Some Notes on Subjectivization in Japanese and Preposition Stranding in NPs in English: With Special Reference to Takami's Notions of Characterization and Identification

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1. Introduction

As is well known, Japanese has constructions where one predicate (seemingly) takes two nominative NPs, as typically illustrated by (1).\(^1\)

(1) a. Zoo-ga hana-ga nagai.  
elephant-NOM trunk-NOM long  
'The elephant has a long trunk.'

b. Taroo-ga Hanako-ga sukida.  
Taro-NOM Hanako-NOM like  
'Taro likes Hanako.'

Although (1a) patterns with (1b) in case marking, (2a) and (2b) reveal that there is a striking difference between them: the sentence-initial NP in (1a) can also be marked with the genitive case, but the one in (1b) can only be compatible with the nominative case.

(2) a. Zoo-{ga/no} hana-ga nagai.  
elephant-{NOM/GEN} trunk-NOM long  
'The elephant has a long trunk.'

b. Taroo-{ga/+ni/+de} Hanako-ga sukida.  
Taro-{NOM/GEN/DAT/LOC} Hanako-NOM like  
'Taro likes Hanako.'

In Yamada (1999, 2000, 2001a, 2001b), I have differentiated (1a) from (1b) for the reason above, and have called the former a pseudo double nominative construction and the latter a *bona fide* double nominative construction (see also Noda (1996), Shibatani and Cotton (1976-77) and Sugimoto (1986)). In this paper, I am concerned only with pseudo double nominative constructions.

It has often been assumed in the literature that the sentence-initial nominative

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\(^1\) This paper is a modified version of a portion of Yamada (2001a). I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the following people, who helped me at various stages of this paper in various ways: Minoru Nakau, Yukio Hirose, Shoichi Yamada, Seong-Sik Chae, Kazunori Kan and Taichi Hirota. All remaining errors and inadequacies are of course my own.

\(^1\) It is well known that in examples like (1a) and (1b) the sentence-initial nominative NP represents exhaustive listing (X and only X), not neutral description (see Kuno (1973a, 1973b) among others). Thus it is more appropriate to use cleft sentences in the glosses corresponding to (1a) and (1b), but I do not use them for simplicity's sake. Similarly with the other examples I present in this paper.

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NPs in question are derived from the genitive or other NPs through application of "subjectivization" (see Kuno (1973a, 1973b) among many others). Takami and Kamio (1996) investigate what factors are relevant to its applicability from a functional point of view, proposing two conditions, namely, Characterization Condition for Subjectivization (hereafter CCS) and Identifiability Condition for Subjectivization (hereafter ICS). I believe that their analysis is correct in its essentials, and have made use of those two conditions to account for the differences as to the extractability of the second nominative NP among pseudo double nominative constructions (see Yamada (2000, 2001b) with respect to this issue). This does not mean, however, that I entirely agree to Takami and Kamio's analysis. In Yamada (2000, 2001a, 2001b), I argue that CCS and ICS cannot be treated as independently motivated conditions, as they claim, claiming that ICS should be taken as a subcondition or one of controlling factors for satisfying CCS. In this connection, I will discuss where such a status of ICS comes from and why ICS is compatible only with "conceptual identification" in sense of Takami and Kamio (1996). I will also argue that the type of identification that they call "practical identification" can contribute to successful characterization under certain circumstances.

I will also discuss what kind of conceptual identification ICS requires. I agree with Takami and Kamio that ICS plays an important role in determining the acceptability of pseudo double nominative constructions. However, this functional condition needs to be slightly modified under the assumption that it functions as a subcondition for CCS. In this paper, I will deal with some of the examples whose unacceptability seemingly cannot be accounted for in terms of Yamada's (2000, 2001b) analysis, claiming that ICS is satisfied under a certain restriction.

Moreover, I will touch upon the phenomenon of preposition stranding in NPs observed in English. To cite a few examples:

(3) a. Which journal, did you read [NP a review [PP of ti]]?
   b. * Which desk, did you read [NP a review [PP on ti]]?

(4) a. Which car, do you like [NP the gears [PP in ti]]?
   b. * Which car, do you like [NP the girl [PP in ti]]?

((3a)-(4b) taken from Takami and Kamio (1996:228))

Takami and Kamio (1996), along with Takami (1992), argue that the notion of (conceptual) identification plays a crucial role in determining the extractability of wh-phrases from such NPs as observed in (3) and (4), proposing Identifiability Condition for Preposition Stranding in NPs (henceforth ICPS). There are, however, some examples that seemingly cannot be explained in terms of this condition. In this paper, it will be argued that a strict restriction is imposed on ICPS as well.
2. ICS as One of Controlling Factors for Satisfying CCS

As previously mentioned, Takami and Kamio (1996) propose the following functional conditions for subjectivization.

(5) a. Characterization Condition for Subjectivization (CCS)
Subjectivization is acceptable if and only if the subjectivized subject is characterized by the rest of the utterance.

(Takami and Kamio (1996:224))

b. Identifiability Condition for Subjectivization (ICS)
An utterance of the structure \([X-ga\ Y-ga]\) is acceptable if and only if the Y can be identified by the X.

