, can be replaced with *have got*, as in (33), while the dynamic *have* cannot, as in (34). Interestingly, there is also a difference between the causative and experiential *have* constructions with respect to the possibility of the replacement, as the following contrast illustrates:

(35) a. Mary always has her hair shortened against her; will.  
     b. Mary always has got her hair shortened against her; will.

(36) a. Mary always has John's shoes made by artists.  
     b. *Mary always has got John's shoes made by artists.

The *have* of the experiential *have* construction can be replaced with *have got* as in (35b), whereas that of the causative *have* construction cannot as in (36b). This fact shows that causative and experiential *have* constructions differ in the type of *have*: the experiential *have* construction contains the stative *have*, while the causative *have* construction the dynamic *have*. This is diagrammed as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{dynamic } & \quad \text{causative } \quad \text{stative } \quad \text{experiential } \\
\text{have} & \quad \text{have} & \quad \text{have}
\end{align*}
\]

We saw in subsection 4.1 that the dynamic and stative *haves* are syntactically different in that the former requires *do*-support, while the latter does not. Let us observe interrogatives with the stative and dynamic *haves*. We repeat the relevant examples as (38) and (39):

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\(^5\) There are many constraints on the replacement of the stative *have* with *have got*. For them, see Jespersen (1931), Visser (1973) and Toda (1993) among others.
(38) a. Do you have {a book / an idea}?
   b. Have you {a book / an idea}?

(39) a. Do you have {a party / a meeting / a game of tennis}?
   b. * Have you {a party / a meeting / a game of tennis}?

The dynamic *have* always requires *do*-support, as in (39), but the stative *have* does not, as in (38). It is therefore predicted that causative and experiential *have* constructions also behave differently with respect to *do*-support, which is in fact the case as shown in the following:

(40) a. Did you have your watch repaired against your will?
   b. ? Had you have your watch repaired against your will?

(41) a. Did you have Mary's watch repaired there?
   b. * Had you Mary's watch repaired there?

As shown, the causative *have* construction, exemplified in (41), always requires *do*-support, while the experiential *have* construction, exemplified in (40), does not.

The same holds true for negation:

(42) a. I didn't have {a book / an idea}.
   b. I hadn't {a book / an idea}.

(43) a. We didn't have {a party / a meeting / a game of tennis}.
   b. * We hadn't {a party / a meeting / a game of tennis}.

(44) a. John didn't have his watch repaired because he refused.
   b. John hadn't his watch repaired because he refused.

(45) a. John didn't have Mary's watch repaired there.
   b. * John hadn't Mary's watch repaired there.

The dynamic *have* and the causative *have* construction always requires the *do*-support as in (43) and (45), while the stative *have* and the experiential *have* construction does not, as in (42) and (44). These syntactic parallels strongly support our claim that the experiential *have* construction contains the stative *have*, while the causative *have* construction contains the dynamic *have*, as summarized in (37).
4.3. Summary

In this section, we have empirically shown (i) that the verb *have* can be classified into two types, i.e. the stative and dynamic *haves* and (ii) that there are a lot of parallelism between the two types of *haves* and *have* constructions. Taking these facts into consideration, we can safely conclude that the experiential *have* construction contains the stative *have*, while the causative *have* construction the dynamic *have*.

Now, I am in a position to answer the question posed in (5): why does the *have* construction have two interpretations? This is, we argue, because the *have* construction has two interpretations because the (main) verb *have* is classified into two types. More accurately, *have* constructions are classified into two types, i.e. causative and experiential *have* constructions, because the *have* involved in each construction is different, i.e., the causative *have* construction involves the dynamic *have*, while the experiential *have* construction the stative *have*. The most important point is the division between causative and experiential *have* constructions. The division means that the *have* construction is not the form which has an abstract meaning, from which two meanings are derived.

5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have shown through a detailed examination of the syntax and semantics of *have* constructions that they are classified into two types, i.e. causative and experiential *have* constructions and that each of causative and experiential *have* constructions counts as an independent construction. Furthermore, I have also shown the parallelism between the causative *have* construction and the dynamic *have* and between the experiential *have* construction and the stative *have* and argued that the ambiguity of the *have* construction is reduced to the existence of two types of *haves*.

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