(Takami and Kamio 1996:230)

Along the same line of argument as Takami and Kamio (1996), let us first examine how these two conditions in (5) work. Consider the following examples:

(6) a. Zoo-\{ga/no\} hana-ga nagai. (=\(2a\))
elephant-\{NOM/GEN\} trunk-NOM long

'The elephant has a long trunk.'

b. Ano seki-\{*ga/no\} kodomo-ga totemo kasikoi.
that seat-\{NOM/GEN\} child-NOM very wise

'The child taking that seat is very wise.'

In (6a), the fact of the elephant's having a long trunk can be taken as offering an intrinsic property of the animal, and therefore it can be said that the subjectivized NP is characterized by the rest of the utterance. Furthermore, the elephant serves as identifying a long trunk. Hence the acceptability of (6a) results, in keeping with CCS and ICS.² On the other hand, utterance (6b) satisfies neither CCS nor ICS. The fact of the child's being very wise hardly qualifies as a characterization (or an intrinsic property) of that seat. The child also cannot be identified by the place where he happens to be at a given time. Hence the unacceptability of (6b).³

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² This expression would be quite misleading. When I say that an utterance with the sentence-initial NP marked with both the nominative and other cases is acceptable (or unacceptaable), it refers to the utterance with the NP marked with the nominative case.

³ There is a vast amount of literature on (pseudo) double/multiple nominative constructions, in which similar proposals have often been put forward (see Amano (1990), Saito (1982), Shibatani and Cotton (1976-1977), Sugimoto (1990, 1995) among others). Roughly speaking, what they have in common is the idea that the rest of the sentence must express a general characteristic attributable to the "subjectivized" NP. Clearly, this idea overlaps with Takami and Kamio's idea that the subjectivized NP must be characterized by the rest of the utterance. It has also been argued in the literature that a certain semantic relation, such as an (inalienably) possessive relation, between the "subjectivized" NP and the second nominative NP often plays an important role in determining whether or not the rest of the sentence expresses an attribute of the "subjectivized" NP (see Amano (1990), Shibatani and Cotton (1976-77), Muromatsu (1997) among others). This observation also overlaps with Takami and
We have briefly seen how the difference in acceptability observed in (6a) and (6b) can be explained in terms of CCS and ICS. Two caveats are needed here. First, Takami (1995) roughly classifies characterization into three types when he uses this notion to account for acceptability differences observed in pseudo passives in English. Of the three types, the type of characterization that I am concerned with here corresponds to what he calls "permanent characterization". It requires that an inherent property or attribute of the referent of the subject NP be expressed by the rest of the utterance (see Takami (1995: 59)). From the discussion above it is clear that the difference in acceptability status observed in (6a) and (6b) depends on whether or not they satisfy CCS in this sense.

Second, one might argue against the claim that ICS is not satisfied in (6b) by pointing out that we can sometimes identify someone by pointing to the seat that he is taking, as shown in (7).

(7) A: Dono kodomo-ga kasikoi-desu ka?
    which child-NOM wise-is Q
    'Which child is wise?'

B: Ano seki-no Kodomo-ga kasikoi-desu.
    that seat-GEN child-NOM wise-is
    'The child taking that seat is wise.'

This remark is correct in a sense. Notice, however, that identification of the kind illustrated here differs greatly from identification of the kind observed in (6a). According to Takami and Kamio, identification of the former type can succeed solely in a restricted situation. Thus, we can identify a child by pointing to the seat he is taking only if we are in a situation where the child and the seat are clearly visible to us. On the other hand, identification of the latter type succeeds quite generally. In (6a), for example, it works successfully even if there is no elephant just in front of us. Based on an argument like this, Takami and Kamio differentiate between those two

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Kamio's observation that the second nominative NP must be identified by the subjectivized NP. Takami and Kamio's analysis is highly similar to the above-mentioned analyses in these two respects. Yet this does not mean that there are no differences between them. One of the basic differences is that Takami and Kamio treat CCS and ICS as independently motivated conditions, while the other analyses (implicitly) take the counterpart of ICS as being subsumed under the counterpart of CCS. To the best of my knowledge, the question of whether CCS and ICS (or their counterparts) should be treated as independently motivated conditions, or alternatively, whether the latter should be subsumed under the former, has never examined. In the discussion below, I will afford evidence against Takami and Kamio's treatment of CCS and ICS.

In Takami (1995), the other two types of characterization are called "habitual characterization" and "temporary characterization". I point out in Yamada (2001a) that both of them are observed with pseudo double nominative constructions as well (see Yamada (2001a) for details). In this paper, I deal mainly with permanent characterization.
types of identification, and provisionally term the former “practical identification” and the latter “conceptual identification”. Related to their Identifiability Condition is only conceptual identification. I will return to this issue later.

With these in mind, let us turn to Yamada’s (2000, 2001a, 2001b) claim that ICS should be taken as one of controlling factors for satisfying CCS. Before dealing with this issue, it is necessary to discuss examples like the following:

(8) a. Taroo-{ga/ni} kodomo-ga {iru/aru}.
    Taro-{NOM/DAT} child-NOM {is/is}
    ‘Taro has a child.’

  b. Sono kooen-{ga/ni} hunsui-ga aru.
    the park-{NOM/LOC} fountain-NOM is
    ‘The park has a fountain in it.’

Takami and Kamio (1996) deal exclusively with multiple nominative constructions in which the subjectivized NPs can alternate with the genitive NPs. It should be noticed here, however, that CCS and ICS have a wider range of application. In (8a), the subjectivized NP is derived from the dative NP. In this case, it is fully characterized by the rest of the utterance because the fact of (Taro’s) having a child can be construed as offering an intrinsic property of Taro. Moreover, a child can be conceptually identified by Taro through a kinship relation that Taro bears to a child. Hence the acceptability of (8a) results, satisfying CCS and ICS. The same applies to (8b), in which the subjectivized NP is derived from the locative NP. In this case, too, the subjectivized NP is fully characterized by the rest of the utterance because the statement that the park has a fountain in it can be understood as offering an intrinsic property of the park. Furthermore, a fountain can be conceptually identified by the park through a part-whole relation that the park has to a fountain. Hence the acceptability of (8b) yields, observing CCS and ICS. The discussion here clearly shows that CCS and ICS play crucial roles in determining whether the dative or locative NP can be subjectivized or not.

One problem arises here. Takami and Kamio argue that CCS and ICS are independently motivated conditions, claiming that acceptability differences observed in subjectivization result from the interaction of the two conditions. Thus, full acceptability results if CCS and ICS are both satisfied, marginality results if either of them is violated, and unacceptability results if neither of them is satisfied. At first sight, their analysis might seem to be fascinating, because it can deal with a continuum of acceptability observed in subjectivization (see Takami and Kamio (1996:231-232)). However, consider the following examples:
(9) a. Taro-{ga/ni} eigo-ga wakaru.
   Taro-{NOM/DAT} English-NOM know
   'Taro knows English.'

b. Hanako-{ga/ni} kono kanzi-ga yomeru.
   Hanako-{NOM/DAT} this Chinese character-NOM can read
   'Hanako can read this Chinese character.'

Since knowing English and having the ability to read that Chinese character can be easily interpreted as being intrinsic properties of the referents of the subjectivized NPs, (9a) and (9b) are in conformity with CCS. Notice, however, that they fall foul of ICS. English and a Chinese character cannot be identified by Taro and Hanako, respectively, because Taro and Hanako do not serve to specify what language English is and what the Chinese character is. Accordingly, it is wrongly predicted that the utterances in (9) are judged marginal. We would fail to explain the full acceptability observed in these examples if we accepted Takami and Kamio's claim.

From this consideration, I concluded in Yamada (2000, 2001a, 2001b) that CCS and ICS should not be treated as independently motivated conditions, as Takami and Kamio claim, but ICS functions as a subcondition or one of controlling factors for satisfying CCS. This means that the applicability of subjectivization is conditioned not by CCS and ICS but only by CCS. It also opens the possibility that even if ICS is violated, CCS can be satisfied if it observes some other subcondition.⁵

Direct evidence in favor of the claim that ICS functions as one of controlling factors for satisfying CCS comes from the following pair of examples:

(10) a. Sono kooen{-ga/ni} hunsui-ga aru. (=8b)
   the park{-NOM/LOC} fountain-NOM is
   'The park has a fountain in it.'

b. Sono kooen{-*ga/ni} Taro-no zitensya-ga aru.
   the park{-NOM/LOC} Taro-GEN bicycle-NOM is
   'Taro's bicycle is in the park.'

As we have seen earlier, the utterance in (8b), repeated here as (10a), is perfectly acceptable, satisfying both CCS and ICS. One point to be noticed here is that if Taro-no zitensha is used as a substitute for hunsui, the acceptability of this utterance is severely diminished, as shown in (10b). In this case, the utterance describes a situation in which Taro's bicycle happens to be in the park at the time of utterance. Since this description can not be interpreted as offering an intrinsic property of the

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⁵ In Yamada (2000, 2001a, 2001b), I argue that utterances like (9a) and (9b) are in conformity with another subcondition rather than ICS, and therefore they are perfectly acceptable, in obedience to CCS. See Yamada (2000, 2001a, 2001b) with respect to a subcondition relevant to examples like
park, it is appropriate to say that the subjectivized NP is not characterized by the rest of the utterance. Furthermore, just as in (6b) the seat identifies the place where a child happens to be at a given time, so in (10b) the park identifies the place where Taro's bicycle happens to be at a given time. As mentioned above, this type of identification is classed with practical identification, and therefore it cannot be said that Taro's bicycle is conceptually identified by the park. Thus (10b) is unacceptable, in violation of CCS and ICS.

Of much importance is that (10a) makes a minimal contrast to (10b): the former is only different from the latter in the referent of the second nominative NP. It follows from this that in these cases, whether the subjectivized NP is characterized by the rest of the utterance or not depends upon the referent of the second nominative NP. This is tantamount to saying that whether CCS is satisfied or not depends on whether ICS is satisfied or not, because the difference between the two nominative NPs under discussion can be ascribed to the difference as to whether or not they are conceptually identified by the subjectivized NPs. This consideration leads to the inevitable conclusion that ICS should be subsumed under CCS.6

Why is it then that ICS fulfills a role as one of crucial factors for satisfying CCS? One possible answer to this would be like the following. Characterization Condition requires that the rest of the utterance as a whole qualify as some characterization of the NP under discussion. To satisfy this requirement, the rest of the utterance as a whole must be interpreted at least as expressing something relevant to it. Importantly, the fact that the second nominative NP is conceptually identified by the subjectivized NP implies that the former is closely associated with the latter through a semantic relation such as a part-whole relation and a kinship relation. Therefore, the rest of the utterance including the second nominative NP is also interpreted as being closely related to the subjectivized NP. This would give rise to a situation in which ICS functions as one of crucial factors for satisfying CCS.

At this point, it would be necessary to add that the predicate must express a more or less permanent state in order that characterization of the type that is dealt with

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6 In passing, I would like to touch on Amano's (1990) classification of double nominative constructions. She divides them into two types. One type of double nominative construction requires a certain semantic relation (or more accurately a possessive relation) between the "subjectivized" NP and the nominative NP (immediately) following it. The other type of double nominative construction requires a kind of semantic relation between the "subjectivized" NP and the predicate (see Amano (1990: 30) for details). Of particular relevance here is that she views utterances like (8a) and (8b) as instances of the latter type. This view might be right in a sense, but the discussion here reveals that a certain semantic relation is required between the two nominative NPs in cases like these as well.
here goes well. Saito (1982) states to the effect that whether or not the rest of the sentence expresses a property of an entity referred to by the subjectivized NP depends (partly) on whether the main predicate is stative or not. This is evidenced by the following contrast:

   John-NOM son-NOM excellent-is
   'John's son is excellent.'

b.*John-ga musuko-ga odorooita.
   John-NOM son-NOM was surprised
   'John's son was surprised.'  ((11b) cited from Saito (1982:9))

Although this restriction on the main predicate is not observed with all the (pseudo) multiple nominative constructions, his remark is correct in a sense.\(^7\) Characterization of the type that I am concerned with here requires that an intrinsic property or attribute of the referent of the subjectivized NP be expressed by the rest of the utterance. To satisfy this, the rest of the utterance as a whole must be construed as expressing a more or less permanent state. Thus the predicates that denote temporary states or transitory activities are incompatible with this type of characterization.\(^8\) The subjectivized NP in utterance (11b), like the one in (11a), is in conformity with ICS, but the rest of the utterance cannot be interpreted as expressing a permanent state due to the predicate

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\(^7\) For example, consider utterances like the following:

(i) Tooyoo-\(\{\sim\}^\*\) ga/de) satuzin ziken-ga okoru.
   Tokyo-\{NOM/LOC\} murder case-NOM happen
   'A murder will happen in Tokyo.'

(ii) Tooyoo-\{ga/\} satuzin ziken-ga yoku okoru.
    Tokyo-\{NOM/LOC\} murder case-NOM often happen
    'Murders often happen in Tokyo.'

(iii) Tooyoo-\{ga/\} satuzin ziken-ga okotta.
    Tokyo-\{NOM/LOC\} murder case-NOM happened
    'A murder happened in Tokyo.'

It has been observed in the literature that the presence of frequency adverbials such as yoku 'often' often plays a crucial role in determining the applicability of "subjectivization", as shown by the contrast between (i) and (ii) (see Amano (1990), Sugimoto (1995), Yamada (2000, 2001a, 2001b) among others). What is relevant for us here is that though in (ii), the rest of the utterance as a whole is interpreted as expressing a kind of state (due to the use of the frequent adverb yoku), the predicate okoru 'happen' in itself is not a member of stative verbs. This is verified by (i). This utterance would not express an event that will happen in the future if the predicate okoru were a stative verb. Furthermore, Yukio Hirose (p.c.) points out to me that as (iii) shows, (i) becomes acceptable if the preterit is used instead of the present. It would be clear that in this case, the predicate okoru cannot be interpreted as expressing a state. The facts observed here reveal that the predicates used in pseudo double nominative constructions are not necessarily statives. See also Yamada (2001a), in which I discuss why examples like (ii) and (iii) are judged acceptable.

\(^8\) Put another way, characterization of the type under consideration is compatible with individual-level predicates, but not with stage-level predicates. See Diesing (1992) for the distinction between individual-level and stage-level predicates.
used therein. Hence the unacceptability of this utterance.

Along this line of argument, we can also give a principled explanation for the fact that only conceptual identification can contribute to successful characterization (without any contexts). In the case of practical identification, the subjectivized NP enters into a temporary relation to the second nominative NP. For example, as mentioned earlier, (10b) describes a situation where Taro’s bicycle happens to be in the park at the time of utterance. In this case, the relation that holds between the two nominative NPs can be justly regarded as a temporary relation, because his bicycle might be in another place a few hours later. It is evident that such a relation is not compatible with the type of characterization which requires that the rest of the utterance express a more or less permanent state.

In the case of conceptual identification, on the other hand, the subjectivized NP in general bears a more or less permanent relation to the second nominative NP. Let us consider (9a) and (9b) for illustration. In (9a), Taro conceptually identifies a child through a kinship relation that exists between them. There is no room for doubt that this relation is permanent. In (9b), a fountain is conceptually identified by the park through a part-whole relation. This relation would be reasonably taken as almost a permanent relation. Clearly, the fact that a more or less permanent relation holds between the subjectivized NP and the second nominative NP is compatible with characterization of the type under discussion.

From the descriptive point of view, Takami and Kamio’s idea that only conceptual identification is relevant to ICS is correct, but this is a mere descriptive generalization as long as CCS and ICS are treated independently. However, if ICS is subsumed under CCS, we can provide a motivation for the generalization. That is, this descriptive generalization results from the fact that characterization of the type under discussion is compatible with conceptual identification, but not with practical identification.

3. Further Consideration of Conceptual Identification

I have argued in the previous section that ICS should be taken as one of controlling factors for satisfying CCS. In this section, I argue that this functional condition is satisfied under a certain restriction. I also argue that the same restriction is imposed on preposition stranding in NPs in English.

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9 The fountain in question might be able to be moved from within the park, but it would be reasonable to think that the fountain is in general understood to always remain in the place. Similarly for the relation between a car and its engine, which Muromatsu (1997) calls an integral relationship. In this case, too, the engine might be transferred from a car to another, but it is most likely that the relation between the two entities is usually understood as almost a permanent one.
Let us begin with the following examples.10

(12) a. 250cc-{*ga/no} ootobai-ga yoku urete-iru. 
   250cc-{NOM/GEN} motorcycle-NOM well sell
   ‘250cc motorcycles sell well.’

b. Honda-{ga/no} ootobai-ga yoku urete-iru. 
   Honda-{NOM/GEN} motorcycles-NOM well sell
   ‘The motorcycles that Honda produces sell well.’

According to Takami and Kamio, the subjectivized NP in (12a) conceptually identifies the second nominative NP, but it is not characterized by the rest of the utterance. This would be the case, because 250cc serves to specify what type of motorcycle the motorcycles are, and the statement that the motorcycles sell well cannot be interpreted as offering a property of 250cc. One question raised by this example is how we can give a coherent explanation for the fact that the subjectivized NP in (12a) is in conformity with ICS but nonetheless it is in violation of CCS. One might wonder whether in this case, too, the predicate used therein gives rise to the violation of CCS. However, the case is not as simple as that, because the use of this predicate does not render utterance (12b) unacceptable.

The key to resolving the question is provided by the contrast between (12a) and (12b). In (12b), Honda serves as specifying what the motorcycles are like. This indicates that (12b) is similar to (12a) in that the second nominative NP is conceptually identified by the subjectivized NP. In spite of this similarity between them, the subjectivized NP in (12b) undergoes successful characterization, as opposed to the one in (12a). In this case, the statement that the motorcycles (which Honda produces) sell well can be readily taken as offering an intrinsic property of the company. Therefore, the subjectivized NP in (12b), unlike the one in (12a), satisfies both CCS and ICS. Of much importance is that (12a) makes a minimal contrast to (12b). From this, we can arrive at the conclusion that the difference between (12a) and (12b) as to whether CCS is satisfied or not hinges on the difference in the referent of the subjectivized NP between them.

In what respect, then, is the subjectivized NP in (12a) different from the one in (12b)? With a little reflection we can see that the discrepancy between them lies in the relation that the subjectivized NP bears to the second nominative NP. In (12a), the subjectivized NP expresses an attribute that belongs to the referent of the second nominative NP. In (12b), on the other hand, the second nominative NP refers to products, which are interpreted as belonging to the maker (i.e. Honda) designated by

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10 The example in (12a) is slightly adapted from Takami and Kamio (1996: 231) for the sake of brevity.
the subjectivized NP. Therefore, an inverse relation holds between (12a) and (12b) as to whether the subjectivized NP is construed as belonging to the second nominative NP or whether the second nominative NP is construed as belonging to the subjectivized NP.

The same point can be made with the following minimal pair:11

(13) a. Dansei-{*ga/no} gaadoman-ga yuusyyu-da.
   male-{NOM/GEN} guard-NOM excellent-is
   'The male guards are excellent.'

   b. Ano keibigaisya-{ga/no} gaadoman-ga yuusyyu-da.
      that security company-{NOM/GEN} guard-NOM excellent-is
      'The guards who work for that security company are excellent.'

Takami and Kamio (1996:232) state that the guards are conceptually identified by men. This would be the case because the property of being male serves as specifying what the guards are like. Similarly, the guards can be conceptually identified by the company for which they work, because it serves to specify who the guards are and what they are like. Therefore, (13a) is similar to (13b) in that the subjectivized NP satisfies ICS. Under the null hypothesis, this similarity suggests that both (13a) and (13b) satisfy CCS. Nonetheless (13a) violates CCS, as opposed to (13b). In (13b), the statement that the guards are excellent can be interpreted as offering an intrinsic property of the security company, whereas in (13a) the statement that the guards (who are male) are excellent cannot be taken as offering an attribute of the property of being male. Where does this difference come from? It is now evident that it is due to the difference as to the relation that the subjectivized NP bears to the second nominative NP. In (13a), the subjectivized NP denotes a property of being male, which belongs to the guards designated by the second nominative NP. In (13b), on the other hand, the subjectivized NP denotes a security company, and the guards that the second nominative NP denotes is interpreted as belonging to it. Therefore, an inverse relationship holds between (13a) and (13b) with respect to a relation between the subjectivized NP and the second nominative NP.

We are now ready to answer the question why the subjectivized NPs in (12a) and (13a) do not satisfy CCS despite of the fact that they are in conformity with ICS in the sense of Takami and Kamio (1996). Within their framework, ICS is satisfied if only the second nominative NP is conceptually identified by the subjectivized NP. In addition to this requirement, however, a strict restriction is imposed on ICS: the subjectivized NP must not be interpreted as belonging to the second nominative NP. On this, (12a) and (13a) in fact violate ICS as well as CCS. Considered in this light,

11 The example in (13a) is adapted from Takami and Kamio (1996: 232) for the sake of brevity.
the facts observed in (12a) and (13a) are compatible with the claim that ICS should be subsumed under CCS. That is, the subjectivized NPs in (12a) and (13a) are in fact in violation of ICS, and as corollary to this, they violate CCS.\textsuperscript{12}

The question to be examined here is why such a strict restriction is imposed on ICS. Closely connected with this problem would be perhaps the fact that ICS is one of the controlling factors for satisfying CCS. I argued in section 2 that the rest of the utterance must be interpreted at least as offering something relevant to the subjectivized NP, and that ICS plays an important role in relating the rest of the utterance to the subjectivized NP. Notice, however, that even if the second nominative NP is conceptually identified by the subjectivized NP, it cannot contribute to successful characterization at all when the latter is interpreted as belonging to the former. Consider utterance (13a) as a very clear example. Although CCS requires that the rest of the utterance express an attribute of the subjectivized NP, the subjectivized NP in (13a) expresses an attribute of the second nominative NP included in the rest of the utterance. Clearly, a contradiction arises here. A contradiction like this would give rise to a situation in which the above-mentioned strict restriction is imposed on ICS.

Interestingly enough, the same phenomena as observed in subjectivization can be seen in preposition stranding in NPs in English.\textsuperscript{13} Takami and Kamio (1996) argue that the notion of conceptual identification plays a crucial role in determining the extractability of \textit{wh}-phrases from NPs, proposing Identifiability Condition for Preposition Stranding in NPs (ICPS) (see also Takami (1992)).

\begin{equation}
\text{(14) Identifiability Condition for Preposition Stranding in NPs}
\end{equation}

\text{Extraction of X from the structure [NP [PP P X]] is possible if and only if the head NP can be identified by the PP.}

\text{(Takami and Kamio (1996:66))}

To illustrate how this condition works, let us consider the following examples:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(15) a.] Which journal\textsubscript{1} did you read [\textit{NP a review [\textit{pp of t\textsubscript{1}}]}]? \textit{ (=3a)}
\item[(15) b.] *Which desk\textsubscript{1} did you read [\textit{NP a review [\textit{pp on t\textsubscript{1}}]}]? \textit{ (=3b)}
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{12} In my judgement, the sentence-initial NP in (13a) can be subjectivized in the context where men are compared with women. This would be because the fact that the guards are excellent can be interpreted as offering a property that only the men have under such a contrastive reading.

In this connection, I would like to point out that on this reading the second nominative NP is interpreted as belonging to the subjectivized NP; that is, the guards are interpreted as parts of men (or people that have a property of being male). In my judgement, subjectivization is possible with (13a) only when the relation between the two NPs is interpreted as such. In this case, ICS is satisfied in my sense.

\textsuperscript{13} There is a vast amount of literature on this topic. See Deane (1991), Kuno (1987), Takami (1992), Takami and Kamio (1996) and references cited therein.
(16) a. Which car, do you like [NP the gears [PP in t₁]]?  (=4a)
b. *Which car, do you like [NP the girl [PP in t₁]]?  (=4b)

According to Takami and Kamio, we know as a matter of common knowledge that book reviews appear in a certain journals, and therefore it is perfectly possible to identify a review by the journal that it appears in. In contrast, a review that happens to be placed on a certain desk cannot be identified by the desk because there is no inherent connection between them. They further proceed to argue that gears are normally identified by the car that has them, whereas it would be extremely difficult to identify a girl by the car she happens to be in. From this discussion, it can be justly said that in (15a) and (16a), the head NPs a review and the gears are conceptually identified by the PPs (or more accurately, the objects the prepositions take). Hence they are acceptable, in obedience to ICPS. On the other hand, although the head NPs are practically identified by the PPs from which the wh-phrases are extracted, it cannot be said that they are conceptually identified by them. Thus (15b) and (16b) are unacceptable, in violation of ICPS.

The distinction between the two types of identification goes a long way toward explaining acceptability differences such as observed in (15a)-(16b). This is not the whole story, however. Consider the following contrast:

(17) a. Who, have you forgotten [NP the name [PP of t₁]]?
b. *Which names, do you know [NP people [PP with t₁]]?  (Deane (1991:15))

Generally, we can identify the name of a person by referring to the person. It is also generally the case that we can identify a person by reference to his name. This means that the head NPs in (17a) and (17b) are identified by the PPs from which the wh-phrases are extracted. In addition, identification of the kind illustrated here can be readily taken as conceptual identification, since the relation between a person and his name is an inherent/permanent relation, not a temporary one. The same applies equally to the following examples:

(18) a. Which books, did you enjoy [NP the varied contents [PP of t₁]]?

We can identify a book by reference to its contents. It is also entirely possible to identify the contents of a book by reference to the book (in particular its title). Given this, it can be safely said that in (18a) and (18b) the head NPs are identified by the PPs. In these cases, too, the observed identification can be readily seen as conceptual identification because an inherent relation holds between a book (books) and its contents (their contents). These considerations reveal that the utterances in (17a)-(18b) are all in conformity with ICPS. Therefore, this functional condition as it
stands would fail to account for the acceptability difference between (17a) and (17b) on the one hand, and (18a) and (18b) on the other.

The facts observed here show that a strict restriction is imposed on ICPS as well as ICS: the referent of the head NP must not be interpreted as belonging to the referent of the object that the preposition takes. The name (of a person) and the content (of a book) are in general interpreted as belonging to the person and the book, respectively, which gives rise to the unacceptability of (17b) and (18b).\(^{14}\)

I have argued so far that both ICS and ICPS are satisfied under a strict restriction. It should be emphasized at this juncture that it does not matter whether or not the referent of the subjectivized NP belongs to the referent of the second nominative NP in the actual world. Consider the following examples:

(19) a. Ano gakkoo-{ga/no} seito-ga kasikoi.
   that school-{NOM/GEN} pupil-NOM wise
   'The pupils of that school are wise.'

b. Taro-{ga/no} gakkoo-ga tooi.
   Taro-{NOM/GEN} school-NOM a long way
   'The school to which Taro goes is a long way from his house.'

We can identify students by referring to the school where they go. We can also identify the school where a student goes by reference to the student. In either case of identification, the student belongs to a school in the sense that he is a member of it. This fact is compatible with (19a), in which the subjectivized NP and the second nominative NP designate a school and its pupils, respectively. On the other hand, we cannot explain the full acceptability status of (19b) if it is important that the referent of the subjectivized NP does not belong to the referent of the second nominative NP in the actual world. It is clear that Taro, who is designated by the subjectivized NP, is a pupil of the school denoted by the second nominative NP. This leads to the

\(^{14}\) I argued above that a strict restriction on ICS results from the fact that this condition functions as one of key factors for satisfying CCS. Why is it then that the same kind of restriction is imposed on ICPS? Although further consideration is needed with respect to this issue, the reason would be that the object of the preposition bears a kind of topic-comment relation to the head NP. Kuno (1987) observes that "only those constituents in a sentence that qualify as a topic of the sentence can undergo extraction". He also states to the effect that extraction of X from [NP [P X]] is possible only when the head NP expresses an attribute of X, suggesting that in this case, X enters into a kind of topic-comment relation to the head NP. It seems difficult to say unhesitatingly that the head NP always expresses an attribute of X. As Takami (1992) points out, for example, it would not be immediately clear whether or not the head NP in (i) expresses an attribute of the object that the preposition of takes.

(i) 'What/Whom did you see [NP a picture [Pr of tj]]'?
However, if it is the case that X bears a kind of topic-comment relation to the head NP, we would be able to provide a motivation for the fact that a restriction is imposed on ICPS. That is, X cannot bear a topic-comment relation to the head NP if X is interpreted as belonging to the head NP, which would give rise to a situation in which ICPS is satisfied under a certain restriction.
conclusion that it is not at all relevant whether or not the referent of the subjectivized NP belongs to the referent of the second nominative NP in the actual world. In (19b), Taro is certainly a pupil of a school, but the sequence Taroo-{ga/no} gakkoo does not mean explicitly that Taro belongs to the school where he goes. Taro serves only as conceptually identifying the school where he goes.

The same would apply to the preposition stranding in NPs.

(20) a. What did John buy [NP a book [PP on (about) t1]]?  
(Takami and Kamio (1996:227))

b. *What kind of contents, do you like [NP a book [PP with t1]]?  
(=(18b)

Takami and Kamio (1996:227) argue that (20a) is acceptable because it is commonly the case in our society that a book is primarily identified by its content. However, no such explanation is possible for utterance (20b). In this case, too, the head NP denotes a book and the object of the preposition refers to its contents. Nevertheless, utterance (20b) is unacceptable, as opposed to (20a). Takami and Kamio’s analysis would fail to account for the difference in acceptability between them.

One possible answer to this problem is that in (20a), unlike (20b), the referent of the object that the preposition on takes is not interpreted as belonging to the referent of the head NP. It might be correct in a certain sense to think, as Takami and Kamio do, that in phrases like a book on linguistics, the object of the preposition on expresses the content of a book. However, it can also be construed as expressing the genre the book belongs to. In bookstores or libraries, for example, books are classified into books on mathematics, books on linguistics and so forth. In this case, mathematics, linguistics and the like can be readily interpreted as expressing the genres the books belong to. This suggests that in phrases like a book on linguistics, the object of the preposition can be interpreted as expressing the genre a book belongs to. Therefore, the wh-phrase in (20a) can be extracted from the NP a book on (about).

One might wonder why utterance (20b) does not allow for such an interpretation. For one thing, the use of the preposition with would rule out the interpretation. According to Deane (1991), the preposition with in (20b) has a so-called possessive meaning, and its object denotes one of attributes of the kind traditionally labeled possessions. This means that the preposition with forces the interpretation in which the referent of its object belongs to the referent of the head NP a book. The forced interpretation prevents the wh-phrase from being extracted from the NP a book with.15 This argument is reinforced by the following examples, all of which show that the use of the preposition with with a possessive meaning does not allow the wh-phrase to be

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15 For another thing, it is clearly shown by the form what kind of contents that the wh-phrase in (20b) expresses the contents (of a book), which might forbid its interpretation as genre.
In this section, I have argued that the subjectivized NP and the object of the preposition must not be interpreted as belonging to the second nominative NP and the head NP, respectively. One point to notice about this is that it does not necessarily mean that the latter must be interpreted as belonging to the former. In (19b), for example, Taro serves only as conceptually identifying the school where he goes, and the school cannot be interpreted as belonging to Taro. Moreover, there are some examples in which it is not immediately clear whether the referent of the head NP is interpreted as belonging to the referent of the object that the preposition takes. For example:

(22) Which horse do you like [NP the jockey [PP on t₁]]?  (Takami (1992:67))

A jockey is defined as someone who rides a horse in a race, and therefore it could be justly said that a jockey is closely associated with a horse. Yet it seems difficult, if not impossible, to say that the jockey is interpreted as belonging to a horse. Thus, all that can safely be stated at present is that the subjectivized NP and the object of the preposition must not be interpreted as belonging to the second nominative NP and the head NP, respectively.

4. **Practical Identification**

We have seen in section 2 that ICS is not satisfied even if the second nominative NP is "practically" identified by the subjectivized NP. Recall that this is due to the incompatibility of practical identification with the type of characterization which requires that the rest of the utterance express an inherent property or attribute of the referent of the subjectivized NP. This does not mean, however, that practical identification is incompatible with another type of characterization as well. In what follows, I would like to touch upon this point.

It is generally said that subjectivization is possible with possessive sentences, but not with existential sentences, as illustrated by (8a) and (10b) (see Harada (1976), Muromatsu (1997), Yamada (1998) among others). This is to some extent true. In most cases, existential sentences do not allow the locative NPs to be subjectivized. It
should be pointed out, however, that this process is possible with existential sentences under contrastive readings. This is illustrated by the following example:

(23) Migigawa-no hondana-{ga/ni} Chomsky-no hon-ga aru.
    the-right-GEN bookshelf-{NOM/LOC} Chomsky-GEN book-NOM be
    ‘There is a book by Chomsky on the bookshelf on the right.’

The fact that there is a book by Chomsky on the bookshelf on the right does not express an intrinsic property of the bookshelf. Notice, however, that this fact is only observed with the bookshelf on the right under a contrastive reading in which the bookshelf on the right is compared with the bookshelf on the left. In such a case, the rest of the utterance can be interpreted as expressing a kind of characteristic which the bookshelf on the right has which the bookshelf on the left does not have. The subjectivized NP in (23) is characterized by the rest of the utterance in this sense, and therefore the acceptability yields.\(^{16}\)

What is important here is that in (23) the second nominative NP is practically, not conceptually, identified by the subjectivized NP because of a temporal relation that holds between the two NPs. This reveals that practical identification is compatible with characterization of the kind illustrated here. This compatibility comes from the fact that the rest of the utterance expresses a temporary state. It would be clear that even if the subjectivized NP has a temporal relation to the second nominative NP, such a relation is compatible with characterization of the type which allows the rest of the utterance to express a temporary state. Furthermore, I have argued in section 2 that the rest of the utterance must be interpreted at least as expressing something relevant to the subjectivized NP in order to satisfy CCS. Notice that in (23) a temporal relation that exists between the subjectivized NP and the second nominative NP serves as relating the rest of the utterance to the subjectivized NP. In this sense, practical identification functions as one of factors that contribute to successful characterization.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have dealt with some of Japanese pseudo double nominative constructions in which the sentence-initial nominative NPs are allegedly derived from the genitive or other NPs through the application of subjectivization. Takami and Kamio (1996) propose two functional conditions, CCS and ICS, for this process. I agree with them that these two conditions play important roles in determining the applicability of subjectivization. However, I do not entirely agree to their analysis. I argued in section 2 that CCS and ICS are not independently motivated conditions, as

they claim, but ICS should be taken as one of controlling factors for satisfying CCS. I also claimed that this treatment of CCS and ICS enables us to give a principled explanation for the fact that only conceptual identification is relevant to ICS. Moreover, I showed in section 3 that ICS is satisfied under a strict restriction, and argued that this restriction comes from the fact that ICS functions as one of crucial factors for satisfying CCS. In section 3, I also observed that the same kind of restriction is imposed on the preposition stranding in NPs in English. Finally, I argued in section 4 that practical identification can contribute to successful characterization under contrastive readings.

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